Crowdfunded solar feasiblity study

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Master Dissertation of Jinan University
A Feasibility Study on Community Solar Gardens in China
Author’s Name: Zayn Abdullah King Dollie
Supervisor’s Name: Prof. Wang Guoqing 王国庆
Ph.D. Professor
Master of Business Administration (MBA)
Submission date: 16 April 2015
Date of defense: 11-20 May 2015
Chairman of the defense committee:
Paper Reviewer:
Degree-conferment authority and

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Originality statement
I declare that the academic paper submitted is the achievements of the research carried out by me under the
guidance of the supervisor. To the best of my knowledge, except for the special annotations and acknowledgements,
the paper does not contain the research outcomes published or written by other people have, nor materials already
used to obtain academic degree or certificate of Jinan University or other educational institutions. Any and
all contributions to this research made by my coworkers have been described and recognized herein.
signature of author: Zayn Abdullah King Dollie Date of signature: March 27, 2015
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The author of the academic paper fully understand the provisions promulgated by Jinan University for
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Signature of author: Zayn Abdullah King Dollie Signature of Supervisor:
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Employer: Tel:
Mailing address: Zip Code:

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Abstract
A solar garden is based on a relatively new business model best described as community owned
solar—people within a community enthusiastic about solar, pool their capital, use it to purchase
an array and, via a special purpose entity, have it installed and maintained on a host site which is
either paid rent for the use of its property or enters into a power purchase agreement with the
SPE for purchase of the energy generated by the array. The array is owned by the subscribing
community members (subscribers) throughout the length of the PPA. The PPA contract can be
up to twenty years. Subscriber ROI comes either via the sale of the power generated back to the
grid for the wholesale power rate (feed in tariff); or via the sale of the power generated back to
the host, usually at some discount to the retail rate. After twenty years the subscribers should
have experienced payback and a sufficient IRR, then ownership of the panels flips to the host. A
third alternative involves virtual net metering and the cooperation of the utility to implement
energy (kWh) or monetary ‘bill credits’ which constitute subscriber return. This is the original
solar gardens idea however at the moment it is not feasible in China. Community owned solar
has the potential to work in China via an equity-based crowdfunding model. Pollution and
climate change are both problems that Chinese national government policy is trying to combat
via enormous solar capacity targets and favourable policies for distributed solar developers.
Incentives have been designed so that payback on distributed projects could be as low as 5-8
years and internal rates of return as high as 12-17%. Financing solar arrays is usually
problematic, however ‘the crowd’ in China is a huge source of untapped capital with CNY74
trillion in bank savings. Developing a compelling value proposition for potential investors could
not only lead to a lucrative business opportunity but the chance to contribute to the greening of
China’s energy mix. Before turning to the crowd it will be important to build trust and
credibility via a suitable pilot project such as an array on a university building funded by
students, faculty, departments etc. Successful carrying out of the pilot should attract interest
from the crowd and other investors in future projects.
Key words: distributed solar, solar, crowdfunding, power purchase agreement, energy
performance contracting, renewable energy, impact investing
太阳能花园乃是基于一个相对新的生意模式，最好的形容词是社区所拥有的太阳能（光伏）- 社区里
的人热衷于太阳能，集中他们的资金，用它来购买一个太阳能电池板，并通过一个特定目的的实体
（SPE），让它安装和接受维护于一个主机站，要么是支付租金使用其财产或与特定目的实体 SPE 签订

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一电力购买协议，购买由太阳能电池板产生的能量。该太阳能电池板由订用的社区成员（用户）在整
个电力购买合同（PPA）的运营过程中所拥有。 PPA 的合同可以长达二十年。用户的投资回报率或者
通过回馈到电网的产生电力之批发价（上网电价）的销售;或经由出售回馈到电力主机站的电力，通常
是一些打折到零售的价格。二十年后，用户应该已经历投资回报和充足的内部收益率 IRR，那么所有
太阳能电池板的所有权就回归到主机站。第三种选项是涉及虚拟净计量和实施能源（千瓦时）效用的
合作，或构成用户回报的货币“账单值”。这是原始的太阳能花园构想，目前在中国是不可行的。社区
拥有的太阳能在中国具有通过股权为基础的众筹基金模式的奏效潜力。污染和气候变化问题都是中国
政府通过巨大的太阳能发电量目标，与分布各地的太阳能开发者的优惠政策，所要试图打击的国家政
策。激励机制已设计出来，使分布项目的回报可低到 5-8 年，内部收益率则高达 12-17％。融资太阳能
电池板通常是有问题的，然而中国民间的‘群众’，乃是人民币 74 万亿银行储蓄的巨大未开发资源。
为潜在投资者开发一个引人注目的价值提议，不仅可以导致一个利润丰厚的商机，同时也有助于中国
能源结构的绿化。转向群众之前，通过合适的试验项目建立信任和信誉很重要，例如在大学建筑物上
面架设一个太阳能电池板，由学生，学系，部门等资助。成功的试点项目应该可以吸引群众的兴趣和
其他投资者投资未来的项目。
关键词：分布式太阳能，太阳能，众筹，购电合同，能源管理合同，可再生能源，影响的投资。

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Table of contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................3
Table of contents .............................................................................................................................5
List of figures and tables .................................................................................................................7
Section 1..........................................................................................................................................8
1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................8
2 Community solar gardens .......................................................................................................15
2.1 Solar Mosaic Co..................................................................................................................16
2.2 Serving an expanding market niche.......................................................................................17
2.3 First large scale success story...............................................................................................19
2.3.1 Wildwoods Convention Center.......................................................................................19
2.3.2 Roll out.........................................................................................................................20
2.4 Current Chinese business model...........................................................................................21
2.4.1 Energy performance contracting .....................................................................................21
2.4.2 Recent Solar EPC projects in China ................................................................................22
2.4.3 Returns on EPC projects ................................................................................................25
2.5 Proposal for China ...............................................................................................................25
3 China’s green energy industry development and policies ......................................................30
3.1 Environmental Consequences...............................................................................................30
3.2 Coal....................................................................................................................................32
3.3 Government response...........................................................................................................33
3.4 Solar power.........................................................................................................................35
Section 2........................................................................................................................................37
4 Feasibility study......................................................................................................................37
4.1 Purpose...............................................................................................................................37
5 Market Analysis ......................................................................................................................39
5.1 Demographics .....................................................................................................................39
5.2 Market needs.......................................................................................................................42
5.3 Crowdfunding .....................................................................................................................44
5.4 Market trends......................................................................................................................46
5.5 Market growth.....................................................................................................................48
5.6 SWOT analysis ...................................................................................................................49
5.7 Industry Analysis.................................................................................................................51
5.8 Product offering ..................................................................................................................57
5.9 Crowdfunding keys to success..............................................................................................59
6 Marketing strategy ..................................................................................................................62
6.1 Market research...................................................................................................................62
6.2 Segment and positioning ......................................................................................................65
Section 3........................................................................................................................................67
7 Policy analysis.........................................................................................................................67
7.1 Crowdfunding .....................................................................................................................67
7.2 Solar...................................................................................................................................71
7.3 Financial incentives .............................................................................................................72
7.4 Tax incentives .....................................................................................................................74
8 Organizational structure..........................................................................................................75
8.1 Entity choice .......................................................................................................................75
8.2 Start up...............................................................................................................................76

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8.2.1 Regarding pilot projects .................................................................................................76
8.2.2 Regarding hosts .............................................................................................................77
8.2.3 Technology partner vs. utilising existing platforms ..........................................................77
8.2.4 Costs ............................................................................................................................78
8.2.5 Timeline .......................................................................................................................78
8.3 Solar project approval process..............................................................................................79
8.3.1 Regarding provincial approval........................................................................................80
9 Technical analysis...................................................................................................................81
9.1 Potential sites ......................................................................................................................81
9.2 Host site considerations........................................................................................................84
9.3 Energy usage.......................................................................................................................88
9.3.1 Net metering .................................................................................................................88
10 Financial analysis .................................................................................................................91
10.1 Assumptions and inputs .....................................................................................................91
10.2 Economics and performance...............................................................................................95
11 Issues ....................................................................................................................................97
Section 4......................................................................................................................................101
12 Conclusions and Recommendations...................................................................................101
Notes............................................................................................................................................106
References ...................................................................................................................................107
Appendices..................................................................................................................................112
Appendix A Characteristics of different crowdfunding models.......................................................112
Appendix B Impact investors in China .........................................................................................113
Appendix C Financial incentives..................................................................................................114
Appendix D JV information.........................................................................................................116
Appendix E Business establishment .............................................................................................117
Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................................121

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List of figures and tables
Figure 4-1 Investment and return................................................................................................................................8
Figure 4-2 Shared solar cash and energy flow........................................................................................................14
Figure 5-1 Solar Mosaic investment model..............................................................................................................16
Figure 5-2 Solar Mosaic Project Offerings...............................................................................................................18
Figure 5-3 Wildwoods Convention Center NJ........................................................................................................19
Figure 5-4 Wildwoods Convention Center Solar Installation.........................................................................20
Figure 5-5 Solar Mosaic's Wildwood Convention Center ................................................................................21
Figure 5-6 DuPont R&D Centre Shanghai Solar Installation .........................................................................23
Figure 5-7 Turpan Airport Solar Installation...........................................................................................................24
Figure 5-8 Midea Group Shunde Solar Array.........................................................................................................25
Figure 5-9 Proposed EPC model for China..............................................................................................................27
Figure 6-1 Emissions of carbon dioxide from energy, annually and cumulatively..............................31
Figure 6-2 China's installed electricity capacity by fuel 2012 (total 1,145GW) ...................................32
Figure 6-3 Direct carbon dioxide intensities of different Chinese industries (2007) ..........................32
Figure 6-4 PM2.5 AQI scale............................................................................................................................................33
Figure 6-5 Global investment in renewable energy by region 2013 (US$billion) ...............................34
Figure 6-6 China Solar PV Installations to 2015 (GW).....................................................................................36
Figure 8-1 There are 3 main types of financial services consumers in China ........................................41
Figure 8-2 Yield comparison: Yu'e Bao vs. Li Cai Tong vs. Chinese banks ..........................................43
Figure 8-3 The crowdfunding ecosystem..................................................................................................................45
Figure 8-4 Crowdfunding potential by region.........................................................................................................48
Figure 8-5 Market potential for crowdsourcing across the developing world ........................................49
Figure 8-6 Unique product offering .............................................................................................................................58
Figure 8-7 Four elements of a robust crowdfunding investing ecosystem...............................................59
Figure 9-1 Areas of improvement highlighted by investors ............................................................................63
Figure 12-1 Baiyun airport................................................................................................................................................82
Figure 12-2 Guangzhou South Railway Station.....................................................................................................82
Figure 12-3 Canton Fair Site............................................................................................................................................82
Figure 12-4 Baiyun International Convention Centre.........................................................................................83
Figure 12-5 Guangzhou Library.....................................................................................................................................83
Figure 12-6 Guangzhou Museum..................................................................................................................................83
Figure 12-7 Solar resource in China ............................................................................................................................84
Figure 12-8 In front of the meter vs. behind the meter.......................................................................................89
Figure 13-1 Installed price of residential and commercial over time..........................................................91
Figure 13-2 US estimated installation cost breakdown......................................................................................92
Figure 13-3 International installed cost comparison............................................................................................92
Figure 15-1 Jinan University Library rooftop space .........................................................................................103
Table 6-1 Energy mix of top countries for renewables in 2013.....................................................................35
Table 11-1 WFOE vs. JV...................................................................................................................................................75
Table 12-1 PVWatts inputs...............................................................................................................................................85
Table 13-1 Key assumptions............................................................................................................................................93

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Section 1
1 Introduction
Concept
A solar garden, community solar garden or community shared solar project1, is a renewable
energy project designed, implemented and sold with the specific purpose of providing distributed
solar energy to subscribing members of a local community. The basic idea is that members of a
community buy into a solar array and benefit from its electrical energy output via regular kWh
bill credits on their personal or commercial electricity bills. Additionally subscribers may also
share in any incentives designed to facilitate the development of renewable energy projects in the
region. Thus the buy in is the initial investment and the bill credit and/or share in incentives
over the life of the project the ROI. Due to the longevity of the technology (the solar panels),
returns typically continue for twenty years or more. Thus subscribing to a share in a solar garden
is a long-term investment.
Figure 1-1 Investment and return
Why invest?
 Offset energy bill—by buying into a solar garden project subscribers offset their own
carbon fuelled energy usage with energy produced from a clean, green, renewable
source—the sun. Subscribers may be environmentally conscious people or entities which
desire to be less dependent on the grid, wish to ‘go green’ or simply hedge against the
1
Coughlin, J., Grove, J., Irvine,L., Jacobs, J. F., Phillips, S. J., Sawyer, A., Wiedman,J., A Guideto Community SharedSolar:Utility, Private,
and Nonprofit Project Development, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2012 available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54570.pdf
Subscriber
buy in
Investment
Bill credit,
PPA,
subsidies &
FIT
ROI

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rising electricity rates but for whatever reason are unable to install panels on their own
premises (perhaps it is shaded, there is not enough sun, they are renting, they do not plan
to be in the premises for longer than the life of the panels, red tape, high costs etc.). The
solar garden thus provides these individuals or entities with a solar option by purchasing
capacity in an off-site array and ‘virtually’ using its energy output—the actual energy
output is either sold back to the grid (for a Feed-In-Tariff, FIT) or to the site host
(Power Purchase Agreement, PPA). This process of crediting a subscriber’s bill for
kWh produced off site is called Virtual Net Metering, VNM2.
 Hedge against price rises—a subscriber in a solar garden project hedges against future
energy price rises by virtually producing it’s own energy. If the subscriber receives a
kWh bill credit in direct proportion to the amount of energy the subscriber’s share of the
panel produces, then this not only represents positive cash flow in the form of energy
bills not paid out, but as retail energy rates increase, the monetary value of the kWh bill
credit increases accordingly. In China current retails rates are between CNY0.60 and
CNY0.80/kWh for residential and CNY0.90 to CNY1.20/kWh for commercial3. It is
reasonable to assume that these rates will increase each year (at least to account for
inflation). If energy rates rise faster than inflation, this investment hedges against future
price rises. Since the subscriber is no longer subject to bill payments, it is not longer
subject to rate rises and therefore has hedged against power price increases. If however
the subscriber receives a monetary bill credit then it only hedges against the rising
wholesale price of electricity i.e. the grid’s variable costs—the subscriber would still be
subject to rising fixed costs associated with transmission lines and infrastructure etc.
 Capture financial incentives (return)—what makes this project economically attractive in
China is the combination of the national production incentive and the FIT, which varies
according to the wholesale price of power around the country. This means that,
according to national policies, the local utility is obliged to purchase at the wholesale rate
(the rate it pays for coal fired power for example) energy from any entity feeding power
back into the grid from a distributed solar source. This rate is about CNY0.50/kWh.
Furthermore, there is a national production incentive of CNY0.42/kWh. This means that
regardless of whether the power is consumed onsite or fed back into the grid, Beijing will
2
Huijben, J.C.C.M. & Verbong, G.P.J., Breakthrough without subsidies?PVbusiness model experiments in the Netherlands, 26 December 2012,
Energy Policy
3
Lucia, F., National Policy Initiatives Continue to Fuel Robust Growth in PVmarket for DB Solar Report, 20Jan 2014, available at
http://www.dailyenmoveme.com/en/market/china-national-policy-initiatives-continue-fuel-robust-growth-pv-market-db-solar-report

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reward any entity this rate for any distributed power it produces. Moreover this is a 20-
year agreement. Thus in China distributed energy generators are effectively being paid to
be self-sufficient. According to Felice Lucia:
“Distributed generation users are awarded a ¥0.42/kwh FIT, which is on top of
the reduction in electricity use inherent in having a distributed system. This
effectively means that the customer is offsetting their cost of electricity and is
being paid ¥0.42/kWh to do so.”4
The FIT and production incentive together serve as a lucrative revenue source. The
combined value of the energy produced from a distributed source is 0.42+0.50=0.92
RMB per kWh at the very least. The FIT is a production-based incentive. In the United
States there are capacity-based incentives, the main one being the 30% federal tax credit,
which effectively reduces the cost of the project by 30% for developers or owners with
sufficient tax appetite to capture it. Under China’s ‘Golden Sun Project’ from 2009-13
there were similar production based incentives in the form of up front subsidies5 however
it seems these have been phased out in favour of production based incentives.
Forecasting the lifetime production of the panels and then calculating the revenue from
the sale of that energy constitutes the free cash flow of the project, which is then used to
determine the it’s IRR and NPV.
 Environmental stewardship—finally subscribers may be motivated by a sense of
environmental concern. Solar gardens provide an opportunity for environmentally aware
citizens and entities to invest in a scheme that aims to offset coal-fired energy usage.
Offsetting up to 100% of an entity’s energy usage with green power sources provides
significant opportunity for positive PR (e.g. a university offsetting 50% of its energy
usage with green sources could label itself ‘the greenest university in the world’ – which
could lead to significant intangible benefit).
4
Lucia, F., National Policy Initiatives Continue to Fuel Robust Growth in PVmarket for DB Solar Report, 20Jan 2014, available at
http://www.dailyenmoveme.com/en/market/china-national-policy-initiatives-continue-fuel-robust-growth-pv-market-db-solar-report
5
Xiupei Liang, Lost in Transmission: DistributedSolar Generationin China,August 2014, WilsonCenterChinaEnvironmental Forum

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How?
In the United States most solar gardens projects would typically cost no less than USD5 per Watt
installed, however in China due to the lower labour and materials costs, as well as favourable
policies, similar projects could be done for as low as CNY12/W (less than USD2/W) installed6.
Thus a 2MW project (2,000,000 watts) for example could require a capital outlay of about
CNY24 million. Initial investment is typically the biggest barrier in a distributed solar project.
The solar gardens concept is a unique approach, with capital able to be raised a number of ways.
a) Financial commitments from subscribers—subscribers commit their full investment to
the project and the collection of those funds serve as the capital needed for the project to
get underway. It is the job of the Hosting Service Provider (HSP)—the special purpose
entity set up to carry out the project—to ‘sell’ it to investors, collect funds and facilitate
it’s speedy development. Crucially the HSP would also have to facilitate a VNM
agreement with the utility so that subscribers receive their proportional bill credit.
b) Anchor investment—alternatively an anchor subscriber, an investor with a large energy
appetite subscribes to a large percentage of the array (perhaps 50%), and puts up 100% of
the capital needed for the entire project with investors gradually buying in. The anchor’s
investment is returned as subscribers buy in. This allows the project to get underway
immediately. The anchor subscriber is also able buy up shares of subscribers looking to
divest from the project (for example if they leave the region) as well as sell shares to
incoming investors looking to subscribe. Ideally the anchor subscriber can provide the
host site and may benefit from rental income as well.
c) Power purchase agreement—in the event that VNM is not agreed to by the utility, the
project can be scaled down such that a host is found with an energy appetite large enough
to consume all energy produced by the array. The host then enters into a long term PPA
with the HSP. Since the host and the energy consumer are now the same entity rental
expense could be reduced or eliminated. Return to subscribers is delivered, not as a bill
credit, but monetarily after expenses are deducted. In some arrangement, after payback
and a satisfactory IRR is had by subscribers the ownership of the array flips to the host or
is purchased at market rate. The host then enjoys ‘free’ electricity for the rest of the life
of the panels.
6
personal communicationwith JoyHughes, founder andCEO ofSolar Gardens Institute,10 November2014

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Virtual net metering
In scenarios a) and b) it is crucial that the local utility agrees to virtually net meter subscribers’
electricity usage. In the US in states where the utility agrees to facilitate the process, energy
users’ meters ‘run backwards’ so that they are liable only for their net energy usage i.e. (kWh
used – kWh produced)*retail price of electricity.
Stakeholders
Subscribers—the primary stakeholders in the project with their investment making the project
feasible. Investments can be made either in power capacity increments (e.g. per kW) or by the
panel (panels typically are 200-300W capacity). Subscribers could be any entity or individual
with an energy appetite located within the area served by the array.
Host—for a 2MW array an area of about 4-6 hectares or about three full sized football fields are
needed. In the US, rental expense is typically no more than US$25,000 per MW per year7. Rent
can be minimized or eliminated if the host is a subscriber and land used for the array is gray-field
(failing or under utilized real estate or land) or brown-field (abandoned, industrialised sites,
water treatment plants, airports, unsuitable farmland etc.). Ensuring green fields aren’t used also
maintains the environmental integrity of the project8. Aside from rental income, intangible
benefits to the host include positive publicity, fulfilling environmental duties, and perhaps
establishing a sense of community pride. Ideal hosts are organizations with large amounts of
under utilized space, otherwise unsuitable for commercial, recreational, or agricultural activities
and in a location relatively close to grid connectivity points.
Anchor investor—the anchor investor is ideally an entity with a government connection that can
make the project happen. The anchor investor also has a large energy appetite like an airport,
university, water treatment plant etc. and could own up to 50% of the array. As subscribers buy
in, the anchor investor is reimbursed (with return). If no anchor investor can be found then the
project could possibly be financed with a commercial loan.
7 personal communication with Joy Hughes, founderandCEO of Solar Gardens Institute, 10November 2014
8
Joy Hughes in a personal communicationwith Elana BulmanforherSenior Thesis, March 20, 2012

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Hosting Service Provider—the hosting service provider, HSP, is a special purpose entity set up
to design, install, and implement the project and sell it to subscribers. After installation it is also
responsible for ongoing operations and maintenance, acts as an agent to subscribers, and liaison
between them and the utility, with whom it negotiates the FIT and bill credits. It also liaises
with the relevant authorities to ensure payment of any financial incentives.
Utility—national policy in China states that the utility is obligated to purchase power produced
by the array at the rate it otherwise pays the power plant, i.e. the wholesale rate. Apart from
diversifying its power supply and alleviating strain on the grid during times of peak demand
(especially in summer with intensive A/C usage in Guangzhou), the utility has central
government devised obligations to source a certain percentage of its power from renewable
energy sources. In the US, crucially the utility is not only responsible for grid connectivity, but
also virtual net metering subscribers’ energy usage and billing accordingly.
In an ideal scenario all stakeholders are on board. A host is found which will anchor the project
and purchase a good portion of the output, forgoing rent for a discounted power purchase
agreement. Subscribers make up the remainder of the investment and the utility agrees to credit
them for their proportionate share of the power produced by the array. Ideally this is a virtually
net metered kWh bill credit which directly hedges rate rises and equates to positive cash flow
from day 1; second best is monetary compensation at the full retail rate of electricity (unlikely)
or more realistically some negotiated rate between it and the wholesale rate. A special purpose
entity is created, the HSP, which facilitates the process and importantly collects production or
capacity based incentives and distributes them to investors for a fee. Joy Hughes of Solar
Gardens Institute summarises the cash and energy flow below:

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Figure 1-2 Shared solar cash and energy flow9
9
Source: Hughes, J., Open Standards for SharedRenewables,2013, Solar Gardens Institute

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2 Community solar gardens
The solar gardens concept was pioneered in the US where attractive returns on investment
largely depend on state and local government capacity and production incentives. A number of
schemes and business models exist whereby a group of investors motivated both by
environmental stewardship and financial gain pool their capital to build a solar array either on
rented land or a host site location, returns coming in the form of either power sales to a host or
FIT (production based incentives), as well as other tax incentives (capacity based). Below are
two examples.
1. University Park Community Solar LLC10 in Maryland was established in May 2010
and up and running by 22 July the same year. 35 community members formed an LLC
collectively investing US$130,315 and facilitated the installation of a 22.77kW system
on the roof of a church, which agreed to purchase the 30,442kWh11 generated by the
array for 20 years with an option to purchase the installation outright before the term
expires12. Apart from PPA revenues, other incentives for subscribers included the federal
tax credit/grant, a state grant, accelerated depreciation and sale of renewable energy
credits with an expected payback of 5-6 years13. Using financial data available at the
website I estimate project IRR at conception of around 12% and simple payback in year
8. However in 2011 market rate for SREC’s was US$350. It has since dropped and
averaged around US$185, significantly lowering IRR to around 4.5% and lengthening
payback to around year 13.
2. Greenbelt Community Solar LLC also in Maryland saw 30 community members come
together to facilitate the installation of a 21.6kW array again on the roof a church. Total
funds raised exceeded US$100,000. The PPA with the church is set at 90% of the utility
rate escalating as rates rise14. The length of the PPA is twenty years and if not purchased
before then ownership flips to the church. With no access to financial data I was unable
to estimate payback and IRR.
10
http://www.universityparksolar.com/index.htm
11
http://www.universityparksolar.com/index.htm
12
13
14
Dave Konkle, February2014, A Guidebook forCommunitySolar Programs in MichiganCommunities

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2.1 Solar Mosaic Co.
Solar Mosaic Co. takes the solar gardens concept and scales it up. It is essentially a crowd
sourcing investment platform, which investors use to contribute capital to developing any
number of solar projects around the country. Solar Mosaic is responsible for selecting,
developing and managing the project, navigating the legal environment (in particular dealing
with securities law), and ensuring investors receive their return15. The company connects
investors with solar projects, facilitating and managing the process for a fee. The model
according to the website:
Figure 2-1 Solar Mosaic investment model16
Solar Mosaic plays less of a developer role and more of a financier, making low interest loans
available to project developers who satisfy their credit and project risk requirements as well as
solar leases to entities who choose to lease instead of buy—these entities agree to a PPA with
Solar Mosaic for as long as the panels are on their premises. Solar Mosaic’s revenues thus come
from management fees paid by investors, loan repayments and lease payments, as well as
collection of any other national or state specific financial incentives Solar Mosaic would qualify
for.
Solar Mosaic has been referred to as ‘the Kickstarter for solar’ because of its unique
crowdsourcing model which allows investors to enter the solar market with minimal investment
(as low as US$25). Their value proposition is an opportunity for all to participate in and
15
Konkle, D.,A Guidebook for Community Solar Programs in Michigan Communities,February 2014,Great Lakes Renewable Energy
Associationunder a grant from theMEDC – Michigan Energy Office
16
Source: https://joinmosaic.com/invest-in-solar

17
contribute to the development of a growing, environmentally friendly industry while receiving
modest but stable, long-term returns—usually in the 4.5-7% range (but could be up to 10%)17
and payback of 5-10 years18.
Solar Mosaic’s current strategy is to increase focus on the residential market offering low
interest loans and solar leases to homeowners looking to go solar. The competition in the US
residential solar loan/lease market is stiff with a number of incumbents including SolarCity,
Vivint, Sungevity and SunPower all offering similar services19. On the investor side, while
investor returns are modest and only realised over the long term, interest in Solar Mosaic’s solar
backed securities is high. It is not uncommon for Solar Mosaic project offerings to sell out
within 24 hours and since establishment in 2010, according to their website, they have so far
raised over US$10 million in investments and generated almost 28 million kWh in clean solar
energy.
Solar Mosaic’s product is differentiated in that it takes the community shared solar gardens
concept and makes it easy to use, technically sophisticated, and appealing to a young, tech
savvy, environmentally conscious demographic that is adept at using online platforms to manage
money. On top of this subscribers can pick and choose which project they invest in allowing
them to invest in projects visible in their own communities.
2.2 Serving an expanding market niche
Solar Mosaic has taken the community owned solar gardens concept, expanded it and turned it
into an investment opportunity for anyone—not just those that form a community of
geographically close, like minded people as the typical solar gardens project generally requires.
Initially, just like Kickstarter20, Solar Mosaic offered individual ‘tiles’ (shares) in a project after
which a certain number were sold allowed the project to get underway21. A unique selling point
for investors is knowing in exactly what and how much they are investing, as well as their
proportional share in the project (see graphic).
17
Bulman, E., Community Solar Models NationwideandPossibilities for New York City, May 2012,Senior Thesis for UrbanStudies Dep.
Eugene Language College, The NewSchool University
18
Wang, U., Solar StartupMosaic Counts On Former SunPower ExecFor Growth, 24July 2014,available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2014/07/24/solar-startup-mosaic-counts-on-former-sunpower-exec-for-growth/
19
Wang, U., Solar StartupMosaic Counts On Former SunPower ExecFor Growth, 24July 2014,available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2014/07/24/solar-startup-mosaic-counts-on-former-sunpower-exec-for-growth/
20
https://www.kickstarter.com/
21
Wang, U., 13 Solar Startups to Watch in 2013,9 January2013, https://gigaom.com/2013/01/09/13-solar-startups-to-watch-in-2013/

18
Figure 2-2 Solar Mosaic Project Offerings22
Since kicking off it has evolved into a platform which offers financial products to the online
community comprising prospective solar investors anywhere, and on the solar side allowed for
the development of projects via low interest loans to project developers and homeowners. The
investment is promoted as a safe, low risk, clean and financially attractive vehicle (compared to
savings accounts), thus serving a (steadily) growing niche market that wants access to this solar
asset class23. Even if returns were not competitive it is not an altruistic investment since the
entire community benefits via reduced carbon emissions due to solar users reduced reliance on
the grid.
For organisations, firms and homeowners as well as solar developers Solar Mosaic makes a
source of low interest capital available for their solar projects to get underway. Those who
choose to buy receive instant credit with a low interest loan leading to savings from day 124.
Those who choose to rent simply make their rooftop available for installation and are free of
risk, ongoing transaction and O&M costs, also enjoy savings from day 1. The Solar Mosaic
leasing model is different from other leasing models which generally seek to lock in long term
PPA’s tied to utility rates as compensation.
22
Source: Wang, U., 13 Solar Startups to Watch in 2013, 9 January 2013,https://gigaom.com/2013/01/09/13-solar-startups-to-watch-in-2013/
23
Wang, U., 13 Solar Startups to Watch in 2013,9 January2013, https://gigaom.com/2013/01/09/13-solar-startups-to-watch-in-2013/
24
http://homesolar.joinmosaic.com/partners/

19
2.3 First large scale success story
One of Solar Mosaic’s definitive projects was the raising of a US$698,775 loan to fund the
installation of 447kW worth of panels on the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New
Jersey. Having launched a number of successful smaller scale projects up until this point,
mostly on schools and community centres, and under 114kW in size, Solar Mosaic had decided
to scale up and attempt to raise much more substantial funds for a large scale project on the east
coast of the United States.
2.3.1 Wildwoods Convention Center
Some months prior to the development of the project the Governor of the state Chris Christie had
“signed legislation to grow New Jersey’s solar industry”25 making this an ideal project to
showcase the state’s commitment to renewable energy. The venue, the Wildwoods Convention
Center in New Jersey, was opened in 2001 and is a modern, state-of-the-art, 260,000-square-foot
facility located on the picturesque New Jersey shore and designed to hold conventions, trade
shows, meetings, concerts and exhibits with a maximum capacity of 10,00026. Plans were that
the centre would eventually host the installation of 447kW of panels, which would produce
550,000 kWh of electricity annually, enough for 24% of its energy needs.
Figure 2-3 Wildwoods Convention Center NJ
25
Wildwood Convention Center unveils solar project, 25July 2012, Shore News Today,available at
http://www.shorenewstoday.com/snt/news/index.php/wildwood-mainmenu/wildwood-leader/27771-convention-center-unveils-solar-project.html
26
http://www.wildwoodsnj.com/cc/

20
Figure 2-4 Wildwoods Convention Center Solar Installation
2.3.2 Roll out
The project was rolled out in three phases, with Mosaic involved in the final round, which went
online in April 2013 and sought to raise almost US$700,00027. The securities on offer would
mature in 114 months and subscribers would earn an annual return of 4.5%28. In total funds of
over US$1.3m were raised and total of 1,700 panels were installed with Tioga Energy and EPC
contractor Pro-Tech Energy Solutions involved29. 823 investors from 42 states subscribed to the
project. Their returns consist of revenues from the sale of the output to the state of New Jersey,
the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority and the Greater Wildwoods Tourism
Development Authority, as well as proceeds from the sale of the Solar Renewable Energy
Credits (national incentives) to Atlantic City Electric30. Due to the uniqueness of the funding
approach and ambitious size of the project it received Solar Server’s July 2013 Solar Energy
System of the Month award. The unique power of the crowd funding approach and its ability to
democratize solar is illustrated in Solar Mosaic’s infographic below.
27
https://joinmosaic.com/blog/mosaic-launches-huge-project-its-going-take-crowd/
28
Roseland, C., Solar EnergySystem of theMonth: Wildwoods ConventionCenter PVproject,July 2013, Solar Serveravailable at
http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-energy-system-of-the-month/wildwoods-convention-center-pv-project.html
29
Wildwood Convention Center unveils solar project, 25July 2012, Shore News Today,available at
http://www.shorenewstoday.com/snt/news/index.php/wildwood-mainmenu/wildwood-leader/27771-convention-center-unveils-solar-project.html
30
Roseland, C., Solar EnergySystem of theMonth: Wildwoods ConventionCenter PVproject,July 2013, Solar Serveravailable at
http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-energy-system-of-the-month/wildwoods-convention-center-pv-project.html

21
Figure 2-5 Solar Mosaic's Wildwood Convention Center31
2.4 Current Chinese business model
With the ambitious targets for distributed solar in 2015 and beyond, as well as a national and
various province specific financial incentives, the market is looking for a suitable commercial
model to apply32. Distributed solar focused EPC (Energy Performance Contracting) is one of
these and, with incentives designed to encourage energy self-sufficiency, is one that is starting to
gain traction. EPC is similar a solar lease as described above.
2.4.1 Energy performance contracting
Under an EPC arrangement a solar developer agrees to install a rooftop, ground mounted (or
even building integrated PV) array on a host’s site. The developer takes care of financing,
31
Source: Solar Mosaic via Roseland, C., Solar Energy System of the Month: Wildwoods Convention Center PVproject, July 2013, Solar Server
available at http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-energy-system-of-the-month/wildwoods-convention-center-pv-project.html
32
RooftopSolar Gets Tractionin China – DistributedGeneration, Residential,Commercial,Feed-In Tariffs, Incentives, June 2014, Chadbourne
available at http://www.chadbourne.com/rooftop_solar_china_june2014_projectfinance/

22
development and installation of the project as well as ongoing O&M expenses for the life of the
project. In return the host, usually a commercial entity such as an airport, factory etc., agrees to
a long term PPA with the developer, signing a contract obligating it to purchase all the power
produced by the array for the life of the project—at a discounted rate to incentivise the host
which often escalates along with the current utility rate.
The developer essentially bears all the risk but maintains ownership allowing it to capture any
national or provincial incentives. The host benefits from a discounted energy rate over the life of
the project, which means positive cash flows from day 1 and importantly no initial investment.
After the developer experiences payback (perhaps 6 to 7 years) and had sufficient return (ideally
IRR >12%) ownership of the array reverts to the host which then enjoys grid independence with
unfettered access to its own green energy supply for the rest of the life of the panels. The
ownership flip happens after around 20 years in the US but can be sooner depending on the
agreement between owner/developer and host.
Similarities to US ownership flip model
This kind of ownership ‘flip’ model is not uncommon in the US as a means for community solar
gardens projects to get underway with long term benefits to both host and subscribers (although
subscriber returns are usually much lower than 12%). The University Park Community Solar
LLC and Greenbelt Community Solar LLC projects both have ownership flip options—the host
Churches have the option to buy the panels outright before the PPA contract expires33. At
expiration, the ownership flips to the Church anyway.
2.4.2 Recent Solar EPC projects in China
1. DuPont’s R&D Centre in Shanghai—in the second half of 2014, Yingli Green Energy
Holding Company Limited signed an EPC contract to install a 210kW solar array on the
rooftop of the DuPont China R&D Centre in Shanghai34. According to Dupont’s global
business director Chuck Xu, “DuPont and Yingli Solar established this project to model
how solar power can be most effectively utilized to meet the growing demand for clean
and sustainable distributed solar energy”35. Thus Yingli and Dupont’s model project is
33
34
http://www.pvbuzz.com/press-releases/yingli-green-energy-supports-china-policy-expand-distributed-solar-generation/
35
DuPont and Yingli Solar Collaborate onCleanEnergy,DuPont Case Study, January2015available at www.dupont.com

23
not just an arms-length commercial transaction but a strategic collaboration intended to
showcase both firm’s core competencies and highlight their commitment to the
development of solar in China—in fact DuPont already has 13 other solar installations at
other sites36. The PPA is a 25 year contract in which DuPont agrees to purchase all
202,000 kWh expected to be produced by the panels37 (presumably at a discount). The
installation is financed, owned and managed by Yingli which expects pay back in
approximately 6 years after which it enjoys free cash flows, after expenses, for the rest of
the life of the project. The panels cover a rooftop space of 2,100 square meters and
according to their case study produce the equivalent energy consumption of 670 Chinese
households per month38. A video summary of the project is available at the website39.
Figure 2-6 DuPont R&D Centre Shanghai Solar Installation
2. Turpan Jiaohe Airport in Xinjiang—In May 2014, a subsidiary of China Aviation
Supplies Holding Company signed a contract with Xinjiang Airport Group to install
distributed solar on the area consisting Turpan Jiaohe Airport in the China’s northwest
Xinjiang province. The size of the array is 150kW which consists of 480 ground
mounted and 120 roof mounted panels covering an area of 4,000 square metres40. The
panels are expected to produce 182,500 kWh of electricity per year, which the airport
will purchase under an 18 year PPA after which ownership flips to Xinjiang Airport
Group41. China Aviation Supplies will design, implement, and maintain the project until
36
37
Yingli Green Energy Supports ChinaPolicyto Expand Distributed Solar Generation, 24November 2014,PVBuzz available at
http://www.pvbuzz.com/press-releases/yingli-green-energy-supports-china-policy-expand-distributed-solar-generation/
38
39
http://www.dupont.com/products-and-services/solar-photovoltaic-materials/media/videos/advanced-pv-technologies-from-dupont-and-
yingli.html
40
China’s Turpan Airport Installs 150KWSolar Power System, 4 January 2015,ReneSolar, availablet at http://renesola.com/news/340.htm
41
China’s Turpan Airport Installs 150KWSolar Power System, 4 January 2015,ReneSolar, availablet at http://renesola.com/news/340.htm

24
payback and sufficient return are received. At the end of the PPA the airport enjoys free,
green, grid independent electricity with the panels expected to last another 7 years or
so42.
Figure 2-7 Turpan Airport Solar Installation
3. Midea Group factories in Shunde Guangdong—also in the latter half of 2014 China
Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd received a low interest RMB250 million loan from the
Agricultural Bank of China’s Guangdong branch to install a 32MW (32,000kW) solar
installation on the factories owned by Midea Group in Shunde43. Midea is a leading
consumer appliances and air conditioning systems manufacturer in China. This
installation is slightly different to the two previous cases in that the local utility was the
developer this time, however the transactional arrangement is the same—Midea Group
agrees to purchase energy produced by the array paying China Southern, which owns the
array and collects national production incentives, for the energy it produces. Proceeds
from the incentives and the PPA service the loan and ongoing expenses associated with
the project. After 25 years the ownership flips to Midea Group44.
42
43
http://global.ofweek.com/news/Southern-Power-Grid-gets-RMB-250-million-loans-for-distributed-solar-PV-project-19404
44

25
Figure 2-8 Midea Group Shunde Solar Array
2.4.3 Returns on EPC projects
Typical EPC (solar service agreement/power purchase agreement) projects in the US tend to
attract investors motivated more by environmental responsibility and a desire to see the
development of the industry rather than financial returns which are typically low with payback
occurring after ten years or more45. Additionally their economic feasibility largely depends, not
on revenues from the sale of the power produced, but the capture of the 30% federal government
tax credit, state subsidies, and the sale of renewable energy credits (REC’s and sREC’s) awarded
with the output of every 1000kWh of clean energy output. Incentives in China have been
designed so that the typical distributed scale (defined as less than 6MW46) project in China can
reach an IRR of 12-17% and payback in less than 10 years, perhaps around six to seven.
Additionally they are designed around a ‘self consumption model’ and thus encourage grid
independence of large commercial and industrial entities, as well as schools, hospitals, and
government buildings. The three Chinese EPC projects mentioned above were designed with
this in mind. These projects seem to be financed either with private equity or low interest loans.
2.5 Proposal for China
Considering the receptivity of the EPC model to project hosts (see above) and the willingness of
developers to engage it, we propose combining the EPC model and Solar Mosaic’s
crowdsourcing model to create a Chinese online investment platform, which redefines ‘the
community’ to include ‘the crowd’ and leverages it as a source of capital. Using the platform,
investors are presented with a series of small to medium scale distributed solar projects (perhaps
45
personal communicationwith JoyHughes, founder andCEO ofSolar Gardens Institute,10 November2014
46
“Guanyuzuohao fenbushi dianyuan bingwangfuwugongzuo de yijian neirong” (“Suggestion onthe service ofdistributedgeneration
interconnection”),28 February2013, State Grid, available at http://www.sgcc. com.cn/ztzl/newzndw/cyfz/02/288813.shtml

26
<1MW) located in areas ‘close’ to investors themselves. The community decides which projects
to fund and individuals decide how much they would like to invest considering factors such as:
 the project itself
 the expected return
 the expected payback period
 the IRR etc.
Once 100% (or close to) funding is pledged, the project is implemented and positive cash flows
gained in the form of PPA revenue + national production incentives + state production/capacity
incentives (if any). After expenses are deducted (O&M, insurance, regulatory costs,
management fees etc.) after tax profit is distributed amongst investors as a dividend.
Considering the average commercial electricity rate of 0.92rmb/kWh, and assuming this rises
each year (with utility rates and inflation) + the national 0.42rmb/kWh incentive, with an initial
investment of CNY10-12 per watt, investors could have their money back in around 8 years and
enjoy an IRR of 12-17% over 20 years.
The project is still communal in that any area that is visible, high profile, or easily accessible to
the public so that investors recognise, know and can perhaps even visit, the project in which they
are investing (e.g. an array at Baiyun airport funded by investors in Guangzhou) is usable. This
is in keeping with the community solar gardens concept of local investors helping to develop
locally owned and consumed solar. We reason that close proximity and visibility will encourage
potential investors to take part—an array located at an airport that investors in Guangzhou are
likely to have used will garner far more interest than an array at an airport in western China’s
Xinjiang region.
To incentivise the host who has to make the host site (e.g. a rooftop or unused land area)
available for the length of the project and enter into a long term power purchase agreement, the
solar electricity rate will be pegged to the utility rate with an agreed upon discount e.g. 10%.
This way the host enjoys positive free cash flow from day 1. Furthermore, after payback and
agreed upon IRR is reached by investors, the ownership of the array flips to the host which then
enjoys unfettered access to the green energy it produces for the rest of the useful life of the array.
The array can either be simply flipped to the host or sold. We anticipate that at the rate this

27
technology is developing the array will be fully depreciated with little to no salvage value at this
time.
The SPE/HSP/third party is the entity responsible for commercialising the arrangement. It is the
entity which facilitates the above process and is responsible for:
 hosting the website
 selecting the projects
 partnering with developers to design, implement and maintain the projects
 navigating the legal and regulatory environment
 liaising with the site host and investors
 designing the contract, collecting PPA revenues and distributing dividends
 collecting any production or capacity based financial incentives owed to the project
 maintaining expenses associated operations
 generally ensuring the smooth running of the project over it’s lifetime
In return for the above it either collects a percentage fee of revenues for its services OR is
entitled to a share of the profit (e.g. as investors contribute capital, the third party brings
expertise and project management to the table for which it may be entitled to 20% of the profits
for example, with the remainder being split proportionally amongst investors). The third party is
the legal owner of the project until the ownership flip occurs.
Figure 2-9 Proposed EPC model for China
Crowd
SPE
Distributed solar
installa on
e.g. JNU
Management School
roo op
Host
e.g. Jinan University
Beijing
Profit = ROI
0.42RMB/kWhCrowdfunded capital
Installa on, O&M
and ownership
kWh
PPA 90%*0.92RMB/kWh

28
Why an online investment platform?
Online investment platforms are not uncommon to Chinese investors who currently have a
number of loan and fund based products to choose from, for example Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao,
Renrendai, and Lilicai.
Online platforms are the easiest and most convenient to use for the tech savvy online
community. Investors are likely to demand ease-of-use, convenience, transparency and
comparability. An online platform makes the most sense for this. Additionally it allows
potentially any person or entity in China with an online bank account to participate thus opening
up the market to include almost all of China.
Why focus on small to medium scale independent EPC projects?
In order to ‘test the waters’ pilot projects will initially be small to increase the likelihood that full
funding is achieved, lower risk and gauge investor interest. Additionally small and medium
scale projects are likely to produce insufficient output for the hosting entity to offset its entire
utility bill. This ensures that 100% of the energy is being consumed onsite, ‘behind the meter’,
which means the utility only plays a peripheral role. Removing a stakeholder as large,
influential and potentially cumbersome as the state run utility ensures a smoother path to
implementation. If larger projects are undertaken, perhaps from 2MW to 4MW in capacity, the
array will most likely produce surplus power and which would have be to be sold back to the
utility, entailing a number of regulatory, logistical and structural hurdles.
What are the potential problems?
Potential problems could fall into the below categories:
 Market immaturity—the market may not be ready for this kind of business and
investment model. Investing in solar backed assets is something relatively new to the
Chinese market and therefore this could be met with suspicion. Chinese investors are
risk averse so developing trust could be a big issue.
 Returns are long term—the Chinese investment time horizon is short term. Payback
periods of up to ten years may be too long for Chinese investors who generally want their

29
money back as quickly as possible. Since the most attractive IRR is achieved only after
20 years, shortening the investment period to half that considerably drops the IRR to
around 6-8%.
 Logistic and project related—with little to no experience working with Chinese
developers or hosts there are potentially a number of unaccounted for issues that could
come up related to installation and implementation of a distributed solar array.
 Political—we are unsure how a proposal like this would be received by the regulatory
authorities as well as what and how much of a role traditional ‘relationship’ based
business culture practices will play in getting something like this off the ground.

30
3 China’s green energy industry development and policies
Since opening up in 1978 China has achieved much in the proceeding three decades. Rapid
development exemplified by a 10% average annual growth rate has seen 500 million47 48 people
pulled out of poverty and an increase in life expectancy and life quality for Chinese citizens that
could not have been dreamed of at the time of the first reform. Today China is the world’s most
populous nation with approximately 1.4 billion people, the world’s second largest economy with
a nominal GDP of CNY56,900 billion (US$9.4 trillion)49—although may have just passed the
US to become the world’s first. It is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter making it
effectively the factory of the world; is the world’s largest creditor; boasts two of the word’s
largest banks; has 61 companies in Fortune’s Global 500, has the “world’s second-largest
highway network, the world’s 3 longest sea bridges, and 6 of the world’s 10 largest container
ports”50; and is home to an enormous middle class with significant purchasing power making it
an extremely lucrative consumer market. It goes without saying that China is a highly influential
player on the world stage and wields significant geopolitical and economic power not only in
Asia but globally, typified by its founding in 2015 of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) which a number of countries spanning Europe and Australasia have so far applied to be
members of.
3.1 Environmental Consequences
This rapid development however has come at considerable environmental cost. China recently
exceeded the US to become the world’s largest annual emitter of carbon dioxide (even though
it’s per capital emissions are relatively low). China’s emissions are forecast to continue to rise
as its energy appetite increases, necessary to fuel its growth (despite GDP growth rate targets
reduced to 7% at the recent 两会 National Communist Party meetings).
47
WorldBank andthe Development Research Center of the State Council,P. R. China. 2013. China2030: Buildinga Modern,Harmonious, and
Creative Society. Washington, DC: WorldBank. DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9545-5.License: Creative Commons AttributionCC BY 3.0.
48
Zhang, T., Ge, Y., & Zhao, R., Creating theChinese dream: A practitioner's guideto impact investingin China's greenSMEs.,2012, China
Impact Fundavailable at http://www.ied.cn/sites/default/files/China%20Impact%20Investing%20Report_Compressed%20Final.pdf. 8-9
49
Eco-civilization: China’s Blueprint for a New Era—Interpreting outcomes from China’s latest leaders conference, February2014, Insight
Briefing, TheClimate Group
50
WorldBank andthe Development ResearchCenter of the State Council,P. R. China. 2013. China2030: Buildinga Modern,Harmonious, and

31
Figure 3-1 Emissions of carbon dioxide from energy, annually and cumulatively51
China is effectively the world’s largest polluter however air pollution is not the only problem—
water contamination, food safety, and natural environment issues are all at the fore of public
discourse and shape governmental policy today. China’s capital Beijing is swathed in thick
smog for much of the year with visibility sometimes reduced to less than a few hundred metres,
air purifiers are commonplace in many Chinese homes and face masks a necessity on some days
in many Chinese cities. The pollution has economic consequences—flights are cancelled due to
poor visibility; schools are closed and recommendations are made for sensitive groups such as
elderly, children and sickly to stay indoors; pollution related illnesses, health problems and early
death manifest themselves in otherwise productive individuals and result in direct and indirect
costs via decreased overall productivity and increased health care costs. In their 2012 report
China Impact Fund (CIF) and New Ventures China (NVC) estimated that the economic cost of
environmental degradation rose from CNY511.8 billion to CNY970.11 billion in the five years
from 2004 to 2009—consistently around 3% of GDP by their calculations52. Combined
environmental and ecological degradation, as well as treatment costs were 8.7% of GDP in
200953. In a 2013 report, the World Bank puts the figure at 10% of GDP of which air pollution
accounts for 6.5% or US$564 billion54.
51
Source: WorldBank andthe Development ResearchCenterof theStateCouncil, P. R. China.2013. China 2030:Building a Modern,
Harmonious, and Creative Society.Washington,DC: WorldBank.DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9545-5. License: Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY 3.0.
52
Zhang, T., Ge, Y., & Zhao, R.. Creating theChinese dream: A practitioner's guideto impact investingin China's greenSMEs, 2012,China
Impact FundandNewVentures China, available at
http://www.ied.cn/sites/default/files/China%20Impact%20Investing%20Report_Compressed%20Final.pdf. 8-9
53
Zhang, T., Ge, Y., & Zhao, R.. Creating theChinese dream: A practitioner's guideto impact investingin China's greenSMEs, 2012,China
Impact FundandNewVentures China, available at
http://www.ied.cn/sites/default/files/China%20Impact%20Investing%20Report_Compressed%20Final.pdf. 8-9
54
WorldBank andthe Development ResearchCenter of the State Council,P. R. China. 2013. China2030: Buildinga Modern,Harmonious, and

32
3.2 Coal
Much of the air pollution comes from China’s use of coal for both power production and heavy
industry. China’s appetite for coal is almost insatiable. Increasing steadily for thirteen years,
China now consumes almost half of the world’s coal which goes to generating up to 80% of it’s
power—compared to other countries China’s coal use is double the US and four times India’s55.
Figure 3-2 China's installed electricity capacity by fuel 2012 (total 1,145GW)56
Figure 3-3 Direct carbon dioxide intensities of different Chinese industries (2007) 57
55
William Chandler, ChenShiping, Holly Gwin, Lin Ruosida, WangYanjia, China’s Future GenerationAssessingthe Maximum Potential for
Renewable Power Sources in China to 2050,February2014Report, WFF andEntri
56
Source: FACTSGlobal Energy, IHSCera, ChineseRenewable Energy Industries Association
57
Source: WorldBank andthe Development ResearchCenterof theStateCouncil, P. R. China.2013. China 2030:Building a Modern,
Harmonious, and Creative Society.Washington,DC: WorldBank.DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9545-5. License: Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY 3.0.

33
WWF and Entri estimate that coal related deaths number about 75,000 per year in China58
(although a quick internet search will show that this is probably a highly conservative figure).
Coal is bad because burning it generates particulate matter, PM. This consists of tiny particles
2.5 micrometres in diameter or less which enter the lungs when breathed in and eventually
become the cause of respiratory problems like asthma, coughing and wheezing and even long
term health problems such as cancer. The PM2.5 scale is what is used in China and around the
world to measure air pollution. Beijing often records PM2.5 Air Quality Index (AQI) levels of
over 300, even reaching as high as 700. For reference below is the PM2.5 AQI scale59.
Figure 3-4 PM2.5 AQI scale60
3.3 Government response
Despite the country’s exceedingly bad levels of pollution the Chinese government has
implemented a number of enabling policies to combat it, in particular air pollution. Indeed the
seven priority industries highlighted for development in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015)
were new energy including nuclear, wind and solar power; energy conservation and
environmental protection; biotech; new materials (rare earths and high end semi conductors);
new IT; high end equipment manufacturing; and clean energy vehicles61. The trickle down
effect that the goals of the plan have had at the provincial and municipal levels has resulted in
58
William Chandler, ChenShiping, Holly Gwin, Lin Ruosida, WangYanjia, China’s Future GenerationAssessingthe Maximum Potential for
Renewable Power Sources in China to 2050,February2014Report, WFF andEntri
59
http://aqicn.org/faq/2013-09-09/revised-pm25-aqi-breakpoints/
60
Source: http://aqicn.org/faq/2013-09-09/revised-pm25-aqi-breakpoints/
61
China’s 12th
Five-year PlanOverview, March 2011,KPMGChina

34
significant strides in combating pollution and ultimately climate change. From a 2013 report by
China’s National Development and Reform Commission:
“In 2012, CO2 emissions per unit of GDP fell 5.02 percent compared to 2011. By the end
of 2012, the output of China’s energy saving and environmental protection industry
exceeded 2.7 trillion yuan. China’s current capacity in hydropower, nuclear, solar, and
wind power, and plantation areas all rank first in the world…”62
Even outside of China, the country is acknowledged as being at the forefront of renewable
energy investment and adoption. Of the US$214 invested in renewable energy worldwide in
2013, China accounted for one quarter or US$56 billion—more than all of Europe combined at
US$48 billion and the US at US$3663. This figure was up to US$89.5 billion at the end of 2014,
a year in which total carbon emissions and domestic coal consumption actually fell for the first
time in over a decade—a 2% dip in emissions and 2.9% drop in coal consumption on the
previous year64 65.
Figure 3-5 Global investment in renewable energy by region 2013 (US$billion)66
In a historic agreement with the US late last year, China pledged to get up to 20% of its energy
from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 (60 to 70% by 2050 according to informal sources67) while
62
China's Policies andActions for AddressingClimate Change,2013, TheNational Development andReformCommissionofThe People’s
Republic of China
63
Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF. 2014.Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2014 available at http://www.fs-unep-centre.org
(Frankfurt am Main)
64
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-13/china-s-carbon-emissions-drop-for-the-first-time-since-2001
65
although this didcorrespondtoa slower growth rate of7.4%, marginally missinggovernment targets of 7.5%,accordingto
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-china-economy-idUSKBN0KT04920150120
66
Source: Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF. 2014. Global Trends in Renewable EnergyInvestment 2014 available at http://www.fs-unep-
centre.org(Frankfurt am Main)
67
ZhongyingWang, Director ofChinaNational Renewable energyCentre andenergyResearchInstitute,NDRC as quotedin ‘Expert: China in
2050 the vast majority ofenergy consumption will come fromcleanenergy’,in ChinaNews Network, June 19,2013,
http://finance.chinanews.com/ny/2013/06-19/4947323.shtml

35
the US will cut emissions levels almost 30% below 2005 levels by 202568. The government is
widely regarded as having some of the most encouraging renewable energy policies in the world
and is far ahead in terms of installed capacity and total production as the graphic below
illustrates. Recently the Chinese Academy of Sciences was ranked the top R&D institution in
the world for renewable energy by KIC InnoEnergy and Questel Consulting of the European
Institute for Innovation and Technology (EIT)69.
Table 3-1 Energy mix of top countries for renewables in 201370
3.4 Solar power
Solar will eventually play a significant role in the energy mix. The central government
recognises its importance and has year on year extended it’s incremental capacity and overall
installed capacity goals over the course of the 12th Five Year Plan.
68
Spross, Jeff., We Have A Deal: The U.S. AndChina Agree To Historic EmissionReductionTargets, 12 November2014, available at
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/11/12/3591284/us-china-climate-deal/
69
Beckman, K.,ChineseAcademy of Sciences Is Top Academic R&D Player In SustainableEnergy,14 March2015, available at
http://www.energypost.eu/meet-worlds-number-1-academic-player-sustainable-energy-chinese-academy-
sciences/http://www.energypost.eu/meet-worlds-number-1-academic-player-sustainable-energy-chinese-academy-sciences/
70
Source: REN21. 2014.Renewables 2014Global Status Report (Paris: REN21Secretariat)

36
Figure 3-6 China Solar PV Installations to 2015 (GW)71
Total installed capacity by the end of 2015 is to be 35GW. This target is likely to be met at the
current rate despite last year’s goals falling short—only 10GW of a 14GW goal was installed last
year (8GW of which was to be distributed). Considering that current installed capacity is around
28.05GW of which 23.38GW is ground mounted (utility scale) and only 4.67GW distributed72
the target of 15GW for 2015 is ambitious and exciting. Most of this will have to be distributed
scale though if the government is to reach its 15GW total installed capacity target by the end of
the Plan (3.15GW of this will be rooftop)73.
These targets along with favourable policy, incentives and practical measures (a nation wide
production incentive of CNY0.42/kWh regardless of whether the electricity is consumed onsite
of fed back into the grid, low cost financing options for distributed projects, monthly billing to
help alleviate cash flow pressure for developers, and free permitting and grid interconnectivity74)
create an environment for distributed solar that is not only financially lucrative for the right
business model, but an opportunity for contributing to the alleviation of China’s air pollution
crisis by taking strain off the largely coal fired grid, evening up the energy mix, and thus
curtailing climate change.
71
Source: Hove, A., Cleantech AdvisoryManager, CAN CHINA DISTRIBUTED SOLAR REACH 20GWBY 2015?, 9 December2013, Azure
International (Azure International analysis andgovernment targets)
72
Shaw, V., China: PVinstalled capacity grows to almost 30GWin 2014, 16February 2015,available at http://www.pv-
magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china--pv-installed-capacity-grows-to-almost-30-gw-in-2014_100018231/#ixzz3WsjHhbEl
73
Shaw, V. andHall, Max., Chinaunveils 15GWsolar target, 30January2015, PVMagazine available, at http://www.pv-
magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china-unveils-15-gw-solar-target_100018005/#axzz3T0suDQBJ
74
Hove, A., CleantechAdvisoryManager, CAN CHINA DISTRIBUTED SOLAR REACH 20GWBY 2015?, 9 December 2013, Azure
International

37
Section 2
4 Feasibility study
4.1 Purpose
The purpose of this feasibility study is to explore whether the solar gardens business model
could be adapted to suit China. The model should be in keeping with the basic solar gardens
principles of distributed generation, community buy-in and openness to all, a return, and of
course a net positive effect on the environment. In attempting to maintain these basic principles,
the current distributed solar and crowd-funding environment in China will be examined to see
how the original business model could evolve in order to take advantage of favourable renewable
energy policies and incentives, in particular with regard to distributed solar generation.
Additionally it will be important to explore how the currently hazy regulatory framework
surrounding crowdfunding could be navigated. The question we ask is whether distributed solar
EPC/PPA generation projects could be financed via equity-based crowdfunding in China.
Furthermore it will be important to determine how this investment could be marketed (e.g.
impact investment), what it would involve technically, as well as the potential return to
investors. As far as we know a model like this has not been implemented anywhere yet in
mainland China.
This research was carried out in close collaboration with Joy Hughes of The Solar Gardens
Institute in Colorado, United States. The Solar Gardens Institute (www.solargardens.org) is an
institution devoted to the promotion of the solar gardens concept and community solar in general
through education, training and consulting. Joy Hughes is its founder and CEO and has a strong
interest in promoting the concept in China. Over the course of researching and writing this
thesis I maintained frequent correspondence with her and also had the opportunity to meet with
her in person as she visited China on a number of occasions. This paper aims to be a useful
resource for anyone hoping to develop any kind of community solar model or project in China.
Why crowdfunding?
Numerous studies and reports highlight the potential for crowdfunding to tackle climate change
by making funds available to small and medium sized businesses involved in renewable energy

38
related projects and clean tech in general75 76 77 78. Crowdfunding connects the people with the
business idea, directly to the people with the funds to make it happen, bypassing traditional
financing options like banks and venture capitalists79. This form of funding not only cuts out the
middleman but also democratizes the process i.e. it is the crowd itself which determines which
business or project is worthy of being funded. Additionally, while the crowd at an individual
level holds relatively meagre financial resources, as a whole it represents a significant source of
capital—and in China, as we know, the crowd is huge. The savings deposit base in China is
around CNY74.2 trillion80 and the World Bank values the crowdfunding market here at US$50
billion over the next ten years81. Clearly then there is an opportunity for an impact investment82
type product—like crowdfunded distributed solar—to gain a share of the pie.
75
Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World, 2013,infoDev, Finance andPrivate Sector Development Department, Washington, DC:
WorldBank
76
Tao Zhang, Christine Yip, Ge (Sophy)Wang, Qin (Iris) Zhang, ChinaCrowdfundingReport, October 2014,producedby the China Impact
Fund of Dao Ventures
77
Vellinger, K., Redefiningimpact: case studies in transformative finance, January 2013,Tonic andTransformativeFinance Network
78
CrowdfundingandRenewable Energy: Couldit Revolutionize Large-ScaleRenewable Project Financing?, Energy PolicyInnovationCouncil
79
Tao Zhang, Christine Yip, Ge (Sophy)Wang, Qin (Iris) Zhang, ChinaCrowdfundingReport, October 2014,producedby the China Impact
Fund of Dao Ventures
80
StratforGlobal Intelligence analysis, 3 March2014, available at https://stratfor.com/analysis/new-investment-platforms-raise-questions-chinas-
banking-system
81
WorldBank
82
“combiningforprofit incentives with social andenvironmental (SE) benefits”accordingto TaoZhang, Christine Yip,Ge (Sophy)Wang, Qin
(Iris) Zhangin ChinaCrowdfundingReport, October 2014,producedby the China Impact Fundof Dao Ventures

39
5 Market Analysis
5.1 Demographics
There are no geographic boundaries. Leveraging the reach of the internet, potentially any person
in China with access to the internet and an online bank account could form part of the market. In
2014 of a population of almost 1.4 billion people, 46%, or 641 million people, were internet
users83. This penetration rate has been steadily rising each year.
Regarding demographics, current draft regulations restrict the crowd to accredited investors who
are high net worth individuals i.e. those worth CNY1 million in assets and an income of at least
CNY300,000. This somewhat limits the demographics to individuals with high net incomes and
by extension individuals likely to have had some tertiary education. It is important to note
however that these are draft regulation (more detail below) and that currently nothing is stopping
anyone with an online bank account from making investments in crowdfunding and P2P lending
schemes. If we are to market this opportunity as an impact investment then the key demographic
is likely to be young people, perhaps under 35 who are educated and employed with a reasonable
income level and some savings.
Behavioural factors are likely to be most important. In 2013, more than 250 million internet
users used the internet for online banking (260 million used platforms like Alipay for online
payments)84 and this figure is only likely to grow along with internet penetration rates. The
typical online financial services user is likely to be young and tech savvy and prefers managing
their money using their smartphone or hand held device rather than physically entering a branch.
Furthermore the typical online investor is likely to be a young person with some savings he or
she is keen to grow. We speculate that an investment in a crowdfunded distributed solar
project—what is essentially a solar backed security—could be viewed in the eyes of the
consumer as a substitute to a term deposit savings accounts or other long term low liquidity
investment vehicle, but with much higher returns and relatively low risk. Chinese online
investors are concerned with or characterised by the following:
83
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china/
84
http://www.statista.com/statistics/277352/online-activities-in-china-based-on-number-of-users/

40
 Reputation85—investors are more likely to use a mature platform with a good reputation,
ideally one that is backed by a well-known company within the industry such as Alibaba,
Jindong, or Tencent. This helps to ‘buy trust’, important in Chinese culture, and crucial
to the success of the project or start-up. Lack of reputation and by extension trust is
likely to prove the biggest competitive disadvantage when compared to incumbents.
 Transferrable ownership rights86—investors tend to want a liquid investment. They want
to be able to easily transfer their funds in and out of projects (and presumably between
projects). This helps to reduce their risk. Indeed ‘demand deposit’ is a unique selling
point of Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao 余额宝. This is easy for platforms with a large customer
base but for smaller platforms it is difficult. Building up or inheriting (via partnership) as
extensive a customer base as possible and implementing this feature will therefore be
important.
 Short time horizon87—investors prefer projects with a short time horizon, ideally no more
than one year. The long time horizon associated with payback and ROI of distributed
solar projects may be a hurdle for Chinese investors.
 Small size88—investors prefer projects that are smaller in size, at least initially. Larger
projects should be divided into a series of smaller rounds of funding i.e. instead of one
CNY1 million round, three rounds of CNY333,000 could be offered89. Distributed solar
projects require significant capital outlay—the main barrier actually holding many cash
flow concerned entities from going solar in the first place. Separate but simultaneous
rounds of funding may help to alleviate this issue.
 Risk—Chinese are risk averse. McKinsey found that 70%90 of affluent91 Chinese say
that they are “risk averse” and that “principal protection is their primary investment
consideration” when it comes to personal financial services92. Many of the people I
talked to seconded this view. Solar is a relatively low risk technology however. With
few moving parts and favourable government policy for the next 20 years at least, all that
is needed is for the sun to shine for the array to generate revenue.
85
Personal communicationwith founder of 理理财‘Lilicai’ onThursday5 February2015
86
87
88
89
Interestingly,accordingtothe founder ofLilicai,it seems Chinese investors are not overly concernedwith the kind ofproject they areinvesting
as they lackanymeaningful methodof actuallymeasuringthe risk ofa project, orassessingthequality ofa loan.
90
In 2014 McKinsey andCompanyperformeda personal financial services surveyof 3,558 Chinese consumers across Tier 1,2, 3, and4 cities
91
Affluent segment are those whose pre-tax householdincomeexceeds RMB228,000; mass-affluent between RMB162,000andRMB228,000;
upper mass between RMB88,000and162,000; lower mass between RMB53,000 andRMB88,000(McKinseyandCompany2014)
92
Kenny Lam, JaredShuandElaine Huang, Four Trends ShapingChina’s Retail BankingLandscape, January 2015,McKinsey& Company

41
 Preference for debt93—Chinese consumers would rather their principal be guaranteed
than have an unlimited upside, and therefore prefer debt to equity based crowdfunding
investments.
 Personal financial planning—53% of Chinese consumers say that they have or are
considering a long-term financial plan94.
 Heavy usage—almost half of consumers are heavy users with an average of 4.5 to 6.0
banking products95.
 Financial return—at the end of the day investors are most concerned about their financial
return than any social or environmental benefit associated with the investment96.
Figure 5-1 There are 3 main types of financial services consumers in China97
Key takeaways
Any new investment product will be initially viewed with scepticism unless it leverages the
reputation of a partnering entity. Therefore the most logical entry strategy is to partner with a
reputable incumbent—this could be either a technically sophisticated platform like Alibaba or
93
Getty Goh (CEO of CoAssets.com), 3 Tips for Companies RaisingMore Than$1 Million onAsianCrowdfundingSites, 5 October 2014
available at http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/10/51733-3-tips-companies-raising-1-million-asian-crowdfunding-sites/
94
95
96
Zhang, T., Ge, Y., & Zhao, R. (2012), Creating theChinesedream: A practitioner's guide to impact investingin China's green SMEs, China
Impact Fundavailable at http://www.ied.cn/sites/default/files/China%20Impact%20Investing%20Report_Compressed%20Final.pdf. 8-9.
97
Source: McKinsey Asia PFSsurvey (2014); team analysis

42
Tencent which would co-develop a devoted distributed solar investment platform; or a popular
and reputable Chinese crowdfunding site which would simply list the distributed solar project(s)
to compete with other new start ups or projects seeking funding from the crowd.
Market education will also be important. Since Chinese are risk averse and have relatively short
investment time horizons, some effort will be required to convince them to invest in a product
which has a long investment horizon (up to ten years for payback) and a lucrative return that is
only realised after even longer. Furthermore, even though the technology is safe it is relatively
unknown, as are the policies surrounding it. Much will need to be done marketing wise to
ensure investors are as familiar with the technology as possible.
Ultimately the selling point will be the attractiveness of the return. Policy and incentives have
been designed so that an IRR of 12-17% over 20 years is feasible, even more if the power is sold
to industrial users. This and the fact that it is a technology which is beneficial to the
environment and reduces pollution, big concerns for young people today since it directly affects
their current and future quality of life, should be sufficient to capture market share.
Key questions
 How can we build trust and reputation?
 How can we attract investors to such long-term projects?
 How can we facilitate information flow to reassure investors their money is safe?
5.2 Market needs
Chinese people like to save. Chinese banks have an estimated CNY74.2 trillion98 in savings
cash deposits. Savers lack investment options for their funds due to China’s centrally controlled
interest rates—around 3% on bank deposits—which would do little more than account for
inflation. The stock market is opaque and too risky for the average Chinese saver. Generally
there is a lack of transparent, understandable and accessible investment options within China.
98
banking-system

43
As internet penetration deepens, Chinese consumers become increasingly wealthy and the
average Chinese citizen gets more and more comfortable using online services, demand for more
innovative financial products, in particular investment options, will increase.
Platforms such as Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao 余额宝 are therefore gaining in popularity. Technically a
mutual fund, it has many of the characteristics of a checking account—‘demand deposit’ making
it a highly liquid investment, no minimum deposit making it relatively low risk, an attractive
interest rate of up to 6% variable, and it is easy to use and convenient. The fund itself is
managed by Tianhong Asset Management Co. which is 51% owned by Alibaba99. It is the
largest money market fund in China (one of the largest in the world), and since launching in June
2013 has collected an estimated CNY600 billion in assets with over 100 million users. Other
major online mutual fund based investment platforms with similar features include Tencent’s
LiCaiTong which is a mutual fund run by China Asset Management, offers returns of up to 8%,
is accessible via Tencent’s ubiquitous social messaging service WeChat; JD.com’s XiaoJinKu;
and Baidu’s Baifa. All offer substantially better yields than big four bank savings accounts.
Figure 5-2 Yield comparison: Yu'e Bao vs. Li Cai Tong vs. Chinese banks100
99
banking-system
100
Source: WindInfo Reorient,TheWall Street Journal

44
5.3 Crowdfunding
These aren’t the only online products on offer. In a July 2014 report, McKinsey101 highlights
other business models that are disrupting the financial services landscape in China:
 P2P lending—peer-to-peer lending platforms, which facilitate a kind of ‘debt-based
crowdsourcing’102. For a fee, lenders are connected with high quality borrowers who are
guaranteed principal and a competitive fixed interest rate return. LiliCai is one example,
along with CreditEase 宜信103, Lufax陆金所104, Paipaidai 拍拍袋105 and Renrendai 人人
贷106. These P2P products appear to be mostly short-term loans (less than 12 months),
with various risk levels, sizes (micro loans to large commercial projects in the tens of
millions of RMB), and annualized returns of 6-14%. According to McKinsey107 in 2013
total loans outstanding amounted to CNY14 billion.
 Crowdfunding—usually equity based, an online platform carefully selects projects and
solicits investments from the general public to fund the project’s development. If
sufficient funds are raised the project is initiated. Investors have rights to a proportionate
share of the project’s profits as ROI. Alternatively return may come in the form of non-
monetary rewards or simply be donation based. Notable platforms include
Angelcrunch.com108, Dajiatou.com109, Yuanshihui110, Alibaba’s YuLe Bao (7% ROI)111,
JD.com’s platform Coufenzi JD Finance112; as well as Zhongchou.cn, Demohour.com,
and Dreamore.cn, which are rewards based. A recent World Bank report values the
crowdfunding market in China at USD50 billion over the next ten years113.
101
McKinsey & Company, China’s digital transformation:The Internet’s impact onproductivityandgrowth, July 2014, McKinseyGlobal
Institute
102
Drake, D., Top4 CrowdfundingDevelopments and Predictions forAsia in 2015, 8 January 2015 available at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/241389
103
http://www.creditease.com/
104
http://www.lufax.com/
105
http://www.ppdai.com/
106
http://www.renrendai.com/
107
McKinsey & Company, China’s digital transformation:The Internet’s impact onproductivityandgrowth, July 2014, McKinseyGlobal
Institute
108
http://angelcrunch.com/
109
http://www.dajiatou.com/
110
http://www.yuanshihui.com/
111
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/04/35063-alibaba-enters-crowdfunding-arena-new-entertainment-financing-play/
112
http://z.jd.com/index.html
113
WorldBank

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