Biological Roots of Moral Development AssignmentOVERVIEW

Biological Roots of Moral
Development Assignment
OVERVIEW
You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson
plan in the context of higher
education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading
for comprehension is one thing,
and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be
given opportunities to read for the
purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while
thinking about and devising plans
for how to deliver of the content of the readings.
INSTRUCTIONS
Details:
Read
Chapter 19-22
1. While completing the assigned readings for the Module:
Week, think about which topic
to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic
and come up 3-4 objectives.
The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and
Objectives.” When listing objectives,
start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…”
2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture

Content.” Citing the assigned
readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be
delivered in class. Your
summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced. Do not go
over 3 pages. The goal is
not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to
summarize the lecture
content noting the most important concepts in a coherent
manner (showing their
connections to the overall topic and objectives).
3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-
long lecture on the chosen
topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the
lecture followed by concrete
in-class activity/discussion ideas.
Further instructions:
1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so
think concretely about your
teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as
useful for you as possible.
2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and
headings as well as a reference
page, but do not include the title and abstract.
Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the
Summary and Lesson Plan
Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to
consider as your write your
objectives.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the
Turnitin plagiarism tool.
Ch .19 The Neurobiological Bases of Empathic Concern for
Others
There has been a remarkable increase in theory and research on
the neurobiological foundations
of empathy, sympathy, compassion, prosocial behavior, and
altruism in recent years.
In this chapter, we examine how empathic concern for others is
connected to genetic,
neurophysiological, hormonal, and autonomic physiological
functioning. Neurobiological
researchers take various positions on the extent to which
empathy and related constructs
are reflective of morality, precursors to morality, or
fundamental building blocks of morality.
Our position conforms to the latter view: Empathy is a primary
motivational force
for caring behaviors toward others in need (de Waal, 2008). As
a basic, essential element
of compassion, empathy forms the basis for the capacity to
think and act with positive,
care-oriented morality. We begin with a brief consideration of
definitional and theoretical
issues before turning to the exciting new insights arising from
empirical research.
Empathy is defined here as the recognition and sharing of
another’s emotional state. Recognition
entails cognitive empathy, or the capacity to comprehend
another’s emotional
state and understand another’s perspective. Shared emotional
states reflect affective empathy,
or vicarious affective arousal that might be similar to the

other’s emotion. This is
distinct from emotional contagion, a close matching of the
other’s emotion, or personal
distress, a self-focused aversive reaction to another’s distress or
pain, in that affective empathy
is a resonant emotion that is felt on behalf of the other person
(Zahn-Waxler &
Robinson, 1995). Closely related to empathy are sympathy and
compassion, which reflect
an orientation toward another’s distress or pain, feelings of
sadness or concern on behalf
of that person, and a desire to promote that person’s well-being.
Prosocial behavior constitutes
actions taken to benefit another’s well-being, including actions
to alleviate their
distress. Thus, the broad behavioral category of prosocial
behavior can encompass altruism,
which promotes another’s needs at some cost to oneself. These
related affective, cognitive,
and behavioral reactions all reflect, to some degree, expressions
of empathic concern for
the well-being of others (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson,
Usher, & Bridges, 2000).
Numerous theories have attempted to reconcile the apparent
incompatibility of feeling
and acting toward the well-being of others with the drive for
individual survival and reproductive
success emphasized by traditional evolutionary perspectives.
According to kin
selection processes, a network of genetically related individuals
within a population will
cooperate and engage in altruistic acts with one another and

thereby increase the average
genetic fitness of the network as a whole, even if such behavior
reduces the individual
fitness of certain members of the group (Wilson, 1978). With
evolutionary pressure having
selected for a propensity for cooperative or altruistic behaviors
toward kin, one can
expect that such behaviors would occasionally be directed
toward unrelated others (West,
El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011).
Some sociobiologists have suggested that altruism evolved
through reciprocity (Trivers,
1971). Under certain conditions, natural selection favors
altruistic behaviors because these
actions eventually benefit the altruistic individual at a later
time, through quid pro quo
returns of the favor, or by increasing the benevolent actor’s
stature and status within the
community (McAndrew, 2007). Others have argued that altruism
among nongenetically
related members of social species that live in group contexts
(including humans) increases
the odds of reproduction by the group and, thus, species
survival (e.g., Rachlin, 2002;
Sober & Wilson, 1998). A genetic propensity toward concern
for others facilitates group
cooperation, cohesion, and success against threats and
challenges. Even if some altruistic
individuals are personally disadvantaged by their own actions,
as the group thrives and
grows, the genetic basis for compassion and helping also is
perpetuated.
Research on the Biological Bases of Empathy
These theoretical perspectives put the roots of human empathy

in our biology. In the
balance of this chapter, we review of the evidence for this
proposal from studies of human
neurobiology. Three central themes emerged repeatedly in our
review: definition
and measurement, levels of analysis, and development. Framed
as questions, first, how do
researchers’ definitions of empathy and related constructs
contribute to their identification
of neurobiological correlates, and how are the contexts or
procedures for measuring
empathic concern associated with the neurobiological features
identified? Second, what
can we glean about cohesive or synergistic functioning of
multiple levels of neurobiological
activity during empathic responses? And third, is there any
evidence for age-related
changes in the neurobiology of empathy?
Ch. 20 The Moral Baby
Most developmental research into morality so far has focused
on children and adolescents,
as can be seen in the contributions of this current volume. We
think that the time is ripe to take a
serious look at the moral lives of babies.
One motivation for this comes from evolutionary theory.
Biologists have long been
interested in how a species like ours—in which large groups of
nonkin work together on
projects of mutual benefit—could come to exist. This was
largely a mystery at the time
of Darwin, but there are by now several candidate theories for
how our complex social

structures can arise. These include the accounts developed in
the 1970s and 1980s based
on kin selection and reciprocal altruism (e.g., Axelrod, 1984;
Trivers, 1971, 1985), as well
as theories based on group selection—a proposal once derided
by biologists, but now
returning as a serious contender (see Nowak & Highfield, 2011,
for an accessible review).
Such theories explain our complex social structures as grounded
in certain propensities
that we can view as moral, including altruism to nonkin, guilt at
betraying another, and
righteous anger toward cheaters. While the details are a matter
of considerable debate, the
notion of unlearned moral universals is consistent with what we
now know about biological
evolution. And one way to explore the nature of such universals
is to look at babies.
The second motivation comes from developmental psychology.
Over the last 30 or so
years, findings based on looking-time methods set off a
revolution in how we think about
the minds of babies. The original studies used such methods to
focus on early knowledge
of physical objects—a baby’s “naïve physics.” A vast body of
research now suggests that—
contrary to what was taught for decades to legions of
psychology undergraduates—babies
think of objects largely as adults do, as connected masses that
move as units, that are
solid and subject to gravity, and that move in continuous paths
through space and time
(e.g., Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1990; Wynn, 1992). Other
studies have found rich social
understanding. For instance, babies before their first birthday
appreciate that individuals

have goals (Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998) and soon
afterward they appreciate the other
individuals can have false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005).
These sorts of
findings make it plausible that some rudimentary moral
capacities will also be present in
young babies.
One can distinguish moral understanding from moral
sentiments. It is one thing to judge
that certain acts are right or wrong—to appreciate, for instance,
that if X hits Y for no
reason, then X has done something wrong. It is another to have
moral emotions, to feel
sympathy for the pain of Y and anger toward X. While most of
the research that we discuss
below focuses on understanding, there is little doubt that such
sentiments are critical
to morality. As David Hume (1739/2000) pointed out, without
moral passions, our moral
reasoning would be useless—we might know right from wrong,
but we would never be
motivated to act upon this knowledge.
There are several moral emotions, including guilt, shame,
gratitude, and anger, but most
developmental research has focused on caring about other
people—sometimes described
as compassion. Is this an inherent part of our natures?
Many scholars believe that it is, that it makes society and
culture possible. In his book The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, Hume’s
contemporary Adam Smith begins with:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render
their happiness necessary
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it. Of this
kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the
misery of others, when
we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively
manner.
(Smith, 2002, p. 11)
Ch. 21 A Neurodevelopmental Perspective on Morality
In the past decade, a dramatic shift in the study of morality has
occurred, moving away
from incompatible notions of moral development and toward a
more integrated theory.
An explosion of interdisciplinary research in psychology,
anthropology, biology, economics,
and neuroscience has resulted in an attempt to more clearly
define and investigate the
concept of morality across domains. Work amongst these fields
of study now suggests that
human social sensibility emerges from a sophisticated
integration of cognitive, emotional,
and motivational mechanisms, which are shaped through
cultural exposure, and can therefore
be seen as a product of our biological, evolutionary, and
cultural history, representing
an important adaptive element for social cohesion and
cooperation.
New research involving neuroscientific methods lends support
to the notion of morality
as an integrated process, heavily dependent on emotional
sensibilities. Despite the

enthusiasm and grandiose claims in the media about the
discovery of a moral compass
associated with a single region of the brain, the reality is much
more complex. Functional
neuroimaging studies with healthy participants have shown that,
while moral reasoning is
underpinned by specific neural circuitry, these circuits are not
unique to morality. Rather,
they involve communication between regions and systems
underlying various affective
states, cognitions, and motivational processes. This
phenomenon is not exclusive to the
study of morality. Indeed, there is no evidence for a direct one -
to-one mapping of any
psychological construct to a simple underlying neural substrate.
It is critical, therefore that
moral cognition be decomposed into the multiple processes and
representations involved
in its neuro-computational implementation, including (but not
limited to) the specific
capacities for the perception of causation, valuati on, agency,
cognitive control, emotional
inhibition, and theory of mind (Young & Dungan, 2012).
Complimentary to the neuroscience
approach is the contribution of developmental psychology as a
means of integrating theory and
research on the subcomponents of more complex social
behaviors. A focus on
neurodevelopmental systems is particularly useful,
as it allows one to investigate human social tendencies when
only some components of, or
precursors to, more mature moral behaviors are observable.
Developmental studies can

provide unique opportunities to investigate how the components
of the developing system
interact in ways not possible to view in adults, where all the
components are fully
mature (De Haan & Gunnar, 2009).
The current chapter integrates developmental research with
burgeoning work on the
neurological underpinnings of morality. We begin with a
comprehensive review of the
neurological underpinnings of moral cognition in adults, as
evidenced through psychopathology,
and neuroimaging studies with typically developing populations
and individuals
with socioemotional dysfunctions. Next, the neurodevelopment
of morality is examined
with reference to early signs of sensitivity, fairness, and
concern for others, all of which are
thought to be precursors to a more mature morality.
Neuroimaging studies focusing on
the developmental changes to the perception of others’ distress
is then presented, supporting
the role of affective arousal in moral reasoning. Finally, we
discuss new neurodevelopmental
data, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
eye tracking, and
moral evaluation, indicating that the affective, cognitive, and
regulatory aspects of empathy
involve interacting neural circuits with distinct developmental
trajectories. Together these
data are consistent with the view that morality is instantiated by
functionally integrating
several distributed areas/networks involved in affect,
mentalizing, decision making, and
reward.
In the past decade, research in affective and cognitive

neuroscience has turned to functional
neuroimaging techniques as a way to identify a network of brain
regions involved
in moral cognition.
One seminal functional MRI study investigated the neural
correlates of moral emotion
in participants who were asked to passively view pictures of
emotionally charged
scenes (e.g., physical assaults, poor children abandoned in the
streets, war scenes) with
and without moral content (e.g., body lesions, dangerous
animals, body products). Results
showed that both basic and moral emotions elicited from the
scenes with moral content
are associated with activation in the amygdala, thalamus, and
upper midbrain (Moll et
al., 2002a). The orbital (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), and the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS) were also recruited when viewing
scenes evocative of moral
emotions, indicating that these regions play a central role in
moral appraisals. Similarly,
when participants were engaged in a simple visual sentence
verification task, a network
comprising the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the
temporal pole, and pSTS
was specifically activated by moral judgments (Moll et al.,
2002b). In contrast, judgment of
emotionally evocative, but nonmoral statements activated the
amygdala, lingual, and
vmPFC. Another fMRI study examined brain regions that were
activated during simple
ethical decision making about unambiguous written scenarios
not containing direct
bodily harm or violence (Heekeren et al., 2003). Simple moral

decisions (i.e., judging
whether the sentence described was morally appropriate or
inappropriate), compared to
semantic decisions, resulted in activation of pSTS, temporal
poles, lateral prefrontal cortex,
and vmPFC. To investigate the neural underpinni ngs of
everyday moral decision making,
Sommer and colleagues (2010) contrasted stories describing
conflicts with either moral
or neutral content. In this study, a choice was required between
hedonistic, but not illegal,
behavior or the fulfillment of a moral obligation toward another
person (e.g., after a long
working day, you run to the bus stop to catch your
transportation. At the bus stop, you
see an elderly person who has stumbled and needs help. Helping
that person will result
in missing your bus. What would you decide?). Regions that
significantly increased their
activity during the imagination of moral conflicts versus neutral
conflicts included the
mPFC, right pSTS, and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).
Ch. 22 Searching for the Evolutionary Roots of Human Morality
Foundations: The Role of Comparative Evidence
Humans, like all other organisms, have an evolutionary history,
and many important events
in our history have been documented by paleontologists who
study the fossil record, and
by molecular geneticists who sequence our genes. The challenge
faced by researchers

studying the evolutionary origins of morality is that behavior
and cognition do not leave
traces in the fossil record and cannot be extracted from DNA.
However, we can gain some
understanding of the evolutionary roots of morality by
comparing ourselves to other
closely related organisms. Evolutionary biologists generally
reason that if two closely related
species share a particular trait, then it is likely that they
inherited the trait from their
most recent common ancestor. Thus, if humans share a
characteristic with chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes), such as the absence of a tail, then it is likely
that the same trait characterized
our most recent common ancestor, which lived about 5–7
million years ago. On the
other hand, if humans possess a trait, such as bipedalism, which
chimpanzees and other
great apes do not display, we can be reasonably confident that
this trait evolved after the
human and chimpanzee lineages diverged.
Based on this logic, our goal is to consider whether humans
share any of the features
of morality with other members of the primate order,
particularly the great apes. We do
not expect to find codes of conduct prescribed by society, but it
is possible that some
components of morality, such as a concern for the welfare of
others, might be found in
other species (Flack & de Waal, 2000). The presence of these
traits among other great
apes would imply that these capacities were also present in the
most recent common
ancestor of humans and the great apes. The absence of these
traits in other great apes
would suggest that these capacities arose after the lineages

diverged. We focus on the
extant species most closely related to humans to help us
understand when and how the
foundations of human morality evolved. The foundations,
notably moral sentiments
(Smith, 1759), may also have arisen through convergent
evolution in more distantly related
species, but we are concerned here with the phylogenetic roots
of modern human
behavior.
Cooperation has long been recognized as a problem for the
theory of evolution by natural
selection: Individuals who pay a cost to the benefit of others
will go extinct, since they
will be at a disadvantage to individuals who reap the benefits
without the costs (Darwin,
1871). In the evolutionary literature, as well as in economics at
the proximate level, punishment
is an effective means of maintaining cooperation (or any
behavior, for that matter:
Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). In the
absence of punishment,
free riders and cheaters exploit cooperators, causing
cooperation to decline dramatically
(for an example from economics, see Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
There are a number of accounts of animals harming others for
immediate personal gain
(coercion), but little compelling evidence for punishment that
produces delayed benefits,
at least in nonhuman primates ( Jensen, 2010; Jensen &
Tomasello, 2010; Raihani, et al.,
2012). There is only one study in which researchers attempted

to determine whether the
failure to reciprocate grooming or support led to elevated levels
of aggression, and no
evidence was found to suggest that chimpanzees systematically
targeted nonreciprocators
(Koyama, Caws, & Aureli, 2006). In an experimental study,
chimpanzees punished individuals
who pulled a food tray away from them and thereby caused the
thief to lose food
( Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007a). But in contrast to human
studies in which punishment
(paying a cost so that targets experience a greater loss)
increases levels of cooperative behavior
across trials (e.g., in the public goods game: Fehr & Gächter,
2002), in chimpanzees,

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