The incident occurred during a wireline operation on the Draugen facility to replace a gas lift valve. As the subsurface safety valve was being pulled out of the well, it became stuck in the Xmas tree, blocking the upper swab valve and leaving only one barrier preventing hydrocarbon outflow from the well. After re-establishing additional well barriers, the investigation found issues with risk assessment, well barrier management, and inadequate contingency planning for equipment getting stuck that contributed to the incident. Improvements were identified regarding safety, expertise, well barrier documentation, and securing toolstrings.
This technical report provides guidelines for performing offshore structural reliability analysis of jacket platforms. It outlines the characteristics of jacket structures and their response to environmental loads. It discusses modeling uncertainties and selecting target reliability levels. Important limit states like buckling, joint failure, and fatigue failure are defined. The modeling approaches for an example fatigue limit state analysis and total collapse limit state analysis are summarized. The report is intended to guide reliability analyses to evaluate jacket platform performance.
Summary of New Rules for Horizontal Drilling in West Virginia, as of July 1, ...Marcellus Drilling News
A summary of the new rules drillers in WV have to follow--rules that have been developed over the past two years. This summary of the changes and new rules is provided by the WV law firm Lewis Glasser Casey & Rollins, PLLC.
This curriculum vitae provides information on Eduardo Leguizamon's work experience, education, skills, and personal details. He has over 35 years of experience in engineering roles for companies in industries such as oil and gas, petrochemicals, and power plants. His positions have included field engineer, project engineering, prefabrication superintendent, and drafting roles. He has worked on international projects in countries including Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan, Angola, Kazakhstan, and Tunisia.
This document is a resume for Mansour H. Al-Qadri. It includes contact information, objective, personal details, skills, extensive education and training history, work experience including roles as an accounts payable accountant and SAP senior general ledger accountant, and interests. Al-Qadri has over 15 years of accounting experience, is proficient in various accounting software and Microsoft programs, and seeks a challenging job utilizing his skills.
This document provides a summary of an individual's qualifications and experience. It includes:
1) Over 24 years of experience in the oil and gas industry, with a Bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering. Experience includes various engineering and leadership roles.
2) Technical expertise in areas like piping, pressure vessels, and mechanical equipment. Recognition through various innovation and safety awards.
3) A track record of successfully completing engineering projects and analyses to solve challenges like equipment failures, leaks, and ensuring safety. Methods include finite element analysis, fitness for service assessments, and dynamic modeling.
This document summarizes a blowout that occurred during fracturing operations on a well in South Texas. Wild Well Control responded and was able to install a new wellhead and secure the well within 5 days. They removed equipment from the site and controlled water flow before excavating to remove the damaged wellhead. A diamond wire saw was used instead of an abrasive jet cutter to remove the wellhead faster. A slip lock wellhead was then installed and the well was capped by installing a tubing head and closing manual gate valves.
This technical report provides guidelines for performing offshore structural reliability analysis of jacket platforms. It outlines the characteristics of jacket structures and their response to environmental loads. It discusses modeling uncertainties and selecting target reliability levels. Important limit states like buckling, joint failure, and fatigue failure are defined. The modeling approaches for an example fatigue limit state analysis and total collapse limit state analysis are summarized. The report is intended to guide reliability analyses to evaluate jacket platform performance.
Summary of New Rules for Horizontal Drilling in West Virginia, as of July 1, ...Marcellus Drilling News
A summary of the new rules drillers in WV have to follow--rules that have been developed over the past two years. This summary of the changes and new rules is provided by the WV law firm Lewis Glasser Casey & Rollins, PLLC.
This curriculum vitae provides information on Eduardo Leguizamon's work experience, education, skills, and personal details. He has over 35 years of experience in engineering roles for companies in industries such as oil and gas, petrochemicals, and power plants. His positions have included field engineer, project engineering, prefabrication superintendent, and drafting roles. He has worked on international projects in countries including Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan, Angola, Kazakhstan, and Tunisia.
This document is a resume for Mansour H. Al-Qadri. It includes contact information, objective, personal details, skills, extensive education and training history, work experience including roles as an accounts payable accountant and SAP senior general ledger accountant, and interests. Al-Qadri has over 15 years of accounting experience, is proficient in various accounting software and Microsoft programs, and seeks a challenging job utilizing his skills.
This document provides a summary of an individual's qualifications and experience. It includes:
1) Over 24 years of experience in the oil and gas industry, with a Bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering. Experience includes various engineering and leadership roles.
2) Technical expertise in areas like piping, pressure vessels, and mechanical equipment. Recognition through various innovation and safety awards.
3) A track record of successfully completing engineering projects and analyses to solve challenges like equipment failures, leaks, and ensuring safety. Methods include finite element analysis, fitness for service assessments, and dynamic modeling.
This document summarizes a blowout that occurred during fracturing operations on a well in South Texas. Wild Well Control responded and was able to install a new wellhead and secure the well within 5 days. They removed equipment from the site and controlled water flow before excavating to remove the damaged wellhead. A diamond wire saw was used instead of an abrasive jet cutter to remove the wellhead faster. A slip lock wellhead was then installed and the well was capped by installing a tubing head and closing manual gate valves.
- On November 25, 1998, a fire at an Equilon Enterprises oil refinery delayed coking unit killed six people after a power outage caused abnormal process conditions in one of the coke drums.
- After the power was restored, operators attempted to empty the partially filled coke drum. They decided to open the vessel after injecting some steam based on the outside of the drum appearing cool to the touch. However, the core contents were still hot, causing flammable vapors to ignite upon opening and kill six people.
- The incident showed the need for management of change policies to cover abnormal situations and deviations from standard operating procedures to systematically review risks introduced by non-routine operations.
This document summarizes a minor project report on subsurface safety valves. It discusses the history and operation of safety valves, which provide protection against uncontrolled flow from oil and gas wells. Safety valves have evolved from simple downhole devices in the 1940s to complex systems integral to offshore well completions worldwide. There are two main types - surface operated and subsurface operated valves. Surface operated valves are further divided into pressure differential and pressure operated types, while subsurface operated valves include wireline retrievable and tubing mounted varieties. The project aims to develop an understanding of safety valve applications and parameters that affect their performance and efficiency.
This document discusses the challenges of undertaking repairs and maintenance on wastewater treatment plants. It uses a case study of repairs and maintenance done on the trickling filters at the Christchurch Wastewater Treatment Plant. Key challenges included the need to keep the plant continuously operating, coordinate different teams doing repairs and maintenance, and isolate parts of the plant for work while maintaining treatment. Careful planning was required to schedule the work, modify treatment processes, and address safety issues.
Serious incident 27 10 2015 t12th nov 2015 test plug loosened and shot of...Alan Bassett
Shared learning from a high pressure hydrostatic test, utilising a test plug which failed. This test looked fairly well controlled as regards the test area, but still went wrong! It was probably due to the good controls being in place which prevented any injuries.
This document discusses regulatory requirements and best practices for tailings dam design and construction in Alaska. It outlines Alaska's dam safety program which classifies dams based on hazard potential and requires design to withstand earthquakes and floods of increasing strength depending on hazard class. It also details the permitting and approval process for dam construction and operation. Key lessons from past failures emphasize the importance of thorough site investigation, design, construction oversight, monitoring, and emergency preparedness. State-of-the-art techniques can successfully mitigate risks from slope stability, overtopping, foundations, seepage, erosion and seismic events to develop stable, long-term tailings storage facilities.
A corrosion leak developed on a 20-inch distribution main pipeline in Waterloo, Iowa in 2019. The leak was located at a welded joint that had a poor coating job dating back to its installation in 1955. Repairing the leak and clearing an underground contact with a water main approximately 3 blocks away was estimated to cost nearly $500,000. Corrosion has an estimated global annual cost of $2.5 trillion according to a 2016 report.
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdfJalal Neshat
The document describes a Lift Gas Safety System (LGSS) implemented on gas lift production wells on artificial islands to enhance safety and optimize surface infrastructure during simultaneous drilling and production operations (SIMOPS). The LGSS contains downhole check valves and surface hydraulic safety valves to contain lift gas within the wellbore in an emergency shutdown. It also allows annular pressure monitoring to maintain well integrity. This system lowers the risk of a catastrophic gas release and allows for optimization of surface facilities by removing unnecessary piping and valves. Initial installations are planned for Q4 2014 with wireless monitoring and battery power, transitioning to wired systems for full field development. The LGSS addresses well integrity issues and reduces risks associated with SIMOPS on the islands.
This document discusses the importance of proper valve commissioning for pipelines. It outlines key steps to ensure valve integrity during construction and commissioning, including:
1) Developing a written valve commissioning procedure and assigning a specialized contractor to oversee the process.
2) Inspecting valves upon arrival for damage and preventing damage during handling, transport, and storage.
3) Following guidelines for installation, hydrotesting, and chemical cleaning to avoid contaminating valve internals.
4) Conducting tests like an "inside-out air-seat test" to check for seal integrity without risking damage.
Proper commissioning is crucial to prevent premature valve failure and resulting delays and costs during pipeline start-up
UKWP Case study - Mauchline Final copy 23 06 15ADAM DUKE
The Mauchline STW project involved upgrading the inlet works using a Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DfMA) approach to address issues identified by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. This included constructing a new inlet storm screen chamber, flume channel, grit removal plant, and other components using precast concrete sections for increased efficiency. The DfMA approach reduced construction time and costs by designing elements off-site and assembling them with minimal additional work. The completed upgrades helped ensure the treatment works complied with its discharge consent.
1) A steam explosion at a refinery in Belgium killed two technicians working on a leaking valve. The bonnet separated from the valve body due to failure of 14 out of 20 stud bolts securing it, which were degraded by stress corrosion cracking.
2) An investigation found the valve had a design flaw that put excessive stress on the stud bolts. Several leaks over time exposed the bolts to corrosive conditions, degrading them until one failed during maintenance, causing the explosion.
3) Lessons included the need to thoroughly inspect stud bolts and joints for signs of cracking or corrosion, especially after periods of leakage or being out of service, and considering backup supports when risks are unknown.
Methodology for optimum deepwater safety system selectionamrhaggag
This document summarizes various deepwater safety system designs for oil and gas wells. It discusses conventional heavily sprung designs, balanced line designs, dome charged designs, and self-equalizing designs. For each design, it covers advantages and disadvantages, as well as design improvements that increase reliability, such as eliminating elastomers. The document provides guidance on selecting the optimal safety system design given well parameters and completion type (dry tree vs. wet tree).
This document discusses how pipeline installation and pre-commissioning can impact future pipeline integrity if not properly managed. Specifically, it examines common issues like corrosion from seawater ingress during installation, inadequate cleaning, and hydrotesting. One case study describes over 80 tons of debris and corrosion products removed from a line that flooded with seawater during installation. The document stresses that operators should be aware of how early-life issues can negatively affect integrity over the long-term if not properly mitigated during pre-commissioning.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accident occurred on March 28, 1979 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania. Due to inaccurate instrumentation and operator error, one of the reactors experienced a partial meltdown which released small amounts of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. No public health effects were observed, but it was the most significant accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant history and led to major improvements in safety regulations and emergency preparedness for nuclear plants. The damaged reactor was shut down permanently in 2019 for economic reasons despite having an operating license until 2034.
The document summarizes two major nuclear power plant disasters - Chernobyl in 1986 and Three Mile Island in 1979. It describes the causes of the accidents, their impacts, and lessons learned. The Chernobyl accident was caused by flawed reactor design and human error, resulting in a massive uncontrolled radioactive release. It directly caused 28 deaths and long term health impacts. Three Mile Island's partial core meltdown released some radiation but no direct health effects. It highlighted operational and communication issues. Both led to improved global nuclear safety standards and cooperation.
This document provides the detailed work program for foundation, tower erection, and stringing work for the Nam Ngiep 1 Hydropower Project 230kV transmission line. It outlines the construction procedures, resources required, and environmental and safety plans. The transmission line will be 121.47km long with 304 towers. Foundation construction will include staking tower locations, excavating pits, and potentially blasting rock. Tower erection and stringing will then be conducted according to the schedule. Environmental, health, and safety aspects are addressed throughout to minimize impacts during construction activities.
Well integrity is critical for oil and gas wells to prevent uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons. The document discusses well integrity failures, management, and standards. It defines well integrity and outlines its importance. Failures are common, with 35-50% of existing wells having issues. Well integrity management involves design, construction, monitoring, and abandonment phases. Standards provide guidelines on barriers, casing pressure, and integrity best practices to reduce risks over a well's lifecycle. Maintaining well barriers and addressing integrity proactively are keys to successful management.
The document summarizes the installation of an innovative "Capillary Conveyed" gas lift extension system in a well in Vietnam. The existing gas lift system was no longer effective due to declining reservoir pressures. The new system used a 0.75" diameter capillary string to extend the gas lift injection point deeper into the well. After installation, the well resumed production, flowing for 60 days at rates exceeding expectations before being placed on a production cycle. Cumulative production since was 43,000 barrels of oil, with an estimated payback of only 4 days for the installation. The installation demonstrated that the new technology can effectively reinstate production from wells with inefficient gas lift systems.
The CBC machine is a common diagnostic tool used by doctors to measure a patient's red blood cell count, white blood cell count and platelet count. The machine uses a small sample of the patient's blood, which is then placed into special tubes and analyzed. The results of the analysis are then displayed on a screen for the doctor to review. The CBC machine is an important tool for diagnosing various conditions, such as anemia, infection and leukemia. It can also help to monitor a patient's response to treatment.
- On November 25, 1998, a fire at an Equilon Enterprises oil refinery delayed coking unit killed six people after a power outage caused abnormal process conditions in one of the coke drums.
- After the power was restored, operators attempted to empty the partially filled coke drum. They decided to open the vessel after injecting some steam based on the outside of the drum appearing cool to the touch. However, the core contents were still hot, causing flammable vapors to ignite upon opening and kill six people.
- The incident showed the need for management of change policies to cover abnormal situations and deviations from standard operating procedures to systematically review risks introduced by non-routine operations.
This document summarizes a minor project report on subsurface safety valves. It discusses the history and operation of safety valves, which provide protection against uncontrolled flow from oil and gas wells. Safety valves have evolved from simple downhole devices in the 1940s to complex systems integral to offshore well completions worldwide. There are two main types - surface operated and subsurface operated valves. Surface operated valves are further divided into pressure differential and pressure operated types, while subsurface operated valves include wireline retrievable and tubing mounted varieties. The project aims to develop an understanding of safety valve applications and parameters that affect their performance and efficiency.
This document discusses the challenges of undertaking repairs and maintenance on wastewater treatment plants. It uses a case study of repairs and maintenance done on the trickling filters at the Christchurch Wastewater Treatment Plant. Key challenges included the need to keep the plant continuously operating, coordinate different teams doing repairs and maintenance, and isolate parts of the plant for work while maintaining treatment. Careful planning was required to schedule the work, modify treatment processes, and address safety issues.
Serious incident 27 10 2015 t12th nov 2015 test plug loosened and shot of...Alan Bassett
Shared learning from a high pressure hydrostatic test, utilising a test plug which failed. This test looked fairly well controlled as regards the test area, but still went wrong! It was probably due to the good controls being in place which prevented any injuries.
This document discusses regulatory requirements and best practices for tailings dam design and construction in Alaska. It outlines Alaska's dam safety program which classifies dams based on hazard potential and requires design to withstand earthquakes and floods of increasing strength depending on hazard class. It also details the permitting and approval process for dam construction and operation. Key lessons from past failures emphasize the importance of thorough site investigation, design, construction oversight, monitoring, and emergency preparedness. State-of-the-art techniques can successfully mitigate risks from slope stability, overtopping, foundations, seepage, erosion and seismic events to develop stable, long-term tailings storage facilities.
A corrosion leak developed on a 20-inch distribution main pipeline in Waterloo, Iowa in 2019. The leak was located at a welded joint that had a poor coating job dating back to its installation in 1955. Repairing the leak and clearing an underground contact with a water main approximately 3 blocks away was estimated to cost nearly $500,000. Corrosion has an estimated global annual cost of $2.5 trillion according to a 2016 report.
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdfJalal Neshat
The document describes a Lift Gas Safety System (LGSS) implemented on gas lift production wells on artificial islands to enhance safety and optimize surface infrastructure during simultaneous drilling and production operations (SIMOPS). The LGSS contains downhole check valves and surface hydraulic safety valves to contain lift gas within the wellbore in an emergency shutdown. It also allows annular pressure monitoring to maintain well integrity. This system lowers the risk of a catastrophic gas release and allows for optimization of surface facilities by removing unnecessary piping and valves. Initial installations are planned for Q4 2014 with wireless monitoring and battery power, transitioning to wired systems for full field development. The LGSS addresses well integrity issues and reduces risks associated with SIMOPS on the islands.
This document discusses the importance of proper valve commissioning for pipelines. It outlines key steps to ensure valve integrity during construction and commissioning, including:
1) Developing a written valve commissioning procedure and assigning a specialized contractor to oversee the process.
2) Inspecting valves upon arrival for damage and preventing damage during handling, transport, and storage.
3) Following guidelines for installation, hydrotesting, and chemical cleaning to avoid contaminating valve internals.
4) Conducting tests like an "inside-out air-seat test" to check for seal integrity without risking damage.
Proper commissioning is crucial to prevent premature valve failure and resulting delays and costs during pipeline start-up
UKWP Case study - Mauchline Final copy 23 06 15ADAM DUKE
The Mauchline STW project involved upgrading the inlet works using a Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DfMA) approach to address issues identified by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. This included constructing a new inlet storm screen chamber, flume channel, grit removal plant, and other components using precast concrete sections for increased efficiency. The DfMA approach reduced construction time and costs by designing elements off-site and assembling them with minimal additional work. The completed upgrades helped ensure the treatment works complied with its discharge consent.
1) A steam explosion at a refinery in Belgium killed two technicians working on a leaking valve. The bonnet separated from the valve body due to failure of 14 out of 20 stud bolts securing it, which were degraded by stress corrosion cracking.
2) An investigation found the valve had a design flaw that put excessive stress on the stud bolts. Several leaks over time exposed the bolts to corrosive conditions, degrading them until one failed during maintenance, causing the explosion.
3) Lessons included the need to thoroughly inspect stud bolts and joints for signs of cracking or corrosion, especially after periods of leakage or being out of service, and considering backup supports when risks are unknown.
Methodology for optimum deepwater safety system selectionamrhaggag
This document summarizes various deepwater safety system designs for oil and gas wells. It discusses conventional heavily sprung designs, balanced line designs, dome charged designs, and self-equalizing designs. For each design, it covers advantages and disadvantages, as well as design improvements that increase reliability, such as eliminating elastomers. The document provides guidance on selecting the optimal safety system design given well parameters and completion type (dry tree vs. wet tree).
This document discusses how pipeline installation and pre-commissioning can impact future pipeline integrity if not properly managed. Specifically, it examines common issues like corrosion from seawater ingress during installation, inadequate cleaning, and hydrotesting. One case study describes over 80 tons of debris and corrosion products removed from a line that flooded with seawater during installation. The document stresses that operators should be aware of how early-life issues can negatively affect integrity over the long-term if not properly mitigated during pre-commissioning.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accident occurred on March 28, 1979 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania. Due to inaccurate instrumentation and operator error, one of the reactors experienced a partial meltdown which released small amounts of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. No public health effects were observed, but it was the most significant accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant history and led to major improvements in safety regulations and emergency preparedness for nuclear plants. The damaged reactor was shut down permanently in 2019 for economic reasons despite having an operating license until 2034.
The document summarizes two major nuclear power plant disasters - Chernobyl in 1986 and Three Mile Island in 1979. It describes the causes of the accidents, their impacts, and lessons learned. The Chernobyl accident was caused by flawed reactor design and human error, resulting in a massive uncontrolled radioactive release. It directly caused 28 deaths and long term health impacts. Three Mile Island's partial core meltdown released some radiation but no direct health effects. It highlighted operational and communication issues. Both led to improved global nuclear safety standards and cooperation.
This document provides the detailed work program for foundation, tower erection, and stringing work for the Nam Ngiep 1 Hydropower Project 230kV transmission line. It outlines the construction procedures, resources required, and environmental and safety plans. The transmission line will be 121.47km long with 304 towers. Foundation construction will include staking tower locations, excavating pits, and potentially blasting rock. Tower erection and stringing will then be conducted according to the schedule. Environmental, health, and safety aspects are addressed throughout to minimize impacts during construction activities.
Well integrity is critical for oil and gas wells to prevent uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons. The document discusses well integrity failures, management, and standards. It defines well integrity and outlines its importance. Failures are common, with 35-50% of existing wells having issues. Well integrity management involves design, construction, monitoring, and abandonment phases. Standards provide guidelines on barriers, casing pressure, and integrity best practices to reduce risks over a well's lifecycle. Maintaining well barriers and addressing integrity proactively are keys to successful management.
The document summarizes the installation of an innovative "Capillary Conveyed" gas lift extension system in a well in Vietnam. The existing gas lift system was no longer effective due to declining reservoir pressures. The new system used a 0.75" diameter capillary string to extend the gas lift injection point deeper into the well. After installation, the well resumed production, flowing for 60 days at rates exceeding expectations before being placed on a production cycle. Cumulative production since was 43,000 barrels of oil, with an estimated payback of only 4 days for the installation. The installation demonstrated that the new technology can effectively reinstate production from wells with inefficient gas lift systems.
Similar to 2010 1367 granskningsrapport etter hendelse på draugen og varsel om pålegg - engelsk (20)
The CBC machine is a common diagnostic tool used by doctors to measure a patient's red blood cell count, white blood cell count and platelet count. The machine uses a small sample of the patient's blood, which is then placed into special tubes and analyzed. The results of the analysis are then displayed on a screen for the doctor to review. The CBC machine is an important tool for diagnosing various conditions, such as anemia, infection and leukemia. It can also help to monitor a patient's response to treatment.
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2010 1367 granskningsrapport etter hendelse på draugen og varsel om pålegg - engelsk
1. Investigation report
Report
Report title Activity number
Loss of well barriers in connection with wireline operation on the
Draugen facility.
005093016
Classification
Public
Exempt from public
disclosure
Restricted
Confidential
Strictly confidential
Summary
The incident occurred on the Draugen facility in connection with a wireline operation in well 6407/9-A-01 on 4
December 2010. Shell was the operator and Seawell AS (Seawell) was the contractor for the wireline operation.
The incident was reported to the PSA on the same day. The objective of the wireline operation was to replace a
gas lift valve.
To replace the gas lift valve, the subsurface safety valve must first be extracted from the well. As the subsurface
safety valve was pulled through the Xmas tree, it became stuck. The remaining barrier element in the Xmas
tree, the upper swab-valve, was blocked.
Normalisation of this incident was completed on 8 December 2010 by re-establishing the well barrier situation.
To limit the risk associated with this well, the subsurface safety valve was run back into the well. Subsequently,
two mechanical bridge plugs were inserted in the well above the subsurface safety valve. The other valves in the
Xmas tree were closed, pressure-tested and accepted.
Wellbarrier AS has been utilised for consultancy assistance in the investigation of this incident. The objective
was to procure a technically independent assessment of the barrier situation and the barrier drawings in the
different phases of the incident. “Evaluation of well barriers during Wireline activities” from Wellbarrier dated
11 January 2011, is attached to this investigation report.
The incident did not result in any injury to personnel. The scope of material damage in the Xmas tree was not
known at the time of the incident; however, the incident involved major accident potential in a situation with
only one remaining barrier against hydrocarbon outflow from the well.
Involved
Main group Approved by/date
T-2 Erik Hörnlund, 25 March 2011
Participants in the investigation group Investigation leader
Monica Ovesen and Ola Heia Stig Sandal
2. 2
Table of contents
1 Summary........................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Brief summary of the incident.............................................................. 3
1.2 Cause of the incident:........................................................................... 4
1.3 Identified nonconformities ................................................................... 4
1.4 Identified improvement items .............................................................. 4
2 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Procedure.............................................................................................. 5
2.2 Mandate for investigation..................................................................... 6
3 Sequence of events............................................................................................................ 7
3.1 Wireline operation description............................................................. 7
3.2 Follow-up of the incident ..................................................................... 7
4 The potential of the incident ............................................................................................. 9
4.1 Actual consequences ............................................................................ 9
4.2 Potential consequences......................................................................... 9
5 Observations ................................................................................................................... 10
5.1.1 Inadequate management......................................................... 11
5.1.2 Inadequate risk assessment..................................................... 12
5.1.3 Inadequate well barriers ......................................................... 12
5.1.4 Inadequate well barrier drawings ........................................... 13
5.1.5 Inadequate well control .......................................................... 13
5.1.6 Inadequate daily reporting of drilling and well activities....... 14
5.2 Improvement items............................................................................. 14
5.2.1 Personnel safety...................................................................... 14
5.2.2 Expertise................................................................................. 14
5.2.3 Governing documents on the facility ..................................... 15
5.2.4 Well barriers........................................................................... 15
5.2.5 Cutting function in main valve............................................... 16
5.2.6 Securing toolstring ................................................................. 16
6 Discussion regarding uncertainties ................................................................................. 17
6.1 The investigation is based on the following documents..................... 18
7 Appendices...................................................................................................................... 20
3. 3
1 Summary
1.1 Brief summary of the incident
The incident occurred on Draugen in connection with a wireline operation in well 6407/9-A-
01. The well was completed and started producing in 1994. Since January 2010, the well has
been shut-in. Planning for the wireline operation started in the 4th
quarter of 2009.
During a planned test, it was discovered that the hydraulically operated main valve in the
Xmas tree was not tight, which would entail repair or replacement. The wireline operation
was therefore postponed until the main valve had been fixed. At the end of November 2010,
the main valve had been repaired, and the implementation of the planned wireline operation
could start again.
The primary objective of the wireline operation was to replace the existing gas lift valve. To
gain access to the gas lift valve, the subsurface safety valve must be extracted.
When pulling the SSV, it became stuck in the valve head and blocked operation of the upper
and lower main valves. The wireline toolstring was disconnected from the safety valve,
completely pulled out of the well, and placed in the tool-catcher in the lubricator. The swab
valve on the Xmas tree was closed.
The released toolstring blocked the W/L BOP valves, due to insufficient length of the
lubricator. There was only one remaining barrier during further modification and re-building
of the toolstring for subsequent run sequences.
One nonconformity was identified during this phase, and this led to preparing risk analyses
for replacement and modification of the toolstring with only one barrier. The new toolstring
was connected to the subsurface safety valve and put back in the subsurface safety valve’s
nipple profile. Subsequently, two mechanical bridge plugs were inserted in the well above the
subsurface safety valve. Other valves in the Xmas tree were closed, pressure-tested and
accepted.
The plan was for the wireline operation to use toolstrings that were longer than the available
length between the lubricator’s tool-catcher and shear ram on the wireline operation’s BOP
control. This use of a long toolstring involves increased risk due to obstructing the use of
relevant barriers in an emergency situation. In this situation the opportunities to cut the
wireline were impeded, and in addition, valves in the Xmas tree were blocked. The risk
contribution for the actual incident was not identified in the operator’s original wireline
operation programme. It was also not identified in the revised plan after the incident involving
loss of well barriers had occurred.
The incident did not result in injury to personnel, but limited material damage was registered,
and major accident potential was present with one remaining barrier against hydrocarbon
outflow from the well.
A/S Norske Shell (Shell) is the operator of the Draugen facility and Seawell AS (Seawell) is
the contractor for execution of wireline operations. The subsurface safety valve was delivered
from Halliburton, and was a type “Wireline Retrievable Sub Surface Safety Valve”. The gas
lift valve was delivered by Schlumberger Norge AS.
4. 4
1.2 Cause of the incident:
The direct cause of the incident was the subsurface safety valve becoming stuck in the Xmas
tree. It is not uncommon for damage to valve inserts to occur when extracting equipment from
the well. When equipment becomes stuck, there can be increased strain on the equipment due
to tugging and pulling to free the toolstring.
It is not possible to establish fail-safe methods for preventing things from becoming stuck in
the Xmas tree during wireline operations, but robust solutions, analyses and a correct
understanding of the risk that may be expected, can contribute to prevent the loss of well
barriers if something gets stuck.
1.3 Identified nonconformities
• Inadequate management
• Inadequate risk assessment
• Inadequate well barriers
• Inadequate well barrier drawings
• Inadequate well control
• Inadequate daily reporting of drilling and well activities
1.4 Identified improvement items
• Personnel safety
• Expertise
• Governing documents on the facility
• Well barriers
• Cutting function in main valve
• Securing toolstring
5. 5
2 Introduction
In connection with Shell’s well maintenance on Draugen, the need to replace an inadequate
gas lift valve was identified. The objective of the well intervention was to upgrade to a new
type of valve that was qualified as a well barrier element. To replace the gas lift valve further
down in the well, the subsurface safety valve must be extracted from the well.
An incident occurred as the subsurface safety valve was being pulled through the Xmas tree.
The toolstring with the subsurface safety valve became stuck in the Xmas tree. The remaining
barrier element in the Xmas tree was the upper swab valve; the other valves in the Xmas tree
were blocked by the subsurface safety valve.
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) was notified of the incident and considered
the incident to be serious and decided to carry out an investigation activity.
2.1 Procedure
The incident was reported by Shell on 4 December 2010 at 1600 hours, and a conference call
between Shell and the PSA was held on 6 December 2010. Based on its own assessment and
along with the information discussed during the call, the PSA investigation group was
immediately established.
An unclear situation occurred on the facility and progress in the operation was put on hold
until the company’s plan for continuing the well intervention had been prepared. Risk
assessments and an evaluation of different methods to free the toolstring with the subsurface
safety valve were initiated. Compensating measures in this process included pressure-testing
the swab-valve and continuous monitoring until normalisation could begin.
When the normalisation process was implemented, the original executing personnel were
partially prevented from participating in conversations. This made the investigation group’s
task more difficult as regards finding a time and place to hold conversations with relevant
personnel.
On 7 December 2010, the investigation group therefore chose to call a start-up meeting in
Shell’s offices in Tananger. In the meeting, the PSA informed Shell of its mandate for
carrying out the investigation and what information and documents the company needed to
make available. Shell informed the PSA of the status of the situation and its plans for
initiating normalisation.
Conversations were held with personnel from Shell and Seawell during the period 9-10
December 2010. The conversations were held at Shell’s offices in Tananger and at Seawell’s
offices in Dusavika. In addition, a phone call was held with the well manager responsible for
executing well intervention on the Draugen facility. The conversations had an open dialogue,
and Shell and Seawell ensured good facilitation during the implementation of the
investigation.
6. 6
2.2 Mandate for investigation
Our mandate for the investigation of the incident on the Draugen facility:
1) Clarify sequence of events and scope, assess triggering and underlying causes as well
as the operator’s – A/S Norske Shell’s – follow-up measures
2) Describe actual and potential consequences; inflicted injury to people, harm to the
environment and material assets, as well as considering the potential for injury to
people and harm to the environment and material assets
3) Assess safety and preparedness factors, as well as operational, technical and
management factors in relation to the incident.
4) Identify any breaches of the regulations – nonconformities in relation to requirements,
methods and procedures – as well as recommend further follow-up and indentify a
potential need for use of measures
5) Discuss and describe any uncertainties and confusion
6) Prepare a cover letter and investigation report in accordance with templates.
7. 7
3 Sequence of events
3.1 Wireline operation description
The programme and planning of the activity originally started in 2009. The scheduled time for
the well intervention was February 2010; however, it turned out that there was a need to
improve the hydraulically operated main valve in the Xmas tree. The well intervention was
therefore postponed until the main valve’s function was accepted. In November 2010, the well
was plugged and shut-in with two mechanical bridge plugs inserted between the subsurface
safety valve and the Xmas tree. The objective of the well intervention was to remove these
plugs, extract the SSV and then replace the GLV with a new type of valve which was
qualified as a well barrier element. The well intervention was estimated to last eight days.
The plan was to use a standard rigging plan and wireline operation equipment for the activity.
This plan indicates that the toolstring would be longer than the available length in the
lubricator and would block the BOP valves. Risk assessments and compensating measures
were not carried out to safeguard the need for two available barriers with the toolstring placed
in the upper position in the lubricator.
At the time of the incident, the wireline operation crew was about to extract the retrofitted
insert type subsurface safety valve (SSV) in the gas lift well 6407/9-A-01. As the toolstring
with the SSV passed the upper part of the well it became stuck in the Xmas tree. Repeated
attempts are made to free the SSV, which resulted in the pulling tool’s shear pin being cut. It
thus became impossible to extract the SSV from the well.
In the situation that occurred, the SSV was left in the well, while the toolstring needed to be
pulled out for re-building. Thus, the SSV was left in the Xmas tree and blocked the possibility
of operating the valves in the Xmas tree with the exception of the swab-valve. Consequently,
the toolstring was pulled out of the well and the swab-valve was closed.
3.2 Follow-up of the incident
Shell did not consider the incident to be serious or requiring further follow-up or
investigation. The incident was considered closed by Shell in an email received by the
investigation group on 16 December 2010.
9. 9
4 The potential of the incident
4.1 Actual consequences
The scope of material damage in the Xmas tree was not known when the toolstring became
stuck. No injuries to personnel were registered, and there were no discharges to the external
environment due to the incident.
During the planning and management of this wireline operation, all contributors to
maintaining well barriers were not sufficiently assessed. This included factors such as choice
of equipment, quality of the risk assessments and decisions made for the different operation
phases in the well intervention programme.
During the execution of the well intervention, a sufficient risk assessment was not made as
regards the subsurface safety valve (SSV) becoming stuck in the Xmas tree. The choice of
toolstrings and consequence-reducing measures with the loss of barriers was not included in
the risk assessment.
During further execution, the company operated with inadequate well barriers in the different
phases of the well intervention. This entailed an increased risk level for the activity where
well barrier elements in the operation were not sufficiently emphasised. A main cause of this
was that the company’s system for using well barrier drawings was not sufficiently developed
for all phases of the wireline operation.
As the incident became a fact, a situation with deficient management of robustness in
connection with the choice of equipment during normalisation of the incident occurred. This
includes inadequate availability of barriers in the form of valves, weighted well fluid and
inadequate staffing of the pump assembly.
Data from this well had not been reported to the PSA’s database for daily reporting of drilling
and well activities, the “Common Drilling Reporting System”.
4.2 Potential consequences
In this incident with one remaining barrier in the wellhead area, the further activities in the
area were carried out with major accident risk. The main contributors to a major accident
situation in the well area were falling objects in connection with rigging up and replacing the
toolstring. Another high risk was that wireline breaches could result in the toolstring falling
uncontrollably inside the well.
The company chose to continue the well intervention while also continuing production from
the other wells on the facility. In such a situation, with one remaining barrier and the
toolstring stuck in the Xmas tree, the company is required to consider the prudence in
continuing the operation and the need for shutting down production when normalising the
well intervention.
10. 10
In rebuilding and modifying the tool string, there was a significant challenge associated with
the risk that a wireline breach would lead to increased damage to the only
5 Observations
remaining barrier,
which was the swab-valve. The actual rigging with a wireline operation mast without
scaffolding, and without a derrick to assist and available pump capacity for kill mud on the
facility in a well control situation. In such a continuation of the operation, the margins for
maintaining a sufficient prudence level are very limited.
The PSA’s observations are generally divided into three categories:
• Nonconformities: In this category we find observations which the PSA believes are
breaches of the regulations.
• Improvement item: Related to observations where the PSA finds deficiencies, but does not
have sufficient information to prove breach of the regulations.
• Conformity/barriers that have functioned: Used in the event of proven conformity with
regulations.
• In connection with the observations in Chapter 5 of the report, reference is made to
provisions (requirements) in the HSE regulations that applied at the time of the
incident. The relevant provisions are equivalent or mainly continued in the new HSE
regulations that entered into force on 1 January 2011. For information, in Appendix D
to the covering letter, there is a table showing which provisions in the new regulations
continue previous provisions cited in Chapter 5. More information about the new
regulations can be found on www.ptil.no.
11. 11
5.1.1 Inadequate management
Nonconformity:
In connection with the company’s planning and management of this well intervention, all risk
contributors were not sufficiently assessed. The contributors to this were not sufficiently
identified in the plans for implementation on the facility.
Basis:
During conversations and when reviewing daily work descriptions, it was identified that the
following items constituted deficiencies in the planning and management of the operation:
• risk factors were not sufficiently highlighted in the company’s well intervention
programme
• the plan was to use a toolstring which was longer than the available lubricator length,
which led to the toolstring blocking the BOP
• the toolstring obstructed access to relevant barriers during this emergency situation
and the possibility of cutting the wireline in an emergency situation
• there was only one barrier available when modifying the toolstring between each run
sequence after the subsurface safety valve (SSV) became stuck
• as the toolstring blocked the BOP and swab-valve in the operation phases by freeing
the SSV from the Xmas tree, the only remaining barrier was the upper lubricator
gasket
• in the event of an escalation of the incident with further loss of well control, a
separate action plan for this well intervention had not been prepared
• the company’s assessment of the situation entailed that other wells on the facility
during this emergency situation with loss of barriers were not shut down
• the company’s assessment of the situation entailed that there was no need for an
internal investigation
Requirements:
Section 3 of the Management Regulations relating to management of health, safety and the
environment
Section 9 of the Management Regulations relating to planning, cf. Section 27 of the Activities
Regulations relating to planning
Section 19 of the Management Regulations relating to registration, review and investigation
of hazard and accident situations
Section 77 of the Activities Regulations relating to well control
12. 12
5.1.2 Inadequate risk assessment
Nonconformity:
A sufficient risk review as regards choice of rigging equipment, toolstring and consequence-
reducing measures with the loss of well barriers was not carried out.
Basis:
It was identified through conversations and the review of the risk matrix and daily work
descriptions from the execution of the well intervention that:
• the need for sufficient height when rigging the lubricator in the area was not
emphasised
• the outcome with this type of SSV becoming stuck in the Xmas tree was not identified
in the risk review before the activity
• consequence-reducing measures were not implemented on the facility when the SSV
became stuck in the Xmas tree
• loss of barriers was not sufficiently emphasised in the risk reviews that were carried
out in connection with the well interventions
Requirements:
Section 1 of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction, Section 13 relating to
general requirements for analyses and Section 15 relating to risk analyses and emergency
preparedness analyses
5.1.3 Inadequate well barriers
Nonconformity:
There were inadequate well barriers during various phases of the well intervention.
Basis:
It was identified through conversations and a review of the daily work description that the
well barriers in three out of nine different phases of the operation were not sufficiently
qualified.
• when the SSV was stuck in the Xmas tree and connected to the toolstring, the barrier
situation was deficient
• when down rigging the wireline operation equipment with the toolstring after
disconnecting the stuck SSV, the barrier situation was deficient
• When carrying out wireline operations to free the SSV form the Xmas tree, the barrier
situation was deficient
See appendix from Wellbarrier, report no. SPF 101204, Rev. 01: “Evaluation of well barriers
during Wireline activities”, Chapters 4.4, 4.6 and 4.9 for further information.
Requirements:
Section 1, second subsection of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction and
Section 2 relating to barriers, as well as Section 76 of the Activities Regulations relating to
well barriers
13. 13
5.1.4 Inadequate well barrier drawings
Nonconformity:
There was inadequate use of well barrier drawings as regards application and scope of the
different phases of the well intervention.
Basis:
During review of documents relating to the wireline operations it was identified that:
• well barrier drawings in the work description had not been prepared for the different
phases of the wireline operations
• the well barrier drawing that was used, only described a production well under normal
conditions
Requirements:
Section 72 of the Activities Regulations relating to well programme and Section 76 relating to
well barriers, Section 1, second subsection of the Management Regulations relating to risk
reduction and Section 2 relating to barriers
5.1.5 Inadequate well control
Nonconformity:
The equipment was inadequately robust for re-establishing the barriers in the event of loss of
well control.
Basis:
Through conversations and a document review, it was identified that:
• the well was a discharge source with a shut-in pressure of 22 bar
• in the event of loss of well control the facility does not have a derrick for re-
establishing well barriers
• in the event of an escalation of this incident, the facility lacks other immediate
intervention opportunities
• the drilling fluid system on the facility was not used for well control at the time of the
incident
• the cement pump unit on the facility was not staffed at the time of the incident
• the maintenance status of the cement pump unit was not known to the executing
personnel
Requirements:
Section 23 of the Management Regulations relating to continuous improvement
Section 1, second subsection of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction and
Section 2 relating to barriers
Section 77 of the Activities Regulations relating to well control
Section 42 of the Activities Regulations relating to maintenance
14. 14
5.1.6 Inadequate daily reporting of drilling and well activities
Nonconformity:
Daily drilling and well activities for this well had not been reported to the PSA’s database,
“Common Drilling Reporting System” (DDRS).
Basis:
During review of DDRS it was verified that:
• data has not been reported from this well in connection with well intervention
Requirement:
Section 17 of the Information Duty Regulations relating to reporting of drilling and well
activities
5.2 Improvement items
5.2.1 Personnel safety
Improvement item:
There is a need to improve the personnel safety when rigging and executing wireline
operations.
Basis:
It became evident during conversations and when reviewing documents that there is an
established practice in the industry for rigging for wireline operations using a mast at the
hatch deck, see Figure 1.
There are many risk factors for personnel working in the well area. The Draugen facility is not
equipped with a derrick and the module-based tower for wireline operations was not used. It
became evident during the investigation that the company had not considered the need for
development of solutions that improve personnel safety on the hatch deck.
Requirements:
Section 8 of the Framework Regulations relating to prudent activities
Section 9 of the Facilities Regulations relating to installations, systems and equipment
Section 3 of the Management Regulations relating to management of health, safety and the
environment
5.2.2 Expertise
Improvement item:
Shell’s internal requirement for conducting regulations courses for personnel in Seawell AS
were not complied with.
Basis:
It was identified during conversations and through document reviews (TS02 Item 4.2.1) that
management personnel from Seawell AS on the facility did not satisfy Shell’s internal
requirement of completing familiarisation courses within the HSE regulations.
Requirements
15. 15
Section 19 of the Activities Regulations relating to competence, cf. Section 11 of the
Management Regulations relating to manning and competence.
5.2.3 Governing documents on the facility
Improvement item:
The company’s system for making governing documents available on the facility could be
improved.
Basis:
It became evident during conversations with executing personnel that an IT system for
governing documents was not available on the facility.
Requirements:
Section 3 of the Management Regulations relating to management of health, safety and the
environment
5.2.4 Well barriers
Improvement item:
The company’s acceptance criteria for putting the subsurface safety valve back in the valve
profile in the well in this emergency situation can be improved.
Basis:
During the normalisation phase, the SSV valve was put back in, pressure-tested and accepted.
Such an operation entails that the SSV valve was not in a verified safe position in the well. If
the shear pin in the driving tool was not cut correctly, it means that the verification of the
correctly placed valve is incomplete. This involves risk for the valve coming loose and, in a
worst case scenario, moving uncontrollably upwards in the well.
See appendix from Wellbarrier, report no. SPF 101204, Rev. 01: “Evaluation of well barriers
during Wireline activities”, Chapter 4.10 for more information.
Requirements:
Section 1, second subsection of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction and
Section 2 relating to barriers
Section 76 of the Activities Regulations relating to well barriers
16. 16
5.2.5 Cutting function in main valve
Improvement item:
There was a need to improve the company’s assessment regarding use of the cutting function
of the main valve and use of temporary shear ram.
Basis:
The hydraulic main valve was qualified with a cutting and sealing function for wireline.
According to the operation plan from the company, this main valve function would replace
the requirement of having a temporary shear ram rigged up. In instances where the need to
carry out a cutting operation arises, we request the company’s assessment of preferring use of
the hydraulic main valve compared with using the temporary extra shear ram.
See appendix from Wellbarrier, report no. SPF 101204, Rev. 01: “Evaluation of well barriers
during Wireline activities”, Chapter 6 for more information.
Requirements:
Section 1, second subsection of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction and
Section 3 relating to barriers
Section 76 of the Activities Regulations relating to well barriers
5.2.6 Securing toolstring
Improvement item:
There was a need to improve the company’s use of the safety device when hanging the
toolstring.
Basis:
In became evident during conversations and through the review of the daily work description
that the safety device (cable clamp) was not used during the normalisation phase. Risk factors
in a situation with wireline breach could lead to the toolstring falling uncontrollably with a
risk of damaging the swab-valve and BOP.
Requirements:
Section 1 of the Management Regulations relating to risk reduction
Section 9 of the Facilities Regulations relating to installations, systems and equipment
17. 17
6 Discussion regarding uncertainties
There may be uncertainties related to the investigation group not identifying sufficient basis
for verifying the circumstances surrounding this incident out on the facility. It was also the
opinion of the company that all details regarding the incident could be communicated through
conversations on land and through review of documents. Our opinion is that the factors of the
incident were so serious that the company’s duty to re-establish well barriers needed priority.
Direct conflicts have not arisen from individuals’ viewpoints in conversations and through
verification of documents. In connection with access to governing documents on the facility,
there were different opinions from the supplier of well services compared with the wireline
operator’s access to governing documents.
18. 18
6.1 The investigation is based on the following documents
• Wellbarrier; Evaluation of well barriers during Wireline activities, rev. 1, 11.01.2011
• A/S Norske Shell E&P Draugen. Change Proposal 001 for Draugen A1. Guidelines
Doc. A1 WRSSSV/GLV Replacement Draugen Platform December 2010, 06.12.2010
• Draugen A01 – WRSSSV Recovery operations / Toolstring break out with single well
barrier
• Shell Deviation Control Form – 139687, 05.12.2010
• Shell; Well Barriers Schematic Draugen, last updated 06.01.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 7, 06.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 6, 05.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 5, 04.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 4, 03.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 3, 02.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 2, 01.12.2010
• Shell EP Wells daily operations report, report 1, 30.11.2010
• Confirmation of notification/reporting to the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
concerning hazard and accident situations, 04.12.2010
• Risk Assesment Matrix for use in Incident Investigation & Reporting, rev 7,
10.10.2010
• Total risk analysis of Draugen
• Draugen Emergency Preparedness Analysis, A/S Norske Shell E&P, 01.01.2006
• Shell; Fountain Report (WRSSSV stuck across the Surface Xmas Tree). Status:
Closed
• Shell Draugen; Work permit 9500073400, Wireline A1. Monitoring of lubricator.
04.12.2010
• Shell Draugen; Work permit 9500073303, Wireline A1. Run in hole. 04.12.2010
• Shell Draugen; Work permit 9500073302, Wireline A1. Run in hole. 03.12.2010
• Shell, Draugen platform Concurrent activities matrix
19. 19
• Shell, Concurrent operations policy, rev.code 001, issued 04.06.07, review date
04.06.09
• Seawell, Slickline rig-op on Draugen, A-1
• Seawell, MS-0004113, WLE – Checklist between two runs, Revision number 7,
27.10.2010
• Seawell; Checklist for wireline operations, Platform Draugen, Well A-01, 04.12.2010
• Seawell; procedure for well control exercises, Revision number 6, 28.10.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAW40-Weather Deck W41, W42 & W43, SJA NR.
15385,
• Conduct Wireline Operations on Draugen Well A-01. SJA Responsible: RIS OLWE
WSS NORSKE-EPE-T-WD, 30.11.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAW40-Weather Deck W41, W42 & W43, SJA NR.
15427,
• Free WRSSSV in Surface Xmas Tree and Set in TRSSSV Nipple. SJA Responsible:
Draugen daws NORSKE-EPE-T-WD, 7.12.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAW40-Weather Deck W41, W42 & W43, SJA NR.
15426,
• Wireline Operations. Recover Toolstring # 11 and leak test Wireline BOP. SJA
Responsible: Draugen daws NORSKE-EPE-T-WD, 7.12.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAP43-DOP deck (Drop object deck), SJA NR. 15384, Rig
Up Wireline on Well A-01. SJA Responsible: RIS OLWE WSS NORSKE-EPE-T-
WD, 30.11.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAW40-Weather Deck W41, W42 & W43, SJA NR.
15385, Conduct Wireline Operations on Draugen Well A-01. SJA Responsible: RIS
OLWE WSS NORSKE-EPE-T-WD, 30.11.2010
• Well Services Draugen, DRAW40-Weather Deck W41, W42 & W43, SJA NR.
15426, Wireline Operations. Recover Toolstring # 11 and leak test Wireline BOP. SJA
Responsible: Draugen daws NORSKE-EPE-T-WD, 7.12.2010
• EP WELLS DAILY OPERATIONS REPORT, Report 9, 08/12/2010, Well 6407/9-A-
1, Wellbore 6407/9-A-1, Well Type Development, Company A/S NORSKE SHELL,
WBS No/API No
• Halliburton, Make Up / Running / Pulling procedures for Insert valve, 12.01.10
Released for customer review
• TECHNICAL STANDARD, UIE WELLS, WELL BARRIER REQUIREMENTS,
(TS02), DEP 38.80.00.11 EPE, Revision 01, November 2010
20. 20
• TECHNICAL STANDARD, WELL INTERVENTION WELL CONTROL, UIE
(EPE) WELLS, (TS10), DEP 38.80.00.18 EPE, Revision 02, March 2010
• Wellservices POB/Crew Changes. Total POB for Wellservices Crew: 15- 07/12/10
• Deviation Control Form - 139687 STANDARDS APPROVED
• Draugen A1 Working against the single barrier of inflow tested swab valve
• Valid To: 12/31/2010
• Well Intervention Team (WIT) Bridging Document, issued 1 August 2010
• Change Proposal 001 for Draugen A1. Guidelines Doc. A1 WRSSSV/GLV
Replacement Draugen Platform December 2010, issued 6 December 2010
• Draugen Platform, A01 Slickline WRSSSV/GLV, Replacement Guidelines, Revision
0
7 Appendices
B: Wireline activity barrier evaluation rev.1
C: Overview of conversations held.
D: Overview of relevant provisions in previous and new HSE regulations.
E: Detailed incident description