Data informs Metrics, and Metrics are the basis for Automation in all fields. In information security, we are a at critical new juncture - an influx of data allows us to automate whole new subsets of the field. Doing so systematically and methodically, with appropriate frameworks, is a bigger challenge.

1. DATA, METRICS, AND
AUTOMATION:
A STRANGE LOOP
@MROYTMAN

3. Data
D
M
Metrics
Automation

4. DAN GEER &
BRUCE SCHNEIER &
ANDREW JAQUITH &
ALEX HUTTON &
ED BELLIS

5. SQUAD GOALS:
WHAT IS GOOD DATA? (Bellis, Hutton)
WHAT IS A GOOD METRIC? (Jaquith, Geer)
WHAT CAN BE AUTOMATED? (Geer,
Schneier)

6. SQUAD GOALS:
What parts of risk management should be
automated? (Schneier, Bellis)
What ought to be left to the humans?
(Schneier, Hutton)
What makes a good product? (Schneier)

8. ATTACKERS ARE
BETTER AT
AUTOMATION

9. WE
ARE
SLOW

10. ATTACKERS
ARE
FAST

11. ATTACKERS ARE
BETTER AT
AUTOMATION

12. 2014
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

13. WE NEED BETTER
AUTOMATION

14. WE NEED BETTER AUTOMATION
CURRENT VULN MANAGEMENT:
AUTOMATED VULN DISCOVERY
MANUAL-ISH VULN SCANNING
MANUAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE
MANUAL VULN SCORING
MANUAL REMEDIATION PRIORITIZATION

15. MANUAL

16. WE NEED BETTER DATA:
BETTER BASE RATES FOR EXPLOITATION
BETTER EXPLOIT AVAILABILITY
BETTER VULNERABILITY TRENDS
BETTER BREACH DATA
BETTER M E T R I C S

17. SOMETIMES WE MAKE
BAD DECISIONS
SOMETIMES WE HAVE
BAD METRICS

18. METRICS
ARE
DECISION SUPPORT

19. GOOD METRICS
ARE
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS FOR
AUTOMATION

20. WHAT MAKES A METRIC
GOOD?

21. TWEET WITH ME NOW
#WHATISAGOODMETRIC

22. HEARTBLEED
CVSS 5
SHELLSHOCK
CVSS 10
POODLE
CVSS 4.3

24. CVSS
IS NOT THE PROBLEM

25. CVSS FOR PRIORITIZATION
IS A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM

26. CVSS AS A BREACH VOLUME
PREDICTOR:

27. ATTACKERS CHANGE TACTICS DAILY

28. WHAT DEFINES A GOOD METRIC?
GOOD DATA

29. TWEET WITH ME NOW
#WHATISGOODDATA

30. WHICH SYSTEM IS MORE SECURE?
$1,000 $1,000,000
CONTROL 1 CONTROL 1
ASSET 1 ASSET 2

31. TYPES OF METRICS
-EXCLUDE REAL LIFE
THREAT ENVIRONMENT
TYPE 1
% FALLING FOR SIMULATED
PHISHING EMAIL
CVSS SCORE
-OCCURANCE RATE
CONTROLLED
-INTERACTION WITH
THREAT ENVIRONMENT
TYPE 2
# INFECTED MACHINES OF ISP
% VULNS WITH METASPLOIT
MODULE
-DESCRIBE UNDESIRED
EVENTS

32. WHAT DEFINES A GOOD METRIC?
1. BOUNDED
2. SCALED METRICALLY
3. OBJECTIVE
4. VALID
5. RELIABLE
6. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC - NO GAMING!
7. COMPUTED AUTOMATICALLY

33. MEAN TIME TO INCIDENT DISCOVERY?
1. BOUNDED
2. SCALED METRICALLY
3. OBJECTIVE
4. VALID
5. RELIABLE
6. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
7. COMPUTED AUTOMATICALLY
X
✓
✓
X
✓
✓
X

34. VULNERABILITY SCANNING COVERAGE?
1. BOUNDED
2. SCALED METRICALLY
3. OBJECTIVE
4. VALID
5. RELIABLE
6. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
7. COMPUTED AUTOMATICALLY
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

35. CVSS FOR REMEDIATION?
1. BOUNDED
2. SCALED METRICALLY
3. OBJECTIVE
4. VALID
5. RELIABLE
6. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
7. COMPUTED AUTOMATICALLY
✓
X
X
X
✓
X
✓

36. YOU NEED DATA TO MAKE DATA

37. METASPLOIT PRESENT ON VULN?
1. BOUNDED
2. SCALED METRICALLY
3. OBJECTIVE
4. VALID
5. RELIABLE
6. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
7. COMPUTED AUTOMATICALLY
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

38. YOU NEED DATA TO MAKE METRICS
! Probability*
(You*Will*Be*Breached*On*A*Particular*Open*Vulnerability)?
!"#$%&'($#)*+,(,-,#.% /)#*0ℎ#.%!00')#2%3$%4ℎ#,)%5&6)
43-*(%!"#$%&'($#)*+,(,-,#.
6%

39. PROBABILITY A VULNERABILITY HAVING CVSS SCORE >
X HAS OBSERVED BREACHES
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Breach1Probability1(%)
CVSS1Base

40. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
CVSS*10
EDB
MSP
EDB+MSP
Breach*Probability*(%)
Positive Predictive Value (the proportion of positive test results that are
true positives) of remediating a vulnerability with property X:

41. AN ENGINE,
NOT A CAMERA

45. CONNECTING
THE DOTS

46. 1. EVERYTHING THAT CAN
BE AUTOMATED WILL BE
AUTOMATED

47. 2. METRICS ARE AN
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION FOR
AUTOMATION

48. 3.GOOD METRICS DEFINE
WHAT CAN BE AUTOMATED

49. Corollary 1. Criteria for
good metrics define what
can (and can’t) be
automated.

50. 4. AUTOMATION
GENERATES TREND DATA,
MAKES INFERENCE
POSSIBLE

51. Corollary 2. The rate of
data growth (availability,
integrity, context-specificity)
is the upper bound on the
rate of automation.

52. ASKING THE RIGHT
QUESTIONS

53. Question 1. What defines
good data?
1a. How do we measure
the rate of data growth?
1b. How do we measure
data integrity?

54. Question 2. What defines a
good metric?

55. Question 3. What makes a
product good?

56. KENNASECURITY.COM
@MROYTMAN

57. References
Security Metrics
www.securitymetrics.org
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https://societyinforisk.org/
National Weather Service Research Forum
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/mdl/vlab/forum/VLab_forum.php
Dan Geer’s Full Day Tutorial On Measuring Security
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