183191341 cases-in-election-law-docx

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139357. May 5, 2000]
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited
pleading in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court is the issue
posed in this petition for certiorariwith prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July 6, 1999[1]
dismissing
Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.
The COMELEC’s challenged order summarizes the relevant facts of the controversy
thus:
1. Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the
Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last
May 11, 1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist
and a veteran politician;
2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998, and after the
voting the ballot boxes were transmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial
Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automated counting of
votes and canvass of election returns were centralized;
3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and
electoral frauds were committed at the instance of petitioner or his
followers in that votes actually casted (sic) for the private respondent were
not counted and credited in his favor thru (sic) the concerted acts,
conspiracy and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military,
Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew
of the petitioner;
4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A about 115
official ballots were refused or rejected by the counting machine which the
private respondent’s watchers or representatives have requested and
insisted to be re-fed to the automated machine for the second and third
times pursuant to the provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their
requests were not heeded by the Election Officer and the Machine
Operator, Solaiman Rasad, who is a close kin of the Petitioner, and
instead considered the said ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts
Nos. 12A, 23A1 and 6A, around 56 ballots were found therein which were
not drawn from the official ballots and were included in the counting of
votes over the objection of the private respondent’s watchers or
representatives;
5. Before the termination of the counting of votes and the consolidation of
the results, the machine operator and the Election Officer carried away
from the Kalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to the down
town without the knowledge of the private respondent’s watchers or
representatives;

6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral
frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner because he
appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent
garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes;
7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept at the Kalimodan
Hall, Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded and secured by military and
PNP personnel together with the watchers/representatives of the petitioner
and the private respondent and other candidates or political parties until
they were transported and delivered to the respondent court at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together
with the duly authorized representatives of both parties.
xxx xxx xxx
1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was cheated
and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a
petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as
the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No.
98-226.[2]
2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality, private respondent
filed on May 25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao
del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs. Abdulmadid Maruhom" for
election protest (Manual Judicial Recount, revision and reappreciation of
ballots) docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.[3]
3. On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with
counter-protest in Election Case No. 11-127 special and affirmative
defenses and counter-protest.[4]
In his answer petitioner prayed to hold in
abeyance further proceedings since the protest is ad cautelam or subject
to the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.
4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set for hearing by this
Honorable Commission, the private respondent as petitioner therein, filed
a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case
was among those cases the proceedings of which were ordered to be
continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution No. 3049
promulgated on June 29, 1998.[5]
xxx
5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this Honorable
Commission, (First Division) granting the private respondent’s motion to
withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228 and considered the same
withdrawn.[6]
xxx.

6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17, 1998, private
respondent filed an urgent motion before the respondent court on July 27,
1998, praying for the issuance of an order directing the proper
officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before said court the
ballot boxes subjects of the protest and counter-protest and to set the
case for hearing as mandated by law.[7]
xxx
7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the protest and counter-
protest, the public respondent issued an order, dated August 17, 1998,
setting Election Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for the creation of the
Committee on Revision and appointment of the Chairman and Members
thereof; (b) making of the cash deposit and payment of the revisor’s
compensation; (c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1,
1998, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.[8]
8. When the case was called for hearing on September 2, 1998, a
Revision Committee was created and its membership were duly appointed
in open court which committee was directed by the respondent court to
finish the revision of ballots, if possible, within 20 days from the
commencement of the revision[9]
xxx
9. After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to
commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru
counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest on the grounds that
(1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-
protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots
does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant
is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner
of the protest.
10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel, vigorously
opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that the motion
is clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision Committee
has been ordered to commence the revision of ballots on September 1,
1998 and maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not allowed in an
election protest; (2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject
matter of the protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never
violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not preclude the filing
of the election protest for the judicial recount and revision of ballots; and
(4) The private respondent is not guilty of forum shopping because his
petition of protest is clearly and explicitly a Protest Ad Cautelam in view of
the pendency of his petition before this Honorable Commission which was
withdrawn by the private respondent before it could be set for hearing or
acted upon by this Honorable Commission.

11. After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioner’s counsel asked
that he be given ample time to file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and the respondent court thru then Acting Presiding Judge Rasad
Balindong, issued an order dated September 2, 1998, giving ten (10) days
to Atty. Tingcap T. Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of
all the oral motions he made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned
counsel for the private respondent who was likewise given an equal period
of time to comment.[10]
12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss[11]
and on
September 21, 1998, the private respondent filed a vigorous opposition to
motion to dismiss.[12]
13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto
on September 21, 1998, the petitioner’s counsel requested for ample time
to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss submitted
by the private respondent which was granted by the court and on
September 28, 1998, petitioner filed his rejoinder[13]
and on October 5,
1998 private respondent filed his comment[14]
thereto and thereafter all
incidents were submitted for resolution of the court.
14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru Honorable
Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued the assailed order
denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering the
Revision Committee to report to the court on November 19, 1998, at 8:30
o’clock in the morning for their oath taking and to receive the instruction of
the court in the revision of the ballots and other allied matters.[15]
15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 10, 1998,[16]
and on
November 23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [to
motion] for reconsideration.[17]
16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated November 10,
1998, the respondent court issued the assailed order dated December 1,
1998 which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. In the
same order, the respondent court reiterated its previous order to the
members of the Revision Committee to take their oaths before Atty.
Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil Laguindab and thereafter to convene
and start the revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998,
morning and afternoon.[18]
17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of
the case more specifically the revision of ballots, the petitioner filed on
December 10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction and on December 11, 1998, petitioner

filed an urgent motion before the respondent court praying that further
proceedings in Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after
protestee’s petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable
Commission shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was served
upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12, 1998, at 10:50
A.M.[19]
xxx
18. That before the undersigned counsel could file his opposition to said
urgent motion on December 14, 1998 and in the absence of a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by (the COMELEC), the
respondent judge already issued an order granting the same motion and
ordering the Revision Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled
revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until
further order from the court xxx.[20]
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELEC acted in excess of, or
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in –
1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the
Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are
sufficient legal bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.
In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3) principal issues
raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:
1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that a
motion to dismiss an election protest case in the Regional Trial Court is a
prohibited pleading;
2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a
motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an election protest case in the
Regional Trial court is not allowed; and
3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in failing to resolve the relevant material
and substantial issues raised in SPR No. 52-98.
the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the
Constitution and the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to petitioner,
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes on the conduct of
elections –
…[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may
violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the
elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular
government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate
must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the
votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the
Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created – to promote free, orderly and honest elections. The
choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be
interfered with.[21]
Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text
and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in defining the parameters of
the COMELEC’s powers in conducting elections. Sumulong v. COMELEC[22]
aptly points
out that –
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to
decide complex political questions xxx. There are no ready made formulas
for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of laws relative to the conduct of election xxx we must not
by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that
initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.
Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contests especially the
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.[23]
An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need
to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative,[24]
much
more so in this case considering that a mere twenty (20) votes separates the winner
from the loser of the contested election results.

The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No. 52-98.
In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothing irregular or anomalous in
the filing of the motion to dismiss" after the filing of the answer because in effect he is
merely insisting on a preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus,
he claims that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We disagree.
The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to
prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as
evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by
petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These events, pointed out by private
respondent[25]
and borne by the record, show that –
1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of the Revision
Committee and the appointment of its Chairman and Members and after
the said committee was ordered by the trial court to commence the
revision and to render its report within 20 days that the petitioner orally
moved for the dismissal of the case on the flimsy grounds that (1) the
ballot boxes subject of the protest and counter – protest have been
violated; (2) the automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a
manual recount of ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forum-shopping
warranting summary dismissal of the protest;
2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss the petitioner
requested for ample time within which to file an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss and over the vigorous opposition of the private respondent the
same was granted by the court and the petitioner was given a period of
ten (10) days to file the same and the private respondent was likewise
given a period of ten (10) days to file his comment;
3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[26]
and during the hearing
on the said motion and the opposition[27]
thereto on September 21, 1998,
the petitioner again asked for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous
opposition to motion to dismiss which was again granted by the court and
it was only on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;
4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10, 1998,[28]
the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 1998;[29]
5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on December 1,
1998,[30]
petitioner filed on December 18, 1998 before the Commission on
Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary

injunction and asked the trial court to defer the proceedings of Election
Case No. 11-27 until after his petition shall have been finally resolved
which was granted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the
ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and the
proceedings of the case held in abeyance;[31]
6. As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to petitioner’s prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court, upon motion of the private
respondent, issued an order for the revision of ballots on February 8,
1999.[32]
On said day, neither the petitioner’s counsel nor his designated
revisors appeared, instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed
men, numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented the
court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for the maximum
tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and the intervention of the local
datus/leaders, there would have been bloodshed;
7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioner’s counsel filed a withdrawal of
appearance with the attached letter-request of the petitioner asking for the
deferment of the revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks to enable him
to engage the services of another counsel. Considering that the incident
was designed to delay the further the early disposition of the case which
would frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling on
the withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioner’s counsel to
handle the case after the appearance of a new counsel;[33]
8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed a
petition for transfer of venue of the trial to from RTC, Branch 11,
Malabang, Lanao del Sur to Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the
private respondent did not oppose so as not to delay the early resolution
of this Honorable Supreme Court on the said petition;
9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held in abeyance in view of the
pendency of the said petition for transfer of venue;
10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No. 52-98, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Honorable
Supreme Court with a prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;
11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of
the case, the petitioner filed an urgent motion before this Honorable
Supreme Court praying for the immediate issuance of a TRO directing the
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III, Iligan City to cease, desist and refrain
from conducting any further proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until
the instant case shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme
Court, without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch III,

Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said election case until
further order[s] from this most Honorable Court.[34]
It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundabout manner within
which petitioner virtually substituted his answer by belatedly filing a motion to dismiss
three (3) months later is a frivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of
the electorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its challenged Resolution
dated July 6, 1999,[35]
petitioner only filed his motion to dismiss "when the results of the
trial appear[ed] to be adverse to him’"[36]
or right after the creation of the Revision
Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner truly intended to move for
the preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses as he claims, then he
should have simultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing of his special and
affirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, he should have filed his
motion to dismiss "within the time for but before filing the answer…" pursuant to Section
1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change of mind by petitioner can
not be countenanced much more so in election cases where time is of the essence in
the resolution thereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain terms
that –
SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests in courts. The RTC, in their
respective cases, shall give preference to election contests over all
other cases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall, without delay,
hear and within thirty (30) days from the date of their submission for
decision, but in every case within six (6) months after filing, decide the
same. xxx[37]
(emphasis and italics supplied)
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity of the ballot boxes
has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted are the proper
subjects of an election protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping,
are enough grounds to dismiss the case.
We remain unconvinced.
As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution, these grounds are
"evidentiary in nature and can be best ventilated during the trial of the case."[38]
It needs
be stressed in this regard that the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether
the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice
of the electorate.[39]
In an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes
is involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where
the ballots can not be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the
best evidence.[40]
In this case, the counted official ballots are available and there is no
evidence, other than the bare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot
boxes subject matter of the protest have been violated or the official ballots contained
therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to test the truthfulness of petitioner’s claim is

to open the ballot boxes in the protested precincts followed by the examination, revision,
recounting and re-appreciation of the official ballots therein contained in accordance
with law and pertinent rules on the matter. Needless to state this can only be done
through a full-blown trial on the merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to
dismiss on the basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.
Petitioner’s reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868[41]
to support his restrictive claim
that only rejected ballots or ballots manually counted in case of failure of the automated
counting machines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just as
unpersuasive.
There is admittedly a lacuna leges in R.A. No. 8436 which prescribes the adoption of an
automated election system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled
in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC,[42]
that the Commission is nevertheless not precluded from
conducting a manual count when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:
… In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a
remedy where the error in counting is not machine related for human
foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the
law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the
problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is
to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been
niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the
conduct of our elections … In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a
manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the
decisive local votes ... The bottom line is that by means of the manual
count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot
kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to
R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC…
… Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running
for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too
often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the
process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may
even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair
criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.

Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting
upon election controversies is the principle that "clean elections control the
appropriateness of the remedy."[43]
Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioner’s counter-protest and private
respondent’s protest already justified the determination of the issues through a judicial
revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that –
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.- Where
allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or whenever in
the opinion of the court the interests of justice so require, it shall
immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots
and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the
ballots be examined and votes recounted. (Italics supplied)
So too must fall petitioner’s procedural objection that private respondent should be
faulted for forum-shopping vis-à-vis this Court’s pronouncement in Samad v.
COMELEC[44]
which states in no uncertain terms that –
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the
title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason is that
once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure
will prevent confusion and conflict of authority. Conformably, we have
ruled in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a
pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable.
The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1) the board of
canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation;
(4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was
null and void.
Petitioner’s argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in an election contest filed
with a regular court is not a prohibited pleading is well taken. As we pointed out
in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [45]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the motion to
dismiss filed by private respondent is a prohibited pleading under Section
1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because the said
provision refers to proceedings filed before the COMELEC. The applicable
provisions on the matter are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure
titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE
TRIAL COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v. Court of
Appeals[46]
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto
cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of a certain pleading in the regular courts. The
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court.[47]
The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his
predicament because the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss was based on the fact
that the other grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the
said motion is a prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged
COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the petition in
this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence
to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as
reasoned by the COMELEC, the –
… Commission assumes the competence of the trial court to handle
electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original and exclusive
jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty
seat. To our mind, the trial court should be allowed to resolve the case on
the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal grounds raised by the
petitioner as his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner be
dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still
appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the reglementary period
provided by law.
Moreover –
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections;
literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate
purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voter’s
obvious choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err

in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.[48]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
[1]
Rollo, p. 32.
[2]
Record, pp. 72-74.
[3]
Record, pp. 30-38.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 39-45.
[5]
Id., pp. 214-215.
[6]
Id., pp. 216-218.
[7]
Id., pp. 219-220.
[8]
Id., p. 221.
[9]
Id., p. 222.
[10]
Id., p. 58.
[11]
Id., pp. 59-69.
[12]
Id., pp. 80-89.
[13]
Id., pp. 90-124.
[14]
Id., pp. 125-143.
[15]
Id., pp. 26-28.
[16]
Id., pp. 144-174.
[17]
Id., pp. 175-184.
[18]
Rollo, p. 138; Annex O, Petition.
[19]
Record, pp. 223-225.
[20]
Ibid., p. 226.
[21]
Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911 [1967].
[22]
73 Phil. 288 [1941].
[23]
Pangandaman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134340, 25 November 1999, p. 1, citing Punzalan v. COMELEC, 289
SCRA 702 [1998], citing Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 273 [1995]; Pahilan v. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205
[1994]; Aruelo, Jr. v. CA, 227 SCRA 311 [1993]; Tatlonghari v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 849 [1991]; Unda v.
COMELEC, 190 SCRA 827 [1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA 591 [1981].
[24]
Punzalan v. COMELEC, supra.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 241-243.
[26]
Record, pp. 59-69.
[27]
Ibid., pp. 80-89.
[28]
Id., pp. 26-28.
[29]
Id., pp. 144-174.
[30]
Rollo, p. 138; Annex O, Petition.
[31]
Ibid., p. 255; Annex 2, Comment.

[32]
Id., pp. 262-265; Annex 4, Comment.
[33]
Id., pp. 266-267; Annex 5, Comment.
[34]
Id., p. 204..
[35]
Id., pp. 32-40; Annex A, Petition.
[36]
Id., p. 39.
[37]
See also Rule 35, Section 18 and Rule 36, Section 11, COMELEC Rules.
[38]
Rollo, p. 40; Annex A, Petition, p. 9.
[39]
Agpalo R., The Law On Public Officers, 1st ed. (1998), p. 58.
[40]
Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808 [1991].
[41]
Rollo, pp. 45-47; Annex C, Petition, which provides, inter alia,that:
SEC. 2. Filing of Protest. – Any losing candidate,who registers his objections on the rejection of ballots, may file a
protest with the Commission within ten (10) days from proclamation of the winning candidates in accordance with
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Only rejected ballotsand ballotsmanually counted shall be the subject of protest.
SEC. 3. Examination of rejected ballots.– In determining the intent of the voterin the case of rejected ballots,
the rejection of which have been objected to and noted in the Minute of Counting, the Commission shall examine
and appreciate the rejected ballots concerned applying the provision of Section 7 of Resolution No. 2862 (Rules and
Regulations on the Manual Counting and Canvassing of Votes in Case of Failure of the Automated Counting System
in the September 9, 1996 Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [ARMM], promulgated 14
August 1996).
[42]
G.R. No. 133676, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 832.
[43]
Pangandaman v. COMELEC, supra, citing Pacis v. COMELEC, 25 SCRA 377 [1968].
[44]
224 SCRA 631 [1993].
[45]
G.R. No. 129958, 25 November 1999, pp. 15-16.
[46]
227 SCRA 311 [1993].
[47]
Citing Article VIII, Section 5 (5), Constitution.
[48]
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 [1996].

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003]
PETRONILA S. RULLODA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION OFFICER LUDIVICO L.
ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO.TOMAS, SAN
JACINTO,PANGASINAN, Board of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos.
30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO
PLACIDO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L.
Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed
away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.[1]
His widow, petitioner Petronila “Betty” Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on
Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.[2]
Petitioner’s request was
supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures of people purporting to
be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.[3]
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the
Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as
follows:
Just in case the names “BETTY” or “PETRONILA” or the surname “RULLODA” is
written on the ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words “NOT
COUNTED” like “BETTY NOT COUNTED” or “RULLODA NOT COUNTED.”[4]
Based on the tally of petitioner’s watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass
of votes during the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while
respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.[5]
Despite this, the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.[6]
After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate
requests of Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as
candidates for Barangay Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and

Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively, issued Resolution No.
5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to ADOPT the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ
MANALAYSAY and PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto,
Pangasinan to delete the name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for
Barangay Chairman in Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name
of PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in Barangay Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELEC’s Resolution No.
4801 dated May 23, 2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of
candidacy in connection with the July 15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which reads:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.[8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of
Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they
prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased
husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the
barangay election is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover,
petitioner did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate
for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.[9]
Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contends that its
Resolution No. 4801 was issued not pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of the barangay
elections. Therefore, the same may not be the subject of review in a petition for
certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy and in
proclaiming respondent considering that he was the only candidate for Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas.[10]
We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while
respondent got only 290 votes. Respondents did not deny this in their respective
Comments.
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are
determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the
election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all
republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election.[11]
Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed
in barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. –
If after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may
file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted
by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan,
there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate
the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the
purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters.[12]
It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the
people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.[13]
Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition
against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law
where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or
party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioner’s favor can not be
counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was
the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of
the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it
indubitably appears that petitioner’s letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate of
candidacy.[14]
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.[15]
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.[16]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due
course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The
proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas,
San Jacinto, Pangasinan is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said
Barangay is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio , Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., and Quisumbing, JJ., in the result, pro hac vice only.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
[1]
Rollo, p. 46.
[2]
Ibid., p. 47.
[3]
Ibid., pp. 49-64.
[4]
Ibid., p. 67.
[5]
Ibid., pp. 68-82.
[6]
Ibid., p. 83.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[8]
Ibid., pp. 33-39, at 38.
[9]
Ibid., pp. 122-125.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 133-137.
[11]
Carlos v. Angeles, 346 SCRA 571, 582 [2000].
[12]
Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 147909. April 16, 2002.
[13]
Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., Concurring Opinion of Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, 357 SCRA 545, 566 [2001]; citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 [1996].
[14]
Rollo, pp. 40-43.
[15]
Carlos v. Angeles, supra., citing Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 436, 442 [1994].
[16]
O’Hara v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155087. November 28, 2003]
EDUARDO T. SAYA-ANG, SR., and RICARDO T. LARA, petitioners,
vs. HON. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS,HONORABLE PIO JOSE
S. JOSON, HONORABLE JOSE P. BALBUENA, HONORABLE
LIRIO T. JOQUINO and MANTIL D. LIM, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners herein, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates
for the Office of Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan respectively
for the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) and Barangay
Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate of candidacy in Barangay Congan
on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of
candidacy in Barangay New Aklan on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-report
was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec
which stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be
elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) submitted its study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending
the denial of due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the
elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc Resolution No. 5393, which
essentially denied due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Resolution states:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to approve the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To deny due course to the Certificates of Candidacy of Romeo P.
Sumayog, Sandigan Damie, James Ceasar I. Young, Eduardo T. Saya-ang,
Sr., and Ricardo L. Lara; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Glan, Sarangani to delete their
names from the Certified List of Candidates for Barangay Kagawad and
Punong Barangay of Barangays E. Alegado, Baliton, Cross, Congan, and
New Aklan, respectively.

Without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases against them as the evidence so
warrants under the circumstances.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Despite the abovementioned Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as
winners on July 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of votes in their respective
barangays. On July 31, 2002, petitioners took their oath of office before Alfredo L.
Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
On August 9, 2002, Pio Jose S. Joson, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of
the Comelec, issued a Memorandum for all Regional Election Directors, Provincial
Election Supervisors and City/Municipal Election Officers. This memorandum directed
all election officers to delete the names of those candidates whose certificates of
candidacy were denied due course despite the fact that said denial did not arrive on
time. It also ordered the candidates concerned to desist from taking their oaths and
from assuming the positions to which they have been elected, unless the Supreme
Court issued a temporary restraining order. Lastly, the said memorandum ordered the
Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected
candidates and correcting the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
On August 10, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5584,
entitled “In the Matter of the Policy of the Commission on Proclaimed Candidates Found
to be Ineligible for Being Not Registered Voters in the Place Where They Were Elected
and on the Failure/ Omission of the Board of Canvassers to Include Certain Election
Returns in the Canvass.”[1]
On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, invoking and acting pursuant to
Comelec Resolution No. 5393 and Resolution No. 5584, issued a directive commanding
petitioners to cease and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the
position to which they were elected. He also directed the Barangay Board of
Canvassers for Barangays Congan and New Aklan to reconvene immediately and
proclaim the duly-elected candidates and to correct the certificates of canvass and
proclamation.
Petitioners received the aforementioned directive on August 19, 2002. On August
21, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5666 amending its
Resolution No. 5584 on the basis of the approved recommendations of Commissioner
Sadain. Pertinent portions of the amended resolution state:
I.
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING
NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED
x x x

(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is
proclaimed the winner despite his disqualification or despite the pending
disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified
candidate is hereby declared void from the beginning, with notice to the
candidate concerned, even if the dispositive portion of the resolution
disqualifying him or cancelling his certificate of candidacy does not
provide for such an annulment.[2]
On September 4, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, using as his basis Comelec en
banc Resolution No. 5666 issued a memorandum directing the Board of Canvassers of
Barangay Congan, Glan,Sarangani Province to reconvene at his office on September
13, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole assignment of error:
THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THE EN BANC RESOLUTION NO. 5393,
DATED 15 JULY 2002, BY RESPONDENT HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BEING WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT
AND IN LAW AND THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING EVEN AS IT DOES TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.[3]
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.[4]
Such jurisdiction continues even
after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered
before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives
the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not
been proclaimed or taken his oath of office.[5]
Furthermore, a decision by the Comelec
to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after a period of five
days:
Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days.--- Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a
candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days
from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.[6]
In the present case, the assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners’
certificates of candidacy was promulgated on June 15, 2002, or on the very day of the
elections. On that day, therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet become final
and executory since petitioners still had until June 20, 2002 to file their motion for
reconsideration. The Barangay Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners’ names
in the list of qualified candidates and could not be faulted from counting the votes cast in

favor of the petitioners. Petitioners were, therefore, validly proclaimed as winners of the
elections on June 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of votes. On the day of
the elections or on June 15, 2002, petitioners, for all intents and purposes, were still in
the running. The Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted
from the list of qualified candidates only became final and executory on June 20, 2002,
or five days from the promulgation thereof.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed
Resolution and were never given the chance to present their evidence. They claim that
they only knew about Resolution 5393 on August 19, 2002, when they were served a
copy of the directive issued by Acting Election Officer Alim ordering them to cease and
desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they are
elected. This allegation was not disproved by respondent Comelec. Instead, it cites
Resolution No. 4801, which was published in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin
on May 25, 2002, wherein it was stated that the administrative inquiry of the Comelec
on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed their certificates of
candidacy. The Comelec maintains, therefore, that by virtue of the said resolution, all
candidates are deemed to have constructive notice of any administrative inquiry against
them. Also, it asserts that by virtue of its administrative powers, it may motu
propriodeny or cancel, without any kind of hearing whatsoever, the certificates of
candidacy of those who are found not to be registered voters in the place where they
seek to run for public office.
It is clear, however, that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after
due notice. The same rules also provide that when the proceedings are authorized to
be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to
submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; and when there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at
the discretion of the Commission en banc or the Division, the parties may be allowed to
cross-examine the affiants.[7]
The rules providing for the abovementioned summary hearing were mandated to
accord due process of law to candidates during elections. The right to due process is a
cardinal and primary right which must be respected in all proceedings.[8]
It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play,[9]
the cornerstone of every democratic
society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[10]
Respondent Comelec’s
argument that petitioners have already been constructively notified of the inquiry against
them cannot be given merit. Petitioners herein were not even informed of the
administrative inquiry against them, nor were they called upon to adduce their own
evidence and to meet and refute the evidence against them. Petitioners certainly cannot
read the minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they
have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already been instituted against them
and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf.
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the
winners in the elections. They have already taken their oaths of office and are, at

present, serving their constituents in their respective barangays. In Lambonao v.
Tero,[11]
the Court held that defects in the certificates of candidacy should have been
questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been
expressed through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while provisions
relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps
before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the
will of the electorate. The rationale for this principle was explained in Lino Luna v.
Rodriguez,[12]
where the Court said that these various and numerous provisions were
adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not
to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not
be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and
guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 5393 of the
respondent Commission on Elections en banc is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex “B-4” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-49.
[2]
Annex “C-1” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 51-54.
[3]
Petition, p. 15; rollo, p. 20.
[4]
Section 78, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
[5]
Juan Domino v. Comelec, et. al., 310 SCRA 549, 571 (1999).
[6]
Section 3, Rule 39, Part VII, Comelec Rules of Procedure.
[7]
Section 3, Rule 17, Comelec Rules of Procedure.
[8]
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[9]
Isagani A. Cruz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 95 citing Frankfurter, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
SUPREME COURT, pp. 32-33.
[10]
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 256, 269 (1997) citing Bernas, Joaquin G., THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 108 (1996).
[11]
15 SCRA 716, 719 (1965) citing De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers and Lucero, 48 Phil. 211, 215-
216.
[12]
39 Phil. 208.

EN BANC
MANUEL A. ALEJANDRO, G.R. No. 167101
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TINGA,
DAMIAN L. CO, and the CHICO-NAZARIO, and
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF GARCIA, JJ.
CANVASSERS OF ALICIA,
ISABELA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 31, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Manuel A. Alejandro seeking
to set aside the Resolution[1] dated February 22, 2005 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No. 04-195. The assailed resolution
affirmed the Resolution[2] dated November 23, 2004 of the COMELEC Second

Division directing the Election Officer of Alicia, Isabela to reconvene the
Municipal Board of Canvassers for the purpose of correcting the errors committed
in tallying the votes for the Vice-Mayoralty race in the said municipality and to
proclaim the rightful winner therein.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel A. Alejandro and private respondent Damian L. Co were
rival candidates for Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Alicia, Isabela during
the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. After the canvass of votes, the
petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected vice-mayor by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) on May 13, 2004.
On May 24, 2004, private respondent Co filed a Petition[3] to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Alejandro on the ground that it was the result of
manifest errors committed by the MBC in the canvassing of the election returns
from the 156 precincts comprising the said municipality.
Private respondent Co alleged that the MBC erroneously proclaimed
petitioner Alejandro as the vice-mayor-elect. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes
and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices prepared by
the MBC showed that the petitioner obtained a total of 11,866 votes. However,
based on the taras, words and figures stated in all the election returns, petitioner
Alejandro only obtained a total of 11,152 votes while private respondent Co
received a total of 11,401 votes, thereby making him the rightful winner of the
disputed office with the winning margin of 249 votes. The total, showing the
victory of private respondent Co, allegedly resulted from the correct addition of the
votes received by each of said candidates based on the election returns from all the
156 precincts of the said municipality.

Private respondent Co asserted that he was the victim of “vote-padding and
vote-shaving,” more commonly known as “dagdag-bawas,” committed by the
MBC or its tabulators, as clearly shown by a comparison of the election returns
from the precincts concerned vis-à-vis the statement of votes per precinct and
certificate of canvass.
In her Answer, Election Officer Teresita B. Angangan, Chairperson of the
MBC, admitted that manifest errors were committed in the preparation of the
statement of votes but denied for lack of sufficient knowledge the allegation of
“dagdag-bawas.” She submitted a table comparing the figures in the election
returns and in the statement of votes in all 156 clustered precincts and pointed out
that based on the election returns, private respondent Co should have won the
elections after garnering 11,401 votes as against the 11,152 votes for petitioner
Alejandro. She prayed that the COMELEC issue an order to reconvene the MBC
to correct the errors made in the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes by
Precincts.
For his part, petitioner Alejandro prayed in his Comment that the petition to
annul his proclamation be denied for being filed out of time. He alleged that the
petition was actually one for correction of manifest errors and, therefore, should
have been filed as a pre-proclamation controversy. And that even if the errors
were discovered after proclamation, it should have been filed within five days after
proclamation[4] or, in this case, not later than May 18, 2004.
Petitioner Alejandro further argued that even assuming that the petition was
one for declaration of nullity of proclamation, the petition should have been filed
not later than 10 days from proclamation following several decisions of the
Court.[5] Since he was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, the petition to annul his
proclamation should have been filed by private respondent Co on May 23,
2004. Even if the said date was a Sunday, petitioner Alejandro insisted that the

same was a working day; hence, there was no reason why private respondent Co
could not have complied with the 10-day reglementary period.
Petitioner Alejandro stressed that 11 days had passed between his
proclamation on May 13, 2004 and the filing of private respondent Co’s
petition. No matter how the petition was treated – whether as a pre-proclamation
controversy or a petition for annulment of proclamation – the period for filing
thereof had lapsed.
On the merits, petitioner Alejandro contended that he was the duly-elected
vice-mayor as based on his own computation, he garnered a total of 11,412 votes
as against private respondent Co’s 11,347 or a difference of 65 votes in favor of
the former.
After consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties, the COMELEC
Second Division promulgated the Resolution dated November 23, 2004,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to declare the nullity of
the proclamation of Manuel Alejandro is granted in part. The Election Officer of
Alicia, Isabela is hereby ordered to reconvene the Municipal Board of Canvassers
with the purpose of correcting the errors committed in tallying the votes for the
Vice Mayoralty race in Alicia, Isabela.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner Alejandro sought reconsideration of the said resolution and prayed
for the deferment of the reconvening of the MBC. The said motion likewise prayed
for the dismissal of the petition for having been filed out of time and for utter lack
of merit.
Pursuant to the November 23, 2004 COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, Election Officer Angangan ordered the MBC to reconvene

on December 8, 2004. In compliance therewith, the MBC reconvened on the said
date and after re-canvassing the election returns, proclaimed private respondent Co
as the duly-elected vice-mayor.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division issued the
Order[7] dated December 8, 2004, elevating to the COMELEC en banc petitioner
Alejandro’s motion for reconsideration.The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
It appears that the foregoing motion for reconsideration is not
accompanied by a filing fee in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00).
In view of the foregoing, the motion is hereby elevated to the
Commission en banc for proper disposition.
The “Opposition to Respondent’s Supposed Motion for Reconsideration
and Urgent Prayer for Deferment” is hereby noted.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondent Co filed an Opposition/Comment stating that the
COMELEC en banc had not acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioner
Alejandro’s motion for reconsideration due to his failure to pay the required docket
fee on time.
On February 22, 2005, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution[9] dismissing for lack of merit petitioner Alejandro’s motion for
reconsideration. The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the instant
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
dated November 23, 2004 directing EO Teresita Angangan to 1) reconvene the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alicia, Isabela for the purpose of correcting the
errors committed in the tallying of votes for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Alicia,
Isabela; and 2) determine and proclaim the rightful winner, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioner Alejandro alleging that:
THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS
DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT:
A. DETERMINED THAT THE PETITION OF DAMIAN CO WAS TIMELY
FILED.
B. FAILED TO ORDER THE CONDUCT OF HEARINGS FOR THE
EXAMINATION OF THE DISPUTED ELECTION DOCUMENTS.
C. DID NOT IDENTIFY WHERE THE ERRORS THAT MUST BE
CORRECTED LIE.
D. ASSUMED THAT THERE WERE MANIFEST ERRORS TO CORRECT
DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY COMPETENT PROOF OF EXISTENCE
OF MANIFEST ERRORS, THE BEST EVIDENCE BEING THE
ELECTION RETURNS AND STATEMENT OF VOTES THEMSELVES.
D.1 THE BASIS FOR THE CORRECTION WAS THE ANSWER OF THE
FORMER ELECTION OFFICER, NOT THE ELECTION RETURNS.
D.2 THE FORMER ELECTION OFFICER WAS NOT EVEN
AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS.
D.3 THE FORMER ELECTION OFFICER WAS NOT EVEN PRESENTED
AS WITNESS.
D.4 THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE FORMER ELECTION OFFICER
WAS ILLEGALLY PROCURED.
E. DID NOT NULLIFY THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS ASSUMING THAT THERE WERE MANIFEST ERRORS.
E.1 THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS PROCEEDED WITH THE
CANVASSING DESPITE THE TIMELY FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND IT DID NOT ACT, CONSIDER OR RULE ON
THE MOTIONS TO NULLIFY THE EXECUTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THE SECOND DIVISION.

F. AFFIRMED A NON-EXISTENT RESOLUTION.[11]
On March 29, 2005, the petitioner filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Status Quo Ante Order. Without
waiting for the action of this Court, the COMELEC en banc[12] issued a Writ of
Execution[13] on March 30, 2005, ordering the petitioner to vacate the position of
the Vice-Mayor of Alicia, Isabela, and to cease and desist from performing the
functions thereof.
On April 5, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution[14] requiring the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC
resolutions.
The issues to be resolved are whether respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in: (1) ruling that private respondent Co’s petition to
annul petitioner Alejandro’s proclamation was timely filed; (2) admitting and
considering the answer filed by Election Officer Angangan, the Chairperson of the
MBC; (3) not conducting a hearing for the examination of the disputed election
documents thereby depriving the petitioner of due process; and (4) ordering the
MBC to reconvene to rectify its errors and to proclaim the winner in the Vice-
Mayoralty race in Alicia, Isabela.
The Court rules in the negative.
First Issue: Whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that private respondent Co’s
petition to annul the proclamation was
timely filed

Petitioner Alejandro characterizes private respondent Co’s petition filed with
COMELEC as a “dual-purpose” petition because it expressly prayed for both the
correction of manifest errors and the declaration of nullity of the petitioner’s
proclamation. This tack was allegedly adopted by private respondent Co to
circumvent the mandatory five-day period to file a petition to correct manifest
errors. Even if the petition was one for the annulment of his proclamation, it was
still allegedly filed out of time since it was filed more than 10 days following the
date of proclamation.
The petitioner points out that he was proclaimed as the winning vice-
mayoralty candidate on May 13, 2004; hence, private respondent Co only had
until May 23, 2004 to file the petition to nullify the proclamation. Since private
respondent Co’s petition was filed on May 24, 2004, or 11 days after the
proclamation, then the same was filed out of time. Even if May 23, 2004 fell on a
Sunday, the petitioner asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 6624 specifically
declared all Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from October 2003 until June 30,
2004 as working days in the COMELEC.
The COMELEC Second Division treated the petition as one for the
annulment of petitioner Alejandro’s proclamation as it held that:
The petition to declare the nullity of a proclamation should be within a
reasonable period. Again, private respondent [herein petitioner] is correct when he
said that the Supreme Court has declared that ten days is a reasonable period.
Considering however, that the tenth day after Alejandro’s proclamation
fell on a Sunday, the rule is that the petition may be filed on the next working day.
Although it is again true that the Commission allowed its employees to render
overtime work on May 23, 2004, it would not automatically mean that those
intending to file their petitions should do so on a Sunday. The rule moving a
deadline to the next working day if it falls on a Sunday is an acknowledgment that
majority of our people consider Sunday a day of rest.[15]
The COMELEC en banc affirmed the foregoing ruling.

We hold that the COMELEC correctly ruled that the petition for annulment
was filed well within the reglementary period to file the same. Resolution No.
6624, which declared all Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from October 2003
until June 30, 2004 as working days in the COMELEC, was an internal resolution
intended merely for COMELEC employees. The resolution was for the guidance of
the employees to report for work during

weekends and holidays because of the approaching elections, and for the general
public to give them more time to register as voters. It was never conceived to limit
the period for filing election controversies, contests and offenses. Hence, since the
last day for private respondent Co to file the petition to annul petitioner
Alejandro’s proclamation fell on May 23, 2004, a Sunday, he seasonably filed the
same on the next working day or on May 24, 2004.
In a catena of cases, we have held that one cannot put premium on
technicalities over and above the noble and paramount duty of determining the will
of the electorate. In Dela Llana v. COMELEC,[16] it was ruled that:
Election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials ... Laws (and
rules) governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election
case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the
electorate.(Italics supplied)
Instead of dismissing the petition for purely technical reasons, the
COMELEC correctly considered the merits thereof. xxx
The COMELEC likewise did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated private respondent Co’s petition as one for annulment of proclamation
although it was denominated as also for correction of manifest errors. In fact, it
finds support in several cases decided by the Court. For example, in Mentang v.
COMELEC,[17] we held that where the relief sought is the correction of
mathematical errors which are not attributable to incorrect entries in any of the
election returns, statement of votes and certificate of canvass but in the mere
computation of the votes reflected in those election

documents, it is a petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of proclamation, not
a petition to correct manifest errors.
In Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC,[18] we upheld the COMELEC resolution which
set aside the proclamation of the petitioner therein as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on the basis of a petition for correction of votes in
the statement of votes filed by the respondent therein:
Undoubtedly, therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the
allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical
errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve
the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or
appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and
respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel iscorrection of manifest mistakes in
mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the
proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San
Manuel, Pangasinan.
xxx
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won
the challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of
Pangasinan. Petitioner’s proclamation and assumption into public office was
therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty
tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.[19]
In Milla v. Balmores-Laxa,[20] we sustained the power of the COMELEC to
annul the proclamation, due to an alleged error in the tabulation of the statement of
votes, of a winning candidate for municipal councilor who had taken his oath and
assumed office as such. We ruled therein that:
The Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and
of the proclamation. Any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of
the proclamation.
If a candidate’s proclamation is based on a Statement of Votes which
contains erroneous entries, it is null and void. It is no proclamation at all and the

proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to annul the proclamation.[21]
Significantly, in Milla, the petition for correction of entries in the statement
of votes was filed one month after the proclamation.
Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
treating private respondent Co’s petition as one for the annulment of petitioner
Alejandro’s proclamation and holding that the same was timely filed.
Second Issue: Whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the Answer filed by Anganganand
ruling that manifest errors were committed
Petitioner Alejandro wonders how the COMELEC arrived at such a
conclusion that errors were committed in the copying of results from the election
returns to the statement of votes when not a single election return or a single
statement of votes was presented by any party. To recall, however, in the Answer
she filed with the COMELEC, Angangan, then Chairperson of the MBC of Alicia,
Isabela, admitted that there was manifest error in the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation. She likewise admitted that there was incorrect tallying, tabulation
and addition of votes and prayed that “an order be issued to reconvene the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, Alicia, Isabela to correct the entries made in the
Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes by Precincts.”[22]
Petitioner Alejandro, however, assails the said answer contending that it was
filed solely by Angangan and did not have the conformity of the other members of
the MBC; nor did it show the participation of the other members in its preparation
and the filing thereof considering that the MBC is a collegial body. The petitioner
adds that Angangan’s answer included tabulation of votes which was not verified

and that Angangan filed her answer when she was no longer a member of the
MBC.
The public and private respondents assert that as then Chairperson of the
MBC, Angangan had no alternative but to file an answer because she received the
summons sent by the COMELEC. Hence, even on the assumption that her answer
was not that of the MBC, the respondents believe that it still constitutes evidence
of the highest order. For the respondents, Angangan’s allegations therein are
admissions made by a party in the pleadings, and a responsible officer of the
COMELEC.
The respondents’ contentions are correct. It should be added that the
COMELEC possesses the power of supervision and control over Angangan, as
Chairperson of the MBC, and the MBC. As such, the COMELEC thus aptly
ratiocinated:
xxx [T]he statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over
the boards of canvassers includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the
action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have done, even if
questions relative thereto have not been elevated by an aggrieved party to the
COMELEC, for such power includes the power to initiate motu proprio or by
itself such steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law. The COMELEC’s
power of direct supervision and control includes such authority as reviewing the
actions of the board, extending an inquiry of questions affecting the genuineness
of election returns beyond the election records of the polling places involved,
annulling canvass or proclamation based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or
tampered returns, invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized
meeting of the Board of Canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because
the board did not meet at all, or requiring the board to convene by deputizing and
instructing the City Treasurer to convene the Boards of Canvassers for the
respective localities involved.[23]
The petitioner avers in his memorandum that “not a single election return or
a single statement of votes was presented by any party.”[24] In his petition filed
with the Court, however, he attached a copy of the private respondent’s petition

before the COMELEC which had a copy of the certificate of canvass of
votes[25] and the disputed election returns as annexes thereto.[26]
The correction of manifest errors has reference to errors in the election
returns, in the entries of the statement of votes by precinct/per municipality, or in
the certificate of canvass.[27]Section 5(2), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure likewise provides:
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more
copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate
of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the
copying of figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of
canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the
canvass, and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing
despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates
had already been made.[28]
The following pronouncement of the COMELEC Second Division in its
resolution is particularly instructive:
There is no question that errors were committed regarding the copying of
the results of the elections from the Election Returns to the Statement of Votes.
Both the public and private respondent admitted that errors were indeed
made. They just differ as to who will be the real winner if these errors are
corrected. According to public respondent, petitioner [herein private respondent]
won; private respondent [herein petitioner] maintains he would still have won
even if the errors were corrected.
What is involved is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of
Votes involved in this case does not match the entries made in the election
returns.
It is thus imperative that a Municipal Board of Canvasser be immediately
convened to correct with dispatch the errors committed in the tallying of votes.[29]

Likewise, the COMELEC en banc found that:
In terms of the third issue, the contention of the private respondent [herein
petitioner], that the Commission (Second Division) gravely erred in finding that
he had admitted that there were manifest errors, cannot be given credence. Going
over the records of the case, errors were indeed committed regarding the copying
of results of the elections from the election returns to the SOV. It is already beside
the point whether or not private respondent admitted such error.[30]
The foregoing factual findings of the COMELEC, which are supported by
substantial evidence, are binding on the Court. Hence, petitioner Alejandro’s
allegation that the manifest errors were based on lack of competent proof must fail.
Third Issue: whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in not
conducting a hearing for the examination of
the disputed election documents
The petitioner contends that he and the private respondent have different
versions of the correct computation. He insists that the COMELEC should have
conducted hearings to determine where the alleged tabulation errors lie. By failing
to conduct hearings, the petitioner asserts that he was denied due process and was
not given the opportunity to prove that the manifest errors in the election
documents in fact do not exist.
The petitioner’s claim of denial of due process does not persuade. We quote
hereunder the pertinent portion of the November 23, 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division:
Despite the admission of private respondent [petitioner Alejandro herein]
that there were indeed errors in the tallying of votes, pursuant to the ruling by the
Supreme Court in Bince, Jr. v. Comelec, We cannot annul the proclamation of
private respondent without notice and hearing. This requirement will be

satisfied when the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and corrects the
errors committed in the original tallying of votes.[31]
In his motion for reconsideration filed with the COMELEC en banc, the
petitioner averred that he was notified, through the undated Notice signed by
Angangan, that “the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alicia, Isabela, will
reconvene on December 8, 2004, at nine o’clock in the morning at the Session
Hall, Sangguniang Bayan, Alicia, Isabela. xxx”[32]
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one’s side or opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[33] A formal trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all situations essential to due process. Verily, “to
be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence. One may also
be heard through pleadings and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.[34]
This opportunity was made completely available to the petitioner who not
only participated in the proceedings before the MBC but also sought
reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. In fact, the
issues raised by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration were extensively
passed upon by the COMELEC en banc in the assailed resolution.
Fourth Issue: Whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the MBC to reconvene to rectify its
errors and to proclaim the winner in the
vice-mayoralty race in Alicia, Isabela
The petitioner avers that when he filed the motion for reconsideration of the
November 23, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, the order to

reconvene the MBC was, in effect, suspended by virtue of Section 2, Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.—A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed
within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-
forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order
or ruling.
The petitioner maintains that his motion for reconsideration was timely filed
on December 1, 2004, or within the five-day reglementary period, since he
received a copy of the November 23, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division on November 26, 2004. This contention is not quite correct. The
petitioner cannot count the five-day reglementary period from November 26, 2004,
the date he received a copy of the November 23, 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure clearly provides that the motion for reconsideration should be “xxx filed
within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.”[35] The rationale for
reckoning the period from thedate of promulgation was explained, thus: “A party
cannot feign ignorance of the date of promulgation of a decision or resolution
because it is previously fixed and notice is served upon him in
advance.”[36] Section 5, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the
Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which
notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or
by registered mail or by telegram.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was thus filed late on December
1, 2004 as more than five days had lapsed from the promulgation of the November
23, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. Worse, the filing fee
therefor was paid only on December 13, 2004. Given these defects, the petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration could not have the effect of suspending the execution of
the November 23, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
In any case, the COMELEC Second Division justified the reconvening of
the MBC in this wise:
On June 21, 2004, public respondent Election Officer Teresita B.
Angangan, Chairman of the Board, submitted her answer. She admitted that there
were indeed manifest errors committed by the Board in the preparation of the
Statement of Votes but denied that “dagdag-bawas was done, practiced,
perpetrated and repeated several times over by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.” She maintained that there was nodagdag-bawas but a mere error in
tabulation or tallying.
EO Angangan also submitted a table comparing the figures in the Election
Returns and in the Statement of Votes in all 156 clustered precincts. In this table
(Annex 1 of public respondent’s Answer), she pointed out that based on the
Election Returns, petitioner [private respondent herein] should have won the
elections after garnering 11,401 votes as against the 11,152 votes for private
respondent.
xxx
There is no question that errors were committed regarding the copying of
the results of the elections from the Election Returns to the Statement of
Votes. Both the public and private respondent admitted that errors were indeed
made. They just differ as to who will be the real winner if these errors are
corrected. According to public respondent, petitioner won; private respondent
maintains he would still have won even if the errors were corrected.
What is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of
Votes involved in this case does not match the entries made in the election
returns.
It is thus imperative that a Municipal Board of Canvasser be immediately
convened to correct with dispatch the errors committed in the tallying of votes. [37]
The COMELEC en banc upheld the reconvening of the MBC, thus:
xxx “The teaching of past experience is that every effort should be
strained, every means should be explored, to ascertain the true returns with the
end in view that upon the basis thereof, proclamation untainted by force, fraud,
forgery, mistake and the like, may be made. It is true indeed that after

proclamation, the losing candidate may yet have the remedy of an election
protest. But that may not prove effective. A number of factors, such as the
almost illimitable resources of lawyers and the delay that may be occasioned may
well frustrate the ends of the protest. Victory may just be in sound, and not in
substance.” While it is true that as a general rule, the Board of Canvassers
becomes functus officio after it has performed its last task, which is to proclaim
the winning candidates, the Highest Tribunal had the opportunity to cite an
exception to such general rule in Javier vs. COMELEC, where it stated that “it
may be conceded as a general proposition that when a Board of Canvassers has
fully performed its duty and proclaimed the result of the election according to law
and adjourned sine die, it may be deemed functus officio in the sense that the
members of the board have no power voluntarily to reassemble and re-canvass the
returns. But the foregoing pronouncement finds no application in this case where
as already ruled, the canvass and proclamation were made in violation of the
lawful order of the COMELEC.
Furthermore, where an election return has been amended by court order or
the election return from a certain precinct has been wrongfully or erroneously
excluded by the Board of Canvassers, We held that the COMELEC has the power
to order a new canvass of the election returns even after a proclamation had
already been made. The underlying theory therefore, it was said, is the ministerial
duty of the Board of Canvassers to base the proclamation on the election returns
of all the precincts of the municipality. Where the Board of Canvassers, as in this
instance with knowledge that the return from one precinct is undoubtedly vitiated
by clerical mistake, continued the canvass and proclaimed a winner based on the
result of such canvass, the proclamation cannot be said to have been in faithful
discharge of its ministerial duty under the law.[38]
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the foregoing COMELEC
pronouncements. There is no controversy that discrepancies exist in the statement
of votes and that reflected in the questioned election returns. Considering that any
error in the statement of votes would affect the proclamation made on the basis
thereof, the resolution of the COMELEC directing the MBOC to reconvene to
rectify the errors it committed in tallying the votes for the vice-mayoralty race in
Alicia, Isabela should be upheld. Indeed, “above and beyond all, the determination
of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or
of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue
to hold sacred.”[39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the COMELEC Second Division
and en banc dated November 23, 2004 andFebruary 22, 2005, respectively,
are AFFIRMED. The status quo order heretofore issued is hereby
ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and
CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it institutionalized
people power in law-making. Learning from the bitter lesson of completely surrendering
to Congress the sole authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution
concurrently vested such prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their
residual and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly through the concepts and
processes of initiative and of referendum.
In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses
the practical and legal implications of such differences. It also sets down some
guidelines in the conduct and implementation of these two novel and vital features of
popular democracy, as well as settles some relevant questions on jurisdiction -- all with
the purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the people's exercise of direct
democracy.
In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent
Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848
promulgated on June 27, 1996[1]denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local
initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
The Facts
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the
creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone, thus:
"Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special
Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the

Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America
as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and
Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic
Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by
the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act,
each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of
the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone
as provided herein." (Underscoring supplied)
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.[2] Petitioner
was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed
and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands
embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent
improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or
transferred to another government agency.”[3]
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the
President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following:
"I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang
kundisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa
SSEFZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at
isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan:

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