Philippines-China Security Relations published by Yuchengco Center


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Philippines-China Security Relations published by Yuchengco Center

  1. 1. Philippines-China SecurityRelations: Current Issues and Emerging Concerns Rommel C. Banlaoi Yuchengco Center De La Salle University Manila
  2. 2. © Copyright 2012by the Yuchengco CenterPrinted in the Philippines. All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in aretrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,or any information storage and retrieval system, without thepermission in writing from the Center.ISBN: 978-971-94089-5-6Please address all inquiries to:Yuchengco Center2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco HallDe La Salle University2401 Taft Avenue, Manila, 1004Philippinesemail: (632) 525-3457url:// photo source: Voice of America at
  3. 3. Preface Since the publication of my book, Security Aspects ofPhilippines-China Relations: Bilateral Issues and Concerns inthe Age of Global Terrorism, in 2007, my scholarly activitieson Philippines-China security relations have not stopped.Within a period of more than five years (from 2007 to early2012), I felt the strong need to revise and update my book inorder to accommodate current developments in Philippines-China security relations. Because of some technical issues associated with therevision of my 2007 book published by Rex Book StoreInternational, I decided to just publish another book based onconference papers, academic essays, and opinion pieces I wrotefrom 2007 to the first half of 2012. This effort resulted in thepublication of Philippines-China Security Relations: CurrentIssues and Emerging Concerns. Like my 2007 piece, this present book criticallyexamines the security aspects of Philippines-China relations.My 2007 book discussed how the global campaign againstterrorism provided various opportunities for both countries tosustain their diplomatic friendship and enhance their defensecooperation. The publication of that book coincided with the32nd anniversary of the establishment of Philippines-Chinarelations. Two years before that, the Philippines and Chinacelebrated the “golden years” of their bilateral ties in 2005 onthe occasion of their 30th anniversary. But the renewed securitytensions in the South China Sea that started in 2007 createdvarious difficulties for Philippines-China security relations toreally move forward. This present book is published to describe currentissues and emerging concerns in Philippines-China securityrelations. The publication of this book coincides with thecommemoration of the 37th anniversary of the establishment ofPhilippines-China relations, an odd occasion in the light of thestandoff between the two countries in the Scarborough Shoal. Electronic version of this book has been published bythe Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies(CINSS) of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence andTerrorism Research (PIPVTR). This print version is updated to
  4. 4. make the book more current. The author is very grateful to theYuchengco Center, through its President, Dr. Trinidad Osteria,for publishing this print version. Readers can consider the publication of this presentbook as a sequel to my 2007 book. It is my fervent hope to seethis book adding value to the existing literature on Philippines-China security relations.
  5. 5. Table of Contents PagePreface iiiList of Tables viiList of Figures viiList of Abbreviations viii 1 International Relations Theory in 1 China: Evolution and Current State 2 A Philippine Perspective on China- 11 US-ASEAN Security Relations 3 Philippine Policy in the South China 22 Sea: Implications for Philippines- China Security Relations 4 The Taiwan Factor in Philippines- 36 China Security Relations 5 Philippine Foreign and Security 46 Policy Towards China in the Post- 9/11 World: Current Realities and Future Prospects 6 Renewed Tensions and Continuing 62 Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China Sea: Current and Emerging Concerns on Philippines- China Security Relations 7 Philippine Solution to the South 83 China Sea Problem: More Problems, Less Solutions in Philippines-China Security Relations? 8 Standoff in the Scarborough Shoal: A 100 Difficult Challenge in Philippines- China Security Relations 9 The Philippines and U.S. Pivot to 108 Asia: Implications for Philippines- China Security RelationsReferences 114 Annex 1 Brief Essays on Philippines-China 130 Security Relations and the South
  6. 6. China Sea Disputes A West Philippines Sea: What’s in a 130 Name? B West Philippines Sea: An American 132 Lake? C PH Problematic Protest vs China 134 Over Spratlys D A Mischief Reef in the Making 137 E Anarchy in the South China Sea 140 F Emerging Cold War in the Spratlys 143 G Risks of War in the Spratlys 145 H Clash of Sovereignties in the Spratlys 147 I Word War in the South China Sea: A 152 Diplomatic Crisis in Philippines- China Relations J PHL, China Row on Spratlys: Time 154 for Good Manners and Right Conduct K What’s Needed: More Dialogues 157 Among Spratlys Claimants L Peace and Stability: Way Ahead in 160 SpratlysAnnex 2 List of Bilateral Agreements between 162 the Philippines and ChinaPostscript 175About the Author 178
  7. 7. List of TablesTable 1 Oil and Natural Gas Potential in the South China SeaTable 2 Filipinos workers in Taiwan and the undocumented (runaways, overstayers, etc.), November 2006Table 3 Breakdown of Filipino Workers in Taiwan by Area of Destination, November 2006Table 4 Presently Occupied Areas in the Spratlys and Estimated Number of Troops List of FiguresFigure 1 South China SeaFigure 2 Overlapping Claims in the South China SeaFigure 3 Overlapping Baselines in the South China SeaFigure 4 Overlapping Fishing Activities in the South China SeaFigure 5 Navigational Activities in the South China SeaFigure 6 Lagos Island or Spratly Island (Vietnam)Figure 7 Pugad Island or Southwest Cay (Vietnam)Figure 8 Pentley Reef (Vietnam)Figure 9 Pag-Asa Island (Philippines)Figure 10 Structure in the Rizal Reef (Philippines)Figure 11 ST 57 Docked at the Ayungin Shoal (Philippines)Figure 12 Mischief Reef (China)Figure 13 Johnson Reef (China)Figure 14 Swallow Reef (Malaysia)Figure 15 Ardasier Reef (Malaysia)Figure 16 Itu-Aba (Taiwan)Figure 17 Oil and Natural Gas Fields in the South China SeaFigure 18 Joint Cooperation Area
  8. 8. List of AbbreviationsADMM+ ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting PlusAFP Armed Forces of the PhilippinesAPEC Asia Pacific Economic CooperationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASG Abu Sayyaf GroupBFAR Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic ResourcesCAFIU Chinese Association for International UnderstandingCARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness TrainingCBM confidence building measureCCPIT China Council for the Promotion of International TradeCEO Chief Executive OfficerCFAU China Foreign Affairs UniversityCMR cooperative management regimeCNOOC China National Offshore Oil CompanyCOC Code of ConductCOMELEC The Commission on ElectionsCPRF Carlos P. Romulo FoundationDFA Department of Foreign AffairsDND Department of National DefenseDOC Declaration on the ConductDOST Department of Science and TechnologyDTI Department of Trade and IndustryEAS East Asia SummitEDA Excess Defense ArticlesEEZ Exclusive Economic ZoneEU European UnionFMF Foreign Military FinancingFSI Foreign Service InstituteGDOFA Guandong Ocean Fisheries AdministrationGWOT global war on terrorismICT Information and Communications TechnologyIMF International Monetary FundIR International Relations
  9. 9. IRT International Relations TheoriesISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesJCA Joint Cooperation AreasJI Jemaah IslamiyahJMSU Joint Marine Seismic UndertakingJSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task Force- PhilippinesKIG Kalayaan Island GroupLME Large Marine EcosystemMBA Military Bases AgreementMDT Mutual Defense TreatyMECO Manila Economic and Cultural OfficeMILF Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMLSA Mutual Logistic Support AgreementMNLF Moro National Liberation FrontMNNA Major Non-NATO AllyMOFCOM Ministry of CommerceMRA Mutual Recognition of Academic Degrees in Higher EducationNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDCP National Defense College of the PhilippinesNFPC Navotas Fish Port ComplexNPA New People’s ArmyOEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom- PhilippinesOFWs Overseas Filipino WorkersOPVs Offshore Patrol VesselsOSTEX Operation Sea Training ExercisePAGASA Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services AdministrationPCCI Philippine Chamber of Commerce and IndustryPCYPL Philippine Council of Young Political LeadersPD Presidential DecreePDR Philippine Defense ReformPETROVIETNAM Vietnam Oil and Gas CorporationPLA People’s Liberation ArmyPLAN People’s Liberation Army NavyPN Philippine Navy
  10. 10. PNOC Philippine National Oil CompanyPNP Philippine National PolicePROC/PRC Peoples Republic of ChinaRBN Royal Brunei NavyRMN The Royal Malaysian NavyROC Republic of ChinaRP Republic of the PhilippinesRSIM Rajah Solaiman Islamic MovementSBMA Subic Bay Metropolitan AuthoritySCS South China SeaSEATO Southeast Asian Treaty OrganizationSLOC Sea Lines of CommunicationsTAC Treaty of Amity and CooperationTcf Total cubic feetTECO Taipei Economic and Cultural OfficeWB World Bank
  11. 11. CHAPTER ONE International Relations Theory in China: Evolution and Current StateIntroduction In the context of China’s rise as a global power, it isimperative to study its current International Relations (IR).This will give a sense of how it views itself in the globalcommunity. Understanding how it grapples with internationalrelations at the theoretical level is essential at this juncturewhere it plays a pivotal role in shaping the current trends andfuture directions of international relations. This chapter examines the development and currentstate of IR in China in the context of its rapid rise as a globalpower. It intends to describe the implications of the wholegamut of issues for analyzing Philippines-China securityrelations.Development of IR Theory in China Though China is proud of its more than 3,000 years ofcivilization, IR as a field of study came much later than in theWest.1 It is interesting to note that as early as 1926, a book onChina’s international relations had been published by a foreignobserver in Shanghai. 2 In 1955, the People’s University ofChina established the Foreign Affairs College, which in 2005became the Foreign Affairs University. It is the only universityin China affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3 TheChina Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) offers not onlyforeign language courses but also those international relations,diplomacy, international economics and business, international !" # $ % & % () *(& + % ) % &( , - . / 0* 1 2()+ %3 4 # - 5# 6 7 # 18 % # % 8 % 8%
  12. 12. law, and foreign policy. It offers bachelor’s, master’s anddoctoral degrees in International Relations, InternationalPolitics, Diplomacy, International Economy, English Languageand Literature, Foreign Linguistics and Applied Linguistics,etc. 4 Since its establishment, the CFAU has publishednumerous textbooks such as History of ContemporaryInternational Relations, History of Modern Diplomacy ofChina, Diplomatic Documentation, Deng Xiaoping’s Art ofDiplomacy, An Introduction to Diplomacy, China and the USA,China’s Diplomacy: A New Presentation, US China Policy andthe Issue of Taiwan, Studies of Legal Issues on MultimodalTransportation of International Goods, Fourteen Lessons onCommunication, and Economic Diplomacy.5 The CFAU alsohas the Institute of International Relations, which focuses onthe IR theory “with Chinese characteristics.” The 1960s saw the establishment of the internationalrelations department in key universities in China aside from thePeople’s University. In 1963, for example, Peking Universityand Fudan University set up their own Department ofInternational Politics. During the same period, ten researchinstitutes on international relations were built under the controland supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NewChina News Agency. 6 These research institutes publishedtextbooks and journals on international relations and some eventranslated the works of Western international relations theoristslike Nicholas Spykman, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan andHerman Kahn, among others. 7 The People’s Press and theWorld Affairs Press have a long-standing reputation ofpublishing IR-related books in China. However, no IR theorywas taught in China in the 1960s to the 1970s at the height ofthe Cold War. During the prime of ideological propaganda ofthe Cold War, IR studies in China were interpretations ofMarxism-Leninism-Maoism and Stalinism. University IRcourses were offered “just to explain Marxist theories of9 4%: 4%) ! % )(%; 4%
  13. 13. imperialism colonialism, national liberation movements, andwar and peace.”8 It was in the 1980s when China started thinking aboutIR theoretically with the primordial objective of highlightingChinese characteristics. The landmark event was the holding in1985 of the conference of the China Society of the History ofInternational Relations, culminating to the publication of thebook entitled Essays on the History of International Relations.Thereafter, Chinese universities began to offer IR subjects,which consequently encouraged schools to publish IRtextbooks annotated by Gerald Chan. 9 Though the 1989Tiananmen Square Incident posed a challenge to IR theory-building in China because of the negative international image itprojected as a result of what the Chinese government called“Western propaganda,” theoretical studies on IR continued. The development of IR theory cannot be understoodwithout a deep understanding of the evolution of IR studies inthe country. The major milestone in the growth of IR studieswas in 1979 when Chairman Deng Xiaoping enunciated thepolicy of opening People’s Republic of China (PRC) to theworld. It is, therefore, not a surprise why IR theory-buildingbegan in the 1980s as a result of the open policy of ChairmanDeng. The end of the cold war in 1989 accelerated IR theory-building with the enthusiasm of students specializing ininternational studies. Professor Wang Jisi of the Institute ofAmerican Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciencescategorized the evolution of IR studies in China in the post-cold war era into three periods:10 First Period (1989-1991). This was characterized by thesecurity uncertainties unleashed by the end of the cold war andthe international ramifications of the Tiananmen Incident. Theperiod also saw the rapid economic growth of Japan and thephenomenal economic integration of Western Europe. Havingthese events as a backdrop, Chinese scholars found it difficultto engage in IR theorizing as most of them were preoccupied in< 4 % % )3%2= 15 5 4 * > ?17 4 22<+ %& @ " 15 7 ! *5 - - + 18 % 8 % 8 8 ?8 A 8 ? 8 ? % %
  14. 14. observing current and emerging international events. Theirenthusiasm on IR theories never waned as seen through thetranslations of the works of well-known IR theorists likeKenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffman, Robert Gilpin and JosephNye, Jr.11 Second Period (1992-1998). Wang Jisi (1995)described this period as the start of “fascinating growth of IRscholarship in China,” which coincided with the promotion bythe Chinese government of cordial and friendly relations withkey countries in the Asia Pacific and Africa. 12 Though Asiawas disturbed by the harsh impact of the 1997 Asian financialcrisis aggravated by Taiwan’s growing pro-independencesentiments, IR studies “became increasingly consolidated,diversified and pluralized.” 13 This led to intense scholarlydiscussions on various IR topics like peace and development,multipolarization, economic globalization, strategicpartnership, international cooperation, international politicaleconomy, security outlook, human rights and internationalintervention, the clash of civilizations, democratic peace, andcomprehensive national strength.14 Third Period (1999 – present). The third perioddescribes the current state of IR studies in China wherescholars discovered new unfamiliar areas in IR. According toWang Jisi, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the US spy plane-Chinese jet air collision in 2001 further increased theenthusiasm of Chinese scholars on IR issues not seriouslydiscussed before. These issues are ethnic relations and tensions,the impact of religion on world politics, comparative partypolitics, crisis management, domestic sources of foreign policy,human rights diplomacy, the role of the media in IR, mutualimages and perceptions between nations, and other topics likegood governance, non-governmental organizations, newpeoples’ organizations and civil society.15 Though Wang claimed that Chinese scholars have atradition of attaching great importance to IR theories, he 4 % :%( 4%3 4 % % )%9 4 % % ;%: 4 % % < 2%
  15. 15. underscored that IR theorizing in China is different from IRtheorizing in the West in terms of content, discourse andapproach. Thus, Chinese scholars attempted to develop IRtheories with “Chinese characteristics.” Professor LiangShoude of Peking University was the leading IR scholar whoargued for the development of IR theory with Chinesecharacteristics to challenge other IR theories that wereconstructed and developed to “serve the Western countries.”As mentioned previously, Professor Song Xinning, a Professorof International Relations at the Renmin University of China(also known as the People’s University of China), alsoadvanced the idea of building an IR theory with Chinesecharacteristics. Professor Yiwei Wang of Fudan Universitystressed the end of IR theories of the West and the rise of theChinese school. 16 Yiwei Wang summarized his arguments inthe following words: International Relations (IR) is both a science and an art: The unity of object and subject. Traditional International Relations Theories (IRT) have probed the laws of IR, in an attempt to become the universal science. IRT developed into a class doctrine that defends the legitimacy of Western International System as a result of proceeding from the reality of IR while neglecting its evolving process, and overlooking the meaning of art and the presence of multi- international systems. In other words, IRT have turned into what Karl Marx might have deemed as the Vulgar International Relations Theories (VIRT). Thus, the end of international relations theories. This phenomenon will be negated by the so-called Chinese School, which will set the sustainable and harmonious relations among nations, between state and non-state actors, and within states and non-state actors (in one word “global-society”) in five life-forces of economy, politics, military, culture and religion. Consequently, this will bring about a real) > @ # # ! 18 8 % % 8 8 ?8 A 8 ? 8 ? % %
  16. 16. regression of nationality and compatible development of various international systems.17Current State of IR Theory in China According to Song Xinning (2001), there are threemajor groups of IR scholars in China: a) Researchers ininstitutes under various government agencies, who focus moreon policy-oriented studies to justify government policies andprovide policy reports to the government; b) Universityprofessors and researchers who concentrate more on theoreticaland general IR studies; and, c) Researchers in the ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences in Beijing and various academiesof social sciences at the provincial level, who conduct bothactivities of the first two groups. Despite the efforts of these three groups, Xinninglamented that IR theory in China remains backward comparedto IR theory-building in North America and Europe. He,however, expressed hopes for progress because of increasinginterests in IR theory in China both by Chinese and foreignscholars. Since the 1980s, IR as a field of scientific inquiry hasgrown dramatically amidst ideological constraints and politicalinhibitions.18 The 1990s saw the publication of some excellentbooks on IR theory. In 1998, Wang Yizhou published a book,The Discipline of International Politics in the West: Historyand Theory19 while Zi Zhongyun published the Explorations ofTheories of International Politics in China.20 In 1999, Lu Yi,Gu Guanfu, Yu Zhengliang, and Fu Yaozu edited a volumeentitled Research on International Relations Theories inChina’s New Era.21 These publications strongly demonstratethat intense discussions on IR theory have been taking place inChina. Professor Alastair Ian Johnson of Harvard University; 4%< > B C 1 #- ! " % 9; *" (& (+ % & % & 2 @ >D E # @ 1,* 1 4 22<+ %(& C C A # # * 1 4 22<+ %( F > = = # > C - > D * + G * B 1 4 222+ %
  17. 17. observed that Chinese IRT has gone through three stages orthree styles of IR theorizing in China: traditional, realist andsocial scientific stages.22 Traditional stage or style, which became predominantin the 1960s and 1970s, views theory not as an explanatorydevice but more of a guiding philosophy. As a guidingphilosophy, “it was politically important to get this ‘theory’right.”23 It means that “the correctness of theory rested in itsconsistency with the political interests of the state as defined bythe CCP. Theory was both positivist in the sense that it restedon understanding objective laws of historical development (thelegacy of historical materialism in PRC scholarship), but it wasalso normative in the sense that what was often cast as anobjective process was, in fact, desired by China’s leaders.”24 The realist stage or style, which became popular in the1980s and early 1990s, saw some Chinese scholars abandoningthe traditional style of IR theorizing with the waning ofideological influence of Marxism. During this stage, someChinese scholars, particularly the younger ones, were attractedto realist schools advanced by Hans Morgenthau and HenryKissinger. These younger IR Chinese scholars expressed theirdissatisfaction over the idea of an IR theory with Chinesecharacteristics arguing that this is “backward” and it isolatesChinese scholars from Western IR discourses. 25 Thistheoretical debate among Chinese scholars has positive effectsin terms of acquiring a “higher level of awareness of the meta-theoretical issues behind social sciences, and the need to thinkmore systematically about ontology what is researchable) andepistemology (how to research it).”26 The social scientific stage refers to events of the mid1990s when some Chinese scholars became more consciousabout “understanding and situating Chinese research inrelationship to US and Western IR theory.”27 There are threemajor sources of this “turn to theory.” The first was a group of(( 5 " # ! *(& (+ & 18 % 8 % 8 8 ?8 A 8 ? 8 ? % %(3 4 % % 33%(9 4%(: 4 % % 39%() 4%(; 4%
  18. 18. Chinese scholars who returned to China after acquiring IReducation in the US and Western Europe. These returningscholars who were required to teach IR in China “brought withthem their specific training in theory and methods which theypassed on to their students.”28 The second was the translationinto Chinese major classic IR works of Western theorists likeRobert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, Peter Katzenstein, RobertKeohane and Joseph Nye. The third was the entrepreneurshipof a key group of younger IR scholars in Beijing and Shanghaiwho took over the editing of IR journals and book series.29 According to Johnson, though there is the currentgrowth of IR theory consciousness in China, explicit theorizingis still relatively new in the PRC. In fact, in IR studies inChina, there are more discussions on current internationalevents than on IR theory.Is There an IR Theory With Chinese Characteristics? Though at present there is an increasing interest on IRtheory in China, which encourages other scholars to develop anIR theory with Chinese characteristics, the state remainsnascent or embryonic. Even in the more specific area offoreign policy, the scientific theory and method are still new.30William A. Callahan (2001) expressed doubts about theexistence of IR theory with Chinese characteristics.31 ProfessorQin Yaqing contended that China is yet to develop a ChineseIRT. He identified three reasons why there had been noChinese IRT, to wit: There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT) mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’ in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the Western IR discourse in the Chinese academic(< 4%(2 4 % % 3:%3& 5 " . # - !* # # # :&5 7 # - 4 ? # 5 E 4 (& :+ & %3 @ 5% = 4 D # 1E # !" # 7 % & % () *(& + % ;: <<% &
  19. 19. community, and the absence of a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research. A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chinese intellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the Tributary System in the two millennia of China history, the radical thinking and revolutions in s the nineteenth and twentieth century, and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of China ideational and practical development and s therefore could provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition, a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematic of China identity vis-à- s vis international society, a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike.32 One of the major reasons why IR theory remainsundeveloped in China is that there is no fully developed IRresearch institutions in the PRC that are academicallyindependent from state institutions. 33 Most IR researchinstitutions are regulated by the government whose principalinterests are not in theories but in strategies and tactics. IR-related research works and studies are heavily influenced bythe state’s demand to justify its present political ideology andstrengthen its current foreign policy. According to GustaafGeeraerts and Men Jing (2001), “if social scientists pay muchattention to what the government requires, they will not bescientists but rather aides and staff to government officials.”34This argument was reinforced by Wang Jisi (1995) whounderscored that without academic independence in the field ofIR, there can be no scientific theory.35 IR theories developed byWestern scholars will continue to be used by Chinesecounterparts to analyze PRC foreign policy strategy and its3( H >I @ J ! % % 8 8 #II ; % # 8 & %33 = #= . " ! = 4 7 % : % 3 *(& + & %39 4%3: @ " K K # - 15 7G G @% 4 E7 4 * %+- 1 *0A 1 # 22:+ % :;%
  20. 20. place in the international community.36 Even China’s securitypractice will still be analyzed within the prism of Westerntheories.37 With the rise of China as global superpower, somescholars argued that China can present a challenge to existinginternational relations theory.38Summary and Conclusion Though China can be proud of its 3,000 years ofcivilization with excellent statecraft on foreign relations, IRtheory remains undeveloped. It was only in the 1950s whenserious academic interests on IR began. IR as a field of studybecame more popular in 1979 during its economic opening.The end of the cold further accelerated the interests of scholarson IR studies. Yet, IR theorizing continues to be nascentbecause of limited academic independence of IR researchinstitutions. The government is more interested in strategydevelopment and foreign policy-making rather than on theory-building. Without greater academic independence in the fieldof IR, scholars will find it difficult to develop their own IRtheory.3) # A 57 = 5 G = 15 J ! =% " ? 4 . . * + 5 # * > ?1 4 6 7 (& 3+ % :; & & )%3; @ 4 1 # . D 5 !. 5 * +5 1 . #* # 1 # 6 7 22<+ % : :)%3< " # !* # # 5, , . (& :+ & %
  21. 21. CHAPTER TWO A Philippine Perspective on China-US-ASEAN Security Relations39Introduction To maintain regional stability and promote regionalsecurity, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)has been constructively engaging all major powers in the AsiaPacific. This has been manifested in ASEAN’s dynamicdialogue partnerships with Australia, Canada, China, India,Japan, Russia, and the United States. ASEAN also has dialoguepartnerships with the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and someregional and international organizations. Among its dialogue partners, ASEAN relations withChina and the US are considered to be the most challengingbecause of the prevailing perception that the security of theAsia Pacific region, as well as of Southeast Asia, restsenormously upon the status of China-US relations.40 The twomajor powers are also seriously competing for influence inSoutheast Asia,41 which test the ability of ASEAN to deal withthe rising dragon and the American eagle. 42 Being a foundermember of ASEAN, the Philippines also confronts theformidable challenge on how to engage the rising Chinawithout creating unnecessary discomforts with its Americansecurity ally. # 5- 5 5 5 ! D 4 # 5 #" 6 7 = D ; < 4 (& %9& 7 = # 4 5 #1 6 ! E @ ? % :* 4 (& 3+ % % &9 L F% = M J @ # @ # M5 @ . A % < *" 222+ %9( H 4 E 1 G 5 * " 1" @ % (& <+ - & % 4? # EF E 1 , #6% % * # 1 2<:+%
  22. 22. This chapter presents a Philippine perspective of China-US-ASEAN relations in the post-9/11 world. It starts with thediscussion of the background of China-US-ASEAN relationsduring the cold war followed by an analysis on the status ofthese trilateral relations after 9/11. It then examines theimplications of China-US-ASEAN relations on Philippineforeign and security policy towards China.Background on China-US-ASEAN Relations Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN foreign policyhas always been influenced by the behaviors of majorpowers.43 Southeast Asia became the fulcrum of major powerrivalries in the Asia Pacific. During the cold war, the foundingmembers ASEAN sided with the Western powers to containthe spread of communism in the region. Among the Western powers, the US became the mostimportant partner of ASEAN in preventing communistexpansionism in Southeast Asia. In fact, "support for andcooperation with ASEAN is a linchpin of American PacificPolicy" during the cold war in order to protect ASEAN statesfrom falling to communist rule. 44 The US also entered intomilitary alliances with Thailand and the Philippines to supportAmerican regional security strategy in Southeast Asia. It evenattempted to form a NATO-type security organization inSoutheast Asia in 1955 through the Southeast Asian TreatyOrganization (SEATO). SEATO met its untimely demisewhen it was dissolved in 1977. Nonetheless, the US remainedcommitted to security in Southeast Asia through its existingmilitary alliance with Thailand and the Philippines. During the cold war, ASEAN viewed China as anideological enemy. 45 Beijing’s support to the communistinsurgency movements in Southeast Asia created negativefeelings and hostility towards China among the non-communist93 % = 5 5G . B A ! 5 7 % (( % ( *5 (& & % (:<% &+99 L " % 7 6 5 5 H 5 ! ,- 5 ? % )&*( 5 2<;+%9: - A 4? # 5 5 F 5 * 1 6 7 # 2<:+ %
  23. 23. Southeast Asian states. 46 In fact, none of ASEAN foundingmembers had normal relations with China in the 1960s. 47ASEAN-China security relations improved in the late 1970swhen Southeast Asian countries normalized their relations withthe People’s Republic of China (PROC). China’s securityrelations with ASEAN improved further in the 1980s whenBeijing rallied behind ASEAN in opposing Vietnameseoccupation of Cambodia.48 With the end of the cold war, the ideological conflictamong the major powers subsided. The interests of majorpowers on ASEAN persisted, as they re-defined their interestsin the region. ASEAN, on the other hand, deliberately pursueda post-cold war strategy of engaging all major powers thoughbilateral and multilateral means. A scholar called this strategy“omni-enmeshment,” which refers to the process of engagingan actor or entity to draw it into deep involvement into asystem or community, enveloping it in a web of sustainedexchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim ofintegration.”49 Meanwhile, the post-cold war period increased tensionsbetween the US and China. With the disintegration of theformer Soviet Union, the US was freed of a former archrival.American attention was then focused on China considered bymany Western security analysts as a great threat to the securityof the world. 50 Though China resisted this perception, theTiananmen Incident in 1989 created a negative image of Chinain the world. American security analysts viewed China as the9) 5 75 ? E G 15 5 0 ! E @ ? % 99 *. (& 3+ & % 3%9; 5 E% 5 51 7 # ( 5 !5 7 7 % 93 % 9 *(& 3+ % )(9% &9< 4%92 7 = = 5 10 , 0 ! E @ ? % <9*" (& :+ % <% &:& = *@ E 1 (& &% 5 &+ , 4> * + 1 . * > ? 1 D (& (+ & %
  24. 24. “great American foreign policy problem in the 21st century”51and a “potential peer competitor to the U.S. in world affairs.”52News reports and experts’ analysis demonizing Chinadominated Western literature after 1989. The EP-3 incident inApril 2001 exacerbated the negative view about China. This “aura of tragedy” surrounding US-China securityrelations in the post-cold war era resonated strongly inASEAN. 53 Though ASEAN carried an ambivalent view ofChina after the cold war and was aware of Americanpreeminent power in the Asia Pacific, the fragile China-USsecurity relations was a source of security concern in SoutheastAsia.54 China’s assertive attitude in the South China Sea sincethe 1990s left a negative effect in China-ASEAN relations.China recovered from this when it played a constructive role inthe 1997 Asian financial crisis. Since then, China’s image inASEAN dramatically improved while American imagedeteriorated since it left Clark and Subic in 1992.55 China’snegative image in Southeast Asia resurfaced in 2011 whenPRC displayed anew its assertive attitude in the South ChinaSea. Though the US continued to be the most importantsecurity partner of ASEAN (particularly of the foundingmembers), China’s effective “charm offensive”56 of SoutheastAsia marked by American “neglect” of the region in the late1990s, made ASEAN relations with US and China tilting in: " = 5 @ ! @%* + # 5 1 * 51 (& (+ % ( % &:( . 7 % 0 5 6 1 @ ! 5 % ( *(< . 22+ % 5N 18 8 % 8 # 8 ( 22% 8 O%:3 E P 6% % 1 7 4 7% , D G 4 0$ % 9; % (& 3 % 3;% &:9 , , 5- *@ E% %1 ? 22(+%:: 6% % # 5 6 @ !5 - *(2 5(& 9+ & %:) L D? G 0# 7 # 5 ! , 4 (& )% &
  25. 25. favor of the latter. 57 It was argued that US relations withASEAN became problematic in the 1990s because “ASEAN’sinterests and concerns have never been a major considerationin the formulation of US policy towards the Asia-Pacificregion.”58China-US-ASEAN Relations after 9/11 The 9/11 event served as a significant milestone inChina-US-ASEAN relations. After a decade of neglect, the USdeclared Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the global waron terrorism. This occurred amidst China’s strengtheningrelationship with ASEAN after 9/11. While the US reinvigorated its security alliance with thePhilippines, strengthened military relations with Thailand,improved defense relations with Indonesia and Malaysia andenhanced strategic partnership with Singapore in the aftermathof 9/11 using its “hard power,” China also improved itsbilateral ties with Southeast Asian states and deepened itsdialogue partnership with ASEAN using its “soft power”diplomacy. 59 This was reinforced by a new policy ofmultilateralism which created a benign image of Beijing inASEAN.60 On the other hand, American use of “hard power”aggravated by a strategy of unilateralism isolated itself fromSoutheast Asian affairs.61 To assure ASEAN that China’s international behaviorwas peaceful and constructive, it signed in 2002 theDeclaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea:; D ? 6 5 5# 1E ! * ? # 5 - G@ ?5 G 5 ? ? (( (9 . (& &% &+:< 4%:2 F @ .% . $ G # 5 ! # *9 " (& <+ 5 & % G # 5 ! 25 *3 . (& 9+ & %)& L ? . / 5 5 1 7 5 ! 5 7% (; % *5(& :+ % & ((% & () . B %M, # 1 # # # 28 6 , M* # 5 5 . F 7 7 5 (& <+ & %
  26. 26. (DOC) and acceded in 2003 to the ASEAN Treaty of Amityand Cooperation (TAC). The US upholds its neutral positionon the South China Sea disputes and has not ratified the TAC.Though the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia broughtrenewed US attention to ASEAN, Washington failed to matchBeijing’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia. There is eventhe view that the US was so preoccupied in Iraq andAfghanistan that it exhibited a strategic neglect of SoutheastAsia. While China was busy forging economic ties withASEAN countries using its soft power, the US was using itshard power, hunting for so-called terrorist personalities inSoutheast Asia associated with Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah(JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This shift in China-ASEAN relations affected not only American interests but alsothe US status in the region.62 The post-9/11 era was a period of China’s tactical gainin ASEAN vis a vis the US.63 China’s soft power re-emergencein Southeast Asia resulted in a dramatic change of ASEANstates’ attitude towards the PROC – they are now “less-biased,less anti-communist and less anti-Beijing.” 64 On the otherhand, American assertiveness to use its hard power to achievepolitical and strategic ends in the global war on terrorism hascreated dissent and anti-Americanism in Southeast Asia. 65Though ASEAN needs American presence to balance China’sgrowing influence in the region, it detests Americanpredominance. ASEAN also expressed disappointment that theUS after 9/11 has become less consensual and more coercive.66This is in stark contrast with China, which has become moreconsultative, cooperative and socializing in the aftermath of)( $ 5 1 # 6 ! # *< - 4 (& :+ & %)3 . . ?E 15 G =F 4 * 51 (& (+ & %)9 " E 4? GM # M 5 !* ? P @ G 5 & . (& )+ % 3<% &): . ? 1 # 5 5 !* # ? = 4 D # 5 - @5 : ) 5 (& 3+ & %)) 4 % % 3%
  27. 27. 9/11. 67 Now, ASEAN no longer views China as a threat.Though the rise of China poses security challenges inSoutheast Asia, ASEAN regards Beijing as a partner inregional security. 68 This new reality in China-US-ASEANrelations endangered American primacy in Southeast Asia.69Implications for Philippine Foreign and Security PolicyTowards China in the Post-9/11 World The growing China-ASEAN ties unleashed profoundeffects on Philippine policy towards China. While 9/11resulted in the reinvigoration of Philippine-American securityrelations,70 it also led to the enhancement of Philippines-Chinadefense and military cooperation.71Since the establishment ofPhilippines-China diplomatic ties in 1975, both countries havegone a long way in their relations. After 9/11, Philippines-China relations became comprehensive. In 2005, in fact, thePhilippines and China celebrated the 30th anniversary of theestablishment of Philippines-China diplomatic relations.According to Chinese President Hu Jintao who visited thePhilippines that year, the 30th anniversary represented the“golden-age” of Philippines-China relations. That year wasalso a landmark period in both countries’ bilateral relations as); 5 @ / D @ J A 5 5 ! # 7 7 % 2 % ( *" (& )+ % :; ;2% &)< % 5 7 # 1 5# 28 ! 7 33 % ( * (& 3+ % 2< & & ;%)2 E % E " " ? ? "% % 5 515 5 ! , - ? % <<) * 2 0 4 (& :+ & %;& M 6 5 # - M, - A 7. % < : * 3 . (& (+5 & % % # 5 = 4 5 1 # ! 5 7 % (9 %( *5 (& (+ % (29 3 (Q & D 7 D 6 15 = # @ 5 # ( !5 7 7 % 93 % ) * 7 4 8 E 4 (& 3+ % 2; 2<<Q & .%. 5 5# 41 A. # - 5 ! 55# *"# (& 3+ % ((< (3<% &; % E# . 1 28 * 1 #5 7 # " (& ;+& %
  28. 28. they launched the First Philippines-China Defense and SecurityDialogue in May 2005. 72 The Philippines even played theChina card when Manila’s relations with Washington cooledoff in 2004 as a result of the withdrawal of Filipino troops inIraq.73 Conservative analysts in Washington regretted the factthat China’s relations with the Philippines improved amidst thecrisis in Philippines-American relations, to wit: China has developed and refined a policy of helping regimes in trouble by offering considerable political and economic support. This will become true for the Philippines, as China moves away from threatening rhetoric on territorial disputes in the South China Sea and employs a new approach. Beijing offered Manila $3 million for the establishment of a Chinese language-training program for the Philippine military, donated engineering equipment, and invited the Philippines to participate in naval exercises. Moreover, in the midst of stern U.S. criticism of the withdrawal of the Philippine medical team from Iraq, President Arroyo signed a confidential protocol with China on the exploitation of South China Sea resources. With her presidency in dire straits, Arroyo will gladly accept more largesse from Beijing.74 To understand the post-9/11 Philippine foreign andsecurity policy towards China, there is also a need tocomprehend ASEAN policy in the post-9/11 era. Theimprovement of China’s security relations with ASEANprovided a conducive regional environment for the Philippinesto improve its foreign and security policy towards China.ASEAN’s benign attitude towards China in the post-9/11 eracreated a kindly attitude of the Philippines towards China, evenif Manila is known in ASEAN as Pentagon’s long-standingsecurity ally in Southeast Asia. China-US-ASEAN political;( 4 % 5 # 1 5 # 4 = *H D 1 A ? (& ;+ % % &;3 . 4 5 I, 1 5 6 ! E *(< " (& 9+ & %;9 E E 1@ # 6% %J ! ,- @ 4. % ;22 * < " (& :+ & %
  29. 29. and security dynamics greatly informed Philippine foreign andsecurity policy towards China in the post-9/11 world. In the midst of the strategic uncertainty of the securityenvironment in the post-cold-war/ post-9/11 era, ASEAN facedthe dilemma of balancing its relations with China and the US.Rather than pursuing a balancing act in traditional realist terms,ASEAN, instead, adopted a strategy of what scholars ofinternational relations called “soft-balancing.” 75 This conceptdeparts from “hard balancing,” which requires the formation ofmilitary alliances. According to the traditional realistconception of hard balancing, ASEAN should side with theweak to balance the strong. However, “ASEAN did not actthis way; it rejected the strategy of balancing against thestronger power because it saw the stronger power (the UnitedStates) as less of a threat than the weaker but rising power(China or Japan).” 76 There is also view of hard balancing,which contends that states form or join military alliances tocounter-check the rise of a new power. 77 In the case of Asia,this new power may refer to China. Instead of “hard balancing”China, ASEAN states were soft-balancing China by welcomingAmerican presence but at the same time engaging the newpower. One school of international relations calls this approachas “bandwagoning” that is “crouching under” rather than“containing” the new power. 78 Bandwagoning is a form ofacceptance of “a subordinate role to the dominant power inexchange for material or ideational gain.” 79 It is argued that;: > - L 6 1 # # 5 G @ * # E, 7 @ ? 5 . :(& 9 @ & # 5# # , 7 6 7 + 5 % : #5 L D "% %" * %+ ? 5 1 ## * # 6 7 28 & % (& 9+;) 4 % % <%;; .% @ 5 - #@ ! 7% 2 % 9 * 2<:+ % 3 93%;< L ? E J - #. 22&(& : & 4 5 7 % 3 % 9 *" (& <+ % 9% &;2 4%
  30. 30. instead of balancing, ASEAN is, in fact, bandwagoning withChina.80 There is the view, however, that balancing andbandwagoning “may not fully account for the range ofstrategies state actors adopt to preserve and promote theirinterests.” 81 To accurately explain ASEAN relations withChina and the US, scholars of Southeast Asian security affairsadopted the concept of “hedging strategy.” It is defined as “apurposeful act in which a state seeks to ensure its long terminterests by placing its policy bets on multiple counteractingoptions designed to offset risks embedded in the internationalsystem.”82 In the context of China-ASEAN relations, hedginghas five components: economic-pragmatism, bindingengagement, limited-bandwagoning, dominance-denial andindirect-balancing.83 ASEAN strategy of hedging with China and the UnitedStates also explains Philippine foreign and security policytowards the two major powers. Instead of strictly balancing orbandwagoning with the two powers, the Philippines is hedging.Though the Philippines comprehensively engages China, it alsomaintains its security alliance with the US. Like ASEAN, thePhilippines is relating with China and the US to get the best ofboth worlds. More of China in the Philippines does not meanless of the United States. As rightly underscored by thenPhilippine foreign affairs Secretary Teofisto Guingona, “In ourrelations with an old friend, China, and with a perennial ally,the United States, we Filipinos should be guided by one surecanon: national interests.”84<& E 5 1 # J ! 5 7 % (; % ( *5 (& :+ % 3& 3((% & :< " 7 1= E ! E @ ? % :9 * 7 4(& 3+ % % &<( L ? E J - # . 22&(& : & % %<3 4%<9 # %= "% 6 1- ! *F 7 9 -$ E $F 3 " (& (+ % (% &
  31. 31. Summary and Conclusion ASEAN adopted a strategy of constructively engagingall major powers in the Asia Pacific. Among the great powers,ASEAN relations with China and the US are considered to bethe most challenging. During the cold war, ASEAN sided with US to containthe spread of communism. ASEAN had animosity China atthat time because of its support to communist insurgency. Afterthe cold war, however, China’s relations with ASEANdramatically improved. The US, on the other hand,strategically neglected Southeast Asia. After 9/11, China-ASEAN relations improved further, despite Americandeclaration of Southeast Asia as its second front in the globalwar on terrorism. In the post-9/11 era, ASEAN adopted a hedgingstrategy towards China and the US. Consistent with theASEAN strategy, the Philippines also pursued a foreign andsecurity policy towards China and the US on the basis ofhedging. ASEAN’s hedging strategy informs Philippineforeign and security policy towards China.
  32. 32. CHAPTER THREEPhilippine Policy in the South China Sea: Implications for Philippines-China Security Relations85Introduction In March 2008, the Philippines and China faced aserious controversy concerning the implementation of JointMarine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in the South China Sea.The JMSU, signed in Manila on 14 March 2005, is a tripartiteagreement among the petroleum companies of China, thePhilippines and Vietnam that requires the three countries toconduct joint marine seismic explorations of the designatedarea in the Spratly Island. Both houses of the PhilippineCongress urged for an investigation of the deal to examine theculpability of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for possibleviolation of the Constitution, which is, under the Philippinelaw, a grave offense that can lead to impeachment. The JMSU raised many collateral issues that havebearings on Philippine position in the South China Sea and onthe status of Philippines-China security relations. Thecontroversy demonstrated that the South China Sea disputeremains a lingering challenge in Philippines-China relations inthe post-9/11 world. This challenge not only affectsPhilippines-China security relations but it also has impact onregional security. This chapter re-examines Philippine foreign andsecurity policy on the South China Sea in the light of the JMSUscandal. It describes the strategic significance of the SouthChina Sea in Philippine foreign and security policy andanalyzes its implications for Philippines-China securityrelations. It concludes with a discussion on how to manage thedispute in the South China through what many analysts call“cooperative management regime.” 4 7 E# 6 7 # :5 (& & . - L )5 (& &%
  33. 33. The South China Sea in Philippine Foreign and SecurityPolicy86 There is an avalanche of literature on the South ChinaSea, one of the largest bodies of waters in the world after thefive major oceans. 87 Located in the Pacific, it encompassesareas from the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Strait measuringaround 3,500,000 km.² The South China Sea is composed offour major groups of islands, namely the Pratas Islands, theParacel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands.88Ownership of these islands has been contested by severalclaimants for various reasons including among others historicrights, discovery, effective occupation and sovereignjurisdiction provided for by the United Nations Convention onthe Law of the SEA (UNCLOS). Since the South China Sea isa strategic waterways surrounded by rich marine resources aswell as oil and gas potential, the area is marred by internationaldiplomatic disputes that, if not effectively managed, canescalate into military conflicts.89 The South China Sea Disputehas been creating a security anxiety for being one of theflashpoints of conflict in the Asia Pacific.90 Among these groups of islands, the most controversialis the Spratlys having been claimed in whole by China andTaiwan and in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines andVietnam. Indonesia, though strictly not a claimant state, is animportant stakeholder in the on-going conflict in the Spratlysbecause of its overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)with other claimants, particularly its Gas Field in Natuna Islandbeing contested by China and Taiwan.<) # % E# 7 # ! 5 # 1 5 # 4 =*H D 1 A ? (& ;+ & :%<; A . ?"$ % E 5 % (2< * > ? 0A 6 7 1 # 22:+ E Q ED ? E *E 1 6 22)+ %<< 5 ! 18 % 87 % % 8 8 % A% %<2 5% M # # 1 A # # M 5 # - M R )% *5 ; 22<+ %2& F - * 1E F 22:+ %
  34. 34. The Philippines is claiming parts of the Spratlys that belongto what it calls the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). The KIG liesin the Western section of the Spratlys. It is composed of 53islands, islets, reefs, shoals, cays, rocks, and atolls with an areaof 64,976 square miles. The biggest island in the KIG is Pag-asa (Hope), more internationally known as Thi Tu Island. ThePhilippines has also occupied the following islands: • Patag -Flat Island (Feixin Dao) • Lawak -Nanshan Island (Mahuan Dao) • Likas -West York Island (Xiyue Dao) • Panata -Lankiam Cay (Shuanghuang Shazhou) • Kota -Loaita Island (Nanyue Dao) • Rizal Reef -Commodore Reef (Siling Jiao) The Philippine government laid its claim in the SouthChina Sea in 1947, a year after the Philippines gained itsindependence from the United States. During that time, thePhilippine government described the Spratlys as the “NewSouthern Islands.” Then Philippine Foreign Affairs SecretaryCarlos P. Garcia requested the Allied Forces to put the “NewSouthern Islands” under Philippine jurisdiction for securityreasons. The Philippines asserted its sovereignty to the KIGbefore the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in the1950s. Since 1968, the Philippine military has occupied andadministered at least eight of the islands in the KIG. On 11 June 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcossigned Presidential Decree No. 1596 declaring the KIG as amunicipality of Palawan. PD 1596 reflects the Philippinepolicy position on this claim when it stated that the KIG “doesnot belong to any state or nation, but, by reason of history,indispensable need, and effective occupation and controlestablished in accordance with international law, such areasmust not be deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty ofthe Philippines.” It has also declared the area as vital to thesecurity and economic survival of the Philippines. Since then,residents of KIG have been holding local elections there todemonstrate Philippine sovereignty in the area. 91 ThePhilippines recognizes the fact that there are other claimants on2 - 5 % 7 * + E 1 7 *. 1 E7 5 # 22(+ %
  35. 35. the KIG. PD 1596 articulates the Philippine perspective on thismatter when it said that “while other state have laid claims tosome of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonmentand cannot prevail over that of the Philippines on legal,historical, and equitable grounds.” Another basis of Philippine claim of the KIG is theprinciple of terra nullius. This principle states that the islandsbeing claimed by the Philippines are owned by no one andwithout a sovereign authority. The discovery and occupationof Filipino navigator Tomas Cloma of around 33 islands, cays,sandbars and coral reefs in the South China Sea on 15 May1956 provided the Philippines a historical justification of theclaim. The Filipino navigator collectively called these islandsand islets as Free Territory of the Freedomland. In 1956,Cloma wrote to Garcia to inform him of the occupation of theislands, which were described, as outside of Philippine watersbut not within the jurisdiction of any country. When thePhilippine media publicized the Philippine claim, China,France, South Vietnam, the Netherlands and Taiwan reportedlylaid their respective claims to this group of islands. 92Eventually, France and the Netherlands dropped their claims. The Philippines also laid its claim on the basis of theprinciple of proximity and the principle of the 200-nauticalmile EEZ embodied in the UNCLOS. The Philippines arguesthat the KIG falls within the EEZ of the Philippine archipelago. The final basis of the Philippines is the principle of thecontinental shelf. The KIG lies in the continental shelf abuttingthe Western boundaries of Palawan Province. 93 Filipinogeologists argued that Palawan is a mini-continent. On thebasis of geological evidences, the KIG belongs to thecontinental shelf of Palawan. PD 1596 asserts this basis ofclaim when it states that the KIG “is part of the continentalmargin of the Philippine archipelago.”2( . D .% . ? 6 E !0 # *H D 1 0# # # 5 - # 2<<+ % (%23 , %> = ! % * + 5 5 1 *. 1 E7 22 + = % - D G ! 7 % < (9%
  36. 36. Strategic Significance of the South China Sea in PhilippineForeign and Security Policy The South China Sea is strategically significant for thePhilippines because of the following considerations: a) Thepolitics of oil; b) The geopolitics of navigation; and c) Thepolitics of marine resources. The Politics of Oil. It has been projected that oilconsumption in Asia will going to increase dramatically in thenext few decades. Over the next 20 years, oil consumptionamong developing Asian countries will rise by 4 percentannually.94 If the current oil demand persists, oil consumptionin Asia will double in 2020. Though the Philippines onlyrepresents 1.2 percent of the total oil consumption in Asia, itsoil production is extremely limited making the country heavilydependent on oil imports. Due to the development of new offshore deepwater oildeposits, the Philippines experienced a modest increase in oilproduction in 2007 estimated at 23 thousand barrels per day(bbl/d). 95 The Malampaya Project is the country’s largestnatural gas development project. Nonetheless, the Philippinescontinue to rely on imported oil, particularly from the MiddleEast, to meet the increasing domestic demand. This situationencourages the country to consider the South China Sea as analternative source of its power supply. There are conflicting claims on the oil potential of theSouth China Sea. Based on the research conducted by Chineseexperts, the total gas resources of the South China Sea canreach 900 Tcf with an annual production of 1.8 Tcf. Othersources indicate that the potential oil resources of the SouthChina Sea are 213 billion barrels. In the 1995 study conductedby Russias Research Institute of Geology of ForeignCountries, there were around 6 billion barrels of oil in theSpratly Islands, of which 70 percent would be natural gas.96 Ithad also been estimated that the hydrocarbon resource potentialof the Spratlys area fall into the very broad range of between29 E7 4 ! 18 8 % % 8 % %2: # 5 0 ! 18 8 % % % 7 8 8 48 8 % 0 %2) 4 ! 18 % 8 % 8 % %
  37. 37. one and 17.7 million tons of oil. 97 Despite these competingestimates, the South China Sea is perceived to be “oil rich,”Chinese media described the area as the “Second PersianGulf.” Table 1. Oil and Natural Gas Potential in the South China Sea Countries Proven Oil Proven Gas Oil Production Gas Reserves Reserves (Barrels/Day) Production (Billion (Trillion (Billion Barrels) Cubic Feet) Cubic FeetBrunei 1.35 14.1 145,000 340Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0 0China* 1 3.5 290,000 141Indonesia* 0.2 29.7 46,000 0Malaysia 3.9 79.8 645,000 1,300Philippines 0.2 2.7 <1,000 0Singapore 0.0 0.0 0 0Taiwan <0.01 2.7 <1,000 30Thailand 0.3 7.0 59,000 482Viet Nam 0.6 6.0 180,000 30Total 7.5 145.5 1,367,000 2323Source: GlobalSecurity.Org, “Oil and Gas in the South China Sea,” 2008. Among the claimants in the Spratlys, the Philippineshas been to be the most active in licensing explorationactivities. As stated earlier, the Malampaya Natural Gas toPower Project is its largest venture that started to sell gas inJanuary 2002. The Malampaya Gas Field has proven to be asource of 3.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas with 118 millionbarrels of condensate. Geopolitics of Navigation. The South China is one theworld’s maritime superhighways. More than 50 percent of theworld’s supertanker traffic passes through the South China Sea.Annually, almost half of the world’s merchant fleets sailthrough the South China Sea. According to US Energy Information Administration,“tanker traffic through the Strait of Malacca at thesouthwestern end of the South China Sea is more than threetimes greater than Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times2; 7 # # 1 0 - #" E7 !* # # # . F # # # 5 # 5 F )< 4 (& + % ;% &
  38. 38. more than the Panama Canal.”98 Sea Lines of Communications(SLOCs) in the South China Sea are therefore a matter of lifeand death for the Asia Pacific countries considering that around41,000 ships use its waterways. 99 The South China Sea is astrategic waterway as it also provides the key maritime linkbetween the Indian Ocean and East Asia.100Figure 1. South China Sea Source: Energy Information Administration, 2008. As an archipelagic state, the Philippines heavilydepends on the freedom of navigation in the South China Seafor its development and survival. With a total coastline of17,500 km, of which 1,200 km face in the South China Sea, thePhilippines has enormous interest in the maritime security ofSLOCs in the area considering that around 400,00 fishingvessels and 20,000 other commercial vessels navigate inPhilippine waters. 101 However, almost one third of the2< 4 ! 18 8 % % 8 % %22 "= A @ 1 7 # . ! 5 # % :3 *, 1 @ 5(& + % (% & && 4% & 5 % % 7 . 5 15$ # !* # D4 # E7 . , ; <0 4 22;+ %
  39. 39. country’s sea lanes are found to be “unsafe” for navigation.Moreover, shippers and mariners do not use the Philippine sealanes is extensively as the Strait of Malacca and the SouthChina because voyages in the Philippine waters take longer.Thus, the Philippines has to pursue its claims in the busywaterways of the Spratlys to promote its navigational rights. Politics of Marine Resources. Marine scientistscontend that the South China Sea is rich in marine resources. Itis described as “the center of maritime generic richness anddiversity in the world” with a macro-ecosystem characterizedby “high bio-diversity and fisheries productivity” due to the“intrinsic connectivity of coral reefs, sea-grass, and mangroveforests.”102 The United Nations Atlas of the Oceans declaresthe South China Sea as Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) withthe world’s highest level of bio-diversity.103 Since the South China Sea is the locus of complexecological connectivities, the area is considered a “savingsbank” of all claimant states.104 Marine production in the arearepresents 12 percent of the total marine global production.105Culture fisheries, in fact, contribute 54 percent of worldwideculture production. 106 Due to its rich marine endowments,claimants, including the Philippines, are competing for controlof the fishing area of the South China Sea. The situation isaggravated by the overlapping EEZ not only among claimantsbut also other littoral states of the South China Sea. In the study of Pakjuta Khemakorn of the UnitedNations – The Nippon Foundation, “The average per capitaconsumption of fish in East and Southeast Asia during the&( . E% - #. 7 @ ! 6 7 # . *6 4222+ %&3 - A ?B L ? 4 . # - !*. 7 4 (& )+ & 18 % % 8 8 E 8 8 8 # # S S 8 # S 8# S 8 ? ? S )& & ;S % # % &9 % 7 ! *E# # 4 (& + & % &: %E% = D E #. 7 4J 51 4 . ! 18 % 8 % %B8 & (& & 8 # 8 % #% &) 4%
  40. 40. period 2000-2003 was 26.1 kg/year. This is much higher thanthe world average of 16.3 kg/year.” 107 Khemakorn also writes: Fisheries also contribute to the employment and income of millions of people in the region. In 1994, the estimated numbers of full and part-time fishers engaged in marine and inland fisheries were 8.7 million and 1.7 million, respectively. According to FAO, around 85 percent of the world fishers are concentrated in Asia, s particularly in the SCS region, compared to 77 percent in 1970. China has the largest number of fishers followed by Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. In total, at least 31 million people are engaged in the fisheries sector (including aquaculture) and related industries in the region. Fisheries, therefore, play a very vital role in thefood and economic security littoral states in the SouthChina Sea.The South China Disputes After 9/11: A ContinuingChallenge in Philippines-China Relations With the politics of oil, geopolitics of navigation andpolitics of marine resources, there is no doubt that the SouthChina Sea is a continuing security challenge in Philippines-China relations even after 9/11 with significant impact on thesecurity of Southeast Asia and its neighboring regions. Thoughboth countries are parties to the Declaration on the Conduct ofParties in the South China Sea, which, according to a study, isa product of de-escalation of dispute in the area,108 competingclaims on the ownership of the islands continue to be a sourceof security anxieties not only between the Philippines andChina but also other claimants and stakeholders in the conflict. One of the main sources of controversies involving thePhilippines and China over the issue of the South China Seawas the JMSU scandal. Though Vietnam was part of theJMSU, the issue primarily involved the Philippines and China&; L ? 4 . # - ! % % % (< (2%&< # E # E 5 ! @ ? *) " (& ;+ & %
  41. 41. because of domestic political dynamics in Manila. The threepetroleum companies of the three countries signed the JMSUon 14 March 2005 in Manila in order to undertake joint marineseismic exploration of designated areas in the Spratlys. Thethree countries regarded the JMSU as a significant step in theimplementation of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties inthe South China Sea. It is a manifestation of pragmaticcooperation in the South China Sea in order to promote peace,stability and development of the contested area. The original JMSU only signed between the Philippinesand China on 1 September 2004 as part of their efforts toenhance their bilateral relations. Vietnam protested for beingexcluded in the initiative. Being a strong claimant, thePhilippines and China accommodated Vietnam after less than ayear of negotiations that led to the signing of the tripartiteagreement. China described the JMSU as “landmark agreement”while the Philippines called it a “historic breakthrough.”According to President Arroyo, "This is a historic eventbecause it is the first, it is the breakthrough in implementingthe provisions of the code of conduct in the South China Seaamong ASEAN and China to turn the South China Sea into anarea of cooperation rather than an area of conflict." Arroyoadded, "It is not only a diplomatic breakthrough for peace andsecurity in the region, but also for our energy independenceprogram because one of the elements of this program is towork on strategic alliances with friends and allies so that wecan have more supply of energy for the region and ourcountry.” A $15 million budget was allotted for theimplementation of the JMSU for a period of three yearscovering 2005 to 2008. However, the JMSU was put in the cloud ofcontroversy in the Philippines because of the allegation that thePhilippine government sold out parts of its territory to China inexchange of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Theshort article written by Barry Wain triggered the scandal. Waincriticized President Arroyo for her “bungle in the South ChinaSea.”109 He argued that President Arroyo entered into “unequal&2 @ . G ! - 7 " 8 4 - (& <% &
  42. 42. and surreptitious” agreement with China, which lawmakers inManila linked with a $329 million contract with the Chinesecompany, the ZTE, for a national broadband network. Whatmade the JMSU highly suspicious was the lack of transparencyin the agreement. The JMSU was “shrouded in secrecy” andbroke ranks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), which “was dealing with China as a bloc on theSouth China Sea issue.” He contended that: President Arroyo’s agreement with China for a joint seismic study was controversial in several respects. By not consulting other ASEAN members beforehand, the Philippines abandoned the collective stance that was key to the group’s success with China over the South China Sea. Ironically, it was Manila that first sought a united front and rallied ASEAN to confront China over its intrusion into Mischief Reef a decade earlier. Sold the idea by politicians with business links who have other deals going with the Chinese, Ms. Arroyo did not seek the views of her foreign ministry.110 With the allegation that the Philippines has soften itsclaim in the South China Sea in favor of a multi-million dollarloan package from China, Congressman Roilo Golezsponsored an inquiry into the alleged anomalous agreement andargued that if found guilty of treason, President Arroyo shouldbe held accountable and be subjected to impeachmentprocedure. 111 Golez said that the JMSU was illegal andunconstitutional because it did not pass the approval of thePhilippine Congress. Government officials contended that the JMSU did notviolate the Philippine Constitution and it was intended to easethe country’s dependence on imported oil.112 Local officials inPalawan even expressed support to the JMSU arguing that this & 4% F ? 5 4 # D " 6! . * .(& <+ & 18 % 8 % % 8 8 8 & & (& <8 38 8 ?% % % % 4 %# % D %B %* % & % %+ % % % ( # 5 " 6 . Q 7 / D. . *2 . (& <+ & 18 % 7 8 8 # % JT(& <% 8 % 3&
  43. 43. “will open the gates for us to really know the resources wehave.” 113 Moreover, the Philippine government exclaimed thatthe JMSU was a tripartite commercial agreement among threeoil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam. Theagreement was not “a sell-out” of Philippine territory as theJMSU did not alter the territorial claims of three parties. ThePhilippine government also explained that the JMSU was anexemplary confidence building measure (CBM) to convert theregion of conflict in the South China into a region of peace andcooperation. The heat on the JSMU scandal slowed down when itexpired in June 2008. The Philippine government organized acommittee headed by the Department of Foreign Affairs tolook into the possibility of extending the JMSU for mutualbenefits of all parties concerned.114 Despite the controversy, thePhilippine government remained steadfast in its position thatthe JMSU was needed to manage the South China Sea Disputepeacefully.Managing the South China Sea Disputes: Towards ACooperative Management Regime? After 9/11, Philippines-China relations improvedtremendously based on the various agreements the twogovernments entered into in various fields. Their bilateralrelations also became comprehensive when they started theirdefense and security dialogue in 2005 and enthusiasticallypursued thereafter a series of exchange visits of their militaryand security officials. The JMSU scandal also demonstrated that their bilateralsecurity relations remain fragile and the issues of territorialintegrity in the South China Sea continue to be a sensitive issuein their bilateral relations. There have been many proposals to peacefully managethe South China Sea Dispute. One proposal is through a 3 F 0# # ? " 65 . ! * . (& <+ & 18 % 8 % % 8 8 8 & & (& <8 38 8 ?% % % % 4 %#% D %B %* % & % %+ % % %9 # 4 A # . 6 ! =.5 *( " (& <+ " & 18 % 8 %78 8& 9)<38 # 4 A# . 6% "
  44. 44. functionalist approach where claimants will start cooperating innon-political aspects of the issue to “put under the rag” allsensitive issues that trigger conflict. 115 Another is through“joint development”, which inspires the JMSU. 116 There isalso a concept of “sharing the resources” of the South ChinaSea as a peaceful option.117 The most recent is called “cooperative managementregime” (CMR) conceptualized in 2007 in an internationalconference in Singapore organized by the S. RajaratnamSchool of International Studies of Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity.118 Apparently influenced by a “Regime Theory” ininternational relations, the CMR is consistent with thefunctionalist option in upholding the idea of functionalcooperation to manage conflict in the South China Sea. Thoughthe CMR remains embryonic in its conceptualization with littleclarity and coherence, it urged claimants to engage incooperation in non-traditional security as part of the over-allCBM and trust building in the South China Sea. The CMR isdeemed to be alternative “conflict-avoidance” approach for theestablishment of a regime of peace and stability in the SouthChina Sea. The Philippines and China can contribute in thedevelopment of CMR in the South China Sea by pursuing abilateral fisheries agreement. China and Japan entered into thiskind of agreement in 1997 while China and South Koreafollowed suit in 2000. In fact, the Philippines proposed in 2007 : % 5- 5 . # # 10 # ! 5 # % % <% 5 5 5 - E- 0 *H D 1 E# # + % :9<&% ) 7 # # 1 0 - #" E7 !* # # # . F # # # 5 # 5 F )< 4 (& + & % ; . ?$ . ? " .% $ E ? 5% F # 4? % *, 16 7 #, 22;+% < 1 7. * # 1 6 ) ; . (& ;+ 5 & % #* + 1 7. * > ? F 1 (& <+ & %
  45. 45. a ’fisheries corridor’ in the South China Sea to avoid potentialconflicts that could affect peace and stability in the region.119Though the Philippines and China held in 2005 the FirstMeeting of the Philippines-China Joint Commission onFisheries to explore bilateral cooperation on fisheryinvestments, research and technology, and safety of propertyand life at sea, the momentum to talk was disturbed by theJMSU controversy. There is a need to sustain talks on thisissue to find a more pragmatic, peaceful and non-confrontational solution to the South China Sea conflict.Summary and Conclusion The Philippines has a policy to pursue what it calls alegitimate claim in the contested areas of the South China Sea.Immediately after the end of the cold war, territorial issues inthe South China Sea became a source of tension in SoutheastAsia because of China’s passage of territorial waters law in1992 and occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1995. However,the tension deescalated after 9/11 due to China’s “charmoffensive” in Southeast Asia, which resulted in the signing ofthe Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China in2002. The Declaration was hailed as a historic landmark inmanaging disputes in the South China Sea. But the SouthChina Sea continues to be a security challenge between thePhilippines and China because of lingering concerns over thesensitive issue of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. 2 # % ! *9 4 (& ;+ & 18 8 %4 % 8 % 3J S T2)33%
  46. 46. CHAPTER FOUR The Taiwan Factor in Philippines-China Security Relations120Introduction Though Philippines-China security relations have gonea long way since the establishment of their diplomatic ties in1975, both countries continue to confront the perennialchallenge of Taiwan. Every now and then, the issue of Taiwansurfaces in Philippines’ relations with China causing someirritants and occasional hiccups in their bilateral ties. In fact,the Taiwan issue has been a major source of China’s securitydilemma when dealing with other nations.121 While the Philippines upholds a “One-China Policy,” itmaintains its relations with Taiwan in the economic, social andcultural realms. There was even an allegation that thePhilippines has discreet security ties with Taiwan makingChina suspicious of Manila’s strategic intention in the CrossStrait conflict.122 This chapter examines the issue of Taiwan as a factor inPhilippines-China security relations. It describes Philippines-Taiwan security relations after 9/11 and how these relationsaffected the direction of Philippines-China security relations.Background on Philippines-Taiwan Relation123 Prior to the establishment of Philippines’ relations withthe People’s Republic of China (PROC), the Philippines first(& 4 7 # # = A5 # = A 35 (& %( FB GE 1 * 1 #5 (& + & % (( 0# # E # # # ## # 5 07 7 1 L E7 *H D 15 - #" (& 9+ & % (3 7 7 # % A # 0 1 - ! 5 # 1 5 #= 4 *H D 1 A ?(& ;+ & %
  47. 47. had a diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC).When the Philippines became an independent republic in 1946,the very first Treaty of Amity it entered into was with the ROCthen called as the Nationalist China. Establishing diplomaticrelations with the ROC was considered to be a foreign policypriority of then President Manuel Roxas.124 As reciprocation,the ROC, on the other hand, was one of the first countries torecognize the Philippines as an independent republic. Common historical experiences during the war,geographic proximity and cultural familiarity were crucialfactors for the close ties with Taiwan. During the 3 October1946 presentation of credentials of Chen Chih-ping, the firstChinese ambassador to the Philippines, President Roxasstressed that the Philippines and China had common ties due togeographic propinquity, a mutual wartime cause, and Chinesecontribution through industry and thrift over the centuries toPhilippine economic life. 125 The negotiations on Philippine-Chinese treaty of friendship were not easy. They were stormy,surrounded with controversies because of domesticconsiderations. Both countries finally signed the treaty on 18April 1947, which provided that “the nationals of each countrywere at liberty to enter or leave, to travel or reside in, theterritory of the other upon the same terms as the nationals ofany third country in accordance with domestic laws andregulations.”126 With the signing of the Treaty of Amity between theRepublic of the Philippines (RP) and the ROC, Manilaestablished its Consulate General Offices in Amoy andShanghai in 1947. To strengthen RP-ROC diplomatic ties, thePhilippines opened a legation in Nanking in March 1948 withSenator Proceso Sebastian as the first Philippine ambassador toNationalist China. 127 However, the Philippine Legation wasshort-lived due to domestic political changes in China. WhenMao Tse Tung proclaimed the PROC in 1949, the Philippines(9 . @ . 5 E , # 4 *, 16 7 #, 2):+ % )&%(: 4%() 4%(; " - *. 1F # 2<(+ % 9 %
  48. 48. closed its legation in Nanking, established a liaison office inGuangzhou, and in 1950 finally transferred to Taipei. The establishment of a communist government inMainland China posed two major problems for the Philippinegovernment. The first was internal: increased control overChinese immigration. The second was external: recognition ofa communist regime. On the first problem, the Philippine government, havingadopted a staunch anti-communism policy, decisivelyprohibited Chinese immigration and banned travel to or fromMainland China. 128 While being very strict with anythingrelated with PROC, the government pursued strong diplomaticand economic relations with Taiwan. It signed a tradeagreement with Taiwan and even intensified exchange ofspecialists and information leading to the development of aclose ideological and economic partnership with ROC. In 1956,it raised the legation in Taipei to embassy level. Theestablishment of a Philippine Embassy in Taiwan clearlydemonstrated the interest of the government to have strongeconomic and political partnership with Nationalist China. Being both security allies of the United States, thePhilippines and Taiwan established security relations. Militaryofficers from the Philippines and Taiwan had regularexchanges. Taiwan’s War College inspired the establishment ofthe National Defense College of the Philippines in 1963. Bothcountries established regular exchanges of military officers andeven intelligence information. On the second problem, the Philippine governmentattempted not to get entangled with Beijing-Taipei conflict.During the administration of former President Elpidio Quirino,the Philippine government did not explicitly take an anti-communism posture. The establishment of Philippine Embassyin Taiwan was a lucid expression of Manila’s political leaningswith Taipei. Philippine support of democratic and nationalistChina represented by ROC was revealed as early as 1951 whenthe Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) withthe United States. The MDT was an anti-Communist treaty that(< F # ! * # # G =5 5 5 . 6 7 ) 7 4 222+ % )%