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CAPS
PAPERS
No. 43
Editor: Richard H. Yang
DEFENSE AND MILITARY
COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA:
BROADENING BILATERAL TIES
IN THE POST-9/11 ERA
ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
CHINESE COUNCIL OF ADVANCED POLICY STUDIES
TAIPEI, TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JUNE 2007

DEFENSE AND MILITARY
COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA:
BROADENING BILATERAL TIES
IN THE POST-9/11 ERA
Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies

THE CHINESE COUNCIL OF ADVANCED POLICY STUDIES
As a private and independent research institute, the Chinese Council of
Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) was established in 1992 to analyze emerging
Asia-Pacific security issues and inform the government of its research findings
for decision-making references.
The purpose of the Council is to act as a focus for research on a wide range of
defence and security issues. It conducts its own research by commissioning
research from outside and by organizing working groups, conferences and
seminars to draw together the work of academic and policy specialists on an
interdisciplinary basis.
Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, June 2007
ISBN 957-9014-02-7
The views expressed here are those of the authors alone. They do not represent
the views of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies.
All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
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of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies.
Published by the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 4F, 259, Sec-
tion 1, Dun-hua South Road, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. Tel: 886-2-
2702-0153~4; Fax: 886-2-2702-0157; Email: capsyang@ms2.hinet.net.
Defense and Military Cooperation
Between the Philippines and China:
Broadening Bilateral Ties
in the Post-9/11 Era*
Prof. Rommel C. Banlaoi**
INTRODUCTION
In the pas t, Philippines-China relations were confined merely on diplomatic,
economic, cultural, and social aspects. Both countries deliberately avoided
cooperation on defense and military matters because of mutual suspicions.
Though both countries have regularly exchanged visits of their defense and
military officials, no substantive security cooperation really took place because of
the absence of a mechanism to do so. The existing military alliance between the
Philippines and the United States, the irritant disputes in the South China Sea, and
the ambiguous Philippine position on the Taiwan Issue served as major obstacles
for the establishment of Philippines-China defense and military cooperation.
The “China Threat Theory” fanned by Western analysts after the end of the Cold
War also affected Philippines security perspectives of China making Manila very
wary of Beijing’s future strategic intentions.
But the situation has remarkably changed in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States. China supported the US
global campaign against terrorism, which created a more “cooperative” image of
China in world affairs. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) also made
constructive moves to forge closer security relations with the Ph ilippines, an
**Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Executive Director of Strategic and Integrative
Studies Center (SISC). He was a professor of political science and international
relations at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) from
1998-2007 and is presently lecturing at the Command and General Staff College
(CGSC) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He also serves the
Director of the Mayor’s Development Center (MDC) of the League of
Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) and the Director for Research and
Publications of the World Citi Colleges (WCC).

Defense and Military Cooperation Between the Philippines and China:
Broadening Bilateral Ties in the Post-9/11 Era
2
American Major Non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Ally and a
zealous partner of the US in the global campaign against terrorism.
This paper aims to analyze the developments in Philippines-China defense and
military cooperation. It argues that the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the United States have provided the Philippines and China a golden opportunity to
broaden their bilateral relations encompassing defense and military aspects. But
this paper argues that defense and military cooperation between the Philippines
and China is hard to implement and sustain in the context of
Philippines-American security alliance, China-American strategic competition,
the South China Disputes and the Taiwan Conflict.
THE GENESIS OF PHILIPPINES -CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION
Moment of Amity, 1945-1949
When the United States granted Philippine independence in 1946, the very first
Treaty of Amity that the Philippines ever entered into was with the Republic of
China (ROC), then called by the Philippine government as the Nationalist
China. Concluding a treaty of friendship with ROC was a high diplomatic
priority of then President Manuel Roxas.1
ROC, on the other hand, was one of
the first countries to recognize the Philippines as an independent republic in the
aftermath of the Second World War.
With the signing of Philippine-China Treaty of Amity, the Philippine
government established its Consulates General Office in Amoy and Shanghai in
1947. To strengthen Philippine-ROC diplomatic ties, the Philippines opened a
legation in Nanking in March 1948.2
The Philippines and ROC had very close
military relations because of their strong security relations with the United States.
ROC’s War College even inspired the establishment of the National Defense
College of the Philippines in 1963.3
Era of Hostility, 1949-1974
But the Philippine diplomatic relations with ROC was short-lived because of
domestic political changes in China. When Mao Tse Tung proclaimed the PRC
in 1949, the Philippines immediately closed its legation in Nanking, established a
liaison office in Guangzhou and in 1950 finally transferred to Taipei.
Because of ideological differences, the Philippines’ defense and military
relations with the PRC, then called by the Philippine government as the
CAPS Paper No. 43/Rommel C. Banlaoi 3
Communist China, became very adversarial. The Philippine government
declared the PRC as a serious security threat because of its alleged support to the
local communist movement (LCM). The Cultural Revolution in China inspired
the formation of the Maoist-inspired Community Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), which up to now has been
pursuing the Maoist military strategy of encircling the center from the countryside
through a protracted people’s war. 4
During the Korean War in the 1950s,
Filipino and Chinese armed forces fought on opposite sides.5
The Philippine
military even suspected the ethnic Chinese community in the country as a “fifth
column.”. The presence of ethnic Chinese caused a severe paranoia among
non-communist states in Southeast Asia during the height of the cold war. 6
In the 1950s, China only had military cooperation with communist nations and
to insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambodia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.7
China’s strongest military
cooperation was with the former Soviet Union, which provided Beijing
substantial technical and financial assistance to modernize the PLA. China also
entered into defense treaty with North Korea in 1961 and provided military and
financial assistance to Vietnam until 1978. At the height of the Vietnam War, the
Philippines and China fought again at the opposite sides.
Normalization Period, 1975-1995
When Beijing experienced strategic, territorial and ideological differences with
the former Soviet Union, China explored the establishment of relations with the
United States, which led eventually to the normalization of US-PRC diplomatic
relations in the 1970s. The Philippines followed suit with the opening of
Philippines-China diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975. Since then,
Philippine-China diplomatic relation has become one of the most important
bilateral relations of the Philippines with foreign countries. Both countries entered
into various bilateral cooperation agreements covering wide-ranging areas like
trade and investment; tourism and air services; cultural, scientific and technical
cooperation; agricultural cooperation’ avoidance of double taxation; and, postal
parcel agreement.
Though both countries have dynamic relations in economic, cultural and
diplomatic areas, exploration of bilateral defense cooperation only began in the
mid-1990s. Though China began developing military contacts with Europe and
the United States in the late 1970s,8
contacts between the armed forces of the
Philippines and China was almost absent, except during very limited visits of
defense and military officials. The end of the cold war and the changing

4
socio-cultural interactions between China and other Southeast Asian countries in
the 1990s9
have however prompted the Philippines and China to explore bilateral
cooperation in defense and military areas. They started their defense
cooperation by building greater trust and confidence through increased high-level
exchange of visits of officials from both countries defense and military
establishments.
Troubled Relations, 1995-2000
The Philippines explored the possibility of building defense ties with China
after the termination of Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement in 1991.
Engaging China was an option, though quite reluctantly, to broaden Manila’s
strategic choice in the post-bases era. However, the Mischief Reef incident in
1995 created a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. This held in abeyance
all talks of possible defense cooperation between them. The incident has terribly
angered the Philippine military because of the suspicion that the Mischief Reef
incident was the handiwork of the PLA. As retaliation, the Philippine Navy
reportedly destroyed Chinese markers around some other reefs and captured 60
“fishermen” from Chinese trawlers.10
Former President Fidel Ramos, who
earlier served as the AFP Chief of Staff and Secretary of National Defense, urged
the Philippine military to shift fro m internal counter-insurgency campaign to
external defense operation.11
The General Headquarters of the AFP issued the
Rules of Engagement (ROE) for External Threat on 22 May 1997.
The Mischief Reef issue also encouraged the AFP to strongly push for the
passage of the AFP Modernization Law to increase its capability to defend its
national territory against external threats.12
The immediate passage of the force
modernization law was no doubt influenced by the Mischief Reef controversy in
the South China Sea. 13
The Philippines even solicited the support of the
members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to condemn China and
sponsored the drafting of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to
prohibit the building of any structures on the disputed islands.14
But China
objected to the “internationalization” of the South China Sea disputes and
opposed the effort to pass a regional code of conduct. China considered the
South China disputes a bilateral concern.
To address their existing bilateral differences over territorial disputes in the
South China Sea, the Philippines and China signed the Joint Statement on
PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on other Areas of Cooperation
in August 1995. This statement revived their interests to pursue defense and
military cooperation, though still marred with mutual suspicions. But to express
China’s desire to establish closer defense and military friendship with the
Philippines, General Xiong Gungkai, PLA Vice Chief of General Staff, visited
Manila in May 1996. During this visit, both countries exchanged cordial views
on regional and national security concerns. They also explored the possibility of
exchanging their respective defense attachés to overcome their lingering
suspicions of each other. The exchange of defense attaché started their initial
defense cooperation, which they regarded as an opportune time to elevate their
bilateral relations to a higher plane.
Aiming to sustain their optimism for the prospects of defense cooperation, then
Philippine Defense Secretary Renato De Villa visited Beijing on 29 July 1996.
In this visit, the Philippines and China signed the Agreement on the Establishment
of the Offices of the Defense and Armed Forces Attaché. It was in this
agreement where the Philippines and China strongly recognized the importance of
their bilateral relations. They even expressed their interest to strengthen their
defense cooperation beyond the exchange of defense attaché. As a warm gesture,
therefore, China extended a military loan assistance of US$3 million to the
Philippine government, which translated into delivery of 40 military dump trucks
to the engineering brigade of the AFP. The Philippines actually received the 40
dump trucks in May 1998.
With the signing of the Agreement on the exchange of defense attaché, the
Philippines and China also decided to conduct bilateral intelligence exchange to
intensify their military-to-military contacts. They launched their first
Intelligence Exchange (INTELEX) in March 1998. Their 5th
INTELEX was held
in April 2000 but this has not been followed through since. Both countries
claimed that this bilateral undertaking not only facilitated the development of
friendly relations and cooperative ties between the two countries’ armed forces.
It also contributed to the over-all confidence building measures (CBMs) in their
bilateral relations.
China made a follow-up visit in September 1996 when PLA Chief Fu
Quangyou went to Manila to demonstrate China’s sincerity to strengthen
military-to-military contacts between the two countries. In February 1997,
Defense Minister Chi Haotian visited the Philippines to promote cordial relations
between the countries’ defense establishments.
But PRC’s strategic intention was put to doubt when the Philippines
discovered that China fortified its structures in the Mischief Reef in 1999. This
irked the Philippines considering that both already made an understanding in 1995
to halt any construction activities in the disputed island. Former Defense
Where the americans
started to get pissed
indeed serves to delay
justice for those in
government who do not
want to be accountable
Imagine that provision
in the agreement, the
US will not only be
pissed, reason why
USAID office in
Zamboanga City was
bombed?
With the Balikatan
Economic reason that
the corrupt in
government could take
advantage of

6
Secretary Orlando Mercado described the incident as an indication of China’s
“creeping invasion” of Philippine territory.15
But China explained that the said
structure was a mere “fishermen’s shelter” to be used during adverse weather.
But the 1999 structure looked like a military garrison with heliport, satellite radio
and missile frigates spotted nearby.16
Also in 1999, the Philippine Navy chased and collided with Chinese fishing
boat in the Scarborough Shoal, sinking the Chinese vessel. The Scarborough
Shoal is a large atoll in the eastern South China Sea about 122 nautical miles off
Luzon. Like the Mischief Reef, the Philippines and China both claim the island.
The Scarborough Shoal is within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).17
The Mischief Reef and Scarborough issues unleashed enormous domestic
anxieties and left indelible ink of distrust in Philippine military thinking towards
China. This promoted the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy to issue on 30 June
1999 the ROE in the Conduct of Naval Operations at the Kalayaan Island Group
to enforce Philippine sovereignty in the KIG. The AFP even the repaired the
runway in the Philippine-controlled Pag-Asa (Thitu) Island of the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) to efficiently facilitate access of military planes and helicopters in
the area. The AFP also intensified the activities of the Western Command of the
Philippine Navy to protect not only Philippine national security but also the
security and stability of Southeast Asia. The Philippine Navy stepped up its
patrols in the South China Sea and continually blasted territorial markers that
Chinese forces had set up in various other features of the contested islands. The
Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coastguard also intensified their coordinated
campaign against illegal fishermen in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and arrested several Chinese fishermen poaching on Philippine territorial
waters.
Sustaining Friendship, Enhancing Cooperation, 2000 and Beyond?
Despite territorial controversies, the Philippines and China signed the Joint
Statement on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century
on 16 May 2000. In this agreement, they acknowledged “the strength of their
long, historical friendship and geographical proximity in order to advance the
fundamental interests of their two peoples.” They also expressed hopes that this
agreement would “contribute to peace, security, stability, sustained growth, and
development in Asia and the rest of the world.” To pursue these aspirations,
Manila and Beijing also expressed their interests to widen the scope and deepen
the level of their cooperation in the defense and security areas. Among the
features of this agreement with defense and security implications are the
following:
• They agree “to make further exchanges and cooperation in the defense and
military fields, strengthen consultations between their military and defense
personnel and military diplomatic officials on security issues, to include
exchanges between their military establishments on matters relating to
humanitarian rescue and assistance, disaster relief and mitigation, and enhanced
cooperation between their respective strategic and security research institutes.”
• They agree “to explore new areas for cooperation among their law
enforcement, judicial, security, and defense agencies in order to address the
serious threats posed by organized transnational crimes”
The Philippine-China Joint Statement on the Framework of Bilateral
Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century is the only document signed by both
countries that contains provisions on defense cooperation. With the signing of
this Joint Statement, both countries provided a written basis to enhance their
CMB activities through middle and high-level exchanges of defense and military
officials. In October 2000, for example, then AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes
visited China to meet his Chinese counterpart, General Fu Qangyou, Chief of the
PLA General Staff. General Reyes also met then Chinese Defense Minister Chi
Haotian and key members of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In
January 2001, then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado paid an official visit to
China to meet his Chinese counterpart, Minister Chi Haotian. Both defense
leaders explored the possibility of strengthening their defense and military
cooperation to address security issues of mutual concerns.
Immediately after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States,
China hosted the 9th
Summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
in October 2001. The Philippines and China took this opportunity to sign three
important Memoranda of Understanding, namely:
• Treaty of Extradition between the Republic of the Philippines and the
People's Republic of China.
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
Cooperation Against Illicit Traffic and Abuse of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic
Substances and Precursor Chemicals.
Padala lang ng padala ng
droga drug mules, etc.

8
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime.
These three MOUs provided opportunities for both countries to intensify their
defense and military cooperation. But the lack of clear and coherent operational
framework has prevented both countries to move forward. When General Reyes
replaced Mercado as the secretary of national defense, one of the first countries
that Reyes visited was China where he met for the second time General Chi
Haotian in April 2002. During this visit, both leaders cultivated deeper personal
friendship that facilitated official discussions for the enhancement of their defense
cooperation. They agreed to intensify their strategic defense and military
dialogues through their annual intelligence exchange program and occasional
exchange of visits of their defense and military colleges. They even explored,
albeit very cautiously, the possibility of conducting joint military training and
exercises in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
General Chi Haotian reciprocated this visit when he met General Reyes in
Manila in September 2002. Secretary Reyes underscored during his meeting
with Minister Chi that it is in the interest of Philippine government to develop
“healthy, comprehensive, and long-term relationship” with China.
Interestingly, the main theme of Ch i’s visit to the Philippine was “sustaining
friendship, enhancing cooperation”, which demonstrated the interest of the
Department of National Defense (DND) to really establish closer defense ties
with Beijing. President.18
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo even issued Proclamation No.
148 in 2002 declaring June 9 of every year as “Philippine-China Friendship Day”
to raise their bilateral relations, including defense and security, to a more mature
and enduring level.
PHILIPPINES -CHINA MLITARY COOPERATION AFTER 9/11:
CAUTIOUS COOPERATION?
The 2002 visit of Minister Chi was a turning point in Philippines-China
relations for it provided a fertile ground to define the direction of their countries’
defense relations in the post-9/11 era. The personal friendship that Minister Chi
and Secretary Reyes have cultivated also provided a constructive environment to
take a candid stock of their bilateral relations and to identify areas where they can
enhance their defense ties in the post-9/11 world. 19
They even made an
understanding to shelve territorial issues in the South China Sea in order to move
their defense relations forward.
During Chi’s visit, President Arroyo stressed that the "South China Sea is the
sea that unites rather than divides the Philippines and China”20
to convey a
message that the Philippine government was very serious to establish defense
relations with China. Arroyo even strongly articulated a benign view of China
when she repeatedly pronounced that China was not a threat but rather an
opportunity for the Philippines. Like the Chinese government, the Arroyo
government expressed willingness to shelve sovereignty issues in the South China
Sea. The main intention of the Philippines was to promote closer relations with
the PRC and take advantage of China’s rise as an economic power. 21
In fact,
entering into bilateral defense relations with China is part of the Philippine
government’s comprehensive engagement with the PRC.22
When she was still
the Vice President, Arroyo already said, “Comprehensive engagement is indeed
what the Philippines needs to pursue its relations with China. China is not only
our closest neighbor to the north. It is also a very important player in the
regional and world economy as well as in international politics.”23
The Policy Paper on China made by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
in the aftermath of 9/11 also recommended to “engage China and enhance
relations in all aspects.”24
The policy of comprehensive engagement embraces
all aspects of Philippine relations with China. For the DND, a policy of
comprehensive engagement may enhance Philippines-China relations in defense
and military fields to promote Philippine national security.25
The DND even
drafted the Philippines’ Engagement Plan with China on Defense and Security
“to strengthen and institutionalize RP-China security and defense relations in
order to best optimize relations for mutual gains.”26
Economic consideration is the primordial factor that encouraged the Philippine
government to constructively engage China in all aspects. In her speech at the
30th anniversary celebration of Philippine-China diplomatic relations held at the
Manila Hotel, Arroyo underscored that "China has become a major trading
partner of the country." She added, "Aside from being a vigorous and generous
trading partner, China is an investor in our industries, in our mines, in our oil
exploration." She proudly announced that Philippine trade with China exceeded
$US 13 billion in 2004 and “the future of the two countries’ trade partnership
looks even brighter.” 27
Establishing defense cooperation with China is a political decision of the
Philippine government to take advantage of China’s economic prosperity and to
benefit from growing Philippines-China economic relations. In fact, China has
been wanting to have defense cooperation with the Philippines as indicated by the
various pronouncements of its defense and military leaders. But the Philippine
government was initially reluctant to pursue this type of cooperation because of
Question is how much of
an economic power has it
really become?
Americans left with del
Monte sold to the chinese

10
security anxieties associated with the rise of China. When PRC assured its
neighbor that China will rise peacefully as a great power, 28
the Philippine
government took an open mind on the issue and gave China “the benefit of the
doubt.”
Thus, when Arroyo was re-elected President in May 2004, the first country that
she visited was China. Arroyo visited China on 1-3 September 2004 at the
invitation of President Hu Jintao. It was during this visit when both leaders
seriously discussed the strengthening of their defense ties by a setting-up a
framework for defense cooperation. 29
It was also during this visit when the
Philippine government accepted China’s offer of loan assistance to implement the
now controversial North Luzon Train Project. Also in September 2004, then
AFP Chief of Staff Narciso Abaya visited China and witnessed the Military
Exercise “Iron Fist 2004”. Abaya and his party were impressed by the modern
military hardware and equipment of the PLA and they expressed desire to learn
lessons from the exemplary p ractice of China on military modernization.
Philippines-China defense relations took a much clearer direction when
Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz, Jr., visited China on 7-14 November 2004.
Cruz stressed the importance of his visit “to build stronger confidence and
enhance defense cooperation between the two countries.”30
He congratulated
China for hosting the ARF Security Policy Forum on 4-6 November 2004 and
said that the hosting of the Forum demonstrated China’s positive role in regional
security. Cruz also emphasized that the Philippines welcomed all initiatives
aimed at further strengthening and expanding defense and military ties and would
“sustain its efforts in exchange visits between defense and military officials.”31
More importantly, Cruz visit to China led to the signing of an MOU on defense
cooperation.
The MOU on defense cooperation was signed amidst international debate on
the regional implications of the Anti-Secession Law passed by the Chinese
People’s Congress.32
To convey to the Chinese government that the
Philippines was not alarmed by the passage of the Anti-Secession Law, Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo said in the official statement that the
Philippines “certainly don’t see China as a threat” arguing that “We see China as
a partner in the East Asian community.” Romulo even visited China on 28
February to 2 March 2005 to ratify the Philippines-China MOU on defense
cooperation.
The MOU on defense cooperation is an important document that provides the
framework for defense and military cooperation between China and the
Philippines. It contains provisions on how to intensify their military-to-military
contacts and to promote security cooperation in non-traditional security areas,
particularly in counter-terrorism. The MOU also calls for the annual conduct of
defense and security dialogue to exchange view on their countries’ defense
policies and on national and security issues of mutual interests. Pursuant to
Article 2 of the MOU on Defense Cooperation signed in November 2004 by the
Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) and the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense (MND), the two countries conducted the First Philippines-China
Defense and Security Dialogue (PCDSD) in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City on 22-25 May 2005.
The holding of the PCDSD was a great milestone in Philippines-China
relations as both countries finally cover the hitherto neglected aspects of their
bilateral ties: the defense and military aspects. The AFP called the dialogue
“the first time” in the entire diplomatic history of Philippines-China relations.
The PLA, on the other hand, described the holding of the event as “first, frank,
and fruitful” to increase the level of exchanges of their defense official and
military officers and to intensify their cooperation on defense and military
security issues in order to make their bilateral relations relevant and responsive to
the needs of the 21st
century.
At the end of the defense and security dialogue, the two countries formally
signed the $US1.2 million military assistance of China to the Philippines and
proposed a military exchange program between their armed forces. China also
offered five military training slots for Filipino officers and invited the Philippines
to participate in joint naval exercises, particularly in the areas of search and rescue
operations. They also agreed to promote closer cooperation on counter-terrorism
and maritime security and to intensify their port visits. At the conclusion of the
PCDSD, they signed a protocol agreement to provide more details on their annual
defense and security dialogue to be held alternatively between the two countries.
In October 2006, the Philippines and China held their second defense and
security dialogue in Beijing where they exchanged candid views on international,
regional and bilateral security issues to include South China Sea territorial
disputes, North Korean issue, ASEAN-China relations, international terrorism and
maritime security. At the end of the dialogue, the Philippines thanked China for
new tranche of military assistance for 2006. The Philippines also thanked China
for offering additional 16 slots for the Philippine armed forces to attend military
schooling in Beijing.
Nasiraan na ng ulo itong
goviernong ito ni Arroyo.
candid about how
corrupted they had
become they cannot be
held accountable
anymore, jokingly like a
typical trapo Filipino or
Fil-Spaniard?

12
In May 2007, both countries conducted their third defense and security
dialogue where they discussed usual topics of mutual security interests. But the
third dialogue was more candid and frank in their discussions of the South China
Sea Disputes, North Korean Issue and the Taiwan Problem. Both parties even
explored the possibility of the Philippines to receive observer status in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Six-Party Talks. China also
raised the prospects of joint naval exercises with the Philippines to promote their
common maritime security interests and the strengthening of their military
intelligence exchanges to deepen their security cooperation.
CHALLENGES IN PHILIPPINES-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION
Despite the optimism of the Philippines and China to pursue their defense and
military cooperation, there are problems on how to sustain and operationalize this
cooperation in the context of Philippines-American security alliance, China-US
strategic competition, the South China Sea Disputes and Cross-Strait Conflict.
The Philippines-American Security Alliance
The Philippines’ over-all defense diplomacy remains anchored on its security
alliance with the United States. The US continues to be a treaty ally by virtue of
the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The MDT is still in effect and “shall
remain in force indefinitely.”33
Though the Philippines and the United States
terminated the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991, they signed the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999 to provide a legal framework for the resumption
of their joint military exercises. When the Philippine Senate ratified the VFA,
one major justification of the senators that voted in favor of the agreement was the
perceived China’s military advancement in the South China Sea. 34
In the
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Philippines used
the VFA as the legal cover for the conduct of Balikatan military exercises against
terrorist threats posed by Abu Sayyaf Group.
But Beijing was suspicious of Balikatan exercises because of the perception
that these exercises were strategically aimed at China.35
Although Pentagon
officially denies this perspective, there is a prevailing perception in China that the
United States is re-establishing its presence in the Philippines to re-gain its
foothold in Southeast Asia and strategically encircle China.36
There is a view in
China that the United States is using the Philippines to regain its dominant
position in Southeast and prevent China’s regional influence from rising.
According to a prominent professor of Beijing University’s School of
International Studies, "If it's just anti-terrorism, China won't be too worried, but if
fighting terrorism will lead to a stepping up of military exchanges between the
United States and Southeast Asian countries, then China would be worried."37
He
also argues that "China doesn't want to see the United States using the fight
against terrorism to set up military bases in Southeast Asia and have troops
stationed there" because such action would be interpreted by Beijing as a threat
and as partly targeted at China. But the Philippine government explained that its
military exercises with the US are not aimed at other countries, particularly China.
On 21 November 2002, the DND and the US Department of Defense (DOD)
signed the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA). The main purpose of
the MLSA is to establish “basic terms, conditions, and procedures to facilitate the
reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services,” between the two
countries armed forces during:
a) Combined exercises and training, operations and other deployments
undertaken under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement or
the Military Assistance Agreement as agreed upon between the Parties; and,
b) Other cooperative efforts, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster
relief and rescue operations, and maritime anti-pollution operations, within
Philippine territory, or outside Philippine territory in cases where either Party, or
both, have decided to participate.38
The MLSA also contributes to the strengthening of Philippines-American
relations in the fight against terrorism. Because of Manila’s ardent support to the
global campaign against terrorism, President George Bush declared the
Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally in May 2003.39
Bush said that making
the Philippines a major non-NATO ally "will allow our countries to work together
on military research and development, and give the Philippines greater access to
American defense equipment and supplies."40
In September 2003, the DND
released the RP-US Joint Defense Assessment Update. As the title suggests, it is
an update of the Joint Defense Assessment Report of April 2001. The Joint
Defense Assessment (JDA) aims to strengthen the RP-US defense alliance based
on the MDT.41
The JDA also aimed “to provide a comprehensive assessment of
Philippine defense capabilities, and assist the DND in developing a
comprehensive defense program and plan for improving prioritized Philippine
defense capabilities.”42
As a defense ally, the US continues to provide security assistance to the
Philippines in the form of the following: a) Foreign Military Financing or FMF;
b) Foreign Sales Program or FSP; c) Excess Defense Articles or EDA; d)
International Military Education and Training or IMET; and, e) Presidential Draw

14
down Authority or PDA. In 2004, the total US military assistance to the
Philippines amounted to $US62.18 million.43
With this kind of assistance and
the nature of their bilateral ties, the cornerstone of Philippine defense diplomacy
is still the Philippine-American defense alliance.
Thus, the US has expressed concerns on the strengthening of Philippines-China
defense relations. The US government has called the attention of the Philippine
government to the country’s “important, delicate bilateral and political
relationship with China.” 44
The US was sensitive to know the extent of
Philippines-China security dialogue and “how it was in the national interests of
the Philippines to expand defense relations with all countries, including China.”45
There is no doubt that China is a factor in Philippine-American relations.46
In
order not to faze the US, the Philippine government explained that its improving
defense relations with China were not meant to jeopardize Philippine-American
security alliance. In his speech before the Heritage Foundation on 18 May 2005,
Secretary Romulo stressed:
Like the United States, we are developing constructive relations with China.
We believe that Beijing should come forward in reassuring its neighbors on
matters of security, especially given the steady growth in its defense spending. At
the same time, China’s commerce can boost the prosperity of all.
The Philippines is a living example of how China’s growth can fuel progress
and development in neighboring countries. China’s increasing wealth propelled
our bilateral trade to grow by an average of 41 percent since 2003. Total trade
with China last year was at $13.3 billion, in favor of the Philippines.
A friendly, prosperous and increasingly open China is a powerful stabilizing
force for the region and the world… .
Encouraging Beijing to expand its external contacts and to be more involved in
regional cooperation with other Asia-Pacific nations is the way forward.47
In this speech, Romulo als o conveyed an explicit message to the US
government that “Filipino and Americans have been friends for more than a
century. Americans have enjoyed longer, closer and more cordial relations with
Filipinos than with any other people in Asia. These ties are firmly based on shared
historical experiences, on a common commitment to democracy, and on the
heritage of free and open societies.”48
This message was meant to allay the fear
of the US on the recent developments in Philippines-China defense and military
relations.
Because of the US factor, it is very difficult for the Philippines broaden its
defense ties with China. Though there is a perception that the Philippines is
playing the China card against the US, the government in Manila still values its
long-standing “special” relations with the United States. In fact, the US is
actively involved in providing technical assistance to the Philippines in the
implementation of Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program, which aims to
provide “the framework for introducing a comprehensive, institutional, structural
and systemic reform package at the strategic level for the defense and military
establishment.“49
China-US Strategic Competition
American concerns of the direction of Philippines-China defense relations can
also be attributed to the China-US strategic competition. For the United States,
the Philippines has an important role to play in US-China relations.50
As a
security ally, the US expects the Philippines to side with Washington on difficult
international issues like the rise of China. Thus, the Philippines’ current
engagement of China in defense and military areas is causing some concerns in
the US.
In his “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century”,
Robert S. Ross describes East Asian regional order in the aftermath of the cold
war as bipolar, divided into continental and maritime regions. This bipolar
regional structure, he says, “is characterized by Chinese dominance of mainland
East Asia and U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia.”51
Ross contends that in
the midst of this bipolar regional order, smaller Asian states tend to compensate
for their own vulnerability by clearly aligning with either China or the United
States.52
As a maritime state and by virtue of Philippine-American security
alliance, the Philippines is expected to strictly align with the US to balance China
in the post-cold war era.
However, recent developments have shown that Manila is strengthening its
defense ties with Beijing while maintaining its security relations with Washington.
Rather than aligning strictly with the US, the Philippines has opted to cooperate
with China in defense and military areas. The US finds this problematic not
only within the framework of Philippine-American security relations but also in
the context of US-China strategic competition.
In its 2005 Annual Report to the US Congress on the Military Power of the
PRC, the DOD welcomes the peaceful rise of China. But it expresses anxieties
“about the basic choices China’s leaders will make as China’s power and
The bad news.

16
influence grow, particularly its military power.”53
Though US-China relations
remain “cooperative, candid and constructive”, the US is wary of China’s growing
economic and military power because there are forces “that could divert China
from a peaceful pathway”, to wit:
a) Nationalistic fervor bred by expanding economic power and political
influence;
b) Structural economic weaknesses and inefficiencies that could undermine
economic growth;
c) An inability to accommodate the forces of an open, transparent market
economy;
d) A government that is still adapting to great power roles; and,
e) An expanding military-industrial complex that proliferates advanced
arms.54
For the US, China is a formidable power to contend with in the present and in
the future. In fact, American security analysts have viewed China to be the “great
American foreign policy problem in the 21st
century”55
and a “potential peer
competitor to the U.S. in world affairs.”56
The Asia 2025 candidly states, “China
will be a persistent competitor of the United States.”57
The United States
Commission on National Security/21st
Century warns, “The potential for
competition between the United States and China may increase as China grows
stronger.”58
Even the Global Trend 2015 prepared under the direction of the
National Intelligence Council argues that the implications of the rise of China
“pose the greatest uncertainty” in East and Southeast Asia.59
The Commission on
America’s National Interests describes China as “America’s major potential
strategic adversary in East Asia.”60
The most revealing perspective on American view of China is the one
articulated by the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. The Commission
argues that U.S.-China security relation “is one of the most important and most
difficult bilateral relationships” of the United States.61
It describes China as an
emerging global power that has the potential of defeating a superior power.62
This promoted Bill Gertz to argue “The People’s Republic of China is the most
serious national security threat the United States faces at present and will remain
so into the foreseeable future.”63
Analysts have enumerated several factors contributing to the idea of a China
threat in the US and among China’s neighbors.64
But the most compelling factor
is “the fear of the unknown” or the idea of uncertainties associated with China’s
growing power. The 2005 Annual Report of the DOD on the military power of
China laments, “secrecy envelops most aspects of Chinese security affairs.”
This creates American distrusts of China’s strategic intentions. Based on the
neo-realist theory of international relations, distrusts of other states create a
security dilemma, which exists when military preparations of one state create an
un-resolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations
are for “defensive” purposes only or for “offensive” purposes (“guessing
game”).65
If the current trend of China’s military modernization persists, the
DOD warns, “PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern
militaries operating in the region.”66
These American perspectives on the uncertainties of China’s growing power
pose tremendous challenges to the pursuance of Philippines-China defense and
military relations. The United States is suspicious of Chinese strategic
intention in strengthening military relations with countries in Southeast Asia.
There is a dominant thinking in the United States that China is actively engaging
Southeast Asia to enhance its regional influence and pursue its plan to control the
world.67
There is a view in the US that the rising power of China, if not checked
and managed, will most likely result, over the very long term, in a more assertive
China.68
This explains serious concerns of the US on the recent developments in
Philippines-China defense relations. US strategic analysts have already raised
worries on the presumed decline of American influence in Southeast Asia as
China increasingly gains recognition as Asian dominant power. 69
It is therefore
alarming for the US to see the Philippines, its security ally, relating closely with
China on defense and military issues. Though the Philippines is not prevented
from relating with China to have an effective counterweight to the
well-entrenched strategic influence of the US in Philippine foreign and security
policy,70
Washington is wary to see the enhancement of Philippines-China
defense relations being used at its expense in the US-China strategic competition.
The South China Sea Dispute
Another issue that can pose a formidable challenge to the strengthening of
Philippines-China defense relations is the territorial dispute in the South China
Sea. Various authors have already covered the many ramifications of the
dispute.71
But the issue has not been fully analyzed in the context of
Philippines-China defense relations.72
There is optimism that Philippines-China defense relations can provide
opportunities to manage conflicts in the South China Sea. As explained in
Chapter 2, the Mischief Reef and Scarborough issues created a dent in
Philippines-China security relations and even resulted in the feeling of distrust in
Certainly.
Russia, its old foe. or
Japan.
what is it?
China can buy one of these
polynesian islands
threatened by global
warming and turn it into a
base.

18
Philippine military thinking towards China.
The PRC states that it is shelving the South China Sea dispute, for the time
being, to promote cooperation in the area. Shelving sovereignty issue, however,
does not really solve the issue. It only postpones discussions on “hard” security
issue to allow cooperation in less controversial aspects or “soft” security issues of
the South China Sea conflict. Thus, the sovereignty issue remains a contested
issue. Moreover, the term, “for the time being” implies that China may raise
sovereignty issue “when the time is ripe” in the future. It has already been
asserted that conflicting sovereignty claims can trigger military conflicts in the
South China Sea. In this situation, the credibility of Philippines-China defense
relations will really be put to test.
To demonstrate China’s willingness to promote cooperation in the settlement
of the South China Sea dispute, it signed the ASEAN-China Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) on 4 November 2002. This
Declaration urges all parties to promote “dialogues and exchange of views as
appropriate between their defense and military officials.” China’s participation
to the DOC is considered a radical departure from its previous bilateral approach.
China is now opening its options to multilateral approaches to deal peacefully
with the South China Sea issue.73
To convert the South China Sea from military
flashpoint to “sea of friendship and cooperation”, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), and the
Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (PETROVIETNAM) signed an agreement on
14 March 2005 to conduct joint marine seismic survey.
Despite the signing of the DOC and the Trilateral Agreement, tensions
continue to pervade in the area. When Vietnam promoted tourist activities to
visit Vietnam military outposts in the South China Sea, it irked Beijing calling it
an infringement on China's territorial sovereignty. Philippine military
intelligence reports continue to monitor poaching of Chinese fishermen in
Philippine territorial waters in the South China Sea. It was even suspected that
some of the Chinese fishermen were actually military men in civilian attire tasked
to protect China’s interests in the area.74
Mutual suspicions on the territorial
conflicts in the South China Sea are major stumbling blocs in Philippines-China
defense relations.
The Taiwan Issue
Though the Philippines upholds a one-China policy, Manila continues to have
relevant interactions with Taiwan on economic, trade commercial, cultural and
social areas. One-China policy prohibits any official military engagements with
Taiwan. But the one-China policy has not prevented defense contacts between
Taiwan and the Philippines.
As described in Chapter 2, the issue in the Taiwan Strait affects the direction of
Philippines-China defense and military cooperation. It was even raised by an
American security analyst, “By reinvigorating its military alliance with the United
States, the Philippines may be in the undesirable position of having to choose
between security cooperation with the United States and economic cooperation
with China in the event of a confrontation between the two over Taiwan. The
Philippines hopes to avoid having to make such a choice.”75
This situation is
confounded by the fact that “there remains an influential group within the
Philippines’ political elite, especially in the Senate, that is committed to
establishing ties with Taiwan for a combination of ideological or personal
economic reasons.”76
Because of the Taiwan Issue, the Philippines is pursuing a
very cautious relations with the PRC. Chapter 11 provides a more detailed
analysis on how the Taiwan issue affects Philippines-China security relations.
PROSPECTS FOR BROADER MILITARY COOPERATION AFTER 9/11
Despite all the aforementioned problems identified, there are non-traditional
security issues that can provide opportunities for the two countries to define the
scope of their defense and military cooperation after 9/11. These non-traditional
security issues are “soft” security issues that are less controversial that can
promote broader cooperation between the Philippines and China towards the
resolution of their bilateral conflicts in “hard” security issues. Functionalist
theory of international relations states that cooperation in low or soft politics of
security can lead to “a change in attitudes in favor of even greater cooperation
over a widening spectrum of issues"77
including hard security issues. Chapter 8
of this book explains how the functionalist approach can improve
Philippines-China security relations, particularly in the context of managing
disputes in the South China Sea.
It is expected that Philippines-China defense and military cooperation in
non-traditional security issues can yield positive results in their over-all bilateral
relations even in traditional security areas. Among the non-traditional, soft
security issues that the Philippines can implement their defense and military
relations are international terrorism, maritime security, and transnational crimes.
International Terrorism

20
The Philippines and China have a common interest to address “terrorist
problems” posed by Muslim separatism. The Philippines has Muslim separatist
problems in Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) while China has
its own problems in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Among
Muslim separatis t groups, the Philippines has labeled the Abu Sayyaf Group ASG)
as a terrorist organization.78
China, on the other hand, “labels as terrorists those
who are fighting for an independent state in the northwestern province of Xinjiang,
which the separatists call Eastern Turkestan.”79
The Philippines and China
supported the United States in the global campaign against terrorism and signed
all UN resolutions on counter-terrorism. Both countries even explored the
possibility of forming an Asian anti-terror alliance to combat international
terrorism.80
Because of their common desire to combat terrorism, the Philippines and
China can pursue bilateral cooperation to share their experiences in
counter-terrorism. During the visit of Minister Chi to the Philippines in 2002,
the Philippines raised the possibility of having intelligence exchange on terrorism
as one area of defense cooperation. During the First Philippines-China Defense
and Security Dialogue in May 2005, one of the major areas that they tackled was
terrorism. Though both countries have recognized that countering terrorism
cannot be solved by military approach alone, they find it imperative to promote
military-to-military cooperation against terrorism through regular intelligence
exchange and information sharing. Joint-military training on counter-terrorism
can also be explored to operationalize their defense cooperation. This area of
cooperation is less problematic because of international understanding to combat
terrorism.
Maritime Security
Maritime security is also an area where the Philippines and China can
operationalize their defense and military cooperation. Though it is so broad a
concept that it includes panoply of notions such as maritime safety, port security,
freedom of navigation, security of the sea lines of communications (SLOC),
security from piracy attacks including armed robberies against ships, and most
recently, security from maritime terrorism, maritime security is a common issue
of both countries that they have to address.81
As an archipelago, maritime security is inherently an important security
concern of the Philippines. China is also considered as a maritime nation that
heavily depends on sea for commerce, trade and resource supplies. China is
broadening its cooperation with ASEAN countries in the area of maritime security.
A Chinese military official even proposed joint maritime military exercises
between China and ASEAN countries.82
In November 2004, the Philippines and
China - along with other ASEAN members plus South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh,
India, and Sri Lanka - signed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. This agreement indicates the
prospects for maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia.83
During the First
Philippines-China Defense and Security Dialogue in Manila on 22-25 May 2005,
China has strongly encouraged the Philippines to conduct joint maritime security
exercise, particularly in the area of search and rescue operation. The idea of
strengthening maritime security cooperation between the Philippines and China
was reiterated during the Second Philippines-China Defense and Security
Dialogue in Beijing on 9-13 October 2006.
Maritime security is therefore a viable area where the Philippines and China
can operationalize their defense and military cooperation. Maritime security
cooperation can even provide opportunities to promote trust and confidence
between the Philippines and China in the management and avoidance of conflicts
in the South China Sea.84
Transnational Crimes
The Philippines and China have common concerns in combating transnational
crimes. The Philippine Center on Transnational Crime considers this problem as
one of the major non-traditional security concerns of the country. In China’s
National Defense 2004, Beijing stressed the importance of international
cooperation to combat transnational crimes. In fact, there are Chinese organized
crime groups in cahoots with other crime groups in Southeast Asia, which
includes the Philippines. These crime groups are involved in narcotic trade,
human trafficking and money laundering.85
The attendant social costs of
transnational crimes are serious security concerns of both countries. In fact,
transnational crime has become a major threat to domestic security, inter-state
relations, and global security.86
This menace has “already begun to undermine
the foundations of the state and the fabric and values of societies as well as to
strain relations among states and threaten the stability of the international
community.”87
Thus, the Philippines and China have converging interests in
combating transnational crimes.
The Philippines and China have signed two documents that can promote
defense cooperation to combat transnational crimes. These are a) Memorandumof
Understanding on Cooperation Against Illicit Traffic and Abuse of Narcotic
Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals; and, b) Memorandum

22
of Understanding on Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime. When
President Arroyo visited China in September 2004, she underscored the need to
improve security cooperation mechanism between the two countries and promote
judicial assistance in order to combat transnational crimes more effectively.
When President Hu Jintao made a reciprocal visit to the Philippines in April 2005,
he urged the Philippine government to increase their bilateral cooperation in
security in order to combat transnational crimes. In their joint statement
following the state visit of President Hu, the Philippines and China expressed
their willingness to strengthen cooperation in non-traditional security areas such
as combating drugs and transnational crimes. China and the Philippines can
operationalize their cooperation in this area through deeper intelligence exchange,
frequent joint training and meaningful information sharing.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The MOU on defense cooperation signed in 2004 was a turning point in
Philippines-China bilateral relations. With the defense MOU, the two countries
are optimistic that they can elevate their bilateral ties to a higher plane.
There are realities, however, in inter-state relations that both countries have to
face while implementing the MOU. Broadening Philippines-China defense and
military cooperation is very hard to pursue in the context of Philippines-American
security alliance and China-American strategic competition. Territorial issues in
the South China Sea and the on-going conflict in the Taiwan Strait are “hard”
security issues that the Philippines and China have to inevitably contend with in
the future to test the viability of their defense and military relations.
However, there are non-traditional security issues that can make
Philippines-China defense and military relations less controversial and
problematic. Issues of international terrorism, maritime security and
transnational crimes provide opportunities for the Philippines and China to pursue
their defense and military cooperation without causing fears among its neighbors,
particularly the US.
For the Philippines, managing its relations with China and the United States in
the area of hard politics is a dilemma in its strategic policy. But rather than being
“torn between two lovers”, the challenge for the Philippines is how to get the best
of both worlds without necessarily offending any one of them. Managing
Philippines-China defense relations and Philippines-American security alliance is
a real test of diplomatic skills for the Philippines. To maintain good relations
and to maximize its trade with China, the Philippines may strategically
bandwagon with China but not at the expense of its security relations with the US.
The most common approach to Southeast Asian countries to a rapidly growing
power of China is “low-balancing” with the US “combined with efforts to assure
and engage China.”88
In fact, there is strong view in Manila that more of China
in Philippine defense and military diplomacy will not mean less of the United
States. Manila’s military alliance with Washington remains the cornerstone of
Philippine defense policy. The challenge in Philippines-China defense and
military cooperation is to move at a pace that will not create unnecessary anxieties
on the part of the US.
For China, the challenge is how to effectively convince the Philippines and the
United States that its strategic intention as a rapidly growing power is benign.
Though China is presently adopting the principle of “peaceful rise” or “peace
development”, there are still doubts among its neighbors if China will really
continue to peacefully rise in the future. Uncertainties associated with the rise of
China are still causing regional and global apprehensions. China has to exert
greater effort to assure its neighbors that its strategic intention as a major Asian
power, and eventually a global power, is peaceful and responsible now and in the
future.
*This work is a revised and updated version of a paper entitled
“Philippines-China Defense and Military Cooperation: Issues and Prospects in
the Post-9/11 Era” presented to the International Conference on the 30 Years of
Philippines-China Relations, “Charting New Directions in a Changing Global
Environment” organized by the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies on 22
October 2005 at Crowne Plaza Galleria Manila, Ortigas Center. This work is
also based on the author’s book, Security Aspects of Philippines-China Relations:
Bilateral Issues and Concerns in the Age of Global Terrorism (Manila: Rex
Book Store International, 2007).

24
NOTES
1. Milton Walter Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965), p. 60.
2. Jose Ingles, Philippine Foreign Policy (Manila: Lyceum of the Philippines
Press, 1982), p. 141.
3. Jose G. Syjuco, Military Education in the Philippines (Quezon City: New
Day Publishers, 1977. Reprinted by St. Pancratius Print, Inc., 2001).
4. 1
Jose Ma. Sison even wrote an ideological book propagating Maoism in
the Philippines. See Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution
(Oakland: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979). For excellent
discussions on the history and dynamics of communist movement in the Philippines,
see Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 1968-1993: a
Story of Its Theory and Practice (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press,
2001); Patricio N. Abinales, Fellow Traveler: Essays on Filipino Communism
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001); Joel Rocamora,
Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines
(Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1994); Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the
Philippines: An Introduction (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press,
1990); and Greg R. Jones, Red Revoluion: Inside the Philippine Guerilla
Movement (Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press, 1989).
5. Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, “Perceptions of a China Threat: A Philippines
Perspective” in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds), The China Treat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality (New York and London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 249.
6. For a collection of excellent articles on the status of ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia, see Teresita Ang See and Go Bon Juan, The Ethnic Chinese
(Manila: Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1994).
7. Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations
(Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), p. 3.
8. Kenneth Allen, “China’s Foreign Military Relations with Asia Pacific”,
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29 (2001), p. 647.
9. Melissa G. Curley and Hong Liu (eds), China and Southeast Asia:
Changing Socio-Cultural Interactions (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the
University of Hong Kong, 2002).
10. R. Tasker, “A Line in the Sand”, Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April
1995). Also see Koong Pai Ching, “Southeast Asian Countries’ Perceptions of
China’s Military Modernization”,(The Cigur Center Conference Paper) at
http://www.gwu.edu/AsiaPapers/koong.htm<accessed on 17 April 2004>, p. 7.
11. “Ramos Shift Military Role to External Threats”, Foreign Broadcast and
Information Service (24 April 1995). Also in Ibid.
12. “Ramos Shift Military Role to External Threats”, Foreign Broadcast and
Information Service (24 April 1995). Also in Ibid.
13. Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Modernization Program Primer
(Quezon City: General Headquarters, 1998). Also see Ian James Storey,
“Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1999), pp. 95-118.
14. For the author’s detailed discussion of this issue, see Rommel C. Banlaoi,
“The ASEAN Regional Forum and the Management of Conflicts in the South
China Sea” in James K. Chin and Nicholas Thomas (eds), China-ASEAN:
Changing Political and Strategic Ties (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the
University of Hong Kong, 2005), pp. 181-209.
15. See pertinent BBC reports at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/352214.stm. <accessed on 12
December 2003>
16. Ibid.
17. “Scarborough Shoal - The Next Mischief Reef ? “ , Virtual Information
Center Press Summary at
http://www.vic-info.org/regionstop.nsf/0/5dfb865fb0f31fbf8a2568b100094a0f?Ope
nDocument. <accessed on 16 March 2004>
18. See Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Philippines-China Defense Relations: Sustaining
Friendship, Enhancing Cooperation?” (Paper presented to the Centre of Asian
Studies, University of Hong Kong on 19 April 2004).
19. For a serious analysis of their defense ties after 9/11, see Armando S.
Rodriguez, “An Analysis of RP-China Defense Relations After 9/11” (MA Thesis:
National Defense College of the Philippines, 2003).
20. “South China Sea Unites Not Divides China, RP: Arroyo”, The Philippine
Star (28 September 2002).
21. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Philippine Defense Policy Perspectives on the South
China Sea and the Rise of China”, Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, No. 2 (2002), pp.
10-15.
22. Aileen S. P. Baviera, Comprehensive Engagement: Strategic Issues in
Philippines-China Relations (New Manila: Philippine-China Development
Resource Center, 2000).
23. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, “Foreword” in Ibid.
24. Department of Foreign Affairs, Policy Paper on China (Pasay City: DFA
Office of Policy Planning and Coordination, October 2001).
25. Rommel Banlaoi, “Philippines-China Defense Relations: Implications for
Philippine National Security” (An Policy Paper included in the Reference Folder of
Secretary of National Defense’s visit to China on 7-14 November 2004).
26. Department of National Defense, Philippines’ Engagement Plan with China
on Defense and Security (A draft policy paper, 2004).

26
27. “Philippines-China Trade Exceeds 13 Billion U.S. Dollars”, Philippine Star
(12 June 2005).
28. For the author’s view on the rise of China, see Rommel C. Banlaoi,
“Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security After 9/11”,
Parameters: US Army War College Quaterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp.
98-107.
29. See Virtual Information Center, “GMA Visits China (1-3 September 2004) -
A Special Press Summary “ at
http://www.vic-info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/0/8ed4a606eb7185250a256f09007bb0a1?
OpenDocument <accessed on 3 October 2005>.
30. Department of National Defense, Reference Folder: SND’s Visit to PROC
(Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Special Concerns, 7-14 November
2004).
31. Ibid.
32. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “China’s Anti-Secession Law: Implications for
Philippines-China Defense Relations” (Paper delivered to the Roundtable
Discussion on “China’s Anti-Secession Law: Implications for Philippines-China
Relations” held at the Social Science Building of the Ateneo De Manila University
on 17 June 2005).
33. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United State of America (30 August 1951), Article VIII.
34. The Senate of the Philippines, The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate
Decision (City of Pasay: The Office of the Philippine Senate Publication, 1999).
35. For an elaboration of this argument, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “American
Strategic Intentions in the War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia” in International
Anti-Terrorism and Asia Pacific Security, eds., Wang Xinsheng, Yu Changsen and
Cao Yunhua, (Guangzhou: Center for Asia Pacific Studies, 2003), pp. 1-64.
Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Quezon
City: Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, 2003), Chapter 4. Then full copy
of this book is also available at
http://www.apan-info.net/terrorism/banlaoiBook/index.htm.
36. Zhai Kun, “What Underlies the U.S-Philippine Joint Military Exercises”,
Beijing Review (14 March 2002), p. 9. Also cited in J. Mohan Malik, “Dragon on
Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses After 11
September”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 2 (August 2002), p. 273.
37. See quotes at
<http://taipeitimes.com/news/2002/07/29/print/0000158149>.
[Accessed on 1 August 2002].
38. Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (21 November 2002), Chapter III.
39. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the
Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 2 (August 2002), pp. 294-312.
40. American Forces Information Service, “Philippines to Become Major
non-NATO Ally, Bush Says” at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/n05192003_200305193.html <accessed
on 3 October 2005>
41. RP-US Joint Defense Assessment Update (3 September 2003).
42. Report of the US-Philippine Joint Defense Assessment (April 2001).
43. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Status of US Security Assistance to the Philippines
(Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines General Headquarters, 2005).
44. Volt Contreras, “China Military Assist to RP Does Not Faze US, says Exec”,
Philippine Daily Inquirer (27 June 2005).
45. Ibid.
46. Aileen S.P. Baviera, “The US Factor in US Alliances in East Asia and the
Pacific”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2003), pp.
339-352.
47. Speech of Dr. Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, at The
Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 18, 2005. For a complete copy of
the speech, see
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2005/may/26/yehey/opinion/20050526opi5.ht
ml.
48. Ibid.
49. 1
Department of National Defense, “Philippine Defense Reform Program”
(PDR) at http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm.
<accessed on 5 October 2005>.
50. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The
Philippines in China-US Relations: A Strategic Assessment” (Lecture delivered to
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Beijing,
China on 11 August 2003).
51. Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the
Twenty-first Century”, International Security, Vol. 23, No.4 (Spring 1999), pp.
81-118.
52. Shannon. Tow, “Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 2004), pp. 434-459.
53. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005 (Washington DC:
Department of Defense, 2005).
54. Ibid., p. 8.

28
55. Joseph Grieco, “China and American in a New World Polity” Carolyn W.
Pumphrey (ed) The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2002) P. 21.
56. Marvin C. Ott, “Southeast Asia and the United States: Policy Without
Strategy”, PACNET Newsletter, No. 21 (28 May 199). Also at
<http://www/csis.org/pacfor/pac2199.html>..
57. Robert G. Kaiser, “2025 Vision: A China Bent on Asian Dominance”,
Washington Post (17 March 2000), p. A25.
58. The United States Commission on National Security/21st
Century, Seeking a
National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom (15
April 2000), p. 9.
59. National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the
Future With Nongovernment Experts (National Foreign Intelligence Board, NIC
2000-02 December 2000), p. 63.
60. The Commission on America’s National Interests, America’s National
Interests: A Report of the Commission on America’s National Interests (July
2000), p. 64.
61. Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission
(Washington DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July
2002).
62. Ibid.
63. Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America
(Washington DC: Regnery 2000), p. 199.
64. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths
and Reality (New York and London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 2-6.
65. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma” in John Baylis
and N.J. Rennger (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a
Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 29-60. Also see Jack
Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914”, in Robert Jervis, Richard
Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 155.
66. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005, “Executive Summary”.
67. Geoff Metcalf, “China’s Plan to Control the World”, World Net Daily (8
October 2000). Also in http://www.mvcf.com/news/cache/00154/.
68. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand
Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp.
232-233.
69. Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Banwagoning?”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2005), p. 320.
70. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Strategic
Implications for Philippines-China-US Relations” (Paper presented to the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Zhongshan University, Guanzhou China, 7 January
2003).
71. See for example Bilateral Confidence Building with China in Relation to the
South China Sea Disputes: A Philippine Perspective (Ontario, Canada:
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001); Michael Studeman,
“Calculating China’s Advances in the South China Sea: Identifying the Triggers
of Expansionism”, Naval War College Review (Spring 1998); Ian James Storey,
“Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea
Dispute”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1999); Mark J.
Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the
South China Sea, Paperback edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1999); Shee Pon Kim, “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4 (March 1998); Ralph A. Cossa,
"Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential
Triggers of Conflict", A Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report ", PacNet Newsletter
#16 (April 17, 1998); Daniel Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Disputes (Durham:
International Boundaries Research Uni, 1996)Chen Jie, “China’s Spratly Policy:
With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No.
10 (October 1994); and Julius C. Parrenas, "Geopolitical Dimensions of the
Spratly Islands Dispute", Foreign Relations Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (March
1993).
72. For an attempt, see Natalio C. Ecarma III, Strengthening Philippines-China
Defense Relations (Master’s Thesis: National Defense College of the Philippines,
2005).
73. 1
Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its
Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27,
No. 1 (April 2005).
74.An interview with a high ranking naval officer assigned to monitor the
situation in the South China Sea.
75. Carl Baker, China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation” in Satu
Limaye, ed. Asia’s Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2004.).
76. Ibid.
77. David Mitrany, "The Functionalist Approach to World Organization",
International Affairs, XXIV (July 1948).
78. To read some existing literatures on the ASG, see Djanicelle J. Berreveld,
Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Ladens East
Asian Connection (San Jose: Writers Club Press, 2001); Maria Ressa, Seeds of
Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in

30
Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam
in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc., 2003). For an insightful analysis on the evolution of ASG, see Rohan
Gunaratna, “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group”, Janes
Intelligence Review (July 2001). For a very excellent historical analysis, see
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Bearer of the Sword”, Military Review (March/April,
2002), pp. 38- 47. For an analysis of ASG and civil society, see Alfredo Filler,
“The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society”, Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002). Also see Larry Niksch, “Abu
Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”, CRS Report for
Congress (25 January 2002) and Mark Turner, “Terrorism and Secession in the
Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), pp. 1-19. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi,
“Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat”, Naval War
College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80; Eusaquito P. Manalo,
Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (MA Thesis: Naval
Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004).
79. Chien-peng Chung, “China's "War on Terror": September 11 and Uighur
Separatism”, Foreign Affairs (July-August 2002).
80. Paolo Romero “RP, China to Push Formation of Asian Anti-Terror Alliance,
The Philippines Star (September 1, 2003) At
Http://Www.Newsflash.Org/2003/05/Hl/Hl018695.Htm.<accessed on 6 October
2005>.
81. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia” in
Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (eds), The Best of Times, The Worst of
Times: Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: World Scientific,
2005), pp. 59-79.
82. Lee Kim Chew, “China Could Play Part in ASEAN’s Maritime Security”,
Strait Times (24 June 2004).
83. John Bradford, “The Growing Prospects For Maritime Security Cooperation
In Southeast Asia “, Naval War College Review, Vol. Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer
2005), pp. 63-86.
84. Aileen S.P. Baviera, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia and the South
China Sea: A View from the Philippines” (Paper presented at the International
Conference on “Promoting Trust and Confidence in Southeast Asia: Cooperation
and Conflict Avoidance” held at the Manila Hotel on 17-18 October 1997.
85. Glen Curtis, Seth Ellan, Rexford Hudson, Nina Kollars, Transnational
Activities of Chinese Crime Organizations (Washington DC: Library of Congress,
2003), p. 37.
86. Carolina G. Hernandez and Gina R. Pattugalan (eds), Transnational Crime
and Regional Security in the Asia Pacific (Quezon City: Institute for Strategic and
Development Studies, Inc., 1999).
87. Ibid., p. ii.
88. Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Banwagoning?”, p. 319.

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