This document outlines three crisis scenarios involving India, Pakistan, and China in Afghanistan that could destabilize the region: 1. A terrorist attack on Indian assets in Afghanistan by Pakistan-backed groups, which could prompt a strong response from India like increasing military support for Afghanistan or supporting anti-Pakistan groups. This would heighten tensions between India and Pakistan. 2. A terrorist attack claimed by Lashkar-e-Taiba on Indian assets in Afghanistan, taking hostages. Pakistan's response could escalate tensions into a military standoff between India and Pakistan. 3. A terrorist attack on Chinese commercial interests in Afghanistan by Pakistan-based groups as China increases investment there. This could prompt China to

1. Crisis Scenarios and Regional Strategic Instability
India, Pakistan, and China in Afghanistan, and possible state responses that could destabilize the
region are as follow:
Scenario A: Indian Response to Terrorist Attack on Indian Assets in Afghanistan
Head administrator Narendra Modi broadly anticipates that would lead a more solid remote
approach than his forerunners. While his emphatic and nationalistic notoriety may give him
space to act all the more carefully in remote undertakings, it may likewise make motivators to
utilize power amid an emergency. An emergency could follow if a substantial terrorist assault led
on an Indian office in Afghanistan and the assaults connected to Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence. The emergency's force would expand contingent upon,
a) Whether it was a prisoner circumstance and if this is trues, the quantity of prisoners and
the states of their treatment
b) The quantity of consequent losses included on the Indian side
c) The nature of media deceivability of the prisoners' situation and its resultant effect on
general assessment and on residential political constituents
Conceivable reactions by New Delhi that could further destabilize local flow are:
1) The supply of overwhelming military hardware to Afghanistan on the grounds of helping
Kabul to secure itself, upgrading Pakistan's feeling of shakiness and in this way adding to
unsteadiness in the district.
2) Secret furnishing of hostile to Pakistan is components inside Afghanistan. In this way, it
is improving Pakistan's instability. Revisionist propensities by Islamabad in countering,
e.g. expanded cross-outskirt insurrections in Kashmir, could add to expanded
unsteadiness in the district.
3) Furthermore, New Delhi may collaborate with Tehran to bolster dread gatherings inside
Afghanistan adversarial towards Pakistan's military-political foundation and the Taliban.
An Indo-Iranian hub would largely destabilize the area because it would represent an
immediate test to Pakistan's position in the district, yet likely likewise to the U.S. part in
the Afghanistan strife.

2. For clear reasons, no Indian troop arrangement in Afghanistan anticipated. Largely, if the
emergency were to heighten, contingent upon the way of Pakistan's reaction, it could prompt
strain and flimsiness. More likely than not, China would, best-case scenario remain a
spectator to what it would see as a generally India-Pakistan emergency.
Scenario B: Pakistani Response to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack on Indian Assets in
Afghanistan
On May 23, 2014, four shooters assaulted the Indian department in Herat, Afghanistan and
gunned around Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Afghan security powers. No conciliatory
staff harmed in the assault. Afghan President Hamid Karazi faulted the Pakistan-construct LeT
for the assault in light of the Indian office. In any case, neither the Afghan Taliban nor the LeT
have asserted obligation regarding the assault to date. An emergency in the middle of India and
Pakistan could rapidly develop if (as indicated by Scenario) an assault occurred against Indian
resources in Afghanistan. Discretionary staff taken prisoner by LeT terrorists with connections
to ISI and a high loss of life included Indian representatives, their relatives and officers of ITBP.
Given this situation, Pakistani reactions to an emergency would possibly heighten
1) Government has requested to hand over individuals from the LeT association in charge of
the assault on its department. This activity would welcome guaranteed corrective activity
by the Indian government. Both militaries could confront a standoff like that of the 2001-
02 emergencies. Just now with a conservative gathering resolved to rebuff Pakistan in
force and a Pakistan certain about confronting India with strategic atomic weapons in its
stock.1
2) As examined in Scenario, in the long haul, the Indian government may choose to expand
its security vicinity in Afghanistan. These moves could fuse giving generous military
equipment direct to Afghanistan to signal Indian resolve to develop an indispensable
association with Afghanistan and to fortify Kabul's hand against Pakistan. Any such
system, brining India intentionally closer to Afghanistan, would have awful results for
relentlessness in the district following Pakistan's, overall, unsecured western edge with
1 Akhtar ,Rabia.,& Sarkar,Jayita , Ibid.,pp. 8-9.

3. Afghanistan is its Achilles heel. Such a circumstance could provoke an upsurge in
terrorist activities against joint operation by LeT or Afghan-Taliban in Afghanistan.
Scenario C: Terrorist Attack on Chinese Commercial Assets in Afghanistan by Pakistan-based
terrorists
A crisis could create amidst China and Pakistan if Pakistan-based terrorist accumulates
particularly crippled Chinese money related side interests inside Afghanistan. China is energetic
to place vivaciously in Afghanistan to mishandle the late diverse general resources, make
headway base, and make trade travel courses. As the United States gets prepare for withdrawal,
China is all around arranging to expand its business and security interests in the zone.
Regardless, the nexus of Al-Qaeda–TTP–ETIM has energy for subverting any approaching
Chinese intrigues in Afghanistan. It could pose substantial security perils to Chinese intrigues in
the region.
In case Afghanistan equalizations out, there will be an extended region of Chinese fashioners and
change masters. Chinese associations, which have affected Pakistani tribes in FATA for security,
would likely look for after a practically identical system to guarantee its subjects in Afghanistan.
In case this strategy misses the mark, diverse terrorist social affairs and Afghan gatherings could
target Chinese workers, making an extraordinary common security crisis and assaulting Chinese
wanders.
Chinese reactions to such exhibitions of terrorism could pass on the risk of actuating phenomenal
responses. Terrorism, along these lines, could be an essential particular point of interest for the
China-Pakistan relationship if Chinese take interest in Afghanistan for business and security