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Encryption: It's For More Than Just Passwords

The document discusses various aspects of encryption and password security, emphasizing the importance of hashing and salting passwords to protect against vulnerabilities like SQL injection. It highlights modern practices such as using bcrypt for password hashing and advises against storing sensitive data that requires encryption. The document also explores different cryptographic algorithms and methods, stressing the need for strong techniques to ensure data integrity and security.

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ENCRYPTION It's For More Than Just Password
JOHN CONGDON
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com • FaxBurner.com
JOHN CONGDON • PHP Since 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com • FaxBurner.com • I am not a cryptographer
TODAY'S TOPICS Hashing & Encryption
The Evolution Of Password Maintenance
CLEAR TEXT $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == $password) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
MAJOR VULNERABILITY • Server compromise give complete username and password list • SQL-Injection does too
HASHING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASHMessage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage 1abcb33beeb811dca15f0ac3e47b88d9unicorn
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:A cryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage 1abcb33beeb811dca15f0ac3e47b88d9unicorn
MD5 EXAMPLE $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
MD5 EXAMPLE $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
AVAILABLE ALGORITHMS <?php print_r(hash_algos()); Array ( [0] => md2 [1] => md4 [2] => md5 [3] => sha1 [4] => sha224 [5] => sha256 [6] => sha384 [7] => sha512 [8] => ripemd128 [9] => ripemd160 [10] => ripemd256 [11] => ripemd320 [12] => whirlpool [13] => tiger128,3 [14] => tiger160,3 [15] => tiger192,3 [16] => tiger128,4 [17] => tiger160,4 [18] => tiger192,4 [19] => snefru [20] => snefru256 [21] => gost [22] => gost-crypto [23] => adler32 [24] => crc32 [25] => crc32b [26] => fnv132 [27] => fnv1a32 [28] => fnv164 [29] => fnv1a64 [30] => joaat [31] => haval128,3 [32] => haval160,3 [33] => haval192,3 [34] => haval224,3 [35] => haval256,3 [36] => haval128,4 [37] => haval160,4 [38] => haval192,4 [39] => haval224,4 [40] => haval256,4 [41] => haval128,5 [42] => haval160,5 [43] => haval192,5 [44] => haval224,5 [45] => haval256,5 )
VULNERABILITIES • SQL-Injection gives you hashed passwords
ADDING SALT
ADDING SALT In cryptography, a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks.
ADDING SALT In cryptography, a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks. $hash = md5('RAND_SALT' . $password);
ADDING SALT In cryptography, a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks. $hash = md5('RAND_SALT' . $password); RAND_SALT must come from a cryptographically secure source. Do not use (rand, mt_rand, uniqid) Do use (/dev/urandom, mcrypt, openssl)
$username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($user->salt . $password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used MD5+SALT EXAMPLE
function generateUserPassword ($salt_string, $password)
 {
 $str1 = substr($salt_string, 0, 8);
 $str2 = substr($salt_string, 8);
 return md5($str1 . $password . $str2);
 }
function hashPassword($password)
 {
 return sha1(
 $this->Salt1 . $password . $this->Salt2
 );
 }
USE TODAY'S STANDARDS Currently: BCrypt • Slower by design • Configurable to help withstand the test of time • Should be configured to take 0.25 to 0.50 seconds • Start with a cost of 10, use higher if possible https://github.com/johncongdon/bcrypt-cost-finder
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API http://www.php.net/manual/en/ref.password.php
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API function authenticate($user, $password) {
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 return $authenticated
 }
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API function authenticate($user, $password) {
 $authenticated = false;
 $hash = $user->password;
 if (password_verify($password, $hash)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 return $authenticated
 }
PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 if (authenticate($user, $password)) {
 if (password_needs_rehash
 ($user->password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT))
 {
 $user->password = 
 password_hash($password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT);
 $user->save();
 }
 }
I Lied: Available in PHP >= 5.3.7 https://github.com/ircmaxell/password_compat A forward compatible password API implementation that will work until you are ready to upgrade to 5.5. This will work for all versions of PHP that has the $2y fix. Upgrading to 5.5 will not break your current code if you use this library.
Want More? Get Statistics Here http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2013/01/password-storage-talk-at-php-benelux-13.html
Passwords Are Easy We don't need to know it, except for user login
ENCRYPTION
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS!
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt.
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it.
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward?
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward? Are there any alternative solutions available to you?
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward? Are there any alternative solutions available to you? Example: Credit card companies usually offer a token solution
SYMMETRIC VS ASYMMETRIC
SYMMETRIC VS ASYMMETRIC Symmetric Only one shared key Same key encrypts and decrypts Easiest to understand
SYMMETRIC VS ASYMMETRIC Symmetric Only one shared key Same key encrypts and decrypts Easiest to understand Asymmetric Two keys (Public and Private) Encryption/Decryption Public key encrypts Private key decrypts Signing/Verifying Private key signs Public key verifies
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION a.k.a. Shared-Key Encryption
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY!
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors Similar to SALT in hashing (It's not a secret)
KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES, AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors Similar to SALT in hashing (It's not a secret) Must be random per encrypted text
EXAMPLE: ENCRYPT USING CRYPT $crypt_key = 'MySecretKey';
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 $iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC
 ); $iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM);
 $cipher = mcrypt_encrypt(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 $crypt_key,
 $message,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,
 $iv
 );
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with.
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting:
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text.
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text.
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text. When Decrypting:
HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text. When Decrypting: Always verify the signature first, and then decrypt if successful.
EXAMPLE: USING HMAC $crypt_key = 'MySecretKey';
 $hmac_key = 'HashingKey';
 
 $hmac = hash_hmac('sha512', $cipher, $hmac_key);
 
 //Store it with your encrypted data
 $encoded_data = base64_encode($iv . $cipher . $hmac);
$decoded_data = base64_decode($encoded_data);
 $iv = substr($decoded_data, 0, $iv_size);
 $hmac = substr($decoded_data, -128);
 $cipher = substr($decoded_data, $iv_size, -128);
 
 if ($hmac != hash_hmac('sha512', $cipher, $hmac_key))
 {
 throw new Exception('HMAC does not match');
 }
 $message = mcrypt_decrypt(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 $crypt_key,
 $cipher,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,
 $iv
 ); EXAMPLE: DECRYPTING USING HMAC
USE A LIBRARY http://phpseclib.sourceforge.net They've done the hard parts, save yourself the headache and just use it. It's even PHP4+ compatible, so no excuses.
EXAMPLE: USING PHPSECLIB $crypt_key = 'MySecretKey';
 $hmac_key = 'HashingKey';
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 
 require 'Crypt/DES.php';
 require 'Crypt/Hash.php';
 
 $des = new Crypt_DES();
 $des->setKey($crypt_key);
 $cipher = $des->encrypt($message);
 
 $hash = new Crypt_Hash('sha512');
 $hash->setKey($hmac_key);
 $hmac = bin2hex($hash->hash($cipher));
EXAMPLE: USING PHPSECLIB require 'Crypt/DES.php';
 require 'Crypt/Hash.php';
 
 $hash = new Crypt_Hash('sha512');
 $hash->setKey($hmac_key);
 $verify_hmac = bin2hex($hash->hash($cipher));
 
 if ($verify_hmac == $hmac) {
 $des = new Crypt_DES();
 $des->setKey($crypt_key);
 $message = $des->decrypt($cipher);
 }
ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION a.k.a. Public-Key Encryption
COMMON ASYMMETRIC USES SSH Keys HTTPS / SSL PGP: Pretty Good Privacy Email Files Really any message
EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/
EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.pem -out public.pem -days 365
EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ $key = file_get_contents('public.pem');
 $public_key = openssl_get_publickey($key);
 
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 $cipher = $e = null;
 openssl_seal($message, $cipher, $e, array($public_key));
 
 $sealed_data = base64_encode($cipher);
 $envelope = base64_encode($e[0]); openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.pem -out public.pem -days 365
EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ $key = file_get_contents('private.pem');
 $priv_key = openssl_get_privatekey($key, $passphrase);
 $input = base64_decode($sealed_data);
 $einput = base64_decode($envelope);
 
 $message = null;
 openssl_open($input, $message, $einput, $priv_key);
ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION
ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Data obtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure.
ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Data obtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure. For us to encrypt/decrypt, we must have access to the key. Therefore, any breach of the system will disclose the key to the attacker, leaving ALL encryption useless.
ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Data obtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure. For us to encrypt/decrypt, we must have access to the key. Therefore, any breach of the system will disclose the key to the attacker, leaving ALL encryption useless. Apache environment variable, memory, config files, password entered during system start, etc... do not keep the key private.
AVOID ENCRYPTION AT ALL COSTS! There is no such thing as 100% secure.
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done • Think about restricting requests per second
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done • Think about restricting requests per second Paranoid about password safety? Consider encrypting the hash. Renders SQL Injection and rainbow tables/brute force mostly useless without the key.
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER Do you need access to the user's information without them on the system?
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER Do you need access to the user's information without them on the system? If your user must be present, then consider making them partially responsible for the security. Have them use a second password or passphrase that you can add to your key to use in the encryption.
FINAL WORDS... I've learned a ton while preparing this presentation. Thanks especially to Anthony Ferrara (@ircmaxell) http://blog.ircmaxell.com
THANK YOU!

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Encryption: It's For More Than Just Passwords

  • 1.
    ENCRYPTION It's For MoreThan Just Password
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer
  • 5.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online
  • 6.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com
  • 7.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com
  • 8.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com • FaxBurner.com
  • 9.
    JOHN CONGDON • PHPSince 2003 • SDPHP Organizer • Developer for Networx Online • PhoneBurner.com • MeetingBurner.com • FaxBurner.com • I am not a cryptographer
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
    CLEAR TEXT $username =$_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == $password) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
  • 13.
    MAJOR VULNERABILITY • Servercompromise give complete username and password list • SQL-Injection does too
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest.
  • 17.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH
  • 18.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASHMessage
  • 19.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage
  • 20.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage
  • 21.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage 1abcb33beeb811dca15f0ac3e47b88d9unicorn
  • 22.
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING Wikipedia Definition:Acryptographic hash function is a hash function; that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bitstring, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that any (accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash value.The data to be encoded are often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or simply the digest. HASH DigestMessage 1abcb33beeb811dca15f0ac3e47b88d9unicorn
  • 23.
    MD5 EXAMPLE $username =$_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
  • 24.
    MD5 EXAMPLE $username =$_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used
  • 25.
    AVAILABLE ALGORITHMS <?php print_r(hash_algos()); Array ( [0] =>md2 [1] => md4 [2] => md5 [3] => sha1 [4] => sha224 [5] => sha256 [6] => sha384 [7] => sha512 [8] => ripemd128 [9] => ripemd160 [10] => ripemd256 [11] => ripemd320 [12] => whirlpool [13] => tiger128,3 [14] => tiger160,3 [15] => tiger192,3 [16] => tiger128,4 [17] => tiger160,4 [18] => tiger192,4 [19] => snefru [20] => snefru256 [21] => gost [22] => gost-crypto [23] => adler32 [24] => crc32 [25] => crc32b [26] => fnv132 [27] => fnv1a32 [28] => fnv164 [29] => fnv1a64 [30] => joaat [31] => haval128,3 [32] => haval160,3 [33] => haval192,3 [34] => haval224,3 [35] => haval256,3 [36] => haval128,4 [37] => haval160,4 [38] => haval192,4 [39] => haval224,4 [40] => haval256,4 [41] => haval128,5 [42] => haval160,5 [43] => haval192,5 [44] => haval224,5 [45] => haval256,5 )
  • 26.
  • 31.
  • 32.
    ADDING SALT In cryptography,a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks.
  • 33.
    ADDING SALT In cryptography,a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks. $hash = md5('RAND_SALT' . $password);
  • 34.
    ADDING SALT In cryptography,a salt is random data that is used as an additional input to a one-way function that hashes a password or passphrase.[1]The primary function of salts is to defend against dictionary attacks versus a list of password hashes and against pre-computed rainbow table attacks. $hash = md5('RAND_SALT' . $password); RAND_SALT must come from a cryptographically secure source. Do not use (rand, mt_rand, uniqid) Do use (/dev/urandom, mcrypt, openssl)
  • 35.
    $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password= $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($user->salt . $password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 } *example only: not meant to be used MD5+SALT EXAMPLE
  • 37.
    function generateUserPassword ($salt_string, $password)
 {
 $str1= substr($salt_string, 0, 8);
 $str2 = substr($salt_string, 8);
 return md5($str1 . $password . $str2);
 }
  • 38.
  • 40.
    USE TODAY'S STANDARDS Currently:BCrypt • Slower by design • Configurable to help withstand the test of time • Should be configured to take 0.25 to 0.50 seconds • Start with a cost of 10, use higher if possible https://github.com/johncongdon/bcrypt-cost-finder
  • 41.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API http://www.php.net/manual/en/ref.password.php
  • 42.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API
  • 43.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API
  • 44.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
  • 45.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API function authenticate($user, $password) {
 $authenticated = false;
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 return $authenticated
 }
  • 46.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API function authenticate($user, $password) {
 $authenticated = false;
 $hash = $user->password;
 if (password_verify($password, $hash)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 if ($user->password == md5($password)) {
 $authenticated = true;
 }
 return $authenticated
 }
  • 47.
    PHP 5.5 PasswordHashing API $username = $_POST['username'];
 $password = $_POST['password'];
 
 $user = getUserByUsername($username);
 if (authenticate($user, $password)) {
 if (password_needs_rehash
 ($user->password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT))
 {
 $user->password = 
 password_hash($password, PASSWORD_DEFAULT);
 $user->save();
 }
 }
  • 48.
    I Lied: Availablein PHP >= 5.3.7 https://github.com/ircmaxell/password_compat A forward compatible password API implementation that will work until you are ready to upgrade to 5.5. This will work for all versions of PHP that has the $2y fix. Upgrading to 5.5 will not break your current code if you use this library.
  • 49.
    Want More? GetStatistics Here http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2013/01/password-storage-talk-at-php-benelux-13.html
  • 50.
    Passwords Are Easy Wedon't need to know it, except for user login
  • 51.
  • 53.
  • 54.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt.
  • 55.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it.
  • 56.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward?
  • 57.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward? Are there any alternative solutions available to you?
  • 58.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! Clarification: Avoid storing any data that you need to encrypt. Before deciding to collect and store this information, ask yourself why you need it. Is the risk of potentially leaking this information worth the reward? Are there any alternative solutions available to you? Example: Credit card companies usually offer a token solution
  • 59.
  • 60.
    SYMMETRIC VS ASYMMETRIC Symmetric Onlyone shared key Same key encrypts and decrypts Easiest to understand
  • 61.
    SYMMETRIC VS ASYMMETRIC Symmetric Onlyone shared key Same key encrypts and decrypts Easiest to understand Asymmetric Two keys (Public and Private) Encryption/Decryption Public key encrypts Private key decrypts Signing/Verifying Private key signs Public key verifies
  • 62.
  • 63.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY!
  • 64.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret)
  • 65.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers
  • 66.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish)
  • 67.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes
  • 68.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them)
  • 69.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book)
  • 70.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack)
  • 71.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors
  • 72.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors Similar to SALT in hashing (It's not a secret)
  • 73.
    KEYS, CIPHERS, MODES,AND IV OH MY! Keys should be easy enough (Keep it secret) Ciphers Deterministic algorithm (Ex: 3DES, Blowfish, TwoFish) Modes Determines how the key stream is used (never cross them) Avoid ECB (Electronic Code Book) Use CBC or CFB, Cipher Block Chaining / Cipher FeedBack) Initialization Vectors Similar to SALT in hashing (It's not a secret) Must be random per encrypted text
  • 74.
    EXAMPLE: ENCRYPT USINGCRYPT $crypt_key = 'MySecretKey';
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 $iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC
 ); $iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM);
 $cipher = mcrypt_encrypt(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 $crypt_key,
 $message,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,
 $iv
 );
  • 75.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE
  • 76.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with.
  • 77.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting:
  • 78.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text.
  • 79.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text.
  • 80.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text. When Decrypting:
  • 81.
    HMAC: HASH-BASED MESSAGEAUTHENTICATION CODE Using a separate key, this will give us a signature of the encryption. We can use this to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. When encrypting: Always encrypt first, and then get the signature of the Cipher Text. Store the signature with your IV and Cipher Text. When Decrypting: Always verify the signature first, and then decrypt if successful.
  • 82.
    EXAMPLE: USING HMAC $crypt_key= 'MySecretKey';
 $hmac_key = 'HashingKey';
 
 $hmac = hash_hmac('sha512', $cipher, $hmac_key);
 
 //Store it with your encrypted data
 $encoded_data = base64_encode($iv . $cipher . $hmac);
  • 83.
    $decoded_data = base64_decode($encoded_data);
 $iv= substr($decoded_data, 0, $iv_size);
 $hmac = substr($decoded_data, -128);
 $cipher = substr($decoded_data, $iv_size, -128);
 
 if ($hmac != hash_hmac('sha512', $cipher, $hmac_key))
 {
 throw new Exception('HMAC does not match');
 }
 $message = mcrypt_decrypt(
 MCRYPT_BLOWFISH,
 $crypt_key,
 $cipher,
 MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,
 $iv
 ); EXAMPLE: DECRYPTING USING HMAC
  • 84.
    USE A LIBRARY http://phpseclib.sourceforge.net They'vedone the hard parts, save yourself the headache and just use it. It's even PHP4+ compatible, so no excuses.
  • 85.
    EXAMPLE: USING PHPSECLIB $crypt_key= 'MySecretKey';
 $hmac_key = 'HashingKey';
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 
 require 'Crypt/DES.php';
 require 'Crypt/Hash.php';
 
 $des = new Crypt_DES();
 $des->setKey($crypt_key);
 $cipher = $des->encrypt($message);
 
 $hash = new Crypt_Hash('sha512');
 $hash->setKey($hmac_key);
 $hmac = bin2hex($hash->hash($cipher));
  • 86.
    EXAMPLE: USING PHPSECLIB require'Crypt/DES.php';
 require 'Crypt/Hash.php';
 
 $hash = new Crypt_Hash('sha512');
 $hash->setKey($hmac_key);
 $verify_hmac = bin2hex($hash->hash($cipher));
 
 if ($verify_hmac == $hmac) {
 $des = new Crypt_DES();
 $des->setKey($crypt_key);
 $message = $des->decrypt($cipher);
 }
  • 87.
  • 88.
    COMMON ASYMMETRIC USES SSHKeys HTTPS / SSL PGP: Pretty Good Privacy Email Files Really any message
  • 89.
  • 90.
    EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ opensslreq -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.pem -out public.pem -days 365
  • 91.
    EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ $key= file_get_contents('public.pem');
 $public_key = openssl_get_publickey($key);
 
 $message = "Do not tell my boss, but I did xyz";
 $cipher = $e = null;
 openssl_seal($message, $cipher, $e, array($public_key));
 
 $sealed_data = base64_encode($cipher);
 $envelope = base64_encode($e[0]); openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.pem -out public.pem -days 365
  • 92.
    EXAMPLE: ASYMMETRIC CODE http://codereaper.com/blog/2014/asymmetric-encryption-in-php/ $key= file_get_contents('private.pem');
 $priv_key = openssl_get_privatekey($key, $passphrase);
 $input = base64_decode($sealed_data);
 $einput = base64_decode($envelope);
 
 $message = null;
 openssl_open($input, $message, $einput, $priv_key);
  • 93.
  • 94.
    ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Dataobtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure.
  • 95.
    ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Dataobtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure. For us to encrypt/decrypt, we must have access to the key. Therefore, any breach of the system will disclose the key to the attacker, leaving ALL encryption useless.
  • 96.
    ENCRYPTION !== PROTECTION Dataobtained through SQL Injection attacks should be relatively secure. For us to encrypt/decrypt, we must have access to the key. Therefore, any breach of the system will disclose the key to the attacker, leaving ALL encryption useless. Apache environment variable, memory, config files, password entered during system start, etc... do not keep the key private.
  • 97.
    AVOID ENCRYPTION ATALL COSTS! There is no such thing as 100% secure.
  • 98.
  • 99.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server
  • 100.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity
  • 101.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data
  • 102.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done
  • 103.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done • Think about restricting requests per second
  • 104.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER • Encrypt / decrypt on a separate server • More overhead and complexity • Any server breach can still decrypt data • With enough thought and monitoring, you can kill the decryption server to limit the damage done • Think about restricting requests per second Paranoid about password safety? Consider encrypting the hash. Renders SQL Injection and rainbow tables/brute force mostly useless without the key.
  • 105.
  • 106.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER Do you need access to the user's information without them on the system?
  • 107.
    OTHER THINGS TOCONSIDER Do you need access to the user's information without them on the system? If your user must be present, then consider making them partially responsible for the security. Have them use a second password or passphrase that you can add to your key to use in the encryption.
  • 108.
    FINAL WORDS... I've learneda ton while preparing this presentation. Thanks especially to Anthony Ferrara (@ircmaxell) http://blog.ircmaxell.com
  • 109.