1. 1
FROM THE WAR ON TERROR TO THE WAR AGAINST DAESH
‘REPRODUCTION’ AND ‘TRANSFORMATION’
IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSES
Master Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree Masters of Laws (LL.M)
2015/2016 in Law and Politics of International Security
María Sofía Cossar Lambertini
Student number: 2573784
Advisor: Dr. Tanja E. Aalberts
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2nd August 2016
Amsterdam, Netherlands
23. 710 Words

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INDEX
1. Introduction
1. A. Our case study and the aim of this analysis
1. B. A glance to the epistemological and theoretical framework
1. C. The relevance of our study and its contribution to the academy
1. D. Research question, hypothesis, methodology & data
1. E. The structure of the analysis
2. Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis
2. A. PDA: language as an ontological and epistemological choice applied to
Terrorism Studies
2. B. Official foreign policy discourse: identity and policy
2. B. I. Foreign Policy as the discursive framework
2. B. II. Security foreign policy and the Copenhagen School
2. B. III. The particular case of “terrorism” after 2001 in security speeches
2. B. IV. Selves and Otherness and their interlink with Policies
2. C. The qualitative methodological model of Intertextuality
2. C. I. Methodological structure
2. C. II. Methodological procedure
3. The War on Terror basic discourse
3. A. Identity representation and policies proposed
3. A. I. The official foreign policy speech in the aftermath of 9/11
3. A. II. Introductions and transformations from 2002 on
3. B. Critics and support
4. The War against Daesh basic discourse
4. A. Identity representation and policies proposed
4. B. Critics and Support
5. From Bush to Hollande: “reproduction” or “transformation”?
6. Conclusions
3
3
5
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9
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10
10
12
12
13
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18
18
20
21
21
22
39
45
48
48
63
66
68

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1. INTRODUCTION
“It is crucial to our understanding of the ‘war on terrorism’
to examine and explain how the discourse of counter-terrorism
constructs the practice of counter-terrorism”
(Jackson, 2005; 24)
1. A. OUR CASE STUDY AND THE AIM OF THIS ANALYSIS
A decade and a half after September 11 ‘terrorist attacks’ have been discursively identified in
diverse points of Western and Eastern Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa and North America.
Amongst Western capitals cities, New York, Madrid, London, Brussels and Paris have been
‘targeted’ since 2001 up to 2016. Within this particular group, State Administrations have reacted in
a multiplicity of ways; that is, constructing more or less radical speeches where different policies
are proposed against certain Otherness for the protection of certain Selves. Interestingly, it was after
Paris attacks on November 13th
, 2015 that parallelisms began to be drawn -both by the media and
the academy- between two specific official reactions: the one of former United States (US)
President George W. Bush and the one of the current French President François G. G. Hollande1
.
It has been pointed out that despite being constructed in a different time and space, Bush post-2001
and Hollande post-2015 official foreign policy speeches offer quite some similarities. To begin
with, both claimed the end of measures short of war –shall we recall George Bush’s phrase “war on
terror” (Bush, 2001b) and François Hollande’s statement “France is at war” (Hollande, 2015b)-.
Moreover, both anticipated a “new and different war” (Bush, 2011f), a “different kind of war”
(Hollande, 2015b) and tried to frame their respective Otherness –‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘Daesh’ terrorist
organisations- as threats to international peace and security through United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolutions.
More importantly, what calls for attention is that such alleged ‘connection points’ between one and
another official rhetoric contrast with a historical background of French ‘opposition’ to certain
features of Bush’s War on Terror discourse. Particularly, France and Germany appeared as the
‘European bastion’ of disagreement to the Iraq War in 2003, which was explicitly mentioned by
former French President Jacques Chirac on multiple occasions. After a meeting with former Spanish
1
See, for example, Chossudovsky, M. (2015); Friedersdorf, C. (2015); Hemish, M. (2015) and Audureau, W. (2015)

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President Maria Aznar Jacques Chirac stated that, regarding the Iraq war, both governments had “a
common objective, that is to say, the need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq”,
despite not sharing “the same sentiment as regards the means to be adopted to achieve this goal”.
France, according to Chirac, considered the “possibility to achieve this goal through peaceful
means, that is to say through inspections” and war appeared no longer “inevitable” but rather “the
worst solution and a failure” (Chirac, 2003).
In such a context, it is interesting to reflect to what extent Bush’s and Hollande’s discursive
approaches to a ‘terrorist Other’ actually share –or not- a similar semantic structure from a post-
structuralist approach. If one aims at conducting a research project through a post-structuralist
outlook which assumes that language does not reflect but rather constitutes ‘reality’, the first
assumption to guide the rest of the analysis is that characterizations from one and another state
administration cannot be argued as objective or self-evident. There is no prior ‘natural’ reason for
labelling an event as “terrorist attack”, a “crime” or an “act of war” (Bartolucci & Gallo, 2013; 1).
That being said, distinguishing semantic constructions that are being ‘reproduced’ and/or
‘challenged’ from the War on Terror to the War against Daesh official speech is relevant for
understanding the dynamics and evolution of the international security agenda –also discursively
construed- where certain identities and policies are legitimised whilst other are discarded. The
discursive field is not an ‘even one’ and the US and France enjoy a privileged position as political
agencies shaping such agenda, which could facilitate their approaches assuming a ‘hegemonic’
position. Both appear as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and next to the US
argued ‘global extension of influence’2
, it has been highlighted France’s current relative ‘regional
leadership position’ influencing the foreign policy rhetoric of European Union (EU) countries3
.
Bearing this in mind, is the aim of this research project to provide a post-structuralist
comparative analysis between two official foreign policy discourses -the post-9/11 American War
on Terror and the post-11/13 French War against Daesh- specifically dwelling on the construction
of ‘identity’ and ‘policy’ within them.
2
See, for example, in Tsui, CK. (2014), pp. 52
3
See, for example, in Firat, G. (2010), pp. 20

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1. B. A GLANCE TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Post-structural Discourse Analysis (PDA) is an ontological and epistemological framework adopted
within Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) which focuses on the role of language as performative of
the social construct, therefore excluding the possibility of any extra-discursive reality. For the
purpose of this analysis and on the basis of such assumption, it is the paired construction of
‘identities’ –national/ international Selves and risky/ threatening Otherness- and ‘policies’ –
exceptional defensive and preventive measures- the conceptual guide for a comparative view of the
War on Terror and the War against Daesh. These concepts result from the combined provisions of
certain scholars: the Copenhagen School (1998), Lene Hansen (2006) and Rens Van Munster
(2004) jointly with Claudia Aradau (2009).
Lene Hansen (2006) theoretical and methodological proposal relies on its applicability to uncover
and deconstruct the interrelationship between identity, policies and foreign policy discourse.
According to Hansen, identity representations result in the construction of ‘Selves’ and ‘Otherness’
–e.g France/ Daesh- to which certain signs are attached –France = ‘civilized’/ Daesh =
‘uncivilized’-. They also enjoy a certain ‘spatial’ –as for their geographical boundaries- and
‘temporal’ –as for their capability to change- location, whilst the Self is also ‘ethically’ located –as
for its responsibility towards the Other- (2006; 38-46). In parallel, certain policies are discursively
proposed so as to deal with the specific ‘Otherness’ and shelter the specific ‘Selves’ –e.g. military
operations in Iraq and Syria, the revision of the French policy of asylum- . The final aim of a
foreign policy discourse –e.g. War against Daesh- is then to ‘discursively stabilize’ the identity
representations and the policies proposed (2006; 18), which despite being interlinked do not amount
to a causal relationship, so long one is not the precondition of the other (2006; 10).
Particularly for the case of security foreign policy discourses, Hansen relies on the work of the
Copenhagen School (1998) which argues that the “securitization of an issue” presents it an
“existential threat” –Hansen’s concept of ‘Other’- to a “referent object” whose survival is at stake –
Hansen’s concept of ‘Self’-, therefore allowing for “exceptional measures” – Hansen’s concept
‘policies’- (Buzan et al., 1998; 21-25). To these provisions, the author introduces some
particularities to the understanding of the referent object for the cases when ‘terrorism’ becomes the
securitized issue: securities foreign policy speeches tend to oppose a ‘terrorist Other’ not only to a
‘national Self’ as traditionally construed but also to the ‘International community Self’.

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In addition, further particularities have been introduced to the understanding of ‘exceptional
measures’ and ‘existential threat’ when analysing the rhetoric of War on Terror. Rens Van Munster
(2004) jointly with Claudia Aradau (2009) have argued that after 9/ 11, the US as a political agent
has systematically encompassed within its foreign policy speech concepts usually belonging to
distinctive semantic realms. Consequently, the War on Terror resulted not only a matter of
international security, deterrence/defence against a threat by military means but also an issue of
homeland security, prevention of a risk by law enforcement and intelligence means; thus putting
together two ‘conceptual chains’ with a distinctive temporal/ territorial character within the scope of
the same foreign policy discourse (Van Munster, 2004; 146) (Van Munster & Aradau, 2009; 698).
1. C. THE RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACADEMY
Deciding to carry out this research project within such epistemological and theoretical confines
responded to two main reasons. A circumstantial one, for partly due to the proximity in time to the
Paris attacks there are still no sound articles specifically addressing the War on Terror and the War
against Daesh comparatively. A substantial one, for those analyses dwelling either on America/
France foreign policy towards a ‘terrorist Other’ do not rely on the concepts highlighted above
within a comparative PDA.
Indeed, there is abundant literature within CTS about the American and European/ French official
foreign policy discourse towards a “global international threat” from 2001 on. However, scholars
have followed at least one of three ‘patterns’: focusing either on America or France instead of both
of them comparatively; focusing either on the ‘policies’ or the ‘identities’ proposed instead of a
paired understanding; and adopting a framework which is not PDA.
For instance, with a focus on the ‘policy element’ Jason Ralph (2009) (2013) sought to analyse the
American ‘policy of exception’ to both international and domestic bodies of law explaining it on the
basis of Carl Schmitt. Illustrating cases in which the Bush and Obama administration have
systematically ‘suspended’ provisions regarding jus ad bellum, jus in bello and international human
rights Ralph found them consistent with the Schmittean idea of the “friend/ enemy”
interrelationship and the “superficiality of the norm”. That is to say, the possibility of exception is
constitutive to the law itself, whose applicability in hands of the Sovereign State will be always
shaped by politics, war and the confrontation with the “enemy” (2009; 632), (2013; 6).

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Halit Mustafa Tagma (2009) also dwelled on American foreign policy when trying to combine
Giorgio Agamben propositions with a Foucaultian approach to the Guantanamo Bay Detention
Camp. Tagma argued that whereas the decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions of legal
treatment of prisoners might be seen as an “exceptional” measure decided by the state –as stated by
Agamben- ‘political violence’ is not solely conducted from top to button but it is also exercised at
the micro-level by subjects that decide on whom violence is going to be inflicted –as proposed by
Foucault- (2009; 423).
Richard Jackson (2005) resorted to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in combination with
international relations theory and communication and cultural studies to examined how the
“rhetoric and practice” of key social and political actors has normalized and institutionalized the
American reaction to September 11 based on a militaristic approach at odds with international legal
standards. By manipulating public anxiety so as to gain public support, Jackson argues that the War
on Terror is an example of a successful exercise of power which ultimately undermines instead of
providing with useful answers for political violence (2005; 2-5).
Looking to the other side of the globe, Karin von Hippel (2005) compiles the work of various
authors with two aims. Firstly, describing the role and contribution of the European Union (EU) and
particular states within it –including France- to the “counter-terrorism alliance” forged with the
NATO and the UN (2005; 19- 146). Secondly, explaining the “transatlantic tension” created by the
institutional, legislative and political strategies adopted in Europe on the basis of the perception
over US unilateralism, individual states as future targets and the process of integration at the
European level since the ‘70s on.
Dwelling on the understanding of ‘identities’ within foreign policy speeches, Christopher Baker-
Beall (2009) provided an interesting argument within CDA on how the EU counter-terrorism policy
is based on the construction of a “migrant Otherness” equated with a “threatening terrorist
Otherness” which ultimately leads to the securitization of immigration and asylum policies. In strict
correlation, Ali Bilgic (2006) also adopted a CDA framework focused on the EU securitization of
immigration and asylum but now incorporating some national cases, including the case of France.
According to the author, immigrants and asylum-seekers are depicted as “threats to social and
national identities, welfare states, social security systems” (2006; 1) ultimately connected a
potential terrorist threat (2006; 30).

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Looking back to the American continent, Chin-Kuei Tsui (2014) applied CDA to a genealogical
understanding of the US construction of identities behind the War on Terror, arguing that instead of
being a “revolutionary” turn in the American foreign policy speech the Bush Administration is
rather an expression of continuity built on foundations of previous administration -specially from
former President Reagan on (2014; 1)- maintaining certain identity narratives as “the good and
evil”, “civilisation and barbarism” or “heroes and cowards” (2014; 154-173).
Now resorting to PDA and applying Laclau and Mouffe (2001) academic work, Silje Solheim
(2006) put under the loop how the War on Terror was constructed as the “appropriate” response by
the US to September 11 whilst focusing on identity representations within it. The author argues the
resort to a “simplistic dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’”, a “zero-sum game” based on opposed
signs attached to each other -“civilisation vs. barbarism”; “evil vs. good”- (2006; 2).
Each one of the elements analysed by the cited scholars -exceptional measures defying international
legal bodies, the role of international organisations and differential signs attached to Selves and
Otherness in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism- can and will be also fully grasped through the
conceptual framework that this research project intends to apply to the case study. Its differential
and additional value to the existent literature on the topic is its ability to display how all these
elements become engaged and interconnected in one complex, partially-stabilized semantic
structure. Thus, it enables a more complete and precise identification of patterns of reproduction
and transformation between one and another official discourse.
In other words, especially when deepening into the analysis of the War on Terror, it might seem at
first that what is being presented is a “collection” of findings that other authors have also dwelled
on. However, not only it is shaped under a different theory and methodology but it is also put in
more comprehensive terms setting a sort of “blueprint” or “semantic map” instead of profoundly
enquiring into one specific discursive element or looking for certain power relations as an
explanatory tool. It is the structure of such “semantic map” that this analysis seeks to replicate and
fill with the specific content of the War on Daesh, hence allowing for a comparative analysis.

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1. D. RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESIS, METHODOLOGY, DATA & STRUCTURE OF
THE ANALYSIS
In order to achieve our above-mentioned aim, our research question will address how does
Hollande’s War against Daesh rhetoric reproduce and/ or challenge discursive constructions set
by Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric? For reaching an answer we will focus on three lines of enquiry:
I. How did the post-9/11 Bush administration discursively construct identity representations
and policies under the War on Terror rhetoric?
II. How did the post-11/13 Hollande administration discursively construct identity
representations and policies under the War against Daesh rhetoric?
III. How does Hollande’s War against Daesh rhetoric reproduce and/ or challenge discursive
constructions set by Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric?
The methodology selected hereby is a qualitative analysis in a comparative historical view founded
on selected elements from Lene Hansen’s proposal (2006). In terms of the data analysed, this
analysis resorts to various official speeches, drafted legislations, passed legislations and statements
and reports from governmental organs and agencies. For the American case, the temporal gap for
data collection has been the entire Bush administration from 9/11 on; whilst for the French case it
has been set from 13/11 up to June 2016. Academic writing and Approval Rating Polls carried by
recognized newspapers and agencies are analyzed as critics and support to the official rhetoric.
In the case of France, partially due to the short time lapse since Paris attacks, there are cases where
access to transcripts of official speeches –be it in French or in English- through governmental
official websites is possible. In other cases, there is access to only video recordings. For the purpose
of this analysis, data that was not offered in English or was only in an audiovisual format has been
interpreted and translated with the utmost caution to the fidelity of the discourse; that is, its own
semantic structure (Hansen, 2006; 83-84).
This research project will be structured as follows. The first section offers a deeper understanding of
the epistemological, theoretical and methodological framework on top of which this study is
construed. The second and third sections provide an analysis of the War on Terror and the War
against Daesh as basic discourses. Patterns of reproduction and transformation from one to another
are discussed in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section provides a synthesis of the various
issues raised in the discussion, the limitations of the study and advices for future research.

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2. POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
2. A. PDA: LANGUAGE AS AN ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHOICE APPLIED
TO TERRORISM STUDIES
Scholars of International Security (IS) have frequently pointed out to the end of the Cold War as a
turning point in our field of studies redefining who is to be protected, from what and by which
means. The traditional international security approach focused on the state nation as the object of
reference, armed conflicts as the main threat and the use and control of military force as the main
means to deal with it (Sotomayor Velásquez, 2007; 68). After the dissolution of the URSS, an
academic shift gave place to multidimensional international security approaches dwelling on
transnational threats -climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the majority
world, terrorism and global militarization (Abbot et. al, 2006; 4)- therefore requiring transnational
solutions, and human security approaches where not only the state but the individual became an
object of reference (Duffield, 2005; 1-2).
In this context, the attack on the Twin Towers and its aftermath redirected IS studies attention to the
phenomenon of terrorism, where a hectic and enormous compilation of articles lead later on to a
general dissatisfaction with the scientific standards obtained by mostly orthodox/ positivist
publications (Stump & Dixit, 2013; 13). Challenging ahistorical approaches built on top of “why”
questions for the uncovering causal links between dependent and independent variables (Stump &
Dixit, 2013; 17), “Critical Terrorism Studies” (CTS) brought about an interest in “how” power
constructs identities, actors, and modes of conduct (Doty; 1996; 4).
Amongst the wide range of possible approaches within CTS, Discourse Analysis concentrates on
the role of language as a key element for the understanding of the social construct. Particularly,
Poststructural Discourse Analysis (PDA) is structured over fourth assumptions on top of which
our analysis has been constructed. Firstly, language is performative; that is to say, constitutive to
what is brought into “being”. Secondly, language is social and political; as it is a shared construct
that gives prominence to certain rhetoric in spite of others. Thirdly, language has a relative stability
for it can never be completely fixed or completely inconsistent. Fourth, language incorporates both
material and ideational factors. All these features together exclude the necessity and the possibility
to draw causation links in a rational-positivist way (Hansen, 2006; 17-28)

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To start with, language as performative is opposed to language as descriptive of social reality. That
means that for PDA there is no extra-discursive reality with a particular objective essence that
language ought to describe. It is only through a relationally structured discourse that “things”
acquire “entity” (Hansen, 2006; 18) –e.g., there is no natural, self-evident reason to present ‘Al
Qaeda’ or ‘Daesh’ as ‘terrorist organisations’-. Alternatively, this means that there is no ulterior true
that discourse representations should ultimately reflect to be considered more or less valid (Masugi
& Shapiro, 1984; 218).
Even more, language as a social practice means that it is a convention, a collective semantic
structure to which individuals resort in order to make themselves comprehensible (Hansen, 2006;
18). Language as a political practice means that it allows for the production and reproduction of
certain discursive representation(s) of the social construct whilst excluding others (Hansen, 2006;
19). Throughout a permanent struggle amongst different speeches, hegemony is provisionally
established every time one rhetoric exercises its dominance over the competing others (Laclau &
Mouffe, 2001; 137). For example, discursively portraying the ‘terrorists’ as a ‘fanatics’ opposed to
‘France’/ ‘The US’ as ‘moderate’ is one speech –the hegemonic one- over alternative ones.
On top of this, language is a web of juxtaposed paired dichotomies formed by a privileged sign –
‘France/ ‘The US’ in the example above- and a devalued/ supplementary sign –“terrorists”- where
despite being presented as diametrically opposed one cannot be fully comprehended without
referring to the other (Derrida, 1976; 142). Discourses will try to present themselves as stable and
structured, but there will always be certain points of unsteadiness and shakiness challenging its
paired dichotomies as perfectly opposed fixed entities –what happens when ‘fanatism’ is to be
found in ‘France’/ ‘The US’ as well?- (Hansen, 2006; 20-21).
Finally, PDA challenges the argument of reality being split into ideational and material spheres
with language representing an “ideational element” instead of a “material factor”. PDA contends
that discourses “encompass” both material and ideational elements so long neither of them has a
particular presence without the other. “Facts” –the American Twin Towers collapse or the shootings
at the French club Bataclan- are, therefore, not disregarded but rather considered as interdependent
and interlinked with the “semantic frame” that presents them (Hansen, 2006; 22).

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For all these reasons, PDA research designs like the one carried out here cannot and do not need to
establish any causal links. Causality designs require the identification of an “independent” and a
“dependent” variable; that is, a certain “fact” determining the probable occurrence of a certain
“result”. PDA designs applied to foreign policy speeches assume that there are neither “identities”
nor “policies” with an independent, objective existence constraining each other. Rather, speeches
produce –and reproduce- representations on top of previously construed “identities” and “policies”,
as no rhetoric appears on a completely undefined semantic field. Thus, instead of questioning why
does a certain speech propose a certain policy/identity we reflect on how one and another are
construed and interlinked by a certain discourse. PDA as a non-causal design is, therefore, not a
“flaw” but an ontological and epistemic choice (Hansen, 2006; 25).
2. B. OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE: IDENTITY AND POLICY
2. B. I. Foreign Policy as the discursive framework
The main feature of every official foreign policy speech is its intention to persuade its audience
about its legitimacy and enforceability by portraying a link between ‘policy(ies)’and ‘identity(ies)’
that appears consistent. Consistency might be achieved through stability. Internally, stability refers
to the relationship between Selves and Otherness and the link between such identity representation
and the policies proposed. Externally, stability refers to the relationship between the semantic
constructions of the foreign policy speech in question and critical/supportive discourses situated
within a wider social and political context. Neither type of stability can be ever completely
achieved, which leads to a constant process of (re)adjustment of the foreign policy speech so as to
maintain a –relative- appearance of legitimacy and enforceability (Hansen, 2006, 28-29).
In terms of adjustment, change and transformation of a foreign policy discourse, “key events” have
a relevant role. Key events refer to “facts” which discursively assume a protagonist role in the
political and/or media agenda and therefore force official foreign policy speeches to rethink their
policy/ identity construct and to react to opposition or criticism (Hansen, 2006; 32). When facing
critical or oppositional discourses after a key event, government administration as the political
agencies constructing foreign policy speeches might seek to react in three different ways. They
might either resort to major adjustments –e.g. the depiction of a more radical Otherness paired with

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a more confrontative policy- to an acknowledgement and reinterpretation of the facts under the
already established discursive frame or to a complete silence over the issue (Hansen, 2006; 33).
For the purpose of our analysis, what is commonly referred by the media and political actors as the
‘9/11 terrorist attack’ or the more recent ‘11/13 terrorist attack’ are to be referred as key events not
because of some extra-discursive essential feature but because of their undeniable impact on the
American and French official foreign policy speeches. From then on, the War on Terror and the
War against Daesh are to be seen as relatively stable discourses in a continuous dynamic of self-
readjustment towards internal and external points of instability.
2. B. II. Security foreign policy speeches and the Copenhagen School
Within the spectrum of foreign policy speeches, international security discourses like the ones
analysed in our case study offer some particularities according to scholars of the Copenhagen
School. They are based on the idea of an “existential threat” to a “referent object” whose survival is
at stake; traditionally articulated by States in security speeches confronting a “national self” to a
“threatening other” whose “nature” makes it as a high-priority issue on the political agenda (Buzan
et al., 1998; 21).
An issue is successfully securitized when the relevant audience to which the speech is directed
accepts it as such (Buzan et al., 1998; 21), which in turns is connected to the aim and achievement
of being presented as legitimate and enforceable. Once an issue is securitized, the sense of priority
provides those in charge of enacting security measures with the power and the responsibility to take
“exceptional measures”; in other words, suspending, annulling or modifying rules and procedures to
which they would be bound under “normal circumstances” in order to successfully respond to the
“threat” (Buzan et al., 1998; 25).
2. B. III. The particular case of “terrorism” after 2001 in security speeches
Alternatively, certain considerations are to be added according to Hansen (2006) and Van Munster
(20014) jointly with Ardau (2009) and in terms of how the existential threat, referent object and
exceptional measures –identity and policies for the purpose of our analysis- are discursively built in
official security speeches after 2001 when opposed to a ‘terrorist Other’.

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A. THE “REFERENT OBJECT”
The securitization of an issue in the military sector –that is to say, involving the potential use of
force as exceptional measure- has been traditionally framed as protecting the ‘state’ or ‘national
Self’ as the referent object from a certain existential threat (Buzan et. al, 1998; 21) (Hansen, 2006;
35). Nonetheless, after 2001 when ‘terrorism’ is constructed as the existential threat, the referent
object whose survival is a stake is usually not only portrayed as the ‘national Self’ but the
‘international community Self’. This, in turns, challenges the traditional construction where the
power and responsibility to take exceptional measures rest solely on the state actor by endowing the
international community with the responsibility to react to the threat (Hansen, 2006; 35-36).
B. THE “EXISTENTIAL THREAT” AND “EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES”
Particularly, the American rhetoric of the War on Terror has introduced further semantic changes to
official security discourses built in relation to ‘terrorism’. To start with, the assurance of survival of
the referent object is necessary not only when facing a concrete existential threat posed by
‘threatening Otherness’ –more or less precisely identifiable- but also in front of a ‘risky Otherness’,
that is, a potential threat. Such semantic shift in the identity characterization also influences the
construction of exceptional measures, which shall now incorporate not only ‘defensive’/ ‘re-active’
actions carried out by military forces out of the state’s borders, but also as ‘preventive’/ ‘pro-active’
ones carried out by ‘law enforcement and intelligence agents’ inside borders (Van Munster, 2004;
146), (Van Munster & Aradau, 2009; 698).
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume such conceptual distinctions are relevant and applicable
not only to Bush’s rhetoric but also to Hollande’s discursive construction. Consequently, identity
representations are to be interpreted as encompassing –at minimum- ‘national’ and ‘international’
Selves whose ‘survival is at risk’ because of a ‘risky’ and ‘threatening’ Otherness. Alternatively,
policies are regarded as including ‘defensive’ and ‘preventive’ exceptional measures.
2. B. IV. Selves and Otherness and their interlink with Policies
As introduced before, identity representations and policies are interlinked in foreign policy
speeches. Two important remarks ought to be highlighted with regards to the former. Recalling, for
example, Silje Solheim’s analysis (2006; 2) it has been argued the construction of a “simplistic

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dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’”, a “zero-sum game” hindered in George W. Bush’s discourse.
However, -as we will see once engaged in our analysis of American and French speeches- this does
not have to be necessarily the case.
Firstly, foreign policy discourses can depict a variety of non-Selves enjoying different degrees of
radicalization gives place to “complementary identities, contending identities, negative identities,
non-identities” and not only “radically opposed identities” (Hansen, 2006; 39). Secondly,
discourses might not only construct a simple duality Self/ Other but rather a web of identities where
multiple Selves might be opposed to differently constructed Otherness (Hansen, 2006; 41).
Independently of the particular set of identity representations under the loop, uncovering the
semantic content of identities representations requires of involves two procedures. In the first place,
each official speech explicitly articulates different “signs” to the Self/Selves and Other/Otherness
which ought to be identified. Taking as an example Lene Hansen’s work (2006), the author
identified that during the Bosnian War, certain semantic constructions portrayed a European Self as
‘civilized’, ‘controlled’, ‘developed’ and ‘rational’ and a Balkan Other as ‘barbarian’, ‘violent’,
‘underdeveloped’ and ‘irrational’.
These explicit signs are to be put together and articulated in a larger web by a process of linking –
positive identity- and a process of differentiating –negative identity- (Hansen, 2006; 41). In other
words, whilst ‘barbarian’, ‘violent’, ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘irrational’ are positively linked signs
attached to one identity –the Balkan Other-, ‘barbarian’/ ‘civilized’, ‘violent’/ ‘controlled’
‘underdeveloped’/ ‘developed and ‘irrational’/ ‘rational’ are differentiated terms that oppose the
Other to the Self.

16. 16
FIGURE PROVIDED IN (HANSEN, 2006; 42)
To these two processes offered by Lene Hansen we will add a third one: process of equating, that
is to say, the semantic construction where some or all of the explicitly attached signs of one identity
–e.g. ‘The US’ Self- are transferred and exported to another identity –e.g the ‘International
Community’ Self-. For example, this could be the case if the official speech states or indicates that
‘The US’ Self is representative of the ‘International Community’ Self.
In the second place, we ought to identify the spatial, temporal and ethical location of the identity
representations. Each one of the three analytical categories has the same theoretical and ontological
status –none determines nor is “more substantial” than the other- and need not be explicitly
mentioned in the discourse but rather inferred from it (Hansen, 2006; 46).
Spatiality is related to the delineation and construction of boundaries. In foreign policy discourses,
certain identities can be directly related to countries –the United States- or regions –Latin America-
whereas representations as ‘international community’; ‘humanity’ or ‘civilisation’ are a
combination of territorial bounded and abstract political subjectivities on their own (Hansen, 2006;
47). For instance, even when the ‘international community’ Self –over which we will dwell on-
might be territorially connected to the planet Earth, it is construed with a particular political content

17. 17
–‘civilized’, ‘rational’- which sets aside non-abiding identity representations –e.g. ‘terrorist
organisations’- (Hansen, 2006; 48).
Temporality refers to the capacity of change attached to an identity and its temporal location with
respect to its counterpart. Some identities might have the ability to ‘progress’ –transform, develop-
whilst others might be portrayed as ‘intransient’ –condemned to repetition, stagnation- (Hansen,
2006; 48). Additionally, Selves and Otherness can be construed as part of a ‘same temporality’, or
as one being ahead or time than the other –e.g. the Self as ‘more developed’ in relation to the
Other- (Hansen, 2006; 49).
Finally, ethicality is to be found only in the discursive construction of the Self/ Selves and refers to
the responsibility and morality towards the Other/ Otherness. It can go in two ways: either there is a
sense of responsibility or a lack of it from the former towards the later. Lack of responsibility in
security speeches carries inaction, whilst the existence of it is accompanied by either a more
confrontative or a more accommodative reaction (Hansen, 2006; 50). We should keep in mind that
official security speeches towards a ‘terrorist’ Other –like our case study- ethically locate not only
the ‘state national’ Self but also the ‘International Community’ Self (Hansen, 2006; 34).
Policies or ‘directions for action’ will be proposed on the basis of the spatial, temporal and ethical
construction of Self/Selves and Other/Otherness related by processes of linking and differentiating.
Especially in relation to the ethical location of the Self/ Selves; a wide range of proposals –military
operations, surveillance measures, etc. – might be presented by the official speech which can be
classified by numerous criteria: their purpose, their geographical and temporal nature, etc.
Altogether, this conceptual structure allows us to specify in detail the way a basic discourse
constructs stability –internally and externally-; the points where it becomes unstable; and the
specific way in which it changes and evolves (Hansen, 2006; 45). When analyzed in a comparative
way, reproducing and challenging patterns can be described by pointing out to the way semantic
elements are construed –e.g., the amount of identity representations, the degrees of the Otherness,
the temporal location of Self- and interconnected in one and another rather than resorting to more
vague and general conclusions.

18. 18
2. C. THE QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF INTERTEXTUALITY
2. C. I. Methodological structure
Carrying out a PDA research project based on Lene Hansen’s proposal (2006) requires selecting a
methodological structure and a methodological procedure adapted to the aims of the analysis in
question. Particularly, defining the structure of the methodology requires addressing six issues.
The first question is the number of Selves we want to examine. The analytical focus can be posed
over a “single Self”; “comparative Selves” - a study addressing the same foreign policy issue from
the perspective of different Selves - or a “discursive encounter” –comparing the construction of the
Self with the Other’s counter-construction- (Hansen, 2006; 76).
The second issue is the number of events we are going to focus on. We can put under the loop one
“single event”; “multiple events related by issue” –e.g., ‘terrorism’- in which case we will examine
reproducing and challenging patterns between the discourses being compared; or “multiple events
related by time” -the 90’s- providing an insight on discourses of the Self that appear politically
relevant for foreign policy speeches (Hansen, 2006; 80).
The third consideration is related to the temporal perspective; that is, whether we will consider
speeches at one particular moment or in a longer historical outlook. We can either chose to focus on
“one moment”; “comparative moments” by looking to ‘key events’ related to the same specific
foreign policy issue to find reproducing and/ or challenging patterns; or a “historical development”
by considering the evolution of the identity representation along time in relation to various foreign
policy issues (Hansen, 2006; 77-78).
In our research analysis, we will examine “comparative Selves” -the US as depicted by the Bush
Administration after 9/11, France as depicted by the Hollande Administration after 11/13-,
“multiple events related by issue” -Washington and Paris ‘terrorist attacks’- in a “comparative
temporal perspective” –post 9/11/2001 until January 2009 for the American case and post
11/13/2015 until the end of June 2016 for the French case-.

19. 19
The fourth element to consider is which ‘intertextual model’ we ought to select. There are four
‘intertextual methodological models’ for conducting a research project that can be summarized in
regards to their focus as “Model 1- Official Discourse”; “Model 2- Wider Political Debate”; “Model
3-A Cultural Representations” and “Model 3 B- Marginal Political Discourses” (Hansen 2006; 81).
The difference amongst each model is their distance to the official foreign policy discourse and the
incorporation of other political and social agencies which might reproduce or contest the official
discursive construction (Hansen 2006; 63).
In this case, the one selected is Model 1°. Although the analytical focus is the official discourse -the
discursive constructions of political leaders authorized to sanction foreign policy and those with a
key role in its enforcement-, the object of the analysis also includes ‘critical’ and ‘supportive’ texts
for the purposes of observing the external (in)stability of the official speech (Hansen, 2006; 60).
Because of the factual limitations in terms of length of the analysis and the time to prepare it, we
have restraint the scope of analysis that Hansen proposes.
Regarding critical texts, the selection of the discursive examples will be reduced to those portraying
the ‘most radically opposed’ versions to the official rhetoric in their ‘most fundamental version’4
. A
whole “shades of grey” where more confrontative/ accommodative voices might refer in a deeper,
more complex way to the same semantic constructions will be set aside. Regarding supportive texts,
they are harder to include in an analysis without resulting redundant. That is why we will focus on
the evolution of Presidential Approval Rating Polls for getting a sense of the level of acquiescence
of the audience to the official foreign policy speech.
Particularly, we will not make use of “intertextuality” as an analytical tool; that is, identifying
further texts to which the original speech makes direct or indirect reference (Hansen, 2006; 56-57).
Although it has an important additional value, it is not indispensable for the goals of the analysis set
by Model 1, that is, unveiling the way each official discourse seeks for internal stabilisation and its
reaction to critical speeches (2006; 64).
4
‘More radically opposed versions’ refers to critical voices claiming for a more accommodative approach whilst the official speech
appears as rather confrontative . In our case, this would exclude the most right-wing conservative political parties’ views on the topic.
Their ‘most basic fundamental version’ refers to critical voices that challenge a semantic construction from its foundations. This would
exclude, for example, criticism over the application of a law if arguments are raised challenging the legal character of the provision in
itself.

20. 20
In the fifth place, there is the genre selection. Different genres -literary non-fiction, journalism,
academic writing and policy documents- are constructed with a different sense of authority to speak
about an issue, and knowledge has a particular place in it for each case (Hansen, 2006; 65). Our
analysis will be based on policy documents for the official speech and academic and journalist
writings for critic and supportive texts. In this case, whilst journalist and academics writing’s
authority ought to be erected solely through knowledge, politicians build authority in their foreign
policy speeches not only through knowledge but also through their ability to deploy power and take
responsibility (Hansen, 2006; 67).
Finally, there is the textual selection. In terms of the type of material, we will resort to and general
material from which we can identify the dominant discourses, which should a) establish a clear
articulation of ‘identity’ and ‘policies’ b) be widely attended to, that is to say, play a key role in
defining the semantic content of the central discourse and c) display status and power as the
political agency behind the discourse enjoys the formal authority to portray a political position
(Hansen, 2006; 83). “Key texts” or recurrently quoted ones which are usually included for the
purpose of intertextuality are not to be considered. In terms of the temporal location, we will make
use of primary sources or texts that are taken from the time of the study (Hansen, 2006; 83).
“Historical material” which might be useful for genealogical explanations of certain concepts will
be also excluded (Hansen, 2006; 83)
We should take into account that for analysing the War on Terror –temporally covering
approximately eight years- there is a fairly greater amount of relevant texts than for analysing the
War against Daesh –temporally covering less than a year-. For this reason, from the bulk of relevant
general material on Bush’s rhetoric, we will mainly focus on the annual State of Union Address and
the annual Presidential Speech to the United Nations, whereas for Hollande’s rhetoric we will make
use of every text complying with the three criteria of selection of general material.
2. C. II. Methodological procedure
Based on the structure set aside, carrying out our research project will require following certain
steps. Firstly, we ought to identify our basic discourses or main points of contestation within a
comparative analysis. That is, discursive frames that although related by “issue” –in our case- they
comparatively construct a) different Otherness with different degrees of difference b) diverging

21. 21
forms of spatial, temporal and ethical identity and b) competing links between identity and policy
(Hansen, 2006; 52). For the purpose of this analysis, the War on Terror and the War against Daesh
will be our basic discourses.
Secondly, from the basic discourses selected we will a) identify the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ signs
adjudicated to Otherness and Selves; b) integrate them into a larger system of process of ‘linking’,
‘differentiating’ and equating; c) read the ‘spatial’, ‘temporal’ and ‘ethical’ constructions of the
political identity; and d) unveil the characteristics of the defensive and/or preventive counter
policies proposed. Thirdly, we will focus on the reaction of the basic discourses to supportive
and/or critical texts so as to devise the possible adjustments, changes and transformations within
them accordingly with the aim of maintaining an internal and external stability. Finally, we will
compare each basic discourse so as to find reproducing and/ or challenging patterns from one to
another in the construction of ‘identity’ and ‘policy’.
3. “THE WAR ON TERROR” BASIC DISCOURSE
3. A. IDENTITY REPRESENTATION AND POLICIES PROPOSED
If one is to analyze the basic discourse of the War on Terror in its entirety -that is, as construed by
the Bush administration from the key events in 2001 to January 2009- one will unequivocally
encounter a high level of complexity in the identities construed, the richness of the signs attached to
each one of them and the density of policies proposed. Moreover, the level of complexity increases
over time.
For this reason, this section is sub-divided. First, we will present the identity representations and
policies proposed ‘right after’ 9/11. Second, we will we highlight the introductions –e.g new
policies, new identities, if any- and transformations –e.g. different ethical location of the Self, if so-
to that semantic structure from 2002 on. Why not just presenting Bush’s rhetoric in its final and
more complex version? As argued before, every discourse is construed over an already ‘semi-
defined semantic field’ and this case is no exception. Introductions and transformations from 2002
on are made on top of the ‘blueprints’ initially set by the official discourse.

22. 22
3. A. I. The official speech in the aftermath of 9/11
Far from being a simplified dichotomy Self/ Other as argued, for example, by Solheim (2006), the
official foreign policy speech right after September 11 presented a five-folded identity
representation: ‘The US’ and the ‘International Community’ as Selves and the ‘Al Qaeda terrorist
organisation ’, the ‘Taliban Afghan Regime’ and the ‘Afghan People’ as Otherness.
 ‘AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION ’ OTHER
In the aftermath of September 11 ‘key events’, former American President George W. Bush began
by condemning what he portrayed, alternatively, as “terrorist attacks” (Bush, 2001a), “acts of mass
murder” (Bush, 2001a) and “act of war against our country” (Bush, 2001b). Speaking to a nation
and the world, former Head of State remarked: “Americans are asking: Who attacked our
country?” (Bush, 2001b). Well, the ‘attackers’ were to be pinpointed by the official speech as a
“loosely affiliated terrorist organisation known as ‘Al Qaeda’” (Bush, 2001b). Its ‘vaguely
connected character’, however, was almost automatically confronted with a parallel contradicting
description of a ‘pretty solid entity’. ‘Al Qaeda’ was a “network”, had identifiable “assets” and
coordinated “operatives” throughout its “cell around the world” (Bush, 2001b).
According to Bush, ‘Al Qaeda terrorist organisation’ enjoyed of a particular position within
‘terrorism’. By stating: "the suffering of September 11 was inflicted on people (...) [who] were killed
(...) by the terrorist leaders” (Bush, 2001e); ‘Al Qaeda’ was understood as embodying a
‘leadership’. But, what were they actually leading?: one of the ‘ideological sides’ in the struggle,
given according to Bush “at the start of the 21st century, it [was] clear that the world [was]
engaged in a great ideological struggle between extremists who use terror as a weapon to create
fear and moderate people who work for peace” (Bush, 2006b).
What Al Qaeda’s ideology represented was very precise in the official speech. The world was
joining in “the fight against extremism” (Bush, 2007a) and it had to be cautious as “in the shadows
of hopelessness, radicalism thrives” (Bush, 2001b). The terrorist had chosen “the weapon of fear”
(Bush, 2002d), they embodied a “dark vision of hatred and fear” (Bush, 2006a). If they were behind
the incitement of “violence and terror” (Bush, 2001e), it was a particular type: “lawless violence”
(Bush, 2001e). On top of this, Al Qaeda’s ideology of extremism, radicalism, fear and lawless
violence did not appear to the Bush Administration as something new. It resonated to the “heirs of

23. 23
all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical
visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow[ed] in the path of fascism,
Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush, 2001b).
The importance of the ‘semantic linkage’ between ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’,
‘terror’, ‘fear’, ‘lawless violence’, ‘totalitarianism’ lies in the fact that, from that point on, the
official American speech will proceed to treat the ‘extremists’, the ‘radicals’, ‘terror’, ‘terrorists’
and ‘Al Qaeda’ as equivalent labels.
There is another element, perhaps one of those with the ‘highest resonance’ in scholarly work5
: the
idea of ‘evil’, repeatedly remarked by former President Bush. ‘Evil’ had being inflicted upon ‘them’
-America was “angry at the evil that was done” (Bush, 2001e)-. But was also ‘personified’ by
Osama Bin Laden -America had seen “the evil one threatening” (Bush, 2001d)-; Al Qaeda –
America had learnt “a good lesson on September 11th
, that there is evil in this world” (Bush,
2001d)-; and terrorism itself -America ought to “confront and defeat the evil of terrorism” (Bush,
2008b), “the man-made evil of international terrorism” (Bush, 2003a)-.
Interlinked with the construed features highlighted above, the official rhetoric addressed Al Qaeda’s
relationship with ‘religion’ in a particular way. For the former Head of State, “those who commit
evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. Terrorists are traitors to their own faith,
trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself” (Bush, 2001b). ‘Terrorism’ resulted in a “disease for Islam”
(Bush, 2001b), a “fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Bush, 2001b).
More generally, ‘Al Qaeda’ resulted in a ‘blasphemy’, ‘treason’, ‘perversion’ and ‘disease’ not
only to ‘Islam’ but to ‘every religion’, having “no place in any religious faith” (Bush, 2003b).
Nevertheless, this point could be argued as a source of internal instability. If ‘terrorism’ had no
connexion to ‘Islam’ or any other religion; making explicit references to the Islamic faith for
describing the Otherness would not be necessary. However, the official speech also claimed, for
instance, that “the Shia and Sunni extremists [were] different faces of the same totalitarian threat”
(Bush, 2007a)
5
Not only the scholarly work of Tsui, C.K (2014) and Solheim, S. (2006) –remarked here because of their approach of unveiling the
‘general panorama’ of identity construction– dwell on this semantic feature. There is plenty of literature in CTS focused solely or mostly
on the construction of evil and the rationale behind it, see for example: Sarfo, E. & Krampa, E. A. (2013); Daghrir, W. (2013).

24. 24
Finally, ‘Al Qaeda’ was not only ‘uncivilised’ -quite a passive expression of “lacking” certain
features- but rather ‘against civilisation’. Consequently, what is depicted is a much more
‘threatening’ Other towards which there is only room for forceful confrontation. In other words, the
‘terrorist’ were actively plotting “against America and the civilised world” (Bush, 2004a) and
opposed to “almost any principle of civilisation” (Bush, 2007a). As “the civilised world face[d]
unprecedented dangers” (Bush, 2002a) and “civilisation itself (...) [was] threatened” (Bush, 2001e)
this was nothing else than “civilisation's fight” (Bush, 2001b).
Leaving the explicitly articulated signs aside, the spatial location of ‘Al Qaeda’ as presented in
Bush’s rhetoric might appear at first glance quite tough to unveil because of both the characteristics
of “terrorism” as an abstract political entity (Hansen, 2006; 48) and the particularities of the identity
representation in the War on Terror as a basic discourse. For starters, Bush’s official speech makes
a differentiation of Al Qaeda’s spatial circumvention as for its origins, on the one hand, and the
extension of its influence –or territories from which they gain ‘supporters’-, on the other hand.
In tracking ‘Al Qaeda’s origins’, former American President stated that the responsible for
September 11 were “some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania
and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole” (Bush, 2001b). The 9/11 Commission
Report also made reference to the same events whilst connecting them to Osama Bin Laden. The
Saudi Arabian was the “inspirer and organiser of the new terrorism”6
, recruiting and training what
later on became known as Al Qaida began in Sudan and Afghanistan7
.
George W. Bush continued locating Al Qaeda’s extension of influence, encompassing “many other
organisations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan” (Bush, 2001b). According to the Republican President, “there [were]
thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They [were] recruited from their own
nations and neighbourhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they [were]
trained in the tactics of terror” (Bush, 2001b).
Although former Head of State did not go any further outlining which the countries subject to Al
Qaeda’s ‘influence’ were, he considered that the “free people” were not to be drawn to “violent
and malignant ideology” (Bush, 2007a). Additionally, the majorities of tyrannies and dictatorships,
6
Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. (2011), pp. 108
7
Ibid. pp. 109

25. 25
according to the official discourse, were to be found in the Middle East. That was the reason why it
was mainly the Middle East the one to be “transformed” so as to “benefit the entire world by
undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands” (Bush, 2003b).
As for the temporal location of ‘Al Qaeda’, there are two constructions that come together. Firstly,
Al Qaeda’ as ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, ‘violent’, and ‘evil’ ‘uncivilized’ depicts an identity temporally
located as ‘backwards, primitive, or less developed’ than the Selves. This is reinforced by the
reference to ‘terrorism’ as a renewed version of “murderous ideologies of the 20th
century” which
are understood to have been “eliminated after Second World War” in the light of “freedom”,
“peace” and “justice” (Bush, 2001b). Secondly, there is a sense of intransience attached to ‘Al
Qaeda’ when understood as ‘against civilisation’, incapable of change and permanently subject to
its state of ‘evilness’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘primitiveness’. As former American President remarked, the
terrorist had to be seen “for what they [were]” understanding that “no concession could ever satisfy
their ambitions” (Bush, 2008b).
 ‘TALIBAN REGIME’ OTHER
Simultaneously to references of ‘Al Qaeda’, the Bush Administration pointed out to the Taliban
Regime’s role in September 11 attacks. They were “servants of terrorism” (Bush, 2003b),
“sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists” (Bush, 2001b). Particularly, they had
“harboured terrorists” (Bush, 2006b) whilst making “Afghanistan the primary training base of ‘Al
Qaeda’ killers” (Bush, 2004a).
As ‘sponsoring’, ‘sheltering’, ‘supplying’, ‘serving’ and ‘harbouring’ members of the ‘Al Qaeda’
was not seeing in the official rhetoric as pure ‘negligence’ but rather as an ‘active support’ to the
organisation ’s goals they were discursively treated as ‘equals’. The US President articulated it
explicitly: “the Taliban are now learning this lesson: that regime and the terrorists who support it
are now virtually indistinguishable” (Bush, 2001e). In this way, by a process of equating, signs
explicitly attached to the ‘Al Qaeda’ Other were semantically transferred to the ‘Taliban Regime’
Other, which therefore also became ‘evil’, ‘radical’, ‘uncivilized’, etc.

26. 26
The Taliban Regime’s inside-borders behaviour was also ‘repelled’ by the official speech, portrayed
as an ‘outlaw’, ‘tyrannical’, ‘brutal’ and ‘oppressive regime’. The “tyranny of the Taliban” (Bush,
2008a), the “outlaw regime in Kabul” (Bush, 2004b), the “brutal Taliban Regime” (Bush, 2006b)
was responsible for “brutalizing women” (Bush, 2001e) and submitting “millions of Afghans” to
“oppression” (Bush, 2001e).
Although the spatial location seems quite clear and leaves no grounds for doubts –the geographical
borders of the State of Afghanistan as defined in the 21st
century-, temporally there is an
interesting construction to highlight. It is understood that by attaching to the ‘Taliban Regime’
features linked to ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘condemning’ the rapport with its own population, Bush’s official
speech presents once again an Otherness located in a temporally previous state of development in
relation to ‘The US’ Self and ‘International Community’ Self. However, the framing of the
Taliban’s capacity to ‘change’ and ‘progress’ did not correspond to the one attached to the ‘Al
Qaeda’ Other.
Initially, the American administration resorted to a list of demands for the ‘Taliban Regime’ as
‘provisional measures’ before resorting to war, being amongst others “delivering (...) all the leaders
of ‘Al Qaeda’ who hide in [their] land (...), clos[ing] immediately and permanently every terrorist
training camp in Afghanistan, and hand[ing] over every terrorist, and every person in their support
structure, to appropriate authorities” (Bush, 2001b). Even after the first incursion into Afghan
territory, the Press questioned whether the bombing would stop if the Taliban turned over Bin
Laden, to what President Bush responded: “we still have the same objective. And that is, for the
Taliban to hand over Al Qaeda” (Bush, 2001d).
Giving the ‘Taliban Regime’ such possibility of ‘redeeming itself’ by making the ‘right choice’
speaks for a temporal location where the ‘possibility of change’ is still there. This is maintained
even after Osama Bin Laden was not handed over to the US, moment when President Bush stated:
“we must defeat the evil doers where they hide (...) I gave them ample opportunity to turn over ‘Al
Qaeda’ (...) they obviously refused to do so, and now they're paying a price (Bush, 2001d). For the
official discourse, The Taliban ended up suffering the ‘consequences of making the incorrect
decision’, but had always the opportunity to do otherwise –and change, progress-.

27. 27
 ‘AFGHAN PEOPLE’ OTHER
The ‘Afghan People’ identity representation is recited in Bush’s discourse as the ‘other side of the
coin’ of the State of Afghanistan whilst maintaining its character of Otherness. The ‘Afghan
People’ “practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c). The “United States respects the people of
Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001b), as they are “themselves the victims of a repressive regime” (Bush,
2001d), “have been brutalised; many are starving and many have fled” (Bush, 2001a). They are an
“oppressed people” (Bush, 2001c); the “suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan”
(Bush, 2001c).
One of the key aspects of the ‘Afghan People’ Other is that, whilst being temporally situated in a
previous, underdeveloped state than ‘The US’ and ‘International Community Selves’, this is
framed as an imposed condition by the ‘Taliban Regime’, not an intrinsic and unchangeable
characteristic. For instance, after the Taliban were out of power, former American Head of State
described “the men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation that is free and proud” (Bush,
2004a) which lead to a new “Afghanistan (...) now [ruled] by the freely elected Government of
Afghanistan” (Bush, 2006b), leaving ‘oppression’ and ‘brutality’ behind.
 ‘THE US’SELF
‘The US’ Self is construed with great richness and complexity; being presented as one entity which
is discursively split into different spheres to stabilise each paired identity representation. As for ‘Al
Qaeda’, ‘The US’ enjoys a parallel role of ‘victim’ and ‘target’ of the ‘terrorist attacks’ and key
events of 9/11. That day, it “fellow citizens, way of life, and very freedom came under attack in a
series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts (...) America was targeted” (Bush, 2001a).
‘The US’ Self is also portrayed as assuming a role of ‘leadership’ and it was “because of American
leadership and resolve, [that] the world [was] changing for the better” (Bush, 2004a). A leading
role was presented almost as an ‘inevitable’ and ‘natural’ position, since American leadership was
“the only way to secure the peace” (Bush, 2006a) and “the only alternative to American leadership
[was] a dramatically more dangerous and anxious world” (Bush, 2006a).

28. 28
As one might predict, ‘The US’ leading role is construed around the diametrically opposed side of
the ‘ideological spectrum’ that ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘terrorism’ itself were thought to represent.
According to President Bush, ‘The US’ represented “moderate people who work for peace” (Bush,
2006b), “free people” (Bush, 2003a), “a compassionate nation” (Bush, 2001d). Contrary to the
‘lawless violence’ resorted to by the ‘Al Qaeda’ Other, America made use of “every lawful and
proper tool of (...) military action” (Bush, 2007a). Contrary to ‘totalitarianism’, America stands for
a “democratically elected government” (Bush, 2001a).
Comparatively, ‘The US’ is ‘tolerant’ and ‘respectful’ not only of ‘Islam’ but to ‘every religion’.
In the official discourse, ‘The US’ did not “fight a war against Islam or Muslims” and did not
“hold any religion accountable”. By defending “freedom of religion” (Bush, 2001b) what made the
“nation so strong” and what would “ultimately defeat terrorist activity” was ‘The US’ “willingness
to tolerate people of different faiths” (Bush, 2001d).
Naturally, in the battle against ‘evil’ America had “good intentions” and would achieve “good
outcomes” (Bush, 2003b). Former Head of State celebrated “how good” America was and how
they would “overcome evil with greater good” (Bush, 2002a). Accordingly, in the struggle against
the ‘uncivilized’ and those ‘against civilisation’, it is implicit that America is presented as
‘civilised’ and the ‘defender of civilisation’, in connection with the leading role it had assumed.
Additionally, ‘The US’ assumed the contrary mission than the ‘Taliban Regime’ towards
‘terrorism’. It was determined to “prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (Bush, 2002a); “track
terrorist threats” (Bush, 2008a), “fight radicalism” (Bush, 2004b), “defeat the terrorists on the
battlefield”- (Bush, 2005b) and “destroy terror networks wherever they operate” (Bush, 2004b).
Inside borders, ‘The US’ government was not only ‘legitimate’ –being the very aim of ‘terror’ to
“threaten the stability of legitimate governments” like America (Bush, 2001d)- but it also embodied
precise values: the ‘rule of law’, the defence of ‘human dignity’ and ‘human freedom’. As framed
to the UN General Assembly, ‘The US’ appeared committed to “the equal value and dignity of
every human life”, which was “honoured by the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect
for women, protection of private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance”
(Bush, 2004b).

29. 29
Regarding the ‘Afghan People’, ‘American’ people were ‘multi-religious and multi-ethnical’ –or
in Bush’s terms, there were “Americans of all races and backgrounds” (Bush, 2005a)-. American’
people’s ‘great force’ lied on “freedom and prosperity” (Bush, 2006a) which made them a
“compassionate, decent, hopeful society” (Bush, 2006a). Their ‘great strength’ was “the heroic
kindness, courage, and self-sacrifice of the American people” (Bush, 2007a).
Spatially located within the geographical bounds of the United States of America as defined in the
21st
century and temporally construed as a ‘capable of change’ and ‘more developed, advanced,
ahead in time’ in relation to each Otherness, it is the ethical sphere of ‘The US’ Self the one
diverging according to each case of paired identity representation.
Because of the characteristics attached to both the ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ Other,
there is a sense of ethical responsibility channelled in a way that ‘The US’ Self faces the need of
defeating, fighting and/or destroying them. We shall notice that such confrontative response is
not aimed to a mere ‘neutralization’, but to a rather ‘destruction’ of what is perceived as ‘evil’,
‘radical’ and ‘against civilisation’ either because of making the wrong decisions –the Taliban- or
because of being unable to change –Al Qaeda-.
Conversely, the sense of ethical responsibility towards the ‘Afghan People’ Other is envisaged as a
more accommodative response; with ‘The US’ Self facing the need of liberating, setting them
free. Setting the ‘Afghan People’ free from an oppressive regime is seen as a requirement to set the
conditions which bring about change, “because free people embrace hope over resentment and
choose peace over violence” (Bush, 2003b).
There is more to it. Not only ‘The US’ Self embraces such ethical responsibility for granting self-
protection, but also because it ‘leads’ a ‘mission’ on behalf of the entire ‘international community’.
In words of George W. Bush, this is an uncalled yet praiseworthy mission –America had “not ask
for this mission”, but it was an “honour in history's call” (Bush, 2001e)-. The mission, whilst
setting an example of “how to fight the new wars of the 21st century” (Bush, 2001d), aimed at
pursuing the “advance of human freedom” (Bush, 2001b) not only for American people but for
“people everywhere” (Bush, 2001c)

30. 30
 ‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’SELF
The key characteristic of the ‘International Community’ Self in the official speech is its explicit
equation with what ‘The US’ Self stands for, importing its attached signs from the later to the
former in a process of equating. To begin with, it represents ‘civilisation’ and the ‘civilised world’,
for this was not “just America's fight” and what was a stake was not just “America's freedom”
(Bush, 2001b). This was “the world's fight (...) civilisation's fight” (Bush, 2001b).
Moreover, it embodied the same ideology which ‘The US’ defended since “this [was] the fight of all
who believe[d] in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush, 2001b) as well as “hope
and order, law and life”, commitments which “unite people across cultures and continents” and
upon which “depend all peace and progress” (Bush, 2001e).
The temporal location –‘advanced’, ‘developed’, and ‘ahead’ of time- and ethical responsibility of
the ‘International Community’ Self -‘defeating’ Al Qaeda and the Taliban whilst ‘liberating’ the
Afghan People- are shared with ‘The US’ Self. As for its spatial location, one might assume that a
priori it is construed to assume a global extension. However, in Bush’s official rhetoric it is
confined to the geographical boundaries of the political entities complying with its discursively
construed features –e.g civilized entities, representing pluralism, tolerance and freedom- whilst
discarding those unable and unwilling to abide them. Accordingly, each identity representation
portrayed as Otherness would not be part of this discursively constructed Self.
THE PARTICULAR CASE OF “FRIEND”/“ENEMY” SIGNS AND THE DEGREES OF OTHERNESS
One key feature of Bush’s rhetoric that we have not remarked so far is the largely studied reference
to a ‘friend/ enemy’ duality. As a matter of fact, there are plenty of CTS scholars dwelling on it,
mostly –but not only- from a Schmittean perspective8
. There is, however, an additional feature to
point out to if we decide to understand such binary construction in the light of the different degrees
of Otherness in the identity representation of the former American President discourse.
8
See, for example, the above-mentioned Ralph, J. (2009) (2013); Tagma, H. M. (2009); Van Munster (2004) for the specific case of Carl
Schmitt’s categories applied to the War on Terror. See, for example, Odysseos & Petito (Eds.) (2007) for a broader overview of
contemporary International Politics under a ‘Schmittean outlook’. Jackson (2005), Tsui (2014), Solheim (2006) also highlight the „friend/
enemy“ construction without necessarily rooting it into Schmitt’s formulation.

31. 31
In effect, an speech that resorts to the idea of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ in the way George Bush does
might appear to portray an image of enclosed dichotomy, and ‘Us’/’Them’ zero-sum game with no
place for ambiguities. After all, Head of State had warned: “either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists” (Bush, 2001), and “between these alternatives, there is no neutral ground” (Bush,
2003a). Nonetheless, the five-folded identity structure of the American official discourse contains
more than one degree of Otherness, whilst not every Other is in effect an ‘enemy’.
Both ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ fit an expected outcome. For starters, the “enemy is a
radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them” (Bush, 2001b); both of
them conceived as ‘radical threatening/ risky Otherness’ against the ‘The US’ Self and the
‘International Community Self’ –seen, for example, in UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 of
September 12th
2001 or Resolution 1378 of November 14h 2001, adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter-. Additionally, America’s “staunch friends [and] allies” (Bush, 2001b) are located in the
‘International Community’ Self since “the civilised world is rallying to America's side” (Bush,
2001b).
However, what it is interesting to see is the role of the ‘Afghan People’. Framed as a rather
‘different and underdeveloped Other’ -some sort of ambiguous identity still not part of
‘International Community’ Self but different from the ‘radical Otherness’- it is America’s ‘friend’.
President Bush said: “The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and [] almost
a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c), therefore hinting the possibility
of finding an ‘ally’ not only in ‘Us’, but also ‘Them’. This will have a clear interlink with the
policies formulated.
OTHERNESS SPATIAL LOCATION TEMPORAL LOCATION
US/ INT. COM
ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DEGREE OF OTHERNESS
AL QAEDA
TERRORIST
ORGANISATION
SUDAN/AFGHANISTAN
MIDDLE EAST
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
INTRANSCIENT
DEFEATING,
FIGHTING,
DESTROYING
THEM
RADICAL,
THREATENING/
RISKY OTHER,
ENEMY
TALIBAN REGIME
STATE OF
AFGHANISTAN
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
INTRANSCIENT
DEFEATING,
FIGHTING,
DESTROYING
THEM
RADICAL,
THREATENING/
RISKY OTHER,
ENEMY
AFGHAN PEOPLE
STATE OF
AFGHANISTAN
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
CAPABLE OF
CHANGE
LIBERATING,
SETTING
THEM FREE
DIFFERENT,
UNDERDEVELOPED
OTHER, FRIEND

32. 32
AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION
ATTACKERS
LEADERS
IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM,
RADICALISM, FEAR, LAWLESS
VIOLENCE, TOTALITARISM
EVIL
BLASPHEMY, TREASON,
DISSEASE, TO ISLAM
AND EVERY RELIGION
UNCIVILISED,
AGAINST CIVILISATION
VICTIMS
GOOD
IDEOLOGY OF MODERATION,
FREEDOM/ LIBERTY,
COMPASSION, LAWFUL MILITARY
ACTION, DEMOCRACY
RESPECFUL, TOLERANT
TO ISLAM AND EVERY
RELIGION
CIVILISED,
DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION
LEADERS
UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
PROCESS OF LINKING
PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATING
PROCESS OF EQUATING

33. 33
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TALIBAN REGIME
UNITED STATES
SPONSORING, SHELTERING,
SUPPLYING, SERVING AND
HARBOURING TERRORISTS
IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM,
RADICALISM, FEAR, LAWLESS
VIOLENCE, TOTALITARISM
OUTLAW, TYRANNICAL,
BRUTAL, OPPRESSIVE REGIME
BLASPHEMY, TREASON,
DISSEASE, TO ISLAM
AND EVERY RELIGION
UNCIVILISED,
AGAINST CIVILISATION
LEGITIMATE REGIME, RULE
OF LAW, HUMAN DIGNITY,
HUMAN FREEDOM
IDEOLOGY OF MODERATION,
FREEDOM/ LIBERTY,
COMPASSION, LAWFUL MILITARY
ACTION, DEMOCRACY
RESPECFUL, TOLERANT
TO ISLAM AND EVERY
RELIGION
CIVILISED,
DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION
PREVENTS, TRACKS,
FIGHTS, DEFEATS,
DESTROYS, TERRORISM
AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION

34. 34
 POLICIES PROPOSED
Much can and has been said about the policies planned by the post-9/11 American Administration.
What matters in our analysis is to remember that it is in connection to the Selves and Otherness that
George W. Bush proposed to the audience a set of measures that, first and foremost, can be unveiled
as a single multi-faceted, semi-stable structure founded on interlinked concepts, ‘construing’ the
nature and justification for the course of action.
“It is war...” When first facing the expectant audience in and out America’s borders, George W.
Bush did not hesitate in labelling September 11 key events as an “act of war” (Bush, 2001b), hence
gathering “America, [] friends and allies (...) together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush,
2001a).
AFGHAN PEOPLE
RESPECTED ISLAMIC PEOPLE VICTIMS, BRUTALIZED, OPPRESSED,
STARVING, SUFFERING, HOPELESS
UNITED STATES
MULTI-RELIGIOUS AND MULTI-
ETHNICAL PEOPLE
FREE, PROSPER,
COMPASSIONATE, HOPEFUL
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

35. 35
Legal ‘shelter’ was sought under Article 51 of the UN Charter9
; the provision recognizing the
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations” which sets an exception to the prohibition on the threat and use of force
under Article 2 (4) of the Charter.
The resort to collective self-defence was channelled through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, a ‘political and military alliance’ for cooperation in the ‘field of security and defence’
originally established on April 4th
, 1949 between North American and European countries10
. This
intergovernmental organisation –that is, in which each state member maintains its sovereign
competences (Klabbers, 2015; 27)- appeared to George Bush as “reflect[ing] best the attitude of the
world” as “an attack on one is an attack on all” (Bush, 2001b). Indeed, Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty encourages each member state to assist “the Party or Parties so attacked” by taking
“such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. 9/11 brought nothing else
than its first invocation.
“A different type of war” If the jus ad bellum –or the “right to war”- in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 sought to be justified in relatively ‘conservative terms’ as for its compliance with
international legal standards, the official American speech carefully ‘warned’ that this type of war
would be a different ‘kind’ than the ones waged before.
What had changed according to the Bush administration? First, the ‘nature of the attack’; which was
‘indiscriminate’ –“on thousands of civilians”- (Bush, 2001b), ‘unexpected’ and ‘on American soil’
–“at the centre of a great city on a peaceful morning”- (Bush, 2001b). Second, the ‘nature of the
adversary’; a partly known -America had “seen their kind before” (Bush, 2001b)- two-folded
enemy: Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime.
Thus, what was to be expected was a true “unconventional war” (Bush, 2001d), a “new and
different war” (Bush, 2001d), a “guerrilla war” (Bush, 2001d), an “asymmetric war” (Bush, 2001d)
calling for “a different type of approach and a different type of mentality” (Bush, 2001d); one that
will use “conventional forces” but will also require “to fight on all fronts” (Bush, 2001d).
9
See in: United States House of Representatives, Joint Resolution 23, 107th
Congress, (2001-2002)
10
See in: What is NATO?, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Website, (n.d)

36. 36
“A multi-purpose war” To begin with, the War on Terror aimed at achieving multiple purposes
in consonance with the ethical responsibility of the Selves, that is; the need of fighting, defeating
and destroying ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ whilst liberating and setting free the ‘Afghan
population’.
“A defensive and preventive war” Moreover, there was the intention of carrying out in parallel
‘defensive’/‘re-active’ measures and ‘preventive’/ ‘pro-active’ exceptional measures not only in
front of an ‘established and actual threat’ but also in relation to a ‘potential risk’; in and out
domestic borders and resorting to a broader spectrum of means than solely military strikes.
On October 7th
, 2001 former President Bush informed the American people that ‘The US’ had
begun “strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan” in a joint operation with allies such as “Canada, Australia, Germany and
France” (Bush, 2001c). The reference was being made to the well-known ‘Operation Enduring
Freedom’, carried by a multinational coalition forged for deploying land, sea, and air military forces
and sharing intelligence assets11
.
Operation Enduring Freedom was actually preceded by the ‘Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team’ -
deployed on September 26th
, 2001 integrated by over CIA’s Special Activities Division agents12
-
and the ‘Task Force Dagger’ -deployed in earlier October 2001, integrated by members of the 5th
Special Forces Group13
-. Ultimately, it ‘dismantled’ the ‘Taliban Regime’ in early December when
retrieving from the city of Kandahar and defeated and dispersed members of the ‘Al Qaeda terrorist
organisation’ who mainly flew to the neighbour country of Pakistan.
Claiming that “the Islamic ‘street’ greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration” (Bush,
2002a), the official speech transmitted a sense of double success in accomplishing the
‘responsibilities’ towards the ‘Taliban Regime’ and the ‘Afghan People’. Nonetheless, ‘Al Qaeda’
as a radical Other was an “existential threat” (Buzan et al., 1998) and “risk” (Van Munster, 2004)
(Van Munster & Ardau, 2009) which required of ‘parallel via’ to be applied domestically.
11
See in: Gerleman, D. J. et al. (2001), pp. 1
12
See in: Schroen, G. (2005), pp. 30
13
See in: Operation Enduring Freedom, at Special Forces Association Official Website, (n.d)

37. 37
There was, however, some inner instability in George Bush’s construction. At times, he would still
label as “defensive measures” responses towards “any attacks that may come” (Bush, 2001b) –
which a priori are to be understood as a ‘risk’ of ‘potential attack’-. In other examples, the official
rhetoric would make a more clear transition from a re-active to a pro-active approach when stating:
“we will come together to (...) prevent hijacking [and] know the plans of terrorists before they act,
and to find them before they strike” (Bush, 2001b), or warning: “the government is taking strong
precautions” (Bush, 2001c).
Particularly, and given that ‘Al Qaeda’ required the coordinated action of the entire national body,
President Bush advocated for the creation of national organs as the ‘Department of Homeland
Security’ which integrated 22 different agencies and federal departments14
and the ‘Terrorist Threat
Integration Center’15
which was later on replaced by the ‘National Counterterrorism Center’16
, with
the aim of “merg[ing] and analyz[ing] all threat information in a single location” (Bush, 2003a).
Preventive measures within borders were to be focused on “four key areas: bioterrorism;
emergency response; airport and border security; and improved intelligence” (Bush, 2002). The
last two areas offer an interesting inside. Airport and border security was federalized by creating the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)17
in charge of supervising transit via highways,
railways, ports, and domestic airports.
Moreover, the US Border Patrol whose priority mission is “preventing terrorists and terrorists
weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States”18
went under
control of the Department of Homeland Security whilst the government promised “doubling [its]
size (...) and funding new infrastructure and technology” (Bush, 2007a). Indeed, border control
appeared as a matter of higher priority for ‘preventing’ the ‘entrance’ of the radical Other, spatially
understood as a ‘foreign element’ ought to be kept outside national borders.
With regards to improvement of intelligence, there are two main official introductions: the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp. Firstly, the official version was that the
USA PATRIOT Act was conceived as an “essential tool (...) which allows federal law enforcement
to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets”
14
Homeland Security Act, Pub. Law 107–296, 116 STAT. 2135 (2002)
15
Exec. Order n° 13354, 69 Fed. Reg. 169 (27th
August 2004)
16
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. Law 108-458, 118 STAT. 3638 (2004)
17
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. Law 107-71, 115 STAT. 597 (2001)
18
See in: Border Patrol History, US Customs and Border Protection Official Website

38. 38
(Bush, 2004a). However, a point of instability is to be found as ‘suspects’ rather than ‘terrorists’
were the target of the legal reform; designed for, inter alia, ‘seizing funds of foreign persons,
organisations and countries suspected of being involved in terrorist attacks’ (Title I); ‘incorporating
and/or increasing the use of surveillance mechanisms as warrantless searches, trapping and
intercepting communications’ (Title II); and ‘increasing the power of federal migration authorities
to ban people suspected of being involved with terrorist organisation from entering the country’.19
Secondly, the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, in words of former Secretary of Defence Donald
H. Rumsfeld, had been installed as a “temporal facility” detention of “extremely dangerous men”
for the purposes of “interrogation”, “gathering intelligence information”, and “law enforcement
information” (Rumsfeld, 2002). It is here where the construction of a risky, dangerous, potentiality
threatening but still unidentified Other can be clearly devised.
“A global and perpetual war” Additionally, former American Administration’s approach
deliberately set a ‘temporally and spatially unenclosed battlefield’ calling for a ‘global’ and
‘perpetual war’; once again connected to the ‘expansionist’ nature of ‘Al Qaeda’ Other. “We are
looking for Al Qaeda cells around the world” had stated former American President (Bush, 2001d),
for “these enemies view the entire world as a battlefield and we must pursue them wherever they
are” (Bush, 2002a). The Selves had become engaged in a “long war against terrorist activity”, a
“lengthy campaign, unlike any other [America] had ever seen” (Bush, 2001d).
“A lawful and just war” Finally, there is a particular hoisting of the idea of a ‘lawful’ and ‘just’
war, which the official speech treated as coexistent and differential features. We shall remember
that ‘The US’ Self had been described as resorting to “lawful military action” and had sought for
legal shelter regarding the ‘right to war’ –jus ad bellum-. With regards to the ‘right in war’ –jus in
bello-, the official speech pronounced itself over two issues.
As for the qualification of ‘the armed conflict’, George W. Bush initially stated to comply with “the
legal conclusion of the Department of Justice” which determined that “none of the provisions of
Geneva appl[ied] to [America’s] conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the
world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda [was] not a High Contracting Party to Geneva”
(Bush, 2002b).
19
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. Law 107-
56, 115 STAT. 272 (2001)

39. 39
As for the ‘means and methods at war’, it was sustained that despite the legal debate around the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions, ‘The US’ was still resorting to “every lawful and effective
measure to protect [the] country” (Bush, 2008a). It was highlighted, for instance, that the treatment
of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay -although considered “unlawful combatants”- was “humane” in
compliance with international bodies of law (Rumsfeld & Pace, 2002).
In addition, the War on Terror was not only a matter of what was ‘lawful’, but more importantly a
matter of what was ‘just’ and ‘right’; surpassing the traditional framing of exceptional measures as
‘needed’ for assuring the State’s ‘survival’ (Buzan et al., 1998) Repeatedly, American Head of State
transmitted to the audience: “I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just”
(Bush, 2002a); “I am assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come”
(Bush, 2001b). This ‘just cause’ was ‘ancient’ and ‘well-known’, since “freedom and fear, justice
and cruelty, [had] always been at war” (Bush, 2001b). It represented “the cause of all mankind”
(Bush, 2004a); bringing the ‘good’ Selves and ‘evil’ Otherness against each other without ground
for neutrality as “God [was] not neutral between them” (Bush, 2001b).
3. A. II. Introductions and transformations from 2002 on
It is on top of the semantic structure defined in the right aftermath of 9/11 that a series of discursive
introductions and transformations were set both in terms of identities and policies increasing the
level of complexity. A five-folded identity representation was maintained, now gathering together
‘Al Qaeda’, the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ –in replacement of the ‘Taliban Regime’, and the ‘Oppressed
Peoples’ –in replacement of the ‘Afghanistan People’- as Otherness; and ‘The US’ and the
‘International Community’ –whose ethical locations are expanded- as Selves. As for the policies
proposed, additions and modifications occur in terms of the understanding of a “multipurpose”,
“defensive/ preventive”, “lawful/ just” war.
 ‘OUTLAW REGIMES OTHER’ AND ‘OPPRESSED PEOPLE OTHER’
In replacement of the ‘Taliban Regime’, George W. Bush resorts to a much broader, heterogeneous
‘radical, threatening/ risky Other’ and ‘enemy’. In official words: “the gravest danger in the war on
terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is [now] outlaw regimes” (Bush, 2003a).

40. 40
The differential characteristic of ‘Outlaw Regimes’ was that they “seek[ed] and possess[ed]
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons” (Bush, 2003a); which was understood as illegitimate
and dangerous. Firstly, it came at odds with international provisions of nuclear non-proliferation –
e.g. ‘Outlaw Regimes’ were not part of the Five Nuclear States as defined in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1968- and prohibitions on the acquisition, possession and use of chemical and biological
weapons –e.g. Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 and Biological Weapons Convention of
1975-. Secondly, the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ could “use such weapons for blackmail, terror and mass
murder” or “give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies” (Bush, 2003a).
Certain signs initially attached to the ‘Taliban Regime’ were exported to this new identity, for they
were also considered potential ‘sponsors’, ‘shelters’, ‘suppliers’, and ‘harbours’ of terrorists. They
stand next to the ‘uncivilised’/ ‘against civilisation’ ideological side of the struggle based on
‘extremism’, ‘fear’ and ‘radicalism’, for terrorist –as it reads above- were their ‘allies’. They
represented the ‘evil’ side –recalling the famous reference to the “Axis of Evil” (Bush, 2002a)-.
Inside borders, they were also condemned as ‘dictatorial’, ‘repressive’ regimes (Bush, 2002a)
Whilst maintaining a ‘backward intransient’ temporal profile, ‘Outlaw Regimes’ were no longer
spatially conscripted to a certain geographical area but appeared as an open category applying to
any ‘Regime’ fitting the semantic description. There are, however, specific examples as the famous
North Korea, Iran and Iraq triad (Bush, 2002a). This is coupled with a general reference to the
‘East’ as more prone to host ‘Outlaw Regimes’ seen, for example, when American Head of State
transmitted: “we also hear doubts that democracy is a realistic goal for the greater Middle East,
where freedom is rare (...) as long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny, and despair, and
anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and our
friends” (Bush, 2004a).
Comparatively, there was a similar discursive abstraction when the ‘Afghan People’ was replaced
by a broader identity category exporting some of its signs to the ‘Oppressed Peoples’ Other. This
‘different and underdeveloped Other’, ‘friend’ of America, encompassed the ‘victims’, ‘brutalized’,
‘oppressed’, ‘starving’, ‘suffering’, and ‘hopeless’ peoples.
Temporally still backwards in relation to the Selves but capable of overcoming such state; it is
spatially open to every location where the official speech discursively identify the lack of
‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’. As posed by George W. Bush: there is a “call of history to deliver

41. 41
the oppressed” (Bush, 2006a) because “when it comes to the desire for liberty and justice, there is
no clash of civilisations. People everywhere are capable of freedom, and worthy of freedom” (Bush,
2004b).
 ‘THE US’ SELF AND ‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’ SELF: ETHICAL EXPANSION
In the face of newly construed Otherness, ‘The US’ Self also suffered transformations as for its
ethical location vis a vis the ‘Oppressed Peoples’. Whilst there were no major changes from the
‘Taliban Regime’ to the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ –they needed to be ‘defeated’, since “this threat is new;
[but] America's duty is familiar” (Bush, 2003a)-, the ‘Oppressed People’ needed not only to be ‘set
free’ but also a more comprehensive ‘national building and reconstructing process’.
For instance, right in the beginning, President Bush had stated that “it would be a useful function
for the United Nations to take over the so-called nation- building (...) after [America’s] military
mission [was] complete” (Bush, 2001d). Paradoxically, only one year later the Bush Administration
informed without hesitation: “America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We will be
partners in rebuilding that country” (Bush, 2002).
It was clear that such ‘ethical location’ and sense of responsibility grasped the whole ‘Oppressed
People’ identity representation when the Head of State promised that, with America’s help,
“millions will see that freedom, equality, and material progress are possible at the heart of the
Middle East. Leaders in the region will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open
societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity” (Bush, 2003b).
Despite the fact that ‘The US’ was supposed to “lead toward this vision where all are created equal
and free to pursue their dreams” (Bush, 2007b), it was a shared responsibility with the
‘International Community’. After all, “The U.N.'s founding members laid out great and honourable
goals in the charter they drafted six decades ago”, goals to which the ‘International Community’
had to “remain committed to” whilst “continu[ing] to work to ease suffering and to spread
freedom” (Bush, 2005a).

42. 42
OTHERNESS SPATIAL LOCATION TEMPORAL LOCATION
US/ INT. COM ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DEGREE OF
OTHERNESS
AL QAEDA
TERRORIST
ORGANISATION
SUDAN/AFGHANISTAN
MIDDLE EAST
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
INTRANSCIENT
DEFEATING,
FIGHTING,
DESTROYING
THEM
RADICAL,
THREATENING/
RISKY OTHER,
ENEMY
OUTLAW
REGIMES
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN,
IRAQ, NORTH
KOREA; ECC.
OPEN IDENTITY
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
INTRANSCIENT
DEFEATING,
FIGHTING,
DESTROYING
THEM
RADICAL,
THREATENING/
RISKY OTHER,
ENEMY
OPPRESSED
PEOPLE
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN,
IRAQ, NORTH
KOREA, ECC.
OPEN IDENTITY
UNDERDEVELOPED,
PRIMITIVE
CAPABLE OF
CHANGE
LIBERATING
THEM, SECURING
AND REBUILDING
THEIR COUNTRY
DIFFERENT,
UNDERDEVELO
PED OTHER,
FRIEND
VICTIMS, BRUTALIZED, OPPRESSED,
STARVING, SUFFERING, HOPELESS
FREE, PROSPER,
COMPASSIONATE, HOPEFUL
UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
OPPRESSED PEOPLES
AFGHAN PEOPLE

43. 43
OUTLAW REGIMES
UNITED STATES
SPONSORING, SHELTERING,
SUPPLYING, SERVING AND
HARBOURING TERRORISTS
IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM,
RADICALISM, FEAR,
LAWLESS VIOLENCE,
TOTALITARISM
OUTLAW, TYRANNICAL, BRUTAL,
OPPRESSIVE REGIME
ILLEGITIMATE SEEKERS AND
POSSESORS OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
UNCIVILIZED,
AGIANST CIVILISATION
LEGITIMATE REGIME, RULE
OF LAW, HUMAN DIGNITY,
HUMAN FREEDOM
IDEOLOGY OF
MODERATION, FREEDOM/
LIBERTY, COMPASSION,
LAWFUL MILITARY ACTION,
DEMOCRACY
ONE OF THE “FIVE
NUCLEAR STATES”
CIVILIZED,
DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION
PREVENTS, TRACKS,
FIGHTS, DEFEATS,
DESTROYS,
TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
TALIBAN REGIMES