The elections in Myanmar resulted in a massive victory for the ruling USDP party, which won over 75% of seats in national and state legislatures. However, the process was marred by irregularities, including the suspension of vote counts when the USDP was losing and an influx of late "advance votes" that reversed results. Several parties have contested the results without much expectation of success. In ethnic minority states, the USDP does not have a majority on its own but forms a majority bloc with the military.

1. Outcome of the Myanmar elections
Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum by
Richard Horsey1
17 November 2010
I. Introduction
Elections for the bicameral national legislature as well as fourteen state and
regional legislatures were held on Sunday 7 November. Voting took place in a
peaceful and somewhat subdued atmosphere, but it was marred by what appears to
be massive manipulation of the vote count. The official results show the regime’s
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) winning a massive majority.
Several other parties have condemned the count, and have launched legal challenges
(without much expectation of success). Nevertheless, they had always seen these
elections as the first step of a long and difficult process, and the consensus of most
parties at this point is that they must continue to engage with the process, taking
their seats in the legislatures and making the best use of the limited space that has
opened. Also, despite the irregularities, a number of ethnic-minority parties have
fared reasonably well, particularly in the state/region legislatures.
This paper provides an account of the voting process on election day, and a
detailed analysis of the official results. It then makes some observations on what
may lie ahead for the country in the next few months, in light of the election results
as well as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the ongoing tensions in some ethnic
areas.
II. Election day
Election day itself was peaceful, and the voting took place in an overwhelmingly
calm (even subdued) atmosphere. There were many reports of irregularities – it
would have been strange had there not been – but reporting from a credible local
network of trained volunteer monitors concluded that as regards the voting itself:
“The administration of the poll was generally smooth and most regulations
were followed: 71% of observers reported that the voting process was efficiently
1 Richard Horsey is an independent political analyst and a former ILO liaison officer in
Myanmar; he is fluent in the Burmese language.

2. handled. Infractions were observed in many polling stations, though probably
not on a scale that would significantly shift the overall result of the election.”2
As the polling stations closed at 16:00, representatives of democratic parties
were relatively upbeat: they had known all along that the many constraints of the
pre-election period meant that they could not win a legislative majority. However,
they were buoyed by a turnout that appeared to be reasonably high – despite a
boycott campaign by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and exiled activists
– and indications that many voters, despite numerous pressures, had voted for the
party of their choice.3
This optimism appeared to be borne out by the initial counting of votes, which
according to the election laws took place in each polling station in the presence of
candidates or their representatives as well as members of the public. In the evening
of election day, on the basis of the observed vote count, democratic candidates
reported strong support in the constituencies that they contested. One local
Myanmar organization, which was following developments closely, projected at
midnight on election day that the democratic parties might win over forty percent of
elected seats at the national level (i.e. almost all the seats they were contesting),
with the USDP just under forty percent and the ‘establishment’ National Unity
Party (NUP) less than fourteen percent. While such projections always have to be
treated with extreme caution, it was certainly the case that many democratic
candidates appeared that night to have built up unassailable leads.
The situation then began to change, however. In a number of constituencies,
candidates reported that the vote count was suspended once it became clear that the
USDP candidate was going to lose, and resumed later without the presence of
observers, with the USDP candidate then winning. In other cases where USDP
candidates were losing, large numbers of advance votes (almost all of which were for
the USDP) were brought in late in the count, reversing the USDP candidate’s
2 “Preliminary findings report”, 8 November 2010, issued by an independent and politically
neutral local association based in Myanmar. The report was based on observations by 175
volunteer observers in many different parts of the country who had been trained in
international standards on election observation methodologies.
3 There were striking discrepancies between reports of voter turnout by international media
on the one hand, and party candidates and observers on the other. International media
overwhelmingly reported a low turnout, mostly on the basis of the lack of queues observed at
polling stations; whereas party candidates reported a reasonably high turnout of over sixty
percent. The discrepancies may be due to the very large number of polling stations (on
average, one per 500 voters), which may have given the impression of a low turnout. Official
voter turnout figures, which have not yet been released, may be significantly inflated by the
apparently widespread practice of using supposed “advance votes” to boost USDP results.
Interestingly, a pre-election poll commissioned by the exiled media organization Mizzima
found that sixty percent of respondents intended to vote, thirty percent did not, and ten
percent were undecided. (“Mizzima publishes independent pre-poll survey of more than 4,200
Burmese voters”, Mizzima, 5 November 2010.)
2

3. fortunes. In a number of cases, candidates and observers have claimed that these
“advance votes” were secured after polls closed, when it became clear that the
numbers of actual advance votes were not sufficient to ensure a win for the USDP
candidate. Overall, it seems from anecdotal reports that advance votes made up a
significant proportion of the total vote, although official figures have not been
announced. This contradicts statements made shortly before the poll by the
Chairman of the Election Commission to the effect that the numbers of advance
votes were “small”.4 It is also suspicious that the vast majority of advance votes
appear to have been for the USDP, even if this could be partly explained by the fact
that the largest categories of advance voters (civil servants and the military, a large
proportion of whom are posted away from their home areas) might be more likely to
vote – through choice or pressure – for the USDP. Overall, it is the sheer number of
advance votes that is most suspicious.
By Monday, when many results were communicated to candidates by the
Election Commission (but not yet made public), the extent of “advance” voting
irregularities was becoming clear. A number of parties, including the NUP, National
Democratic Force (NDF), Democratic Party (Myanmar), and a number of ethnic
parties began preparing legal challenges through the Election Commission. This is a
lengthy and potentially expensive process, through a system that is not independent
of the regime, and therefore the parties have little expectation of success. A number
of parties also made public statements questioning the results and in particular the
manner in which “advance votes” had been used.
Shortly after polling, there were armed clashes at two Myanmar towns on the
Thai border (Myawaddy and Payathonzu), sparked by a renegade unit of the
Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army ceasefire group taking control of key positions in
the towns. While the timing was clearly election-related, these events were not
“election-related violence” in the normal sense of that term. The attacks on these
towns may have been designed to embarrass the regime at a time of elections, or
may have just taken advantage of the distraction the elections provided. But these
actions did not seek to influence the elections themselves.
III. Analysis of results5
The USDP has an overwhelming legislative majority. In the Upper House (Amyotha
Hluttaw) it has seventy-seven percent of the elected seats, and in the Lower House
4 At a briefing on 18 September in Nay Pyi Taw for diplomats and the media, the Chairman
of the Election Commission stated in reply to a question that: “The numbers of those casting
advance votes are compiled by the township Election Commission. The categories include
those under hospitalization, those in detention, military personnel on duty and training and
those abroad. These numbers are small.”
5 At the time this paper was finalized (17 November), results had yet to be announced for 17
seats: 2 in the Upper House, 3 in the Lower House, and 12 in the state/region legislatures.
Except where noted, however, the pending results will not change the numbers given below.
3

4. (Pyithu Hluttaw), seventy-nine percent. Coincidentally or not, this is very close to
the proportion of seats won by the NLD in its 1990 election landslide.6 Including the
twenty-five percent bloc of legislative seats reserved for military appointees, the
balance of power in the national legislatures is as follows (see appendix 2 for a
graphical representation):
USDP military NUP NDF7 ethnic parties independents8
Upper House 57% 25% 3% 2% 12% <1%
Lower House 59% 25% 3% 2% 10% <1%
Combined Union 58% 25% 3% 2% 11% <1%
Legislature
Such USDP dominance is not only symbolically significant, it also has
important legislative consequences at the national level:9
• The USDP has a majority, by itself, in both houses and in the combined
legislature. This means that the party will choose two of the three
presidential nominees, with the other chosen by the military bloc
(controlled by the commander-in-chief). The presidential electoral college
is the combined legislature, and the USDP’s majority there means that it
will be able to choose the president.
• The president, chosen by the USDP, will therefore have much greater
formal legislative power than the commander-in-chief, since the president
and USDP will be able to act alone in matters requiring a simple majority
(i.e. most decisions), without needing the support of the military.
• The USDP and the military bloc together have a ‘super-majority’ (greater
than seventy-five percent). This has several implications. It means that
the USDP+military can amend the constitution as they see fit10 and can
impeach public office holders. The other legislators are far from the
twenty-five percent needed to block changes to the constitution, to initiate
6 In 1990, the NLD won 392 of 485 seats in the unicameral legislature, or 80.8 percent. The
NUP won only two percent of the seats in 1990, and only four percent of national elected
seats in 2010.
7 Of the democratic parties, only the NDF won any seats in the Upper House and the Lower
House.
8 There are only two independent representatives-elect at the national level, one in each
house. This constitutes less than half a percent (rounded up to one percent in the table so
that totals add to 100%).
9 For an overview of the provisions of the 2008 constitution relating to the legislative issues
raised in the following paragraphs, see Richard Horsey, “A preliminary analysis of
Myanmar’s 2008 constitution”, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Briefing Paper, 14
January 2009.
10 Amendments to certain provisions of the constitution require a referendum in addition to a
three-quarters decision of the combined legislature.
4

5. impeachment proceedings, and to convene special sessions of the
legislatures (important if they otherwise meet infrequently), and far from
the thirty-three percent of either house needed to block impeachment
proceedings.
In the fourteen state/regional legislatures, the situation is slightly different.
Across all these legislatures, the USDP has a huge majority, with seventy-five
percent of the total elected seats, or fifty-six percent of all seats (including military
appointees). However, there are important regional variations. A summary of the
balance of power in these legislatures is as follows:
Legislature Balance of Power
1. Ayeyarwady Region USDP majority [USDP 67%; military 25%; NUP 8%]
2. Bago Region USDP majority [USDP 68%; military 25%; NUP 5%; KPP 2%]
3. Magway Region USDP majority [USDP 71%; military 25%; NUP 4%]
4. Mandalay Region USDP majority [USDP 73%; military 25%; others 2%]
5. Sagaing Region USDP majority [USDP 63% military 25%; others 8%; 2 seats result pending]
6. Tanintharyi Region USDP majority [USDP 71%; military 25%; NUP 4%]
7. Yangon Region USDP majority [USDP 61%; military 25%; NUP 6%; NDF 4%; others 5%]
8. Chin State USDP+military majority [USDP 29%; military 25%; CPP 21%; CNP 21%;
ENDP 4%]
9. Kachin State USDP+military majority [USDP 39%; military 25%; NUP 22%; SNDP 8%;
others 6%]
10. Kayah State USDP majority [USDP 75%; military 25%]
11. Kayin State USDP+military majority [USDP 30%; military 25%; PSDP 18%; KPP 9%;
AMRDP 9%; others 9%]
12. Mon State USDP+military majority [USDP 46%; military 25%; AMRDP 23%; NUP 6%]
13. Rakhine State USDP+military majority [USDP 30%; military 25%; RNDP 38%; others 7%]
14. Shan State USDP+military majority [USDP 35%; military 25%; SNDP 21%; others 14%;
8 seats result pending]
In the regional legislatures (the Burman heartland), the USDP has a massive
majority (higher even than in the Upper and Lower houses). It fully controls these
legislatures, mirroring the situation at the national level. Similar consequences
follow: the USDP does not need the support of the military bloc for matters requiring
a simple majority, and together with the military bloc it has a super-majority. This
allows the USDP+military to impeach regional public office holders (Chief Minister,
region ministers, and so on). The other legislators are far from having sufficient
numbers to initiate impeachment proceedings themselves, block such proceedings, or
convene special sessions of the legislature.
In the ethnic minority state legislatures, the picture is somewhat different.
While the USDP still has a sizeable bloc – more than twenty-five percent – in all of
these legislatures, it does not have a majority in any of them (except Kayah). This
has two implications: first, the party must join forces with the military in order to
5

6. have a simple majority (presumably the interests of the two will be closely aligned
for now); second, even with the support of the military bloc, the party has no super-
majority. This means that the USDP/military will not have a free hand in matters
such as impeachment: they can initiate impeachment proceedings, and block
proceedings, but some ethnic parties also have the power to do so. The
USDP/military also do not have control of when the legislatures meet, as special
sessions can be convened by others. In most of the State Legislatures, this at least
gives ethnic parties some influence over their affairs.
It should also be noted that a large proportion of the USDP legislators in
state assemblies are members of the ethnic minorities in that state – some of them
respected members of the community; the USDP put a major effort into recruiting
such credible candidates. This means that while there will no doubt be issues where
the (Burman-dominated) national-level USDP dictates the positions to be adopted by
its state legislators, many – perhaps most – issues of local concern will be decided by
the (ethnic-dominated) party at the local level.
Taken together, these two developments will significantly alter the way in
which ethnic issues are addressed in Myanmar, and the way in which ethnic areas
are governed. While these are important developments, the potential impact of
which should not be underestimated, they must be set against a number of much
more negative trends: tensions with armed ethnic organizations are at a dangerous
level; the Kachin have been excluded from the political process; the only Kayah
party to contest has failed to win any seats in the Kayah legislature; the Wa
(UWSA) and Mongla group (NDAA) have refused to participate in the election
process; and fighting has flared on the Thai border.
It is also important not to put too much emphasis on legislatures. The biggest
factor in the day-to-day governance of the country will be the president and the
cabinet that he selects (at the national level) and the chief ministers and the local
governments that they select (at the local level). It is not required that any of these
office-holders be elected representatives, and the legislatures have little power to
influence or block such appointments.
IV. The path ahead
With the voting over, and up to three months before the new legislatures are
convened, a president chosen, and the cabinet appointed, Myanmar has now entered
a period of considerable change and uncertainty (the present government continues
in power during this period). 11
11 For a detailed discussion of the Constitutional procedures governing the transition to a
new government, see International Crisis Group, “The Myanmar Elections”, 27 May 2010,
section IV.A.
6

7. While parties were taken aback at the level of manipulation of the vote count,
they have always been well aware of the flaws in the election process, and
understood that this was the first step in what will be a long and difficult process.
The current consensus is that the results will be challenged through legal channels
(without much expectation of success), but there will be no boycott of the legislatures
or of the broader process.
The significance of the elections has never been dependent on their free and
fair conduct. The opportunities lay elsewhere, with the resumption of legal political
activity and discussion (including, to some extent, in the domestic media), something
that has been impossible for most of the last half-century; with the generational
transition within the military; with the separation between military and
government; and with the introduction of regional legislatures and a limited
devolution of governance. Some of these developments are tentative, not all may
prove positive, but they do represent change and opportunity in a situation that has
been frozen for many years.
At the same time, emotions in the country are running high. People are
dismayed at the extent of the perceived ballot fraud and at how flagrantly it was
carried out; Aung San Suu Kyi’s release is also a highly emotional moment for the
country. Overall, it makes for a volatile situation.
Many questions are being posed about the impact of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
release in such a context. Speculation is running the gamut from her possible
assassination to her possible appointment as foreign minister12 (neither prediction,
it seems, is based on any concrete information). What does seem clear is that the
regime has taken the decision on her release from a position of strength and
confidence, having completed the election process on their terms. They are therefore
unlikely to be interested in compromise or political deals; they may, however, make
certain unilateral concessions (such as releasing political prisoners or increasing
international engagement), which they historically prefer to do from a position of
strength.
At the time of her last release, in 2002, some within the regime believed that
Aung San Suu Kyi had lost some of her popular appeal – in part because they had
kept her isolated from the population, and in part because of the decline in the
capacity of the NLD. The regime was reportedly shocked by the huge crowds that
turned out to meet her across the country in the course of early 2003, and were
determined to prevent her reaching Mandalay, fearing that the city would erupt in
popular support – hence the attack on her convoy at Dipeyin. It seems unlikely that
the regime has underestimated her popularity a second time, which raises important
questions, as yet unanswered, about how they plan to deal with the inevitable
outpouring of public support.
12 Aung San Suu Kyi was asked about this rumor by a journalist at her 15 November press
conference.
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8. V. Conclusions
Political parties in Myanmar are taking a forward-looking approach, determined to
make the best strategic use of the small opportunities that are available. They are
challenging the election results, but are not defining their strategy for the future on
that basis. It is critical for the international community to understand the approach
they are taking.
The standard gloss for the elections, “a sham process that changes nothing”,
is unhelpful. While the results may be devoid of credibility, many things are
changing nonetheless. A dramatically new political landscape is taking shape in
Myanmar, although it may take a while for some of the protagonists to recognize
this. The institutions of government and the government itself are changing; the
opposition is in flux, with a host of new players and perspectives, into which Aung
San Suu Kyi has been thrust; and the ethnic issue has been further complicated,
with some ethnic parties doing reasonably well in the polls, others being excluded
from them, and heightened military tensions in some areas.
It is important not to pre-judge any of these processes. The international
community must recognize that there is a multiplicity of voices in Myanmar that do
not fit neatly into the tripartite categorization of ‘government’, ‘opposition’ and
‘ethnic’. It is vital to listen to all of these voices. Failure to do so risks reinforcing the
polarization of the past rather than helping to transcend it.
8

9. Appendix 1 – Seats won by political parties
Party Upper Lower State/Region Total
1 Union Solidarity and Development Party 128 257 489 874
2 National Unity Party 5 12 45 62
3 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party 3 18 36 57
4 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party 7 9 19 35
5 All Mon Regions Democracy Party 4 3 9 16
6 National Democratic Force 4 8 4 16
7 Chin Progressive Party 4 2 5 11
8 Pao National Organization 1 3 6 10
9 Chin National Party 2 2 5 9
10 Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Party 3 2 4 9
11 Kayin People's Party 1 1 4 6
12 Taaung (Palaung) National Party 1 1 4 6
13 Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State 1 2 2 5
14 Inn National Development Party – 1 3 4
15 Wa Democratic Party – 1 3 4
16 Democratic Party (Myanmar) – – 3 3
17 Kayin State Democracy and Development Party 1 – 1 2
18 National Democratic Party for Development – – 2 2
19 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of – – 1 1
Myanmar)
20 Ethnic National Development Party – – 1 1
21 Kayan National Party – – 1 1
– Independent candidates 1 1 4 6
22 Democracy and Peace Party – – – –
23 Kaman National Progressive Party – – – –
24 Khami National Development Party – – – –
25 Kokang Democracy and Unity Party – – – –
26 Lahu National Development Party – – – –
27 Modern People Party – – – –
28 Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization – – – –
29 National Development and Peace Party – – – –
30 National Political Alliance – – – –
31 Peace and Diversity Party – – – –
32 Rakhine State National Unity Party, Myanmar – – – –
33 Union Democratic Party – – – –
34 Union of Myanmar Federation of National – – –
Politics
35 United Democratic Party – – – –
36 Wa National Unity Party – – – –
37 Wunthanu NLD (The Union of Myanmar) – – – –
TOTAL 166 323 651 1140
Not yet announced 2 3 12 17
The total number of constituencies was 1163; polling was cancelled in 6, leaving 1157.
8

10. Appendix 2 – Balance of power in the national legislatures
Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house)
25% 50% 75%
Military bloc (110); USDP (257); NUP (12); NDF (8); ethnic parties (45); independent (1); 3 pending
Total seats: 440 (of which 330 elected); polls cancelled in 4 seats
Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house)
25% 50% 75%
Military appointees (56); USDP (128); NUP (5); NDF (4); ethnic parties (29); independent (1)13
Total seats: 224 (of which 168 elected)
13 Results for 2 seats are pending in the Upper House. One is contested only by ethnic candidates so is shaded
blue. One is contested only by USDP and NUP and is shown as a split cell.
9