This document provides an introduction and background for a research paper analyzing how political partisanship affects civil liberties and due process protections for terror suspects in the United States and European Union following major terror attacks. It discusses the key due process protections outlined in the Geneva Convention and reviews literature on how political institutions and threat perceptions influence protections. It then provides background on executive actions limiting protections under Bush after 9/11 and Supreme Court decisions granting some habeas corpus rights.

1. Nadeau 1
State University of New York at New Paltz
Rights or Renditions:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND POLITICAL
PARTISANSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
Martina Nadeau
POL 401 – Seminar in American Government and Politics
May 2016

2. Nadeau 2
Abstract:
This paper presents how political partisanship and ideologies affect the civil liberties, and
particularly, due process protections that are received by terror suspects during times of national
security crises in both the United States and European Union. Taking into context the terror attacks
of September 11, 2001, and the London Bombings on July 7, 2005, this paper analyzes how
legislators react to terror attacks with respect to their political ideology. Due process protections
are a fundamental human right and a violation of these protections is virtually undemocratic. This
paper serves to critique the responses to the War on Terror that limit due process protections and
the right to file habeas corpus petitions in spite of constitutional provisions.

3. Nadeau 3
Introduction:
Political scientists and humanitarians argue that the most critical protections and safeguards
for preventative detention are drawn from the Fourth Geneva Convention. “These protections,
which are recognized as sufficient due process for detained suspects, include: (1) immediate
review of detention by the state, (2) the ability of the detainee to appeal the detention decision
(habeas or judicial review), (3) periodic review of continued detention, and (4) release of the
detainee when reasons for his detention have ceased.”1
This baseline ensures that states adopting
security-based preventative detention policies enforce a fair balance between national security and
personal liberty, granting sufficient due process protections which guarantee that “legal
proceedings will be fair and will provide an opportunity to be heard before the government acts to
deprive one of life, liberty, or property.”2
Many preventative detention systems do not fulfill all of these basic protections despite the
fact that they are recognized as fundamental human rights stipulations in international law, treaties,
and covenants. Because democracies put a heavy emphasis on checks and balances, they are
typically considered the regimes most likely to grant due process protections upheld in
constitutions and legal codes. Comparatively, autocratic societies are not expected to adhere to the
civil liberties defined in international law because the authority of the head of state is rarely in
check or in question. However, even in democratic societies, “this fundamental human right is
violated by practices of indefinite detention in circumstances that do not allow for habeas review
or termination of detention.”3
Consequently, the democratic rule of law and power of constitutions
are eroded alongside the preservation of civil liberties. It is vital to explore the conditions under
1
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 7.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.

4. Nadeau 4
which democracies lapse and deprive terror suspects and detainees of certain civil liberties during
national security crises.
Considering the current terror threats of ISIS worldwide and the Obama administration’s
announced plan to close Guantanamo Bay, studying national security has significant real world
implications. The sharp incline of global terrorism calls for states to create preventative detention
systems through a legal framework that ensures sufficient due process protections. As more and
more individuals are detained for purely security reasons, the due process protections of innocent
people are being violated. Studying national security law in relation to terrorism contributes to
understanding how political structures and party partisanship impact human rights and civil
liberties within the context of policymaking in security-based dilemmas.

5. Nadeau 5
Literature Review:
The debate over why some states afford detained individuals greater due process
protections than others in the midst of combating terrorism has been largely characterized by two
major components: (1) the political institutions and structure of a democracy, (2) the social
construction of the law. Both components are vital in examining the bridges and gaps in
international law that essentially governs the rights of defendants in times of emergency.
Many political scientists argue that in order to understand the great variation of due process
protections among states, we must look to (1) the political structure of institutions within specific
democracies. In the United States, the presidential democracy uses a pure separation of powers
system. Amid a security crisis, “the executive typically asserts authority during emergencies in a
separation of powers system, and with realist views in mind, state survival is the top priority during
all legitimate security crises.”4
Because the executive implements preventative detention policies
that will benefit the most people collectively, or the survival of the state, due process protections
for terror suspects are extraordinarily limited. The independence of each institutional branch and
lag of institutional processes make checks and constraints on extralegal executive authority ex post
facto.5
Essentially, the pace of checks and balances would change the legal consequences of the
current due process protections after protections were already insufficient and violated. Because
due process protections should also begin immediately after detainment, it is nearly impossible for
the checks on the executive to restore due process protections after they have already been
sufficiently limited or denied after becoming entrenched within the system. In the United Kingdom,
the parliamentary democracy is equivalent to a pure fusion of powers system, “where the executive
4
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 10.
5
Ibid.

6. Nadeau 6
and legislative branches of government are intermingled and legislative power is shared between
the two, the executive cannot make unilateral and independent policies.”6
In a pure fusion of
powers system, the executive is required to consult with the legislature extensively in order to
create policy. In a pure fusion of powers system, there exists virtually no way for there to be a
deadlock in the manner that can sometimes occur where the legislature and executive are separated.
Due to the range of voices that are made apparent and the constant communication required in the
decision making process of a pure fusion system, due process protections are less likely to be
granted at times of emergency.7
The extent to which major international human rights treaties and other sources of
customary international law allow states to derogate from their international obligations with
respect to due process is also limited by (2) the social construction of these statutes and the
perception of threat to national security. In the periods between war and normalcy, the social
construction of standards developed by international courts are vital to understanding why due
process protections are or are not granted during times of emergency? The perception of threat
influences how policymakers in congress and in parliament weigh the importance of civil liberties
monitored by human rights law in comparison to national security. Should the state uphold the
civil liberties stipulated in constitutions, legal codes, and common law that make up the
foundations of democratic society? Or should due process protections be limited as to protect the
greater good and enforce national security? When threat is high, it is expected that states with
preventative detention will offer far less due process protections. Conversely, when threat declines,
it is more likely that sufficient due process protections will be granted, “explaining the justification
6
Linz, Juan. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1 No. 1(1990): 51-69.
7
Pati, Roza. 2010. “Due Process and International Terrorism: An International Legal Analysis.” Leiden, Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Political Science Complete: EBSCOhost (accessed April 2, 2016).

7. Nadeau 7
of extra-legal executive authority during emergency situations.”8
However, because it is difficult
to measure threat levels and their duration, the argument that a heightened sense of threat causes
insufficient due process protections is nearly impossible to quantify. It is difficult to conclude that
due process protections are limited because of how different executive authorities and politicians
perceive threats. In addition, “the realist construction of threat perception does not explain why
Britain punished foreign nationals with indefinite detention after the September 11 attacks, but not
after the London bombings, where Britain would have been presumably under a greater threat.”9
Current procedures often still fail to guarantee that individuals suspected of involvement
in terrorist activity or breach of national security law are treated in a fair and impartial manner by
all democratic societies. The breadth of the political spectrum provides a wealth of opinions for
evaluating commonalities and divergences in partisanship.10
Recognizing the challenges faced by
governments and executives that seek to protect their nation from acts of terrorism concurrently
attempting to respect the fundamental human rights of suspects, researchers err in acknowledging
whether or not there is a correlation between the lack of these due process protections granted and
the political party in power at the time of immediate threat, which this paper serves to analyze and
explore.
8
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 8.
9
Blum, Stephanie. “Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: Comparison of How the U.S., Britain, and Israel
Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects,” Homeland Security Affairs 3 (2008):1-30.
10
Marcus, George E. and Michael B. MacKuen. "Emotions and Politics: The Dynamic Functions of Emotionality," in
Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology. Ed. James H. Kuklinski. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001

8. Nadeau 8
Background:
Immediately following the devastating terrorist attacks that took place on September 11,
2001, the Bush Administration proclaimed a “War on Terrorism.”11
Under Bush, executive power
was enhanced in light of immediate national security threats, and counterterrorism policies were
enacted that would expand the executive authority to detain terror suspects indefinitely in order to
prevent suspects from participating in another terror act. In addition, the Central Intelligence
Agency allegedly permitted the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” 12
specifically,
torturing terror suspects through the act of waterboarding, or “pouring water over a cloth that
covers the breathing passages of an immobilized captive, causing the individual to experience the
sensation of being drowned.”13
The founding fathers called for the President’s authorization to “repel sudden attacks”14
against the United States, but otherwise, Congress was to be the decision maker on whether or not
to engage in war and whether or not military force should be used abroad. “Prior to the Second
World War, presidents did not claim unilateral authority as commander in chief to engage in
military combat operations overseas.”15
However, with the onset of the Cold War and the idea that
communism posed a threat to the United States, presidents began to assert even wider war powers,
and congress deferred to presidential suggestion. Although Congress has since placed some
restraints on presidential military ambitions and exercises a tacit checking power that sends signals
11
George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
12
"CIA Tactics: What Is 'enhanced Interrogation'?" BBC News. N.p., 10 Dec. 2014. Web. 04 May 2016.
13
Ibid.
14
Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Powers of Congress in History and
Law, 2nd ed. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989).
15
Hendrickson, Ryan. “Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers: A Comparative Analysis of the Military Strikes on
Iraq and Bin Laden. Eastern Illinois University.

9. Nadeau 9
and different options to the president it seems clear that the War Powers Resolution has proved to
have a limited checking influence on the president.”16
Senate Joint Resolution 23, passed on September 14, 2001, reads that “the President is
authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such organizations or persons.”17
Only
one member of Congress voted against the resolution (Barbara Lee, D-Ca). The Bush
Administration, taking S.J.Res23 seemingly quite literally, implemented enhanced interrogation
techniques and used the practice of indefinite detention as a “necessary force” to “prevent future
acts of international terrorism.”18
President Bush proclaimed constitutional wartime powers in order to detain individuals
suspected of terror activity as an “enemy combatants.”19
In January of 2002, the administration
subsequently created a detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to hold these “enemy
combatant” suspects indefinitely and without due process protections. Eventually, in the 2004
Supreme Court case Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court intervened to allow the inclusion of
minimal due process, holding that “U.S. courts have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
hear legal challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay,
16
Hendrickson, Ryan. “Clinton, Bush, Congress and War Powers: A Comparative Analysis of the Military Strikes on
Iraq and Bin Laden. Eastern Illinois University.
17
Grimmett, Richard F. Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40)
Legislative History. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006. Authorization for
the Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks: Legislative History. CRS Report for Congress, 16 Jan.
2007. Web. 28 Apr. 2016.
18
S.J. Res 23.
19
Kate, Martin, and Onek Joe. ""Enemy Combatants," The Constitution and the Administration's "War on Terror""
“Enemy Combatants,” The Constitution and the Administration’s “War on Terror” (n.d.): n. pag. American
Constitution Society for Law and Policy. Aug. 2004. Web.

10. Nadeau 10
Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism.”20
However, indefinite detention was still
present.
The Pentagon established administrative hearings, called “Combatant Status Review
Tribunals” (CSRTs), to allow the detainees to contest their status as enemy combatants, and
informed them of their right to pursue relief in federal court by seeking a writ of habeas corpus.21
Congress subsequently passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The Detainee
Treatment Act essentially limited CSRT appeals. “After the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
the Detainee Treatment Act left it without jurisdiction to review a habeas challenge to the validity
of military commissions in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 which amended the Detainee Treatment Act to further reduce detainees’
access to federal courts.”22
In Boumediene v. Bush (2008) the Supreme Court held that that “aliens designated as
enemy combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay DO have the constitutional privilege of
habeas corpus.” 23
The Court also found that the limited judicial review of executive
determinations of the petitioners’ enemy combatant status was an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. The impact of the Bourmediene decision allowed for detainees at
Guantanamo to petition a federal district court for habeas review of the legality of their
imprisonment and circumstances of their detention.
20
Elsea, Jennifer K., and Michael J. Garcia. "Enemy Combatant Detainees." Congressional Research Service RL33180
(2010): 1-54. Nova Science Publishers, 3 Feb. 2010. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Garcia, Michael J. "Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees Right to Habeas Corpus." Congressional
Reseach Service (2008): 1-11. 8 Sept. 2008. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

11. Nadeau 11
The Bush Administration argued that “foreigners detained abroad have no right to a hearing
and can be detained indefinitely without any trial whatsoever.”24
However, the left leaning
Supreme Court ruled against the Bush administration, 6-3, granting habeas corpus relief and a trial
and maintained that “no one may be detained without a court hearing justifying detention.”25
After
President Bush left office, detainees had gained limited due process protections, but were still
being held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay.26
24
Eddlem, Thomas. "Military Commissions: Rights of Accused Terrorists Under Bush, Obama." Military
Commissions: Rights of Accused Terrorists Under Bush, Obama. The New American, 28 Sept. 2011. Web. 04 May
2016.
25
Ball, Howard. Bush, Detainees, and the Constitution. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007.
26
Eddlem, Thomas. "Military Commissions: Rights of Accused Terrorists Under Bush, Obama." Military
Commissions: Rights of Accused Terrorists Under Bush, Obama. The New American, 28 Sept. 2011. Web. 04 May
2016.

12. Nadeau 12
Policy Initial
Review by
State
Judicial
Review
Periodic
Review
Pre-charge
Detention
Party
Majority
Executive
Military
Order (2001)
None None None Indefinite Bush
administration
(right-wing)
Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld
(2004)
No change Required:
U.S. citizens
only
No change No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Rasul v. Bush
(2004)
No change Required: to
U.S. citizens
AND aliens
No change No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Detainee
Treatment
Act (2005)
No change Special
review of
challenges
No change No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld
(2006)
No change DTA did not
prevent
habeas
review
No change No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Military
Comissions
Act (2006)
No change Special
review of
challenges
Annual No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Boumediene
v. Bush (2008)
No change Military
Commissions
Act held
unconstitional
due to
suspension of
habeas
review
No change No change SCOTUS left-
wing majority
Table 1: Due Process Protections in the United States Post September 11, 200127
Table 1 (above) illustrates the changes that occurred in U.S. policies. Immediately after
9/11, the preventative detention system formed did not provide for any of the safeguards necessary
for due process. Years later, “safeguards were provided that included initial state review of
detainee status and periodic review of detention on an annual basis with a limited appeal to judicial
authorities.”28
Where the party majority is left wing, there are seldom changes in review and pre
27
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 19.
28
Hazuka, Margaret. "Don’t Forget Guantanamo: The Legacy of the “War on Terror”, Torture, and Indefinite
Detention." Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review. N.p., 4 Apr. 2016. Web. 02 May 2016.

13. Nadeau 13
charge detention, however, where the party is right wing, there is a more strict adherence to
limiting due process protections.
In the wake of the London Bombings in 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair held a press
conference where he asserted that the “rules of the game”29
for terrorists were changing. Despite
the substantive existing legislation, Blair announced the introduction of a multifaceted twelve
point legislative regime plan against terrorism that aimed to take a tougher stance against
individuals “who encourage or advocate terrorism; to disrupt the recruitment and training of
would-be terrorists; and make it more difficult for these individuals to remain in, or enter, the
UK.”30
The legislation called for revisions that would promote the extension of the period of
detention of terrorist suspects “pending the result of an examination or analysis of any relevant
evidence or of anything the examination or analysis of which is to be or is being carried out with
a view to obtaining relevant evidence.”31
After both the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the London
Bombings in 2005, the United Kingdom acted defensively and extensively prepared to enforce
national security measures by expanding the powers of the executive to “permit detainment of
foreign nationals indefinitely without full due process.” 32
After three years, the policy was
eventually struck down and replaced with executive control orders, which allow obligations,
prohibitions, and restrictions to be imposed upon a person for the purpose of protecting the public
from an anticipated or suspected terrorist act. These types of obligations, prohibitions, and
restrictions may include but are not limited to imposing a curfew, wearing of an electronic
29
Lennon, Genevieve, and Clive Walker. Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism. New York: Routledge: Taylor &
Francis Group, 2015. Print.
30
Lennon, Genevieve, and Clive Walker. Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism. New York: Routledge: Taylor &
Francis Group, 2015. Print.
31
"Terrorism Act 2006." Legislation.gov.uk. The National Archives, 2006. Web. 5 May 2016.
32
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 22.

14. Nadeau 14
monitoring tag, restricting use of telecommunications, and regular reporting to law enforcement
agents.33
Despite the increased surveillance and decrease in privacy for detained terror suspects,
the executive control orders have created the permission of sufficient due process protections.
Policy Initial
Review
by State
Judicial
Review
Periodic
Review
Pre-charge
Detention
Party Majority
Prevention of
Terrorism Act
(2005)
Upon
arrest
with
control
order
After 7 days Annual 12 month
max.
Blair
administration
(left-wing)
Terrorism Act
(2006)
No
change
No change No change 28 day max. Blair
administration
(left-wing)
Secretary of State
v. MB
No
change
After 7 days No change No change Conservative/right
wing majority
Counterterrorism
Bill (2008)
No
change
No change No change 42 day max. Blair
administration
(left-wing)
Table 2: Due Process Protections in the United Kingdom Post London Bombings, July 5, 200534
In the United Kingdom (see table 2 above), the executive used a security based immigration
framework in order to detain non-citizen terror suspects after the heightened perception of threat
post 9/11, however, the judiciary almost immediately struck it down.35
The left leaning Blair
administration was required to consult with the legislature to derive a new detention policy. “The
interaction and communication between the executive and legislature resulted in constraints on
executive preference and concurrently gave parliament a voice in deciding which legal framework
was best for preventative detention.”36
33
Zedner, Linda. "Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice." Journal of Law and
Society 32.4 (2005): 507-33. Wiley Online Library. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.
34
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 21.
35
Blum, Gabriella and Philip B. Heymann, Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010.
36
Harvard College BA Honors Thesis, pg 23.

15. Nadeau 15
Theory:
There are statistical differences when analyzing general party attitudes toward granting full
due process to terror suspects. Partisan differences vary and there are comparable percentages of
Republicans (15%) and Democrats (12%) that believe that severe limits on due process protections
of suspected terrorists to gain important information is often justified, but twice as many
Republicans as Democrats say this denial of protections is sometimes justified (49% vs. 24%).37
Similarly, while nearly identical percentages of Republicans and Democrats say dismissal of due
process under these circumstances is rarely justified, 38% of Democrats believe that due process
and/or torture of suspected terrorists is never justified, compared with 14% of Republicans.38
In the United States, a consistent majority of Republicans have been opposed to closing
the prison at Guantanamo Bay, with only 8% supporting Obama’s pledge to close the facility in
2009, whereas 41% of democratic partisans support the idea and exhibited a negative attitude
toward the detention policies and due process in Guantanamo.39
37
Drake, Bruce. "Americans' Views on Use of Torture in Fighting Terrorism Have Been Mixed." Pew Research
Center RSS. 09 Dec. 2014. Web. 04 May 2016.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.

16. Nadeau 16
Image 1: Partisanship and the Constitution40
There is a longstanding belief that Republicans view the Constitution by its original intent,
and that the constitution should be evaluated and adhered to in an attempt to ascertain the meaning
of how the provision was understood at the time it was drafted and ratified (see Image 1 above).
Democrats, on the other hand, are more likely to view the constitution as a living document,
meaning that the Constitution is dynamic and has the properties of an animate being in the sense
that it changes over time and develops to fit the modern era. Likewise, corresponding ideologies
40
Kiley, Jocelyn. "Americans Divided on How the Supreme Court Should Interpret the Constitution." Pew Research
Center RSS. N.p., 31 July 2014. Web. 13 May 2016.

17. Nadeau 17
show an even greater conformity to these beliefs. The right wing thinkers contest this idea because
it undermines the key limitations on government power that are written into the Constitution itself.
The common perception of ideological beliefs correlating to interpretation of the
constitution challenges the traditional concept of ideology correlating to policies surrounding
national security. With right wing thinkers and traditional conservatives (in terms of United States
ideology) being more supportive of originalism in interpreting the constitution, Republicans would
be more likely to uphold the constitutional protections of due process as outlined in the fifth
amendment, “nor shall any person… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of the law,”41
and habeas corpus in the second clause of section 9 in the first article of the
constitution. Conversely, those viewing the Constitution as a living document would be opposed
to these civil liberties because in the midst of terror, the Constitution should morph to respond to
the immediate threat in order to protect the greater good and in turn limit due process protections
and the right to petition for habeas corpus.
Despite the fact that the European Parliament is a multi-party system, the parties have a
clear division between the left and the right that are comparably similar to the partisan values
defined in the democratic and republican party-ideology in the United States. Following the
premise that right wing parties share many of the same policy goals as U.S. republicans, and left
wing parties in Parliament share many of the same policy goals as democrats, it is likely that
partisanship affects attitudes toward due process protections in Europe, too.
41
US Const. amend. V

18. Nadeau 18
Hypothesis: The partisanship of the party evaluating the laws regarding preventative
detention policies directly correlates to the amount of due process protections granted
toward terror suspects.
H1: When Republicans or right wing thinkers evaluate the rule of law surrounding
preventative detention under threat of national security, policymakers are more likely to
oppose granting full civil liberties, and thus, terror suspects will receive limited due process
protections.
H2: When Democrats or leftist politicians evaluate preventative detention policies,
politicians look more favorably to upholding due process protections for noncitizens, and
thus, terror suspects are granted sufficient due process protections.
Dependent variable: Due process protections granted for terror suspects.
D1: Due process protections granted for terror suspects in the United States post September
11, 2001.
D2: Due process protections granted for terror suspects in the United Kingdom post
London Bombings, July 7, 2005.
Independent variable: Partisanship of political parties.
I1: Partisanship of political parties in the executive, legislative, and judicial in the United
States.
I2: Partisanship of political parties in the executive, legislative, and judicial in the United
Kingdom.

19. Nadeau 19
Research Design:
Using a data set that provides Roll Call Votes for the United States House of
Representatives on the Military Commissions Act of 2006, I identified each representative by their
respective party and created a cross tabulation to analyze whether or not their party ideology
affected the way in which they voted.
Table 3: Party and Support for Limiting Habeas Corpus
Vote on Military Commissions Act Party
Democratic Republican Total
No 162 (84%) 7 (3%) 169 (40%)
Yes 32 (16%) 218 (97%) 250 (60%)
Total 194 225 419
Somers’ d = .804
p =.000
Roll Call Vote 508, September 29, 2006. 1 Independent (Sanders) voted no.
Table 3: Crosstabulation of United States Party Ideology in House of Representatives and Roll Call Vote on
Military Commissions Act of 2006
With a large majority of democrats voting against the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and a
large majority of republicans voting in favor of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, there is a
clear relationship between party support or opposition for civil liberties and habeas corpus. Somers’
d was equal to .804, suggesting a positive association between partisanship and the ways in which
each representative voted, and p =.000, suggesting a statistical significance.

20. Nadeau 20
Using a data set that provides Roll Call Votes in the European Parliament, I pulled out the
EPG, or European Parliamentary Group along with each party’s roll call vote (yays, nays, and
abstentions) for “transport and illegal detention of prisoners” in the policy area of “civil liberties,
justice, and home affairs.”42
I proceeded to analyze policy goals of different European Parliament
groups and used a chart to determine which parties in the European Parliament leaned “left” and
which leaned “right,” following the rhetoric of American left wing/right wing political party-
ideologies.
Image 2: Partisanship of Members in European Parliament43
42
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science; Abdul Noury, New York University; Gerard Roland,
University of California, Berkeley: “Democratic Politics in the European Parliament.”
43
"Guide to the European Parliament: Party Groups." BBC News. N.p., 13 Feb. 2014. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

21. Nadeau 21
After determining which parties in the European Parliament leaned which way in terms of how
America characterizes its two party system, I designated each party an “ideology” and coded them
as such:
SPSS Syntax.
if (epg_name="ALDE") LCR=0.
if (epg_name="EPP-ED") LCR=0.
if (epg_name="IND/DEM") LCR=0.
if (epg_name="UEN") LCR=0.
if (epg_name="SOC") LCR=1.
if (epg_name="EUL/NGL") LCR=1.
if (epg_name="G/EFA") LCR=1.
variable label LCR 'EP Ideology'.
value labels LCR
0 Right
1 Left
For those who designated their roll call votes as “no,” due process protections should not
be granted, I coded the vote as -1. For those members in parliament (MPs) voting for greater due
process protections, I coded the vote as 1. Those abstaining are recognized as 0.
SPSS Syntax.
recode rollcallvote2390 (1=1) (2=-1) (3=0) (else=sysmis) into Vote.
value labels Vote
-1 No
0 Abstain
1 Yes
.
frequencies Vote.
CROSSTABS
/TABLES=Vote BY LCR
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=D
/CELLS=COUNT COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

22. Nadeau 22
I then proceeded to enter the data into SPSS to generate a cross tabulation contingency table to
analyze the joint frequency distribution of the cases based on the categorical variables.
Roll Call Vote on Civil Liberties and Due Process Crosstabulation
Vote * EP Party Ideology Crosstabulation
EP Ideology
TotalRight Left
Vote No Count 247 3 250
% within EP Ideology
60.8% 1.1% 36.4%
Abstain Count 49 11 60
% within EP Ideology
12.1% 3.9% 8.7%
Yes Count 110 266 376
% within EP Ideology
27.1% 95.0% 54.8%
Total Count 406 280 686
% within EP Ideology 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 4: Crosstabulation of European Party Ideology and Roll Call Vote on Civil Liberties & Due Process
While setting up the cross tabulation, I selected Somers’d to measure the strength and direction of
association that exists between the European Parliament Ideology (partisanship) and the roll call
vote.
Directional Measures
Value
Asymptotic
Standardized
Errora
Approxima
te Tb
Approximate
Significance
Ordinal
by
Ordinal
Somers' d Symmetric .651 .022 26.811 .000
Vote Dependent .702 .024 26.811 .000
EP Ideology
Dependent
.606 .023 26.811 .000
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
Table 5: Somers’d of European Party Ideology and Roll Call Vote on Civil Liberties & Due Process

23. Nadeau 23
Analysis:
When looking at the data provided by the roll call vote on the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, which “set aside the principle of habeas corpus, and gave the president absolute power to
designate enemy combatants and set his own definitions for torture,” 44
I identified each
representative as either a Republican or Democrat, and excluded those without party identifications
or those who did not vote. Eighty three percent of democrats in the house voted against the MCA
of 2006, whereas an overwhelming majority of 96.9% of republicans voted for the MCA of 2006
to pass into legislation. The 3.1%, of Republicans that voted against the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 can be attributed to the idea that those republicans tend to lean more toward the left and
favor a more moderate ideology in terms of foreign policy and war. The 16.2% of democrats voting
for the MCA of 2006, which would limit detainees’ access to federal courts and the ability to seek
a writ of habeas corpus, are largely representatives from Southern states, and can often be
considered members of the blue dog coalition, a caucus of congressional representatives that
identify as conservative democrats. As a conservative-democrat, these representatives would be
more likely to vote moderately or toward the right in particular issue areas.
In order to understand whether or not these representatives were moderate voters and
whether or not this “moderate ideology” would shift the causal relationship observed, I used the
Americans for Democratic Action evaluation ratings to analyze how some groups select votes
based less on preferences and concerns of political parties and more solely on issues concerns.
These specific tables show ratings for where incumbents have stood on a series of votes on Civil
Liberties and Civil Rights in the past few years for those representatives voting the opposite of the
majority of their respective party.
44
"Military Commissions Act of 2006." American Civil Liberties Union. N.p., n.d. Web. 05 May 2016.

24. Nadeau 24
Republicans voting No and ADA Scores:
State CD Representative ADA
Republican Presidential Vote
2004
1 IA 2 Jim Leach 50 44
2 OH 14 Steve LaTourette 20 53
3 MD 1 Wayne Gilchrest 40 63
4 MD 6 Roscoe Bartlett 25 66
5 TX 14 Ron Paul 45 67
6 NC 3 Walter Jones 45 68
7 KS 1 Jerry Moran 5 74
Table 6: Americans for Democratic Action Ratings for Republicans Voting Against MCA 2006

25. Nadeau 25
Democrats voting Yes and ADA scores:
State CD Representative ADA
Republican Presidential Vote
2004
1 GA 8 Jim Marshall 35 71
2 TX 17 Chet Edwards 55 70
3 MS 4 Gene Taylor 40 69
4 UT 2 Jim Matheson 45 68
5 ND 0 Earl Pomeroy 80 64
6 SD 0 Stephanie Herseth Sandlin 65 61
7 AL 5 Bud Cramer 50 61
8 TN 6 Bart Gordon 50 60
9 OK 2 Dan Boren 25 59
10 KY 6 Ben Chandler 60 59
11 TN 4 Lincoln Davis 35 59
12 PA 17 Tim Holden 60 58
13 SC 5 John Spratt 75 58
14 MN 7 Collin Peterson 35 56
15 IL 8 Melissa Bean 60 56
16 NC 7 Mike McIntyre 50 56
17 CO 3 John Salazar 60 56
18 KS 3 Dennis Moore 85 56
19 FL 2 Allen Boyd Jr. 50 54
20 NC 2 Bob Etheridge 80 54
21 TX 28 Henry Cuellar 35 54
22 TN 8 John Tanner 55 53
23 AR 4 Mike Ross 50 52
24 GA 12 John Barrow 45 51
25 GA 2 Sanford Bishop 65 50
26 IA 3 Leonard Boswell 70 50
27 NY 26 Brian Higgins 85 46
28 OH 13 Sherrod Brown 80 44
29 GA 13 David Scott 85 40
30 NJ 1 Rob Andrews 85 39
31 AL 7 Artur Davis 75 35
32 TN 9 Harold Ford Jr. 45 30
Table 7: Americans for Democratic Action Ratings for Democrats Voting For MCA 2006

26. Nadeau 26
Overall, a large majority of the American for Democratic Action scores fall in between
what would typically be considered a far left voter and a far right voter. Having already coded a
cross tabulation for party support of the Military Commissions Act, I created a cross tabulation to
analyze the association between ideology and the support for limiting habeas corpus rights.
Table 8: Ideology and Support for Limiting Habeas Corpus
Vote on Military Commissions
Act Party
Liberal Moderate Conservative Total
No 149 (94%) 18 (34%) 3 (1%) 170 (40%)
Yes 9 (6%) 35 (66%) 206 (97%) 250 (60%)
Total 158 53 209 420
Americans for Democratic Action scores 30-70 coded as moderate.
Somers’ d = .749
p =.000
Roll Call Vote 508, September 29, 2006.
Table 8: Crosstabulation for Ideology and Support for MCA2006
When coding ideology, representatives recognized as “liberal voters” sat somewhere in
between a rating of 71-100. Those who were more “un-democratic,” with a rating of 0-29 were
considered “conservative voters.” All representatives sitting between liberal and conservative
ideologies were coded as “moderates,” with an American for Democratic Action rating somewhere
in between 30-70. Overall, 94% of liberal representatives voted against the passing of the Military
Commissions Act, while an overwhelming majority of conservatives, 97%, voted in favor of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006. The 53 representatives who were categorized as having a
moderate ideology eliminates a vast majority of outliers that we see within the “party” cross
tabulation. Even so, 9 liberal voters were still found in favor of the Military Commissions Act of
2006, straying from the 94% voting against the act. In order to address this, I created another cross

27. Nadeau 27
tabulation, this time, coding an alternate operationalization of moderate representatives as those
with an American for Democratic Action rating of 20-80.
Table 9: Ideology and Support for Limiting Habeas Corpus
with alternate operationalization of moderate
Vote on Military Commissions
Act Party
Liberal Moderate Conservative Total
No 132 (94%) 37 (39%) 1 (1%) 170 (40%)
Yes 4 (6%) 62 (62%) 184 (99%) 250 (60%)
Total 136 99 185 420
Americans for Democratic Action scores 20-80 coded as moderate.
Somers’ d = .645
p =.000
Roll Call Vote 508, September 29, 2006.
Table 9: Crosstabulation for Ideology and Support for MCA2006 Accounting Larger Range ofADA Moderate
Ratings
After increasing the moderate rating range, forty six representatives were shifted into the
“moderate” ideology. The amount of liberal voters in favor of the MCA of 2006 decreased to 4,
while the conservatives, originally at 3, decreased to 1. Overall, the voting pattern of those with a
“moderate ideology” had a somers’ d value of .645, not statistically significant, proving the point
because of the simple fact that they are indeed moderate. Most of the deviation stems from the fact
that moderates are ideologically different from both democrats and/or republicans.
With Bush carrying their state, the representatives may have voted a specific way on the
issue so as not to cause them their re-election. Essentially, another potential explanation for a
deviation in the typical party aligned voting mechanisms is that the sense of electoral risk correlates
to ideology. In order to measure whether or not ideology is associated with electoral risk, I added
an interval-level variable for the Republican share of the presidential vote in each district as a
percentage of the two major party vote (see table 6 and table 7).

28. Nadeau 28
Following, I created a dichotomous variable for districts carried by the opposing party’s
presidential candidate in 2004 (for Democrat’s, George Bush, for Republicans, John Kerry) as one
construction for electoral risk, and then used that variable to control the cross tabulation for party
and vote.
Table 10: Party and Support for Limiting Habeas Corpus, Controlling for Electoral Vulnerability
A. Districts carried by the Party’s Presidential Candidate in 2004
Vote on Military Commissions
Act Party
Democratic Republican Total
No 146 (96%) 6 (3%) 152 (42%)
Yes 6 (4%) 201 (97%) 207 (58%)
Total 152 225 359
Somers’ d = .932, p = .000
B. Districts carried by the Opposing Party’s Presidential Candidate in 2004
Democratic Republican Total
No 16 (38%) 1 (6%) 17 (28%)
Yes 26 (62%) 17 (94%) 43 (72%)
Total 42 18 60
Somers’ d = .325, p = .000
Table 10: Crosstabulation for Electoral Risk of Party and Support for Limiting Habeas Corpus
Ninety six percent of the 359 representatives are not at a significant electoral risk vote
with their party. However, for those at electoral risk, the 62% of Democrats and 1 Republican
break with their parties. Districts carried by the party’s candidate are not significantly affected by
electoral vulnerability, whereas districts carried by the opposing party’s presidential candidate do
face electoral risk, which may serve as a potential explanation for ideological breaks and
democratic votes for the MCA of 2006.
In analyzing how the MP’s (member in parliament) partisanship affects their roll call vote,
a majority of 60.8% of the right wing voted against the protection of civil liberties, whereas 27.1%

29. Nadeau 29
voted for civil liberties. Only 12.1% of the “right wing” ideology abstained. Essentially, most
members of parliament associated with American values of “republicanism” voted against granting
due process protections and civil liberties. Contrastingly, a whopping 95.5% of those identified as
“left wing” voted in favor of due process protections and favored to uphold practices of civil
liberties, and only 1.1% voted against, with the remaining 3.9% abstaining.
The directional measures indicate that there is a direct correlation between partisanship of
European Parliament Groups and their roll call on civil liberties and due process. Overall, left
leaning parties are more likely to vote for greater due process protections, whereas right-wing
parties are more likely to vote against due process protections.
With the parliamentary roll call vote on civil liberties acting as the dependent variable, it
is clear that there is very little standardized error when looking at the directional measures (.024).
However, this error can be analyzed in two ways: (1) those parties which abstained or voted
contrary to the masses of their ideology were more “middle of the road” parties. In this case, it
could have been potentially useful to create a “center ideology” to place these parties into. It is
possible that excluding these “centrist parties” as well as their votes when analyzing the data could
have also been helpful in understanding the correlation of EP partisanship and due process
protections. The standardized error, largely in part of the right-leaning voters, can also be in
response to (2) the CIA renditions uncovered in the same year.
For the 27.1% of right leaning MPs who voted for greater due process protections and the
12.1% right leaning MPs who chose to abstain, it is possible that their votes were swayed after the
CIA renditions uncovered that “15 European countries and Turkey helped the CIA transport
terrorism suspects held in secret”45
and “failed to cooperate in the parliament’s investigation of the
45
Moore, Molly. "E.U. Report Faults 16 Nations in Probe Of Secret CIA Flights." Washington Post. The Washington
Post, 15 Feb. 2007. Web. 05 May 2016.

30. Nadeau 30
practice.”46
Many of the member states turned a blind eye to the CIA-operated flights that were
“abducting and interrogating terror suspects at secret sites overseas,”47
and in turn, the prisoners
were subjected to “incommunicado detention and torture during interrogations, violating E.U.
human rights standards.”48
Because the European Parliament has “admonished 11 countries for
having a role in the flights,” and there were “recommendations for sanctions against some
countries for human rights violations,” it is possible that MPs were more conscientious of how
they were voting so as not to indicate that the region they are representing has involvement with
the CIA’s extralegal tactics and should receive a sanction or face a criminal investigation.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Moore, Molly. "E.U. Report Faults 16 Nations in Probe Of Secret CIA Flights." Washington Post. The Washington
Post, 15 Feb. 2007. Web. 05 May 2016.

31. Nadeau 31
Conclusion:
My initial hypothesis, “the partisanship of the party evaluating the laws regarding
preventative detention policies directly correlates to the amount of due process protections granted
toward terror suspects,” is true with limited exceptions. Hypothesis 1 predicts that when
republicans evaluate the rule of law, policymakers are more likely to oppose granting full civil
liberties, and thus, terror suspects will receive limited due process protections. After creating cross
tabulations to analyze the association between D1 and I1 (dependent variable 1 and independent
variable 1) and D2 and I2 (dependent variable 2 and independent variable 2), both data matrixes
found positive associations, indicating a clear and direct relationship between partisanship and due
process protections granted toward terror suspects in times of national security crises, specifically,
the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the London Bombings on July 7, 2005.
These findings indicate that right wing thinkers are indeed more likely to be favorable of policies
that enforce stricter national security measures and left wing thinkers are more favorable of policies
procuring greater civil liberties.
This study contributes to a substantive meaning in the context of analyzing the vast field
of national security and laws pertaining to terror suspects and foreign nationalists. It is important
to understand how partisanship affects the decisions that policymakers are in favor of and opposed
to implementing in order to anticipate the areas in which political parties will likely seek to expand
its authorities and favored interests. In turn, executives will be able to craft laws and policies that
counteract these legislative tendencies. Amid the growing threat of terror and the growing presence
of ISIS, there is an exhortative call to action to come to a consensus on how to proceed in granting
due process protections toward terror suspects while concurrently respecting the Constitution our
nation was founded on.

32. Nadeau 32
Glossary:
Boumediene v. Bush (2008) (United States): held that the prisoners had a right to the habeas
corpus under the United States Constitution and that the MCA of 2006 was an unconstitutional
suspension of that right.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, CSRTs (2004) (United States): set of tribunals for
confirming whether detainees held by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp
had been correctly designated as enemy combatants.
Control Orders: restrict an individual's liberty for the purpose of "protecting members of the
public from a risk of terrorism. Can place restrictions on what the person can use or possess, their
place of work, place of residence, whom they speak to, and where they can travel. Furthermore,
the person can be ordered to surrender their passport, let the police visit their home at any time,
report to officials at a specific time and place, and allow themselves to be electronically tagged so
their movements can be tracked.
Counterterrorism Bill (2008) (European Union): increased police powers for the stated purpose
of countering terrorism, including removal of prohibition on post-charge questioning, longer
terrorism sentences, register and monitoring, changes to rules surrounding interception of evidence,
power to seize assets, police ability to remove documents from property searches to decide whether
or not they will need to be legally seized as part of an investigation.
Detainee Treatment Act, DTA (2005) (United States): Contains provisions relating to treatment
of persons in custody of the Department of Defense, and administration of detainees held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, requiring
military interrogations to be performed according to the U.S. Army Field Manual, directing the
Department of Defense to establish CSRTs for persons held in Guantanamo Bay, requiring that
habeas corpus appeals be per the DTA, giving immunity to government agents from civil and
criminal action for using interrogation techniques that were officially authorized and determined
to be lawful at the time they were conducted.
Detained: to hold or keep in or as if in custody (i.e. detained by the police for questioning); to
keep back, withhold.
Due Process: a fundamental, constitutional guarantee that all legal proceedings will be fair and
that one will be given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard before the
government acts to take away one’s life, liberty, or property. Also, a constitutional guarantee that
a law shall not be unreasonably, arbitrary, or capricious.
Executive Military Order (2001) (United States): executive order authorizing the creation of
military tribunals for the detention, treatment and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against
terrorism members; military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by
the individuals subject to the order. Individuals subject to the order shall not be privileged to seek
remedy or maintain proceeding in any court of the United States or any State thereof, any court of

33. Nadeau 33
a foreign nation, or any international tribunal. When tried, an individual subject to the order shall
be tried by military commission. Sentences may include life imprisonment or death.
Extralegal: not regulated or sanctioned by law.
Habeas Corpus: a writ requiring a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court,
especially to secure the person’s release unless lawful grounds are shown for their detention.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) (United States): held that military commissions set up by the Bush
administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay lack the power to proceed because its structures
and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva
Conventions (article 3) signed in 1949.
Indefinite Detention: the practice of detaining an arrested person by a national government or
law enforcement agency without a trial.
Military Commissions Act (2006) (United States): authorized trial by military commission for
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes. Prohibited detainees who had been classified
as enemy combatants or were awaiting hearings on their status from using habeas corpus to petition
federal courts in challenges to their detention.
Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) (European Union): allowed the Home Secretary to impose
"control orders" on people who were suspected of involvement in terrorism, which in some cases
may have derogated (opt out) from human rights laws.
Rasul v. Bush (2004) (United States): established that the U.S. court system has the authority to
decide whether foreign nationals (non-U.S. citizens) held in Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully
imprisoned.
Secretary of State v. MB (2007) (European Union): articulated the minimum requirements of
disclosure that are necessary for a fair trial in control order cases. A person subject to a control
order must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give
effective instructions; does not have to be given the detail of the allegations or all of the supporting
evidence, but must be given a minimum level of disclosure. Where the material he is given contains
no more than general assertions, and the true case against individual is based solely, or to a decisive
degree, on closed materials, the requirements of fair trial are not satisfied.
Terrorism Act (2006) (European Union): creates new offences related to terrorism, and amends
existing ones varying from detainment of terror suspects to disseminating terrorist publications

34. Nadeau 34
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