2. Initial Responses
Early commentators on
the crisis had an
American dominated
view.
As documents have
become declassified the
Soviet and Cuban
perspective on the crisis
has opened up
3. Traditional Interpretations
Many ‘traditional’ interpretations of the crisis come
from commentators and members of the U.S.
Administration at the time
Largely based on personal recollection and reinforced
with available official documents (nearly always
American).
4. Traditional Interpretations
Present the presence of missiles on Cuba as an intolerable
provocation:
Kennedy had to respond to protect balance of power
Kennedy had to convince USSR of American resolve
Blockade is praised as optimal strategy
Outcome of Crisis is a triumph for USA
7. Traditional Interpretations
Soviet Accounts: only Khrushchev’s memoirs and letters
written to USA were available pre-glasnost.
Other Soviet accounts from the 1960s and 1970s are
propagandistic
Limited Soviet sources available.
Khrushchev and USSR’s motives can often only be speculated
upon.
8. Revisionist Interpretations
A common mistrust of JFK and an assertion he
brought the world closer to nuclear war
More emphasis give to idea that the missiles were
placed on Cuba to defend Castro’s socialist regime
against an anticipated American invasion.
Still had little access to Soviet or Cuban sources, so
tends to apportion blame to USA rather than explain
Soviet or Cuban motives
9. Revisionist Interpretations
T. G. Paterson
‘Bearing the burden: a critical look at JFK’s foreign
policy’ Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1974)
“The President’s desire to score a victory.”
“Kennedy gave Khrushchev no chance to withdraw
his mistake or to save face”
10. Post - Revisionist
Interpretations
Use declassified documents
Attempt to construct a holistic view
Highlights the importance of CIA activity, from the
Bay of Pigs to Operation Mongoose
Improves JFK’s reputation as a ‘dove’ and emphasises
later US (secret) agreement to remove missiles from
Turkey
11. Post - Revisionist Interpretations
John Lewis Gaddis
‘We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
History’ 1997
“Two superpowers dominated the
post-1945 world; each often acted in
response to what the other had done.”
Khrushchev as an impulsive believer in
supporting the Cuban revolution