Liberal Democratic Theory

1. 1
Airticle By: Musachi Gift
Political Scientist Unza
Liberal Democratic Theory
+260975953479/musachigift@hotmail.com
The beginning of this century, politics seemed headed towards a democratic future, as more
countries adopted – in full or in part – the basic tenets of democratic process. The progress was
jerky and uneven, but continuous: it seemed that Western-style liberal democracy was, albeit
slowly, on its way to becoming the political system of choice for an ever-widening part of the
world. In the last 15 years, all that has changed.
In recent times, many citizens appear to have lost confidence in their Key Institutions of
democracy. Paradoxically, however this loss of confidence has not eroded citizen’s support for
democracy as a political system. The present essay reviews this if this paradox reflects a simple-
minded contradiction on the part of citizen, or if it reveals something deep and special about the
nature of democracy. The essay discussion will start with an Introduction which will contain
definitions of some prominent terms and background of democracy, also loss of confidence in
democratic institutions. Continue with support for democracy as political system, lastly nature of
democracy and conclude.
The word ‘democracy’ as presented in survey questions can mean different things to different
people (Bratton 2002), such as liberty and elections, peace, social welfare or even economic
development (Bratton 2002). Coppedge identify six major conceptions of democracy,
distinguishing between democracies that are electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory,
deliberative or egalitarian (Coppedge, 2011).
Furthermore, the word ‘democracy» is a term that comes from Greek and it is made up with two
other words demos= People and kratein= to govern, to rule. “Democracy” can then be literally
translated by the following terms: Government of the People or Government of the Majority.
Democracy, as a State form, is to be distinguished from monarchy, aristocracy and dictatorship.
Most common definition of democracy: ‘the government of the people, by the people and for the
people’ by Abraham Lincoln. To put it another way we can say that a government comes from
the people; it is exercised by the people, and for the purpose of the people’s own interests.
Institution is a custom or system that has existed for a long time among a particular group of

2. 2
people. Political System is an organized set of ideas or theories or a particular way of doing
something connected with the state, government or public affairs (Freedom House reports).
In 1900 there were only nine electoral democracies with universal male suffrage out of 55
independent countries in the world (less than one-fifth). In 2000 the number of democracies had
been multiplied by 10 while the number of independent countries had increased less than four
times: 92 liberal democracies out of 191 countries (almost a half). If ‘partly free, electoral
democracies’ are also taken into account, the number of countries with soft forms of government
in the present world rises to 141, which is about three-quarters of the independent countries
encompassing two-thirds of the world population (Colomer, 2001).
Additionally, the numbers of presently existing democracies that were established in different
periods also shows an increasing rhythm. Starting with the year in which universal male suffrage
was established in today’s oldest democracy, Switzerland, and limiting the calculation to
countries with more than one million inhabitants, only nine enduring democracies were
established during the 69-year-long first wave from 1874 to 1943; 18 enduring democracies were
established during the 29-year-long second wave, from 1944 to 1973 (twice as many as in the
previous longer wave); and 37 enduring democracies have been established since 1974 (again
more than double the number in a shorter time). The long-term acceleration process has been
confirmed during the third wave: 18 enduring democracies were established during a 15-year
period from 1974 to 1988 and other 19 democracies during the following 10 years (Gasiorowski,
1996).
The diffusion of democracy has brought about a blossoming of institutional pluralism. Most
attempts of democratization during the first wave were promoted with relatively restrictive
institutions. Specifically, six out of the nine electoral democracies existing in 1900 were
parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral systems limiting political competition to two
major parties (Canada, France, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). This
was in contrast only to the presidential United States and two parliamentary regimes with
proportional representation in Belgium and Norway. But restrictive democratic formulas based
on plurality rule elections provoked a high number of failures in some of the mentioned countries
and in subsequent attempts at democratization, not only in Europe in the 1920s and the 1930s,
but also in a number of former British colonies in Africa and Asia with plural ethnic, religious,
or language com-position (Colomer, 2001).

3. 3
In contrast, democratization with parliamentary institutions based on proportional representation
obtained higher rates of success. It is remark-able that even the 11 European democracies with
proportional representation that broke down between the two World Wars, all re-established
proportional representation: seven at the end of the Second World War (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway) and four at the fall of communism in the
1990s (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) (Przeworski, 2000).
The advantages of another major element of institutional pluralism and division of powers –
separate elections for president and for the assembly – has been submitted to intense discussion
among political scientists. But empirical observation in a broad long-term perspective suggests
that once installed, direct presidential elections are not easily abandoned. There have been a few
instances of reverse moves, such as Germany after Nazism. But in almost all cases, further
redemocratization after an authoritarian period has been followed by a reinstatement of direct
presidential elections, especially in Latin America in the 1980s (Mainwaring and Shugart,
1997).
Previously, scholars such as Dalton (2005, 2006), Norris (1999), and Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) used modernization theory to explain declining levels of trust in democratic institutions.
This approach suggests that electorates become dissatisfied and increasingly critical of the
political elite as new value systems and ‘post-material’ issues (i.e. issues that value self-
expression and quality of life, such as environmentalism and gender equality, over economic and
physical security) arise in political discourse. Citizens’ preferences, attitudes and values change
as a consequence of the rationalization, secularization and bureaucratization entailed in
development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
However, these issues are more challenging for politicians to ‘solve’ compared to earlier
generations’ concerns with basic economic security. This produces citizens who are dissatisfied
with political parties, governments, public officials and politicians that are unable to address
important social problems.
In addition, because post-industrial societies have greater access to education, and political and
organizational resources, citizens have more capacity to question and challenge traditional
processes of representative democracy and political elites (Dalton 2005: 140; Norris 1999).
Consequently, societies are less trustful of political institutions, such as political parties. Norris
(1999), for example, refers to this phenomenon as ‘critical citizens’. Paradoxically, the

4. 4
increasing number of ‘critical citizens’ is an indicator of increasing political sophistication in
younger generations that are less satisfied with the performance of their government, rather than
expressing discontent with the system itself. In this sense, critical citizens are actually more
appreciative of democracy as a regime type specifically because it provides them with the tools
to vote governments out of office (Foa and Mounk 2016).
There exist two views of support for democracy. The more popular instrumental view of
democratic support holds that democracy is supported as a means to other ends. This view
stresses performance-driven loyalty to democracy (Rogowski 1974).
Some instrumental theorists assert that economic performance matters more while others
emphasize the significance of political performance. In contrast, the intrinsic view of democratic
support holds that democracy is supported as an end in itself. This view stresses norm-based
loyalty to democracy. Intrinsic theorists assert that values and norms acquired through political
socialization matter more for democratic support (Easton and Dennis 1969; Dahl 1971).
Both views are complementary in understanding the dynamics of support for democracy.
Nonetheless, when analyzing support for democracy, it is desirable to distinguish performance-
based support from norm-based support, because their consequences significantly differ. When
democracy as an idea is strongly supported among the population, poor performance may have
little effect on democratic stability. In contrast, when democracy as an idea is not strongly
supported, poor performance may have a detrimental influence on democratic stability. In the
long run, support for democracy as an idea is strengthened or weakened by experiences with the
working of democracy or the performance of democratic institutions. Recognizing the
importance of performance-based support for democracy, we now focus on what causes people
to be satisfied with the working of democracy or to place trust in political institutions.
Performance theorists claim that people support democracy because they believe that democracy
fulfills their demands and delivers expected outcomes. Modernization theorists regard economic
development as its most important pay-offs (Lipset, 1959).
As McDonough, Barnes and Lopez Pena (1986) suggest, however, types of pay-offs people
expect and the priorities they place on them may differ. Hence, the criteria by which people
evaluate democratic performance may vary. Recently, researchers of third-wave democracies
increasingly demonstrate that political pay-offs matter more than economic ones. In their work
on post-Communist countries, for instance, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) demonstrate that

5. 5
regime performance, especially political one, matters more for democratic support. In a similar
study on post-Communist Europe, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also discovers that political
performance is more important than economic one in generating normative democratic support.
In their single-country study of the dynamics of democratic commitment in Korea, Shin and
McDonough (1999) show that evaluations of governmental performance and democratic
experiences are more important in developing support for democracy than evaluations of
economy or the quality of life. In their comparative analysis of support for democracy in Africa,
Bratton and Mattes (2001) emphasize that the government’s capacity at delivering political
goods than economic ones plays a more important role in approval of democracy. After
reviewing recent empirical research findings, Diamond (1999) concludes that support for
democracy strongly depends on political performance of the regime, its delivery on political
goods.
At the heart of true democracy is liberty under the law. Democratic government must be freely
elected, for a fixed period, in a universal franchise, untainted by coercion. There must be checks
and balances to its authority. The rule of law must apply. The judiciary must be independent, and
there must be a free media, an independent academia, and a functioning opposition free to
oppose without sanctions. Only then can freedom of speech and action be protected. But these
attributes are merely the trappings of democracy. Democracy in action is more than satisfying
the material demands of the majority, or honoring the promises of an election manifesto.
Democratic government must govern for the future as well as the present. A governing party
must govern for political opponents who did not vote for them – and may never do so. It must
govern for the unborn, and the country they will inherit. For the wider international community.
And all governments have a responsibility to themselves for the manner in which they govern
(Diamond, 1999).
Today, we have a disillusioned, disinterested, preoccupied or (in some cases cowed or misled)
electorate shrugging its shoulders and turning away from politics. In such a climate, democracy
faces a threat from the rise of nationalism. This is not theoretical: in many countries it is a reality.
In others, a clear and present danger. In the democratic West, we have come to believe that our
liberal, social and economic model of democracy is unchallengeable. It is not. Last year – as the
United Nations has reported – 67 countries suffered a decline in political and civil liberties, while
only 36 had gains. What has happened there can happen elsewhere. Over 20 democracies have

6. 6
collapsed during the last two decades, and there is widespread public dissatisfaction in many
others (Hibbing, 2001).
Liberal democracy can be seen as a political system that joins three distinct elements. The first is
a state that concentrates and uses power to defend the nation from foreign and domestic threats,
as well as enforce the law and delver basic services to citizens. A modern state is one that is
impersonal and makes a clear distinction between public and private; the state exists not for the
self-enrichment of the rulers but for public benefit. The second institution is the rule of law,
ideally a system of transparent laws that are binding not just on ordinary citizens but on the most
powerful political actors in the society. And finally, institutions of democratic accountability
such as free and fair multiparty elections seek to ensure that governments are accountable to as
broad a part of the population as possible and not just to the elites that run it. Liberal democracy
is therefore a balance between the power-generating and power-deploying institutions, the state,
the rule of law and democratic accountability, which are fundamentally institutions of constraint.
If the institutions of constraint, law and democracy are weak, the system tends toward
dictatorship; if the state is weak or ineffective, it fails to deliver on behalf of its citizens (Theiss-
Morse 2001).
In 2016, the Law and Justice Party in Poland launched a campaign against the Polish judicial
system, demanding the retirement of most sitting judges and seeking to replace them with others
sympathetic to the party. The Fidesz party in Hungary has used its legislative supermajority to
push through a series of constitutional changes that reduce the independence of various checking
institutions. All of these regimes claim the mantle of democracy, but do not maintain the balance
between state, law and democracy that true liberal democracy demands (Wiberg, 1995).
It is clear that democracy can bring an important contribution in making citizens feel that it is
good to live in a State, to express themselves freely, to know that the economy is thriving and
security guaranteed. In this context, it is becoming more and more important that even different
States cooperate and make efforts to develop models that are common to their States or to the
continent. It is only in this way that wars can be avoided and that anarchy and chaos would not
reign. With the help of modern means of communication, no State in the world should leave its
citizens in ignorance or in doubt regarding their rights and the freedom that take place in other
countries. If it wants to avoid that its citizens try to claim these same rights by means of
revolution or coups, it must be ready to allot those to them in advance (Theiss-Morse 2001).

7. 7
The 1996 and 1997 KDB surveys and the 2003 EAB survey asked respondents how much
confidence they have in public institutions such as the national government (the executive), the
legislature, courts, civil service, the military, the police and political parties. These public
institutions except political parties consist of key state institutions while the executive, the
legislature and courts, the three branches of government. Some degree of trust in each of these
public institutions. For every public institution, public trust has dramatically declined over the
period of 1996-2003: the executive (from 62 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 2003), the
legislature (from 49 percent in 1996, 31 percent in 1997 to 15 percent in 2003), courts (from 70
percent in 1996, 58 percent in 1997 to 51 percent in 2003), civil service (from 56 percent in
1996, 78 percent in 1997 to 45 percent in 2003), the military (from 74 percent in 1996, 71
percent in 1997 to 59 percent in 2003), the police (from 57 percent in 1996, 42 percent in 1997 to
50 percent in 2003), and political parties (from 40 percent in 1996, 20 percent in 1997 to 15
percent in 2003) (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).
Ordinary citizens evidently lost their confidence in every public institution in the wake of the
economic crisis. Notable is that two core political institutions of a representative democracy, the
legislature and the executive, experienced the sharpest decline in public confidence. Even the
judicial branch of government registered a substantial decline in public confidence. The
percentage having some degree of trust in all of the three branches of government sharply
dropped from 38 percent in 1996 to 8 percent in 2003. It is surprising that only less than one-
tenth places some degree of trust in all of the three branches of government. An absolute
majority of the public is cynical to the performance of core state institutions why has public trust
in political institutions declined while public satisfaction with the working of democracy
increased over the same period of time? Perhaps criteria of evaluation vary depending upon the
target of evaluation or across political institutions. Although democratic satisfaction and
institutional trust generally reflect evaluation of democratic performance, their targets or
referents may differ. That is why the trajectories of democratic satisfaction and institutional trust
appear to be in the opposite direction. We will address this issue later (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2001).
In conclusion overall, more ordinary citizens expressed support for democracy as an idea and
some degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy. In contrast, only a few citizens
placed some degree of confidence in all of the three branches of government. The trends in both

8. 8
democratic legitimacy and democratic satisfaction evidently indicate an optimistic outlook on
democratic consolidation. In contrast, the trends in institutional trust indicate a pessimistic
outlook on it. Hence as a last man standing Democracy as an idea is not strongly supported; poor
performance may have a detrimental influence on democratic stability. In the long run, support
for democracy as an idea is strengthened or weakened by experiences with the working of
democracy or the performance of democratic institutions. Like in The Republic, Plato famously
argued that citizen incompetence rendered democracy an undesirable form of government. While
this argument would have few takers in modern, advanced democracies, recent events have
brought to the forefront questions about how individuals process information and make voting
choices.
Anyway, it is clear that democracy as a last man standing can bring an important contribution in
making citizens review something deeper. The goals of democratization consist in: Changing the
authority structures of the power and the government; Creating new procedures, new
mechanisms and new forms of social participation, and finally, In creating the socio-political
conditions necessary to social development.
We must not forget that democracy represents a path to development. The democratization
process then leads to development, through democracy. The newly created procedures,
mechanisms, structures of power and development conditions must evidently be consolidated.
The key words in this field are: The taking into consideration of and the promotion of
fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights; The democratization of elections; The promotion
of plural media, as well as multipartite systems that function; The emergence of political cultures
and a governance that is based on the democratic values; Furthering of democracy, and finally,
the promotion of a rapid and sustainable economic growth that takes at the same time into
account the social interest ranges of society.
This is the reason why democracy consolidation concerns all interest groups, all population
parties as well as all social fields and actors. Democracy requires a permanent participation of
the citizens because contrary to autocratic State forms that require the subordination of submitted
people, it is only strong, thanks to the strength of responsible citizens.