Password Storage And Attacking In PHP - PHP Argentina

1. Password Storage (And Attacking) In PHP Anthony Ferrara

2. “Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't break.” - Bruce Schneier

3. Github URL Follow Along: github.com/ircmaxell/password-bad-web-app A "Bad Web App" - Has Known Vulnerabilities - Only Use For Education!!! - Requires only Apache + PHP - Has Composer Dependencies

4. Let's Start From The Beginning

5. Plain-Text Storage git checkout plaintext Stores passwords in Plain-Text What's wrong with this picture?

6. Plain-Text Storage What happens if we have a SQL-Injection Vulnerability? localhost/sqli Simulates: ?offset=0'+UNION+SELECT+*+FROM+users

7. Plain-Text Storage Problem! Any attack vector results in leakage of ALL credentials!

8. We Can Do Better

9. MD5 git checkout md5 Uses the MD5 Cryptographic Hash function. md5($password) hash('md5', $password)

10. Wait, What Is A Hash?

11. What's A Cryptographic Hash? Like a fingerprint. One-way. - Easy and efficient to compute - Very inefficient to reverse - (Practically impossible) - Very hard to create collision - (new input with same output)

12. MD5 What's the problem now? SQL-Injection still gives us hash But the hash is one-way, how can we attack it?

13. Enter: Lookup Tables

14. Lookup Table Google is a great example Maps hash to password directly Database Table: hash | password --------------+----------- "5f4dcc3b..." | "password" "acbd18db..." | "foo"

15. Lookup Table Lookups are CPU efficient. Require a LOT of storage space - (Very space inefficient) All passwords <= 7 chars (95^7, 70 Trillion) Requires 1.5 PetaBytes - In Most Optimal Storage Format

16. We Can Do Better

17. Lookup Table Password Hash a4fef...

18. Rainbow Table Seed Hash Reduce Hash a4fef... Reduce New Password b741...

19. Chained Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 4 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 5 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 6 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash

20. Rainbow Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 4 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 5 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 6 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash

21. Using A Rainbow Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash a4fef... b741... b741... b741...

22. Using A Rainbow Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash a4fef... b741... b741... b741...

23. Using A Rainbow Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash a4fef... b741... b741... b741... Reduce Hash

24. Using A Rainbow Table Seed 1 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 2 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash Seed 3 Hash Reduce Hash Reduce Hash a4fef... b741... b741... b741... Reduce Reduce Hash Hash

25. Rainbow Table Time/Space Tradeoff - Slower than a Lookup Table - Uses Much less storage Most (99.9%) passwords <= 7 chars Requires only 64 GB - Chain length of 71,000

26. Defense!

27. Salted MD5 git checkout salted-md5 Uses the MD5 Cryptographic Hash function. But adds a random salt UNIQUE per user. md5($salt . $password) hash('md5', $salt . $password)

28. Salts Must be unique! - Per Hash - Globally Should be random - Strong!!! - Reasonably long (at least 64 bits)

29. Salted MD5 What's the problem now? SQL-Injection still gives us hash - And the salt But the salt defeats rainbow tables...

30. Can Anyone See The Problem?

33. Hash Functions Are Made To Be FAST

34. Brute Forcing Several Tools Available - John The Ripper - OCIHashCat A Lot Faster Than You May Think

35. Brute Forcing Multiple Ways To Attack - Mask Based (permutations) - Dictionary Based - Combinator Based - Combinations of dictionary words - Fingerprint Based - Combinators applied with permutations - Rule Based - Takes input password and transforms it

36. Brute Forcing Salted MD5 2012 Macbook Pro: - md5: 33 million per second - sha256: 20 million per second Mask Attack: 6 char passwords: 5 hours 7 char passwords: 22 days Entire English Language: 1.8 seconds "LEET" Permutations: 1 hour

38. Brute Forcing Salted MD5 25 GPU Cluster - md5: 180 Billion per second - < US$50,000 6 char passwords: 4 seconds 7 char passwords: 6 minutes 8 char passwords: 10 hours Entire English Language: "LEET" Permutations:

39. Brute Forcing Salted MD5 25 GPU Cluster - md5: 180 Billion per second - < US$50,000 6 char passwords: 4 seconds 7 char passwords: 6 minutes 8 char passwords: 10 hours Entire English Language: yeah... "LEET" Permutations: 0.7 seconds

40. But Wait, I Thought MD5 Was Broken?

41. MD5 IS Broken! But No Other Primitive Hash Is Not!!! sha1≈ md5 sha256 ≈ md5 sha512 ≈ md5 whirlpool ≈ md5 ALL raw primitive hashes are broken for password storage.

42. So, How Can We Combat Such Hardware?

43. Iterated MD5 git checkout iterated-md5 Uses the MD5 Cryptographic Hash function. But adds a random salt UNIQUE per user. And iterates a lot of times do { $h = md5($h . $salt . $password) } while($i++ < 1000);

44. We're Intentionally Slowing It Down

45. Brute Forcing Iterated MD5 25 GPU Cluster - md5: 70 million per second 6 char passwords: 17 minutes 7 char passwords: 1 day 8 char passwords: 124 days Entire English Language: 0.8 seconds

47. PBKDF2 git checkout pbkdf2 Uses the standard PBKDF2 algo - With SHA512 primitive Slower, and harder to use on GPU pbkdf2($pass, $salt, 10000, 40)

48. Brute Forcing PBKDF2 25 GPU Cluster - PBKDF2(sha512): 300,000 per second 6 char passwords: 28 days 7 char passwords: 7 years 8 char passwords: 700 years Entire English Language: 3 minutes

49. We Can Still Do Better

50. BCrypt git checkout bcrypt Uses the standard BCrypt algo - based on Blowfish cipher Same execution time, Much harder to run on GPU crypt $2a$

51. Brute Forcing BCrypt 25 GPU Cluster - BCrypt: 70,000 per second 6 char passwords: 120 days 7 char passwords: 31 years 8 char passwords: 3000 years Entire English Language: 14 minutes

52. A Note On Cost BCrypt accepts a "cost" parameter Must be tuned per server! - Target about 0.1 to 0.25 second runtime - Cost of 10 is a good baseline - Cost of 11 or 12 is better - Only if you have good hardware.

53. PHP 5.5 Password Hashing API git checkout password-compat A thin wrapper over crypt() - Simplifies implmentation - Strong random salt generation - Can specify cost as int option password_hash($pass, $algo, [$opts]) password_verify($pass, $hash) github.com/ircmaxell/password_compat

54. We Can Do Even Better!

55. Let's Encrypt As Well!

56. Encrypted BCrypt git checkout bcrypt-with-encryption Hash with BCrypt, Then encrypt result with AES-128. Requires key storage for the app. - Not trivial Use only if needed! - BCrypt alone is typically sufficient

57. Brute Forcing Encrypted BCrypt Attack requires low level server compromise! - SQL Injection is not enough! localhost/codeinject - Simulates code injection that reads source Any low level compromise Is No Worse than raw BCrypt - BCrypt is the baseline.

58. The Future

59. The Future scrypt - Sequential Memory Hard - Uses a LOT of memory (> 4mb / hash) - MUCH Harder to brute-force than bcrypt - IFF setup correctly

60. The Future Password Hashing Competition - Currently being setup - Aims to pick "standard" password hashing algorithm - A community effort

61. The Future Brute Forcing Word Lists - Complex combinations of words - "horse correct battery staple" Brute Forcing Grammar - "I don't want no cookies" Brute Forcing Structures - URLs, Email Addresses, URLs, etc

62. “Few false ideas have more firmly gripped the minds of so many intelligent men than the one that, if they just tried, they could invent a cipher that no one could break.” - David Kahn

63. A Note On Protecting Yourself

64. xkcd.com/936/

65. BAD ADVICE xkcd.com/936/

66. Use True Random Passwords

67. Use A Password Manager

68. Anthony Ferrara @ircmaxell me@ircmaxell.com blog.ircmaxell.com youtube.com/ircmaxell

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