This document discusses the importance of mine countermeasures (MCM) and summarizes the capabilities and challenges of airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM). It notes that over 50 countries possess mine capabilities and mines are a low-cost but high-effect asymmetric weapon. The document outlines the AMCM capabilities of US Navy squadrons including mine hunting sonar and influence mine sweeping systems. It discusses trends in more lethal, deeper anchoring mines and challenges in countering improved stealth and remote control. The role of MH-53E helicopters in providing a rapid AMCM response worldwide is summarized.

1. AIRFORCES brief to MINEWARA:
MCM from the Air
21 May 09

2. MCM
RELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCE
US SHIP CASUALTIES BY WEAPON TYPE
1950-PRESENT
16
KOREA 1950-52
USS PRINCETON
14 VIETNAM 1969-72
USS TRIPOLI
ISRAEL 1967 USS TRIPOLI USS S.B. ROBERTS
12
IRAN 1987-88 USS WARRINGTON
USS PRINCETON
USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY
10 IRAQ 1991
USS BARTON
TERRORIST 2000 USS E.G. SMALL
8
USS WALKE
USS MANSFIELD
6 USS BRUSH
USS COLE
USS SARSI
4 USS PARTRIDGE
USS PLEDGE
2 USS HIGBEE USS PIRATE
USS STARK USS LIBERTY USS LIBERTY USS COLE USS MAGPIE
MISSILE TORPEDO AIRPLANE SMALL BOAT MINE 2

3. The Threat to Assured Access
Moored Moored Floating
Anti-Invasion Buried/Partially Bottom Rising
Contact Influence Contact
Buried Influence Influence
 The real goal of a minefield is Sea Denial, NOT the damage or destruction of a specific ship.
 The Sea is a maneuver area. Navy goal is to assure Access, support STOM/OMFTS, NOT counter
every mine. • Over 300 Mine Types
• Over 50 Countries Possess
• Low Cost but High effects
• Simple to Deploy
• Asymmetric
4

4. SUMMARY OF MINING EVENTS (1980 – PRESENT)
• 50-60 VESSELS SUNK OR DAMAGED
– MAJORITY IN SRI LANKA
• MANY ARMED CONTACT MINES ADRIFT
– PERSIAN GULF
• > 20 LIVES LOST AT-SEA & ASHORE
• COSTLY SHIP REPAIRS/REPLACEMENTS
• EXPENSIVE MULTI-NATIONAL MCM OPERATIONS
• EXTENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
60+ COUNTRIES WITH MINING CAPABILITIES

5. MINING OF MISRATAH
• MINED BY LIBYAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (29 Apr 11)
– ATTEMPT TO CLOSE PORT
• MINES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE
HARBOR ENTRANCE
– 2 “QUICKLY CLEARED”
– 1 “DRIFTED AWAY”
• “ANTI-SHIPPING” MINES
– MOORED CONTACT MINES
• LIBYA PROVEN MINER LIBYAN MOORED CONTACT MINE
– 1984 RED SEA MINING
(Reuters) - NATO minesweepers searched the
approaches of Misratah harbor Monday for a
drifting mine that has blocked aid supplies to
the besieged Libyan city and halted
evacuation of foreigners and wounded
Libyans.

6. NAVAL MINE TRENDS
• Increasing Lethality Ranges and Minable Waters
– Torpedo-mines
– Deeper anchor depths
• Emerging Anti-Helo and ACV Capabilities
• Mine Employment More Difficult to Detect
– Denial & Deception improving
– Standoff employment
• Improved Target Discrimination/CCM Features
– Microprocessor controlled triple influence TDDs/upgrade kits
– Target libraries improving
• Minehunting Increasingly Difficult
– Stealth technology application growing
• Security and Flexibility of Minefield Control Improving
– Wireless Remote Control (Acoustic, EM, RF)
CONVERGENCE OF WEAPONS, DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WIDE AREA
SENSORS NETWORKS

7. Straight Rising Propelled Warhead Mines
• PROPELLED-WARHEAD MINE
– STRAIGHT-RISING
– ROCKET PROPELLED
• PASSIVE ACOUSTIC
EM55
• 130 kg WARHEAD
• CASE DEPTH: 50-150 m
• ANCHOR DEPTH: 55 – 200 m
• SUBMARINE, SHIP-LAID
• ASUW

8. Encapsulated Torpedo Mines
• PMK-2
• PASSIVE / ACTIVE ACOUSTIC
• MPT-1M THERMAL TORPEDO
• CASE/ANCHOR: 400/1000 m
• WIDE AREA COVERAGE

9. Agile Minelayers
• EXERCISE MINES LOADED
ON SMALL BOATS

10. ROCKET LAUNCHED MINES
ROCKET LAUNCHER WATER IMPACT
DRIFTING MINES?

11. MINE STEALTH
IRREGULAR SHAPES CLOSE-TETHER MOORINGS
NON-MAGNETIC CASES
CASE BURIAL
ACTIVE CASE BURIAL

12. AIRLANT role in MCM
Man, Train and Equip
• HM-14
y Dedicated
• HM-15 T oda
• HSC-Expeditionary Organic
re
AMCM F utu
MCM Triad
MCM Triad
UMCM SMCM
4

13. Today’s Dedicated AMCM
Around the world in 72 Hours
HM-14 – homeport Norfolk
Det 1 supporting C7F in Pohang, Korea (2 a/c)
HM-15 – homeport change to Norfolk Sept 09
(BRAC)
Det 2 supporting C5F in Bahrain (4 a/c)
5

14. What makes up an HM squadron?
5

15. HM Mission Requirements
• Provide a 72-hour rapid-response Airborne Mine Countermeasures
(AMCM) capability worldwide to support COCOM requirements.
• Provide secondary capability for Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD)
and Heavy Lift.
• Operate from ship or fully expeditionary shore self-support capable
7

16. Requirement: 28 total aircraft inventory
• 20 AMCM aircraft to cover multiple OPLAN and NORTHCOM
HLD AMCM requirements
– Includes 4 VOD a/c to cover EUCOM or other COCOM heavy lift
logistic requirements and NORTHCOM HA/DR relief requirements.
– HM AMCM to cover requirement with HC-4 Decom in Sept 07
• 4 Aircraft on the line for FRS throughput
• 2 RDTE a/c in P-City (supports alternative platform Organic
AMCM systems DT/OT)
• 2 aircraft for pipeline (10% of inventory)
Bottom Line:
Bottom Line:
20 MH-53E provide world-wide AMCM response
20 MH-53E provide world-wide AMCM response
capability
capability
No comparable NATO/coalition capability exists
No comparable NATO/coalition capability exists 6

17. AMCM Capabilities
• Rapid mine sweeping
– Actuate influence mines (MK-105)
– Sever moored mines from their tether
(MK-103 Mechanical Sweep)
• Mine hunting
– Uses sonar or laser energy to locate,
classify, and identify mines
• Requires follow-on intervention for
disposal
9

18. Capability: Mine Hunting
AN/AQS-24
AN/AQS-24A
Manta MK 36
UNCLAS
10

19. AN/AQS-24 Laser Line Scan
MK-36
CRN 73
7
AQS-24 Sonar

20. AMCM Contingency Systems
AQS-20 Configuration
Three of five OAMCM systems MH-53E compatible:
• AQS-20 and AMNS contingency systems approved for MH-53E
• Both systems have passed OPTEVFOR OA test program on MH-53E
• Full OT not funded in favor of MH-60S platform
• OASIS currently undergoing CT testing on MH-53E
12

21. Pacing Capability: Influence Mine Sweeping
MK-105
AN/SPU-1/W
Magnetic Orange Pipe MK-104
24

22. AN/SPU-1W (MOP)
• AN/SPU-1W: Remains
effective against influence
mines in brackish to fresh
water. In service.
10

23. MK-104
• Acoustic minesweeping
system.
• Generates a sound field
capable of actuating
acoustic mines.
• Streamed, towed and
recovered from MH-53E.
9

24. MK-105 MOD IV
• Hydrofoil towed and
remotely controlled
from helicopter.
• Launched from ships,
ramps or remote sites.
• Provides a safe and
reliable method of
detonating magnetic
influence mines.
• MK-106: combination
acoustic / magnetic
sweeps.
(MK-104 + MK-105 = MK-106)
11

25. MK-103
• Mechanical minesweeping
system used for sweeping
moored mines.
• Streamed, towed and
recovered from MH-53E.
• Consists of a port and
starboard diverted wire
sweep armed with cutters.
• Sweep wires diverted by
otters and supported by
marker floats.
8

26. Austere Site AMCM Operations
39

27. HM NVD transition
Crawl – walk – run implementation
within the MH-53E fleet
12

28. Other MCM in R&D
Counter-mine Remote Mine-hunting Unmanned Surface
system (JDAM) System (RMS) Sweep System (US3)
Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance UUV Low Frequency Broad Band Sonar 18
and Analysis (COBRA) (UUV LFBB)

29. MH-53E: What has changed since 2005?
• OAMCM
MH-53E demand evolving beyond AMCM: Sea Base AR/LSB
• Sea Base CONOPS:
- Heavy Lift•OAMC
ICD approved by JROC
• OIF/GWOT Heavy lift requirements
- ISO 3rd Army in Iraq
• Increased demand for HA/DR assets
TSUNAMI HA/DR OPS GWOT / OIF
17

30. DSCA support
• • Surveys of 12 DoD ports underway • Change detection
Surveys of 12 DoD ports underway
• • Surveys allow change detection
Surveys allow change detection
• • In experiments change detection:
In experiments change detection:
will reduce time to
– Eliminated 54% of mine-like objects
– Eliminated 54% of mine-like objects
– Reduced clearance time by 30% clear a port.
– Reduced clearance time by 30%
• Heavy lift provides
unmatched capability
responding to civil
emergencies.
6

31. MH-53E Look-back
• Tsunami Relief JAN-MAR 05 HADR (PACOM)
• JTF KATRINA AUG-SEP 05 HADR (NORTHCOM)
• JTF RITA SEP 05 HADR (NORTHCOM
• RIMPAC 06 JUN–AUG 06 MIW (PACOM)
• PANAMAX 06 AUG–SEP 06 MIW (SOUTHCOM)
• JTF LEBANON AUG – Nov 06 NEO (EUCOM)
• POTUS MAR 07 Uruguay/Mexico SOUTHCOM
• 3P (C7F AOR) MAY-NOV 07 HADR/GWOT (PACOM)
HM-15 deliver essential supplies during Katrina MH-53E during RIMPAC Sled Ops 18

32. FDNF – CENTCOM AOR
• Pakistan Relief OCT-NOV 05 HADR
• FAWOMOEX 05-2 OCT 06 MIW
• NAUTICAL UNION JUL 06 MIW
• SAIPAN MK-105 SEP – NOV 06 MIW
• RFF 3rd Army IRAQ JAN06-JAN 07 GWOT support
MK-105 SAIPAN C5F Ops 19
HM-15 conducting HADR in Pakistan

33. MH-53E FLEX
• MH-53Es begin reaching their
structural service life limit in FY-
07
• Fatigue Life Extension (FLEX) –
extends fatigue life limit of a/c
from 6900 to 10,000 hours
• Costs $500,000 per a/c ($4M for 16
AMCM aircraft)
• Limited FLEX (16 a/c) maintains
inventory through FY 15.
• Allows Navy flexibility in
assessing long term requirement
for MH-53E or HLR
36

34. MH-53E
Program Milestones
• 1987 MH-53E enters service as Navy’s AMCM platform
• PR07 MH-53E Fatigue Life Extension (FLEX) extends service
life from 2009 to 2014
• POM 08 Navy VOD (HLR) strategy (AR/LSB ICD):
– IOC 2015
– FOC 2020
– Inventory Objective: 20 - 32 (notional) AOA to inform
40
MH-53E Requirement AR/LSB VOD (HLR)?
35
30
Number of Airframes
25
20 MH-53E Total Active Inventory
15
10
5
0
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 RO
37
Year

35. MH-53E Sustainment
1. MH-53E Fatigue Life Extension Program
2. Integrated Threat Warning System
3. Night Vision Device (NVD) Capability
4. Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic/Health and Usage Monitoring
System (IMD/HUMS)
5. Leverage off USMC HLR Program for MH-53E Follow-on Aircraft
6. Leverage off USMC T-64 Engine Reliability Improvement Program
7. Replace Kapton wiring
8. Continue to Fund MH-53E Simulator
9. Leverage off USMC Common Defensive Weapon System (GAU-21)
10. #2 Engine Exhaust Redesign
Fully Funded
= Partially Funded = POM-08 Issue =Pom 08
= Unfunded 35

36. Take Away
• H-53E increasingly high demand - low density platform for
COCOMs
– GWOT demand exceeds USMC/USA heavy lift capacity
• Evolving non MIW mission requirements will continue for MH-53E
given GWOT/HADR demand
• HC-4 Decommissioning removes Navy’s remaining non AMCM
heavy lift response option
– Limited AMCM assets will now be pressed for non MIW missions
• Potential impact on core MIW readiness and primary AMCM
response posture
• Required: Unified Navy understanding of and response to future
RFF for non MIW deployments of the MH-53E
20

37. AMCM Outlook
CAPT Paul Lluy
COMHSCWINGLANT
1