The document summarizes a seminar presented by the OECD Economics Department on approaches to fiscal consolidation that balance growth, equity, and global rebalancing objectives. It proposes a methodology for selecting consolidation instruments based on their short- and long-term impacts. Instruments are ranked from most to least desirable based on quantitative assessments. Country-specific rankings are developed based on cyclical position, inequality, and current account. Simulations show the extent of consolidation different countries may need to achieve and which instruments would likely be used. Structural reforms can ease trade-offs by improving efficiency.

1. NAEC Seminar 11 October 2013
In association with the OECD Economics Department
HOW MUCH SCOPE
FOR GROWTH- AND
EQUITY-FRIENDLY
CONSOLIDATION?
Speakers:
• Boris Cournède, OECD
• Antoine Goujard, OECD
• Álvaro Pina, OECD

2. Remarks
• The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this
document are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the
official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its
member countries.
• This document and any map included therein are without
prejudice to the status of or sovereignity over any territory, to
the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and
to the name of any territory, city or area.
• The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the
responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of
the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in
the West Bank under the terms of international law.

3. The objectives:
• Propose a structured way of looking at the
selection of consolidation instruments in
the light of their effects on:
– growth (short and long term)
– income inequality (short and long term)
– global rebalancing
• Illustrate this approach with quantitative
simulations
• Highlight the role of structural reforms
3

4. Consolidation and other objectives
• Bring gross debt to 60%
of GDP and keep it
stable.
• Other objectives
– Output: long-term but
also short-term
– Equity
– Global rebalancing
Defines
consolidation
needs: short and
long term
Guides the choice
of instruments
4

5. Public-sector debt and deficits in 2012
Underlying primary fiscal
balance, % of potential
GDP
6
ITA
4
GRC
ISL
2
KOR
EST
DEU
CHE
AUT
LUX
0
NOR
SWE
NZL
-2
SVN
FIN
AUS
PRT
BEL
CZE
DNK
HUN
ISR NLD
FRA
IRL
ESP
POL
CAN
-4
SVK
GBR
USA
-6
JPN
-8
-10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
Government debt (national accounts definition), % of GDP
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93.
5

6. Further consolidation is needed over
the outcomes achieved as of end-2012
Difference between debt-control and baseline underlying primary surplus
In the year when initial consolidation ends (short to medium term)
In 2060 (long term)
% of potential GDP
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
6

7. The instruments of consolidation:
spending side
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Education (public consumption)
Health (public consumption)
Other public consumption except family policy
Pensions (cash transfers)
Unemployment (cash transfers)
Sickness and disability (cash transfers)
Family policy (public consumption and cash
transfers)
• Subsidies
• Public investment
7

8. The instruments of consolidation:
revenue side
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Personal income taxes
Social security contributions
Corporate income taxes
Environmental taxes
Consumption taxes (non-environmental)
Recurrent taxes on immovable property
Other property taxes
Sales of goods and services
8

9. Assessing the instruments: highlighting
trade-offs and complementarities
• Rough assessment (from -- to ++) are
given to the effects of each instrument on:
– short- and long-term growth
– short- and long-term equity
– global rebalancing
• Based on wide body of work including
– Study on the Sources of Growth
– Going for Growth
– Wider literature
– New econometric estimates
9

10. Assessing the instruments
Growth
Current
account(a)
Equity
ST
LT
ST
LT
ST
---
--
-
--
+
++
--
-
--
+
++
+
+
++
--
Revenue increases
Personal income taxes
Social security contributions
Corporate income taxes
Environmental taxes
Consumption taxes
-
---+(b)
-
Recurrent taxes on immovable property
Other property taxes
Sales of goods and services
-
Spending cuts
Education
Health services provided in kind
Other government consumption
Pensions
Sickness and disability payments
Unemployment insurance
Family
Subsidies
Public investment
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
+
--+
+
+
-
++
-
-+
+
+
+
-
+
++
++
++
+
+
++
Notes: (a) current
account effects refer
to a deficit country
and would switch
signs for a surplus
country
(b) this + sign
relates to welfare
effects as the GDP
impact may be
ambiguous.
+
++
+
++
+
+
+
10

11. Turning this assessment into a possible
generic ranking
1. Each plus sign is valued as +1 and each
minus sign as -1
2. Equal weights are given to each column:
0.25 each for short- and long-term growth
and equity. [the current account is dealt
with separately].
3. As a result each instrument gets a score
and is ranked accordingly from highest to
lowest.
11

12. A possible generic hierarchy of
consolidation instruments
Ranking from most (highest score) to least (lowest score)
desirable instrument of consolidation
Subsidies
Equal weights
Pensions
Simulated interdecile range
Other property taxes
Unemployment insurance
Personal income taxes
Corporate income taxes
Environmental taxes
Rec. taxes on imm. property
Other gov. consumption
Sales of goods and services
Sickness payments
Consumption taxes
Public investment
Health services in kind
Social security contributions
Childcare and family
Education
0
2
4
6
8
10
Instrument rank
12
14
16
18
Note: The rankings are based on the assessment in Table 2. Scores of +1 and -1 are given to each + and- signs respectively, each
objective is given a weight, and the resulting indicator is used to rank instruments. Each individual instrument score based on the
assessment in Table 2 is kept with a probability of ¾ or increased by +1 with a probability of 1/8 or reduced by -1 with a probability
of 1/8. Weights ranging each from 0.15 to 0.55 and summing to unity have been given to each objective. Weights have been
restricted to no smaller than 0.15 because each objective is considered important. A total of 40,000 random draws have been made.
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
12

13. Adapting the hierarchy to country
circumstances
• Short-term growth: cyclical weakness (output
gap) and risk of hysteresis (2007-12 increase
in long-term unemployment).
• Equity: income distribution and poverty.
• Current account: relative to country and
OECD GDP.
• Five country clusters
• A specific hierarchy for each cluster
13

14. The optimal use of instruments depends on:
1. Consolidation needs
2. Hierarchy of instruments: instruments are used
one by one until consolidation needs are met.
3. Room for manoeuvre in each instrument:
– Move until reaching the group of the ten OECD countries with
lowest spending or highest taxation for the instrument under
consideration (avoid extreme policy settings)
– No move larger than one standard deviation (respect national
preferences as revealed by existing spending/tax structures)
– Specific technical adjustments:
• Reduced margins for pensions (especially in the short term)
• Adjustments for pensions and education (demography) and for unemployment
benefits (structural unemployment level)
• Leeway evaluated jointly for personal income tax and social contributions
14

15. Two sets of simulations for each country
• Short to medium term simulations:
– short- to medium-term consolidation needs
– Instrument hierarchies are differentiated by country
cluster depending on circumstances (cyclical position,
inequality level, current-account position)
• Long-term simulations:
– long-term consolidation needs
– Uniform instrument hierarchy (considering only longterm growth and equity effects)
15

16. Number of countries using instruments
in simulations
0
5
10
15
20
Subsidies
Pensions
Other property taxes
Unemployment insurance
Personal income taxes
Corporate income taxes
Environmental taxes
Recurrent property taxes
Other government consumption
User charges
Sickness and disability payments
Consumption taxes
Public investment
Health services provided in kind
Social security contributions
Family policy
Short to medium-term packages (25
countries)
Long-term packages (29 countries)
Education
Source: Economics Department Policy Note No. 20.
16

17. Fiscal consolidation in practice: the role
of public investment cutbacks
Consolidation achieved through cuts in net public investment,
% of potential GDP
2009-12
2012-14
3
2
1
0
-1
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 93.
17

18. How far down the hierarchy of
instruments do countries need to go?
Simulated short- to medium-term consolidation
packages:
• Top-half instruments only in sixteen countries (e.g.
Australia, Canada, Netherlands).
• Top-half instruments mainly in 6 countries (e.g.
Finland, France).
• Bottom-half instruments account for most of
consolidation in Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
18

19. How far down the hierarchy of
instruments do countries need to go?
Simulated long-term consolidation packages:
• Top-half instruments only in 20 countries.
• Top-half instruments mainly in 6 countries.
• Bottom-half instruments account for most of
consolidation in three countries: Australia, New Zealand
and the United States.
19

20. Spending vs. taxes in simulated packages
On average across countries, spending reductions account
for:
• 41% of short- to medium-term simulated packages
• 65% of long-term simulated packages
with considerable variation across countries.
Some examples:
• In Japan and the United States, the simulations give a
large role to tax increases (70% of consolidation over the
medium term).
• France has a very strong potential for spending cuts
which make up 73% of the simulated medium-term
package.
20

21. Structural policy has a key role to play
Ease trade-offs between consolidation and
other objectives
• Spending reductions: e.g. efficiency gains.
• Revenue increases: e.g. base
broadening, reducing tax expenditures.
21

22. Potential efficiency gains in primary and
secondary education
Per cent of GDP, 2007
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
Source: Update of Sutherland et al. (2007) reported in Hagemann (2012).
ISL
USA
N…
D…
S…
L…
BEL
ITA
D…
A…
AUS
NZL
N…
IRL
H…
SVK
POL
JPN
G…
FIN
ESP
CZE
C…
C…
PRT
T…
M…
0
K…
0.2
22

23. Tax expenditures in personal and corporate
income taxes are difficult to estimate but large
9
Estimated personal and corporate income tax expenditures, % of GDP
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
United
Kingdom
(2006)
United States
(2008)
Canada
(2004)
Spain (2008) Korea (2006) Netherlands
(2006)
Germany
(2006)
Source: OECD (2010), Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries.
23

24. Illustrative potential efficiency gains in
value-added taxation
9
Potential efficiency gains in VAT
8
7
% of GDP
6
5
4
3
2
T…
I…
G…
P…
P…
ISL
F…
B…
M…
G…
S…
S…
E…
D…
F…
I…
D…
N…
H…
C…
N…
A…
S…
C…
I…
A…
E…
K…
C…
C…
J…
L…
0
N…
1
Note: these highly hypothetical estimates show how much additional revenue
could be raised if VAT receipts rose from their current level to become equal to
the VAT standard rate times the amount of final consumption expenditure. This
is subject to considerable caveats.
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
24

25. A need for integrated policy strategies
• Successful structural reform does not
necessarily ensue from fiscal consolidation
• Joint efforts to consolidate and reform can
– make consolidation more durable, and
– avoid “quick fixes” to the budget with harmful
side-effects.
25

26. The full results are available in:
• OECD Economic Policy Papers No. 07, “Choosing Fiscal
Consolidation Instruments Compatible With Growth and
Equity”, A Going for Growth Report, July 2013.
• Cournède, B., A. Pina and A. Goujard (2013), “How to
Achieve Growth- and Equity-Friendly Fiscal Consolidation? A
Proposed Methodology for Instrument Choice With an
Illustrative Application to OECD Countries”, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 1088.
• Barbiero, O. and Cournède (2013), “New Econometric
Estimates of Long-Term Growth Effects of Different Areas of
Public Spending”, OECD Economics Department Working
Papers, forthcoming.
• Goujard, A. (2013), “Cross-Country Spillovers from Fiscal
Consolidation”, OECD Economics Department Working
Papers, forthcoming.
26

27. BACKGROUND SLIDES
5nOT FOR PRESENTATION
27

28. Background slides (not for presentation)
• Metholodogical details
• Further detail on results
• Information on the central-subnational split
of best and lowest ranked instruments.
28

29. The baseline
• Starts from the underlying primary balance
in 2012
• Unchanged fiscal policy except:
– measures to keep public pension spending
constant as a share of potential GDP
– measures to contain the increase in
government expenditure on health and longterm care as in de la Maissonneuve and
Oliveira-Martins (2013)
29

30. Main features of the simulated
consolidation profiles
• The underlying primary surplus increases
by 1% of potential GDP each year until
enough is done to put the debt-GDP ratio
on a trajectory bringing it to 60% by 2060.
• Afterwards, the underlying primary surplus
evolves gradually toward the value that
keeps the debt ratio stable .
30

31. Defining consolidation needs
Brings debt to
60% of GDP
Underlying
primary
balance
Peak underlying
primary surplus
Keeps debt
ratio stable
Steady-state
underlying
primary surplus
Short- to
medium-term
consolidation
need
2012 outturn
Baseline
2060
Time
Long-term
consolidation
need
31

32. Illustration of the budget consolidation
profile and baseline in two countries
Simulated underlying primary balance, per cent of potential GDP
Debt-control path
Baseline path
Japan
Belgium
10
8
10
8
6
4
2
6
4
2
0
-2 2012
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
2022
2032
2042
2052
0
-2 2012
-4
-6
-8
2022
2032
2042
2052
-10
-12
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
32

33. Adapting the hierarchy to the long-term
perspective (2060)
• Long-term effects only:
– growth
– equity
• Current-account effects ignored
Spending reductions move up the list
when looking at long-term consolidation.
33

34. Rankings are differentiated by country
group in the short term
Cluster-specific short-term ranking
Generic ST
ranking
1*
2*
3*
4*
5*
Long-term
ranking
Subsidies
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
Pensions
2-3
3
2
1
1
3
2
Other property taxes
2-3
2
3
3
3
2
3-6
Unemployment benefits
4-8
7
4
4
4
9
3-6
Personal income taxes
4-8
5
8
9
9-10
8
10-12
Corporate income taxes
4-8
4
5
7
9-10
12
10-12
Environmental taxes
4-8
8
6
5
4
4
3-6
Recurrent taxes on immovable property
4-8
6
7
6
6
5
7-9
Other government in kind consumption
9-10
9
9
11
11
6
3-6
Sales of goods and services
9-10
10
10
8
7
7
7-9
Sickness and disability payments
11-12
13
11
10
8
11
7-9
Consumption taxes (other than environmental)
11-12
11
12
12
12
13
10-12
13
12
13
13
15
15
13-14
Health services provided in kind
14-15
14
14
14
16
16
13-14
Social security contributions
14-15
15
16
15
13
10
15-16
Family
16
16
15
16
14
14
15-16
Education
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
Instruments
Public investment
1*: AUS, CAN, EST, ISR, ITA, JPN, KOR, NZL, POL, PRT, GBR / 2*: USA
3*: GRC, IRL, ESP / 4*: AUT, BEL, CZE, DNK, FIN, FRA, HUN, ISL, NOR, SVK, SVN
5*: DEU, LUX, NLD, SWE, CHE.
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
34

35. Results from short- to medium-term simulations
Consolidating more in general implies using more unfavourable marginal
instruments (but there are exceptions)
Marginal instrument rank
20
18
16
USA
JPN
GBR
14
NZL
IRL
12
ISL
FRA
GRC
10
AUS CAN
ESP
FIN
8
PRT
HUN
SVN
6
SVK
NLD
ISR
4
BEL
ITA
POL
CZE
2
AUT
SWE
LUX
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Achieved consolidation (percent of potential GDP)
35
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).

36. Results from long-term simulations
Consolidating more in general implies using more unfavourable marginal
instruments (but there are exceptions)
Marginal instrument rank
16
NZL
AUS
USA
14
GBR
IRL
12
ISR
10
ESP
JPN
KOR
SVK
LUX
8
SVN
POL
NLD
6
CZE
CHE
CAN
DEU
4
ISL
DNK
FIN
BEL
EST
2
HUN
SWE
GRC
FRA
PRT
AUT
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Achieved consolidation (percentage point of potential GDP)
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
36

37. A medium-term increase in the tax
share
Cyclically-adjusted primary government revenue, % of potential GDP
55
Estimated in 2012
Simulated in 2020
50
45
40
35
Source: Economics Department Policy Note No. 20.
USA
AUS
SVK
JPN
IRL
ESP
CAN
POL
NZL
ISR
GBR
CZE
PRT
ISL
LUX
NLD
HUN
GRC
SVN
ITA
AUT
SWE
BEL
FIN
FRA
30
37

38. The proposed consolidation packages respect
the diversity of tax and spending structures
Standard deviations of spending and tax items as a percentage of potential
GDP assuming that the simulated long-term consolidation packages are
implemented in full
Spending
2012
2060
Receipts
2012
2060
Unemployment insurance
0.9
0.5
Other property taxes
0.6
0.5
Subsidies
0.7
0.6
Recurrent property taxes
1.0
1.0
Sickness and disability ben.
0.6
0.5
Environmental taxes
0.7
0.5
Family benefits
1.1
1.1
Sales of goods and services
1.1
0.9
Education
1.1
1.1
Corporate income taxes
0.9
0.9
Health services
1.4
1.2
Personal income taxes
3.3
3.1
Other gov. consumption
2.3
1.9
Consumption taxes
2.4
2.0
Pensions
3.6
2.8
Social security contributions
5.3
5.3
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
38

39. In many countries, well-ranked instruments
are mainly central-level items
Share of central government, per cent, 2009
Direct taxes
Subsidies
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
39

40. In many countries, large low-ranked spending
instruments are subnational.
Share of subnational government, per cent, 2009
Education
Public investment
Health
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: Cournède, Goujard and Pina (2013).
40

41. THANK YOU FOR YOUR
ATTENTION
FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE CONTENT
OF THIS PRESENTATION PLEASE EMAIL
BORIS.COURNEDE@OECD.ORG