This document discusses the effectiveness of "naming and shaming" as a policy tool for enforcing international human rights law. It hypothesizes that less developed and autocratic states are more likely to violate human rights laws because they have less to lose from negative international reputation effects. The author aims to analyze if naming and shaming is less effective on these states compared to developed democracies that are more dependent on global economic participation. Prior research is examined that finds naming and shaming can sometimes increase violations or be strategically ignored. The study will consider political and economic characteristics that impact a state's responsiveness to such enforcement techniques.

1. Breaking the Law! - Naming and Shaming is it an Effective Policy Tool?
Joshua Peterson
American Military University – School of Security and Global Studies
Although naming and shaming is the most widely used and is perceived as the most
effective response tool in the international community when dealing with breaches of
international law, scholars, policy makers, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders within the
community must reassess the effectiveness of these actions especially pertaining to
international laws and treaties pertaining to human rights. Critics state that the
administering and upholding of international law is fundamentally flawed, as
participation is largely voluntary. International organs such as the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are charged with
administering these laws and charging violators. These organs while active have lacked
absolute effectiveness as nations, political constructs and individuals appear on the
“habitual” human rights violation list year after year. The technique of naming and
shaming human rights violators performed by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International organizations is a “softer” approach that would possibly be more
effective if a state or a political party was concerned about its “global reputation”.
Developed, western states and even some developing states within the Global South that
have become dependent on the current system to improve their economic place within the
international community will seek to avoid appearing on a violator list. This is especially
important as they want to be seen as good global citizens and drawing businesses is
increasingly dependent on the appearance of law and order. States that have very little if
any role within the current economic and political order may suffer from participation or
global socialization issues. These participation issues are born from very specific
characteristics within a state. This study will address those characteristics and the
effectiveness of the technique of naming and shaming on certain states.

2. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
Introduction
The international relations theory of socialization prompts a nation to join an
International Organization (IO). The socialization theory can be used to explainwhy a
nation would decide to participate in the international legal system and agree to and abide
by treaties and conventions constructed by international organs such as the U.N. The
socialization theory states that nations participate in either Type I or Type II socialization.
Type I socialization is considered to be “relatively shallow and describes the situation in
which an actor simply learns to play by the rules of a new social context or institution.1
Type II socialization is considered to be deeper as “actors take on a new social identity,
independent of any material incentives, leading to a demonstrable change in interests
over time.2Researchers who prescribe to the functionalist theory believe that “states join
IGOs for certain goods, such as development and prosperity.”3
Just as these socialization theories are applicable to the participation in IGOs, I
believe the same is true for why a nation decides to agree to an international treaty or
agrees to join the International Criminal Court (ICC).
States may approach the
usefulness of international law differently than some countries or why some nations
choose to ignore international law outright as the “potential cost to a government of
ratifying the Rome Statute establishing the ICC are not the same for all governments.”4
The risk inherent in the transaction is greatest for those countries that have a higher
1David H. Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest
Convergence, 61 Intl. Org. 706 (2007).
2
Id.
3
Charles Boehmer & Timothy Nordstrom, Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political
Community and the Attributes of International Organizations, 34 Intl. Interactions, 283 (2008).
4Terrence L. Chapman & Stephen Chaudoin, Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court 57 Intl.
Studies Qrtly. 500 (2013).
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3. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
probability of committing violations in the future. The economic participation and the
political structure of a state are important indicators of what level of socialization a state
will have within the system. Least developed and newly developing countries and those
with more autocratic political structures are more apt to display Type I socialization
behavior whereas developed or those developed nations that have realized prosperity
because of the global system are more likely to develop Type II socialization
characteristics. Those nations that have a more “shallow” relationship with the global
communities are more likely to breach international law because their potential losses
within the global community are much less. A Type II nation will feel even more
empowered to break laws that may not be deemed beneficial since the international
community’s primary action tool, public naming and shaming will have minimal effects
as these country’s reputational value is the least of their worries. In this paper, I will
attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the naming and shaming technique as it relates to
human right violations with states that are least developed or in the early development
stage versus those states that are developed or that have developed to the point where
global reputational value is worth conformity. I will also analyze the effectiveness
human rights naming and shaming with countries that are autocratic versus those that
have a democratic political structure.
Prior Research
Countries that have an interest in abiding by international rules do so because
there is perceived political and ultimately, economic value to global reputation. Signing,
ratifying and enforcing treaties and conventions is part of being a good global citizen.
Therefore, states are concerned about two things, political repercussions from either not
participating in international law or willfully or unwillfully breaking it and the economic
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4. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
fallout that would soon follow. This is especially true when discussing international law
pertaining to human rights.
Burton analyzes the “relationship between global naming and shaming efforts and
governments’ human rights practices for 145 countries” 5 over an ordinal period from
1975-2000.In her work, she highlights the violators of human rights law in some cases
“continue or even ramp up some violations” 6 after they have been recognized as an
international law violator.Burton also points out that some nations’ rank order human
rights improvements according due to strategic convenience, and may chose to abide by
certain human rights covenants and not others.These strategic conveniences could be a
part of a nation’s grand strategic goals or may have an effect on interactions with an ally.
However, many of these “strategic conveniences” lead to economic imperatives.
In Posner and Sykes research piece, they argue that there are “a variety of
circumstances that arise under which violations of international law are desirable from an
economic standpoint.” 7 Due to the potential economic benefits of non-compliance,
Posner and Sykes believe that an order for international law to be effective, there should
be remedial or mechanism that encourage compliance and impose real cost to a violator.
That cost could come in the form of actions and decisions by non-state actors or multinational corporations (MNC).
The influence of non-governmental organizations (NGO) has been especially
important for those MNCs that look to invest their capital overseas. Barry et al state that
5Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcment Problem, 62, Intl.
Organizaion, 689 (2008).
6Id.
7Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized
Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110, MI Law Review, 243 (2011).
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5. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
the network of human rights NGOs will seek to publically address a “government’s
human rights violations to foreign governments, media outlets, and inter-governmental
organizations, all of which apply pressure on the target state to change their human rights
practices, thus increasing the cost of repression.”8 The cost comes in the form of “large
and powerful MNCs pulling back their reins in overseas operations in order to maintain a
positive brand image.”9
Research Question
This study will address the perceived notion that international law as it relates to
human rights has “no teeth” and that states should not fear international action if a state
or a state actor violates international law. This analysis will analyze the effectiveness of
naming and shaming by NGOs and its effect on states that exhibit certain political and
economic characteristics.
I theorize autocratic states and those nations that are
considered least developed/developing (LDD) with low GDP per capitaare more likely to
break human rights international law. I also theorize that these countries are more apt to
continue to exhibit such behavior if they remain in the same political and economic
situation.
Hypothesis
The international relations and legal communities claim that international
law has no teeth. Practioners and scholars believe that violators of international law are
primarily subjected to “naming and shaming” with most international law breaches with
serious consequences being reserved for only the most heinous and most important
violations of international law.
8Colin M. Barry, et al Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment 57 Intl.
Studies Qrtly. 553 (2013).
9Id.
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6. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
In my hypothesis, I will use a multivariatestatistical model to analyze and prove
that the strategy of naming and shaming human right violators are ineffective for certain
types of states. I believe that breaches of international law are dependent on three
factors, the political construct of the nation state, whether the nation has a stable
government and finally I believe breaches of international law occur primarily in
developing countries with low GDP per capita. Therefore I have constructed
fourhypotheses:
H1 – Political actors within autocratic political structures are more prone to violate
international law.
H2 – The stability of the government will determine if a state is more prone to violate
international law.
H3 – LDD countries are more likely to break international law.
H4–Naming and shaming techniques will not improve the actions by least
developed/developing and autocratic countries.
Analysis Framework Construction
I will begin the analysis by constructing the framework to prove or disprove my
hypothesis. I will begin the analysis by selecting the types of human rights international
laws to assess. These laws will represent the primary independent variables in the
analysis. I have created an index called a HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
QUALIFER (HRDQ) to assess which states are involved in the enforcement of global
human rights. The QUALIFER variable is dichotomous with 1= a positive or true
occurrence and 0= a negative or false response.
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7. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
The HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT QUALIFIER (HRDQ) was
developed using the five primary global human rights and development covenants.
Those covenants are:the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CTCIDTP), and finally the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC). Those that met the requirements were coded 1 those that did not were
coded 0.
Once we’ve determined the independent variable qualifiers, I created dependent
variables that would aid in explaining the correlation of political structure, state stability,
and economic position and the occurrence of that state breaking an international law.
These will be identified as dependent variable identifiers. The DEMOCRATIC AND
STABILITY IDENTIFIER variables are dichotomous with 1= a positive or true
occurrence and 0= a negative or false response. I will use the ECONOMIC IDENTIFIER
to segment the economic position of states in to fourstratification buckets, HIGH
INCOME, UPPER MIDDLE INCOME, and MIDDLE INCOME AND LOW INCOME.
The DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFIER (DI) was determined by using data from the
Polity IV Project from 2000-2010. The findings in this dataset were used to construct the
IDENTIFIER framework.If a country’s current Polity score is greater than or equal to 0
(Democracy-Autocracy=Polity), I coded the entry as 1 meaning the country is a
democracy, if the Polity score was less than or equal to 0, I then coded the entry as 0
meaning the country is an autocracy.
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8. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
The STABILITY IDENTIFIER (SI) was determined by using the Correlates of
War (COW) data set. In this analysis, I will evaluate the intra-state, non-state COW
typologies of war. If a state has been involved in any type of conflict within a forty-year
period, the entry will be coded as 1, if not then the entry will be coded as 0. I’ve chosen
intra-state and non-state typologies because these types of conflicts represent internal
strife and evidence of instability within a nation.
Finally, the ECONOMIC IDENTIFIER (EI) determines the economic health of
each nation. The basis of economic health was determined by comparing the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)/capita of each nation compiled by the World Bank from 20002010. I then compared the GNI/capita and what the World Bank determines to be HIGH,
UPPER MIDDLE, MIDDLE and LOW incomes.
Research Design and Analysis
The research and analysis was conducted utilizing a quantitative approach using
standard statistical correlation techniques. The temporal period analyzed is 2000-2010.
The primary independent variable in this analysis is data taken from the CingranelliRichards (CIRI) human rights data project. I picked this dataset because it represented a
fairly robust look at different types of basic human rights and potential offenses. These
include disappearance related to political motivations, extrajudicial killings, political
imprisonment, torture, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of foreign
movement, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of speech, electoral selfdetermination, freedom of religion, workers rights, women’s economic rights, women’s
political rights, women’s social rights and finally independence of the judiciary.10 The
10David L. Cingranelli &David L. Richards Short Variable Descriptions for Indicators in the Cingranelli-Richards
(CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (2008).
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9. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
data is coded as such, 0 is assigned to those acts of human rights violations that occur on
a regular basis or if a basic human right is severely restricted, if the variable occurs
occasionally than 1. If there is the realization of full human rights practice and there is no
evidence of violation of a nation’s citizens, then that variable is assigned a 2.
Results
I started out by first testing the CIRI variable against the GDP and the Polity IV
variables to determine if there were any correlative effects between the variables. I was
unable to run a correlation analysis for the CIRI – SI, as the SI variable is dichotomous
only.
From this exercise we see that there is a slight correlation between CIRI and GDP and the
CIRI/Polity IV index relationship, but not enough to make overwhelming conclusions.
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10. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
Chart 1
Chart2
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11. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
I continued the analysis by further segmenting the CIRI scores of states by
establishing quartiles based off of the average CIRI score of all 190 states. I created five
quartiles, lower, 25th, 50th, 75th and top. I then compared these quartiles to the average
ten-year GDP of those nations that are considered to be low, middle, upper middle and
high income. Breaking out the variables produced an outcome closer to my expectations,
which supports H3.
Over 50 percent of the Low Income state’s CIRI scores ranked in the 50th quartile or
worse. We see continual improvements in CIRI scores as we move up the income ladder.
In Middle Income states over 80 percent of them have CIRI scores that rank in the top
and 75th quartile. A full 75 percent of High Income countries rank in the top quartile of
the CIRI index.
I then continued to test the CIRI scores versus a state political structure and the
state’s perception of stability.
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12. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
In this analysis, H1 and H2 are supported as states that were identified as autocracies had
a lower CIRI score than those states that were identified as democracies. Countries that
were identified as unstable had significantly lower CIRI scores than stable countries.
Lastly, I analyzed the effectiveness of the naming and shaming technique by
segregating those states that appeared on the Human Rights Watch (HRW) list at least 50
percent of the time between 2000-2010. I then ascertained any improvements in the CIRI
index for those states that were habitually featured on the HRW list. The outcome
produced a slightly negative outcome (0.07) in index values proving that there was no
benefit to naming and shaming those countries that appeared on annual human rights
watch lists therefore supporting H4.
Conclusion
This research piece clearly provides evidence that nations that have certain
characteristics are more prone to violating human rights laws.
Societies that are
autocratic and are determined to be LDDs are the primary violators of international
human rights laws and the practice of naming and shaming is an ineffective policy tool
when addressing the violations.
The international community has three options; 1)
promote the benefits of democratic values and ideals to the general populace so they can
demand change within their own governments, 2) create trade frameworks and policies to
continue to bring these LDD countries in to the global economic framework and create
greater prosperity within these states, and 3) create a harsher set of responses to violators
of human rights transgressions beyond naming and shaming for those countries that are
autocratic or are considered to be LDDs.
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13. Breaking the Law! – Naming and Shaming, is it an Effective Policy Tool?
Annotated Bibliography
Colin M. Barry, et al Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct
Investment 57 Intl. Studies Qrtly. 553 (2013).
David H. Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization,
and Member-State Interest Convergence, 61 Intl. Org. 706 (2007)
Charles Boehmer & Timothy Nordstrom, Intergovernmental Organization Memberships:
Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations, 34
Intl. Interactions, 283 (2008).
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcment Problem, 62, Intl. Organizaion, 689 (2008).
Terrence L. Chapman & Stephen Chaudoin, Ratification Patterns and the International
Criminal Court 57 Intl. Studies Qrtly. 500 (2013).
David L. Cingranelli &David L. Richards Short Variable Descriptions for Indicators in
the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (2008).
Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal
Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110, MI Law Review, 243
(2011).
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