A C A D E M I C P A P E RReforming policy roles in the Jor.docx

A C A D E M I C P A P E R
Reforming policy roles in the Jordanian policy‐making process
Rami Tbaishat1 | Ali Rawabdeh1 | Khaled Qassem Hailat2 |
Shaker A Aladwan1 |
Samir Al Balas1 | Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlouny3
1 Department of Public Administration, Faculty
of Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan
2 Department of Marketing, Faculty of
Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan
3 Department of Business Administration,
Faculty of Business, Al‐zaytoonah University
of Jordan, Irbid, Jordan
Correspondence
Rami Tbaishat, Department of Public
Administration, Faculty of Economics and

Administrative Sciences, Yarmouk University,
Irbid 21163, Jordan.
Email: [email protected]
The aim of this diagnostic analysis is to identify the weaknesses
in the process of
reforming policy in Jordan. This study will first present a
diagnostic analysis of the
characteristics of administrative reform in Jordan. Following
this, weaknesses will be
identified with a focus on policy roles in the policy‐making
process. Administrative
reform has long been an area of interest and development in
Jordan since the early
1980s. Conferences were held, political and technical
committees formed, and exper-
tise and resources invested. The outcomes of these programs
have been below
expectations, with inadequate impact. This investigation paid
attention on how
Jordan can best invest its resources to maximize efficiency in
the public sector, spe-
cifically the process of reforming policy. This study concludes
that the primary factor
impacting efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness is the

degree of authority at
both national and organizational level. Recent efforts in Jordan
to tackle these issues
could create more conflicts that threaten the Jordanian
government's stability. Other
resources have been dedicated to reviewing the rules and values
that govern the rela-
tionship between state and society.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The bureaucratic ethos that emphasizes the importance
of centrally controlled rationality considers one of the
most important characteristics of the political regime
which Jordan has experienced during the last decades
(UNDP Report, 2015). In this context, economic
performance in most cases proved to be less than
adequate for either ensuring self‐sustained development
or, at a minimum, being able to meet the basic
requirements of the populace. In Jordan, the movement
away from the authoritarian past is characterized by
the efforts to maintain or improve the neoliberal

foundations of the economy while opening the political
arena to ensure the participation of a traditionally
marginalized citizenry that demands an equitable and
prompt share of the benefits of economic growth.
Despite the official political structure, it is so clear that the
domination
of the executive branch over the judicial and legislative branch
of
government is eminent. The extreme centralization of
managerial
decision‐making surrounded by the executive branch challenges
the
power of attempts at change and, more notably, to retard efforts
to
tackle the problems of the government bureaucracy, like that of
inef-
ficiency and corruption. Consequently, ministers and Prime
ministers
continue their involvement in routine matters at the expense of
stra-
tegic issues and are reluctant to send meaningful powers
downward.

Researchers noticed that a significant number of senior
administrators
have received their jobs through patronage rather than on merit.
Their
longevity has conferred on them too much discretionary power
and
rendered them ill prepared to handle the responsibilities
associated
with decentralization (Amster, 2012).
The shift from government to governance, which involves the
focus of administrative practice, is moving from the
bureaucratic
direct governmental form of services to third‐party government
as it
has been called lately (Duflo, 2012).
Explicitly, the way we govern is shifting outside governmental
boundaries—the long‐established procedures and institutions of
gov-
ernment are developing into less concerned with less centralized
to,
which we administrate ourselves (Jacobsen, 2006).
The irresistible challenges in political environment recently,
yet,

have created new passageway to self‐searching among
practitioners
and thinkers in this field. This rethinking went alongside the
subse-
quent lines: Can the old official procedure of government cope
with
Received: 19 September 2018 Accepted: 13 October 2018
DOI: 10.1002/pa.1886
J Public Affairs. 2019;19:e1886.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa 1 of 10
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727
mailto:[email protected]
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pa
economic, political, and social transform? Is it pressed to
nationwide
improvement, which is basically the loud spoken objective of
all
former and current governments? Should not the focal point be
turned from mere repair maintenance system to active and

dynamic
improvement? Should not more concentration be given to the
dynamic development and innovative portion of governmental
deci-
sion making‐administrations?
2 | RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study focused on a diagnosis of reforming the Jordanian
policy‐
making process to recognize the difficulties and weaknesses
that
accompanied it. In this comparative procedure, the study
scrutinize
the individuality of rival's explanation reform of policy‐making.
Pattern‐matching is a famous method that goes with this kind of
stud-
ies, where quite a lot of situations are well known in having
confident
results, and the analysis concentrated on answering the
investigated
issues of how and why, which leads to this conclusion turn out
in
every situation. A regular problem in policy‐making is to be
aware of

the surroundings under which research and development can be
formalized in a constructive way to the community.
Hence, this analysis is valuable in elucidation and
understanding
the methods and drivers of modern governmental reforms,
which
has been carried out and modernized. Also, this form presents
theoret-
ical frameworks for investigation of organizational of and
public
administration and modernized governance.
To solve the previous matter, this study focused on the situation
under which structural government works efficiently, and how
Jordan
can manage material capital and human in the direction of
efficient
and effective governmental services.
3 | PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to analyze the career public servant
roles in
the policy process and, more generally, how should government
seek

to influence the policy‐making process. These questions involve
a vari-
ety of difficult issues about the procedures through which
government
should make its decisions as well as the content of those
decisions
(Kugler & Kugler, 2009). Too often, those two issues are
conflated,
with the assumption that certain actors (civil servants) will
produce
certain types of policies (interventionist). Therefore, more
market‐
based instruments (e.g., vouchers) that keep the bureaucrats out
are
preferable.
In some ways, the questions about the public sector problems
are
basically a reformation of the old questions regarding
“governance.”
How should government administrations function? How should
we
decide what government administrations will and can do? How
should

tasks be divided among career civil servants and political
executive's
administrators? To what degree should one branch is to have the
power to check the other?
However, the economic and financial difficulties forced the
gov-
ernment to initiate a reform process. This reform was more
urgent
due to the financial crises in 2008 and globalization. This
study's main
purpose is to scientifically analyze policy roles to recognize its
and
effectiveness and pitfalls. The expectation of this research study
also
is to present to government administrators with the chance to
identify
any variation that could be adjusted within an appropriate
method.
4 | STUDY SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this study depends on both hypothetical and
prac-
tical forms. On the hypothetical side, investigating the policy
making

process development in Jordan and identifies its consequences
and
pitfalls. It is the first study of its kind based on the knowledge
of the
researchers. Hence, this study was projected to develop and
study
prior literatures in the policy‐making field in particular and
public
administration in general.
Alternatively, this study has practical importance and its
outcome
will offer to the policy and decision makers to recognize some
of the
outcomes of the managerial transformation in Jordan and be
attentive
of some of the pitfalls of the transformation process. Moreover,
the
significance of this kind of study is to attain the anticipated
purpose
of the transformation plan.
Understanding policy‐making in Jordan requires an
understanding
of policy roles and the nature of its institutional arrangements.
There-

fore, the importance of this study stems from its analytical
framework
to review and assess the policy‐making process in the Jordanian
bureaucracy with special emphasis on policy roles played by
different
participants and command and control mechanisms as
evaluation
criteria.
5 | RESEARCH PROBLEM
Transform programs that have come about at the political and
socio‐eco-
nomical levels in Jordan for the last decade, have focused on
the
question of the legitimacy of traditionally detained visions. It
concerns
the role and function of mutually the state, and those with most
important roles in the policy‐making processes (Blackden &
Hallward‐
Driemeier, 2013).
Efforts to transition toward democracy have focused on either
reform of the constitution at a systematic level or roles played
by or

assigned by conventional institutions with influential power
such as
legislatures, executives, political parties, or external
influencers.
Less consideration is given to the potential positive influencers
in
the development of changes processes and improvement in the
pro-
cess of policy making by the public sector.
Good governance should be able to control the incompatible
goals
of economic efficiency in a rational manner. Along this, there
ought to
be a force toward legality based on extensive involvement in the
pro-
cess of public policy‐making and fairness in the sharing of
services
offered by the government to the public (Adrian, 1994).
The difficulty here is in achieving an equilibrium between the
demands for enhancement in the operations of a neoliberal,
capitalist,
free market, and the call to restore and develop conventional
govern-

ment and formulate a process forms that connected with a free
bene-
fit state (World Bank Ministerial Seminar, 2001).
The state has been instrumental in addressing a variety of
challenges ranging from regulations and promotion of
economical
2 of 10 TBAISHAT ET AL.
and social activities to ensure equality and integrations among
the
public. These have all been addressed through changes to
economic
policies on a national level, in response to urbanization.
Characteristically, the state develops on an institutional level
with
long‐enduring outcomes for public administration services.
First, on an
organizational level, the state expands its functional scope to
include
commercial, industrial, financial, economic, social security,
public
health, education, and welfare activities.

Second, the disorderly development of the governmental public
sectors turns out to be an obstacle in attempting at answering
the
question of how to develop from a practical viewpoint.
Governmental
procedures and programs are built to respond to hesitant
legality, and
considerable differentiation in capital accessibility was
established
without congruence. There was minimal preparation,
synchronization,
and controlling power by policy administrators.
The growth outline in the governmental public sectors is a
cumu-
lative based on a combination of an incremental aggregation. No
incorporated well‐studied master plan was created before the
initiat-
ing of determined improvement of public strategy and agendas.
Neither was expansion in the compass of the government
function,
cost, size, nor relative influences and authorities which is based
on

intellectuality planning.
In response to these issues, this analysis focuses on how the
reform model can clarify how legislators, political executives,
and
career civil servants can share responsibility for policy‐making
and
implementation.
6 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Within an article entitled “Globalization and public
administration” by
Karamack (Kamaraack, 2001), it was noted that there are four
key
driving forces behind the waves of reform to public
administration
across the world, that is, democratization, the deficit in
performance,
the revolution in information technology and global economic
compe-
tition. The modern type of administrative state can shape
society and
guide it, through regulations and control of social and economic
devel-
opment. Doubts with regard to the capacity of the state to

govern do
not just have a basis in concern over limited capacity in
financial
terms; there are also deep‐rooted disputes over ideology and
percep-
tions of what the nature of a state ought to be and what its
purposes
are, and balances of opinion shift with regard to what people
feel a
state ought and ought not to do. Within his argument related to
strat-
egies for reform, Cheng (2005) explained that many factors in
combi-
nation influence the reform of public administration such as
traditions
of national administrations, political evolution as a result of
decoloni-
zation, nation‐building and democratization and global trends
with
regard to the reinvention of government and administrative
reform.
Angranof and Yildis (2006) articulated a dichotomy between
administration and politics; they sought answers to issues
stemming

from politics being related to policies and expressions of the
will of
the state, whereas administration is concerned with how such
policies
are to be executed. Political decisions over public policy are
made by
political leaders, and then it is simply a case of career officials
figuring
out what is the most effective and efficient manner in which
those
policies are to be implemented. It is conceptually appealing to
cleanly
split between labor for administration and labor for politics;
however,
in realty, there is a complete disconnect. The perspective of
gover-
nance offers another kind of solution to the issue. As Wachhaus
(2012) noted, governing structure patterns are experiencing
change
in what is considered a shift from government to forms of
governance.
Such a shift involves the movement of managerial practices
focus

beyond government boundaries of bureaucratic states and the
provi-
sion of services directly from government to what is called
“third
party” kinds of government. Expressed another way, the manner
in
which people govern is going beyond the boundaries of
government
and is less involved with traditional institutions and
mechanisms.
The reforms that have been disseminated and inspired by the
‘new public management’ new reforms have been implemented
within many countries and, as Schick (2002) argued, there has
been
an increase in the horizontal specialization witnessed in the
function-
ing of administrations, which has often been coupled with more
clear
separation between administrative and political function. The
aim has
been to have sharper structural task separation in relation to
policy
advice, control, and regulation. Another way of looking at the
shift is

to consider that reform rhetoric and theories in relation to
normative
practice thus give the suggestion that actors in administration,
such
as agencies operating at arm's length, ought to focus upon the
implementation of policy instead of being involved with
processes of
decision‐making around policy.
Talbot (2004), meanwhile, pointed out that “Next Steps” has the
aim of a more precise description of the respective roles of civil
servants and ministers, with the former being responsible for
making
policy intentions happen with the autonomy to do so, and the
latter
being responsible for the setting of policy in the first instance.
Reformers within the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have
frequently argued that specialization of functions of public
services
into agencies would lead to better forms of management and
better
delivery of services. Also, the distancing of public services into
agen-

cies was thought likely to lead to more professional forms of
manage-
ment with greater levels of transparency through the bringing of
services closer to citizens and through making, and allowing,
managers
to manage (Kettl, 1996). It was emphasized within an appraisal
of gov-
ernment reform (“Inside the Reinvention Machine”) that a need
still
exists for centralized coordination and control; although policy
may
lead to devolved activity, as long as there is an involvement of
public
funds, government still remains responsible for how such
funding is
used. A need to ensure that there is value for money leads to
encour-
agement for early detection and policy conflict resolution and
the
elimination of duplication. There is, therefore, a call for further
informal procedures and suitable communication between them,
in
addition to change in behavior and attitudes on both parts. It

was
claimed by Lawson (2006) that there is a need for good
governance
to rest upon the ability of a system to manage conflicting goals
related
to rationality and efficiency in economic terms along with goals
for
legitimacy based upon wide participation in the processes of
public
policy‐making along with equity in access to, and distribution
of, public
services. Stolk and Wergrich (2008) have indicated that reforms
search
continuously for improved linkages that can reconcile the goals
of
budget and policy and serve to ensure that they have a mutually
TBAISHAT ET AL. 3 of 10
reinforcing nature. One development with promise is that with
regard
to evolving roles within budget ministries. There is a move
away from
traditional roles with budget ministers being perceived as

“naysayers”
to a culture wherein expertise is developed for identification of
efficiency and cost‐cutting measures; as such, they are better
placed
to offer ministries advice in relation to how administrative costs
can
be cut without there being a need to reduce programs.
7 | FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Politically, Jordan is a constitutional system that differentiates
the
powers of each of the three branches of government. The
Jordanian
governmental system is parliamentary with an inherited
monarchy.
The Mulgi government is the 84th since the founding of the
Jordanian
State some 95 years ago, giving the government an average life
span
of 11 months (www.gov.jo/byFormationdate).
Over the years, the centralization aspect has reinforced and per-
petuated a status quo judged as inappropriate by researchers and
practitioners. The king appoints the Council of Ministers, which

is
responsible for the daily operations of the domestic government,
the
president, and the members of the Senate. He approves and
promul-
gates laws. The king has the power to declare war and sign
peace
treaties, although treaties must be signed by the National
Assembly
(Jordan Constitution, article 35).
Policy‐making cannot adequately be studied apart from the
environment or context in which it operates. Therefore, it is
necessary
to review and focus on the important actors in the
policy‐making
process.
7.1 | The Palace and the Cabinet
In the absence of democracy, decisions have been those of the
king,
often in conjunction with several key advisers. On issues of
foreign
policy and military, the king, the Prime Minister, and the Chief
of the

Royal Court are the decisions‐making circle. The cabinet, as a
body,
is not involved, although its members may be consulted for their
reac-
tions or comments.
Brand also argued that in foreign policy, the major goal was to
secure aid for the budget and to finance the military. In the case
of
the budget, the king's highest concern has been paying the
salaries
of the army and the security apparatus, whose members have
tradi-
tionally been largely recruited from the kingdom's tribes and
who have
long been regarded as the bedrock of support for the monarchy.
The Prime Minister has generally handled the “how” questions
related to the economy and bureaucracy. The role of the Prime
Minis-
ter was also described as key, but his input varies depending
upon the
political or economic conditions at any given time (Brand,
1994).

Beyond these two figures—the king and the Prime Minister—
the
economic decision‐making group differs from the foreign policy
group.
The king has certain advisers and confidants both within and
outside
government whose friendship and proximity give them access
and,
hence, the opportunity to lobby for certain policies. The king is
described as an arbiter by nature, preferring not to interfere in
policy
details. However, if a complaint is voiced frequently enough
either
by officials or by nonofficial confidants, he will likely come to
view it
as a general problem. He may then draw the cabinet's attention
to it
and, if it is not solved, may replace the relevant minister.
However,
for domestic economic matters to have an influence on upper
level
decision‐making, they must be of real consequence—large
loans, the
devaluation of the dinar, and the like (Kernaghan, 2010).

7.2 | The Economic Security Committee
One key factor that affected the development of the economy
and the
process of economic decision‐making in the kingdom was the
pres-
ence of a martial law regime during most of the 1957–1990
periods.
Symptomatic of the conditions that existed under martial law
were
the establishment, development, and activities of what was
called
the Economic Security Committee (ESC; Alfanik, 2016). This
body
was originally founded in 1967 to address the economic
problems cre-
ated by the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. With martial
law
already in place giving the state sweeping powers, adding such
a com-
mittee seemed like a natural step. Composed of the Minister of
Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of
Transport,
and the Governor of the Central Bank, and standing in effect

above or
outside the law, the committee initially served to help solve
problems
faced especially by the government and some of the public
companies
and institutions (UNDP, 2015).
Gradually, however, the committee's “mandate” broadened. It
began to act as a kind of extraordinary legislative council. The
commit-
tee was permitted to make decisions that overturned existing
laws;
even those that had been passed after the occupation and that
had
taken the post‐June 1967 reality into account. In this way, the
com-
mittee came to be used to bypass existing laws when it was
problem-
atic or inconvenient from the point of view of the
decision‐makers or
their confidants (Brand, 1994). For example, if the Prime
Minister
requested something to be done quickly or something done that
was

officially against the law, he could refer it to the committee.
The
committee also made decisions about liquidating companies,
borrow-
ing to the ceiling of the Central Bank, and then legalizing more
borrowing, allowing the Central Bank to deposit with other
banks to
support the currency, issuing more currency than had been
allowed,
expelling people from commercial organization, and consenting
to
someone who would or else have been banned, to be part of the
board of directors of a corporation. In the days of escalating
political
repression in 1988, its decisions also dissolved the boards of a
number
of public shareholding companies including those of the major
daily
newspapers.
Many of the rulings the committee made are open to criticism,
not
only on legal grounds but also on economic and financial ones.
Some

of its decisions were intended to benefit a particular person,
company,
or bank, to enable them to undertake an activity that was against
the
law or to avoid procedures dictated by the law (Alfanik, 2016).
More-
over, only a few of the ESC's decisions were ever published in
the
Official Gazette, the newspaper in which all legislation is
supposed
to appear. Most were confidential, and for specific purposes,
they
were usually not general edicts.
http://www.gov.jo/byFormationdate
Comprising only a handful of cabinet members who were chosen
by the Prime Minister in consultation with the king, the ESC
appears
to have been the institutionalized form of an inner circle for
economic
policy. Their power derived from both the cabinet positions
they held

and their closeness to the king and the Prime Minister at the
time, to
which they owed their appointment.
7.3 | The role of the ministers
The type of regime that produces and perpetuates an institution
such
as the ESC is clearly one that is uninterested in or incapable of
decentralizing decision‐making. And, indeed, even for what
would
appear to be relatively minor matters, economic
decision‐making is
highly centralized in the kingdom. Most decisions—whether
important
or relatively minor—are made at the cabinet level or even
above, not
even at the level of individual ministers.
Part of the reason for the lack of ministerial involvement is that
ministerial appointments in Jordan generally owe to
considerations
of domestic political balancing along ethnic and regional lines.
All cab-
inet members must meet certain unofficial but well‐known
formulae.

As a result, most ministers are appointed because of ethnicity,
tribal/
family background, or regional considerations, not because of
exper-
tise in the field of their appointment, although there are
certainly
numerous notable exceptions. In such a system, where a
minister's
background in his or her field has generally been only a
secondary
consideration, a minister's power derives from a number of
sources.
The first is the degree of support he or she enjoys from the
Prime
Minister. They therefore have no automatic political base in the
Parliament or outside, as would be the case in a normal
parliamentary
system. Beyond his or her ties with the decision‐making group,
a min-
ister's power is often determined by such factors as the degree
to
which he or she has developed ties in the bureaucracy (both
within

his or her own ministry and elsewhere) and his or her own
energy
and involvement. Another source of power lies in the ministry
itself.
For example, the Ministry of Finance is potentially very
powerful,
because it includes the customs bureau, the income and sales tax
department, the budget, and the land and surveys bureau—all
the
departments responsible for domestic revenue.
At least part of the problem with ensuring implementation
below
the cabinet level is that many individual ministers prefer not to
take
responsibility, opting to leave certain issues to the cabinet. If
that is
the case at the level of minister, one can imagine what happens
(or does not happen) at lower levels. As is the case for
bureaucrats
everywhere, there is no incentive (and in this case, also no
authority)
to make decisions without prior approval from above, even on
very minor matters. If the relevant minister does not take an

interest in solving a problem, no action will be taken. In
general, then,
because of the lack of authority to make decisions, there is little
or no
follow‐up.
In addition to the issue of authority and responsibility is the
problem of the lack of a guiding program or policy. In more
general
terms, however, one reason for the lack of a coherent policy is
that
there have not been political parties steering the government.
The
appointment of the Prime Minister has always been the king's
prerogative, not a response to election results, even since the
political
liberalization of 1989.
Although some studies agreed that ministerial changes are
disrup-
tive, given the lack of a program, it is not necessarily the case
that a
change in minister will mean a complete change in the ministry
(Kernaghan, 2010). After all, the other mid‐level and lower

level
bureaucrats remain in place. Instead, the change of ministers
will often
mean that projects in which the former minister was involved
may
simply be set aside as the new minister begins to establish his
own pri-
orities (Brand, 1994).
7.4 | The Parliament
Legislative authority resides with the King and Parliament that
is a
bicameral national assembly consisting of the upper house (the
Sen-
ate) and the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies). The
constitution
provides that the Senate, indulging the Speaker, shall consist of
not
more than one‐half of the number of members of the Chamber of
Deputies (Senate 65 members, Chamber of Deputies 130
members).
The King chooses all senators that meet the requirements
approved
in the constitution. A senator must be 40 years old and belong

to
one of the following classes: present or former prime ministers,
per-
sons who have previously held the office of Ambassador,
Speaker of
Chamber of Deputies, retired military officers of the rank of Lt.
General and above, president and judges of the Court of
Causation
and of the Civil and Sharia Courts of Appeal, former deputies
who
were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar
personalities
who enjoy the confidence of the king in view of the services
rendered
by them to the nation and country. Senators serve 4‐year terms,
renewable every 4 years (AL Taamneh, 2016).
The Chamber of Deputies consists of 130 members elected by
secret ballot in a general and direct election. The term of office
is
4 years. A deputy must be 30 years old. Unlike senators, who
must
meet specific qualifications, the Chamber of Deputies does not
have

specific requirements except potential deputies must have
Jordanian
citizenship, no current declaration of legal bankruptcy, and not
subject
to any indictable charge.
The public perception is that the Parliament, especially the
Cham-
ber of Deputies, is very weak and a rubberstamp for the
executive
branch (AL Taamneh, 2016). The majority of its members must
rely
on the executive branch to keep their constituencies happy,
which is
accomplished primarily through nepotism and political
patronage.
There are no restrictions on political campaign financing, and
conse-
quently, getting elected to Parliament depends in part on tribal
affilia-
tions and wealth. The members of both houses have immunity
from
prosecution, which can only be lifted by a majority of votes in
Parlia-

ment. The Prime Minister and his ministers are jointly
accountable to
Parliament regarding public policy, and each minister is
accountable
to Parliament regarding the work of his ministry.
Another structural weakness is Parliament; in practice, it does
not
initiate legislation. Although Article 95 of the Constitution
states that
any 10 Deputies (MP's) may propose any law, in reality, the
Prime
Minister submits proposals for laws, which Parliament can
accept,
amend, or reject. In all cases, the proposed laws have to be
submitted
to the Senate, and they do not become laws unless approved by
both
houses and signed by the King.
7.5 | The judiciary
Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial
functions,

they are subject to no authority other than that of the law. The
judicial
system is divided into two categories: civil and religious courts.
According to the constitution, the civil court has jurisdiction
over all
personnel in all affairs, criminal and civil, including cases
brought by
or against the government. Religious courts are divided into (a)
the
Sharia court, jurisdiction in issues of personal status of
Muslims, cases
concerning blood money where the two parties are Muslims; and
(b)
the Tribunals of Religious Communities are those for the
non‐Muslims
communities that are recognized by the government.
The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to
affect the nature and content of public policy through exercise
of
the powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in
cases
brought before them.

In practice, the courts do not play an active role in deciding
issues
of administrative accountability or responsiveness. The exercise
of this
limited power, however, is further constrained by practical
consider-
ations. To avoid being either politicized or caught in the middle
of a
fight between branches of government, courts tend to define
prob-
lems as political in nature and hence beyond their jurisdiction—
the
basic rationale used for not questioning decisions made by the
government.
7.6 | The bureaucracy
The domination of the executive branch over legislative and
judicial
branches of government is evident. The extreme centralism of
deci-
sion‐making inside the executive branch resists endeavors at
change and, more considerably, hinders attempts to tackle
problems
of the government bureaucracy like inefficiency and corruption

(Pearce, 2011).
The executive branch is vested with an impressive array of
formal
powers that places the Prime Minister at the center of the
political
arena. He is called upon to carry out a number of roles that give
him
the opportunity to expand his ability to persuade and influence
other
significant actors in the political process.
The cabinet and its bureaucracy are the most important actors in
the policy‐making process in spite of the fact that the legislative
authority resides with the king and the Parliament (Kpundeh,
1999).
The cabinet and its authority to exercise legislative leadership
is clearly
established by both the constitution and legislation and accepted
as a
practical and political necessity (AL Taamneh, 2016). As a
result, Par-
liament expects the Prime Minister to present proposed
legislation

program. In practice, Parliament does not initiate legislation's.
Although Article 95 of the constitution states that any 10
Deputies
(PM's) may propose any law, in reality, the Prime Minister
submits pro-
posals for laws, which Parliament can accept, amend, or reject.
7.7 | The private sector
Two institutions with potential clout and interest in the
economic
policy arena, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have
been in
existence throughout much of the kingdom's history. The
Chamber
of Commerce is in fact a federation of local chambers of
commerce.
The federation was founded in December 1955, as the
representative
of the private sector in all economic, commercial, and service
fields
(Amman Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The Amman Chamber
of
Industry established itself as a separate entity in 1962 (Amman
Cham-

ber of Commerce, 2015). Its members are public, private, and
mixed
sector companies. The chamber serves as a forum for
formulating
and expressing the views of the industrial sector in the
kingdom.
The annual report of the chamber of commerce provides some
insights into the influence that the institutionalized private
sector
has had on policy‐making. The summaries of meetings held with
the
ministers to discuss issues related to the role of the private
sector,
and development seems to be the best indicator for formal
access
by the chambers to the government. Rather than simply waiting
to
read the text of new law in the official gazette, industrialists
began
to initiate projects and make suggestions regarding tariff,
interest rate,
and rate of taxes to the government (Amman Chamber of
Commerce,
2015). In general, however, it seems clear that formal meetings

were
few and effective input is quite limited. In short, it would be
inaccurate
to conclude that, in practice, the private sector plays an
important role
in the policy‐making process in Jordan.
8 | ASSESSMENT OF FINDINGS
The Jordanian policy‐making process and the roles played by
the dif-
ferent parties explain the Jordanian political culture,
characterized by
bureaucratic elitism and political–administrative centralism that
tend
to legitimize the moral authority of the ruling elites.
The finding reveals that the cabinet and its bureaucracy are the
most important actors in the policy‐making process in spite of
the fact
that the legislative authority resides with the king and the
parliament.
The political alliances between elected representative and
bureau-
cracy can be seen as a way in which the bureaucracy can
generate

power necessary for successful action. An exchange of
bureaucratic
services for political support is the norm of cooperation
between
legislators and bureaucracy in Jordan. Parliamentarians, who
seek
reelection every 4 years, certainly need the support of the
bureau-
cracy. Political representative who oppose the government
legislations
in a given policy feel that his own objection will be meaningless
because of the size of the group of which he is a member. These
alliances play an essential role in the success or failure of a
given
legislation.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of government substantially
depends upon executive leadership and action in both formation
and
execution of policy. The authority of the Prime Minister to
exercise
legislative leadership is clearly recognized by both legislation
and the

constitution and acknowledged as a practical and political
necessity.
The crumbling of power in parliament stems from lack of
strong party leadership, renders and committee system, which
incompetent of building a inclusive legislative program. As a
result,
parliament has come to expect the Prime Minister to present to
it a
program of proposed legislation. The parliament does not,
however,
do whatever the Prime Minister recommends. More than 90% of
the
Prime Minister Policy proposals were adopted by the parliament
dur-
ing the period 2010–2015 (World Bank Report, 2015). Although
the
Prime Minister is the head of the executive branch, he does not
act
alone on policy matters. The bureaucracy compromises several
staff
agencies' advice and assists the Prime Minister in handling his

respon-
sibilities, including development and implementation of policy.
For
example, the Budget Department assists the Prime Minister in
prepar-
ing the annual budget, supervising expenditures, and managing
the
executive branch (Jreisat, 1998). On the other hand, in foreign
and
military policies, the palace has the authority to decide and
almost
operate in freedom. Foreign and military policies in Jordan are
largely
the product of the King's leadership and action.
The most important institution in this respect is the palace. The
King is the only figure in the kingdom that represents a national
constituency.
In Jordan, the capacity of legislatures to engage effectively in
policy‐making has been very limited because they lack the
required
professional personnel to serve the individual members of the
Parlia-

ment. The absence of the professional staff helps to make
parliament
members more dependent on others—the executive,
administrative
agencies, and interest groups—for information.
Because there are few policy issues, a larger proportion of them
can reach the cabinet level, and the executive plays a larger role
in
forming public policies about most issues; because power is
more
highly concentrated, the political executive is free to establish
policies
on many more issues without worrying as much about having to
build
coalitions.
The courts have a very limited role to play in policy‐making to
affect the nature and content of public policy through the
exercise
of powers of judicial review and statutory interpretation in
cases
brought before them. The exercise of this very limited power,
how-
ever, is further constrained by practical considerations. To

avoid being
either politicized or caught in the middle of a fight between
branches
of government, courts tend to define problems as political in
nature
and hence beyond their jurisdiction.
In short, as in many developing countries, the policy‐making
struc-
ture is rather simple and executive policy‐making prevails. In
such
countries, too, interest groups have little influence on
policy‐making
because of their limited independence from political
institutions.
A number of reasons lie behind the apparent lack of influence
by
the private sector (World Bank Report, 2016). First of all is the
state
perception of the private sector. Public sector employees tend to
view
private businessmen as selfish and unconcerned with the
national
interest. Second and not surprisingly, the private sector,
although

small, is not unified in its interests. Another more general
problem is
that the government has in effect over the years trained
Jordanians
not to challenge it, but to depend on it for a whole range of
services.
However, part of the explanation for private sector inactivity
must be
attributed to the years of martial law (1957–1990) and political
repression. In a situation in which complaints were often
(mis)read,
whether deliberately or not, as potential assault upon the
security of
the state, few people had the courage or the power to speak out.
Such
an atmosphere is hardly conducive to open an effective
expression of
discontent, preferences, or challenging initiatives. Finally, this
problem
is perhaps most significant for the argument of this study; the
size
of the private sector's contribution to the economy, as well as
its

dependence upon the state for a good deal of its activity, has not
given it much bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the state (World Bank
Report, 2017). If one looks at the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) fig-
ures, one finds that the real productive sectors of the
economy‐phos-
phate, potash, fertilizers, and so on are public sector companies.
The
bureaucracy contributes another major chunk of GDP.
The media and its role in policy‐making are very limited also
due
to the following reasons. Sixty percent of the newspapers are
govern-
ment owned. Most of the broadcasts media–radio and television
are
owned by the government and controlled by the Information
Ministry.
Radio and television documentaries are pro‐government,
highlighting
its achievements. Although some address issues such as poverty,
unemployment, education, and health, none have focused on
corrup-
tion and mismanagement. The government‐owned newspapers

are
managed as public share‐holding companies. Major stockholders
are
current or former government officials. This arrangement has
politi-
cized the press. Dominant stockholders oftentimes use the
media to
promote their interests and criticize their rivals. Private
newspapers
that have published stories about governmental abuses and
misman-
agement have become targets of arrest and prosecution.
Government
papers glamorize high‐level government officials, especially
those in
the cabinet and criticize their detractors. In general, the media's
role
in raising public awareness has been minimal in this society.
9 | EXPLANATION
Jordan politics and administration manifest the historical stamp
of
Jordanian political culture, characterized by bureaucratic elitism
and

political–administrative centralism to a substantive
authoritarian
political psychology that tends to legitimize the moral authority
of
the upper strata.
Traditionally, public policy in Jordan is totally viewed as the
favor-
ites and values of the governing personnel elite (Allam, 2017).
The
nonparticipatory Jordanian masses have long been
psychologically
oriented toward powerful leadership by the elite and a
centralized
hierarchical bureaucracy. Thus, a highly centralized
administration
typifies the recurrent institutional essence of Jordanian political
tradi-
tions. Despite the trauma of Westernization in recent centuries,
the
core values of Jordanian political culture have not been
substantially
altered by the cross‐cultural fertilization. Western patterns of
liberal
pluralistic ideals have had some cultural impact upon the

Jordanian
elite. However, as yet, the elite political culture remains highly
authoritarian and still oriented toward exclusive
decision‐making by
a centralized government.
Since the independence of Jordan in 1946, the Western pluralist
form has had a comprehensive impact on the organization of the
offi-
cial institutional structure of the government of Jordan (Al
sabaileh,
2018). Further than the official structures of Jordanian
government,
however, the impact has been at a minimum, and centralization
of
bureaucratic rather than democratic pluralism persists in the
public
policy‐making. We may ascribe this to the lack of sociocultural
precon-
ditions of pluralism.
The strict political tradition of Jordanian government does not

cultivate such pluralistic prerequisite as follows:
1. Viable groups and/or individuals competition,
2. Opportunity creation for individuals and organizations to
achieve
contribution in the process of decision‐making,
3. Using organized mediation between public and government,
4. Using practical approaches of masses in participating in
political
decisions‐making such as elections and other media of effect
and access, and
5. Democratic harmony based on the free system.
Drifting to strict government in Jordan therefore should be
viewed
partially as historical–cultural determinism and in part as the
absence
of the pluralistic prerequisites.
The elite‐mass class division of Jordanian public lean to stand
with
a political system that maintained by domination and regulation
and
not by pluralist interest group balancing. The high level of

political
centralism or authority enforces elitist policy upon the different
strata
of the masses. Some other determined ideological limitations as
a
result of the Arab‐Israel conflict besides inhibit pluralistic
prospects
for political and socioeconomic development:
1. Less political freedom for individuals,
2. Less power of the judiciary and legislature over executive
bureaucracy,
3. More restrictions of political parties' role and function, and
4. Military expansion role in politics.
The governing elite based upon the political passivity of the
Jordanian masses may facilitate effective bureaucratic
intervention
in the economic and social areas but impedes the creation of
autonomous centers of decision‐making authority in the
develop-
mental process—the democratic/political area. Recent Jordanian
politics and administration manifest bureaucratic centralism,

which
give little encouragement to the positive projection of
democratic
development.
Jordan's recent move toward political democratization is
expected
to mature with its emphasis on socioeconomic development, a
new
popular consciousness, greater national self‐confidence, and a
new
generation of democratic leadership, if it is subjected to the
precondi-
tions of pluralism.
Jordanians also face the challenge of “civilizing” their politics
and
government, calling upon their talent to lead an increasingly
complex
economy and society. Jordan has already made a historic
commitment
to greater democratization. Consequently, there appears to be a
gen-
eral consensus along with Jordanians of diverse political
persuasions

that government institution and administrative practices up to
now
have been inadequate to convene Jordan's complicated current
and
potential demands. A drastic administrative reform will be a
vital part
of democratization of politics. Jordan now has the opportunity
to
match its socioeconomic progress with much better
administrative
apparatus, and by doing so, it will have laid the groundwork not
only
for enduring democratic progress but also for enduring
economic
prosperity.
10 | RECOMMENDATIONS
It is clear that the bureaucracy does have significant, if not
necessarily
dominant, policy roles in the Jordanian government. The
problem then
is how to structure government in ways that recognize the
reality, and
even the desirability, of the enhanced policy roles for civil
servants

while at the same time preserving the requirements of
democratic
accountability.
This is a difficult balance for the designers of government
institu-
tions to achieve, especially given the historical legacy of
thinking
about Jordan politics and administration characterized by
political–
administrative centralism and public demands for enhanced
account-
ability. The politicization role of the bureaucracy, if not the
members
of the civil service themselves, may make the delicate balance
of
policy competencies mentioned above all more difficult to
achieve.
However, in a national context like Jordan, the following are
recom-
mended to enhance the policy‐making process in an attempt to
create
balance between the bureaucracy and some important
participants

like legislatures, interest groups, and the media in policy roles
and
initiation.
First, the civil service should be acquiescent and respond almost
entirely to the policy directives given to them by their nominal
political
masters. This can be achieved by enhancing the legislature's
role in
policy‐making by engaging them directly in the central political
tasks
of law making and policy formation in the political system.
In the era of democracy and free‐market policies, Jordanians are
expecting from their legislatures to do more than accept, amend,
or
reject the proposed legislation. They are expecting them to
initiate
legislation's especially on matters that affect directly the life of
the
people such as taxation, civil right, social welfare, and
economic regu-
lation. The capacity of the legislatures to engage effectively in
policy‐
making can be enhanced by the following:

1. Personal staff: These people serve individual members of the
parliament; some of them professionals to handle policy
responsi-
bilities; and others to handle routine office duties.
2. Committee and subcommittee staff: The professional
members of
committee staffs enhance the legislature capacity to have
consid-
erable influence on legislation, drafting bills, and developing
polit-
ical support.
3. Institutional staff: Agencies that can serve the Parliament
with
research studies, policy evaluations, and budgetary data. In
addi-
tion to the Audit Bureau, we can add Parliament Research
Service
and Parliament Budget Office.
All of this staff assistance helps to make parliament less
dependent
upon others—the executive, administrative agencies, and
interest

groups—for information.
Second is enhancing the role of the private sector in
policy‐making.
Well‐organized groups have an important impact on public
policy‐
making. Interest groups may perform an interest‐articulation
function;
that is, they express demands and present alternatives for policy
action.
They may also supply legislatures with much information, often
techni-
cal, about the nature and possible consequences of policy
proposals. In
doing so, they contribute to the rationality of policy‐making.
Interest
groups, such as those representing organized labor, business,
and
agriculture, are a major source of demands for public policy
action in
Jordan. Civil society organization is another example, if it is
free to orga-

nize and act, and is an essential partner in developing and
strengthening
policy proposals.
Last is strengthening the role of media and publicity. Jordan
has no tradition of using publicity as a mechanism for keeping
bureau-
cracy under control. On the contrary, secrecy has been a
distinctive
characteristic of the way government operates on a daily basis.
The
communication media—newspapers, newsmagazines, radio, and
televi-
sion—can participate in policy‐making as suppliers and
transmitters of
information and, whether deliberately or otherwise, shapers of
atti-
tudes. For many Jordanian people, the late afternoon news on
the
television is the main information source of on public affairs.
Compli-
ance about bias in reporting of public affairs and media
coverage are
familiar for Jordanian people, as are accusations that
governmental

officials are controlling or manipulating the news. Attempts
must be
made to introduce reforms aimed at expanding the scope of
civilian
control over bureaucracy. In general, the democratic ideal of
ensuring
an informed citizenry would require changes in this area of
concern.
ORCID
Rami Tbaishat http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Dr. Rami Tbaishat is an experienced assistant professor of
Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working
in
government reform.
Dr. Ali Rawabdeh is an experienced associate professor of
Public
Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working
in
public health services.
Dr. Khaled Qassem Hailat is an experienced Assistant Professor
of Marketing with a demonstrated history of working in the
education management industry.

Dr. Shaker A Aladwan is an experienced Assistant Professor of
Public Administration with a demonstrated history of working
in
the excellence Models.
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3164-1727
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00275.x
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.4.1051
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.4.1051
https://doi.org/10.1086/592839
https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5610
https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5610
https://doi.org/10.1787/budget-v2-art2-en
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852308098470
Dr. Samir Al Balas is an experienced Assistant Professor of
Public
Health Administration with a demonstrated history of working
in
public health services.
Dr. Mohammed Iqbal Al Ajlouny is an experienced Associate
Professor of business administration demonstrated history of
working in human resources management and development.
How to cite this article: Tbaishat R, Rawabdeh A, Hailat KQ,

A Aladwan S, Al Balas S, Al Ajlouny MI. Reforming policy
roles
in the Jordanian policy‐making process. J Public Affairs.
2019;19:e1886. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1886
Copyright of Journal of Public Affairs (14723891) is the
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