Judicial Independence in Latin America and the (Conflicting) Influence of Cultural Norms, by Roberto Laver

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384125
Judicial Independence in
Latin America and the
(Conflicting) Influence of
Cultural Norms
Roberto Laver
Network Fellow, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics,
Harvard Law School Visiting Scholar
Judicial Reform Consultant, former World Bank Senior Counsel
Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 35
http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab
January 23, 2014

EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE (CONFLICTING) INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL NORMS • LAVER • JANUARY 23, 2014
2
About this Working Paper Series: In 2010, Lawrence Lessig launched the Edmond J. Safra
Research Lab, a major initiative designed to address fundamental problems of ethics in a way
that is of practical benefit to institutions of government and society around the world. As its
first undertaking, The Edmond J. Safra Research Lab is tackling the problem of
Institutional Corruption. On March 15, 2013, this Working Paper series was created to
foster critical resistance and reflection on the subject of Institutional Corruption.
http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab
Judicial Independence in Latin America and the
(Conflicting) Influence of Cultural Norms
by Roberto Laver
Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 35
Harvard University
124 Mount Auburn Street, Suite 520N, Cambridge, MA 02138
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en_US
Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 35

3
Abstract
This Working Paper highlights the dimension of informal social norms in
institutional corruption by using Latin American judiciaries, collectively, as a test
case. Judicial independence is central to the integrity and trustworthiness of
judicial institutions worldwide. Billions of dollars in development assistance have
been invested in promoting judicial independence in Latin American and other
developing countries. Despite the institutional reforms sponsored by international
development organizations, judiciaries in Latin America remain dependent on
political and other inappropriate influences. This paper argues that addressing
judicial corruption in Latin America is not just a question of adopting the right
institutions and living “happily ever after.” The paper claims that informal social
norms are key factors underlying institutional corruption in the judicial systems in
Latin America. Further systematic study of such phenomena should be a central
focus of future anti-corruption reform efforts.
This Working Paper is part of a broader writing project on international
development assistance in promoting the rule of law and judicial independence.
Keywords:
Institutional Corruption, Judicial Corruption, World Bank, Trust, Social Norms,
Favoritism, Nepotism, Latin America.

4
Introduction
“For my friends, anything; for my enemies, the law.”
–Óscar R. Benavides, President of Peru, 1914-1915 and 1933-1939
President Benavides’s words bring to mind an episode experienced by the
renowned Belgian jurist, Marcel Storme. As Storme writes, he had been teaching
his students that “a judge must suffer from [what he called] a Becket-complex,
referring to Thomas Becket who, following his appointment as Lord Chancellor by
Henry II, informed the latter: ‘I was your friend, now I am your Lord Chancellor.’”
He then continues to say that he told the story to the then-Chairman of the
Supreme Court of Argentina, who was said to be “a notorious friend of President
Menem.” As Storme shares, the Chairman “answered tersely: ‘I have remained
President Menem’s friend.’”1
President Menem’s court (as it was popularly known) was infamous for its
subservient attitude towards the executive branch. Unlike FDR, Menem was able to
pack the court, increasing the ranks from five to nine justices. The high court
ended up having six justices, who were close family friends of, and unconditional
loyalists to, Menem. Tragically, this is not an isolated incident in Argentine, or for
that matter, Latin American history. Few forms of corruption can hurt a country
more than improper political influence in the judiciary.
It is widely recognized and accepted that an independent judiciary is fundamental
to the rule of law. Such independence is not limited to the political branches of
government; it extends to any particular individual or group. Unfortunately, most
people in Latin America—and worldwide—do not enjoy the blessings of the rule of
law. They live in countries where the image of Lady Justice, wearing her blindfold,
is simply that—an image far removed from reality, her blindfold often removed or
not there to begin with. Impartial justice is rare: seldom dispensed without fear or
favor and regardless of money or power. This systemic and pervasive government
intrusion weakens the integrity of the judicial institution and erodes public trust. In
1
Marcel Storme, “Independence of the Judiciary: The European Perspective,” in Shimon Shetreet and
Christopher Forsyth, eds., The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 88.

5
its latest Global Corruption Barometer,2
Transparency International finds that
corruption is perceived to be permeating through the foundations of the legal
system in many countries. In fact, the judiciary comes in as the second most
corrupt institution after the police. In Latin America, the judiciary stands as one of
the most corrupt institutions in a majority of the countries surveyed. Indeed, six
out of eleven countries score the judiciary over 4 (on a score scale of 1-5 where 1
means not at all corrupt and 5 means extremely corrupt), and three other countries
score the judiciary just below 4.
Promoting the rule of law and independent judiciaries is high on today’s
international development agenda. A widespread consensus exists among
international development organizations, development practitioners, and scholars
that an effective judiciary is key to a country’s political, economic and social
development.3
A well-functioning judicial institution is required to stimulate
investment, both domestically and from abroad.4
Private investors seek a judiciary
that respects and protects property and contractual rights, and treats related
disputes without capriciousness or influence from outside forces.5
For a country’s
citizens, fair and impartial judges are needed to protect important civil and
2
Transparency International, “Global Corruption Barometer 2013,” http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013.
The 2013 Global Barometer, which surveyed 114,000 people and analyzes corruption in 107 countries, finds
that corruption is prevalent across both developed and underdeveloped nations: More than 50 percent of
respondents in the world said corruption had worsened in the last two years. This is not only about individual
corruption and bribes. The report also evaluates other systemic forms of corruption that occur when decisions
to allocate public resources are distorted by money, power, access, connections or some combination of the
above. Almost two-thirds of the respondents thought that personal contacts were important to get things done
in the public sector. And 54 percent of people think that the government is either largely or entirely captured
by self-interested groups, rather than being run for the benefit of the public at large. In some countries (i.e.
Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, Russia, Tanzania and Ukraine), more than 80 per cent of people believe the
government is either largely or entirely run by a few big entities acting in their own self-interest.
3
For a survey of this scholarship, see Richard Messick, “Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A
Survey of the Issues,” World Bank Research Observer 14.1 (1999): 120-123. On the specific relationship
between judicial independence and economic growth, see Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, "Economic Growth
and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators,” European Journal of
Political Economy 19.3 (2003): 497-527 and Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, “Unbundling Judicial
Independence,” June 20, 2007, http://www.isnie.org/assets/files/papers2007/voigt.pdf (accessed on
November 30, 2013). For skeptical views on the evidence, see Thomas Carothers, ed., Promoting the Rule of
Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
4
Messick, “Judicial Reform and Economic Development.” For additional World Bank sources on the
relationship between functioning judicial institutions and economic and social development, see Ana Palacio,
“Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Action Agenda for the World Bank,” World Bank Working Paper No.
48701 (2006); World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (World Bank,
2005); World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (World Bank, 2001); World
Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (World Bank, 1996).
5
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, Volume 2 (M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 149-150.

6
political rights. Judiciaries that are institutionally weak, subject to corruption, and
heavily politicized cannot fulfill these vital roles.6
While an effective judicial institution is important in the developed world, it is
perhaps even more critical in countries, such as those in Latin America, where
democracy is fresh and the need to institutionalize the rule of law is essential for
development. In the past three decades, many developing countries have made the
transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic form of governance. In many
such transitions, “victims of human rights abuses . . . have demanded that [their
offenders] be brought to justice.”7
These shifts to democracy brought with them a
need for a judiciary that can effectively establish confidence in government
institutions and practices, and governments have also quickly realized that their
social and economic development is inextricably linked to an effective judicial
institution that can impartially resolve commercial disputes.8
To varying degrees, judiciaries in developing countries remain unprepared to
respond to these challenges. Judicial institutions are affected by a myriad of
problems including inefficient procedures, excessive court fees, inaccessible
courthouses, biased and poorly trained judges, and cumbersome procedural
requirements. Often, they are heavily influenced by (or under the direct control of)
the executive or legislative branch, thus making it very improbable that a private
6
The World Bank produces empirical evidence showing the relationship between a sound justice sector and
development. This includes cross-country data sets that demonstrate a correlation between deficiencies in the
rule of law and negative economic and social development. See World Bank International Development
Association, “IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI),” 2011, http://go.worldbank.org/S2THWI1X60. The “Doing
Business” Reports—a publication of the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—provide a quantitative
measure for comparing business regulations in ten indicator sets across 181 countries. “Doing Business” has
found that streamlined court processes and faster contract enforcement are associated with a better
environment for business. See, e.g., World Bank, Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulations (World
Bank, 2003), 41-42. The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)—developed
jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—comprises surveys of
over 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries in the Eastern European and Central Asia Region. The findings of
these surveys indicate that firms identify critical obstacles to their effective functioning, such as crime,
complex regulations, and judicial performance, among others. See World Bank, “Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey,” http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/BEEPS.
7
See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights Education
and Action, Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System (Human Rights First, 1996),
18.
8
Id.

7
litigant will receive a fair trial against the government.9
This kind of “dependence
corruption” limits the effectiveness of the judiciary and undermines public trust.10
In an effort to deal with these challenges, Latin American countries (as well as
other countries) have taken steps to reform their respective judicial institutions.
These judicial reform projects have received significant financial and technical
support from international development institutions, amounting to billions of
dollars since the 1980s. These programs run the gamut from comprehensive and
ambitious overhauls of a judicial system to more narrow and discrete interventions
in judicial administration. The World Bank (hereinafter, the Bank),11
for its part,
has provided over a billion dollars in judicial reform programs worldwide.12
It has
engaged in judicial reform operations since the early 1990s as a result of the
gradual expansion of its mandate and its then-emerging governance agenda.13
Judicial reform and anti-corruption measures are also elements of foreign aid
conditionality, as in certain IMF operations, or accession criteria for membership in
the European Union.
This working paper focuses on judicial corruption in Latin America, particularly the
pervasive and improper political influence in the judicial institution. Over the last
two to three decades, Latin American governments, with assistance from
9
Id. and Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, 151.
10
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights Education and
Action, Halfway to Reform, 19-20.
11
“The World Bank is composed of two unique development institutions, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD
focuses on middle-income countries and creditworthy poor countries while the IDA focuses on the poorest
countries in the world. IBRD provides low-interest loans and IDA provides interest-free credits and grants to
developing countries.” World Bank, “Initiatives in Justice Reform 2009,” 1 n.5,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/01/11102800/initiatives-justice-reform-2009.
12
See Roberto Laver, “The World Bank and Judicial Reform: Overcoming ‘Blind Spots’ in the Approach to
Judicial Independence,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 22.2 (2012): 183-238.
13
Initially, the World Bank adopted a narrow interpretation of development as exclusively economic growth.
Correspondingly, “economic considerations” encompassed “only those issues that were directly relevant to
the financial and technical feasibility of the projects it was funding and to the project’s impact on the
economic growth potential of the Member State.” Daniel D. Bradlow, “The World Bank, the IMF and Human
Rights,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 6.1 (1996): 47-90, 55 (citing United Nations, Statements
of U.N. Legal Counsel and IBRD General Counsel on Relations of U.N. and IBRD and Effect of U.N.
Resolutions, 6 I.L.M. 150 [1967]). However, as notions of development have evolved and international political
circumstances have changed, the World Bank’s interpretation of its mandate has expanded. Beginning in the
1960s, its scope widened to a broader focus on poverty alleviation and sustainable development, including
new areas of lending such as rural development, human resources development (e.g., health, education), the
environment, and structural reforms. See Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye, Aid and Power: The World
Bank and Policy Based Lending, Volume 1 (Routledge 1991), 21-23. For an analysis of the World Bank’s rule of
law programs, see Gordon Barron, “The World Bank & Rule of Law Reforms,” Development Studies Institute
Working Paper (2005).

8
multilateral and bilateral donors, have implemented reforms to “de-politicize” the
judiciary. Section I describes and evaluates these reforms and remedies sponsored
by donors, particularly the World Bank, to strengthen judicial independence in
Latin America. Section II makes a preliminary case that low levels of judicial
independence in Latin America are largely driven by informal factors of low social
trust and dysfunctional cultural norms, which factors are largely understudied and
marginalized in the anti-corruption field. Section III offers some final thoughts.
Reforms to Promote Judicial Independence in Latin
America
Judicial independence is a fundamental constitutional norm around the world and
is central to the core mission and integrity of the judicial institution.14
Simply put,
judges, in the performance of their duties, should be solely subject to the force of
the law, and free of improper interference and pressures. As Lawrence Lessig
asserts, independence of the judiciary means “proper dependence,” that is “a
judiciary dependent upon the law and not upon the president, politics or whatever
else you think might taint the judiciary.”15
The decisions of judges should be
enforced truthfully and in full, regardless of their impact on government or other
powerful interests.
In Latin America, judicial independence in practice is very limited. Indeed, there is
a substantial deviation in the actual functioning of the judicial institution from its
official and stated mission—the well-known gap between de jure and de facto
judicial independence. Judicial independence has been impeded by the undue and
pervasive influence of actors from the executive or legislative branches of
government. Governments regularly interfere in the administration of judicial
appointments and judicial processes. This systematic and inappropriate influence
on the impartiality of the judicial process weakens the integrity of the institution
and erodes public confidence. As we will discuss later, this widespread tendency to
14
Adam M. Dodek and Lorne Sossin, eds., Judicial Independence in Context (Irwin Law, 2010), 298 (referring to
numerous sources) and Shetreet, The Culture of Judicial Independence, 1.
15
Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve, 2011), 130-
131.

9
“distract” judges from their proper application of the law is not limited to
politicians.
Judicial independence has been, and remains, a key objective in international
donor’s efforts to promote the rule of law in Latin America. At an early stage, the
World Bank, like other bilateral and multilateral donors, identified judicial
independence as an imperative feature in judicial reform projects,16
and reaffirmed
this centrality in its 2003 strategic framework on judicial reform.17
In fact, the first
pillar of the World Bank’s legal and judicial reform strategy is judicial
independence.18
As the Bank affirmed, “first and foremost, the judiciary must be
independent, impartial, and effective.”19
The rule of law, as expressed by the Bank
“is built on the cornerstone of an independent, efficient, and effective judicial
system.”20
Further, judicial independence is identified as an “imperative feature of
any judicial reform project”21
and “efforts to promote judicial independence are . . .
at the heart of insuring judicial reform.”22
In their operations, the World Bank, like
other bilateral and multilateral donors, has sponsored a wide array of remedies to
reduce improper political influence in the judicial process. As with other forms of
corruption, the World Bank addresses the problem of judicial corruption mainly
through reforms in the institutional and incentive frameworks of the respective
recipient countries.23
These reforms include a menu of so-called supply- and
16
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, “Legal Framework for Development: The World Bank’s Role in Legal and Judicial
Reform,” in Malcolm Rowat, Waleed H. Malik, and Maria Dakolias, eds., Judicial Reform in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Proceedings of a World Bank Conference (World Bank, 1995) (the core function of the judicial system
encompasses three principal elements: (1) a well-functioning judiciary in which judges apply the law in a fair,
even and predictable manner without undue delays or unaffordable costs; (2) rules interpreted and applied
according to established procedures; and (3) an independent body to resolve disputes).
17
World Bank, “Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions,” World Bank Working Paper (2003),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/2629017/legal-judicial-reform-strategic-directions.
18
Id., 3.
19
Id., 2.
20
Id.
21
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “Building on Quicksand: The Collapse of the World Bank’s Judicial
Reform Project in Peru,” 2000, 3.
22
Maria Dakolias, “A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America,” Virginia Journal of
International Law 36.1 (1995): 167-232, 172.
23
The term “institution” is used here not in the broader sense of the institutional economics writings, but in
the narrower sense of “organization,” as commonly used in literature on judicial independence and judicial
reform programs. For specific definitions of these terms, see Shahid Javed Burki and Guillermo E. Perry,
Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter (World Bank, 1998), 2 (“Institutions are rules that shape
the behavior of organizations and individuals in a society. They can be formal (constitutions, laws, regulations,
contracts, internal procedures of specific organizations) or informal (values and norms). In contrast,
organizations are sets of actors who collectively pursue common objectives.”) Informal rules include: “trust or

10
demand-side remedies.24
The supply-side remedies focus on the structure and
functions of government. They primarily consist of changes in rules (including
constitutional norms), institutions and procedures concerning the manner of
judicial appointments, security of tenure, financial security of judges, and judicial
control over court administration, budget, and discipline. Beyond these structural
measures, donors sponsor interventions to support what is termed as “operational
independence”; that is, the capacity of the judiciary to manage and administer its
own resources. These are the operational tools that judges require, such as
education, safety, reasonable working conditions and salaries, legal information,
and effective court and case management procedures.25
On the demand side,
donors support increased participation of civil society, through transparency and
accountability measures, to enhance public oversight of the judiciary. These
remedies deal mainly with institutional tools and safeguards for increased
engagement of NGOs, media, and the general public.26
Peru offers a good example of the World Bank’s approach to judicial independence.
In the early 1990s, it was widely recognized that the Peruvian judicial system
lacked integrity and public trust. This was largely based on the perception that the
judiciary was highly politicized. Donors recognized that there was a tradition of
political interference in Peru, not unlike many other countries in Latin America. In
response to this institutional corruption, the government undertook several
the tendency to cooperate among individuals who encounter each other infrequently,” ethics or values and
political norms. Id., 12.
24
Mary Noel Pepys, “Justice System,” in Bertram Irwin Spector, ed., Fighting Corruption in Developing
Countries: Strategies and Analysis (Kumarian Press, 2005) (noting four broad areas of judicial reform: limiting
authority; reducing discretion; increasing transparency and accountability; and improving working terms and
conditions) and Mary Noel Pepys, “Corruption within the Judiciary: Causes and Remedies,” in Transparency
International, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems (Cambridge University Press, 2007):
4-5 (noting three broad categories of remedies: enhancing the independence of the judiciary; introducing
accountability mechanisms; and enhancing the competency of external controls). Common to these judicial
reform programs, especially in Latin America, are judicial councils formed as independent and participatory
mechanisms for the selection and appointment of judges. See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, “Guarding
the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence,” American Journal of Comparative Law 57.1 (2009):
103-134 (“the World Bank and other multilateral donor agencies have made judicial councils part of the
standard package of institutions associated with judicial reform and rule-of-law programming.”). Often these
new institutions include a diverse membership representing not only various branches of government but also
constituent groups of civil society. Bar associations, universities and other professional associations are
among these civil society representatives. On paper, these councils seemed like a great improvement. In
practice, however, they have been disappointing. Patterns of inappropriate influence, cronyism and partiality
have endured. These upgraded institutional attributes have proved insufficient to overcome the deeper
cultural norms of excessive particularism and favoritism.
25
See Laver, “World Bank and Judicial Reform,” 183.
26
Id.

11
structural reforms. Of most significance, Peru (like many other Latin American
countries) moved from a political appointment procedure of judges to an allegedly
more independent and pluralist mechanism governed by independent bodies called
“judicial councils.” Through constitutional enactment, Peru established its own
judicial council, the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (hereinafter, the Consejo).
The purpose of creating the Consejo was to depoliticize the Judiciary and move
towards a merit-based system for judicial recruitment and removal, through a body
free of executive or legislative branch representation. The Consejo was created with
the power to select, appoint and remove judges and prosecutors. Rules were
enacted for the open and merit-based selection process of judges and prosecutors
with opportunity for public participation. Members of the Consejo include
representatives of the judiciary and civil society organizations such as the bar
association, public universities, private universities and other professional
associations. Beyond these structural measures, other remedies included higher
judicial salaries, performance evaluations of judges and prosecutors, and greater
transparency of court operations.
The above structural and operational reforms, implemented in Peru and in other
Latin American countries, have largely failed to deliver more independent and
impartial justice. After two to three decades of reforms, the impact of judicial
reform efforts is disappointing, to say the least.27
There is a lot of “reform” without
27
For example, see Katya Salazar and Jacqueline de Gramont, “Civil Society’s Role in Combating Judicial
Corruption in Central America,” in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007, 117 (“In spite of
these reforms, there is widespread recognition that the objectives of independence, transparency and
efficiency have not fully materialized”); Keith Henderson, “Global Lessons and Best Practices: Fighting
Corruption and Promoting the Rule of Law through Transparency, Openness and Judicial Independence,”
International Foundation for Electoral Systems White Paper (2005),
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2006/Global-Lessons-and-Best-Practices-Fighting-
Corruption-and-Promoting-the-Rule-of-Law-Through-Transp.aspx (“While it is true that many countries are
struggling with how to create or nurture an independent judiciary within different socio-economic contexts, the
reality is that most have not succeeded because of a lack of both political leadership and broad-based public
support—and not because judicial independence is conceptually too abstract to define or too complex to
structurally implement.”); Maria González de Asis, “Anticorruption Reform in Rule of Law Programs,” World
Bank (2006),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/AnticorruptionReforminRuleofLawPrograms
FinalVersion.pdf (noting data showing that judicial corruption has not decreased and that judicial
independence standards have deteriorated, and adding that “an overall examination of judicial reform over the
last twenty to thirty years does not show impressive results”); Margaret Popkin, “Esfuerzos por Aumentar la
Independencia e Impacialidad judicial en América Latina,”
http://www.sistemasjudiciales.org/content/jud/archivos/notaarchivo/673.pdf (noting unsatisfactory results
of reforms focused on systems of selection, appointment, discipline, promotion and evaluation of judges);
Linn Hammergren, “Fighting Judicial Corruption: A Comparative Perspective from Latin America,” in
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007, 139-140 (noting some positive impact of reforms in
some Latin American countries, but recognizing that public opinion polls in the region show a decline of
public confidence in judiciary since 1996, at 140, and “the introduction of judicial councils has not been an

12
true reform. The institution-focused reforms are inadequate to achieve de facto
independence on the bench. Such donor-supported programs are not yielding more
independent judiciaries. While the program interventions are not devoid of merit,
they are not enhancing, in any significant manner, the confidence of the public that
judicial decisions are made in a fair and impartial manner. The research shows
that institutional remedies are not sufficient to achieve judicial independence.
Indeed, several studies show little, if any, correlation between formal and actual
judicial independence in developing countries, including those in Latin America.28
As these studies note, the relationship between de jure and de facto is “tenuous at
best.”29
Scholars assert, “We find little evidence of a direct and strong relationship
between (a) the formal, typically constitutional rules that scholars claim promote
independent judging and (b) independent judicial behavior. Put simply, indicators
of de jure and de facto independence are at best weakly correlated—in some cases,
they are negatively related.”30
This gloomy picture has led Transparency
International to admit that “despite several decades of reform efforts and
international instruments protecting judicial independence, judges and court
personnel around the world continue to face pressure to rule in favour of powerful
absolute disaster, but the few successes (El Salvador) are outweighed by the clear failures (to which Bolivia
and Ecuador can be added) and several examples (Peru, Colombia) that have had ambiguous results” at 144);
and Peter DeSchazo and Juan Enrique Vargas, Judicial Reform in Latin America: An Assessment (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2006) (noting that only Chile has made substantial progress). Similar
views are expressed on the results of rule of law and good governance reform in general. See Rachel Kleinfeld,
Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012);
Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad; Anja C. Gebel, “Human Nature and Morality in the Anti-Corruption
Discourse of Transparency International,” Public Administration and Development 32.1 (2012), 109-128 (citing
several sources including statements by the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, and
Transparency International); Jakob Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 19.3 (2005) 19-42 (noting that traditional approaches to improve governance have produced
rather disappointing results); and Sebastian Wolf and Diana Schmidt-Pfister, “Between Corruption,
Integration, and Culture: The Politics of International Anti-Corruption” (2011), http://www.nomos-
shop.de/_assets/downloads/9783832958466_lese01.pdf.
28
Juan Carlos Donoso, “A Means to an End: Judicial Independence, Corruption and the Rule of Law in Latin
America,” Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 2009 http://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-07152009-
154311/unrestricted/donoso.pdf (comparison between two de jure and two de facto measures of judicial
independence in Latin American countries); Julio Ríos-Figueroa and Jeffrey K. Staton, “Unpacking the Rule of
Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures,” CELS 2009 4th
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper (2009) (comparison of 13 of the most widely used measures of judicial independence); Feld
and Voigt, “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence” (design and comparison of the impact on economic
growth, of de jure and de facto measurements in 66 countries). For further research showing that formal
rules, by themselves, do not guarantee substantive outputs of judicial independence and impartiality, see
Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review,”
Journal of Legal Studies 32.1 (2003) 59-89, 60 (citing several sources).
29
Ríos-Figueroa and Staton, “Unpacking the Rule of Law,” 22.
30
Julio Ríos-Figueroa and Jeffrey K. Staton, “An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Judicial
Independence,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, published online October 24, 2012, 2,
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/10/23/jleo.ews029.abstract.

13
political or economic entities, rather than according to the law.”31
In Peru, trust in
the judiciary is worse today than two decades ago. In fact, the judiciary is perceived
as the most corrupt institution in Peru. The underlying patterns of patronage and
cronyism have tended to endure.
There is an over-emphasis on institutional and structural responses in anti-
corruption discourse and reform. Clearly there are factors, other than institutional
design and incentives, which are influencing the lack of independent judicial
behavior. Despite structural and operational changes, politicians are, in many
societies, willing and able to trample on judicial independence. The most visible
and notorious instances of breaches of judicial independence are generally those
emanating from partisan politics. While issues of distribution of power and checks
and balances are of paramount importance, informal norms are arguably a key
factor, yet one that is marginalized in the literature and under studied. Generally,
politicians quash judicial independence in contexts where there is a high level of
social tolerance for disrespect of the rule of law, and weaker public outrage and
opposition to political breaches of judicial independence. Institutional safeguards
and incentives “probably require backing by a political norm, in which other actors,
especially voters, punish an executive who tramples on the judiciary’s formal
protections.”32
The primary focus is on structures and incentives to protect against
political threats to conditions of office such as appointment; removal; disciplinary
action; remunerating, educating and evaluating judges; and control over court
administration. Indeed, “while important, this focus obscures the extent to which
judicial independence must be a recognized and accepted part of the political and
legal culture if it is to be effective.”33
We must realize and address that “the
integrity of the legal culture is the responsibility of all citizens”34
and that “public
pressure can make it easier for executives and legislatures to take steps for the
purpose of undermining judicial authority and this diminishing judicial
independence.”35
Next I turn attention to preliminary observations on informal
31
Mary Noel Pepys, “Corruption within the Judiciary,” xxii-xxiii.
32
Charles M. Cameron, “Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who Cares?” in
Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman, eds., Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary
Approach (Sage Publications, 2002), 139.
33
Patricia Hughes, “The Significance of Public Pressure on Judicial Independence”, in Dodek and Sossin,
eds., Judicial Independence in Context, 269.
34
Id.
35
Id.

14
norms in Latin America that arguably act as significant and systemic determinants
of corrupt judicial outputs.
“Proper Dependence” on the Law and the Influence
of Cultural Norms
Public trust in Latin American judiciaries is extremely low, to a great extent
because people experience and/or perceive a judicial institution that is not
independent and impartial. I submit that one strong hypothesis for explaining the
gap between de jure judicial independence and de facto judicial independence is the
influence of pervasive and dysfunctional informal social norms which permeate
Latin American societies, profoundly influencing the radius of trust beyond family
and the circle of friends. Interpersonal trust in Latin America remains at a low level
in spite of decades of political, institutional and economic reforms. As the Latino
Barometer reports, “trust remains one of the Gordian knots for the development of
Latin American societies.”36
Using political power and influence to promote favoritism for personal or political
connections is often perceived as acceptable and legitimate. This dysfunctional
behavior, however, is not limited to the political and economic elite. While leaders
bear much of the responsibility, the problem often cuts across all segments and
sectors in society. While we need to guard against the temptation to stereotype and
oversimplify the behaviors of communities and individuals, there may be a high
degree of complicity among the citizenry. In fact, “doing favors for family and
friends is such an ingrained behavior in many cultures that magistrates do not
often believe it affects their role as impartial arbiters.”37
Such practices are woven
into the fabric of the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Relatives and friends expect
favoritism and partiality from those with authority and influence, whether a political
leader, police officer or teacher. In the absence of social trust, institutions weaken
and citizens are less able to associate with others to demand better governance.
These assertions generally, but not universally, hold true in Latin America, where
36
Latinobarómetro Corp. “Latinobarómetro Report 2010,” available at
http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp.
37
See Pepys, “Justice System,” 18.

15
low levels of trust correspond to high levels of perceived corruption and, globally,
relatively low percentage rankings for rule of law (See Table 1 and Figure 1 below).
Table 1. Trust in Latin America
Country World Values
Survey*:
% responding
that most
people can be
trusted rather
than that you
can't be too
careful
World Values
Survey*:
% responding
that they trust
their family
completely
World Values
Survey*:
% responding
that they trust
completely
people they
know
personally
Latinobarómetro
1996-2010**:
% Responding
that Most
People Can Be
Trusted
Latinobarómetro
2010***:
% Trust in
institutions of
Democracy:
Judiciary
Argentina 17.6 90.9 36.7 24 34
Bolivia 18 24
Brazil 9.4 66.7 14.2 10 51
Chile 12.6 82.9 14.7 17 38
Colombia 14.5 84.5 17.2 20 34
Costa Rica 19 46
Cuba - -
Dominican
Republic
31 28
Ecuador 17 21
El Salvador 26 22
Guatemala 15.7 - - 18 17
Honduras 22 34
Mexico 15.6 78.1 25.7 26 28
Nicaragua 16 22
Panama 21 34
Paraguay 14 27
Peru 6.3 76.1 10 14 15
Uruguay 28.4 84.9 33 30 58
Venezuela 24 38
* WVS selected countries/samples: Argentina (2006), Brazil (2006), Colombia (2005), Chile (2006),
Guatemala (2004), Mexico (2005), Peru (2006), Uruguay (2006)
**Latinobarómetro, p. 69. Avg. Latin America: 20%
***Latinobarómetro, Table No. 17: Trust in institutions of democracy, 2010 (%), p. 71. Avg. Latin America:
32%
Ecuador’s former president, Osvaldo Hurtado, vividly illustrates the absence of a
culture of legality in his home country.38
A deep-rooted custom of disregard for the
38
Osvaldo Hurtado, Portrait of a Nation: Culture and Progress in Ecuador (Madison Books, 2010).

16
law exists among Ecuadorians and the “parameters of honesty are minimal.”39
Furthermore,
Personal merits are not recognized and rewarded due to the power and
influence that personal relations have in a stratified and paternalistic
society in which many decisions are based on the exchange of loyalty
and favors. The predomination of personal relations over institutional
ones means that decision makers, above all in the public sector, think
about the person or group who will be benefited from a decision, and not
about its merits, needs and rights, nor about national conveniences.
Friendship, kinship and the relationship between godparents and their
godchildren’s parents, as well as political affinities, union affiliations and
the so-called esprit de corps are examples of ties that weigh more
heavily.40
. . . When government officials find themselves with the
opportunity of providing retribution or sanctioning an individual, instead
of bearing in mind the person’s capacity, experience, and responsibility,
what frequently counts is friendship, kinship, and the relationships
between someone and his or her godchildren’s parents, as well as
political affinities, union camaraderie, connections, contacts and
favoritisms . . . personal connections are a guarantee that, when
necessary, one can find an appropriate person with influence.41
Hurtado adds, “Nepotism and favors for ‘buddies’ are commonly present. The
relationship between relatives and friends is so strong that the person who does
not accept the request and does not place them in bureaucratic positions causes
resentment among those affected, to whom it would never occur to think about
whether the person was deserving of the position or not.”42
What Osvaldo Hurtado says about Ecuador applies generally to the rest of Latin
America. Renowned journalist and writer Carlos Alberto Montaner laments that “a
large percentage of Latin Americans either nurture or tolerate relationships in
which personal loyalty is rewarded and merit is substantially ignored. In Latin
39
Id. at 134
40
Id. at 181
41
Id., at 143.
42
Id.

17
American culture loyalty rarely extends beyond the circle of friends and family.
Thus the public sector is profoundly mistrusted and the notion of the common
good is very weak.”43
Montaner further affirms that perceived power in Latin
America resides in the ability to operate above the law.44
Echoing Montaner,
Francis Fukuyama adds,
In many Latin American societies, a narrow radius of trust produces a
two-tier moral system, with good behavior reserved for family and
personal friends, and a decidedly lower standard of behavior in the
public sphere. This serves as a cultural foundation for corruption, which
is often regarded as a legitimate way of looking after one's family. . . .
[In] much of Latin America, social capital resides largely in families and
a rather narrow circle of personal friends. It is difficult for people to trust
those outside of these narrow circles. Strangers fall into a different
category than kin. A lower standard of moral behavior applies when one
becomes, for example, a public official. This provides cultural
reinforcement for corruption: in such societies, one feels entitled to steal
on behalf of one's family.45
The above observations about the Latin America are also a reality in other
countries and regions around the world.46
43
Carlos Alberto Montaner, “Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America,” in Lawrence E. Harrison and
Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books 2000), 59.
44
Id., 58.
45
Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital and Civil Society,” Prepared for Delivery at the IMF Conference on
Second Generation Reforms, George Mason University, October 1, 1999,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm.
46
Outside of Latin America, a Nigerian political leader rhetorically asks, “who gets to . . . a position of power
and then refuses to help his people?” See Daniel Jordan Smith, “The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in
Corruption in Nigeria”, in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Corruption, Global Security, and World Order (Brookings
Institution Press, 2009), 290. Scholars further elaborate that “the discussion on institutionalization of culture
of accountability in Nigeria’s local government administration would not be complete without considering the
constraints imposed on the polity. These constraints . . . include the multiple loyalties and primordial instincts
in ethnic societies . . . cultural constraints are more dominant at the family clan, village and ethnic group
levels. . . . The multiple loyalties in the larger society emphasize the use of particularistic criteria instead of
universalistic criteria, thereby resulting in opaqueness and lack of accountability. . . . The successful
institutionalization of culture of accountability in Nigeria’s local government has been impossible to some
extent due to some of these constraints. This has led to a diminishing trend in accountability at grassroots
governance.” Deyemi O. O., Akindele S. T., Aluko O. A. and Agesin B, “Institutionalizing the Culture of
Accountability in Local Government Administration in Nigeria,” African Journal of Political Science and
International Relations 6.4 (2012): 81-91, 88. Regarding the Philippines, Stephen Golub notes that “Filipino
society prizes personal connections to an extraordinary degree,” and that “extreme personalism . . . leads to
the graft and corruption evident in Philippine society.” Stephen Golub, “The ‘Other 90 Per Cent’: How NGOs
Combat Corruption in Non-Judicial Justice Systems,” in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report

18
In such social contexts, the judiciary is arguably a mirror of society. The judiciary
does not operate in a vacuum; judges are a product of their respective societies.
The capture of the judiciary by political actors is not simply an outgrowth of
dysfunctional political structures but also underlying cultural norms. Corruption in
the judiciary is closely associated with the broader phenomenon of corruption in
state and society. As Transparency International recognizes, “the justice system is
also embedded within society: the reality is that general levels of corruption in
society correlate closely with levels of judicial corruption. This appears to support
the contention that a clean judiciary is central to the anti-corruption fight; but
might also suggest that the quality of the judiciary and the propensity of its
members to use their office for private gain reflect attitudes to corruption in society
more broadly.”47
The environment in turn places limits on what even the most
perfect institutional structure can accomplish, and thus on our ability to deal with
judicial corruption by addressing only the judicial sector.
In these social environments, individual judges operate under cultural constraints
that conflict with a judge’s fidelity to the law. Judicial partiality rather than
independence becomes the social norm and expectation. Indeed, “[judges] find
themselves under pressure not only from substantial groups and institutions, such
as politicians, big business and organized crime, but from the looser, still potent
informal networks formed by extended family, friends, neighbors and other groups
with whom they associate. To a judge working in this setting, the form, extent and
significance of corrupt practices become indistinct because they reflect local
norms of networking, exchanging favours and gifts, and offering and receiving
payoffs to ensure favourable outcomes.”48
2007, 131. The author further adds that “A World Bank study finds only 5 per cent of Filipinos believe that
‘most people can be trusted’, a phenomenon that reinforces reliance on special favours. This favouritism in
turn creates utang na loob (‘debt of gratitude’) that imposes reciprocal, sometimes corrupting, obligations. To
complicate matters further, corruption in the Philippines does not just involve reaping material and personal
benefits. Those who fail to honour the interests of powerbrokers can face social ostracism, economic harm or
professional damage. For government personnel, this includes transfers to bureaucratic backwaters or
unappealing parts of the country. The upshot is that governance is not a set of neutral institutions, but rather
a web of personal and financial connections. This blocks law reform, law enforcement and the poorly
connected majority’s access to justice.” Id.
47
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007, xx.
48
Marina Kurkchiyan, “Judicial Corruption in the Context of Legal Culture,” in Transparency International,
Global Corruption Report 2007, 103.

19
As another expert puts it, “doing favors for family and friends is such an ingrained
behavior in many cultures that magistrates do not often believe it affects their role
as impartial arbiters. Rather than reveal the conflict of interest and seek
disqualification, magistrates often submit to the pressure without compunction.”49
Personal relationships and influence trump merit and impartiality, and even the
judges’ conception of what is dishonorable. “It may be more dishonourable for a
judge to ignore the wishes of a family member than to abide strictly by the law. . . .
The strength of personal relationships is so great in some countries that all judicial
decisions are suspected of being a product of influence.”50
These harmful cultural practices are clearly evidenced in Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco’s
exemplary and empirical study on judicial corruption in a state in central Mexico.51
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 individuals, mainly magistrados
(magistrates or justices), jueces (judges), and empleados (staff members). Some
interviewees defined corruption as a cultural phenomenon: es una mala costumbre
que tienen los mexicanos (it is a bad habit of Mexican people). The study shows that
corruption in the Mexican judiciary means much more than just bribery; there is
also the “other corruption,” to use Ferreyra Orozco’s phrase, which includes
influence peddling, favors, cronyism, and nepotism. 78 percent of those surveyed
strongly agreed that the aforementioned phenomena occur on a daily basis.
Corruption through connections (to obtain positions and tenures) has a long history
in Mexican society. According to interviewees, the “other kind” of corruption
(through connections) often sways the outcome of trials to favor one of the parties.
My own experience as a Latin American attorney supports this finding. Due to
friendship, political pressure, cronyism, favors, kinship, or personal interest, a
person in charge of a decision-making process (mostly judges and magistrates, but
also some staff members such as court secretaries) can influence a verdict directly
or misrepresent the evidence to affect the result of a trial. The study notes that
favoritism and undue influence are commonly used in two areas: (1) as leverage to
obtain tenures and positions due to a poor civil service, and (2) to influence the
proceedings and verdict of a particular trial. Furthermore, the study finds that
these practices are “commonplace in the daily life of the judicial system because
49
Pepys, “Justice System,” 18.
50
Pepys, “Corruption within the Judiciary,” 4.
51
The study uses fictitious names for the actual locations.

20
they are not considered a deviant practice; the abnormal became the normal.”52
These cultural norms further erode social trust, a key determinant of judicial
independence.53
Figure 1: Trust and Corruption in Latin America
Final Thoughts
As discussed in this paper, reforms dealing with judicial corruption in Latin
America (and arguably other places) have primarily focused on the implementation
of new appointment structures and external accountability mechanisms. Overall,
these reforms have largely failed to deliver the desired outcomes and improve the
integrity of the judiciary and its trustworthiness. The gap between judicial
independence rule and behavior persists in Latin America despite institutional and
incentive-based reform efforts sponsored by international development
52
Gabriel Ferreyra-Orozco, “Understanding Corruption in a State Supreme Court in Central Mexico: An
Ethnographic Approach,” Human Organization 69.3 (2010): 242-251.
53
See Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt, “Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence,” International Review of Law
and Economics 27.3 (2007): 269-290.

21
organizations. Latin America shows that it is not just a question of adopting the
right institutions and incentives and living “happily ever after.”
This paper has argued that judicial independence depends on supportive cultural
norms which are largely absent in Latin America. Cooperative norms of honesty
and reciprocity are not widely held in the region. Particularistic personal
relationships are widespread, and they strongly influence how rules are applied, or
not applied, in all areas of human interaction. These particularistic norms help
explain the systematic and widespread problem of a lack of “proper dependence”
on the law. Of course, these harmful social practices are not exclusive to Latin
America or, for that sake, to any particular group of countries or communities.
They are found here, there, and everywhere. Rather, I would argue, it is more a
question of degree—in the scope, frequency and intensity with which they occur
and the level of social tolerance of and complicity with such practices. In such
social environments, the challenge is not in dealing with a few “bad apples” (such
as corrupt politicians or judges), but rather a “rotten barrel” of dysfunctional social
practices.
Anti-corruption study and reform needs to focus more on these, largely under-
studied and marginalized, socio-cultural drivers of systemic judicial corruption in
Latin America. The empirical basis of the insights and claims articulated in this
paper would benefit from more systematic studies, similar to the one performed by
Gabriel Ferreyra Orozco in central Mexico and discussed in this paper. Such
studies might draw more nuanced distinctions, such as examining the potentially
different effects of harmful social norms on lower-level and higher-level courts, or
contrasting the differences between internal versus external types of judicial
dependencies. Another possible means of strengthening the empirical basis of the
main premise of this paper is by resort to the comparative perspective—namely, by
further delving into the effects of the informal norms, facilitating nepotism and pro-
family biases, on other social institutions (such as the school system, hospitals and
the medical systems, the local governance realm, etc.).
Latin America arguably shows a deficit in its civic capital. Judges, and those
interacting with them, are generally more sensitive to political and personal
relationships and loyalties than to the merits of the law, in spite of the institutional
safeguards and incentives protecting judicial independence and impartiality. As
Transparency International recognizes, socio-cultural factors are a fundamental

22
element of a country’s system of integrity, including the institution of the judiciary.
An effective judiciary, like other institutions in a country’s integrity system,
depends upon supportive societal values and norms such as social trust and
personal integrity.54
As we move forward, the next phase of reforms must prioritize
efforts to better understand the interaction between these socio-cultural factors
and judicial independence, and to promote alternative strategies and remedies
(educational, religious and others) to build the software, not only the hardware, of
the rule of law and judicial integrity in Latin America.
Acknowledgments
With gratitude to the following: Rebecca Wolozin, Talia Fisher, Mark Somos, Heidi
Carrell and Emily Bromley.
54
Transparency International, “National Integrity System,”
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/nis/NISIndicatorsFoundations_EN.pdf.

23
Working Paper Series
Institutional Corruptions
by Lawrence Lessig
Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corruptions:
Broadening, Clarifying, and Measuring
by Donald W. Light
Influence Incognito
by Brooke Williams
Professionalism and Moral Behavior:
Does A Professional Self-Conception Make One More Unethical?
by Maryam Kouchaki
Short-Termism At Its Worst: How Short-Termism Invites Corruption…
and What to Do About It
by Malcolm S. Salter
What Institutional Corruption Shares with Obscenity
by Gregg Fields
Investment Consultants and Institutional Corruption
by Jay Youngdahl
Does the Gender of Directors Matter?
by Miriam Schwartz-Ziv
Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption:
Lessons from Cognitive Dissonance Theory
by Lisa Cosgrove and Robert Whitaker

24
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by Daniel M. Weeks
What’s the Big Deal?: The Ethics of Public-Private Partnerships Related to
Food and Health
by Jonathan H. Marks
Tax-Exempt Corruption: Exploring Elements of Institutional Corruption in
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by Zachary Fox
Second Thoughts on Second Opinions: Conflicted Advisors Reduce the Quality
of Their Advice When They Know They Will be “Second-Guessed”
by Sunita Sah and George Loewenstein
Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corruption, and
the Lost Underpinnings of Market Conduct Regulation
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Institutional Corruption and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy
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Think Tanks’ Dirty Little Secret: Power, Public Policy, and Plagiarism
by J.H. Snider
Rooting Out Institutional Corruption To Manage Inappropriate Off-Label
Drug Use
by Marc A. Rodwin
Divided Loyalties: Using Fiduciary Law to Show Institutional Corruption
by Michael Pierce

25
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by Timothy Winters
Blinding as a Solution to Institutional Corruption
by Christopher Robertson
A Passport at Any Price? Citizenship by Investment through the Prism of
Institutional Corruption
by Laura Johnston
Independent Drug Testing to Ensure Drug Safety and Efficacy
by Marc A. Rodwin
Brazil’s Case Against Private-Sponsored Events for Judges:
A Not-yet-perfect Attempt at Fighting Institutional Corruption
by José Vicente Santos de Mendonça
Institutional Corruption: A Fiduciary Theory
by M.E. Newhouse
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by Sergio Sismondo
The Power of Perception: Reconciling Competing Hypotheses about the Influence
of NRA Money in Politics
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Does Trust Matter?
Corruption and Environmental Regulatory Policy in the United States
by Oguzhan Dincer and Per Fredriksson
Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in Financial
Benchmark Governance
by Justin O’Brien

26
Justification of Academic Corruption at Russian Universities:
A Student Perspective
by Elena Denisova-Schmidt
Fighting Corruption in Education: A Call for Sector Integrity Standards
by Mihaylo Milovanovitch
Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout
by Malcolm S. Salter
From “Institutional” to “Structural” Corruption: Rethinking Accountability in
a World of Public-Private Partnerships
by Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros
The Open Government Index Initiative: A Colombian Tool for Preventing
Institutional Corruption
by Juan Pablo Remolina
Judicial Independence in Latin America and the (Conflicting) Influence of
Cultural Norms
by Roberto Laver
With Special Thanks to our Working Paper Series Board Members:
Advisory Board Editorial Board
Marcia Angell Lisa Cosgrove
Arthur Applbaum Oguzhan Dincer
Marguerite Avery William English
Mahzarin Banaji Gregg Fields
Max Bazerman Paul Jorgensen
Archon Fung Aaron Kesselheim
David Korn Genevieve Pham-Kanter
Nancy Rosenblum Marc Rodwin
Malcolm Salter Susannah Rose
Dennis Thompson

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