Dr. Giuseppe Mario Saccone will give a talk titled "Democracy and Obstacles to Democracy". The talk will discuss how democracy requires more than just structural components and must consider intrinsic qualities like liberal values and human rights. While the doctrine of democracy and human rights is gaining recognition, its real-world application remains unsatisfactory. The talk will be held on July 31st from 3-4:30pm at the North Star Library. All are welcome and coffee will be provided.

1. North Star Library
Special talk
DEMOCRACY AND OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY
By Dr. Giuseppe Mario Saccone
Lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of
Liberal Arts, Asian University, 89 Moo 12, Highway 331, Tambon
Huaiyai, Chon Buri
In the West not less than in the Third World, democracy (i.e.,
government by the people) must be more than its structural and
institutional components and must be considered in terms of its
intrinsic qualities of liberal values and human rights. That is to say,
what is commonly understood as liberal democracy is a system of
government which is supposed to combine the right to representative
government with the right to individual freedom, and limitations on the
invasion of this freedom by government. The doctrine of democracy and
human rights is as a matter of principle increasingly acquiring almost
universal recognition and in terms of its structural and institutional
components some visible progress has been achieved in most countries,
and yet, in fact, in terms of its intrinsic qualities its application is still
mostly largely unsatisfactory.
Thursday the 31st
of July, 2008
15 – 16,30 hr. Meeting Room, North Star Library
Please call 038-716-755 or sign up at the reception.
Free for public and coffee break to be provided.
1

2. Democracy and the Third World
Globalization can result in profound political changes. That is to say, factors such as
the expansion of international commerce and easy access to new ideas through media
and technology have led to demands for changes not only at the economic but also at
the political level. These demands have resulted in calls for the introduction of
democratic institutions and practises in several Third World countries. A process is
occurring that may lead to the exhaustion of viable alternatives to Western
democracy. In other words, Western liberal democracy has already become or is
rapidly becoming the dominant political paradigm, at least in theory - if not in
practice, also in (most) Third World countries.
The most basic idea in democracy is that people are essentially equal, and thus
each person has a right to have a say in who govern and how they do so. Hence,
legitimate political power comes from the people, and government, therefore, is legal
only when the governed consent. If democracy is to be regarded as the most
appropriate practical means in order to ensure that political decisions are directed
toward the common good and that the content and scope of these decisions respect the
thesis of human moral worth underpinning the doctrine of human rights, democratic
governments must effectively perform and be seen to perform such role.
However, to dispel undiscerning naivety, we should bear in mind that in the West not
less than in the Third World, democracy (i.e., government by the people) is more
than its structural and institutional components and must be considered in terms of
its intrinsic qualities of liberal values and rights. That is to say, what is commonly
understood as liberal democracy is a system of government which is supposed to
combine the right to representative government with the right to individual freedom,
and limitations on the invasion of this freedom by government. In practise, the
features of a liberal democratic system must include:
1 Representative institutions based on majority rule,
2 Free and fair elections;
3 A choice of political parties;
4 Accountability of the government to the electorate;
5 Freedom of expression, assembly, and individual rights, guaranteed by an
independent judiciary;
6 Limitations on the power of government guaranteed by the existence of a free and
vibrant civil society which includes free and independent mass-media, N.G.O., etc.
Only, in the late 1940s most Western countries became in their structural and
institutional components, full-fledged democracies, with universal adult suffrage.
(But, in terms of intrinsic qualities and rights, the process is still ongoing.) However,
one hundred years earlier, by the late 1840s, most of them had already adopted
important aspects of constitutional liberalism – the rule of law, private property
rights, free speech and assembly, and increasingly, separated powers between
legislative, judiciary and executive. So for much of modern history, what
characterized governments in Europe and North America, and differentiated them
from those around the world, was not democracy but constitutional liberalism. That is
to say, the “Western model” is best symbolized not by the ideal of democracy, as
government by the people through mass plebiscite (as practised in Switzerland), but
by the ideal of the rule of law and of the impartial judge.
2

3. The recent history of much of East and South-East Asia (often broadly defined until
recently, but less so now, as developing areas) follows the Western itinerary. After
brief flirtations with democracy after World War II, many East and South-East Asian
regimes turned authoritarian. Over the time they moved from autocracy to liberalizing
autocracy, and, in some cases, toward liberalizing semi-democracy. Most of these
regimes remain only semi-democratic, with patriarchs or one-party systems that make
their elections ratifications of power rather than genuine contests. But these regimes
have accorded their citizens a widening sphere of economic, civil, religious, and
limited political rights. As in the West, liberalization has included economic
liberalization, which is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal democracy.
Historically, the factors most closely associated with full-fledged liberal democracies
are capitalism, a bourgeoisie, and a high per capita income. Today many East and
South-East Asian governments are a mix of democracy, liberalism, capitalism,
oligarchy, and corruption – much like the Western governments circa 1900.
Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring
constitutional liberalism. Moreover, during the last two decades in other developing
areas, i.e., in Latin America, Africa, less so in other parts of Asia and the Middle East,
dictatorships with little background in constitutional liberalism have given way to
democracy. The results have been mixed.
In the Third World, paradoxically, often illiberal democracies gain legitimacy and
thus strength, from the fact they are reasonably democratic. However, in this way,
illiberal democracy can discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on
democratic governance. This would not be unprecedented as it has been often the
case, especially in Latin America, that every new wave of democracy has been
followed by setbacks in which the system was seen as inadequate and new
alternatives were sought by ambitious leaders and restless masses. In Europe, the last
such period of disenchantment was during the interwar years, it was seized upon by
demagogues, many of whom were initially popular and even elected.
Lofty democratic ideals versus political realities in the Third World
The effective role of political ideals can be grasped in terms of ideas, institutions
and historical practice. This seems to be most clearly the case for the ideal of
democracy in the Third World. Thus, firstly, if the notion of democracy can be read
primarily in terms of classical European political philosophy, the equivalent ideas in
developing countries to be solidly grounded will also have to be located in the various
local great and little traditions, as well as in the imported schemes of the first
generation of leaders after decolonization. Then, secondly, in terms of institutional
vehicles (the ways in which ideas generally affirmed are expressed in concrete and
practical institutional machineries) the notion of democracy comes in varieties with
American-style representative democracy (separation of powers, open debate and
conflicting interest groups – all theorized typically via notions of political-liberal
pluralism) and European social-democracy (with a more clearly dispersed pattern of
power, open debate and an active and involved citizenry). But in the Third World,
democracy will have to be expressed either through (or in some cases against)
institutional vehicles which typically revolve around elite-ordered developmental
states often oriented to the pragmatic pursuit of material advance. Then, thirdly,
the rise and consolidation of democracy is an historical experience occurring in the
3

4. aftermath of a process which has included colonial rule, the pursue of independence
and development, and the emergence of integrated regional and world economies.
In sum, overall, it does make sense to speak of locally grown models of democracy in
the Third World but at the same time it necessary to be sensitive both to the real world
diversity of political experiences and to the element of elite excuse making in those
countries where the governments are simply authoritarian.
Of course, this is not to deny that some post Cold War missions by Western powers to
spread democracy can be seen partly as a pose, given the fact that in some countries
free and fair elections would be seen by those same Western powers as their worst
nightmare. That is to say, Western powers while they praise democracy, in fact they
often endorse autocratic rulers in the Third World.
There are two main constraints on democratization. First, it is extremely difficult if
not impossible to graft democracy on to countries lacking a stable political
community. On the one hand, if an election is legitimate, then the state must be
clearly seen as legitimate, and that is often not the case. Second, liberal democracy
emerged in Western Europe in tandem with the expansion of capitalism and the rise of
a middle class constituency. It developed in opposition to medieval, hierarchical
institutions – the despotic monarchies whose claim to all-powerful rule rested on the
assertion that they enjoyed divine support. Liberal democrats attacked the old system
on two fronts. First, they fought for the creation of a sphere of civil society where
social relations including private business and personal life could evolve without state
interference. An important element in this respect was the support of a market
economy based on the respect for private property. The second element was the claim
that state power was based not on natural or supernatural rights but on the will of the
sovereign people. Ultimately, this claim would lead to demand for democracy – that is
for the creation of mechanisms of representation that assured that those who held state
power enjoyed popular support. The tradition that became liberal democracy was
liberal first (aimed at restricting state power over civil society) and democratic later
(aimed at creating structures that would secure a popular mandate for holders of state
power). Even when the focus was on democracy, liberals had various reservations.
They feared that democracy would impede the establishment of a liberal society.
Today, in many countries there is a real tension between attempts to promote
democracy, and the increasingly global rather than local dynamics of capitalism. In
many states, especially in Africa, powerful middle classes have yet to develop, and it
is unclear whether the European and North American experience can be duplicated
there.
Democracy and political culture
There is some evidence from regional surveys and countries studies suggesting that it
not necessary to have a certain set of cultural attributes present before democratic
practises and institutions can emerge. But to build democracy it is necessary to forge a
pro-democracy political culture among both elites and ordinary citizens and this is
often difficult to achieve for various reasons. Some analysts argue that it is especially
difficult in Islamic and some other cultures. It has been often pointed out that among
the still existing most authoritarian states, a large proportion has a majority Muslim
population and often strong Islamic fundamentalist pressures. Huntington argued that
democracy was scarce not only in Muslim majority countries, but also in those with
Buddhist and Confucian cultures. For some scholars, this is explained by these
4

5. religions allegedly hierarchical and in-egalitarian teachings that make democratic
progress very difficult to achieve. For example, Buddhism, in confining itself to a
domain of private worship centring around the family is said to be politically passive
in the face of authoritarianism, while Islamic fundamentalism, with its alleged
nostalgic reassertion of an older, purer set of values, looks to many as politically
authoritarian.
Evidence does not always confirms these claims. We saw that India, predominantly
Hindu, but with an important Muslim minority comprising more than 100 million
people, has been a democracy for half a century; while Turkey, Jordan Morocco, with
Muslim majorities are polities with variable, in some cases increasingly plausible,
claims to be developing their democratic systems. In addition, Buddhist Thailand,
Confucian/Christian Taiwan and Confucian/Buddhist/Christian South Korea have all
taken the democratic road in recent years. Consequently, the claims of Huntington
should be treated with scepticism.
Rather than a specific religious culture, it seems clear that what is necessary for
democracy is an appropriate civic culture, characterized by high level of mutual trust,
tolerance of diversity and a propensity for accommodation and compromise. This
outcome, the result of democratic institutions and structures working relatively well
over time, involves processes and institutions that help generate and disseminate
democratically appropriate values and beliefs among both elites and ordinary citizens.
Question
In what ways can the global context influence the rise of democracy in the Third
World?
Make an overall assessment of the opportunities and challenges which the present
international situation offers for the process of democratization in the Third World.
5

6. religions allegedly hierarchical and in-egalitarian teachings that make democratic
progress very difficult to achieve. For example, Buddhism, in confining itself to a
domain of private worship centring around the family is said to be politically passive
in the face of authoritarianism, while Islamic fundamentalism, with its alleged
nostalgic reassertion of an older, purer set of values, looks to many as politically
authoritarian.
Evidence does not always confirms these claims. We saw that India, predominantly
Hindu, but with an important Muslim minority comprising more than 100 million
people, has been a democracy for half a century; while Turkey, Jordan Morocco, with
Muslim majorities are polities with variable, in some cases increasingly plausible,
claims to be developing their democratic systems. In addition, Buddhist Thailand,
Confucian/Christian Taiwan and Confucian/Buddhist/Christian South Korea have all
taken the democratic road in recent years. Consequently, the claims of Huntington
should be treated with scepticism.
Rather than a specific religious culture, it seems clear that what is necessary for
democracy is an appropriate civic culture, characterized by high level of mutual trust,
tolerance of diversity and a propensity for accommodation and compromise. This
outcome, the result of democratic institutions and structures working relatively well
over time, involves processes and institutions that help generate and disseminate
democratically appropriate values and beliefs among both elites and ordinary citizens.
Question
In what ways can the global context influence the rise of democracy in the Third
World?
Make an overall assessment of the opportunities and challenges which the present
international situation offers for the process of democratization in the Third World.
5