1. What doesNSC-68 reveal about why the UnitedStates became involvedinthe Cold War?
NSC-68 wouldplayone of the mostpivotal rolesindirectingpost-warUSforeignpolicyuntil itsend.
It simultaneouslyidentifiedthe cause andeffectsof the evergrowingthreatgeneratedbythe Cold
War inthe eyesof Americans,aswell asproposingastrategyfor yearsto come.Inthisessay,we will
explore howNSC-68accountedforthe rise of the ColdWar afterWWII. Thiswill be done by
consideringthe ‘powergap’leftafterWWII and the response bybothAmericanandSovietleadersin
response tothis.Thiswill thenbe contrastedagainstNSC-68toput the documentintocontext,and
howaccuratelyit demonstratesAmericanview of the originof the ColdWars.
One of the mostunderlyingcausesof increasingtensionsbetweenthe UnitedStatesandthe Soviet
Unionis ultimatelyasa response tothe powergapthat emergedinEurope afterWWII.1
NSC-68
revealedafearinAmericananalystsandpoliticiansthatSovietexpansionwouldposeanever
increasingrisktoAmericannational security. The fearsof earlySovietexpansionandthe increase of
Sovietinfluencewouldbecome apparentinthe yearsafterthe conclusionof WWII.The fears
outlinedinNSC-68wouldfirstbe institutedinFebruaryof 1946, withStalinaddressingthe Soviet
world,witha desire forideologicalpurityandhighlightingthe struggle againstcapitalism.2
While
‘Roosevelt,Truman, andpolitical advisors’werewillingtoaccede toStalin’sclaimsof Eastern
Europe,tensionswouldriseoverthe contentionforthe Middle East, namelyIran,Greece and
Turkey.3
A jointtreatybetweenthe British,RussiansandAmericans,designedtoprotectalliedoil
interestduringthe war,occupiedIran.4
By1946, the AmericansandBritishhadpulledout,butthe
Russiansremained,demandingoil concessions grantedtothe British.The appearance of Soviet
tanksin Tehrancausedwidespreadoutrage fromthe Americans,namelySecretaryof State JamesF.
Byrnes,andthe SovietgovernmentwasforcedtoabandonIran.5
Thiswouldbe one of the firstsigns
of increasingtensions,aseachside beganfightingforvital resourcesforfuture wars.
Fearsof “worlddomination”bythe Sovietswouldbecomemore accentuatedinTurkeytheninIran.
StalinbeganpressuringTurkey,soasto gainaccessto the Mediterranean,andassuggestedbyNSC-
68, so as to increase Sovietinfluence in WesternEurope throughItaly.6
InAugustof 1946, the now
Secretaryof State,DeanAchesonwouldconsiderStalin’scommunicationswithTurkeyasthe
beginningsof the ‘DominoTheory’.7
Trumanwouldgoonto sendthe mostpowerful aircraftcarrier
inthe fleettosecure Americaninterests,againforcingStalintobackdown.8
The actionsby boththe
Sovietsandthe AmericanstowardsbothIranand Turkeycome to conveythe attitudesof NSC-68,
mostspecificallyoverthe build-upof Sovietmilitaryassets,andhow thismode of thinkingwould
come to shape AmericanattitudesandSovietresponses.9
The ‘Marshal Plan’andthe ‘TrumanDoctrine’wouldspawnsome of the mostimportantUS foreign
policyof the ColdWar, outliningthe threatof Communismaswell asformingthe foundationof US
1 U.S. National SecurityCouncil, NSC-68, byPaul Nitze, (Washington, D.C.:, 1950), https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-
NSC-68.pdf (accessed May 7, 2015), 4.
2 Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge Historyof American Foreign Relations Volume 4:America in the Age of Soviet Power,
1945–1991, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 28.
3 Ibid.,p. 30.
4 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War: 1945-1990, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 35.
5 Ibid., p. 35.
6 NSC-68, p. 6.
7 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 37
8 Ibid.,p. 37.
9 NSC-68, p. 35.

2. ColdWar strategyin Europe.ItbecomesclearinNSC-68 that the economicreconstructionof Europe
was consideredanecessity,asthe “economicconditions” of Europe were “the fundamental
determinantsof the will andstrengthtoresistsubversionandaggression”.10
GeneralGeorge
Marshall,whowas responsible forthe stabilityof Chinawouldbe selectedforSecretaryof State in
Januaryof 1947, and wouldbe taskedbyTruman to heada new policyplanningcommittee.11
Marshall as well asDean Acheson(Undersecretaryof the US Departmentof State underMarshall12
)
wouldhave a difficult time convincingthe fiscallyconservative RepublicanSenate forfundsforthe
Marshall plan.13
Achesonthough,wouldbe able toconvince the Senate thatthe keyinstabilityin
Europe,Greece (facingacommunistrebellionfundedbyYugoslavia14
) wasnota‘civil war’but rather
part of Sovietstrategytoencircle GermanyandwiderEurope.15
Trumanwouldgainthe supportof
congress,andon March 12, 1947 he wouldspeaktothe nation,callingfornational supportina
global fightagainstcommunism.16
Modernanalysisidentifiesthe actionof AchesonandTrumanas
ultimatelyatacticusedbythe Trumanadministrationtoexaggerate the threatposedbythe Soviet
Unionat the time,soas to “dominate legislativeagenda” inmucha similarwaytothat of duringa
wartime scenario. 17
AlthoughNSC-68clearlystatedthatEuropeaninvestmentwasdesignedto“strengthenthe free
world”, the Marshall plan for obviousreasonsdidnotadvertise anti-communistsentimentinthe
same way the Truman Doctrine did.18
Stalinconsidered the offertojoinWesternEuropeanpowers
inthe planninganddistributionof Americaninvestment,soasto speedup the restoration of Russia
and itssatellites.19
WhatStalinconsideredbeneficial AmericaninvestmentinbothWesternand
EasternEurope wouldquicklybecome anotherstrainonUS-Sovietrelations.Stalinreconsidered
afterhisambassadorto Washington,NikolaiNovikov,suggestedthatthe Marshall planwasa tool to
forminga “WestEuropeanblocas a tool forUS policy”withthe extensionof the plantowardsthe
SovietUniona “smokescreen”.20
Stalinwouldpull backhisdelegatesandorderthe same of states
underSovietinfluence,condemningthe planasan act of ‘containment’,suchaswasdesiredby
Truman and Marshall.21
If NSC-68 onlyreveals AmericanattitudestowardsEurope inthe postwaryears,an analysisof Soviet
thoughtcan helpto understandthe true effectsof AmericanforeignpolicytowardsEurope,namely
Germany,inshapingUS-Sovietrelations.The divisionof Europe wasagreeduponwell before the
endof the war,withthe Sovietsassumingcontrol of Hitler’seasternSatellites,andthe Western
AlliesoverItalyandWesternEurope.Earlytensionswouldnotonlyrise fromthe Middle-East
problem,butalsofromthe ‘Germanproblem’.22
The rehabilitationof Germanybecame akeypart of
the ‘Truman Doctrine’andthe Marshall plan. Althoughduringthe war,bothStalinandWestern
10 NSC-68., p. 29.
11 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 36.
12 Ibid.,p. 31.
13 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 53.
14 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 37
15 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 53
16 Ibid.,p. 49.
17 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), pp. 39-40.
18 NSC 68., p. 31.
19 John Lewis Gaddis,We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York, Oxford University Press Inc.,
1997),p. 41.
20 Ibid.,p. 41.
21 Ibid.,p. 42.
22 John Lewis Gaddis,The United States and the origins of the cold war, 1941-1947,(New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000),p. 95.

3. Europeangovernmentswereindecisiveastotake an approachthat wentto greaterlengthsthen
VersaillesafterWWI,orlearnfromthese mistakesandallow Germanytomaintainrelative qualityof
livingunderamore lenientpolicyof reparations.
At the endof the war,both powersbegantosee the importance of Germanyto the reconstruction
and protectionof theirrelativeinterests.WhiteHouse aide ClarkCliffordwouldcome toidentifythis
fundamental shiftinthe SovietattitudetowardsGermany,statingthattheywere now “relying
insteadupontheirbelief thatareasonablystrongGermanyismore to theiradvantage.”23
The
Truman administrationwouldcome tothe same realisation,andthe Marshall planpavedthe way
for an economicreconstructionof Westernunification.InJune of 1948, Westernalliesmergedtheir
respective divisionsof Western Germany.24
Stalinviewedthisasadirectthreat,withfearsof a
Germanresurgence followedbyanalliance betweenWestGermanandWesternAllieswitha
combined powertothreatenthe Sovietsystem.25
In response,inthe same monthof unification,Stalinwouldenactthe ‘BerlinBlockade’which
severedthe connectionbetweenBerlinandWesternEurope andsparkedone of the firstmajorpost
war international incidents.26
SovietMinisterof ForeignAffairs, VyacheslavMolotov justifiedthis
actionnoting,"What happenstoBerlin,happenstoGermany;whathappenstoGermany,happens
to Europe."The Seizure of Berlinbythe Sovietswouldprove tobe unacceptable bythe Truman
administrationforthisreason,seekingtoprotectthe politically WesternalignedWestGermany.27
Truman wouldrespondwiththe Berlinairlift,whichdeliveredaconstantstreamof suppliesbycargo
plane toWest Germany.28
The blockade wasliftedinMayof the followingyear. The blockade would
come to affirmthe policyof “economicfrustration”and“economicstability”neededtomaintain
Americaninterestsinthe region,ashighlightedinNSC-68,butmore importantly,topreventthe
SovietUnionfrom “furtherexpansion”to the pointthat“no coalitionadequate toconfrontthe
Kremlin…couldbe assembled”.29
At the beginningof the essay,the notionof the ‘powergap’wasidentified,butitwasnot simplya
gap of geopolitical influence.The “securitydilemma”orthe ideathat “an increase inone state's
securitywill automaticallyandinadvertentlydecreasethatof another”encapsulatedthe second
majorpolicyrecommendationof NSC-68.30
NSC-68identifiedthe threatof reportedSoviet
Thermonucleartests,andthe powertheywouldhave overinternational policy.31
Unlike the
‘Europeanproblem’,NSC-68as well asmanypolitical leadersfrombothsides,demonstratea
contemptforthe stockpilingof Nuclearweapons.Despite this,NSC-68necessitatesthe needto
stockpile these weaponstosucha pointthat“the U.S.S.R.be deterredfromemployingitsatomic
weapons.”32
Inthisrespect,Americawasforcedtoengage inthisaspectof the ColdWar due to the
fact that,as Eisenhowerputit,“…we do notknow what else todoto provide ourSecurity.”33
23 John Lewis Gaddis,Rethinking Cold War History, (New York, Oxford University Press Inc.,1997), p. 41.
24 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 45.
25 Ibid.,p. 45.
26 Ibid.,p. 45.
27 Ibid.,p. 45.
28 Ibid.,p. 45.
29 NSC-68., pp. 4, 29-30.
30 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993), p. 28.
31 NSC-68., p. 38.
32 Ibid.,p. p. 39.
33 John Lewis Gaddis,We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York, Oxford University Press Inc.,
1997),p. 221.

4. It becomesapparentfromthe analysisof NSC-68as well asUS and SovietactionsthatAmerican
foreignpolicywasfuelledbyadual fearof Sovietexpansionismandsubsequentreactionary
strategy.The ‘powergap’of Europe andthe Middle Eastwoulddraw the world’stworemaining
great powersintoheatedcontentionfor‘worlddomination’,witheachside seekingtosecure their
mutual interests.NSC-68woulddemonstratehow the originsof the ColdWarwere an economic
response bya fundamentallyeconomicideologytofears of Sovietexpansionism.Americanpolicy,as
prescribedbyNSC-68soughtto secure the Democraticfreedomof Europe througheconomic
stability,asanaffrontto Communismandthe SovietIdeology,whichthe Sovietssoughttoevade,by
any meansavailable tothem.