The document discusses the evolution of participatory water management in coastal Bangladesh, highlighting a shift from centralized, top-down approaches to more decentralized, community-based practices since the 1950s. Despite attempts to increase local involvement, issues such as elite capture, lack of equity, and inadequate technical solutions hinder effective participation and management. The conclusion emphasizes the need for permanent maintenance funds and greater support for grassroots institutions to address water management challenges sustainably.

1. The Imposition of Participation?
The case of participatory water
management in Coastal
Bangladesh
G3:
Water
Governance
and
Community-­‐based
Organiza:ons
Camelia
Dewan
Marie-­‐Charlo0e
Buisson
Adi6
Mukherji

2. Participation in Water Policy
From
Top-­‐down
poli.cized
to
depoli.cized
par.cipa.on
•
1950s:
Floods
and
Krug
Mission
Report
recommending
embankments
• 1960s:
BWDB
created
4000
km
of
embankments:
Top-­‐down
• 1970s-­‐1980s:
Poli.cized
par.cipa.on
• Donors
also
funding
social
empowerment
NGOs
• Water
projects
with
local
decision-­‐making
and
involvement
• Early
Implementa:on
Project
(1972-­‐1995),
Land
Reclama:on
Project
(1978-­‐1991),
Delta
Development
Project
(1981-­‐1999)
• Focus
on
marginalized
groups:
‘Target
groups’,
Landless
• 1990s-­‐2000s:
A
depoli.cized
shiM:
Par.cipa.on
as
Maintenance
• Wider
shiV
towards
decentraliza:on
to
non-­‐state
bodies
• Reduc:on
of
BWDB
from
24000
to
8000
staff
• Community-­‐Based
Natural
Resource
Management
(CBNRM)
• Effec:veness,
equitability
and
sustainability
• Guidelines
for
Par:cipatory
Water
Management
(GPWM)
• ‘Stakeholder
consulta:on’,
Labor
Contrac:ng
Socie:es
and
Water
Management
Organiza:ons

3. Participation in Practice
Lack
of
Efficacy:
Inability
to
address
top-­‐down
engineering
• CBNRM
for
effec.ve
water
management
through
involving
communi.es
• GPWM
seeks
to
place
the
decision-­‐making
power
in
the
hands
of
stakeholders
through
Water
Management
Organiza:ons
(WMOs)
• Integrated
into:
• BWDB’s
Integrated
Planning
for
Sustainable
Water
Management
(IPSWAM)
• LGED’s
Small-­‐Scale
Water
resources
Development
Sector
Project
(SSWRDSP)
• Constraints
• BWDB:
50
year
delay
in
the
consulta:on
of
WMOs
• Project
dependence
• Several
examples
of
inadequate
technical
solu:ons
• Unsa:sfactory
number
of
regulators,
too
low
or
weakly
constructed
embankments,
flawed
sluice
gate
shubers,
and
superficial
canal
re-­‐excava:on.
• (waterlogging,
canal
silta:on
and
river
erosion)
•
Par.cipa.on
as
a
‘tool’
to
give
a
'human
face'
to
depoli:cized
and
technocra:c
projects
(Palmer-­‐Jones
et
al.,
2010).
• WMO
equated
with
community

4. Participation in Practice
Lack
of
equity
:
WMO
obscuring
power
differences
within
communi.es
WMO’s
to
represent
all
societal
segments
BUT
• Elite
capture
of
WMOs
• Domina:on
of
rural
male
elite
• Non-­‐representa:ve
• Focuses
on
‘produc:ve’
uses
• Exclusion
of
women
&
landless
• Drinking
water,
homestead
garden,
bathing,
livestock,
cooking,
• GPWM
Percentage
of
households
quota
fails
to
empower
target
groups
• Token
members
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Elite Frequency in Executive Committee Composition.
*
From
1000
representa.ve
households
selected
in
polders
and
sub-­‐projects.
Small
farmer
(less
than
2.49
acres)
Medium
farmer
(2.5
to
7.49
acres)
Large
farmer
(more
than
7.5
acres)
In
the
popula:on*
In
the
WMOs
execu:ve
commibee
members
Ability
to
par.cipate
defined
by
‘power’
and
‘economic
status’

5. Lack of Equity
Rural
Inequali.es
and
Conflict:
Opera.on
for
compe.ng
water
uses
• Sluice
gate
commiaees
created
regardless
of
the
presence
of
a
WMO
• Local
operators
paid
through
rice
or
fishing
rights
• Land
and
canal
grabbing
make
WMOs
redundant
• A
minority
of
gates
is
operated
through
WMOs
(land
grabs,
private
gates/pipes,
• Canals
are
drying
up
• Par:cular
problems
with
salinity
intrusion
in
brackish
gher
areas
• Respondents
did
not
equate
par.cipa.on
with
a
WMO
• WMO
as
an
external
idea
that
prompts
polder
popula:ons
to
create
commibees
in
order
to
receive
funding
for
maintenance
à
Prevent
benefits
of
water
management
for
‘all
the
stakeholders’

6. Lack of sustainability
The
panacea
of
financial
cost-­‐sharing
• 1990s
and
‘par.cipa.on’
as
financial
cost-­‐sharing
• GPWM
encouraged
communi:es
to
contribute
to
maintenance
costs.
• Poor
condi.on
of
canals,
gates
and
embankment:
• Canal
excava:on
and
re-­‐excava:on
are
the
top
two
issues
in
survey
•
No
evidence
that
WMO
micro-­‐credit
ac:vi:es
gives
incen:ves
to
maintain
the
polder
infrastructure.
• Funding
gap
in
maintenance
• Both
communi:es
and
implemen:ng
agencies
struggle
to
meet
maintenance
demand;
Oversubscrip:on
to:
• LGED’s
Emergency
Fund
• BWDB’s
Non-­‐Revenue
Development
Budget
No
coherence
between
the
considerable
hydrological
challenges
and
the
means
by
which
the
WMOs
can
generate
funds.

7. Conclusion – Permanent Funds
The Role of Existing Institutions
Acknowledge
coordina.on
role
Union
Parishad
and
NGOs
already
playing:
• Implica:on
in
gate
opera:on
(UP),
• Implica:on
in
conflicts
resolu:on
(UP),
• Role
in
case
of
disaster
(UP,
NGO)
• Rural
employment
schemes
(UP,
NGO,
LGED)
Perception of the responsibility for Water Management
Establish
Permanent
Maintenance
funds
• Donors
could
focus
on
suppor:ng
the
increase
of
funds
available
for
rural
employment
schemes
for
adequate
canal
excava:on
and
embankment
repairs
via
Upazila
Parishad.
• Support
autonomous
quality
assurance
body
for
payment
of
funds
aVer
sa:sfactory
comple:on.
Community
people
24%
WMO
2%
Union
Parishad
35%
BWDB
28%
LGED
9%
Other
2%