This document outlines a legal decision from a case involving Alfredo T. Romualdez and the Sandiganbayan regarding the validity of Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law. The court ruled that repetitive motions to invalidate an indictment burden the court system and that prior motions had waived certain arguments. Additionally, the court found that the law was constitutional and could not be challenged on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth, emphasizing that such doctrines are not applicable to penal statutes.

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[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004]
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN
(Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidateor summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior
to plea and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion to
quash ormotion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of
justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such
repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no longer be used as bases of
similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential
relatives who “intervene,directly orindirectly,in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government.” This provisionis not vagueor“impermissibly broad,”
because it can easily be understood with the use ofsimple statutory construction. Neither
may the constitutionality ofa criminal statutesuch as this be challenged on the basis of
the “overbreadth” and the “void-for-vagueness” doctrines, which apply only to free-
speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1]
underRule 65 ofthe Rules of Court,seeking
to set aside the November 20, 2001[2]
and the March 1, 2002[3]
Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
“WHEREFORE, for lack ofmerit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The
arraignment ofthe accusedand the pre-trialofthe case shallproceed as scheduled.”[4]
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
“[The People ofthe Philippines],through the PresidentialCommission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court]
charging the accused[with]violation ofSection 5,Republic Act No. 3019,[5]
as
amended. The Information reads:
‘That on orabout and duringthe periodfromJuly 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro
Manila,Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of[the Sandiganbayan],said [petitioner],
brother-in-lawofFerdinand E. Marcos,formerPresident ofthe Philippines,and
therefore,related to the latterby affinity within the third civil degree,did then and there
wil[l]fully and unlawfully,and with evident bad faith,forthe purpose ofpromotinghis
self-interested [sic]and/orthatofothers,intervene directly orindirectly,in a contract
between the NationalShipyard andSteelCorporation(NASSCO),a government-owned
and controlled corporation andthe BataanShipyard andEngineering Company

2. (BASECO), a private corporation,the majority stocksofwhich is owned by former
President Ferdinand E.Marcos,wherebythe NASSCOsold,transferredand conveyed to
the BASECO its ownership andallits titles and interestsoverall equipment and facilities
including structures,buildings,shops,quarters,houses,plantsandexpendable and semi-
expendable assets,located at theEngineerIsland knownas the EngineerIsland Shops
including some ofits equipment and machineriesfromJose Panganiban,Camarines
Norte needed by BASECOin its shipbuilding andship repairprogramforthe amount
of P5,000,000.00.
‘Contrary to law.’
“On December 27, 1996, the accusedfiled his first ‘MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT’ claiming that no valid preliminary investigationwas
conductedin the instant case. He assertsthatifa preliminary investigation could be said
to have been conducted,the same was nulland void havingbeenundertaken bya biased
and partialinvestigative body.
“On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan],through theFirst Division,issued an order
giving the accusedfifteen daysto file a Motion forReinvestigationwith the Office of the
SpecialProsecutor.
“[Petitioner]questioned said orderbefore the Supreme Court via a petition forCertiorari
and Prohibition with prayerfortemporary restrainingorder. On January 21,1998, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition forfailure to showthat [the Sandiganbayan]
committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in issuing theassailed order.
“On November9, 1998, the [petitioner]filed with the Office of the SpecialProsecutora
Motion to Quash.
“On September22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer(SPO) III Victorio U.
Tabanguil,manifested that theprosecution hadalready concluded thereinvestigation of
the case. He recommended the dismissalofthe instant case. Both the DeputySpecial
Prosecutorand theSpecialProsecutorapproved the recommendation. However,
Ombudsman AnianoA.Desierto disagreed anddirectedthe prosecutorsto let the
[petitioner]present his evidence in Court.
“Subsequently,[petitioner]filed on October8,1999 his second‘MOTIONTOQUASH
AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT’.
“On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan]deniedthe motion forlackof merit.
“On June 19, 2001, [the]accused filed a ‘MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
TO DISMISS’. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan]admitted themotion and
admitted the attached (third)Motion to Dismiss.
“The [Motion to Dismiss]raise[d]the following grounds:
‘I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF
[PETITIONER] WASVIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
‘A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WASCONDUCTED IN
THE INSTANT CASE; AND
‘B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WASCONDUCTED BY A
BIASED AND PARTIALINVESTIGATOR
‘II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS
VIOLATED
‘III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
[PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
‘IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HASBEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PRESCRIPTION’”[6]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayanexplained that allthe grounds invoked bypetitioner,except the
third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous
Resolutions.[7]
In resolving the third ground,the anti-graft court pointed out that Section
17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic law was
amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on or about 1975,
the amended provision was inapplicable to him.[8]
In denying theMotion forReconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary
investigation was not violated,becausehe had been granteda reinvestigation.[9]
It further
held that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not
trampled upon,either,inasmuch as the Information hadset forththe essentialelements of
the offense charged.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
The Issues
In his Memorandum,petitionerassigns the following errors for our consideration:

3. “Whetherornot the Honorable Sandiganbayanerred and gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lackof, orin excess ofjurisdiction –
I. In not dismissing and/orquashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite
clear and incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No.3019 is unconstitutionalbecause
its vaguenessviolatesthe due processright ofan individual
to be informed of the nature andthe causeofthe accusation
against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No.3019 is unconstitutionalbecause
it violates the due processright ofan individualto be
presumed innocentuntilthe contrary is proved;
C. The constitutionalright of petitioner x x x to be informed of
the nature and the cause ofthe accusation against himwas
violated;
D. The constitutionalright to due processoflawof petitionerxx
x was violated during the preliminary investigationstagein
the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation wascon-ducted
for Criminal Case No. 13736; and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a
biased and partialinvestigator.
E. The criminal action orliability has been extinguished by
prescription;and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973
Constitution,petitionerxx x is immune from criminal
prosecution.
And
II. In light ofthe foregoing,in denying petitioner[’s]xx x right to equal
protection ofthe laws.”[12]
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act
3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a
valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal
prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitionerchallengedthe constitutionality ofSection 5 of RA 3019 for the first time
in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his
December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to
Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to
quash.[13]
We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the denial of his
original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner
could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration been
turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for
certiorari[14]
-- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- which should be filed within 60
days fromnotice ofthe assailed order;[15]
or(2)to proceed to trialwithout prejudice to his
right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same questions before the
proper appellate court.[16]
But instead of availing himself of these remedies, he filed a
“Motion to Dismiss” on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantialdistinction between a “motion to quash” and a “motion to
dismiss.” Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such
motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of
proceedingto trial. A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedingsto annul
a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil
proceedings,is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus,our Rules of Court use
the term “motion to quash” in criminal,[17]
and “motion to dismiss” in civil,
proceedings.[18]
In the present case, however, both the “Motion to Quash” and the “Motion to
Dismiss” are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The
hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second
motion to quash. A party is not permittedto raise issues,whether similar or different, by
installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to
preliminary objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to quash

4. delays the administration ofjustice andunduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117
provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed
waived.[19]
Petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss” violates this rule.
Constitutionalityof
the ChallengedProvision
If only forthe foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed
outright. However,given theimportance of this case in curtailing graft and corruption,
the Court will neverthelessaddress the otherissues on their merit. Petitioner challenges
the validity ofSection 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penalstatute,on the ground that the act
constituting the offense is allegedly vague and “impermissibly broad.”
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth[20]
and the
vagueness[21]
doctrineshavespecialapplicationonly to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
explained the reason as follows:
“A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because ofpossible ‘chilling effect’upon protectedspeech. The theory is that
‘[w]hen statutesregulateorproscribespeechand noreadily apparent construction
suggestsitselfas a vehicle forrehabilitating the statutesin a single prosecution,the
transcendentvalue to allsociety ofconstitutionally protected expressionis deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statuteswith no requirement that the person
making the attackdemonstratethat hisown conduct could notbe regulated by a statute
drawn with narrowspecificity.’The possible harmto society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunishedis outweighedby the possibility that theprotected
speech ofothers may be deterredand perceivedgrievances left to festerbecause of
possible inhibitory effectsofoverly broadstatutes.
This rationale does not apply to penalstatutes. Criminal statuteshave general
in terroremeffect resulting fromtheirvery existence,and,if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone,the State may well be prevented fromenacting laws againstsocially
harmful conduct. In the area ofcriminal law, the law cannot take chancesas in the area
of free speech.
x x x x x x x x x
In sum,the doctrinesofstrict scrutiny,overbreadth,and vaguenessare analyticaltools
developedfortesting“on theirfaces” statutesin free speech casesor,as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. Theycannotbe made to do service when whatis
involved is a criminal statute. With respectto such statute,the establishedrule is that
‘one to whomapplication ofa statute is constitutionalwill not be heard to attackthe
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applyingto otherpersonsor
othersituationsin which its application might be unconstitutional.’ As hasbeenpointed
out,‘vaguenesschallenges in the First Amendment context,like overbreadthchallenges
typically producefacialinvalidation,while statutesfound vagueas a matterofdue
processtypically are invalidated [only]‘as applied’to a particular
defendant.’”[22]
(underscoring supplied)
“To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity.”[23]
While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-
vaguenessconcept hasyet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad,[24]
the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the
equalprotectionclause,not because it was vague. Adiongv.Comelec[25]
decreed as void
a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec[26]
held that a
portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative
powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass
acquittalofparties whose casesmay not haveevenreachedthe courts. Such invalidation
would constitute a departure fromthe usualrequirement of“actualcase andcontroversy”
and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual
concreteness. InYoungerv.Harris,this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in these words:[27]
“[T]he taskofanalyzing a proposedstatute,pinpointingits deficiencies,and requiring
correction ofthesedeficienciesbefore thestatute is put intoeffect,is rarely if everan
appropriate taskforthe judiciary. The combination ofthe relative remotenessofthe
controversy,the impact on the legislative processofthe relief sought,and above allthe
speculative and amorphousnature ofthe required line-by-line analysis ofdetailed
statutes,xx x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutionalquestions,whicheverway theymight be decided.”
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes,
described asa “manifestly strongmedicine” to be employed “sparingly andonly as a last
resort.” In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that
have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant has been charged.[28]
As conduct --not speech--is its object,the challenged provision mustbe examined
only “as applied” to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared
unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
“Section 5. Prohibition oncertainrelatives.— It shallbe unlawful for the spouse orfor
any relative,by consanguinity oraffinity,within the third civil degree,ofthe President of
the Philippines,the Vice-President ofthe Philippines,the President ofthe Senate,orthe
Speakerof the House ofRepresentatives,to intervene,directly orindirectly,in any
business,transaction,contractorapplicationwith the Government:Provided,Thatthis
section shallnot apply to anypersonwho,priorto the assumption ofoffice ofany ofthe

5. above officials to whomhe is related,has been alreadydealing with the Government
along the same line of business,norto any transaction,contract orapplicationalready
existing or pending at the time ofsuch assumption ofpublic office,norto any application
filed by him the approvalofwhich is not discretionaryon the part ofthe officialor
officials concerned butdependsuponcompliance with requisites provided by law,or
rules or regulationsissued pursuant to law,norto any act lawfully performed in an
official capacity orin the exercise of a profession.”
Petitioner also claims that the phrase “to intervene directly or indirectly, in any
business,transaction,contractorapplicationwith the Government” is vague and violates
his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.[29]
He
furthercomplains that the provision doesnot specify what acts are punishable under the
termintervene,andthus transgresseshis right to be presumed innocent.[30]
We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.[31]
On the party challenging its validity weighs
heavily the oneroustaskofrebutting this presumption.[32]
Anyreasonable doubt about the
validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[33]
To doubt is to
sustain, as tersely put by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive
Secretary,[34]
the rationale forthe presumptionofconstitutionality was explained by this
Court thus:
“The policy ofthe courts is to avoid ruling on constitutionalquestionsand to presume
that the acts ofthe politicaldepartmentsare valid in the absence ofa clearand
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumptionis based
on the doctrine ofseparationofpowers which enjoins uponeachdepartment a becoming
respect forthe acts ofthe otherdepartments. The theory is that asthe joint act of
Congressand thePresident ofthe Philippines,a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordancewith the fundamentallawbefore it was finally
enacted.”[35]
In the instantcase,petitionerhasmiserably failed to overcome such presumption.
This Court has previously laid down the testfor determining whether a statute is vague,
as follows:
“x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definitenessthat personsofordinary intelligence can understandwhat conductis
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that speciesoflegislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e.,that which cannot be clarified eitherby a saving clauseor
by construction.
“A statute oract may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guessat its meaning and differin its
application. In such instance,the statute is repugnantto the Constitution in two (2)
respects -it violates due processforfailure to accord persons,especially the parties
targeted by it,fair notice ofwhat conduct to avoid; and,it leaves lawenforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisionsand becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[36]
But the doctrine doesnot apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language butwhich nonethelessspecify a standard though
defectively phrased; orto those thatare apparently ambiguousyet fairly applicable to
certain types ofactivities. The first may be ‘saved’by properconstruction,while no
challenge may be mounted as against the secondwheneverdirected against such
activities.[37]
With more reason,the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clearand free from ambiguity,as in this case.
“The test in determining whethera criminal statute is void foruncertainty is whetherthe
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conductwhen
measured by common understandingand practice.[38]
It must be stressed,however,that
the ‘vagueness’doctrine merely requires a reasonable degreeofcertainty forthe statute
to be upheld -not absolute precision ormathematicalexactitude,as petitionerseems to
suggest. Flexibility, ratherthan meticulousspecificity,is permissible as long as the
metes and boundsofthe statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings ordetailed in its
provisions,especially where,because ofthe nature ofthe act,it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advanceas in all otherstatutes.”[39]
A simpler test was decreed in Dansv.People,[40]
in which the Court said that there
was nothing vague about a penallawthat adequately answered the basic query “What is
the violation?”[41]
Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters
that the lawitself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case.[42]
The question “Whatis the violation?” is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA
3019, as follows:
1. The offenderis a spouseorany relative by consanguinity oraffinity within the
third civil degree ofthe Presidentofthe Philippines,the Vice-Presidentofthe
Philippines,the Presidentofthe Senate,orthe Speakerofthe House of
Representatives; and
2. The offenderintervened directly orindirectly in any business,transaction,
contract orapplicationwith the government.
Applicabilityof
Statutory Construction
As to petitioner’sclaimthat the term intervene is vague,this Court agrees with the
Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple
statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a termused in a statute
will not renderthe law“void forvagueness,” if the meaning can be determined through
the judicial function ofconstruction.[43]
Elementary is the principle that words should be
construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.
“x x x. A statute is not rendereduncertain andvoid merely becausegeneralterms are
used therein,orbecause ofthe employment ofterms without definingthem;[44]
much less

6. do we have to define every word we use. Besides,there is no positive constitutionalor
statutory command requiring the legislature to define eachand every word in an
enactment. Congressis not restrictedin the formofexpression ofits will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vaguenessorambiguity ofthe lawso long as the legislative will is clear, orat least,can
be gathered fromthe whole act x x x.
“x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle oflegal hermeneutics that wordsofa statute will be
interpreted in theirnatural,plain and ordinary acceptation andsignification,[45]
unlessit
is evident thatthe legislature intended a technicalorspeciallegalmeaning to those
words.[46]
The intention ofthe lawmakers - who are,ordinarily, untrained philologistsand
lexicographers -to use statutory phraseology in sucha manneris always presumed.”[47]
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation,
which is to “to come between.”[48]
Criminally liable is anyonecovered in the enumeration
of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the government. As we have explained, it is
impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention
could be performed. But the courts may passuponthosedetails once trial is concluded.
Thus,the alleged vaguenessofintervene is not a groundto quash the information prior to
the commencement of the trial.
In sum,the Court holds that thechallenged provision is not vague, and that in any
event,the “overbreath” and“void forvagueness” doctrinesare not applicable to this case.
SecondIssue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Otherthan arguing on thealleged intrinsic vaguenessof intervene,petitionerfurther
contendsthatthe Information itselfis also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not
specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.[49]
Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accusedis not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.[50]
The pertinent
provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
“Section 9. Bill ofparticulars. --The accused may,before arraignment,move fora bill
of particulars to enable himproperly to plead and prepare fortrial. The motion shall
specify the alleged defectsofthe complaint orinformation and the details desired.”
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient
particularity as to apprise the accused ofwhat they are being charged with and to enable
the court to pronounce judgment. [51]
The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information.[52]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
information,[53]
matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the
nature ofthe offense --need not be averred.[54]
Whatever facts and circumstances must
necessarily be alleged are to be determined by referenceto the definition andthe essential
elements of the specific crimes.[55]
In the instantcase,a cursoryreading ofthe Information shows that the elements of
a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the
allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to
enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are
evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation
when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayan’s Order
giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.[56]
Citing Cojuangco v.Presidential Commissionon Good Government,[57]
he
undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation,
because the PCGGacted both as complainant and as investigator.[58]
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to
conducta preliminary investigation,the lattercould not do so with the “cold neutrality of
an impartial judge” in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and
subsequently filed the complaint.[59]
On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary
investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of the records to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the
Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGGinitiated the present Complaint
against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary investigation.
However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and
afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined
in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan’s actions are in accord also with Raro v.
Sandiganbayan,[60]
which held that thefailure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation
would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been
filed, the properprocedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while
the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.[61]
Fourth Issue:
Prescription

7. The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.[62]
Such issue should be
disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion
within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may not
circumvent this rule by filing a subsequentmotion that raises the same issue andthe same
arguments.
Furthermore,it is easy to see why this argument beingraised by petitioneris utterly
unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense was
committed “during the period fromJuly 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975.” He argues thatwhen
the Information was filed on July 12, 1989,[63]
prescriptionhad alreadyset in,because the
prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from
the time the offense was allegedly committed. The increase ofthis prescriptive period to
fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195.[64]
Act No. 3326, as amended,[65]
governs the prescription of offenses penalized by
special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
“Sec.2. Prescription shallbegin to run fromthe day ofthe commission ofthe
violation ofthe law, and if the same not be known at the time,from the discoverythereof
and the institution ofjudicialproceedingsforits investigation andpunishment.
“The prescriptionshallbe interruptedwhen proceedingsare institutedagainstthe guilty
person,and shallbegin to run again if the proceedingsare dismissedforreasons not
constitutingjeopardy.”
Consistent with the provisionquoted above,this Court haspreviously reckoned the
prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986
EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66]
In Republic v. Desierto, the
Court explained:
“This issue confronted thisCourt anew,albeit in a largerscale,in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loansv.Desierto. In the said recent case,the Board
of Directors ofthe Philippine Seeds,Inc.and Development Bankofthe Philippines were
charged with violation ofparagraphs(e)and (g)ofSection 3 ofRA No. 3019, by the
PresidentialAd Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,createdby thenPresident
Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recoverthe so-called ‘Behest Loans’, where the
Philippine Government guaranteed severalforeign loansto corporationsandentities
connected with the formerPresident Marcos. xx x In holding that thecasehad not yet
prescribed,this Court ruled that:
‘In the presentcase,it was well-nigh impossible forthe State,the aggrievedparty,to
have known the violations ofRA No.3019 at the time the questioned transactionswere
made because,as alleged,the public officials concernedconnived orconspired with the
‘beneficiaries ofthe loans.’ Thus,we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period forthe offenses with which the respondentsin OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged shouldbe computed fromthe discovery ofthe commission thereofand not from
the day ofsuch commission.
x x x x x x x x x
‘People v. Duque is more in point,and what was stated there standsreiteration: In the
nature ofthings,actsmade criminal by speciallaws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; forthis reason,the applicable statute requires that ifthe
violation ofthe speciallawis not known at the time, the prescription beginsto run only
from the discoverythereof,i.e.,discovery ofthe unlawfulnature ofthe constitutive act or
acts.’ (Italics supplied)
“There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest LoansCaseand the presentone
which lead us to apply the ruling ofthe former to the latter. First,both casesarose outof
seemingly innocent businesstransactions;second,both were ‘discovered’only afterthe
government createdbodies to investigate these anomaloustransactions; third,both
involve prosecutionsforviolations ofRA No.3019; and, fourth,in bothcases,it was
sufficiently raised in the pleadingsthat the respondentsconspired andconnived with one
anotherin orderto keep the alleged violationshiddenfrompublic scrutiny.
“This Court’s pronouncement in the case of Domingov.Sandiganbayanis quite relevant
and instructive as to the date whenthe discovery ofthe offenseshould be reckoned,thus:
‘In the presentcase,it was well-nigh impossible forthe government,the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations committed at the time the questionedtransactionswere
made because both parties to the transactionswere allegedly in conspiracyto perpetuate
fraud against the government. The alleged anomaloustransactionscould only have been
discoveredafterthe February 1986 Revolution when one ofthe originalrespondents,then
President Ferdinand Marcos,was oustedfromoffice. Prior to said date,no person would
have dared to question the legality orpropriety ofthosetransactions. Hence,the counting
of the prescriptiveperiod would commencefromthe date ofdiscovery ofthe offense,
which could have been between February 1986afterthe EDSA Revolutionand26 May
1987 whenthe initiatorycomplaintwasfiled.’”[67]
The above pronouncementis squarely applicable to the present case. The general
rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime
cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the
aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged
interventionwas made. The accusedis the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ brother-
in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question
the legality of the sale orwould even have thought of investigating petitioner’s alleged
involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation[68]
of PCGG[69]
and its
exhaustive investigationsthat the alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation
on November29, 1988 of a Complaint against formerPresident Marcosand petitionerfor
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the

8. Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from
the discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitionerargues that he enjoysderivative immunity,because he allegedly served as
a high-ranking navalofficer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President
Marcos.[70]
He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended,
which we quote:
“The President shallbe immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter,no suit
whatsoevershalllie for official acts done by himor by others pursuantto his specific
orders during his tenure.
“x x x x x x x x x”
As the Sandiganbayanaptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the
alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[71]
this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive
immunity in orderto determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that
executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be
used to shield a non-sitting President fromprosecution for alleged criminal acts done
while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives
his immunity from one who is no longersitting as President. Verily, the felonious actsof
public officials and theirclose relatives “are notactsofthe State,and theofficerwho acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.”
In sum,petitionerutterly fails to showthat the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuingthe assailed Resolutions.[72]
On the contrary, it acted prudently, in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED,and the questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127718. March 2, 2000]
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, ABELARDO SANGADAN, LUCIANO
RAMOS, NESTOR TILASAN, GREGORIO TILASAN, JOAQUIN GARCIA,
ROGELIO SABAITAN, CASTRO LEONARDO, PILARDO POTENCIANO,
RONILLO POTENCIANO, SANTIAGO SABAITAN, JOVENCIO BARTOLOME,
JUANITO CONCERMAN, GEORGE TUMILAS, PATROCINIO DOMINGO,
AVELINO FRANCISCO, MELITON SANGADAN, ALEXANDER GERONIMO,
JOAQUIN GERONIMO, RAMIL MACASO, LAMBERTO JOVEN, CRISTINO
GARINA, SAMMY GANTAAN, NACIAL USTALAN, EDWIN USTALAN,
ROLAND POTENCIANO, RODY CONCERMAN, ELMER DOMINGO,
ARNAGUEZ SANGADAN, UNDING BOLENG, EDUARDO BOLENG,
ROBERTO PANEO and HENRY SANGADAN, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th Division), PATALON COCONUT
ESTATE and/or CHARLIE REITH as General Manager and SUSIE GALLE
REITH, as owner, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a specialcivil action for certiorari to setaside andannultwo (2)resolutions
of the NationalLaborRelations Commission[1]
promulgatedon April24, 1996[2]
and
August 29,1996[3]
denying the award ofseparationpay to petitioners.
The pertinent factsare as follows:
Petitioners are bona fide members ofthe NationalFederation ofLabor(NFL), a
legitimate labororganization duly registeredwith the Department ofLaborand
Employment. They were employed by private respondentsCharlie Reith and Susie Galle
Reith, generalmanagerand owner,respectively,ofthe 354-hectare Patalon Coconut
Estate located at Patalon,Zamboanga City.Patalon Coconut Estate was engagedin
growing agriculturalproductsandin raising livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted intolawRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the ComprehensiveAgrarian ReformLaw (CARL), which mandated the compulsory
acquisition ofallcovered agriculturallands fordistribution to qualified farmer
beneficiaries underthe so-called Comprehensive AgrarianReformProgramme (CARP).
Pursuant to R.A.No.6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awardedto the PatalonEstate
Agrarian ReformAssociation(PEARA),a cooperativeaccredited by the Department of
Agrarian Reform(DAR), ofwhich petitioners are members and co-owners.
As a result ofthis acquisition,private respondents shut downthe operation ofthe Patalon
Coconut Estate and theemployment ofthe petitionerswas severed on July 31,1994.
Petitioners did not receive anyseparation pay.

9. On August1,1994, the cooperative tookoverthe estate.A certain AbelardoSangadan
informed respondentsofsuchtakeovervia a letterwhich was received by therespondents
on July 26, 1994. Being beneficiaries ofthe Patalon Coconut Estate pursuant to the
CARP, the petitioners became part-ownersofthe land.[4]
On April 25, 1995, petitioners filed individualcomplaints before the RegionalArbitration
Branch (RAB) of the NationalLaborRelations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City,
praying fortheirreinstatement with fullbackwages on thegroundthat they were illegally
dismissed.The petitionerswere representedby theirlabororganization,the NFL.
On December12, 1995, the RABrendered a decision,the dispositive portion ofwhich
provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing complainants’charge forillegal dismissalforlack
of merit, but ordering respondentsthru [sic]its owner-managerorits
duly authorized representative to paycomplainants’separationpay in
view of the latter’s cessationofoperationsorforced sale,and for13th
month differentialpay in the amount,as follows,for:
Names Separation Pay 13thMo. Pay
Diff. Total
Abelardo Sangadan P23,879.06 N o n
e P23,879.06
Luciano
Ramos 43,605.24 P711.25 44
,316.49
Nestor
Tilasan 19,726.18 401.46
20,127.64
Gregorio Tilasan 25,955.50 N o n
e 25,955.50
Joaquin
Garcia 7,267.54 1,211.25 8,
478.79
Rogelio
Sabaitan 21,798.00 1,211.25 23,009.
25
Castro Leonardo,
Jr. 25,955.50 63.10 26,018.60
Pilardo
Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25
6,102.35
Ronillo Potenciano 7,267.54 N o n
e 7,267.54
Jovencio
Bartolome 8,305.76 477.25 8
,783.01
Santiago
Sabaitan 4,152.88 1,011.25 5,164.13
Juanito
Concerman 7,267.54 611.25
7,928.79
George
Tumilas 16,611.52 1,011.25 1
7,622.77
Patrocinio
Domingo 2,076.44 1,011.25 3,087.6
9
Avelino
Francisco 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.9
1
Meliton
Sangadan 15,573.30 392.50 15,
965.80
AlexanderGeronimo 15,573.00 N o n
e 15,573.30
Joaquin
Geronimo 24,917.28 1,211.25 26,128.5
3

10. Ramil
Macaso 6,229.32 861.25
7,090.57
Lamberto
Joven 16,611.62 1,011.25 17,62
2.77
Cristino
Garina 35,299.48 849.65
36,149.13
Sammy
Gantaan 14,535.08 961.25 15,49
6.33
Nacial
Ustalan 38,414.14 79.95
38,494.09
Edwin
Ustalan 7,267.54 1,011.25 8,27
8.79
Roland
Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,
102.35
Rody
Concerman 7,267.54 691.25 7,
958.79
Elmer
Domingo 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,
325.91
Aranquez
Sangada 45,681.68 711.25 46,39
2.93
Unding Boleng 31,146.60 N o n
e 31,146.60
Eduardo
Boleng 35,299.48 759.30
36,058.78
Roberto
Paneo 23,876.06 911.25
24,787.31
Henry
Sangadan 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77
Total
Benefits P586,774.22
"FURTHER, complainants’claimforMuslimHoliday,overtime pay
and rest day pay should be dismissedforlackof merit, too."[5]
Appealwas taken by privaterespondentsto public respondent NLRC.[6]
On April 24, 1996, the NLRC issued a resolution,the dispositive portionofwhich
provides:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealedfromis hereby modified in
favorof the following findings:
1) Respondentsare not guilty ofillegally dismissing
complainants.Respondents’cessation ofoperationwas not due to a
unilateralaction on theirpart resulting in the cutting offofthe
employment relationship between the parties.The severance of
employer-employee relationship between the partiescame about
INVOLUNTARILY, as a result ofan act of the State.Consequently,
complainants are not entitled to anyseparation pay.
2) The award of 13th month pay differentialis,however,Set
Aside.Any award of13th month pay differentials to complainants
should be computedstrictly based ontheirreducedpay,equivalent to
six (6) hours work,Mondayto Friday,pursuantto what the parties
agreed in the November18, 1991 Compromise Agreement."
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by theNLRC in its
resolution[8]
dated August 29,1996.
Hence,this petition.
The issue is whetherornot an employerthatwas compelled to cease its operation
because ofthe compulsory acquisitionby the government ofits land forpurposes of
agrarian reform, is liable to pay separationpay to its affected employees.

11. The petition is bereft ofmerit.
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to separation payciting Article 283 of the Labor
Code which reads:
"ART. 283.Closure ofestablishment and reduction ofpersonnel. –
The employermay also terminate the employment ofany employee
due to the installation oflaborsaving devices,redundancy,
retrenchment to preventlosses orthe closing orcessation ofoperation
of the establishmentorundertaking unless the closing is forthe
purpose ofcircumventingthe provisionsofthis Title,by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Ministry ofLaborand
Employment at least one (1) month before the intendeddate thereof.
In case oftermination due to the installation oflaborsaving devicesor
redundancy,the workeraffected therebyshallbe entitled to a
separationpay equivalent to at leasthis one (1)month pay orto at
least one (1) month pay forevery yearofservice,whicheveris higher.
In case ofretrenchmentto prevent lossesand in casesofclosuresor
cessation ofoperationsofestablishment orundertakingnot due to
serious businesslosses orfinancialreverses,the separation payshall
be equivalent to one (1)month pay orat least one-half(½)month pay
for every yearofservice,whicheveris higher.A fraction ofat least six
(6) months shallbe considered asone (1)whole year."
It is clearthat Article 283 of the LaborCode applies in cases ofclosuresofestablishment
and reductionofpersonnel.The peculiarcircumstances in the case at bar,however,
involves neitherthe closure ofan establishment nora reductionofpersonnelas
contemplatedunderthe aforesaid article.Whenthe Patalon Coconut Estate was closed
because a large portion ofthe estate was acquiredby DARpursuant to CARP,the
ownership ofthat large portionofthe estate wasprecisely transferredto PEARA and
ultimately to the petitionersas members thereofand asagrarian lot beneficiaries.Hence,
Article 283 ofthe LaborCode is not applicable to the case at bench.
Even assuming, arguendo,that the situation in this casewere a closure ofthe business
establishment called PatalonCoconut Estate ofprivate respondents,stillthe
petitioners/employeesare not entitled to separation pay.The closure contemplated under
Article 283 ofthe LaborCode is a unilateraland voluntary act on thepart ofthe
employerto close the businessestablishment as may be gleanedfromthe wording ofthe
said legalprovision that "The employer may also terminate the employmentofany
employee due to...".[9]
The use ofthe word "may," in a statute,denotesthatit is directory
in nature and generally permissive only.[10]
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory constructionis thusapplicable in this case.Where the wordsofa statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity,it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attemptedinterpretation.[11]
In otherwords,Article 283 ofthe Labor Code does notcontemplatea situation where the
closure ofthe businessestablishment is forced upon theemployerand ultimately forthe
benefit ofthe employees.
As earlier stated,the Patalon Coconut Estate was closeddownbecause a large portion of
the said estate was acquired by theDARpursuant to the CARP.Hence,the closure ofthe
Patalon CoconutEstatewas not effected voluntarily by private respondentswho even
filed a petition to have said estate exempted fromthe coverage ofRA 6657.
Unfortunately,theirpetition was denied bythe Department ofAgrarain Reform.Since
the closure was due to theact ofthe governmentto benefit the petitioners,as members of
the Patalon Estate Agrarian ReformAssociation,by making themagrarian lot
beneficiaries ofsaid estate,the petitioners are not entitled to separationpay.The
termination oftheir employment was not causedby the private respondents.The blame,if
any,for the termination ofpetitioners’employment can even be laid upon the petitioner-
employees themselvesinasmuch astheyformed themselves intoa cooperative,PEARA,
ultimately to take over,as agrarian lot beneficiaries,ofprivate respondents’landed estate
pursuant to RA 6657. The resulting closure ofthe businessestablishment,Patalon
Coconut Estate,when it was placed underCARP,occurred through no fault ofthe private
respondents.
While the Constitution providesthat "theState xx x shall protect the rights ofworkers
and promote theirwelfare",that constitutionalpolicy ofproviding fullprotectionto labor
is not intended to oppressordestroy capitaland management.Thus,the capitaland
management sectorsmust also be protectedundera regime of justice and the rule oflaw.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutionsofthe NationalLabor
Relations Commission dated April24, 1996 and August 29,1996 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,(Chairman),Mendoza,Quisumbing, and BuenaJJ.,concur.

12. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14859 March 31,1962
MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
PEDRO S.HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Sycip,Salazarand Associatesforpetitioners-appellees.
Office of the SolicitorGeneralforrespondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On January 1,1957, Macario King,a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the ownerof
the businessestablishment knownas "Import Meat and Produce",a grocery wholesale
and retail business,previously owned bythe Philippine Cold Stores,Inc.In the business
15 personswere employed 12ofwhomare Filipinos and the other3Chinese.The three
Chinese were old employees ofthe previousowner,the Philippine Cold Stores,Inc.,one
having been employed as purchaserand the othertwo as salesmen.
Three weeks afterKing had acquired the businessas aforesaid,he sought permission
from the President ofthe Philippinesto retain the servicesofthe three Chinese employees
pursuant to Section2-A ofCommonwealth Act 108, coursinghis letterthru the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry.This officialrecommended to the President the disapproval
of King's requeston the ground that aliens may not be appointedto operate oradminister
a retail businessunderSection1of Republic Act No.1180 which requires that its capital
be wholly owned by citizens ofthe Philippines,the only exception theretobeingthe
employment oftechnicalpersonnelwhich may be allowed after securing to that effect an
authorization fromthe President.The President approved the recommendationofthe
Secretary ofCommerce and Industrysince the positionsofpurchaserand salesmen
occupied by thethree Chinese employeesare not technicalpositionswithin the meaning
of Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No.134.
As a result ofsuch adverseruling,Macario King and his three Chinese employeesfiled a
petition fordeclaratory relief,injunction and mandamuson August 25,1958 against the
Secretary ofCommerce and Industryand theExecutive Secretary before the Court of
First Instance ofManila prayingthat they be givenreliefbecause theyare "uncertain and
in doubt as to theirrights and dutiesunderRepublic Act No.1180 and Commonwealth
Act No.108, as amended by Republic Act No.134, in viewof the aforesaid rulings ofthe
Department ofCommerce and Industryand ofthe Executive Secretary."They alleged
that said rulings are illegal in viewof the respectivesituationsand positionsofpetitioners
in the retail establishment,the purpose andlanguage ofthe laws abovementioned,andthe
constitutionalguarantee ofthe rightsofan employerto employ and ofan employee to
work accorded to citizens andaliens alike.The lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction exparte upon petitioners'filing a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët

13. Respondentsfiled an answersettingup certain affirmative and specialdefensestendingto
showthat the petition doesnotallege facts sufficient to constitutea cause ofaction.With
regard to the declaratoryrelief,respondentsclaimthat such remedy is not available to
petitioners because they have alreadycommitted a breach ofthe statute which is apparent
on the face ofthe petition,meaning that the employmentofthe three Chinese as salesmen
and purchaserin the store ofMacario King is a violation ofthe Section 1 ofthe Retail
Trade Act which providesthatonly citizens ofthe Philippinescan engage in retailtrade,
as well as ofSection 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which prohibits Chinese citizens to
intervene in the management,operation,administration orcontrolofsuch business,
whetheras an officer,employee orlaborerwith or without remuneration.Respondents
furtherclaim that the three Chinese employees are not technicalmen who are exempted
from the operationofthe law,and even if they are,they need theauthorization ofthe
President which theyfailed to obtain in theircase.
With regard to the petition forpreliminary injunction,respondentscontend that the
requisites forits issuance have notbeensatisfied.Andwith regard to the petition for
mandamus,respondentsalleged that petitioners have failed to showthat respondentshave
unlawfully neglected anyduty which theyare called upon to performand which would
make themliable for such relief. Hence,respondentsprayed that the petition be dismissed
and that the writ of preliminary injunction issuedby the court exparte be lifted.
To this answer,petitioners filed a reply, which was followed by a rejoinderand sur-
rejoinder,with a detailed discussion ofthe argumentsadvancedin support thereof.And
because the motion to dismissfiled by respondentshad been denied forlackof merit, trial
proceeded,afterwhich the lower court enteredjudgmentholding"that petitionerMacario
King may employ any person,although not a citizen of the Philippines orofthe United
States ofAmerica,including the three petitionersherein as purchaserandsalesmen,in
any positionin his retail businessnot involving participation,orinterventionin the
management,operation,administration orcontrolofsaid business;that petitionersLim
Pin, Chang Pak and Ng See Keng are entitled to continue aspurchaserand salesmen,
respectively,in Macario King's Import Meat and Produce orin any otherretail
establishment;that the writ of preliminary injunction issuedagainstrespondentsordering
the to desist frominterfering by criminal and/oradministrative action with the rightsof
the petitionersas abovedefined,is hereby declaredfinal; and,finally,respondentsare
hereby ordered to allowand permit petitionersto enjoy andexercise theirrights in the
mannerand to the extent aforestated." Respondentstookthe present appealbefore this
Court.
The centerofcontroversy betweenpetitioners-appelleesand respondents-appellants
hinges on the interpretationbe given to Section 1,Republic Act No.1180, in relation to
Section 2-A,Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No.134. For ready
reference we quote the pertinentprovisions:.
SECTION 1. No person who is not a citizen ofthe Philippines,and no
association,partnership,orcorporationthe capitalofwhich is not wholly owned
by citizens ofthe Philippines,shallengage directlyorindirectly in the retail
business:...(Emphasis supplied).
SEC. 2-A. Any person,corporation,orassociation which,having in its name or
underits control,a right,franchise,privilege,property orbusiness,the exercise
or enjoyment ofwhich is expressly reserved by theConstitutionorthe laws to
citizens of the Philippines,orofany otherspecific country,orto corporationsor
associationsat least sixty percentumofthe capitalofwhich is owned by such
citizens,permits or allows the use,exploitation orenjoyment thereofby a
person,corporation orassociation notpossessing therequisitesprescribed by
the Constitutionorthe laws ofthe Philippines; orleases,orin any otherway
transfers orconveyssaid right,franchise,privilege,propertyor businessto a
person,corporation orassociation nototherwise qualified underthe
Constitution,orthe provisionsofthe existing laws; orin any mannerpermits or
allows any person,notpossessing the qualificationsrequired by the Constitution
or existing laws to acquire,use,exploit orenjoy a right,franchise,privilege,
property orbusiness,the exercise and enjoyment ofwhich are expressly
reserved by the Constitutionorexisting laws to citizens ofthe Philippines orof
any otherspecific country, to intervene in themanagement,operation,
administration orcontrol thereof,whetherasan officer,employee orlaborer
therein,withorwithout remunerationexcept technical personnelwhose
employmentmay be specifically authorizedby the President ofthe Philippines
upon recommendation ofthe DepartmentHead concerned....(emphasis
supplied).
With regard to the RetailTrade Law, this Court had already occasion to rule on its
constitutionality.We held that the same is valid and that its purpose is to completely
nationalize the retail trade in the Philippines.In otherwords,its primordialpurposeis to
confine the privilege to engage in retailtrade to Filipino citizens by prohibiting any
person who is not a Filipino citizen or any entity whose capital is not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines fromengaging,directly orindirectly,in the retailbusiness.The
nationalization ofretailtrade is, therefore,complete in the sense that it must be wholly
owned by a Filipino citizen or Filipino controlled entityin orderthat it may be licensed to
operate.The lawseeks a complete ban to aliens who may not engage in it directly or
indirectly.And the reasonsbehindsuch banare the perniciousand intolerable practicesof
alien retailers who in the past have eitherindividually orin organized groupscontrivedin
many dubious waysto controlthe trade and dominate the distributionofgoodsvitalto
the life ofourpeople thereby resultingnotonly in the increasingdominance ofalien
controlin retail trade but at times in the strangle hold on oureconomic life. These reasons
were well expressed by Mr.Justice Labradorin the following wise: .
"But the dangersarising fromalien participation in the retailtrade does not
seemto lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endangerthe nationalinterest.Withample capital,
unity ofpurpose and action andthoroughorganization,alien retailers and
merchants can act in suchcomplete unison andconcert on such vitalmatters as
the fixing of prices,the determination ofthe amount ofgoodsorarticles to be
made available in the market, and even the choice ofthe goodsorarticles they
would or would not patronize ordistribute,thatfears ofdislocationofthe
nationaleconomy and ofthe complete subservience ofnationalretailers and of
the producers andconsumers alike,can be placed completely at theirmercy...

14. "... Grave abuseshave characterized the exercise ofthe retail trade by aliens.It
is a fact within judicial notice,which courts ofjustice may not properly
overlookorignore in the interests oftruthand justice,thatthere exists a general
feeling on the part ofthe public that alien participation in the retailtrade has
been attendedby a perniciousandintolerable practices,the mentionofa few of
which would suffice for ourpurposes;that at some time or otherthey have
cornered the market ofessentialcommodities,like corn and rice,creating
artificial scarcities to justify andenhance profits to unreasonable proportions;
that they have hoardedessentialfoodsto the inconvenienceand prejudice ofthe
consuming public,so much so that the Governmenthashad to establishthe
NationalRice and Corn Corporation to savethe public fromtheircontinuous
hoarding practicesand tendencies; thattheyhaveviolatedprice controllaws,
especially on foodsandessentialcommodities,suchthat thelegislature had to
enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.1168), authorizing theirimmediate and
automatic deportationforprice controlconvictions; that they have secret
combinationsamong themselves to controlprices,cheatingthe operationofthe
law of supply and demand;that they have connivedto boycott honest merchants
and traders who would notcateroryield to theirdemands,in unlawfulrestraint
of freedomof trade and enterprise.Theyare believed by the public to have
evaded taxlaws,smuggled goodsand moneyinto and out ofthe land,violated
import and export prohibitions,controllaws and the like,in derision and
contempt oflawful authority.It is also believed that theyhave engaged in
corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes,indirectly causing the
prevalence ofgraft and corruptionin the Government.As a matteroffact
appeals to unscrupulousaliens have been made bothby the Government and by
theirown lawful diplomatic representatives,action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence ofmany ofthe above practices.
The circumstancesabove setforth create wellfoundedfears thatworse things
may come in the future.The present dominance ofthe alien retailer, especially
in the big centers ofpopulation,therefore,becomes a potentialsourceofdanger
on occasionsofwaror othercalamity.We do not have here in this country
isolated groupsofharmless aliens retailing goodsamongnationals; what we
have are well organized and powerfulgroupsthat dominatethe distribution of
goodsand commodities in the communities andbig centers ofpopulation.They
owe no allegiance orloyalty to the State,and the State cannot rely uponthemin
times ofcrisis or emergency.While the nationalholdshis life,his person and
his property subject to the needsofhis country,the alien may even become the
potentialenemy ofthe State.(Lao H. Ichong v.Hernandez,et al., G.R. No. L-
7995, May 31, 1957).
The purpose ofthe enactment ofthe RetailTrade Law, therefore,is clear. As expressed
by this Court,it is to translate the generalpreoccupation ofthe Filipinos againstthe threat
and dangerto ournationaleconomy causedby alien dominance andcontrolofthe retail
businessby weedingoutsuch threat anddangerandthusprevent aliens fromhaving a
strangle hold uponoureconomic life. But in so doing the legislature did not intendto
deprive aliens oftheirmeans oflivelihood.This is clearly pointed out in the explanatory
note ofthe law: .
This bill proposesto regulate the retailbusiness.Its purpose is to prevent
personswho are not citizens ofthe Philippinesfromhaving a strangle holdupon
oureconomic life. If the personswho controlthis vitalartery ofoureconomic
life are those who owe no allegiance to this Republic,who have no profound
devotion to ourfree institutionsandwho have nopermanent statein our
people's welfare,we are not really the masters ofourown country.Allaspects
of ourlife, even ournationalsecurity,will be at the mercy of otherpeople.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose,we do not proposeto deprive
personswho are not citizens ofthe Philippinesoftheirmeans oflivelihood.
While this bill seeks to take away fromthe hands ofpersonswho are not
citizens of the Philippines a powerthat can be wielded to paralyze allaspectsof
ournationallife and endangerournationalsecurity,it respectsexisting rights.
It is in the light ofthis view ofthe Retail Trade Law that the issue was posed whetherthe
prohibition to aliens fromengaging in suchtrade is intendedmerely to ban themfromits
ownership andnot fromits management control oroperation.However,fromthe context
of the law as well as fromthe decision ofthis Court in the Ichongcase,it may be safely
inferred that the nationalization ofthe retailtrade is merely confined to its ownership and
not its management,control,oroperation.Nevertheless,this apparent flawin the Retail
Trade Law cannot be availed ofby an unscrupulousalien as a convenient pretext to
employ in the management ofhis business personsofhis ilk to flout the law or subvert its
nationalistic purpose,forin pari materiawith such lawwe have the Anti-Dummy Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No.134), which seeks "to
punish actsofevasionofthe laws ofnationalization ofcertain rights,franchises or
privileges." Read in connectionwith the RetailTrade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would
punish actsintended to circumvent theprovisionsofthe formerlaw which nationalize the
retail business.
The question that nowarisesis:Is the employment ofaliens in non-controlpositions in a
retail establishment ortrade prohibited bythe Anti-Dummy Law?
Petitioners contend that theiremployment is not prohibited eitherby theRetailTrade
Law orthe Anti-Dummy Law. The three Chinese petitionerstestified that they had
nothing to do with the management andcontrolofthe business,nordo theyparticipate in
its profits outside oftheirmonthly salaries.Theyhad been employed long before the
enactment ofRepublic Act No.1180. They only wait for customers and sellaccording to
the prices appearingon the tagspreviously fixed by theirmanagerMacario King.They
desire to continue in the employ ofMacario King in his businessandtheirjob is their
only means ofearning support forthemselvesandtheirfamilies. Lim Pin who is
employed as buyerdeclared that his duties include no more than buyingthe groceries
appearing in a list prepared and given to himfrom time to time by Macario King,and at
no more than the prices indicated in said list.Respondentsdid not present anyevidence to
contradict these facts,as theymerely relied their motion to dismiss.
It is evident that petitioners'theory is thatsince they donot intervene in the management,
operation,administration orcontrolofthe retailestablishment ofMacario King theyare
not covered bythe Anti-Dummy Law. Indeed,they contend,Section 1ofRepublic Act

15. No. 1180 mirrors the legislative intent to nationalize the retailtrade merely thru the
ownership by Filipinos ofthe business,and as stated bythis Court in the Ichongcase,the
ownership ofthe retailbusinessbynon-citizens lies at the foundationofthe prohibition,
and since there is nothing in the RetailTrade Law which prohibits a Filipino-owned retail
enterprise fromemploying an alien and the dummy law merely limits the prohibition to
any positionthat relatesto management,operation,administration orcontrol,petitioners
contendthattheymay be allowed to continue in theirpositionswithout doing violence to
both the RetailTrade Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. In otherwords, they drawa line of
distinction betweenone classofalien employees occupyingpositionsofcontroland
anotherclassoccupying non-controlpositions.
Respondents,on the otherhand,sustain a different view.They hold that thelanguageof
the Anti-Dummy Law bans aliens'employment in bothcontroland non-controlpositions.
They contendthat thewordsmanagement,operation,administrationand control,
followed by and blended with the words"whetheras an officer,employee orlaborer
therein",signify the legislative intent to coverthe entire scale ofpersonnelactivity sothat
even laborers are excluded fromemployment,the only exemption being technical
personnelwhose employment may be allowed with the previousauthorization ofthe
President.This contention,accordingto respondents,resultsfromthe application ofthe
rule known in statutory construction as redendosingula singulis.This means that the
antecedents"management,operation,administrationand control" andthe consequents
"officer,employee,and laborer" should be read distributively to the effect thateach word
is to be applied to the subject to which it appearsby context most properly relate and to
which it is most applicable (Vol. 2, Sutherland,Statutory Construction,Section4819).
We agree to this contention ofrespondentsnotonly because the context ofthe law seems
to be clear on what its extent and scopeseemto prohibit butalso because the same is in
full accord with the main objective thatpermeatesboth the RetailTrade Law and the
Anti-Dummy Law. The one advocatesthecomplete nationalization ofthe retailtrade by
denying its ownership to any alien,while the otherlimits its management,operation,
administration and controlto Filipino citizens.The prevailing idea is to secure both
ownership andmanagementofthe retailbusinessin Filipino hands.It prohibitsa person
not a Filipino from engaging in retailtrade directly orindirectly while it limits the
management,operation,administration andcontrolto Filipino citizens.These wordsmay
be technically synonymousin the sensethat they allreferto the exercise of a directing,
restraining orgoverning influence overan affairor businessto which theyrelate,but it
cannot be denied thatby readingthemin connection with the positionstherein
enumerated one cannot drawany otherconclusion than that theycoverthe entire rangeof
employment regardlessofwhetherthey involve controlornon-controlactivities.When
the law says thatyoucannotemploy an alien in any positionpertaining to management,
operation,administration andcontrol,"whetheras an officer,employee,orlaborer
therein",it only means one thing:the employment ofa person who is not a Filipino
citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-controlpositionis prohibited.The reason is
obvious:to plug any loophole orclose any avenue that an unscrupulousalien may resort
to flout the law or defeat its purpose,forno one can denythat while one may be
employed in a non-controlpositionwho apparently is harmless he may laterturn out to
be a mere toolto furtherthe evil designsofthe employer.It is imperative that the law be
interpreted in a mannerthat would stave offany attempt at circumvention ofthis
legislative purpose.
In this respect,we agree with the following remark of the SolicitorGeneral: "Summing
up,there is no point in distinguishingemployments in positions ofcontrolfrom
employments in non-controlpositionsexcept to facilitate violations ofthe Anti-Dummy
Law. It does not require ingenuity to realize that the lawis framed up the way we find it
so that no difficulties will be encountered in its enforcement.This is not the first time to
use the words ofthe United StatesSupreme Court ...that a government wants to know,
without being put to a search,thatwhat it forbids is carried out effectively.".
There is an intimation in the decision ofthe trialcourt that ifthe employment ofaliens in
non-controlpositionsis prohibitedas respondents so advocate,it may impair the right of
a citizen underourConstitution to select,pickand employ any onewho in his opinion
may be amenable to his businessprovidedhe is not a criminal, a communist,or affected
by a contagiousdisease,in the same manneras one may not be deprived ofhis right to
associate with people ofhis own choice because those are rightsthat are guaranteed by
ourConstitution.The language ofthe trialcourt on this matterfollows:.
There is no questionthata Filipino citizen has a right underthe Constitution
and the laws ofthis Republic to engage in any lawfulbusiness,to select,pick
and employ anyonewho in his opinion may be amenable,congenial,friendly,
understanding andprofitable to his businessprovidedthattheyare not originals,
say communists,oraffected by some contagiousdisease ormorally unfit. The
right to associate with ourfriends orpeople ofourchoice cannot be seriously
contestedin a democratic formof government.This is one ofthe most
cherished privilegesofa citizen.Nullify it and it will produce a communist
controlofaction in ourfree movement and intercoursewith ourfellow citizens
as nowprevails in Russia and otherSoviet satellites History hasamply
demonstratedthat in countrieswhere personalliberties are limited, curtailed or
hampered,communismthrives; while in the lands where personalliberties are
protected,democracylives.We needbut lookat the horizon and see terrible and
sinistershadows ofsome catastrophic eventsthreateningto annihilate allour
hopes andlove forliberty if we are to traffic with ourrights as citizens like any
otherordinary commodities.It is oursacred and bounden dutyto protect
individualrights so thatby theirbenigninfluencerealdemocracy may be
nurtured to fullmaturity.
x x x x x x x x x
There is no need ofany lengthy discussion asto the rightsofa Filipino citizen
to employ any person in his businessprovided the latteris not a criminal,
affected with some contagious disease,ora recognized human derelict.The
right to employ is the same as the right to associate.The right to associate is
admittedly one ofthe most sacred privilegesofa Filipino citizen. If a Filipino
citizen has the right to employ any personin his business,has a naturalized
citizen the same rights? We hold andsustain that underthe Constitutionand
laws of this country,there is no difference between a natural-born citizen and a

16. naturalized citizen, with the possible exception,as providedby the Constitution,
that while the former can be President,Vice-President ormemberof Congress,
the lattercannot.But outside ofthese exceptions,they have thesame rights and
privileges.
It is hard to see howthe nationalization ofemployment in the Philippines can run counter
to any provision ofourConstitutionconsideringthat its aimis not exactly to deprive
citizen of a right that he may exercise underit but ratherto promote enhance andprotect
those that are expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness.The nationalization ofan economic measure when foundedon groundsof
public policy cannot be branded asunjust,arbitrary oroppressive orcontrary to the
Constitution because its aimis merely to furtherthe material progress and welfare ofthe
citizens of a country.This is what we expressed in no uncertain terms in the IchongCase
when we declared constitutionalthe nationalization ofthe retailtrade.Indeed,we said
there that it is a law "clearly in the interest ofthe public,nay ofthe nationalsecurity
itself, and indisputability falls within the scope police power,thru which and by which
the State insuresits existence andsecurityand the supreme welfare of its citizens." True,
this fundamentalpolicy was expressed in a decision the subject ofwhich concernsthe
constitutionality ofthe RetailTrade Act,but since the Anti-Dummy Law is but a mere
complement of the former in the sense thatit is designedto make effective its aims and
purposesand bothtendto accomplishthe same objective eitherby excluding aliens from
owning any retailtrade orby banning theiremployment if the trade is owned by
Filipinos,and the target ofboth is "theremovaland eradicationofthe shacklesofforeign
economic controland domination"thru the nationalization ofthe retailtrade both in
ownership andemployment,the pronouncement made in one regarding its
constitutionality applies equally ifnot with greaterreason to theotherbothbeing
complementary one to the other.Indeed,in nationalizing employment in retailtrade the
right of choice ofan employeris not impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the
citizens to the exclusion ofthose ofothernationalities.
We note that the case citedby the trialcourt to substantiate its conclusion that freedomto
employ is guaranteed byourConstitutionis Meyerv.Nebraska, 67Law Ed. 1042, which
is also the same case relied upon bypetitionersin support oftheirpropositionthat"the
liberty guaranteed by theConstitutionincludestheright to engage in any ofthe common
occupationsoflife".We also note thatthis is the same case cited by counselforLao
Itchong to support the same proposition in his advocacy ofthe unconstitutionality ofthe
nationalization ofthe RetailTrade Law which did not deservefavorable consideration by
this Court in the Itchongcase.To refute counsel's argumentthatthe retailtrade is a
common occupationthe pursuit ofwhich cannot be impaired and consequently the right
to employ therein is guaranteed by ourConstitution,suffice it to state thatwe brushed
aside such theory in the Itchong case in viewofthe monopolistic controlexercised by
aliens in the retail businessandtheir"deadly strangle hold on the nationaleconomy
endangering thenationalsecurity in times ofcrisis and emergency".The circumstances
surroundingthe enforcement ofthe RetailTrade Law being the very foundation ofthe
Anti-Dummy Law the same circumstancesthat justify the rejection ofcounsel's
proposition in the Itchongcaseshould also apply with regard to the application ofthe
Meyercase in the considerationofthe constitutionality ofthe Anti-Dummy Law.
The thinking ofthe lower court that the nationalization ofemployment in retail trade
producescommunistic controlorimpairs a right guaranteedby the Constitution to a
citizen seems to have as basisits pronouncement that "the right to employ is the same as
the right to associate".This promise hasno foundation in lawfor it confusesthe right of
employment with the right of association embodiedin the Bill of Rights ofour
Constitution.Section1,paragraph 6,ofsaid Bill of Rights,providesthat "the right to
form associationsorsocieties forpurposesnotcontrary to law,shallnot be abridged",
and this has as its main purpose "to encourage the formation ofvoluntaryassociationsso
that thru the cooperative activities ofindividuals thewelfare ofthe nation may be
advanced."1
Petitioners have neverbeendenied the right to formvoluntaryassociations.
In fact,they can so organize to engage in any businessventure oftheirown choosing
provided thattheycomply with the limitations prescribedby ourregulatorylaws.These
laws cannot be assailed asabridgingourConstitutionbecausetheywere adoptedin the
exercise ofthe police powerof the State (Lao Itchong case,supra).
Against the charge thatthis nationalization movement initiated by Congressin
connection with severalmeasuresthat affect the economic life of ourpeople places the
Philippines in a unique position in the free world,we have only to cite the cases
of Commonwealthv.Hans, 81 N.E. 149, and Bloomfieldv.State,99N.E. 309, which this
Court consideredas basic authorities fornationalization oflegislative measuresin the
Lao Ichong case.Similar laws had been declared constitutionalby the Supreme Court of
California and the United StatesSupreme Court in a series ofcasesinvolvingcontracts
underthe Alien Land Law, and because ofthe similarities ofthe facts and laws involved
therein we can considerthe decisionsrendered in said casesofpersuasive force andeffect
in the determination ofthe presentcase.2
We wish to add one word with regard to the proceduralaspect raised in respondents'
brief. It is respondents'theorythata complaint fordeclaratory relief will not prosperif
filed after a contract orstatute has been breached.The lawdoes not even require that
there shallbe an actualpendingcase.It is sufficient that there is a breach ofthe law,or an
actionable violation,to bara complaint for declaratory judgment (Vol.2, Moran,
Comments on the Rules ofCourt, 1957 Ed., 145). The pertinent provisionsofthe Anti-
Dummy Law postulatethataliens cannot be employedby Filipino retailers except for
technicalpositionswith previousauthorityofthe President,and it is contended that
Macario King had in his employ his Chinese co-petitionersfora period ofmore than 2
years in violation ofSection 2-A of Republic Act No.134. Hence,respondents contend,
due to theirbreach ofthe law petitionershaveforfeited theirright to file the present
action fordeclaratory relief.
It appears,however,that alien petitioners were already in the employ ofthe establishment
known as "Import Meat and Produce" previously ownedby the Philippine Cold Stores,
Inc. when Macario King acquired theownership ofsaid establishment andbecauseofthe
doubt he entertained asregardsthescopeofthe prohibitionofthe lawKing wrote the
President ofthe Philippines to request permissionto continuesaid petitioners in his
employment,and immediately afterthe requestwas denied,he instituted the present
petition fordeclaratory relief.It cannot,therefore,be said that King has alreadybreached
the law when he filed the present action..

17. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed fromis reversed.This preliminary injunction
issued by thetrialcourt on December6, 1958 is hereby lifted.The petition formandamus
is dismissed,with costsagainstappellees.
Bengzon,C.J.,Labrador,Concepcion,Reyes,J.B.L.,Barrera,Paredes,Dizon andDe
Leon,JJ.,concur.
Padilla,J.,took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August2,1991
B/GEN. JOSECOMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE
LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August2,1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY
A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,Branch104,REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August2,1991
B/GEN. JOSECOMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M),
LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO
FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA,
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA,
CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY
A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14,respondents.
No. 97454 August2,1991

18. AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL
MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch86,CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A.
BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T.
MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC,
2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M.Marceloand RainierL.Madridfor petitionersLuisito Sanchez,Tiburcio
Fusillero,EricsonAurelio,LevinoValencia,DaniloArnon Vergel Nacino,Florencio
Flores,Benigno JunioandJoey Sarroza.
Manuel Q.MalvarforRafael Galvezand Danny Lim.
Manuel E.ValenzuelaforArsenio Tecson
Mariano R.Santiago forAlfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M.Rivera forManuelIson.
Castillo,Laman,Tan andPantaleonforDanilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro forRomelino Gojo.
Manuel A.Barcelona,Jr.forJose Comendador.
JonathanB.S.Rebong and Efren C.Carag forMarcelo Blando.
PablitoV.SanidadforFranklin BrawnerandEricsonAurelio.
Efren C. MoncupaforAll Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & AssociatesforrespondentsLigot and Ison .
BaldomeroS.P.Gatbonton,Jr.forJacinto Ligot.
SalvadorB.BritanicoforCesarde la Pena.
Gilbert R.T.Reyesfor Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile,Cayetano,Reyes& Manalastasforpetitionersin G.R.No.93177.
The SolicitorGeneral forrespondents.
CRUZ, J.:p
These fourcases have been consolidatedbecause theyinvolvepractically the same
parties and related issues arisingfromthe same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos.93177 and 96948 and the private respondentsin G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454 are officers ofthe Armed Forces ofthe Philippines facing prosecution
for theiralleged participation in the failed coup d' etat thattookplace on December1to
9, 1989.
The charges against themare violation ofArticles ofWar(AW)67 (Mutiny),AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officerand a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised PenalCode (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari,prohibitionand mandamus,they are
questioningthe conductofthe Pre-Trial Investigation PTIPanelconstitutedto investigate
the charges against themand the creationofthe GeneralCourt MartialGCM convenedto
try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners,besides challenging the legality ofGCM No.14,
seekcertiorari againstits ruling denying themthe right to peremptory challengeas
granted by Article 18of Com. Act No.408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders ofthe respondentjudge ofthe RegionalTrial Court of
Quezon City are assailed oncertiorari onthe groundthathe has nojurisdictionover
GCM No. 14 and no authority eitherto setasideits ruling denyingbailto the private
respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also soughtagainstthe decisionofthe RegionalTrial
Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeascorpus directing the release ofthe private
respondents.Jurisdictionalobjections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the chargeswere referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial InvestigationPTIPanelhad
been constituted pursuant to Office OrderNo. 16 dated January 14,1990, to investigate
the petitionersin G.R. Nos.93177 and 96948. The PTI Panelissued a uniformsubpoena
dated January 30,1990, individually addressedto the petitioners,to wit:
You are hereby directedto appearin personbefore theundersigned
Pre-Trial InvestigatingOfficers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m.at Kiangan
Hall,Camp Crame Quezon City,then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and theaffidavitsofyourwitnesses,ifany,in the
pre-trial investigation ofthe charge/chargesagainstyouforviolence of
AWs _______________.DONOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementionedcounter-affidavitson the date
above specified shallbe deemed a waiver ofyourright to submit
controvertingevidence.
On the same date,the petitionersacknowledged receiptofa copy ofthe charge sheet,
sworn statementsofwitnesses,and death and medicalcertificates ofvictims ofthe
rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing,the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
grounds,promptingthe PTIPanelto grant them10 days within which to file their
objectionsin writing This was done througha MotionforSummary Dismissaldated
February 21, 1990.

19. In a resolutiondated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5days fromnotice to submit theirrespective counter-affidavitsand the
affidavits oftheirwitnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved forreconsiderationofthe foregoing
denialand the PTIPanel gave them7 days within which to reduce theirmotion to
writing. This was done on March14,1990.
The petitioners nowclaimthat there was no pre-trialinvestigation ofthe chargesas
mandated by Article ofWar71, which provides:
Art.71. ChargesAction upon.— Charges andspecificationsmust be
signed by a person subject to military law, and underthe oath either
that he has personalknowledge of,orhas investigated,the matters set
forth therein and that thesame are true in fact, to the best ofhis
knowledge and belief.
No charge willbe referred to a general court-martialfortrial until
after a thoroughandimpartial investigationthereofshallhavebeen
made.Thisinvestigationwill include inquiriesasto the truthofthe
matterset forth in said charges,formofcharges,and what disposition
of the case shouldbe made in the interest ofjustice anddiscipline.At
such investigationfull opportunityshallbe given to the accused to
cross-examinewitnessesagainst himifthey are available andto
present anything he may desire in hisown behalf,eitherin defense or
mitigation,and the investigating officershall examineavailable
witnessesrequestedby the accused.Ifthe chargesare forwardedafter
such investigation,theyshallbe accompaniedby a statement ofthe
substance ofthe testimony takenon both sides.(Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initialhearing ofthe chargesconsisted merely ofa roll call and
that no prosecutionwitnesseswere presented to reaffirmtheir affidavits.while the motion
for summary dismissalwas denied,the motion forreconsideration remains unresolved to
date and they have not beenable to submit theircounter-affidavits.
At the hearing ofMay 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they
were exercising theirright to raise peremptory challengesagainst the presidentand
members ofGCM No.14. They invoked Article 18of Com. Act No.408 for this purpose.
GCM No. 14 ruled,however,that peremptory challengeshad beendiscontinued under
P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied forbail on June 5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No.14. He thereuponfiled with the RegionalTrial Court ofQuezon
City a petition forcertiorari and mandamus with prayerforprovisionalliberty and a writ
of preliminary injunction.Afterconsidering the petitionand the answer thereto filed by
the presidentand members ofGCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an
ordergranting provisionalliberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibusmotion to enforcethe orderforhis
release and to declare in contempt the commanding officerofthe PC/INP Jail for disobey
'ng the said order.He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had
refused to release him"pending finalresolutionofthe appealto be taken" to thisCourt.
Afterhearing,the trialcourt reiterated its orderforthe provisionalliberty ofLigot,as
well as ofintervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecsonand Maj.Alfredo
Oliveros,and laterof additionalintervenorsLtc Romelino Gojo and Capt.ManuelIson.
On August22,1990, the trial court rendered judgment interalia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13,Article III of the Constitutiongranting
the right to bail to all personswith the definedexception is applicable
and covers allmilitary men facing court-martialproceedings.
Accordingly,the assailed ordersofGeneralCourt- MartialNo. 14
denying bailto petitionerandintervenors onthe mistaken assumption
that baildoes not apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedingson the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set
aside and declared nulland void.Respondent GeneralCourt-Martial
No. 14 is hereby directed to conductproceedings onthe applications
of bail of the petitioner,intervenorsand which may as well include
otherpersonsfacing chargesbefore GeneralCourt-MartialNo.14.
Pending the proceedingson the applications forbailbefore General
Court-MartialNo.14, this Court reiterates its ordersofrelease on the
provisionalliberty ofpetitionerJacinto Ligot as wellas intervenors
Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondentsin G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition forhabeascorpusonthe ground that theywere being detainedin Camp Crame
without charges.The petition was referred to theRegionalTrialCourt of Quezon City,
where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P.Solano.Finding afterhearing that no
formal charges hadbeenfiled against thepetitionersaftermore than a yearaftertheir
arrest,the trial court ordered theirrelease.
II
The Court has examined the records ofthis case andrules as follows.
It appears that the petitionersin G.R. Nos.93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunitiesto present theirside at the pre-trialinvestigation,first at the scheduled
hearing ofFebruary 12, 1990, and then again afterthe denialoftheirmotion of February
21, 1990, when they were given untilMarch 7,1990, to submit theircounter-affidavits.
On that date,theyfiled instead a verbalmotion forreconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13,1990. The motion was in effect
denied when the PTIPanelresolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the
General Court Martial for trial.

20. The said petitionerscannot nowclaimthey have been denieddue processbecausethe
investigation was resolved against themowing to theirown failure to submit their
counter-affidavits.They hadbeenexpressly warned In the subpoena sent themthat
"failure to submit the aforementionedcounter-affidavitson the dateabove specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."They chose not to
heed the warning.As theirmotions appearedto be dilatory,the PTIPanelwas justified in
referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting forthe petitionersto submit their
defense.
Due processis satisfiedas long as the partyis accorded an opportunityto be heard.Ifit is
not availed of,it is deemed waived orforfeited without violation ofthe Bill of Rights.
There was in ourviewsubstantialcompliance with Article ofWar71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover,it is nowsettled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trialinvestigation does
not deprive a generalcourt-martialof jurisdiction." We soheld in Arula v.Espino,1
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trialinvestigationdoesnot deprive
a generalcourt-martialofjurisdiction.
The betteracceptedconcept ofpre-trialinvestigationis that it is
directory,not mandatory,andin no way affects the jurisdictionof a
court-martial.In Humphrey v.Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986
(1949), the Court said:
We do not thinkthat the pre-trialinvestigation
procedure by Article 70(The Philippine counter-
part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408)
can properly be construedas an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise ofthe Army General court
martial jurisdiction..The Article does serve
important functionsin the administration ofcourt-
martial proceduresanddoesprovide safeguardsto
an accused.Its languageis clearly such that a
defendant could object to trialin the absence ofthe
required investigation.In that event thecourt-
martial could itselfpostpone trialpendingthe
investigation.And themilitary reviewing
authorities could considerthe same contention,
reversing a court-martial convictionwhere failure
to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured
an accused.But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void becausepre-trial
investigations fallshort ofthe standards prescribed
by Article 70. That Congresshasnotrequired
analogous pre-trialprocedure forNavy court-
martial is an indication that theinvestigatory plan
was not intendedto be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly afterenactment ofArticle 70 in 1920 the
Judge AdvocateGeneralofthe Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trialinvestigation,
court-martialproceedingswere void ab initio.But
this holding hasbeen expressly repudiatedin later
holdings ofthe Judge Advocate General.This later
interpretationhasbeen that thepre-trial
requirements ofArticle 70 are directory,not
mandatory,and in no way effect the jurisdiction of
a court-martial.The WarDepartment's
interpretationwas pointedly called to the attention
of Congressin 1947 afterwhich Congressamended
Article 70 but left unchanged thelanguage here
underconsideration.compensable pre-requisite to
the exercise of Army generalcourt-martial
jurisdiction
A trial before a generalcourt-martialconvened without anypretrial
investigation underarticle ofwar 71 would of course be altogether
irregular but the court-martialmight nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly,this rule is similar to the one obtainingin criminal
procedure in the civilcourts to the effect that absenceofpreliminary
investigation doesnotgo into the jurisdiction ofthe court but merely
to the regularity ofthe proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct ofthe preliminary investigation,that issue was
resolved more than two yearsago in Kapunan v.De Villa, 2
where we declared:
The Court finds that,contrary to the contentionofpetitioners,there
was substantialcompliance with the requirementsoflaw as provided
in the Articles ofWarand P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D.No. 911.
The amended charge sheets,charging petitionersand theirco-
respondentswith mutiny and conductunbecoming an officer,were
signed by Maj.Antonio Ruiz,a person subject to military law, afterhe
had investigated the matterthrough an evaluation ofthe pertinent
records,including thereportsofrespondent AFPBoard ofOfficers,
and was convinced ofthe truthofthe testimonieson record.The
charge sheetswere sworn to by Maj.Ruiz, the "accuser," in
accordance with and in the mannerprovidedunderArt.71of the
Articles ofWar.Considering thatP.D.No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911, is only ofsuppletory application,the fact that the charge

21. sheetswere not certified in the mannerprovided undersaid decrees,
i.e., that the officeradministering the oathhaspersonally examined the
affiant and that he is satisfied thattheyvoluntarily executed and
understoodits affidavit,doesnot invalidate said chargesheets.
Thereafter,a "pretrialinvestigation" was conducted by respondent
Maj. Baldonado,wherein,pursuant to P.D.No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaedand required to file their
counter-affidavit.However,insteadofdoing so,they filed an untitled
pleading seeking thedismissalofthe chargesagainst them.That
petitioners were not able to confrontthe witnesses against themwas
theirown doing,for they nevereven asked Maj.Baldonado to
subpoena said witnessesso that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questionsin accordancewith P.D, No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners alsoallege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitutein accordance with
Article 8 of the Articles ofWarbecauseGeneralOrderNo. M-6, which supposedly
convened thebody,was notsigned byGen. Renato de Villa as Chief ofStaff.
Article of WarNo. 8 reads:
Art.8. General Courts-Martial.— The Presidentofthe Philippines,
the Chief of Staff ofthe Armed Forces ofthe Philippines,the Chiefof
Constabulary and,when empoweredby the President,the
commanding officerof a major command ortaskforce,the
commanding officerof a division,the commanding officerofa
military area, the superintendent ofthe Military Academy,the
commanding officerof a separatebrigade orbody oftroopsmay
appoint generalcourts-martial; but whenany suchcommanderis the
accuserorthe prosecutorofthe person orpersonsto be tried,the court
shallbe appointedby superiorcompetent authority....
While it is true that GeneralOrder No. M-6 was not signedby Gen. De Villa, there is no
doubt thathe authorized it becausethe orderitselfsaid it was issued"By Command of
General De Villa" and it has not beenshownto be spurious.As observed by theSolicitor
General, the Summary DispositionFormshowed that Gen.De Villa, as Chief of Staff,
AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president andmembers.It is
significant that GeneralDe Villa has not disauthorized orrevoked orin any way
disowned thesaid order,as he would certainly havedone ifhis authority hadbeen
improperly invoked.On the contrary,as the principalrespondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustainedGeneralOrderNo. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the otherrespondents
by the SolicitorGeneral.
Coming nowto the right to peremptory challenge,we note thatthis was originally
provided forunderArticle 18of Com. Act No.408 (Articles ofWar),as amended by
Rep. Act No.242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art.18. Challenges.— Members ofgeneralorspecialcourts-martial
may be challenged by the accused orthe trialjudge advocateforcause
stated to thecourt.The court shalldetermine the relevancy and
validity thereof,and shallnot receive a challenge to more than one
member at a time. Challenges by the trialjudge advocate shall
ordinarily be presented anddecidedbefore thoseby the accusedare
offered.Each side shallbe entitled to the peremptory challenge,but
the law member of the court shallnot be challengedexcept forcause.
The history ofperemptory challenge was tracedin Martelinov.Alejandro,3
thus:
In the early formative years ofthe infant Philippine Army,after the
passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No.1 (otherwise known as the
NationalDefense Act),except fora handfulofPhilippine Scout
officers and graduatesofthe United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army,there was a
complete dearth ofofficers learned in military law, its aside fromthe
fact that the officercorps ofthe developingarmy was numerically
made equate forthe demands ofthe strictly military aspectsofthe
nationaldefense program.Because oftheseconsiderationsit was then
felt that peremptory challengesshould not in the meanwhile be
permitted and that only challengesforcause,in any number,would be
allowed.Thus Article 18 of the Articles ofWar(Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September14, 1938, the date ofthe approval
of the Act,made no mention orreference to any peremptorychallenge
by eitherthe trial judge advocate ofa court-martial orby the accused.
AfterDecember17,1958, when the ManualforCourts-Martialofthe
Philippine Army became effective,the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing andintensive
programof training and educationin military law, encompassingthe
length and breadthofthe Philippines.This programwas pursueduntil
the outbreakofWorld War11in the Pacific on December7, 1941.
Afterthe formal surrenderofJapan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps ofthe Armed Forces ofthe Philippines hadexpandedto a very
large number, and a great many ofthe officers had been indoctrinated
in military law. It was in these environmentalcircumstancesthat
Article of War18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side"
to one peremptory challenge,with the sole provisothat"the law
member ofcourt shallnot be challengedexcept forcause.
On September27,1972, President Marcosissued GeneralOrderNo. 8, empowering the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide casesof
military personneland such othercasesasmay be referred to them.
On November7,1972, he promulgated P.D.No.39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition,Jurisdiction,Procedure,andothermatters relevant to military Tribunals).
This decree disallowed the peremptorychallenge,thus:

22. No peremptory challenge shallbe allowed.Challenges forcausemay
be entertained to insure impartiality and goodfaith.Challengesshall
immediately be heard and determined bya majority of the members
excluding the challenged member.A tie vote doesnot disqualify the
challenged member.A successfully challengedmembershallbe
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President MarcospromulgatedP.D.No. 1498, orthe NationalSecurity
Code,which was a compilation and codification ofdecrees,generalorders,LOI and
policies intended"to meet the continuingthreatsto the existence,security andstability of
the State." The modified rule on challenges underP.D.No. 39 was embodied in this
decree.
On January 17,1981, President MarcosissuedProc.No.2045 proclaiming the
termination ofthe state ofmartial law throughoutthe Philippines.The proclamation
revoked GeneralOrder No. 8 and declared the dissolutionofthe military tribunals created
pursuant theretoupon finaldetermination ofthe casespending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General OrderNo. 8 and the othergeneralorders
mentioned therein.With thetermination ofmartial law and the dissolutionofthe military
tribunals createdthereunder,the reason forthe existence ofP.D.No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon ofstatutory constructionthat when thereason ofthe lawceases,the
law itself ceases.Cessanteratione legis,cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressedin
the maxim ratio legisest anima:the reasonoflawis its soul.
Applying these rules,we hold that the withdrawalofthe right to peremptory challenge in
L P.D. No.39 became ineffective when the apparatusofmartial law was dismantled with
the issuance ofProclamation No.2045, As a result,the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No.408 was automatically revived and nowagain allows the right to
peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn underP.D.No. 39. To repeat foremphasis,this decreewas
itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17,1981. Indeed,even ifnot so
withdrawn,it could stillbe consideredno longeroperative,having beencast outunder
the newdispensationas,in the words ofthe FreedomConstitution,one ofthe "iniquitous
vestigesofthe previousregime.
The military tribunalwas one ofthe most oppressive instrumentsofmartial law. It is
curious that thepresent government should invoke the rules ofthat discredited bodyto
justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognitionofthe right to peremptory challenge may be
exploited by a respondent in a court-martialtrial to delay the proceedingsand deferhis
deservedPunishment.It is hoped thatthe accusedofficers in the cases at barwill not be
so motivated.At any rate,the wisdomofCom. Act No.408, in the light of present
circumstances,is a matteraddressedto the law-makers and not to thisCourt.The
judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws withoutregard to its own misgivingson
theiradverse effects.This is a problemonly the politicaldepartmentscan resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos.95020 and 97454 question thepropriety ofthe petitionfor
certiorari and mandamus and the petitionfor habeascorpus filed by the private
respondentswith the RegionalTrial Courts ofQuezon City.It is argued that since the
private respondentsare officers ofthe Armed Forces accused ofviolationsofthe Articles
of War,the respondentcourtshave noauthorityto ordertheirrelease andotherwise
interfere with the court-martialproceedings.
The petitioners furthercontendthat underSec.9(3) ofBP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is
vested with "exclusiveappellate jurisdictionoverallfinal judgments,decisions,
resolutions,orders,orawards ofRegionalTrialCourts and quasi-judicialagencies,
instrumentalities,boardsorcommissions."Ratherirrelevantly,the petitionersalso cite
the case ofYang v.Court ofAppeals 4
where this Court held that "appeals fromthe
ProfessionalRegulation Commission are nowexclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.
It should be notedthatthe aforecited provisionandthe case cited referto ordinary
appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accusedofficers before the respondent
courts.
In Martelino,we observed asfollows:
It is true that civilcourts as a rule exercise no supervision orcorrecting
poweroverthe proceedings ofcourts-martial,and that mere errors in
theirproceedingsare not open to consideration.The single inquiry,the
test,is jurisdiction.But it is equally true that in the exercise of their
undoubted discretion,courts-martialmay commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the languageofRule 65 is referred to as "grave
abuse ofdiscretion" — as to give rise to a defect in theirjurisdiction.
This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature
as one forcertiorari and prohibition ....
The RegionalTrial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court ofAppeals andthe
Supreme Court overpetitions for certiorari,prohibition ormandamus against inferior
courts and otherbodiesand onpetitionsforhabeascorpus andquowarranto.5 In the
absence ofa law providing that the decisions,ordersandruling ofa court-martial orthe
Office ofthe Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court ofAppeals and the
Supreme Court,we hold that the RegionalTrial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bailinvoked by the private respondentsin G.R. Nos.95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
the generalrule embodied in the Bill of Rights.This much was suggestedin Arula,where

23. we observed that "the right to a speedytrialis given more emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist.
The justification forthis exception was wellexplained by the SolicitorGeneral as
follows:
The unique structure ofthe military should be enoughreason to
exempt military men from the constitutionalcoverage on the right to
bail.
Aside fromstructuralpeculiarity,it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the frameworkof democratic system,are
allowed the fiduciary use offirearms by the governmentforthe
discharge oftheirdutiesand responsibilities and are paid out of
revenuescollectedfromthe people.Allotherinsurgent elementscarry
out theiractivities outsideofand against theexisting politicalsystem.
xxx xxx xxx
Nationalsecurity considerationsshould also impress uponthis
Honorable Court that release on bailofrespondents constitutesa
damaging precedent.Imagine a scenario ofsay 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets ofthe Metropolis on bail,orif the assailed July
25,1990 Order were sustained,on "provisional" bail.The sheer
numberalone is already discomforting.But,the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume theirheinousactivity which
could very well result in the overthrowofduly constitutedauthorities,
including this Honorable Court,and replace the same with a system
consonant with theirown conceptofgovernment andjustice.
The argument that denialfromthe military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clauseis not acceptable.This guarantyrequiresequaltreatment only of
personsorthingssimilarly situated anddoesnot apply where the subject ofthe treatment
is substantially different fromothers.The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bailand othermembers ofthe military are not.But they cannot say they have been
discriminated againstbecausetheyare not allowed the same right that is extendedto
civilians.
On the contention ofthe private respondentsin G.R. No.97454 that they had notbeen
charged aftermore than one yearfromtheirarrest,ourfinding is that there was
substantialcompliance with the requirements ofdue processandthe right to a speedy
trial.
The petition forhabeascorpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991,
and was referred to the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and
decision.It was heard on February26,1991, by the respondentcourt,where the
petitioners submitted thechargememorandumand specificationsagainstthe private
respondentsdatedJanuary 30,1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office OrderNo.
31-91, the PTI panelwas created andinitialinvestigation was scheduled onMarch 12,
1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copiesofthe
charges,charge sheetsand specificationsand were required to submit theircounter-
affidavits on orbefore April11, 1991. There was indeed a delay ofmore than one yearin
the investigationand preparation ofthe chargesagainst the private respondents.
However,this was explained by the SolicitorGeneral thus:
... The AFPSpecialInvestigating Committee was able to complete it
pre-charge investigation only afterone (1)yearbecause hundredsof
officers and thousandsofenlisted men were involved in the failed
coup.Allof them, as well as otherwitnesses,had to be interviewed or
investigated,and these inevitably tookmonthsto finish.The pre-
charge investigation wasrendered doubly difficult by the fact that
those involvedwere dispersedand scattered throughout the
Philippines.In some cases,command units,such asthe Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded.Afterthe chargeswere completed,the
same still had to pass reviewand approvalby the AFPChiefofStaff.
While accepting thisexplanation,the Court neverthelessmust reiterate thefollowing
admonition:
This Court as protectorofthe rights ofthe people,must stressthe
point that ifthe participation ofpetitionerin several coupattempts for
which he is confined on ordersofAdjutantGeneralJorge Agcaoili
cannot be established andno chargescanbe filed against himor the
existence ofa prima facie case warrantingtrialbefore a military
commission is wanting,it behoovesrespondentthenMajorGeneral
Rodolfo Biazon (nowGeneral) to release petitioner.Respondentsmust
also be reminded that even ifa military officer is arrested pursuant to
Article 70 of then Articles ofWar,indefinite confinementis not
sanctioned,as Article 71thereofmandates that immediate stepsmust
be taken to try the person accused orto dissmiss thechargeand release
him. Any officerwho is responsible forunnecessary delay in
investigating orcarrying thecaseto a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martialmay direct. 6
It should be noted,finally,that afterthe decision wasrendered by JudgeSolano on
February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice ofappeal ad cautelamand a motion for
reconsideration,the latterwas ultimately denied,after hearing,on March 4,1991. The
48- hourperiod forappealunderRule 41, Section 18, ofthe Rules of Court did not run
untilafter notice ofsuch denialwas received by the petitionerson March12,1991.
Contrary to the private respondents'contention,therefore,the decisionhad not yet
become final and executory when the specialcivil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed
with this Court on March 12,1991.
III

24. Regarding the proprietyofthe petitionsat bar,it is well to reiterate the following
observationsofthe Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martialinvolvesthe exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW71).A petition for certiorari,in orderto
prosper,must be basedon jurisdictionalgroundsbecause,as long as
the respondentactedwith jurisdiction,any errorcommitted by himor
it in the exercise thereofwill amount to nothing more than an errorof
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only byappeal.Even
an abuse ofdiscretionis not sufficient by itselfto justify the issuance
of a writ ofcertiorari.
As in that case,we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse ofdiscretion orwithout orin excess ofjurisdiction to justify the intervention ofthe
Court and the reversalofthe acts complained ofby the petitioners.Such action is
indicated,however,in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have beendenied,and in G.R. Nos.95020 and 97454, where the
private respondentsshould nothavebeen ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondentsare DIRECTED to allow
the petitionersto exercise the right ofperemptory challenge underArticle 18 of the
Articles ofWar.In G.R. Nos.95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and
the orders ofthe respondent courtsforthe release ofthe privaterespondentsare hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan,C.J.,Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,Gutierrez,Jr.,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,
Padilla,Bidin,Griño-Aquino,Medialdea,RegaladoandDavide,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concurwith the ponenciaofmy esteemed colleague,Mr. Justice Cruz,but Idissent
insofaras he would deny bailto accusedmilitary personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bailto "allpersons"before conviction,with
the only exception of"those charged with offensespunishable by reclusion
perpetuawhen evidence ofguilt is strong." 1
The Charteralso statesthat"[T]he right to
bail shallnot be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2
To deny the
military officers here concernedofthe right to bailis to circumscribe the inclusive
meaning of "all persons" — the coverage ofthe right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up bythe SolicitorGeneralof "a scenario ofsay 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets ofthe Metropolis on bail,orif the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained,on "provisional" bail[t]he sheernumberalone is already discomforting .. .
[b]ut,the truly disquietingthought is that they could freely resume theirheinousactivity
which could very well result in the overthrowofduly constituted authorities,including
this Honorable Court,and replace the same with a systemconsonant with theirown
concept ofgovernment andjustice." 3
But would a scenario of1,000 murderers ordrug
pushersroaming the streetsofthe metropolis justify a denialofthe right to bail? Would
not that darkpicture paintedby the SolicitorGeneralbe reproduced by 1,000"equally
dangerous"elements ofsociety?
We gave bailSenatorEnrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why thepetitioners
should notbe granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition,supposed to be firmly settled,as an argument to
deny bail.I submit,however,that tradition is no argument.First,the Constitutiondoes
not say it.Second, we are a government oflaws,not tradition.
If there are precedentsthatattest to the contrary,Isubmit that a reexamination is in order.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concurwith the ponenciaofmy esteemed colleague,Mr.Justice Cruz,but Idissent
insofaras he would deny bailto accusedmilitary personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bailto "allpersons"before conviction,with
the only exception of"those charged with offensespunishable by reclusion
perpetuawhen evidence ofguilt is strong." 1
The Charteralso statesthat"[T]he right to
bail shallnot be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2
To deny the
military officers here concernedofthe right to bailis to circumscribe the inclusive
meaning of "all persons" — the coverage ofthe right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

25. The picture conjured up bythe SolicitorGeneralof "a scenario ofsay 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets ofthe Metropolis on bail,orif the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained,on "provisional" bail[t]he sheernumberalone is already discomforting .. .
[b]ut,the truly disquietingthought is that they could freely resume theirheinousactivity
which could very well result in the overthrowofduly constituted authorities,including
this Honorable Court,and replace the same with a systemconsonant with theirown
concept ofgovernment andjustice." 3
But would a scenario of1,000 murderers ordrug
pushersroaming the streetsof the metropolis justify a denialofthe right to bail? Would
not that darkpicture paintedby the SolicitorGeneralbe reproduced by 1,000"equally
dangerous"elements ofsociety?
We gave bailSenatorEnrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners
should notbe granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition,supposed to be firmly settled,as an argument to
deny bail.I submit,however,that tradition is no argument.First,the Constitutiondoes
not say it.Second,we are a government oflaws,not tradition.
If there are precedentsthatattest to the contrary,Isubmit that a reexamination is in order.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27,1995
PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
A criminal complaint accusingRodrigo Umpad,alias "Meon"ofthe crime of murder
underArticle 248 ofthe Revised PenalCode was filed by the Philippine NationalPolice
Station Commanderin Bato,Leyte for the fatalshootingofGenaro Tagsip in the
afternoon ofSeptember14, 1987. 1
Afterpreliminary investigationby the office ofthe
provincialfiscal,an information charged Umpad with the crime ofHomicide as follows:
The undersigned Assistant ProvincialFiscalofLeyte accusedRodrigo
Umpad alias "Meon"ofthe crime of Homicide committed as follows:
That on orabout the 14th day ofSeptember1987,
in the Island ofDawahon,Municipality ofBato,
Province ofLeyte,Philippines and within the
preliminary jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court,
the above-named accused,with deliberate intent,
with intent to kill did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot oneGENARO
TAGSIP, with a revolver.38 Cal. Snub Nose Smith
and Wesson (Paltik)which the accused had
provided himselfforthe purpose,thereby causing
and inflicting upon the victimfatalgunshot wound
on his head which was the direct and immediate
cause ofthe deathofGenaro Tagsip.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Hilongos,Leyte,October20,1987.
Upon arraignment,however,the parties,with the acquiescence ofthe Public Prosecutor
and the consent ofthe offended party,enteredinto plea bargaining where it was agreed
that the accusedwould plead guilty to the lesseroffenseofAttempted Homicide instead
of homicide as originally charged in the information,and would incurthe penalty of"four
(4) years,two (2) months and one (1)day of prision correccional asminimum to six (6)
yearofprision correccional maximum as maximum." 2
Consequently,in his decision
promulgated on the 27th ofJune 1990, respondent judgefoundthe accused,Rodrigo

26. Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubtofthe lessercrime ofAttempted Homicide and
sentencedhimto sufferimprisonment offouryears,two months and one dayof prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six years of prision correccionalmaximum, as
the maximum period,exactly in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. 3
On October16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressedto the ChiefJustice andsigned by
Pedro S. Amatan,a brother-in-lawofthe deceased,accusedJudge Vicente Aujero of
gross incompetence,gross ignorance ofthe lawand grossmisconduct,relative to his
disposition ofCrim. Case No. H-223 entitled People v.Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon."In
said letter-complaint,complainant contendsthat the sentenceofrespondent judgefinding
the accused guilty beyondreasonable doubt ofthe lesseroffenseofAttempted Homicide
and not Homicide as charged is proofindicative,"on its face,ofgrossincompetence,
gross ignorance ofthe lawor gross misconduct.
Responding to thecomplaint,respondent Judge assertsthat he relied on Sec.2, Rule 116
of the 1985 Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure,as amended,which allows an accused
individual— with the consent ofthe offendedparty — to plead guilty to a lesseroffense,
regardless ofwhetherornot such offense is necessarily includedin the crime charged,or
is cognizable by a court oflesserjurisdiction.He explains that during the May3,1990
hearing,accused andhis counsel,with the acquiescenceand in the presence ofthe
prosecutor,informed the Court ofthe defendant's desire to plea bargain pursuant to the
aforestated rule.Moreover,he aversthatin a conference on June 27,1990, the wife of the
victim herselfagreed to the accused'splea ofguilty to attemptedhomicide,instead of
homicide as she neededthe monetary indemnityto raise hertwo orphanedchildren.In a
Memorandumdated February5,1993, the Deputy Court Administratorrecommended
that the complaint be dismissed,explaining that:
Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it allows the accusedto plead
guilty to a lesseroffense whetherornot it is included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information,with the consent ofthe
offended partyand the fiscal.In this regard,it is inferred that the fiscal
consented to abbreviate theproceedingsandin ordernot to run the
risk of the accused beingacquitted,because there was noconclusive
evidence to obtain the convictionofthe accusedto the offense charged
in the complaint ofinformation.
It may be stated in this connectionthatunlike in the crime ofmurder
where the accusedmay plead to the lesseroffense ofhomicide,in
homicide a misinterpretation may arise,as in this case,when the
accusedpleadsguilty to attempted homicide,becausehere the fact of
the death ofthe victim,which is the principalelement of the crime is
obliterated.This is specially so because thedecision/sentence doesnot
contain findingsoffact and conclusions oflawbut merely an account
that the accusedpleaded guilty to a lesseroffense andthe penalty
imposed.4
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure,as amended,
allows the accusedin criminal case to plead guilty "tolesseroffense regardlessof
whetherornot it is necessarily includedin the crime charged."The fact ofdeath ofthe
victim forwhich the accused RodrigoUmpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple
logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea ofguilty to the loweroffense
of attempted homicide.The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 ofthe Revised
PenalCode necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.Concededly,hiatus
in the law exists in the case before us,which could eitherlead to a misapprehension of
Section 2 ofRule 116 orto outright confusion.Such a result was itselfrecognized by the
Deputy Court Administratorwhen he recommendedan amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum.
However,the law is not entirely bereft ofsolutionsin such cases.In instanceswhere a
literal application ofa provision oflawwould lead to injustice orto a result so directly in
opposition with the dictatesoflogic and everydaycommon senseas to be
unconscionable,the CivilCode 5 admonishesjudges to take principlesofright and justice
at heart.In case ofdoubtthe intent is to promote right and justice. Fiatjustice ruat
coelum.Stated differently,when a provisionoflawis silent or ambiguous,judgesought
to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge ofconscience.
These are fundamentaltenetsoflaw. In the case at bench,the fact ofthe victim's death,a
clear negation offrustratedorattempted homicide,oughtto have alertedthe judge not
only to a possibly inconsistent result butto an injustice.The failure to recognize such
principles so cardinalto ourbodyoflaws amountsto ignorance ofthe lawand reflects
respondent judge'slackofprudence,ifnot competence,in the performance ofhis duties.
While it is true,as respondentjudge contends,thathe merely applied the rule to the letter,
the palpably incongruousresult ought to have been a "red flag" alerting himof the
possibility ofinjustice.The deathofan identified individual,the gravamen ofthe charge
against the defendant in the criminal case,cannot andshould not be ignored in favorofa
more expedient plea of eitherattempted orfrustratedhomicide.We have held before that
if the law is so elementary,not to knowit orto act as if one does not knowit,constitutes
gross ignorance ofthe law.6
Finally, every judge must be the embodiment ofcompetence,integrity and
independence. 7
A judge should not only be aware ofthe bare outlinesofthe lawbut also
its nuancesand ramifications,otherwise,he would not be able to come up with decisions
which are intrinsically fair. In failing to exercise even ordinary common sense,a judge
could be held administratively liable fora verdict that could in no way be legally or
factually sustained orjustified.
We note,however,that underthe circumstancesofthe case,respondent judge'serroneous
exercise ofhis judicial prerogativewas neithertaintedwith malice norbad faith.The
phraseologyofSec.2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such precisionas to entirely eliminate
possible misinterpretation.This observation is bolstered by thefact that thesame
provision prompted theDepartmentofJustice,on July 31,1990, or three months after
respondent judge tookcognizance ofthe caseon April17, 1990, to issue CircularNo.
35, 8
later amended by CircularNo. 55 dated December11, 1990, clarifying and setting
limitations on the application ofSec.2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondentreached
compulsory retirement age on April5, 1995 aftera long period ofservice in the judiciary

27. entitles himto a certain measure ofleniency.Nonetheless,the caseat benchstands
unique because ofthe potently absurd result ofrespondent'sapplicationofthe law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross
ignorance ofthe lawfor which he is hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision appearin respondent'srecord of
service.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla,Davide,Jr.and Bellosillo,JJ.,concur.
Hermosisima,Jr.,J., is on leave.
Footnotes
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and
again we have decreedthatstatutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes
to be achieved and theevils sought to be remedied. Thusin construing a statute the
reason forits enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intendedscopeand purpose. The court may considerthe spirit
and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE THE
USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTION. - The objective and
purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in
its Enforcement,Providing Penalties forViolations thereof,and forotherpurposes,
which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147,
approvedon 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chineseofadopting scores
of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of
trade.Such a practice almost borderedon the crime of using fictitiousnames which
for obviousreasonscould not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,
rightly or wrongly,claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No.
142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT
TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An alias is a
name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in businesstransactionsin addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and thse are known as
aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION
WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION
TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. - The use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to anotherperson in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench.It is not disputed that
petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,”
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the
letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitionerwas a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an
alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use thatname as his second name in addition to his realname. The use

28. of the name “OscarPerez” was made by petitionerin an isolated transaction where
he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still
be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse himbecause the complaintwas part ofpublic records
hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances. While the act ofpetitioner may be covered by other provisions of
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactionswhich theanti-aliaslaw andits related statutesseekto prevent are not
present here asthe circumstancesare peculiarand distinct fromthosecontemplated
by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction ofwhich the statuteis fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences.Indeed,ourmind cannotrest easy on the proposition that
petitionershould be convictedon a law that does not clearly penalize the act done
by him.
Wherefore,the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner
CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE
COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY
AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. - As C.A. No.
142 is a penalstatute,it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor
of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for
violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known
as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases.”[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of
Cotabato requested theOffice of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation
on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitionerand other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and
others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area.[2]
On 1 August 1989Atty.Francis Palmones,counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office
of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint
against petitioner. Atty.Palmonesthenaskedhis client Ursua to take his letter-requestto
the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman
petitionertalked to OscarPerez and told himthat he was reluctant to personally as k for
the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However,
Perez advised himnot to worry as he could just sign his (Perez)name if everhe would be
required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.[3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was
instructedby the security officer to register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing
down his name petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” after which he was told to
proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He
handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms.
Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he
acknowledged by writing the name “Oscar Perez.”[4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance,
Josefa Amparo,who also worked in the same office. They conversedfor a while then he
left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was
actually petitionerCesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station,
Loida reported the matterto the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner
be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution hadcompleted the presentation of its
evidence,petitionerwithout leave ofcourt filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the localcivil registry was fatalto its cause. Petitionerargued that no
document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of
accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found himguilty of violating Sec. 1 of
C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term
of one (1) yearand one (1) day of prision correccional minimumas minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but
modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate termof one (1) year as minimumto
three (3) years as maximumand a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts his
innocence. He contendsthathe has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No.
6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is “Oscar Perez”
his alias.An alias,according to him,is a term which connotesthe habitualuse ofanother
name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as
“Oscar Perez” and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent ofOscarPerezhimself. It is his position that an essentialrequirement for
a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 has not been complied
with when the prosecutionfailed to prove thathis supposed alias was different fromhis
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in not considering the defensetheory that he was charged under the wrong law.[5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutesare to be construed in the light of the
purposesto be achieved andthe evils sought to be remedied. Thusin construing a statute

29. the reason forits enactmentshould be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intendedscopeand purpose.[6]
The court may considerthe spirit and
reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.[7]
For a clearunderstanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was
allegedly violated by petitioner,and thesurrounding circumstances under which the law
was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are
herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its
amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It
provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonymforliterary purposes,no personshalluse any name
different from the one with which he was christened orby which he has been known
since his childhood,orsuchsubstitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court. The name shallcomprise the patronymic name and one ortwo surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias oraliases shallapply forauthority therefor
in proceedingslike those legally providedto obtain judicialauthorityfora change of
name. Separate proceedingsshallbe had foreach alias,and each newpetitionshallset
forth the originalname and the alias oraliases forthe useofwhich judicialauthority has
been obtained,specifyingthe proceedingsand the dateon which such authority was
granted. Judicialauthorities forthe useofaliases shallbe recorded in the propercivil
registerx x x.
The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4
August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonymsolely forliterary, cinema, television,radio orother
entertainment purposesand in athletic events where theuseofpseudonymis a normally
acceptedpractice,no person shalluse anyname different fromthe one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the localcivil registry orwith which he was baptized
for the first time, or in case ofan alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; orsuchsubstitute name as may have beenauthorized by a
competent court:Provided,That personswhose births have not beenregisteredin any
local civil registry and who have notbeenbaptized,have one yearfromthe approvalof
this act within which to registertheirnames in the civil registry oftheirresidence.The
name shallcomprise the patronymic name and one ortwo surnames.
Sec. 2. Any persondesiring to usean alias shallapply forauthority thereforin
proceedingslike thoselegally providedto obtain judicialauthorityfora change ofname
and no personshallbe allowed to secure such judicialauthority formore than
one alias. The petitionforan alias shallset forth the person’sbaptismaland family name
and the name recorded in the civil registry,if different,his immigrant’s name,if an alien,
and his pseudonym,if he has such namesotherthanhis originalorreal name, specifying
the reason orreasonsforthe desired alias.The judicialauthority forthe use of alias,the
christian name and the alien immigrant’s name shallbe recorded in the properlocalcivil
registry,and no personshalluse any name ornames otherthanhis originalorrealname
unless the same is orare duly recorded in the properlocalcivil registry.
The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No.
3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True
Names, Prescribing the Dutiesofthe Directorof the Bureau of Commerce And Industry
in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes,
which was approvedon 14November1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on
28 November 1934.[8]
The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow -
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed
receipt including receipt fortaxor businessorany written orprinted contract not verified
by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions,anyname usedin connectionwith his business other than his true name, or
keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is
conducted,ifhe is engagedin a business, any sign announcing a firmname or business
name orstyle without first registering such other name, or such firmname, or business
name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with himin such contract agreement,
business transaction, or business xxx.
For a bit of history,the enactmentofC.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily
to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
andaliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime ofusing fictitious names which for obvious reasons could
not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who,rightly orwrongly,claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an
alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and
recorded in the civil register.[9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v.Republic[10]
the Court had occasion to explain the meaning,
concept andill effects ofthe use ofan alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we
ruled –
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner’s use of alias ‘KhengChiau Young’in
addition to his realname ‘Yu Cheng Chiau’would add to more confusion. That he is
known in his business,as managerofthe Robert Reid,Inc.,by the former name,is not
sufficient reasonto allowhimits use. Afterall, petitioneradmitted thathe is known to
his associatesby bothnames.In fact,the Anselmo Trinidad,Inc.,ofwhich he is a
customer,knows himby his real name. Neitherwould the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactionswith government officeswhich required himto
explain why he bore two names,justify the grant ofhis petition,forpetitionercould
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using andsticking only to his realname ‘Yu
Cheng Chiau.’
The fact that petitionerintendsto reside permanently in the Philippines,as shown by his
having filed a petition fornaturalization in Branch V ofthe abovementioned court,argues
the more against the grant ofhis petition,because ifnaturalized as a Filipino citizen,
there would then be no necessity forhis furtherusingsaid alias,as it would be contrary
to the usualFilipino way and practice ofusing only onename in ordinary as well as
businesstransactions. And,as the lowercourt correctly observed,ifhe believes (afterhe
is naturalized)that it would be betterforhim to write his name following the Occidental
method,‘he can easily file a petition forchange ofname,so that in lieu of the name ‘Yu
Kheng Chian,’he can,abandoningthe same,askfor authority to adoptthe name ‘Kheng
Chiau Young.’
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not
shown satisfactory properand reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No.142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition
for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by himpublicly and habitually usually in businesstransactionsin additionto his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by

30. which he is commonly designated byhis fellows and by which they distinguish himbut
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known
as aliases.[11]
Hence,the use ofa fictitious name ora different name belonging to another
person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name fromthat day forth does not fall within
the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitionerintroducedhimselfin the Office ofthe Ombudsman
as “OscarPerez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have
brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while
merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not
an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was
intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of
the name “OscarPerez” was made by petitionerin an isolated transaction where he was
not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse himbecause the complaint was part ofpublic records hence opento inspectionand
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
not constitute an offensewithin the concept ofC.A.No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutesseekto prevent are not present here as the circumstances are
peculiarand distinct fromthose contemplatedby the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142
as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12]
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute,it should be construedstrictly against the State andin favorofthe accused.[13]
The
reason forthis principle is the tendernessof the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
the discretion ofthe court limited.[14]
Indeed,ourmind cannot resteasy on theproposition
that petitionershould be convictedon a law that doesnotclearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decisionof the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner
CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and
Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J.:
In ourpredisposition to discoverthe “originalintent”ofa statute,courtsbecome the
unfeeling pillars of the statusquo. Little do we realize that statutesoreven constitutions
are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition,an Orderbe issuedrestraining
the respondentsfromapplying and enforcing Section113of CentralBank
Circular No. 960;
b.) Afterhearing,judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respectiverightsand dutiesofpetitioners and
respondents;
2.) AdjudgingSection113 ofCentral Bank Circular No. 960 as
contrary to the provisionofthe Constitution,hence void;because
its provision that“Foreign currencydepositsshallbe exempt from
attachment,garnishment,orany otherorderto processofany
court,legislative body,government agencyorany administrative
body whatsoever”
i.) has taken away the right ofpetitioners to have the bank
deposit ofdefendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to
satisfy the judgment renderedin petitioners’favorin
violation ofsubstantive due processguaranteed bythe
Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currencydepositors an undue favorora
class privilege in violation ofthe equalprotection clause of
the Constitution;
iii.) has provideda safe havenforcriminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could
escape civilliability for their wrongfulacts by merely
convertingtheirmoney to a foreign currencyand depositing
it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized
bank.
The antecedents facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each
day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people
living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati

31. Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No.104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account – China Banking Corp.,
US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.
On February 16, 1989, MakatiInvestigating FiscalEdwin G. Condaya filed against
Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases
Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with
preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a
scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped fromjail.
On February 28, 1989, the court grantedthe fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motionforthe
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the
accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated
February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February
22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU
InsuranceCorporation in the amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachmentwas
issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy SheriffofMakati served a Notice ofGarnishment on
China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati,China Banking Corporation invokedRepublic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the
notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati
Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which
has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati,China Banking Corporation,in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
processofany court,legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.
This prompted the counselforpetitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank
in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any
exception orwhethersaid section has been repealed or amended since said section has
rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claimsought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank
responded as follows:
“May 26, 1989
“Ms.Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres.Osmeña Avenue
South AdmiralVillage
Paranaque,MetroManila
“DearMs.Carolino:
“This is in reply to yourletterdated April25, 1989 regarding yourinquiry on
Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
“The cited provisionis absolutein application. It doesnot admit ofany
exception,norhas the same been repealed noramended.
“The purpose ofthe lawis to encourage dollaraccountswithin the country’s
banking systemwhich would help in the development ofthe economy. There
is no intention to renderfutile the basic rightsofa person as was suggestedin
yoursubjectletter. The lawmay be harsh as some perceive it,but it is still the
law. Compliance is, therefore,enjoined.
“Very truly
yours,
(SGD)
AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
D
irector”[1]
Meanwhile,on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for leave
to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled “Karen
Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott.” Summons with the complaint was
published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli
failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7,
1989. Afterhearing the case ex-parte,the court renderedjudgmentin favorofpetitioners
on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby renderedin favorofplaintiffs and against
defendant,orderingthe latter:
“1. To pay plaintiffKaren E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;
“2. To pay herparents,plaintiffs spousesFedericoN.Salvacion,Jr., and
Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each ora total
of P300,000.00 for both ofthem;
“3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
“4. To pay attorney’sfees in an amount equivalent to 25% ofthe totalamount
of damages herein awarded;
“5. To pay litigation expensesof P10,000.00; plus
“6. Costs ofthe suit.
“SO ORDERED.”

32. The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
“The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipaljail of
Makatibut was able to escape therefromon February24,1989 as perreport of
the Jail Warden ofMakatito the Presiding Judge,Honorable ManuelM.
Cosico ofthe RegionalTrial Court of Makati,Branch 136, where he was
charged with fourcounts ofRape and SeriousIllegalDetention (Crim. Cases
Nos.802 to 805). Accordingly,upon motion ofplaintiffs,throughcounsel,
summons was served upondefendant bypublication in the Manila Times,a
newspaperofgeneralcirculation as attestedby the Advertising Managerofthe
Metro Media Times,Inc.,the publisherofthe said newspaper. Defendant,
however,failed to file his answerto the complaint despite thelapse ofthe
period ofsixty (60) days fromthe last publication; hence,uponmotion ofthe
plaintiffs through counsel,defendant was declared in default andplaintiffs
were authorized to presenttheirevidence ex parte.
“In support ofthe complaint,plaintiffs presented aswitnessthe minorKaren
E. Salvacion,herfather,Federico N. Salacion,Jr., a certain JosephAguilarand
a certain Liberato Mandulio,who gave the following testimony:
“Karen tookherfirst yearhigh schoolin St.Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but has
recently transferred to Arellano Universityforhersecond year.
“In the afternoon ofFebruary4,1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair MakatiCinema
Square,with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away herfree time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing hersnackon a concrete bench in front ofPlaza Fair, an American
approached her. She was thenalone because Edna Tangile had already left,and she was
about to go home. (TSN,Aug.15, 1989, pp.2 to 5)
“The American asked hername and introducedhimselfas Greg Bartelli. He sat beside
herwhen he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacherandtold herthat he hasa sister
who is a nurse in New York. His sisterallegedly has a daughterwho is about Karen’sage
and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN,Aug.15, 1989, pp.4-
5).
“The American asked Karen what was herfavorite subjectand she told himit’s
Pilipino. He then invited herto go with himto his housewhere she could teach Pilipino
to his niece. He even gave hera stuffed toyto persuadeherto teach his niece. (Id.,pp.5-
6)
“They walked fromPlaza Fair along Pasong Tamo,turningright to reach the defendant’s
house alongKalayaanAvenue.(Id.,p.6)
“When theyreached the apartment house,Karen noticesthatdefendant’s allegedniece
was not outside the housebut defendant told hermaybe his niece was inside. When
Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house,defendant told hermaybe his niece
was upstairs,and invitedKaren to go upstairs.(Id.,p.7)
“Upon entering thebedroomdefendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous
because his niece was notthere. Defendant got a piece ofcotton cordand tied Karen’s
hands with it,and then he undressedher. Karen cried forhelp but defendant strangled
her. He tooka packing tape and he covered hermouthwith it and he circled it around her
head.(Id., p.7)
“Then,defendant suddenly pushedKaren towards the bed which was just nearthe
door. He tied herfeet and hands spread apart to the bedposts. He knelt in front of her
and inserted his fingerin hersexorgan. She felt severe pain. She tried to shoutbut no
soundcould come out because there were tapes onhermouth. Whendefendant withdrew
his fingerit was full of blood and Karen felt more pain afterthe withdrawalof the finger.
(Id., p.8)
“He then got a JohnsonsBaby Oil and he applied it to his sexorgan as well as to hersex
organ. Afterthat he forced his sexorgan into herbut he was not able to do so. While he
was doing it,Karen found it difficult to breathe and sheperspired a lot while feeling
severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sexorgan a little,
because shecould not see. Karen could not recallhowlong the defendantwas in that
position. (Id.,pp.8-9)
“Afterthat,he stood upand went to thebathroomto wash. He also told Karen to take a
showerand he untiedherhands. Karen could only hearthe sound ofthe waterwhile the
defendant,shepresumed,was in the bathroomwashing his sexorgan. Whenshe tooka
showermore blood came out fromher. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress
because it was full of blood. Afterthe shower,Karen was allowed by defendant to
sleep. She fell asleep because she gottired crying. The incidenthappenedat about 4:00
p.m. Karen had no way ofdetermining the exact time because defendantremoved her
watch. Defendant did notcare to give herfood before she went to sleep. Karen woke up
at about 8:00 o’clock the following morning. (Id., pp.9-10)
“The following day,February 5,1989, a Sunday,afterbreakfast ofbiscuit and coke at
about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant rapedKaren while she was stillbleeding. Forlunch,
they also tookbiscuit and coke. She was rapedforthe secondtime at about 12:00 to 2:00
p.m. In the evening,they hadrice fordinnerwhich defendant had stored downstairs;it
was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like “lugaw”. For the third time, Karen
was raped again during the night. During those three times defendantsucceeded in
inserting his sexorgan but she could not say whetherthe organwas inserted wholly.
“Karen did not see any firearmorany bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her
hands andfeet norput a tape on hermouth anymore butshe did notcry forhelp forfear
that she might be killed; besides,allthose windowsanddoors were closed. Andeven if
she shouted forhelp,nobody would hearher. She was so afraid that if somebody would
hearherand would be able to call a police, it was still possible that asshe wasstillinside
the house,defendant might kill her. Besides,the defendant did notleave that Sunday,
ruling out herchance to callfor help. At nighttime he slept with heragain. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, pp.12-14)

33. “On February 6, 1989, Monday,Karen was rapedthree times,once in the morning for
thirty minutes afterbreakfast ofbiscuits; again in the afternoon; andagain in the
evening. At first,Karen did not knowthat there was a windowbecause everythingwas
covered by a carpet,untildefendant openedthe windowforaroundfifteen minutes orless
to let some air in, and she found that the windowwas covered by styrofoamand
plywood. Afterthat,he again closedthe windowwith a hammer and he put the
styrofoam,plywood,and carpet back. (Id.,pp.14-15)
“That Mondayevening,Karen hada chance to callforhelp,although defendant left but
kept the doorclosed. She went to the bathroomand sawa small windowcovered by
styrofoamand she also spotteda small hole. She steppedon the bowland she cried for
help through the hole. She cried:‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungann’yo akong
makalabasdito. Kinidnap ako!’ Somebodyheardher. It was a woman,probably a
neighbor,but she got angry and said shewas ‘istorbo.’ Karen pleaded forhelp and the
woman told her to sleep and shewill call the police. She finally fell asleep but no
policeman came. (TSN, Aug.15, 1989, pp.15-16)
“She woke up at 6:00 o’clockthe following morning,and she sawdefendantin bed,this
time sleeping. She waited forhimto wake up. When he woke up,he again got some
food but he always kept the doorlocked. As usual,she was merely fed with biscuit and
coke. On that day,February 7,1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about
6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about8:30 – 9:00, and the third was afterlunch at 12:00
noon. Afterhe had raped herforthe second time he left but only fora short while. Upon
his return,he caught hershouting forhelp but he did not understand what she was
shouting about. Aftershewas raped the third time,he left the house. (TSN,Aug.15,
1989, pp.16-17) She again went to the bathroomand shouted forhelp. Aftershouting
for about five minutes,she heard many voices. The voices were asking forhername and
she gave hername as Karen Salvacion. Aftera while, she heard a voice ofa woman
saying theywill just call the police. They were also telling her to change her
clothes. She went fromthe bathroomto the roombut she did notchangeherclothes
being afraid that should the neighborscallthe police and the defendantsee herin
different clothes,he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt ofthe
American bacausethe latterwashedherdress. (Id.,p.16)
“Afterwards,defendant arrived and openedthe door. He asked herif she had asked for
help because there were many policemen outside andshe denied it. He told herto change
herclothes,and she did change to the one she was wearing onSaturday. He instructed
herto tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs buthe
locked the door. She could hearpeople conversing but she could not understandwhat
they were saying. (Id.,p.19)
“When she heardthe voices ofmany people who were conversingdownstairs,she
knocked repeatedly at the dooras hard as she could. She heard somebodygoingupstairs
and when the doorwas opened,she sawa policeman. The policeman asked hername and
the reason why she was there. She told himshe was kidnapped. Downstairs,he saw
about five policemen in uniformand the defendantwas talking to them. ‘Nakikipag-
areglo po sa mga pulis,’Karen added. “The policeman told himto just explain at the
precinct. (Id., p.20)
“They went out ofthe house and she sawsome ofherneighbors in front ofthe
house. Theyrode the carofa certain personshecalled Kuya Boy togetherwith
defendant,the policeman,and two ofherneighborswhomshe called Kuya Bong Lacson
and one Ate Nita. They were broughtto Sub-StationIand there she was investigatedby
a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., herfatherarrived,followed by hermothertogetherwith
some of theirneighbors. Then they were brought to the secondfloorofthe police
headquarters. (Id.,p.21)
“At the headquarters,she was askedseveralquestionsby the investigator. The written
statement she gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they proceededto the
NationalBureau ofInvestigation togetherwith the investigatorand herparents. At the
NBI, a doctor,a medico-legal officer,examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in
early morning, of the following day when they reachedthe NBI,(TSN, Aug.15, 1989, p.
22) The findings ofthe medico-legal officerhas been marked as Exhibit B.
“She was studying at theSt.Mary’s Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident
but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini,Arellano University,situated
along Taft Avenue,because she was ashamed to be the subject ofconversation in the
school. She first applied fortransferto Jose AbadSantos,Arellano University along Taft
Avenue nearthe Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admissionaftershe told
the schoolthe true reason forhertransfer. The reasonfortheirdenialwas that they might
be implicated in the case. (TSN,Aug.15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
“Afterthe incident,Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with herbrotherand
sisteranymore,and she is always in a state ofshock; shehasbeen absent-mindedand is
ashamed even to goout ofthe house. (TSN,Sept.12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be
restlessorsad. (Id.,p. 11) The fatherprays forP500,000.00 moral damages forKaren
for this shockingexperience which probably,she would alwaysrecalluntilshe reaches
old age,and he is not sure ifshe could everrecoverfromthis experience.” (TSN, Sept.
24, 1989, pp.10-11)
Pursuant to an Ordergranting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the
lapse offifteen (15) days fromthe date of the last publication of the notice of judgment
and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on
Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief fromthis Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that originaljurisdiction
in petitions fordeclaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

34. Petitioners averas heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 providing that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency orany administrative bodywhatsoever.” should be adjudged as unconstitutional
on the groundsthat:1.) it has taken away the right ofpetitionersto havethe bankdeposit
of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has
provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott
since criminal could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting
theirmoney to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account
with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board,in issuingSection 113 of Central
Bank Circular No.960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took
away: a.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the claimsought to be enforced by the
civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57
of the Revised Rules ofCourt; b.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the judgment
credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment
debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the
MonetaryBoard in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power
or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatimfroma portion of R.A. No.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants
exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law
(R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitutionbecause a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to
be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it
applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign
currency depositsfromattachment,garnishment orany otherorderprocess of any court,
is to assure the development andspeedy growth ofthe Foreign Currency Deposit System
and the Offshore Banking Systemin the Philippines; thatanotherreason is to encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits intothe banking institutions thereby placing such
institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in
the Philippines,thusdirectly contributing to the economic development of the country;
that the subject section is being enforcedaccording to the regularmethods of procedure;
and that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent CentralBankfurtheravers that the questioned provision is needed to
promote the public interestand thegeneralwelfare; that the State cannot just stand idly
by while a considerable segment ofthe society suffers fromeconomic distress; that the
State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so
doing personsandproperty may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to
secure the generalwelfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that
Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are
exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as
amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign
currency depositsshallbe exempted from attachment,garnishment,orany other order or
processofany court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons
similar to that ofrespondent CentralBank,also stated that respondent China Bank is not
unmindfulof the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from
the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to release the dollar
deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has
undergone; but it is restrainedfromdoing so in view ofR.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitionerdeserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondentsto honorand comply with the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory
relief.[2]
However,exceptions to this rule have beenrecognized. Thus,where the petition
has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be
treated as one for mandamus.[3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in herbelief that all Americans are good and
in hergesture ofkindnessby teachinghis alleged niece the Filipino language as requested
by the American,trustingly wentwith said stranger to his apartment, and there she was
raped by said American touristGreg Bartelli. Not once,but ten times. She was detained
therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and
avoid punishment. On the otherhand,the child,havingreceived a favorable judgment in
the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount
could alleviate the humiliation,anxiety,and besmirched reputationshe had suffered and
may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had
wronged herhas the money,could not,howeverget theaward ofdamages because ofthis
unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment
and award ofdamages that she and herparents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court
in its decision,
“Indeed,afterhearing the testimony ofKaren,the Court believesthatit was
indoubtedly a shockingand traumatic experience she hadundergone which
could haunt hermind fora long,long time, the mere recall of which could
make herfeel so humiliated,as in fact she had been actually humiliated once
when she was refusedadmission at the AbadSantosHigh School,Arellano
University,where she sought to transferfromanotherschool,simply because
the schoolauthorities ofthe said High Schoollearned aboutwhat happened to
herand allegedly feared that theymight be implicated in the case.
xxx

35. The reason forimposing exemplary or corrective damagesis due to the wanton
and bestialmannerdefendant hadcommitted the actsofrape during a period of
serious illegaldetentionofhis haplessvictim,the minor Karen Salvacion
whose only fault was in herbeing so naive and credulousto believe easily that
defendant,an American national,could nothavesuch a bestialdesire on her
norcapable ofcommitting such heinouscrime. Being only 12 years old when
that unfortunate incident happened,she hasneverheardofan old Filipino
adage that in every forestthere is a snake,xxx.”[4]
If Karen’s sad fate had happened to anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for
him to fathomhow the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important
than his child’s right to said award of damages; in this case, the victim’s claim for
damages fromthis alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country
where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when
the country’s economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably,this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questionedlawstill denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the inquitouseffects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said that-
“But I also know,[5]
that laws and institutionsmust go hand in hand with the
progressofthe human mind. As that becomes more developed,more
enlightened,as newdiscoveries are made,newtruthsare disclosedand
manners and opinionschangewith the change ofcircumstances,institutions
must advancealso,and keep pace with the times… We might as well require a
man to wear still the coat which fitted himwhen a boy,as civilized society to
remain everunderthe regimen oftheir barbarousancestors.”
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition hasfar-reaching implications onthe right ofa nationalto
obtain redressfora wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge undera law
and regulation promulgatedfora purpose which doesnot contemplate the
application thereofenvisagedby the allien. More specifically,the petition
raises the question whetherthe protection against attachment,garnishment or
othercourt process accordedto foreign currency depositsPDNo. 1246 and CB
Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit doesnot come froma lenderor
investorbutfroma mere transient who is not expectedto maintain the deposit
in the bankforlong.
“The resolutionofthis question is important forthe protection ofnationals
who are victimized in the forumby foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
“xxx RespondentsChina Banking Corporation andCentralBankofthe
Philippines refused to honorthe writ ofexecution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214 on the strength ofthe following provision ofCentralBankCircular No.
960:
‘Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment.– Foreign currency
depositsshallbe exempt from attachment,garnishment,orany
otherorderorprocessofany court,legislative body,government
agency orany administrative bodywhatsoever.’
“CentralBank Circular No. 960 was issuedpursuantto Section7of Republic Act No.
6426:
‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board ofthe
CentralBank shallpromulgate such rules andregulations asmay
be necessary to carry out the provisionsofthis Actwhich shall
take effect after the publicationofsuch rulesand regulationsin
the Official Gazette and in a newspaperofnationalcirculation for
at least once a weekfor three consecutive weeks. In case the
CentralBank promulgates newrules and regulationsdecreasing
the rights ofdepositors,therules and regulationsat the time the
deposit was made shallgovern.”
“The aforecited Section113 was copied fromSection 8 of Republic Act No.
6426. As amended by P.D.1246, thus:
‘Sec. 8. Secrecy ofForeign Currency Deposits.--All foreign
currency depositsauthorized underthis Act,as amended by
PresidentialDecree No.1035, as well as foreign currency
depositsauthorized underPresidentialDecree No.1034, are
hereby declared asand considered ofan absolutely confidential
nature and,except uponthe written permission ofthe depositor,
in no instance shallsuch foreign currencydepositsbe examined,
inquired orlooked into by any person,government official,
bureau oroffice whetherjudicialor administrative orlegislative
or any otherentitywhetherpublic orprivate: Provided,however,
that said foreign currencydepositsshallbe exempt from
attachment,garnishment,orany otherorderorprocessofany
court,legislative body,government agencyorany administrative
body whatsoever.’
“The purpose ofPD1246 in according protectionagainst attachment,
garnishment andothercourt processto foreign currencydepositsis statedin its
whereases,viz.:
‘WHEREAS, underRepublic Act No.6426, as amended by
PresidentialDecree No.1035, certain Philippine banking
institutions and branchesofforeign banksare authorized to accept
depositsin foreign currency;

36. ‘WHEREAS, underprovisionsofPresidentialDecree No.1034
authorizing the establishmentofan offshore banking systemin
the Philippines,offshore bankingunitsare also authorized to
receive foreign currency depositsin certain cases;
‘WHEREAS, in orderto assure the development and
speedy growth ofthe Foreign Currency Deposit Systemand the
Offshore Banking Systemin the Philippines,certain incentives
were provided forunderthe two Systems such as confidentiality
subject to certain exceptionsand taxexemptions on the interest
income of depositorswho are nonresidentsand are not engagedin
trade orbusinessin the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, making absolutethe protective cloakof
confidentiality oversuchforeign currencydeposits,exempting
such depositsfromtax, and guaranteeing thevested right of
depositorswould betterencouragethe inflowofforeign currency
depositsinto the bankinginstitutionsauthorized to accept such
depositsin the Philippines thereby placingsuch institutionsmore
in a position to properly channelthe same to loansand
investmentsin the Philippines,thus directly contributingto the
economic development ofthe country;’
“Thus,one ofthe principalpurposes ofthe protection accordedto foreign
currency depositsis to assure thedevelopment andspeedy growth ofthe
Foreign Currency Deposit systemand the Offshore Banking in the Philippines’
(3rd
Whereas).
“The Offshore Banking Systemwas established by PDNo.1034. In turn,the
purposesofPDNo. 1034 are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, conditionsconducive to the establishment ofan
offshore bankingsystem,suchas politicalstability,a growing
economy and adequate communicationfacilities,among others,
exist in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest ofdeveloping countries to have
as wide accessas possible to the sourcesofcapitalfundsfor
economic development;
‘WHEREAS, an offshore bankingsystembased in the Philippines
will be advantageousand beneficialto the countryby increasing
ourlinks with foreign lenders,facilitating the flowofdesired
investmentsinto the Philippines,creating employment
opportunitiesand expertisein internationalfinance,and
contributingto the nationaldevelopmenteffort.
‘WHEREAS, the geographicallocation,physicaland human
resources,and otherpositive factors provide thePhilippines with
the clearpotentialto developas anotherfinancialcenterin Asia;’
“On the otherhand,the ForeignCurrency Deposit systemwas createdby PD
No. 1035. Its purpose are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, the establishmentofan offshore banking systemin
the Philippines has been authorized undera separate decree;
‘WHEREAS, a numberoflocal commercial banks,as depository
bankunderthe Foreign CurrencyDeposit Act(RA No.6426),
have the resourcesandmanagerialcompetenceto more actively
engage in foreign exchange transactions andparticipate in the
grant offoreign currency loansto residentcorporationsandfirms;
‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending
authority ofthe said depository banksunderRA 6426 and apply
to theirtransactionsthe same taxes as would be applicable to
transaction ofthe proposed offshore banking units;’
“It is evident fromthe above [Whereasclauses]thatthe Offshore Banking
Systemand the Foreign Currency Deposit Systemwere designed to draw
depositsfromforeign lenders and investors (Vide second WhereasofPDNo.
1034; third Whereas ofPDNo. 1035). It is these depositors that are induced
by the two laws and given protectionand incentivesby them.
“Obviously,the foreign currency deposit made by a transient ora tourist is not
the kind of deposit encourage by PDNos.1034 and 1035 and given incentives
and protectionby said laws because such depositorstaysonly fora few days in
the country and,therefore,will maintain his deposit in the bankonly fora
short time.
“Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated,is just a tourist ora transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
“Forthe reasonsstated above,the SolicitorGeneralthus submits thatthe dollar
deposit ofrespondentGreg Bartelli is not entitled to the protectionofSection
113 of CentralBank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment orothercourt processes.”[6]
In fine, the application ofthe lawdependson the extent ofits justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intendedright and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizerzmentecon damode otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is
silent orambiguous,this is one ofthose fundamentalsolutionsthat would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)

37. It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may – but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
Peso? Upholdingthe finaland executory judgment ofthe lowercourt against the Central
Bank Circular protectingthe foreign depositor? Shielding orprotecting thedollardeposit
of a transientalien depositor against injustice to a national and victimof a crime? This
situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.
We definitely cannothave bothwaysand restin the belief that we have served the
ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and
PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because ofits peculiarcircumstances. Respondents are
hereby REQUIRED to COMPLYwith the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., no part.
Mendoza, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4606 May 30,1952
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSEN. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of FirstInstance of Camarines Sur,
EMMA IMPERIAL, representedby her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL,
and SOUTHERN LUZON COLLEGE,respondents.
Ramon Felipe,Jr.,and L.B. Karingalforpetitioner.
Ezequiel S.Grageda and VictorianoYamson forrespondentsJudgeLeuterioand Emma
Imperial.
Padillaand San Juan forrespondent SouthernLuzonCollege.
BENGZON, J.:
Statement ofthe case. The issue in the litigation is whetherthe courtshave theauthority
to reverse the award ofthe board ofjudgesofan oratoricalcompetition.
In an oratoricalcontest held in Naga,Camarines Sur,first honorwas given bythe board
of five judges to Nestor Nosce,and second honorto Emma Imperial. Six days later,
Emma asked the court ofthe first instance ofthat province to reversedthataward,
alleging that one ofthe judgeshad fallen to errorin grading herperformance.Aftera
hearing,and overthe objectionofthe otherfourjudges ofthe contest,the court declared
Emma Imperial winner ofthe first place.Hence this specialcivil action challengingthe
court's powerto modify the board'sverdict.
The facts.There is no disputeabout thefacts:
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratoricalcontest was held in Naga City.
The contestantswere eight,among themNestorNosce,Emma Imperial, and Luis
General, Jr.
2. There were five judges ofthe competition,the petitionerRamon B.Felipe, Sr. being
the Chairman.
3. Afterthe orators haddeliveredtheirrespectivepieces,and afterthe judgeshad
expressed theirvotes,the Chairman publicly announcedtheirdecision awardingfirst
price to NestorNosce,second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro
Benavides andfourth placeto Luis General, Jr.
4. Fourdays afterwards,Emma Imperial addresseda letterto the Board ofJudges
protesting the verdict,andalleging that one ofthe Judgeshad committed a mathematical
mistake, resulting in hersecond place only,instead ofthe first,which she therefore
claimed.

38. 5. Upon refusalofthe Board to amend theiraward,she filed a complaint in the court of
first instance.
6. At the contestthe five judgeswere each furnisheda blankformwherein he give the
participantsgrades according to his estimate oftheirabilities,giving number1 to the
best,number2to the secondbest etc.,downto number8.Then the gradeswere added,
and the contestant receiving the lowest numbergot first prize,the next secondprize,etc.
7. The sums forthe first fourwinners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17,
General 17, the Board of judges having votedas follows:
Judge Nosce Imperial Buenavides General
Felipe Sr. ......... 3 1 2 4
Obias .............. 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez.......... 1 4 5 3
Prado .............. 3 2 1 3
Moll ............... 2 1 5 4
10 10 17 17
8. It appearing that NestorNosce andEmma Imperial had tied for the first place,the
Chairman, apparently with the consent ofthe board,broke the tie awarding first honorsto
Nosce and second honorsto Imperial.
9. Forthe convenience ofthe judgesthe typewritten forms contained blankspacesin
which,after the names ofthe rival orators andtheirrespectiveorations,the judge could
not jot down the gradeshe thought the contestantsdeservedaccording to "Originality",
"Timeliness","English","Stage Personality","Pronunciationand Enunciation"and
"Voice".From such data he made up his vote.
10. It was discovered laterthat theformfiled by Delfin Rodriguez,one ofthe Judges,
gave Imperial and General the following ratings underthe above headings; Imperial19-
15-15-18-14-14 Total94-Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total95-Place 3rd.
11. Imperial assertsthathertotalshould be 95instead of94 and therefore should rank3rd
place in Rodriguez'vote.And ifshe got 3from Rodriguez,hertotalvote should have
been 9 instead often,with the result that she copped first place in the speakingjoust.
12. Rodrigueztestified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; thatshe
should have beengivena totalof95, orplaced No.3, the same as General; that he was
not disposed to breakthe tie betweenherand Generaland insisted that he wanted to give
rank 3 to Imperial and rank3 also to General.
Discussion.Although it would seemanomalousforone judge to give the same rankto
two contestants,we will concedeforthe moment that Delfin Rodriguezcould have given
3 to Imperial to General.
Howeverif deductions are to be made fromhis recorded vote (Exhibit 3) one may infer
that afterthe contestand before submitting his vote he decidedto give Generalan edge
overImperial. How? Underthe caption "English" Generalwas given by himselfat first
"14",later increased to "15".Evidently because afterhe had added the ratingsofImperial
and (erroneously)reachedthe sumof94, he added the ratingsofGeneral(which were the
same as Imperial with 14 under"English")and (mistakenly)reached94also.So what did
he also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general95to place him overImperial's 94.
(Mistakingly again,because with 15General got 96 instead of95).
But to us the important thingis Rodriguez' vote during andimmediately afterthe affair.
His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave Generalplace No. 3 and Imperial place No.4. His
calculations recordedon Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not bother
to fill out the blankspaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusionsgiving
one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc.withoutspecifyingthe ratings for"Voice","English",
"Stage Personality"etc.In otherwordswhat countedwas the vote.
Probably forthe above reasonsthe board refusedto "correct"the allegederror.
The situation then is this:Days aftera contest hasbeen conductedand the winners
announced,one ofthe judgesconfesseshe made a mistake,that the ratings he gave the
secondplace winnershould have been suchas would entitle herto first place.The other
judges refuseto altertheirverdict.May the matterbe broughtto the court to obtain a new
award,reversing the decision ofthe board ofjudges?
For more than thirty yearsoratoricaltilts havebeen held periodically by schoolsand
colleges in these islands.Inter-collegiate oratoricalcompetitionsare ofmore recent
origin. Members ofthis court have taken part in themeitheras contestantsin theirschool
days1
,oras members ofthe board ofjudges afterwards.They knowsome (few)verdicts
did not reflect the audience'spreference andthat errorshavesometimes been ascribedto
the award of the judges.Yet no party everpresumedto invoke judicialintervention;forit
is unwritten lawin such conteststhatthe board'sdecision is finaland unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments ofthe Sword,these tournamentsofthe Word apply the
highest tenets ofsportmanship:finally ofthe referee's verdict.No alibis,no murmurs of
protest.The participantsare supposed to join the competitionto contribute to its success
by striving theirutmost:the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by thecontestants,becausetheir's was merely the
privilege to compete forthe prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless anduntilthey were proclaimed winners ofthe competitionby the appointed
arbiters orreferees orjudges.

39. Incidentally,these schoolactivitieshavebeenimported fromthe United States.We found
in American jurisprudenceno litigation questioningthe determination ofthe board of
judges.
Now, the fact that a particularaction has hadno precedentduring a long period affords
some reason fordoubtingthe existenceofthe right sought to be enforced,especially
where occasion forits assertion must have oftenarisen; andcourts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establisha newlegalprinciple not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon.(See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p.1012).
We observethat in assuming jurisdictionoverthe matter,the respondent judge reasoned
out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courtsoffirst instance are
courts ofgeneraljurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumptionthatImperial suffered some wrong at the
hands ofthe board ofjudges.Ifat all, there was error on the part ofone judge,at most.
Error and wrong do not mean the same thing."Wrong" asused in the aforesaid legal
principle is the deprivationorviolation ofa right.As statedbefore,a contestant hasno
right to the prize unless anduntilhe or she is declared winnerby the board ofreferees or
judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss orinjury,yet in law there are instancesof
"damnumabsque injuria".This is one ofthem.If fraud or malice had been proven,it
would be a different proposition.But then heraction should be directed against the
individualjudge orjudges who fraudulently ormaliciously injured her.Not against the
otherjudges.
By the way what is here in stated must notbe understood as applyingto those activities
which the governmenthas chosen to regulate with the creationofthe Games and
AmusementsBoard in Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment.In viewof all the foregoing,we are ofthe opinion and so declare,that the
judiciary has no powerto reverse theaward ofthe board ofjudgesofan oratorical
contest.Forthat matterit would not interfere in literary contests,beautycontestsand
similar competitions.
Wherefore the orderin controversy is herebysetaside.No costs.
Paras,C.J.,Pablo,Tuason,Montemayor,BautistaAngeloandLadrador,JJ., concur.
Feria,J., concursin the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115245 July11,1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorariunderRule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourt assailing the
Resolution dated April28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND
No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitionerJuanitoC. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacyforthe
position ofmemberof the SangguniangPanlalawigan ofthe Province ofIsabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitionerwithdrewhis certificate ofcandidacy.
In M.R. Nos.93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November3,1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively,the COMELEC imposed upon petitionerthe fine ofTen Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for failure to file his statementofcontributionsand expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24,1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for
reconsiderationofpetitionerand deemed finalM.R.Nos.93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo,p.
14).
Petitionerwent to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition
in a Resolution dated April28, 1994 (Rollo,pp.10-13).
Hence,this petition forcertiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing forSynchronized Nationaland
Local Elections and forElectoral Reforms, Authorizing AppropriationsTherefor,and for
OtherPurposes"providesas follows:
Statement ofContributionsand Expenditures:Effect ofFailure to File
Statement.Every candidate and treasurerofthe politicalparty shall,

40. within thirty (30) days afterthe day ofthe election,file in duplicate
with the offices ofthe Commission the full, true and itemized
statement ofallcontributionsand expendituresin connection with the
election.
No person elected to anypublic office shallenterupon thedutiesof
his office untilhe has filed the statement ofcontributionsand
expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shallapply if the politicalparty which
nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required
herein within the period prescribed bythis Act.
Except candidatesforelective barangayoffice,failure to file the
statements orreportsin connection with electoralcontributionsand
expenditures as required herein shallconstitutean administrative
offense forwhich the offendersshallbe liable to pay an administrative
fine ranging fromOne Thousand Pesos(P1,000.00) to Thirty
ThousandPesos(P30,000.00), in the discretion ofthe Commission.
The fine shallbe paid within thirty (30) days fromreceipt ofnotice of
such failure; otherwise,it shallbe enforceable by a writ ofexecution
issued by theCommission against thepropertiesofthe offender.
It shallbe the duty ofevery city ormunicipalelection registrarto
advise in writing, by personaldelivery orregistered mail, within five
(5) days fromthe date ofelection all candidates residing in his
jurisdiction to comply with theirobligation to file theirstatementsof
contributionsand expenditures.
For the commission ofa second orsubsequent offenseunderthis
Section,the administrative fine shallbe from Two ThousandPesos
(P2,000.00) to Sixty ThousandPesos(P60,000.00), in the discretionof
the Commission.In addition,the offendershallbe subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisionsoflawrelative to election contributionsand expenditures,
the COMELEC promulgated on January 13,1992 Resolution No.2348 (Re: Rules and
Regulations GoverningElectoralContributionsandExpendituresin Connection with the
Nationaland LocalElections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisionsofsaid Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement ofcontributionsand expenditures:Remindersto
candidatesto file statements.Within five (5)days fromthe day ofthe
election,the Law Department ofthe Commission,the regionalelection
directorofthe NationalCapital Region,the provincialelection
supervisorsandthe electionregistrars shalladvise in writing by
personaldelivery orregistered mailall candidateswhofiled their
certificatesofcandidacy with themto comply with theirobligation to
file theirstatementsofcontributionsandexpendituresin connection
with the elections.Every election registrarshallalso advise all
candidates residingin his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement.(a)No personelected to any
public office shallenterupon thedutiesofhis office untilhe has filed
the statementofcontributionsand expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shallapply if the politicalparty which
nominated the winning candidatesfails to file the statement required
within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidatesforelective barangayoffice,failure to file
statements orreportsin connection with the electoralcontributionsand
expenditures as required herein shallconstitutean administrative
offense forwhich the offendersshallbe liable to pay an administrative
fine ranging fromOne Thousand Pesos(P1,000) to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion ofthe Commission.
The fine shallbe paid within thirty (30) days fromreceipt ofnotice of
such failure; otherwise,it shallbe enforceable by a writ ofexecution
issued by theCommission against thepropertiesofthe offender.
For the commission ofa second orsubsequent offenseunderthis
section,the administrative fine shallbe fromTwo Thousand Pesos
(P2,000) to Sixty ThousandPesos(P60,000), in the discretion ofthe
Commission.In addition,the offendershallbe subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
Petitionerargues that he cannot be held liable forfailure to file a statement of
contributionsand expendituresbecause he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his
certificates ofcandidacythree daysafterits filing.Petitionerpositsthat "it is .. . clear
from the law that candidate must have enteredthe politicalcontest,and should have
eitherwon or lost" (Rollo,p.39).
Petitioner's argument is withoutmerit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate"hasthe obligationto file his
statement ofcontributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the lawdoes not distinguish,courtsshould not
distinguish,Ubi lex nondistinguitnec nosdistinguere debemos (Philippine British
Assurance Co.Inc.v.Intermediate Appellate Court,150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v.

41. Commission on Elections,103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application ofa law where none is indicated (Lo Chamv.Ocampo,77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench,as the lawmakes no distinctionorqualification as to whetherthe
candidate pursuedhis candidacy orwithdrewthe same,the term"every candidate" must
be deemed to refer not only to a candidatewho pursued his campaign,but alsoto one
who withdrewhis candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body taskedwith the enforcementand administrationofall laws and
regulationsrelative to the conduct ofan election,plebiscite,initiative,referendum,and
recall (The Constitutionofthe Republic ofthe Philippines,Art.IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued
Resolution No.2348 in implementation or interpretationofthe provisions ofRepublic
Act No.7166 on election contributionsandexpenditures.Section 13ofResolution No.
2348 categorically refers to "allcandidateswho filed theircertificates ofcandidacy."
Furthermore,Section 14 ofthe law uses the word "shall." As a generalrule,the use ofthe
word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory,and imposes a dutywhich
may be enforced ,particularly if public policy is in favorofthis meaning or where public
interest is involved.We apply the generalrule (Baranda v.Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757
[1988]; Diokno v.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,91Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state hasan interest in seeingthat theelectoralprocessis clean,and ultimately
expressive ofthe true will of the electorate.One way ofattaining such objective is to pass
legislation regulating contributions andexpendituresofcandidates,and compelling the
publication ofthe same.Admittedly,contributionsand expendituresare made for the
purpose ofinfluencing the resultsofthe elections(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec.94; Resolution No.
2348, Sec.1). Thus,laws and regulationsprescribe what contributionsare prohibited
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No.2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec.
96), and what expendituresare authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec.
13; Resolution No.2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No.2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutesare not peculiarto the Philippines.In "corruptand illegalpractices acts"of
severalstatesin the United States,as wellas in federalstatutes,expendituresof
candidates are regulated byrequiring the filing ofstatementsofexpensesand by limiting
the amount ofmoney that may be spentby a candidate.Some statutesalso regulate the
solicitation ofcampaign contributions(26AmJur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are
designedto compelpublicity with respect to matterscontained in the statementsandto
prevent,by such publicity,the improperuseofmoneys devoted by candidatesto the
furtherance oftheirambitions (26AmJur 2d, Elections § 289). These statutesalso enable
voters to evaluate the influencesexerted on behalfofcandidatesby thecontributors,and
to furnish evidenceofcorrupt practices forannulment ofelections (Sparkman v.Saylor
[Court of Appeals ofKentucky],180Ky. 263, 202 S.W.649 [1918]).
State courts have alsoruled that suchprovisionsare mandatory as to therequirement of
filing (State exrel. Butchofsky v.Crawford [Court ofCivil AppealsofTexas],269 S.W.
2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom,270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v.
Saylor,supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidatewho withdrewhis candidacy hasaccepted
contributionsand incurred expenditures,evenin the short span ofhis campaign.The evil
sought to be preventedby the lawis not all too remote.
It is notesworthythat Resolution No.2348 even contemplatesthe situation where a
candidate may not have receivedany contribution ormade any expenditure.Such a
candidate is not excused fromfiling a statement,and is in fact required to file a statement
to that effect.UnderSection 15of Resolution No.2348, it is provided that "[i]fa
candidate ortreasurerofthe party has received no contribution, made no expenditure,or
has no pending obligation,the statement shallreflect such fact."
Lastly,we note that underthe fourth paragraph ofSection 73ofthe B.P. Blg. 881 orthe
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal
of certificate ofcandidacy shallnot affect whatevercivil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner'swithdrawalofhis candidacy
did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Feliciano,Regalado,Davide,Jr.,Romero,Bellosillo,Puno,Vitug,
Mendoza and Francisco,JJ.,concur.
Kapunan,J.,is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate,including one who has
withdrawn his certificate ofcandidacy,is obliged to file his statement ofcontributions
and expendituresin line with Section 14 of Republic Act No.7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions ofComelec Resolution No.2348. I must concede thatthe use ofthe word "shall"
in the main statuteas wellas the implementing rules generally suggestmandatorinessas
to coverall candidates.
But is an anspirant forpublic office who had a sudden change ofheart,so to speak,still
considereda candidate to begin with? Iamof the impression that he is not andis thusnot
bound to renderan accountingsubsequent to electionforthe simple reason that the term
'candidate'is usedto designatea personwho actually submits himselfand is voted forat
ourelection (Santos vs.Miranda,35Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs.Hirsch,125
Ind.,207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,Philippine Law Dictionary,1972 2nd ed.,p. 84)
Certainly,one who withdraws his certificate ofcandidacy 3days afterthe filing thereof,
can not be voted forat an election.Andconsidering theshortnessofthe period of3days
from the filing to the withdrawalof the certificate ofcandidacy,petitionercannotbe

42. accused,as indeedthere is no suchcharge,ofutilizing his aborted candidacyforpurposes
to raise funds orto extort money fromothercandidatesin exchange forthe withdrawal.
I, therefore,vote to grant thepetition.
Padilla,J.,concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELO, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate,including one who has
withdrawn his certificate ofcandidacy,is obliged to file his statement ofcontributions
and expendituresin line with Section 14 of Republic Act No.7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent
portions ofComelec Resolution No.2348. I must concede thatthe use ofthe word "shall"
in the main statuteas wellas the implementing rules generally suggestmandatorinessas
to coverall candidates.
But is an aspirant forpublic office who had a suddenchangeofheart,so to speak,still
considereda candidate to begin with? Iamof the impression that he is not andis thusnot
bound to renderan accountingsubsequent to electionforthe simple reason that the term
'candidate'is usedto designatea personwho actually submits himselfand is voted forat
ourelection (Santos vs.Miranda,35Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs.Hirsch,125
Ind.,207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,Philippine Law Dictionary,1972 2nd ed.,p. 84)
Certainly,one who withdraws his certificate ofcandidacy 3days afterthe filing thereof,
can not be voted forat an election.Andconsidering theshortnessofthe period of3days
from the filing to the withdrawalof the certificate ofcandidacy,petitionercannotbe
accused,as indeedthere is no suchcharge,ofutilizing his aborted candidacyforpurposes
to raise funds orto extort money fromothercandidatesin exchange forthe withdrawal.
I, therefore,vote to grant thepetition.
Padilla,J.,concurs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108747 April 6,1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a specialprivilege granted bythe stateto a penitentqualified offender.It
essentially rejects appeals and encouragesan otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save thestate oftime,effort and expensesto jettison an appeal.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealedhis convictionbefore
he can avail ofprobation.This outlaws the element ofspeculationon the partofthe
accused— to wageron the result ofhis appeal— that when his convictionis finally
affirmed on appeal,the moment oftruth well-nigh at hand,and the service ofhis sentence
inevitable,he nowapplies forprobationas an "escape hatch"thusrendering nugatory the
appellate court'saffirmance ofhis conviction.Consequently,probation should be availed
of at the first opportunity byconvictswho are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated,
who manifest spontaneity,contrition andremorse.
As conceptualized,is petitionerentitled to probation within the purviewofP.D. 968, as
amended by P.D.1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started whenas Presidentand GeneralManagerofASPACTrans.
Company he failed to controlhis outburstand blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga,sonofa bitches (sic),
bullshit.Puro kayo walangutak .. . .Mga anak ng puta.. . . Magkano
ba kayo .. . God damn you all.
Thus forhumiliating his employees he was accused ofmultiple grave oraldefamation in
five (5) separateInformationsinstitutedby five (5) of his employees,each Information
charging himwith gravely maligning themon fourdifferent days,i.e., from9 to 12 April
1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years,the Metropolitan TrialCourt ofMakati,
Br. 61, found petitionerguilty ofgrave oraldefamation in four(4) ofthe five (5) cases
filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos.105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced
him to a prison termof one (1) yearand one (l) day to one (1) yearand eight (8) months
of prision correccional "in eachcrime committed on each date ofeach case,asalleqed in
the information(s),"orderedhimto indemnify each of the offendedparties,Victoria

43. Gatchalian,Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages,and P5,000.00 for attorney'sfees,pluscostsofsuit. 1
He was
howeveracquittedin Crim. Case No.105208 for persistentfailure ofthe offended party,
EdgarColindres,to appearand testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision ofthe MeTC,and insisting onhis innocence,petitioner
elevated his caseto the RegionalTrial Court.
On 5 August 1991the RegionalTrial Court of Makati,Br. 59, affirmed his convictionbut
appreciated in his favora mitigating circumstance analogousto passionorobfuscation.
Thus —
. . . (he) was angry and shouting whenhe uttered the defamatory
words complained of.. . . he must have been angry andworried
"aboutsome missing documents.. . as well as the letterofthe
Department ofTourismadvising ASPACaboutits delinquent taxof
P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory wordsmust have been uttered
in the heat ofangerwhich is a mitigating circumstance analogousto
passionorobfuscation. 2
Accordingly,petitionerwas sentenced"in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty ofEIGHT
(8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . " 3
Afterhe failed to interpose an appealtherefromthe
decision.ofthe RTCbecame final. The case was then set forexecution ofjudgment by
the MeTCwhich,as a consequence,issued a warrant ofarrest.But·before he could be
arrested petitionerfiled an application forprobation which theMeTCdenied "in the light
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v.Court ofAppeals,G.R. No, 84850, 29
June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ." 4
Forthwith he went to the Court ofAppealson certiorari which on2July 1992 dismissed
his petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes thatthe petitionerhas failed to comply with
the provisions ofSupreme Court CircularNo. 28-91 of September4,
1991. Violation ofthe circular is sufficient cause fordismissalofthe
petition.
Secondly,the petitionerdoesnot allege anywhere in the petition that
he had asked the respondent court to reconsiderits above order; in
fact,he had failed to give the court an.opportunityto correct itselfif it
had,in fact,committed any error on the matter.He is, however,
required to move for reconsideration ofthe questioned
orderbefore filing a petition forcertiorari (Sy It v.Tiangco,4 SCRA
436).This failure is fatal to his cause.It is a ground fordismissalof
his petition (Santosv.Vda.de Cerdenola,5SCRA 823; Acquiao v.
Estenso,14 SCRA 18; Del PilarTransit,Inc.v.Public Service
Commission,31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly,it is obviousthat respondentcourt did notcommit any
capricious,arbitrary,despotic orwhimsical exercise of powerin
denying the petitioner's applicationforprobation ... .
Fourthly,the petition forprobationwas filed by the petitionerout of
time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notesthat Section 4ofPD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation
afterconviction,upon an applicationby the defendant within the period ofappeal,upon
terms and conditionsandperiod appropriate to eachcase,but expressly rulesout
probation where an appealhasbeentaken .. . . 5
The motion for reconsiderationwas likewise denied.
In the present recourse,petitioner squirms out ofeach ground andseeksthis Court's
compassionin dispensingwith the minortechnicalities which may militate against his
petition as he nowarguesbefore us that he hasnot yetlost his right to availofprobation
notwithstanding his appealfromthe MeTCto the RTC since "[t]he reason forhis appeal
was precisely to enable himto avail himself of the benefits ofthe ProbationLawbecause
the originalDecision ofthe (Metropolitan)TrialCourt was such that he would notthen
be entitled to probation."6 He contendsthat "he appealedfromthe judgment ofthe trial
court precisely forthe purpose ofreducingthe penaltiesimposedupon himby the said
court to enable himto qualify for probation." 7
The centralissue therefore is whetherpetitioneris stillqualified to avail of probationeven
afterappealing his convictionto the RTCwhich affirmed the MeTCexcept with regard to
the duration ofthe penalties imposed.
Petitioneris no longereligible for probation.
First.Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannotextend to those not
expressly included.Probationis not a right ofan accused,but ratheran act ofgrace and
clemency orimmunity conferred by the statewhich may be granted by thecourt to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapesthe extreme rigors ofthe penalty
imposed by lawfor the offense ofwhich he standsconvicted. 9 It is a specialprerogative
granted by lawto a person orgroup ofpersonsnot enjoyed by othersorby all.
Accordingly,the grant ofprobation restssolely uponthe discretionofthe court which is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit oforganized society,and only incidentally for
the benefit ofthe accused. 10
The ProbationLawshould not therefore be permitted to
divest the stateorits government ofany ofthe latter's prerogatives,rightsorremedies,
unless the intention ofthe legislature to this endis clearly expressed,and no person
should benefit fromthe terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
NeitherSec. 4 of the Probation Law,as amended,which clearly mandates that "no
application forprobationshallbe entertained orgranted ifthe defendanthasperfected the
appealfromthe judgment ofconviction,"nor Llamado v.CourtofAppeals 11
which
interprets the quotedprovision,offers any ambiguityorqualification.As such,the

44. application ofthe lawshould not be subjected to anyto suit thecaseofpetitioner.While
the proposition that an appealshould notbarthe accused fromapplying forprobation if
the appealis solely to reduce thepenalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable,we are not yet prepared to acceptthis interpretationunderexisting lawand
jurisprudence.Accordingly,we quote Mr.Justice Feliciano speakingforthe Court en
banc in Llamado v.Court ofAppeals—
. . . we note at the outsetthat Probation Lawis not a penalstatute.We,
however,understand petitioner's argument to be really that any
statutory languagethat appearsto favorthe accusedin acriminal case
should be given.a "liberalinterpretation." Courts ... have no authority
to invoke "liberalinterpretation"or"the spirit ofthe law" where the
words ofthe statute themselves,and·as illuminated by the historyof
that statute,leave no roomfordoubt orinterpretation.We do not
believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set
at naught wordswhich havea clearand definite meaning imparted to
themby ourprocedurallaw.The "true legislative intent" must
obviously be given effect byjudgesand allothers who are charged
with the application andimplementation ofa statute.It is absolutely
essentialto bearin mind, however,that the spirit ofthe law and the
intent that is to be given effect are derived fromthe words actually
used by the law-maker,and not fromsome external, mysticalor
metajuridical source independentofand transcendingthe wordsofthe
legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood asgiving a "strict
interpretation" ratherthana "liberal" one to Section 4ofthe Probation
Law of1976 as amended by P.D.No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are
adjectives which toofrequently impede a disciplined andprincipled
search forthe meaning which the law-making authority projected
when it promulgated the language which we must apply.Thatmeaning
is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as
the nose on a man's face.The Courtis simply·reading Section 4as it is
in fact written.There is no need forthe involved processof
construction that petitionerinvites usto engage in,a processmade
necessaryonly becausepetitionerrejectsthe conclusionormeaning
which shines through the wordsofthe statute.The first dutyofthe
judge is to take and apply a statute as he findsit,not as he would
like·it to be. Otherwise,as this Court in Yangco v.CourtofFirst
Instance warned,confusion anduncertainty willsurely follow,
making, we might add,stability and continuity in the lawmuch more
difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here languageis plain,subtle refinements
which tinge words as to give themthe colorofa
particularjudicial theory are not only unnecessary
but decidedly harmful.That which has causedso
much confusionin the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understandand know
what the law is with respect to a given matter,is in
considerable measure the unwarranted interference
by judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutesandcontracts,cutting thewords
here and inserting themthere,making themfit
personalideas ofwhat the legislature oughtto have
done orwhat parties should haveagreedupon,
giving themmeanings which they do not ordinarily
have cutting,trimming, fitting,changing and
coloring untillawyers themselvesare unable to
advise theirclients as to the meaningofa given
statute orcontract untilit has been submitted to
some court forits interpretation andconstruction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharperas our
people's grasp ofEnglish is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore,that an appealshould not·barthe accusedfromapplying forprobationifthe
appealis taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to theclearand express
mandate ofSec,4 of the Probation Law,as amended,which openswith a negativeclause,
"no applicationforprobationshallbe entertained orgranted ifthe defendanthas
perfected the appealfromthe judgment ofconviction."In Bersabal v.Salvador,13
we
said —
By its very language,the Rule is mandatory.Underthe rule of
statutory construction.negative wordsandphrasesare to be regarded
as mandatory while thosein the affirmative are merely directory.. . .
the use ofthe term"shall" furtheremphasizes its mandatory character
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced.
And where the lawdoes not distinguish thecourts should not distinguish;where the law
does not make exception the court should not except.
Second.At theoutset,the penaltiesimposed by theMeTCwere already probationable.
Hence,there was no need to appealifonly to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period.Multiple prisonterms imposed against an accusedfound guilty of
severaloffensesin one decisionare not,and should notbe,addedup.And,the sumofthe
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative ofhis
eligibility for, nay his disqualification from,probation.The multiple prison terms are
distinct fromeach other,and ifnone ofthe terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law,i.e., not more than six(6) years,then he is entitled to probation,unlesshe
is otherwise specifically disqualified.The numberofoffensesis immaterial as long as all
the penalties imposed,taken separately,are within the probationable period.For,Sec.9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended,usestheword maximumnottotal whenit says that "[t]he
benefits ofthis Decree shallnot be extended to those .. . . sentencedto serve
a maximumtermofimprisonment of more than sixyears." Evidently,the lawdoes not

45. intend to sumup the penaltiesimposed butto take each penaltyseparately anddistinctly
with the others.Consequently,even ifpetitionerwas supposed to have served his prison
termof one (1) yearand one (1)day to one (1) yearand eight (8) months of prision
correccional sixteen(16) times as he was sentencedto serve the prison termfor"each
crime committed on each date ofeach case,as alleged in the information(s)," andin each
of the four(4) informations,he was charged with.havingdefamed the four(4)private
complainants on four(4) different,separatedays,he was still·eligible for probation,as
each prison termimposed on petitionerwas probationable.
Fixing the cut-offpoint at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment forprobationis
based on the assumptionthat those sentenced to higherpenaltiespose toogreat a riskto
society,not just becauseoftheirdemonstrated capability forserious wrong doing but
because ofthe gravity andseriousconsequencesofthe offense they might further
commit. 14 The Probation Law,as amended,disqualifies only thosewho havebeen
convictedofgrave felonies asdefined in Art.9in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised
PenalCode,15
and not necessarily those who have been convictedofmultiple offensesin
a single proceeding who are deemed to be lessperverse.Hence,the basisofthe
disqualification is principally the gravityofthe offense committed and the concomitant
degree ofpenalty imposed.Those sentenced to a maximum termnot exceeding six(6)
years are not generally consideredcallous,hard core criminals,and thusmay availof
probation.
To demonstratethe point,let ustake forinstanceone who is convicted in a single decision
of, say,thirteen (13)counts ofgrave oraldefamation (forhavingdefamed thirteen[13]
individuals in one outburst)andsentenced to atotal prisontermof thirteen (13) years,and
anotherwho hasbeenfoundguilty of mutilation and sentencedto six(6) years and one (l)
day ofprision mayor minimumas minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1)day
of reclusiontemporal minimumas maximuin. Obviously,the latteroffenderis more
perverse and is disqualified fromavailing of probation.
Petitionerthus proceedson an erroneousassumption that underthe MeTCDecision he
could not have availed ofthe benefitsofprobation.Since he could have,althoughhe did
not,his appealnowprecludeshimfrom applying forprobation.
And,even ifwe go along with the premise of petitioner,howevererroneousit may be,
that the penaltiesimposedagainsthimshould be summed up,stillhe would not have
qualified underthe Decision rendered bythe RTCsince if the "STRAIGHT penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed bythe RTCis multiplied sixteen (16)
times,the totalimposable penaltywould be ten (10)years and eight (8)months,which is
still way beyond the limit ofnot more than six(6) years providedforin the Probation
Law, as amended.To illustrate:8months multiplied by 16 cases =128 months; 128
months divided by 12months (in a year)= 10 years and 8months,hence,following his
argument,petitionercannot stillbe eligible for probation as thetotalofhis penalties
exceeds six(6) years.
The assertionthatthe Decisionofthe RTCshould be multiplied only four(4) times since
there are only four(4) Informations thereby allowing petitionerto qualify forprobation,
instead ofsixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand.The penaltiesimposedby
the MeTCcannot be anyclearer — "one (1) yearand one (1)day to one (1) yearand
eight (8) months ofprision correccional,in each crime committed on each date ofeach
case,asalleged in theinformation(s)."Hence,petitionershould sufferthe imposed
penalties sixteen (16) times.On the otherhand,the RTCaffirmed, the judgment of
conviction andmerely reduced theduration ofeach penaltyimposedby the MeTC"in
each case to a STRAIGHT penalty ofEIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account
of a mitigating circumstance foreach case,count orincidentofgrave oral
defamation·There is no valid reasontherefore why the penaltiesimposedby the RTC
should be multiplied only four(4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, consideringthat the
RTC merely affirmed the MeTCas regards the culpability ofpetitionerin each ofthe
sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the durationofthe penalties imposedtherein.Thus
—
Premises considered,the judgment ofconvictionrendered by the trial
court is AFFIRMED with modification,as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.Francisco
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each ofthe aboveentitled cases
and appreciatingin his favorthe mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to passion orobfuscation,the Court herebysentencesthe
said accused in each case to a straightpenalty ofEIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment,with the accessory penaltiesprescribedby
law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated oreven hinted at that the accused was acquitted
or absolved in any ofthe four(4) countsundereach ofthe four(4)Informatfons,orthat
any part ofthejudgment ofconviction was reversed,orthat anyofthe cases,countsor
incidents was dismissed.Otherwise,we will have to account forthe twelve (12) other
penalties imposedby the MeTC.Can we? What is clearis that the judgment ofconviction
rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the durationofthe penalties.
In fine, considering thatthe multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately asthe totality ofall the penaltiesis not the test,petitionershould have
immediately filed an application forprobationas he was alreadyqualified afterbeing
convictedby the MeTC,ifindeed thereafterhe felt humbled,was ready to
unconditionally acceptthe verdict ofthe court andadmit his liability. Consequently,in
appealing the Decisionofthe MeTCto the RTC, petitionerlost his right to probation.
For, plainly,the law considers appealand probationmutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third.Petitionerappealed to the RTCnot to reduce oreven correct the penaltiesimposed
by the MeTC,but to assert his innocence.Nothing more.The cold fact is that petitioner
appealed his conviction to theRTCnot for the sole purpose ofreducinghis penalties to
make himeligible for probation— since he was already qualified underthe MeTC
Decision — but ratherto insist on his innocence.The appealrecord is wanting ofany
otherpurpose.Thus,in his Memorandumbefore the RTC,he raised only three (3)
statements oferrorpurportedly committed by the MeTCallaimed at his acquittal:(a)in
finding that the guilt ofthe accused hasbeen establishedbecause ofhis positive
identification by the witnessforthe prosecution; (b)in giving full faith and credence to

46. the bare statementsofthe private complainantsdespite theabsence ofcorroborating
testimonies;and,(c)in not acquittinghimin all the cases," 18
Consequently,petitioner
insisted that the trialcourt committed an errorin relying on his positive identification
consideringthatprivate complainants could nothavemissed identifyinghimwho was
theirPresident and GeneralManagerwith whomthey worked fora good numberof
years.Petitionerfurtherargued that althoughthe alleged defamatory wordswere uttered
in the presence ofotherpersons,mostly private complainants,co-employees andclients,
not one ofthemwas presented asa witness.Hence,accordingto petitioner,the trial court
could not have convictedhimon the basis ofthe uncorroborative testimony ofprivate
complainants. 19
Certainly,the protestationsofpetitionerconnote profession ofguiltlessness,ifnot
complete innocence,and do not simply put in issue the propriety ofthe penalties
imposed.Forsure,the accusednevermanifested that he wasappealingonlyforthe
purpose ofcorrecting a wrongpenalty — to reduce it to within theprobationablerange.
Hence,upon interposingan appeal,more so afterassertinghis innocence therein,
petitionershould be precluded fromseeking probation.By perfecting his appeal,
petitioneripso facto relinquishedhis alternative remedy ofavailing ofthe Probation Law
the purpose ofwhich is simply to prevent speculationoropportunismon the part ofan
accusedwho although alreadyeligible does not at once apply forprobation,but doingso
only afterfailing in his appeal.
The fact that petitionerdid not elevate theaffirmance ofhis conviction by the RTCto the
Court of Appealsdoesnotnecessarily mean that his appealto the RTCwas solely to
reduce his penalties.Conversely,he was afraid that the Court ofAppealswould increase
his penalties,which could be worseforhim. Besides,the RTC Decision had already
become final and executory because ofthe negligence,according to him,ofhis former
counselwho failed to seekpossible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentionedthatat the outset petitioner,in accordance with Sec 3, par.
(e), Rule 117 ofthe Rules of Court, 20
should have moved to quash aseach ofthe four(4)
Informations filed against himcharged four(4)separate crimes ofgrave oraldefamation,
committed on four(4) separate days.His failure to do so howevermay nowbe deemed a
waiver underSec.8 of the same Rule 21
and he can be validly convicted,as in the instant
case,ofas many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth.The application forprobation wasfiled way beyond the period allowed by law.
This is vital way beyond theperiod allowed by lawand crucial.Fromthe records it is
clear that the applicationforprobation was filed "only aftera warrant forthe arrest of
petitionerhad beenissued.. . (and)almost two months after(his)receipt ofthe
Decision" 22
ofthe RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the instant
petition.We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponenciaofnow
Presiding Justice ofthe Court ofAppeals NathanaelP.De Pano,Jr., on the specific issue
—
. . . the petition forprobationwas filed by the petitionerout oftime.
The law in point,Section 4of P.D. 968, as amended,providesthus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisionsofthis Decree,the trialcourt may,after
it shallhave convicted andsentenceda defendant,
and upon applicationby said defendant within the
period forperfecting an appeal... . place the
defendant on probation ... .
Going to the extreme, and assuming thatan application forprobation
from one who had appealed the trialcourt's judgment is allowed by
law, the petitioner'splea forprobationwas filed out oftime. In the
petition is a clear statement that the petitionerwas up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application forprobation.P.D.No. 968
says that the applicationforprobation must be filed "within the period
for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case,such periodforappealhad
passed,meaning to saythat the RegionalTrial Court's decisionhad
attained finality,and no appealtherefromwas possible underthe law.
Even granting that an appealfromthe appellate court'sjudgmentis
contemplatedby P.D.968, in addition to the judgment renderedby the
trial court,that appellate judgment had become finaland was,in fact,
up for actualexecution before the applicationforprobation was
attempted by the petitioner.The petitionerdid not file his application
for probation before the finality ofthe said judgment; therefore,the
petitioner's attempt at probationwas filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on.the propositionthat an applicationforprobation
may yet be granted evenifit was filed only afterjudgment has become final,the
conviction alreadysetforexecution and a warrant ofarrest issued forservice ofsentence.
The argument that petitionerhad to await the remand ofthe case to the MeTC,which
necessarily must be afterthe decision ofthe RTChad become final, for himto file the
application forprobationwith the trialcourt,is to stretch the lawbeyond comprehension.
The law, simply,does not allowprobationafteran appealhas beenperfected.
Accordingly,considering that prevailing jurisprudence treatsappealand probation as
mutually exclusive remedies,and petitionerappealed fromhis convictionby the MeTC
although the imposedpenaltieswere already probationable,and in his appeal,he asserted
only his innocence and did notevenraise the issue ofthe propriety ofthe penalties
imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application forprobation outsidethe period for
perfecting an appealgrantinghe was otherwise eligible forprobation,the instantpetition
for review should be asit is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Feliciano,Padilla,BidinandRegalado,JJ.,concur.

47. Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals in this case.
I.
The principalbasis forthe affirmance of the decision ofthe Court ofAppeals denying
probation is the fact thatpetitionerhad appealed his sentencebefore filing his application
for probation.Reliance is placed on the literalapplication of§ 4 ofthe Probation Lawof
1976 ,as amended,which providesas follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.— Subject to the provisionsofthis
Decree,the trial court may, afterit shallhave convictedandsentenced
a defendant,and uponapplication bysaid defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal,suspendthe executionofthe sentence and
place the defendant on probationforsuch periodand uponsuch terms
and conditionsas it may deembest; Provided,Thatno application for
probation shallbe entertainedorgrantedifthe defendant hasperfected
the appealfromthe judgment ofconviction.
Probation may be granted whetherthe sentence imposesa termof
imprisonment ora fine only probationshallbe filed with the trial court
application shallbe deemed a waiver ofthe right to appeal.
An ordergranting ordenying probationshallnot be appealable.
Thus,under§ 4 the accused is given the choiceofappealing his sentenceorapplying for
probation.Ifhe appeals,he cannot laterapply forprobation.Ifhe opts forprobation,he
can not appeal.Implicit in the choice,however,is that the accused is not disqualified for
probation underany ofthe cases mentionedin § 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. DisqualifiedOffenders. — The benefitsofthis Decree shallnot
be extended to those:
(a) sentencedto servea maximum termof imprisonment ofmore than
six years;
(b) convictedofsubversionorany crime against the nationalsecurity
or the public order;
(c) who have previously beenconvicted byfinaljudgment ofan
offense punishedby imprisonment ofnot lessthanone monthand one
day and/ora fine ofnot less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation underthe provisionsofthis
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisionsofthis Decree became applicable pursuant to Section33
hereof.
Consequently,ifunderthe sentencegiven to himan accusedis not qualified for
probation,as whenthe penaltyimposedon himby the court singly orin theirtotality
exceeds six(6) years but on appealthe sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified,
I believe that the accusedshould not be denied thebenefit ofprobation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No.1990, the law allowed — even encouraged—
speculation on theoutcome ofappeals by permitting the accused to apply forprobation
afterhe had appealedand failed to obtain an acquittal. 1
It was to changethis that § 4was
amended by P.D.No. 1990 by expressly providingthat"noapplication forprobation
shallbe entertained orgranted ifthe defendanthasperfected the appealfromthe
judgment ofconviction." Foran accused,despite the fact that he is eligible for probation,
may be tempted to appealin the hope ofobtaining an acquittalifhe knows he can any
way apply for probationin the event his convictionis affirmed. 2
There is, however,nothingin the amendatory Decree to suggestthatin limiting the
accusedto the choice ofeitherappealing fromthe decision ofthe trialcourt orapplying
for probation,the purpose is to denyhimthe right to probation in cases like the one at bar
where he becomes eligible for probation only because onappealhis sentenceis reduced.
The purpose ofthe amendment,it bears repeating,is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunismon the part ofan accused who;although eligible forprobation,doesnot at
once apply forprobation,doingso only afterfailing in his appeal.
In the case at bar,it cannot be said thatin appealing thedecision MeTCpetitionerwas
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted.While acquittalmight have been an
alluring prospect forhim, what is clear is that he had a reasonforappealing because
underthe sentencegiven to himhe was disqualified to apply forprobation.The MeTC
had originally sentencedhimto 1 yearand 1 day to 1 yearand 8 months of prision
correccional for"eachcrime committed on each date ofeach case,as alleged in the
information[s]." This meant,as the majority opinion pointsout,that petitionerhad to
sufferthe prison termof1 yearand 1 day to 1 yearand 8 months sixteen times,since he
was found guilty offourcrimes ofgrave oraldefamation in each offourcases.The
totality ofthe penalties imposed on petitioner(26years and 8months)thusexceeded the
limit of six (6) years ofimprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified himfor

48. probation.It was only afterthis penalty was reduced on appealto a straight penaltyof
eight months imprisonment in each case orto a totaltermof2 years and 8months in the
fourcases thatpetitionerbecame eligible for probation.Thenhe did not appealfurther
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals,while acknowledgingthat "there may be some space not covered
by the presentlawon probation.. . where in its originalstate,the petitionerwas
disqualified fromapplying forprobation underSec.9of the Decree,becoming eligible
for probation only underthe terms ofthe judgment on appeal," neverthelessfelt bound by
the letterof § 4: "No application forprobationshallbe entertained orgranted ifthe
defendant hasperfectedthe appealfromthe judgment ofconviction." Themajority
opinion,affirming the ruling,states that to allowprobation in this casewould be to go
against the "clearand expressmandateofsec.4of the Probation Law,as amended." (p.
9)
To regard probation,however,as a mere privilege,to be given to the accusedonly where
it clearly appears he comeswithin its letteris to disregard the teaching in many casesthat
the Probation Lawshould be applied in favorofthe accused notbecause it is a criminal
law — it is not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose.(SantosTo v.Paño,120 SCRA
8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application ofthe lawwould defeat its purpose to "help the
probationerdevelop into a law-abiding and self-respectingindividual" (Baclayonv.
Mutia,129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), perTeehankee, J.)or"afford [him] a chance to
reform and rehabilitate himselfwithout the stigma ofa prison record,to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent forhis food and maintenance while incarcerated,and
to decongest the jails ofthe country."(DelRosario v.Rosero,126 SCRA 228, 232
(1983), perMakasiar, J.)
The approachfollowed by the Court in Atienzav.Court ofAppeals,140 SCRA 391, 395
(1985) instead commendsitselfto me:
Regarding this,it suffices to state that the ProbationLawwas never
intended to limit the right ofan accused person to present allrelevant
evidence he can availofin orderto secure a verdict ofacquittalora
reduction ofthe penalty.Neitherdoes the lawrequire a plea of guilty
on the part ofthe accusedto enable himto avail of the benefits of
probation.A contrary viewwould certainly negate the constitutional
right of an accusedto be presumed innocent untilthe contrary is
proved.
As already stated,petitionerdid not appealprimarily to seekacquittal.Proofofthis is
that afterthe penalty imposed on himby the MeTChad been reduced by the RTCso that
he thereby became qualified forprobation,he did not appealfurther.The majority says
that this was because he was afraid that ifhe did the penalty could be increased.That
possibility,however,was also there when he appealed fromthe MeTCto the RTC. For
by appealing the sentence ofthe MeTC,petitionertookas much riskthat the penalty
would be raised as the chance thathe would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentenceofthe MeTCpetitionerprofessed his innocence
and not simply questioned the propriety ofhis sentence,but no more so doesan accused
who,upon being arraigned,pleads,"NotGuilty." And yet thelattercannot be denied
probation ifhe is otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued thatthere is a difference because an accusedwho pleads"not guilty''in the
beginning,lateracknowledges his guilt and showscontrition afterhe is found guilty.So
does an accused who appeals a sentence because underit he is not qualified forprobation,
but afterthe penalty is reduced,instead ofappealing further,acceptsthe newsentence
and applies forprobation.
This case is thus distinguishable fromLlamado v.Court ofAppeals,174 SCRA 566
(1989), in which it was held that because thepetitionerhad appealed his sentence,he
could not subsequently apply forprobation.For,unlike petitionerin the case at bar,the
accusedin that casecould have applied forprobationas his originalsentence ofone year
of prision correccional did notdisqualify himfor probation.Thatcasefellsquarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies forprobation mustnot
"have perfected an appealfromthe judgment ofconviction."
II.
It is contended that petitionerdid not haveto appealbecause underthe originalsentence
meted out to himhe was not disqualified forprobation.The issue here is whetherthe
multiple prison terms imposed on petitionerare to be consideredsingly orin theirtotality
for the purpose of§ 9(a) which disqualifies fromprobation those "sentencedto serve a
maximum termof imprisonment ofmore than sixyears."
I submit that they should be taken in theirtotality.As thesentence originally imposed on
petitionerwas for"one (1)yearand one (1) day to one (1) yearand eight (8) months
of prision correccional in each crime committed on each date ofeach case"and asthere
are fouroffensesofgrave oraldefamation againstpetitionerin each ofthe fourcases,the
totalprison termwhich he would have to serve was 26years and 8months.This is clearly
beyondthe probationable maximum allowed by law.
It is said,however,thateven ifthe totality ofthe prisonterms is the test,the modified
sentence imposed by theRTCwould not qualify the petitionerforprobation because he
has to sufferimprisonment ofeight monthssixteen times.That is not so.The RTConly
"sentence[d]the said accusedin each case to STRAIGHT penalty ofEIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight(8)months times four(4), since there are
fourcases,or32 months or2 years and 8months.
The policy ofthe law indeed appearsto be to treat as only one multiple sentences
imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided.Forexample, § 9(c) disqualifies
from probation persons"who have previously beenconvicted by finaljudgment ofan
offense punishedby imprisonment ofnot lessthanone monthand one dayand/ora fine
of not less thanTwo HundredPesos.It was held in Rura v. Lopena,137SCRA 121
(1985) that the accused,who had been foundguilty ofestafa in five criminal cases,was

49. qualified for probation because although thecrimes had been committed on different
dates he was found guilty ofeach crime on the same day.As this Court noted,"Rura was
sentencedto a totalprisontermofseventeen(l7) months and twenty-five (25) days.In
each criminal case the sentence was three (3)months andfifteen (15) days.
That the durationofa convict's sentenceis determined by consideringthe totality of
severalpenaltiesfordifferent offensescommitted is also implicit in the provisionsofthe
Revised PenalCode on the accumulationofpenalties.(See e.g.,arts.48and 70)
It is said that the basisofdisqualification under§ 9is the gravity ofthe offense
committed and the penalty imposed.Iagree.That is why I contendthata person who is
convictedofmultiple grave oraldefamation forwhich the totalprison termis,say,6
years and 8months,is guilty ofa graveroffense thananotherwho is guilty ofonly
offense ofgrave oraldefamation and sentencedto a single penalty of1yearand 8
months.The relevant comparison is between an accusedconvicted ofone offense of
grave oraldefamation and anotheroneconvicted ofthe same offense,say fourormore
times. The relevant comparison is not,as themajority says, betweenan accused found
guilty ofgrave oral defamation fourormore times and anotherone foundguilty of
mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate termof6 years and 1day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamentalreason fordenying probationin this
case and that is thatpetitionerapplied forprobationonly afterhis casehad been
remanded to the MeTCforthe execution ofits decision as modified.But that is because §
4 providesthat"an applicationforprobation shallbe filed with the trial court." In the
circumstancesofthis case,petitionerhadto await the remand ofthe case to the MeTC,
which necessarily must be afterthe decision ofthe RTChad become final.
The decision ofthe Court ofAppeals should be REVERSED and respondent judgeofthe
MetropolitanTrialCourt of Makati,Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT
petitioner's applicationforprobation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr.JusticeVicente V. Mendoza in his
dissenting opinionthat an accused,who originally is not qualified forprobation because
the penalty imposedon himby a court a quoexceeds six(6) years,should not be denied
that benefit ofprobation ifon appealthe sentenceis ultimately reduced to within the
prescribed limit, I amunable,however,to second theotherpropositionthat multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in theirtotality forpurposesofSection 9
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect,Iconcurwith Mr.Justice Josue Bellosillo in
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility ordisqualification ofan applicantfor
probation chargedwith,and sentencedto servemultiple prison terms for,several
offenses,"thenumberofoffensesis immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed,taken
separately,are within the probationable period."The use ofthe word maximuminsteadof
the word total in Section 9,paragraph (a)ofP.D. 968, as amended,should be enoughto
revealthat such hasbeen thelegislative intent.
Thus,Istill must vote forthe denialof the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals in this case.
I.
The principalbasis forthe affirmance of the decision ofthe Court ofAppeals denying
probation is the fact thatpetitionerhad appealed his sentencebefore filing his application
for probation.Reliance is placed on the literalapplication of§ 4 ofthe Probation Lawof
1976 ,as amended,which providesas follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.— Subject to the provisionsofthis
Decree,the trial court may, afterit shallhave convictedandsentenced
a defendant,and uponapplication bysaid defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal,suspendthe executionofthe sentence and
place the defendant on probationforsuch periodand uponsuch terms
and conditionsas it may deembest; Provided,Thatno application for
probation shallbe entertainedorgrantedifthe defendant hasperfected
the appealfromthe judgment ofconviction.
Probation may be granted whetherthe sentence imposesa termof
imprisonment ora fine only probationshallbe filed with the trial court
application shallbe deemed a waiver ofthe right to appeal.
An ordergranting ordenying probationshallnot be appealable.
Thus,under§ 4 the accused is given the choiceofappealing his sentenceorapplying for
probation.Ifhe appeals,he cannot laterapply forprobation.Ifhe opts forprobation,he
can not appeal.Implicit in the choice,however,is that the accused is not disqualified for
probation underany ofthe cases mentionedin § 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. DisqualifiedOffenders. — The benefitsofthis Decree shallnot
be extended to those:

50. (a) sentencedto servea maximum term of imprisonment ofmore than
six years;
(b) convictedofsubversionorany crime against the nationalsecurity
or the public order;
(c) who have previously beenconvicted byfinaljudgment ofan
offense punishedby imprisonment ofnot lessthanone monthand one
day and/ora fine ofnot less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation underthe provisionsofthis
Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisionsofthis Decree became applicable pursuant to Section33
hereof.
Consequently,ifunderthe sentencegiven to himan accusedis not qualified for
probation,as whenthe penaltyimposedon himby the court singly orin theirtotality
exceeds six(6) years but on appealthe sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified,
I believe that the accusedshould not be denied thebenefit ofprobation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No.1990, the law allowed — even encouraged—
speculation on theoutcome ofappeals by permitting the accused to apply forprobation
afterhe had appealedand failed to obtain an acquittal. 1
It was to changethis that § 4was
amended by P.D.No. 1990 by expressly providingthat"noapplication forprobation
shallbe entertained orgranted ifthe defendanthasperfected the appealfromthe
judgment ofconviction." Foran accused,despite the fact that he is eligible for probation,
may be tempted to appealin the hope ofobtaining an acquittalifhe knows he can any
way apply for probationin the event his convictionis affirmed. 2
There is, however,nothingin the amendatory Decree to suggestthatin limiting the
accusedto the choice ofeitherappealing fromthe decision ofthe trialcourt orapplying
for probation,the purpose is to denyhimthe right to probation in cases like the one at bar
where he becomes eligible for probation only because onappealhis sentenceis reduced.
The purpose ofthe amendment,it bears repeating,is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunismon the part ofan accused who;although eligible forprobation,doesnot at
once apply forprobation,doingso only afterfailing in his appeal.
In the case at bar,it cannot be said thatin appealing thedecision MeTCpetitionerwas
principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted.While acquittalmight have been an
alluring prospect forhim, what is clear is that he had a reasonforappealing because
underthe sentencegiven to himhe was disqualified to apply forprobation.The MeTC
had originally sentencedhimto 1 yearand 1 day to 1 yearand 8 months of prision
correccional for"eachcrime committed on each date ofeach case,as alleged in the
information[s]." This meant,as the majority opinion pointsout,that petitionerhad to
sufferthe prison termof1 yearand 1 day to 1 yearand 8 months sixteen times,since he
was found guilty offourcrimes ofgrave oraldefamation in each offourcases.The
totality ofthe penalties imposed on petitioner(26years and 8months)thusexceeded the
limit of six (6) years ofimprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified himfor
probation.It was only afterthis penalty was reduced on appealto a straight penaltyof
eight months imprisonment in each case orto a totaltermof2 years and 8months in the
fourcases thatpetitionerbecame eligible for probation.Thenhe did not appealfurther
although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals,while acknowledgingthat "there may be some space not covered
by the presentlawon probation.. . where in its originalstate,the petitionerwas
disqualified fromapplying forprobation underSec.9of the Decree,becoming eligible
for probation only underthe terms ofthe judgment on appeal," neverthelessfelt bound by
the letterof § 4: "No application forprobationshallbe entertained orgranted ifthe
defendant hasperfectedthe appealfromthe judgment ofconviction." Themajority
opinion,affirming the ruling,states that to allowprobation in this casewould be to go
against the "clearand expressmandateofsec.4of the Probation Law,as amended." (p.
9)
To regard probation,however,as a mere privilege,to be given to the accusedonly where
it clearly appears he comeswithin its letteris to disregard the teaching in many casesthat
the Probation Lawshould be applied in favorofthe accused notbecause it is a criminal
law — it is not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose.(SantosTo v.Paño,120 SCRA
8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application ofthe lawwould defeat its purpose to "help the
probationerdevelop into a law-abiding and self-respectingindividual" (Baclayonv.
Mutia,129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), perTeehankee, J.)or"afford [him] a chance to
reform and rehabilitate himselfwithout the stigma ofa prison record,to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent forhis food and maintenance while incarcerated, and
to decongest the jails ofthe country."(DelRosario v.Rosero,126 SCRA 228, 232
(1983), perMakasiar, J.)
The approachfollowed by the Court in Atienzav.Court ofAppeals,140 SCRA 391, 395
(1985) instead commendsitselfto me:
Regarding this,it suffices to state that the ProbationLawwas never
intended to limit the right ofan accused person to present allrelevant
evidence he can availofin orderto secure a verdict ofacquittalora
reduction ofthe penalty.Neitherdoes the lawrequire a plea of guilty
on the part ofthe accusedto enable himto avail of the benefits of
probation.A contrary viewwould certainly negate the constitutional
right of an accusedto be presumed innocent untilthe contrary is
proved.
As already stated,petitionerdid not appealprimarily to seekacquittal.Proofofthis is
that afterthe penalty imposed on himby the MeTChad been reducedby the RTCso that
he thereby became qualified forprobation,he did not appealfurther.The majority says
that this was because he was afraid that ifhe did the penalty could be increased.That
possibility,however,was also there when he appealed fromthe MeTCto the RTC. For

51. by appealing the sentence ofthe MeTC,petitionertookas much riskthat the penalty
would be raised as the chance thathe would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentenceofthe MeTCpetitionerprofessed his innocence
and not simply questioned the propriety ofhis sentence,but no more so doesan accused
who,upon being arraigned,pleads,"NotGuilty." And yet thelattercannot be denied
probation ifhe is otherwise eligible for probation.
It is argued thatthere is a difference because an accusedwho pleads"not guilty''in the
beginning,lateracknowledges his guilt and showscontrition afterhe is found guilty.So
does an accused who appeals a sentence because underit he is not qualified forprobation,
but afterthe penalty is reduced,instead ofappealing further,acceptsthe newsentence
and applies forprobation.
This case is thus distinguishable fromLlamado v.Court ofAppeals,174 SCRA 566
(1989), in which it was held that because thepetitionerhad appealed his sentence,he
could not subsequently apply forprobation.For,unlike petitionerin the case at bar,the
accusedin that casecould have applied forprobationas his originalsentence ofone year
of prision correccional did notdisqualify himfor probation.Thatcasefellsquarely
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies forprobation mustnot
"have perfected an appealfromthe judgment ofconviction."
II.
It is contended that petitionerdid not haveto appealbecause underthe originalsentence
meted out to himhe was not disqualified forprobation.The issue here is whetherthe
multiple prison terms imposed on petitionerare to be consideredsingly orin theirtotality
for the purpose of§ 9(a) which disqualifies fromprobation those "sentencedto serve a
maximum termof imprisonment ofmore than sixyears."
I submit that they should be taken in theirtotality. As thesentence originally imposed on
petitionerwas for"one (1)yearand one (1) day to one (1) yearand eight (8) months
of prision correccional in each crime committed on each date ofeach case"and asthere
are fouroffensesofgrave oraldefamation againstpetitionerin each ofthe fourcases,the
totalprison termwhich he would have to serve was 26years and 8months.This is clearly
beyondthe probationable maximum allowed by law.
It is said,however,thateven ifthe totality ofthe prisonterms is the test,the modified
sentence imposed by theRTCwould not qualify the petitionerforprobation because he
has to sufferimprisonment ofeight monthssixteen times.That is not so.The RTConly
"sentence[d]the said accusedin each case to STRAIGHT penalty ofEIGHT (8)
MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight(8)months times four(4), since there are
fourcases,or32 months or2 years and 8months.
The policy ofthe law indeed appearsto be to treat as only one multiple sentences
imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided.Forexample, § 9(c) disqualifies
from probation persons"who have previously beenconvicted by finaljudgment ofan
offense punishedby imprisonment ofnot lessthanone monthand one dayand/ora fine
of not less thanTwo HundredPesos.It was held in Rura v. Lopena,137SCRA 121
(1985) that the accused,who had been foundguilty ofestafa in five criminal cases,was
qualified for probation because although thecrimes had been committed on different
dates he was found guilty ofeach crime on the same day.As this Court noted,"Rura was
sentencedto a totalprisontermofseventeen(l7) months and twenty-five (25) days.In
each criminal case the sentence was three (3)months andfifteen (15) days.
That the durationofa convict's sentenceis determined by consideringthe totality of
severalpenaltiesfordifferent offensescommitted is also implicit in the provisionsofthe
Revised PenalCode on the accumulationofpenalties.(See e.g.,arts.48and 70)
It is said that the basis ofdisqualification under§ 9is the gravity ofthe offense
committed and the penalty imposed.Iagree.That is why I contendthata person who is
convictedofmultiple grave oraldefamation forwhich the totalprison termis,say,6
years and 8months,is guilty ofa graveroffense thananotherwho is guilty ofonly
offense ofgrave oraldefamation and sentencedto a single penalty of1yearand 8
months.The relevant comparison is between an accusedconvicted ofone offense of
grave oraldefamation and anotheroneconvicted ofthe same offense,say fourormore
times. The relevant comparison is not,as themajority says,betweenan accused found
guilty ofgrave oral defamation fourormore times and anotherone foundguilty of
mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate termof6 years and 1day of prision
mayor to 12 years and 1day of reclusion temporal.
III.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamentalreason fordenying probationin this
case and that is thatpetitionerapplied forprobationonly afterhis casehad been
remanded to the MeTCforthe execution ofits decision as modified.But that is because §
4 providesthat"an applicationforprobation shallbe filed with the trial court." In the
circumstancesofthis case,petitionerhadto await the remand ofthe case to the MeTC,
which necessarily must be afterthe decision ofthe RTChad become final.
The decision ofthe Court ofAppeals should be REVERSED and respondent judgeofthe
MetropolitanTrialCourt of Makati,Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT
petitioner's applicationforprobation.
VITUG, J., concurring:
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr.JusticeVicente V. Mendoza in his
dissenting opinionthat an accused,who originally is not qualified forprobation because
the penalty imposedon himby a court a quoexceeds six(6) years,should not be denied
that benefit ofprobation ifon appealthe sentenceis ultimately reduced to within the
prescribed limit, I amunable,however,to second theotherpropositionthat multiple
prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in theirtotality forpurposesofSection 9
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect,Iconcurwith Mr.Justice Josue Bellosillo in
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility ordisqualification ofan applicantfor

52. probation chargedwith,and sentencedto servemultiple prison terms for,several
offenses,"thenumberofoffensesis immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed,taken
separately,are within the probationable period."The use ofthe word maximuminsteadof
the word total in Section 9,paragraph (a)ofP.D. 968, as amended,should be enoughto
revealthat such hasbeen thelegislative intent.
Thus,Istill must vote forthe denialof the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8238 May 25,1955
CESAR M. CARANDANG, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of FirstInstance of
Manila and TOMAS VALENTON, Sr.and TOMAS VALENTON, Jr., respondents.
S. Mejia-Panganiban forpetitioner.
Evangelista andValentonforrespondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorariagainstHonorable Vicente Santiago,Judge ofthe Court of
First Instance ofManila,to annulhis orderin Civil Case No.21173, entitled CesarM.
Carandang vs.Tomas Valenton,Sr.et al., suspendingthe trialofsaid civil case to await
the result ofthe criminal Case No.534, Court ofFirst Instance ofBatangas.In this
criminal case,Tomas Valenton,Jr.was found guilty ofthe crime of frustrated homicide
committed against the personofCesarCarandang,petitionerherein.Tomas Valenton,Jr.
appealed the decisionto the Court ofAppealswhere the case is nowpending.
The decision ofthe Court ofFirst Instance ofBatangas in the criminal case was rendered
on September1, 1953 and petitionerherein filed a complaint in the Court of First
InstanceofManila to recoverfromthe defendant Tomas Valenton,Jr.and his parents,
damages,bothactualand moral,for the bodily injuries received by himon occasion of
the commission ofthe crime of frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas ValentonJr.
Afterthe defendants submitted theiranswer,theypresenteda motion to suspend the trial
of the civil case,pendingthe termination ofthe criminal case againstTomas Valenton,Jr.
in the Court ofAppeals.The judgeruled that the trialofthe civil action must await the
result ofthe criminal case on appeal.A motion for reconsideration was submitted,but the
court denied the same; hence this petition forcertiorari.
Petitionerinvokes Article 33of the newCivil Code,which is as follows:
In cases ofdefamation,fraud and physicalinjuries,a civil action fordamages,
entirely separate anddistinctfromthe criminal action,may be broughtby the
injured party.Such civil action shallproceedindependently ofthe criminal
prosecution,and shallrequire only a preponderanceofevidence.
The Code Commission itself statesthat the civilaction allowed (underArticle 33)is
similar to the action in tort for libel orslanderand assault and battery underAmerican
law (Reports ofthe Code Commission,pp.46-47). But respondentsargue that theterm
"physicalinjuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code,and therefore said termshould be understood in its peculiarand technicalsense,in
accordance with the rules statutory construction (Sec.578, 59 C. J. 979).

53. In the case at bar,the accusedwas chargedwith and convicted ofthe crime of frustrated
homicide,and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the
defendant on the bodyofthe petitionerherein CesarCarandang,which woundis bodily
injury, the crime committed is not physicalinjuries but frustratedhomicide,forthe
reason thatthe infliction ofthe wound is attendedby the intent to kill. So the question
arises whetherthe term"physicalinjuries" usedin Article 33 means physicalinjuries in
the Revised PenalCode only,orany physicalinjury orbodily injury,whetherinflicted
with intent to kill or not.
The Article in questionusesthe words"defamation","fraud"and "physicalinjuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in theirordinary sense because there are no specific
provisionsin the Revised PenalCode using these terms as meansofoffensesdefined
therein,so that thesetwo terms defamation andfraud must have beenused not to impart
to themany technicalmeaning in the laws of the Philippines,but in theirgeneric sense.
With this apparent circumstance in mind,it is evident that theterm"physicalinjuries"
could not have been usedin its specific sense asa crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code,for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the
same article — some in theirgeneraland anotherin its technicalsense.In otherwords,
the term"physicalinjuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury,not the crime of
physicalinjuries,because the terms usedwith the latterare generalterms.In any case the
Code Commission recommended that the civilfor assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendationmust have beenaccepted by the Legislature when it approved
the article intact as recommended.Ifthe intent has beento establish a civilaction forthe
bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action forassault and
battery,as the Code Commission states,the civilaction should lie whetherthe offense
committed is that ofphysicalinjuries,orfrustratedhomicide,orattemptedhomicide,or
even death.
A parallel case arose in that ofBixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W.641, 643. In that case,the
appellant sought to take his case fromthe scope ofthe statute by pointingout that
inasmuch as notice is required where thecause ofaction is founded on injury to the
person,it has no applicationwhen the damagessought are forthe death ofthe
person.The court ruled thata claimto recoverfor death resulting frompersonalinjury is
as certainly "foundedon injury to the person"as would be a claimto recoverdamages for
a non-fatalinjury resulting in a crippled body.
For the foregoing considerations,we find that the respondent judge committed an errorin
suspendingthe trialofthe civil case,and his orderto that affect is herebyrevoked,and he
is hereby orderedto proceedwith the trialof said civil case without awaiting the result of
the pending criminalcase.With costsagainstthe defendant-appellees.
Pablo,Acting C.J.,Bengzon,Padilla,Montemayor,Reyes,A.,Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion and Reyes,J.B.L.,JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17663 May 30,1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.
Office of the SolicitorGeneralforplaintiff-appellant.
Roces,Alidio and Ceguera fordefendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
The information herein alleges that defendantIsauro Santiago hascommitted the crime of
"libel" as follows:
That on orabout the 5th day ofOctober1959, in the City of Manila,
Philippines,the said accused,forthe evident purposeofinjuring the name and
reputation ofArsenio H.Lacson,andofimpeaching and besmirching thelatter's
virtue,honesty,honorand reputation,and with the malicious intent ofexposing
him to public hatred,contempt and ridicule,did then andthere wilfully,
feloniously,maliciously and publicly callsaid MayorArsenio H.Lacson,in the
course ofa politicalspeech deliveredat 392 Fraternal,Quiapo,in said city,thru
the mediumof an amplifier systemand before a crowd ofaround a hundred
persons,the following,to wit:"Arsenio Hayop Lacson,pinakawalanghiyang
Alkalde,MayorLacson rapeda woman at the Aroma Cafe and anotherCity
Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel",which are false,malicious and highly
defamatory statements against MayorArsenio H.Lacson,delivered with no
good intentions orjustifiable motive,but solely forthe purposeofinjuring the
name and reputation ofsaid MayorArsenio H.Lacson and to expose himto
public hatred,contempt and ridicule.
Defendant moved to quashthis information uponthe groundthatthe crime charged
therein is,not libel, but oral defamation,which has already prescribed,it having been
allegedly committed on October5,1959, or more than six(6) months priorto the filing of
the information on August11,1960. The Court of First InstanceofManila grantedthis
motion and,accordingly,quashed the information,with costs de oficio.Hence,this
appealby the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whetherthe crime charged in the information is oral
defamation,underArticle 358 of the Revised PenalCode,orlibel, underArticle 355, in
relation to Article 353, ofthe same Code.Said provisionsread:
ART. 358. Slander.— Oral defamation shallbe punished byarrestomayorin
its maximum period to prisioncorreccionalin its minimum period if it is of a
serious and insultingnature;otherwise the penalty shallbearresto menor ora
fine not exceeding 200 pesos".
ART. 355. Libel by meansofwritingsorsimilarmeans.— A libel committed
by means ofwriting, printing,lithography,engraving,radio,phonograph,
painting,theatricalexhibition,cinematographic exhibition,orany similar
means,shallbe punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods ora fine ranging from200 to 6,000 pesos,orboth,in addition to the
civil action which may be brought by the offendedparty.

54. ART. 353. Definition oflibel.— A libel is a public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or ofa vice or defect, real orimaginary, or any act,omission,
condition,status,orcircumstance tendingto cause thedishonor,discredit,or
contempt ofa naturalorjuridical person,orto blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
The prosecutionmaintains that "the mediumofan amplifier system",thru which the
defamatory statements imputedto the accusedwere allegedly made,falls within the
purviewofthe terms "writing, printing,lithography,engraving,radio,phonograph,
painting,theatricalexhibition,cinematographic exhibition,orany similar means",
appearing in said Article 355, in the sense,at least,that in "amplifier system" is a means
"similar" to "radio".
This pretense is untenable.To begin with,as correctly statedin defendant's brief,"radio
as a means ofpublication is "thetransmission andreceptionofelectromagnetic waves
without conductingwires intervening betweentransmitterand receiver" (Library of
UniversalKnowledge)"(see,also,18Encyclopedia Britanica,p.285), "while
transmissionofwords by meansofan amplifier system",suchas theone mentioned in
the information,"is not thru "electromagnetic waves" andis with the use of"conducting
wires" intervening betweenthe transmitter.. . and the receiver.. . .
Secondly,even the word "radio"used in said Article 355, should be considered in
relation to the terms with which it is associated — "writing,printing,lithography,
engraving .. . phonograph,painting,theatricalexhibition orcinematographical
exhibition" — all of which have a common characteristic,namely,theirpermanent nature
as a means ofpublication,and this explains the graverpenaltyforlibel than that
prescribed fororaldefamation.Thus,it has been held thatslanderousstatementsforming
part of a manuscript read by a speaker overthe radio constitutelibel(Sorensen vs.Wood,
243 N.W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs.Wasner,20P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R. 877),
whereas the rules governing suchoffense were declaredinapplicable to extemporaneous
remarks of scurrilous nature,made ad libitumin the courseofa radio broadcast by a
person hired to read a preparedtext,but not appearing thereon (Summit Hotel Co. vs.
NationalBroadcasting Co.,PA-124 A.L.R. 963).1äwphï1.ñët
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime oforal defamation
punished in Article 358 of the Revised PenalCode,which prescribedsix(6) months after
its commission,oron April 5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised PenalCode),overfour
(4) months before the filing ofsaid information,in view ofwhich the orderappealed
from is affirmed, without specialpronouncement asto costs.It is so ordered.
Padilla,BautistaAngelo,Reyes,J.B.L.,Barrera,ParedesandDizon,JJ.,concur.
Bengzon,C.J.,ison leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26,1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R.Mutuc in hisownbehalf.
Romulo C.Felizmenaforrespondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation ofhis right to free speech by petitionerAmelito Mutuc,then a candidate
for delegate to the ConstitutionalConvention,in this specialcivil action forprohibition to
assailthe validity ofa ruling of respondentCommission on Elections enjoining theuseof
a taped jingle forcampaign purposes,was notin vain.Norcould it be consideringthe
concededabsence ofany express powergranted to respondentby the Constitutional
ConventionAct to sorequire and thebarto any such implication arising fromany
provision found therein,ifdeference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be
construedconsistently with the fundamentallaw, which accords theutmost priority to
freedomof expression,much more so when utilized for electoralpurposes.On November
3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued,five days afterits filing,with the
election barely a week away,we issued a minute resolution grantingthe writ of
prohibition prayedfor.This opinion is intendedto explain more fully ourdecision.
In this specialcivilaction forprohibition filed on October29, 1970, petitioner,after
setting forth his beinga resident ofArayat,Pampanga,and his candidacy forthe position
of delegate to the ConstitutionalConvention,alleged that respondent Commission on
Elections,by a telegramsent to himfive days previously,informed himthat his
certificate of candidacywas givendue course butprohibited himfromusing jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loudspeakers,an orderwhich,according
to him, is "violative of[his]constitutionalright ...to freedomof speech." 1
There being
no plain, speedy andadequate remedy,accordingto petitioner,he would seeka writ of
prohibition,at the same time praying fora preliminary injunction.On the very next day,
this Court adopted a resolutionrequiring respondent Commission on Electionsto file an
answernot laterthan November2,1970, at the same time setting the case forhearing for
TuesdayNovember3,1970. No preliminary injunction was issued.There was no denial
in the answerfiled by respondent on November2,1970, ofthe factualallegations set
forth in the petition,but the justificationforthe prohibitionwas premised on a provision
of the ConstitutionalConvention Act, 2
whichmade it unlawfulfor candidates"to
purchase,produce,requestordistribute sample ballots,orelectoralpropaganda gadgets
such as pens,lighters,fans(ofwhatevernature),flashlights,athletic goodsormaterials,
wallets,bandanas,shirts,hats,matches,cigarettes,and the like,whetherofdomestic or

55. foreign origin." 3
It was its contention that the jingle proposedto be used by petitioneris
the recorded ortapedvoice ofa singerand therefore a tangible propaganda material,
underthe above statutesubjectto confiscation.It prayed thatthe petition be denied for
lack of merit. The case was argued,on November3,1970, with petitionerappearing in
his behalfand AttorneyRomulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalfof respondent.
This Court,afterdeliberation and taking into account theneedforurgency,the election
being barely a week away,issued on the afternoon ofthe same day,a minute resolution
granting the writ ofprohibition,setting forth theabsence ofstatutory authority on thepart
of respondentto impose such a ban in the light ofthe doctrine ofejusdemgeneris as well
as the principle that the constructionplacedon the statute by respondent Commission on
Elections would raise seriousdoubtsabout its validity,consideringthe infringementof
the right offree speech ofpetitioner.Its concluding portion was worded thus:
"Accordingly,as prayedfor,respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited fromenforcing orimplementing ordemanding compliance with
its aforesaid orderbanning theuseofpoliticaljingles by candidates.This resolution is
immediately executory." 4
1. As made clearin ourresolution ofNovember3,1970, the question before us was one
of power.Respondent Commission on Electionswas called upon to justify such a
prohibition imposed onpetitioner.To repeat,no suchauthority was grantedby the
ConstitutionalConventionAct.It did contend,however,that one ofits provisions
referred to above makes unlawfulthe distribution ofelectoralpropaganda gadgets,
mention being made ofpens,lighters,fans,flashlights,athletic goodsormaterials,
wallets,bandanas,shirts,hats,matches,and cigarettes,and concludingwith the words
"and the like." 5
For respondentCommission,the last three wordssufficed to justify such
an order.We view the matterdifferently.What was done cannot merit ourapprovalunder
the well-known principle ofejusdemgeneris,the generalwords following any
enumeration being applicable only to thingsofthe same kind orclass as those
specifically referred to.6
It is quite apparent that what was contemplatedin the Act was
the distributionofgadgetsofthe kind referred to as a means ofinducement to obtain a
favorable vote forthe candidateresponsible forits distribution.
The more serious objection,however,to the ruling ofrespondentCommission was its
failure to manifest fealty to a cardinalprinciple of construction that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its beingin consonance with,ratherthanrepugnant to,any
constitutionalcommand orprescription. 7
Thus,certain AdministrativeCode provisions
were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets ofthe
fundamentallaw." 8 The desirability ofremoving in that fashion the taint ofconstitutional
infirmity from legislative enactmentshas alwayscommended itself.The judiciary may
even strain the ordinary meaning ofwords to avert any collision betweenwhat a statute
provides andwhat the Constitution requires.The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutionaldefects.To paraphrase Justice Cardozo,ifat all
possible,the conclusion reachedmust avoid not only that it is unconstitutional,but also
grave doubtsupon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission ofhis side ofthe controversy,then,has in its favorobeisance to
such a cardinalprecept.The viewadvancedby himthat if the above provisionofthe
ConstitutionalConventionAct were to lend itselfto the viewthat the useofthe taped
jingle could be prohibited,then the challenge ofunconstitutionality would be difficult to
meet. For, in unequivocallanguage,the Constitution prohibitsan abridgment offree
speech ora free press.It has beenourconstant holding that thispreferred freedomcalls
all the more for the utmost respect when whatmay be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningfulthe equally vitalright ofsuffrage.What
respondent Commission did,in effect,was to impose censorship on petitioner,an evil
against which this constitutionalright is directed.Norcould respondent Commission
justify its action by the assertion that petitioner,if he would not resort to taped jingle,
would be free, eitherby himself or throughothers,to use his mobile loudspeakers.
Precisely,the constitutionalguarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a
speakerhaving hissay,but notperpetuating what is uttered by himthroughtapeorother
mechanicalcontrivances.Ifthis Court were to sustain respondentCommission,then the
effect would hardly be distinguishable froma previous restraint.That cannot be validly
done.It would negate indirectly whatthe Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept ofthe Constitutionas the fundamentallaw,setting forththe
criterion for the validity ofany public act whetherproceeding fromthe highestofficialor
the lowest functionary,is a postulate ofoursystemofgovernment.That is to manifest
fealty to the rule oflaw, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmostrung
in the legalhierarchy.The three departmentsofgovernment in the discharge ofthe
functionswith which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its
commands.Whateverlimits it imposes must be observed.Congressin the enactment of
statutesmust everbe on guard lest therestrictionson its authority,whethersubstantive or
formal, be transcended.The Presidency in the execution ofthe laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains.In its taskofapplying thelawto the facts as foundin deciding
cases,the judiciary is called uponto maintain inviolate what is decreed bythe
fundamentallaw.Even its powerof judicial review to pass uponthe validity ofthe actsof
the coordinatebranches in the courseofadjudication is a logicalcorollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount.It overridesany governmentalmeasure that
fails to live up to its mandates.Thereby there is a recognition ofits being thesupreme
law.
To be more specific,the competence entrustedto respondent Commission was aptly
summed up by the presentChiefJustice thus:"Lastly,as the branchof
the executive department — althoughindependent ofthe President— to which the
Constitution hasgiventhe 'exclusive charge'ofthe 'enforcement andadministration ofall
laws relative to the conduct ofelections,'the powerofdecision ofthe Commission is
limited to purely 'administrativequestions.'"11
It has beenthe constant holding ofthis
Court,as it could not have been otherwise,that respondent Commission cannot exercise
any authorityin conflict with or outsideofthe law,and there is no higherlaw than the
Constitution.12
Ourdecisionswhich liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by
the thought that only thusmay its responsibility underthe Constitution to insure free,
orderly and honestelectionsbe adequately fulfilled. 13
There could be no justification
then forlending approvalto any ruling ororderissuingfromrespondent Commission,the
effect of which would be to nullify so vitala constitutionalright as free speech.
Petitioner's case,as was obviousfromthe time of its filing, stoodon solid footing.

56. WHEREFORE, as set forth in ourresolutionofNovember3, 1970, respondent
Commission is permanently restrained and prohibitedfromenforcing orimplementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid orderbanningthe use ofpoliticaltaped jingles.
Without pronouncement asto costs.
Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Castro,Barredo andVillamor,JJ.,
concur.
Dizon and Makasiar,JJ.,are on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs.Ferrer 1
on the unconstitutionality ofthe
challenged provisionsofthe 1971 ConstitutionalConventionAct,Iconcurwith the views
of Mr. Justice Fernandoin the main opinion that "there could be no justification....for
lending approvalto any ruling ororderissuingfromrespondent Commission,the effect
of which would be to nullify so vitala constitutionalright as free speech." Iwould only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls forapplication ofthe constitutionaltest ofreasonableness
required by the due process clauseofourConstitution.Originally,respondent
Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate ofa
"mobile unit — roaming around andannouncing a meeting and the name ofthe candidate
... is prohibited.Ifit is used only fora certain place fora meeting and he uses his sound
systemat the meeting itself,there is no violation." 2Actingupon petitioner'sapplication,
however,respondent Commission ruled that"the use ofa soundsystemby anyone be he
a candidate ornot whetherstationary orpart ofa mobile unit is not prohibitedby the
1971 ConstitutionalConvention Act"but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamersorpostersplaced in carriers."
Respondent Commission'snarrowviewis that "the use ofa 'jingle,' a verbally recorded
form of election propaganda,is no different fromthe use ofa 'streamer'or 'poster,'a
printed formof election propaganda,and bothforms ofelection advertisementfall under
the prohibition contained in sec.12of R.A. 6132," and "the recorddisc ortape where
said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject ofconfiscation bythe respondent
Commission underpar.(E) of sec.12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age ofthe
electronically recorded ortaped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminatedthrough a mobile sound systemthroughout thecandidate'sdistrict,
respondent Commission would outlaw"recorded ortapedvoices"and would exact ofthe
candidate that he make use ofthe mobile sound systemonly by personal
transmission andrepeatedly personally singhis "jingle" ordeliverhis spoken message to
the voters even ifhe loses his voice in the processoremploy anotherperson to do so
personally even ifthis should provemore expensive and lesseffective than usinga
recorded ortaped voice.
Respondent Commission'sstricturesclearly violate,therefore,petitioner's basic freedom
of speechand expression.They cannot pass the constitutionaltest ofreasonablenessin
that they go farbeyond a reasonable relation to thepropergovernmentalobject andare
manifestly unreasonable,oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofaras the placing ofthe candidate's"streamers"orposterson the mobile unit or
carrier is concerned,respondent Commission'sadverseruling that the same falls within
the prohibition ofsection 12,paragraphs(C)and (E) has not beenappealedby petitioner.
I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use ofa 'jingle' ... is no
different from the use ofa 'streamer'or 'poster'"in that these both representforms of
election advertisements — to make the candidateand thefact ofhis candidacy knownto
the voters — is correct,but its conclusionis not.The campaign appealof the "jingle" is
through the voters'ears while that ofthe "streamers"is throughthe voters'eyes.But if it
be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles"abridgesunreasonably,oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate'sright offree expression,even thoughsuch "jingles" may
occasionally offend some sensitive ears,the Commission'sban on"streamers"being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit orcarrier, which "streamers"are less likely to
offend the voters'sense ofsightshould likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressiveand arbitrary curtailment ofthe candidate's same constitutionalright.
The intent ofthe law to minimize election expensesas invoked by respondent
Commission,laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost ofthe candidate's
constitutionalrights in the earnest pursuit ofhis candidacy,but is to be fulfilled in the
strict and effective implementation ofthe Act'slimitation in section 12(G) on the total
expenditures that may be made by a candidate orby anotherperson with his knowledge
and consent.
# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs.Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality ofthe
challenged provisionsofthe 1971 ConstitutionalConventionAct,Iconcurwith the views
of Mr. Justice Fernandoin the main opinion that "there could be no justification....for
lending approvalto any ruling ororderissuingfromrespondent Commission,the effect
of which would be to nullify so vitala constitutionalright as free speech." Iwould only
add the following observations:
This case once again calls forapplication ofthe constitutionaltestofreasonableness
required by the due process clauseofourConstitution.Originally,respondent
Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate ofa
"mobile unit — roaming around andannouncing a meeting and the name ofthe candidate
... is prohibited.Ifit is used only fora certain place fora meeting and he uses his sound
systemat the meeting itself,there is no violation." 2
Actingupon petitioner'sapplication,
however,respondent Commission ruled that"the use ofa soundsystemby anyone be he
a candidate ornot whetherstationary orpart ofa mobile unit is not prohibitedby the

57. 1971 ConstitutionalConvention Act"but imposed the condition — "provided that there
are no jingles and no streamersorpostersplaced in carriers."
Respondent Commission'snarrowviewis that "the use ofa 'jingle,' a verbally recorded
form of election propaganda,is no different fromthe use ofa 'streamer'or 'poster,'a
printed formof election propaganda,and bothforms ofelection advertisementfall under
the prohibition contained in sec.12of R.A. 6132," and "the recorddisc ortape where
said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject ofconfiscation bythe respondent
Commission underpar.(E) of sec.12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age ofthe
electronically recorded ortaped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminatedthrough a mobile sound systemthroughout thecandidate'sdistrict,
respondent Commission would outlaw"recorded ortapedvoices"and would exact ofthe
candidate that he make use ofthe mobile sound systemonly by personal
transmission andrepeatedly personally singhis "jingle" ordeliverhis spoken message to
the voters even ifhe loses his voice in the processoremploy anotherperson to do so
personally even ifthis should provemore expensive and lesseffective than usinga
recorded ortaped voice.
Respondent Commission'sstricturesclearly violate,therefore,petitioner's basic freedom
of speechand expression.They cannot pass the constitutionaltest ofreasonablenessin
that they go farbeyond a reasonable relation to thepropergovernmentalobject andare
manifestly unreasonable,oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofaras the placing ofthe candidate's"streamers"orposterson the mobile unit or
carrier is concerned,respondent Commission'sadverseruling that the same falls within
the prohibition ofsection 12,paragraphs(C)and (E) has not beenappealedby petitioner.
I would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use ofa 'jingle' ... is no
different from the use ofa 'streamer'or 'poster'"in that these both representforms of
election advertisements — to make the candidateand thefact ofhis candidacy knownto
the voters — is correct,but its conclusionis not.The campaign appealofthe "jingle" is
through the voters'ears while that ofthe "streamers"is throughthe voters'eyes.But if it
be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles"abridgesunreasonably,oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate'sright offree expression,even thoughsuch "jingles" may
occasionally offend some sensitive ears,the Commission'sban on"streamers"being
placed on the candidate's mobile unit orcarrier, which "streamers"are less likely to
offend the voters'sense ofsightshould likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressiveand arbitrary curtailment ofthe candidate's same constitutionalright.
The intent ofthe law to minimize election expensesas invoked by respondent
Commission,laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost ofthe candidate's
constitutionalrights in the earnest pursuit ofhis candidacy,but is to be fulfilled in the
strict and effective implementation ofthe Act'slimitation in section 12(G) on the total
expenditures that may be made by a candidate orby anotherperson with his knowledge
and consent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31,1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE
BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of FirstInstance of Manila,
BranchIV, INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.)
INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
SolicitorGeneral Felix Q.Antonioand SolicitorBernardoP.Pardo forpetitioners.
Sycip,Salazar,Luna,Manalo & Feliciano forprivate respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition forcertiorari with preliminary injunction to reviewthe decision
rendered by respondent judge,in Civil Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No.
52383 both ofthe Court ofFirst InstanceofManila.
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondentsherein,are engaged in the
manufacture,sale and distribution offilled milk productsthroughoutthe Philippines.The
productsofprivate respondent,Consolidated PhilippinesInc.are marketed and sold
underthe brand Darigold whereas those ofprivate respondent,GeneralMilk Company
(Phil.), Inc., underthe brand "Liberty;"and thoseofprivate respondent,MilkIndustries
Inc., underthe brand"Dutch Baby." Private respondent,Institute ofEvaporatedFilled
Milk Manufacturersofthe Philippines,is a corporation organized forthe principal
purpose ofupholding andmaintaining at its highest the standards oflocalfilled milk
industry,ofwhich all the otherprivate respondentsare members.
Civil Case No.52276 is an action fordeclaratory reliefwith ex-parte petition for
preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray foran adjudicationoftheirrespective
rights and obligationsin relation to the enforcement ofSection 169of the TaxCode
against theirfilled milk products.
The controversy arose fromthe orderofdefendant,CommissionerofInternalRevenue
nowpetitionerherein,requiring plaintiffs-private respondents to withdrawfromthe
market all of theirfilled milk productswhich do not bearthe inscription required by
Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days fromreceipt ofthe orderwith the
explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs'private respondentsto comply with said order
will result in the institutionofthe necessaryactionagainstany violationofthe aforesaid
order.Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:
Section 169. Inscriptionto be placedon skimmed milk. — All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whateverform, from which
the fatty part has beenremoved totally orin part,sold orput on sale in
the Philippines shallbe clearly and legibly marked on its immediate
containers,and in all the languagein which such containersare
marked, with the words,"This milk is not suitable fornourishmentfor
infants less than one yearofage," orwith otherequivalent words.

58. The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction datedFebruary16,1963 restraining the
Commissionerof InternalRevenue fromrequiring plaintiffs'private respondents to print
on the labels oftheirrifled milk productsthe words,"This milk is not suitable for
nourishment forinfantslessthanone yearofage orwords ofsimilar import, " as directed
by the above quoted provision ofLaw,and fromtaking any action to enforce the above
legal provision against the plaintiffs'private respondentsin connection with theirrifled
milk products,pendingthe finaldetermination ofthe case,Civil Case No. 52276, on the
merits.
On July 25, 1969, however,the Office of the SolicitorGeneral brought an appealfrom
the said orderby way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 1
In viewthereof,the respondent
court in the meantime suspended disposition ofthese cases but in viewof the absenceof
any injunction orrestrainingorderfromthe Supreme Court,it resumed action on them
untiltheir final disposition therein.
SpecialCivil Action No.52383, on the otherhand,is an action forprohibitionand
injunction with a petition forpreliminary injunction.Petitionerstherein praythatthe
respondent FairTrade Board desistfromfurtherproceeding with FTBI.S. No. I . entitled
"Antonio R.de Joya vs.Institute ofEvaporatedMilkManufacturersofthe Philippines,
etc." pendingfinaldetermination ofCivil Case No. 52276. The facts ofthis specialcivil
action showthaton December7,1962, Antonio R.de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco,both
in theirindividualcapacities and in theircapacitiesas Public RelationsCounseland
President ofthe Philippine Association ofNutrition,respectively,filed FTB I.S. No.1
with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement,mislabeling and/ormisbranding.
Among otherthings,the complaint filed include the charge ofomitting to state in their
labels any statement sufficient to Identify theirfilled milk productsas "imitation milk" or
as an imitation of genuine cowsmilk. and omitting to mark the immediate containersof
theirfilled milk products with the words:"Thismilk is not suitable fornourishment for
infants less than one yearofage orwith otherequivalentwordsas required underSection
169 of the TaxCode. The Board proceeded to hearthe complaint untilit received the writ
of preliminary injunction issuedby the Court ofFirst Instanceon March 19,1963.
Upon agreement ofthe parties,Civil Case No. 52276 and SpecialCivil Action No.52383
were heard jointly being intimately related with each other,with common facts and issues
being also involvedtherein.On April16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision,
the dispositive part ofwhich readsas follows:
Wherefore,judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No.52276:
(a) Perpetually restrainingthe defendant,CommissionerofInternal
Revenue,his agents,oremployeesfromrequiring plaintiffs to print on
the labels oftheirfilled milk products the words:"This milk is not
suitable fornourishment forinfants lessthan one yearofage" or
words with equivalent import and declaring asnunand void and
without authority in law,the orderof said defendantdatedSeptember
28, 1961, AnnexA of the complaint,and the Ruling ofthe Secretary
of Finance,dated November12,1962, AnnexG of the complaint; and
In SpecialCivil ActionNo.52383:
(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent FairTrade Board,its agents
or employees fromcontinuingin the investigation ofthe complaints
against petitioners docketed asFTBI.S. No.2, or any chargesrelated
to the manufacture orsale by the petitionersoftheirfilled milk
productsanddeclaring asnullthe proceedingsso farundertakenby
the respondentBoard on said complaints.(pp.20-21, Rollo).
From the above decisionofthe respondentcourt,the CommissionerofInternalRevenue
and the Fair Trade Board joined togetherto file the present petitionforcertiorariwith
preliminary injunction,assigningthe following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION
169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
IMPLICATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION
169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAXPURPOSE, AND
THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY
TO ENFORCE THE SAMEAND THAT THE PROPER
AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE
FOOD ANDDRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH ANDTHE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED
FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
POWER TO INVESTIGATE ANDTO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS
OF FOOD LAWSIS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG
INSPECTION, THE FOOD ANDDRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED
MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING AND/ORMISLEADING
ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp,4-5,
Rollo).
The lower court did not errin ruling that Section 169of the TaxCode has been repealed
by implication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, togetherwith Section 141(which
imposed a Specific taxon skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of
skimmed milk without payment ofthe specific taxand without the legendrequired by
Section 169). However,Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1ofRepublic Act
No. 344, and Section 177, by Section 1 ofRepublic Act No. 463. By the express repealof

59. Sections 141and 177, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision,without a tax
purpose,ora penalsanction.
Moreover,it seems apparentthat Section 169of the TaxCode does not apply to filled
milk. The use ofthe specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnoteand
"condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section,would restrict the scope ofthe
generalclause "allmilk, in whateverform,from which the fatty pat has beenremoved
totally orin part." In otherwords,the generalclause is restricted bythe specific term
"skimmed milk" underthe familiar rule of ejusdemgeneris thatgeneraland unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particularterms they followin the statute.
Skimmed milk is different fromfilled milk. According to the "Definitions,Standardsof
Purity,Rules and Regulations ofthe Board ofFood Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in
whateverformfrom which the fatty part has beenremoved.Filled milk, on the other
hand,is any milk, whetherornot condensed,evaporatedconcentrated,powdered,dried,
dessicated,to which has been addedorwhich has beenblendedorcompounded with any
fat oroil otherthan milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation orsemblance of
milk cream orskim milk." The difference,therefore,between skimmed milk and filled
milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removedwhile in the latter,the fatty part
is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oilorcorn oil or both.It
cannot then be readily orsafely assumed that Section 169applies both to skimmed milk
and filled milk.
The Board of Food Inspection way backin 1961 rendered an opinionthat filled milk does
not come within the purviewofSection 169, it being a product distinct fromthose
specified in the said Section since the removed fat portionofthe milk has been replaced
with coconut oiland Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p.58,Rollo). This
opinion bolstersthe Court'sstandas to its interpretation ofthe scope ofSection 169.
Opinions and rulingsofofficials of the government called upon to execute orimplement
administrative laws command much respect andweight.(Asturias SugarCentralInc.vs.
Commissionerof Customs,G. R. No. L-19337, September30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan,
et.al. vs.The Municipality ofPagbilao et.al.,L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887;
Grapilon vs.MunicipalCouncilofCarigara L-12347, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 103).
This Court is, likewise, induced to the beliefthat filled milk is suitable fornourishment
for infants ofall ages.The Petitionersthemselvesadmittedthat:"the filled milk products
of the petitioners(nowprivate respondents)are safe,nutritious,wholesome and suitable
for feeding infants ofallages" (p.44, Rollo) and that "upto the present,Filipino infants
fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered anydefects,illness ordisease
attributable to theirhaving beenfed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
There would seem,therefore,to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable forfeeding
infants ofall ages.Being so,the declarationrequired bySection 169of the TaxCode that
filled milk is not suitable fornourishmentforinfants lessthanone yearofage would,in
effect,constitute a deprivationofpropertywithout due.processoflaw.
Section 169 is being enforced only against respondentmanufacturersoffilled milk
product andnot asagainstmanufacturers,distributorsorsellers ofcondensed skimmed
milk such as SIMILAC,SMA,BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which,as admitted by
the petitioner,the fatty parthas been removedand substituted with vegetable orcorn oil.
The enforcement ofSection 169against the private respondentsonly butnot against other
personssimilarly situated asthe privaterespondentsamountsto an unconstitutional
denialof the equalpro petition ofthe laws,forthe law, equally enforced,would similarly
offend againstthe Constitution.Yick Wo vs.Hopkins,118U.S. 356,30 L. ed.220).
As stated in the early part ofthis decision,with the repealofSections 141and 177 of the
Tax Code,Section 169 has lost its taxpurpose.Since Section 169is devoid ofany tax
purpose,petitionerCommissionernecessarily lost his authority to enforce the same.This
was so held by his predecessorimmediately afterSections 141and 177 were repealed in
General Circular No. V-85 as statedin paragraphIXof the Partial Stipulation offacts
entered into by the parties,to wit:
... As the act ofsewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific
tax thereon is no longerunlawfuland the enforcement ofthe
requirement in regard to the placing ofthe properlegend onits
immediate containersis a subjectwhich doesnotcome within the
jurisdiction ofthe Bureau ofInternalRevenue,the penalprovisionsof
Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by Republic Act
No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).
Petitioner's contentionthathe stillhas jurisdiction to enforce Section169by virtue of
Section 3 ofthe Tax Code which provides that the BureauofInternalRevenue shallalso
"give effect to and administerthe supervisoryand police powerconferredto it by this
Code or otherlaws" is untenable.The Bureau ofInternalRevenue may claimpolice
poweronly when necessary in the enforcement ofits principalpowers andduties
consisting ofthe "collectionofall nationalinternalrevenue taxes,fees andcharges,and
the enforcement ofall forfeitures,penaltiesandfines connected therewith."The
enforcement ofSection 169 entails the promotionofthe health ofthe nationand is thus
unconnectedwith any taxpurpose.This is the exclusive function ofthe Foodand Drug
Administration ofthe DepartmentofHealth as provided forin Republic Act No.3720. In
particular,Republic Act No.3720 provides:
Section 9. ... It shall be the duty ofthe Board (Food andDrug
Inspection),conformably with the rules and regulations,to hold
hearings and conduct investigationsrelative to matters touching the
Administration ofthis Act,to investigate processes offood,drugand
cosmetic manufacture andto subjectreports to theFood and Drug
Administrator,recommending foodanddrug standardsforadoption.
Said Board shallalso performsuch additionalfunctions,properly
within the scope ofthe administration thereof,as maybe assigned to it
by the Food and Drug Administrator.The decisionsofthe Board shall
be advisory to the Food andDrug Administrator.
Section 26. ...

60. xxx xxx xxx
(c) Hearing authorized orrequired by this Act shallbe conductedby
the Board of Food and Drug Inspectionwhich shallsubmit
recommendation to the Foodand Drug Administrator.
(d) When it appearsto the Foodand Drug Administratorfromthe
reports ofthe Food andDrug Laboratory thatany article offood or
any drug orcosmetic secured pursuantto Section 28ofthis Act is
adulteratedorbrandedhe shallcause notice thereofto be givento the
person orpersons concerned andsuch person orpersonsshallbe given
an opportunityto subject evidence impeachingthe correctnessofthe
finding or charge in question.
(e) When a violation ofany provisionsofthis Act comes to the
knowledge ofthe Food and Drug Administratorofsuchcharacterthat
a criminal prosecutionought to be institutedagainst the offender,he
shallcertify the facts to the Secretary ofJustice through theSecretary
of Health,togetherwith the chemists'report,the findings ofthe Board
of Food and Drug Inspection,orotherdocumentary evidence on which
the charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shallbe construedas requiring the Foodand
Drug Administratorto certify forprosecution pursuant to
subparagraph(e)hereof,minor violations ofthis Act wheneverhe
believes that public interest will be adequately servedby a suitable
written notice orwarning.
The aforequoted provisions oflawclearly showthat petitioners,Commissionerof
InternalRevenue and the FairTrade Board,are without jurisdiction to investigateand to
prosecute allegedmisbranding,mislabeling and/ormisleading advertisementsoffilled
milk. The jurisdiction on the matterscited is vestedupon theBoard ofFood and Drug
inspectionand theFood andDrug Administrator,with the Secretary ofHealth and the
Secretary ofJustice,also interveningin case criminalprosecution hasto be instituted.To
hold that the petitionershave also jurisdiction aswould be the result were theirinstant
petition granted,would only cause overlapping ofpowersand functionslikely to produce
confusionand conflict ofofficial action which is neitherpracticalnordesirable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed fromis hereby affirmed en toto.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee,(Chairman),Fernandez,Melencio-Herrera,JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78413 November 8,1989
CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., Representedby its President,Rogelio
Q. Lim, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA, INC., respondents.
Efren M. Cacatian forpetitioners.
San Jose,Enrique,Lacas,Santosand Borje forprivaterespondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition forreviewon certiorari seeks the nullification ofthe decision ofthe Court of
Appeals ofDecember5,1986 in CA-G.R. CV No.06685 which reversed the decision of
the trial court,and its resolutiondated May5,1987 denying petitioner'smotion for
reconsideration.
The following antecedent factsgenerative ofthe present controversy are not in dispute.
Sometime in 1953, La Tondeña,Inc.(hereafter,LTIfor short)registeredwith the
Philippine Patent Office pursuantto Republic Act No.623 1 the 350 c.c. white flint
bottles it has beenusing forits gin popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel".This
registration was subsequently renewedon December4,1974. 2
On November10, 1981, LTI filed Civil Case No.2668 for injunction and damagesin the
then Branch 1,Court of First Instance ofIsabela against CagayanValley Enterprises,Inc.
(Cagayan,forbrevity)forusing the 350 c.c.,white flint bottles with the mark "La
Tondeña Inc."and "Ginebra San Miguel" stampedorblown-in therein by filling the same
with Cagayan'sliquorproduct bearing the label"SonnyBoy" forcommercialsale and
distribution,without LTI's written consent andin violation ofSection 2of Republic Act
No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No.5700. On the same date,LTI furtherfiled
an ex parte petitionforthe issuance ofa writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant therein. 3
On November16, 1981, the court a quo issueda temporary
restraining orderagainstCagayan andits officers and employeesfromusing the 350c.c.
bottles with the marks "La Tondeña" and"Ginebra San Miguel." 4
Cagayan,in its answer, 5
alleged the following defenses:

61. 1. LTI has no cause ofaction due to its failure to comply with Section
21 of Republic Act No.166 which requires the giving ofnotice thatits
aforesaid marks are registered by displayingand printingthe words
"Registered in the Phil.Patent Office" or"Reg Phil. Pat.Off.," hence
no suit,civil or criminal, can be filed against Cagayan;
2. LTI is not entitled to any protection underRepublic Act No.623, as
amended by Republic Act No.5700, because its products,consisting
of hard liquor,are not among those contemplatedtherein.What is
protectedundersaid laware beverageslike Coca-cola,RoyalTru-
Orange,Lem-o-Lime and similar beveragesthe bottleswhereofbear
the words "Reg Phil.Pat. Off.;"
3. No reservation ofownership on its bottleswas made by LTI in its sales invoicesnor
does it require any deposit forthe retention ofsaid bottles;and
4. There was no infringement ofthe goods orproductsofLTI since Cagayanusesits own
labels and trademarkon its product.
In its subsequentpleadings,Cagayan contendedthat the bottlesthey are usingare not the
registered bottlesofLTI since the formerwas using the bottlesmarked with "La
Tondeña,Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" butwithoutthe words"propertyof" indicated
in said bottles asstatedin the sworn statement attached to the certificateofregistrationof
LTI for said bottles.
On December18, 1981, the lowercourt issueda writ ofpreliminary injunction,upon the
filing ofa bond by LTIin the sumof P50,000.00, enjoining Cagayan,its officers and
agents fromusing the aforesaid registeredbottlesofLTI. 6
Aftera protractedtrial,which entailed five (5) motions forcontempt filed by LTI against
Cagayan,the trialcourt rendered judgment 7
in favorofCagayan,ruling that the
complaint does not state a cause ofaction andthat Cagayanwas notguilty ofcontempt.
Furthermore,it awarded damagesin favorofCagayan.
LTI appealed to the Court ofAppealswhich,on December5,1986 rendered a decisionin
favorof said appellant,the dispositive portion whereofreads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed fromis hereby SET ASIDE and
judgment is rendered permanently enjoining thedefendant,its officers
and agentsfromusing the 350c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of
ownership "La Tondeña,Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel",blown-in or
stamped on said bottlesas containers fordefendant'sproducts.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by thetrialcourt is therefore
made permanent.
Defendant is orderedto pay the amountsof:
(1) P15,000.00 as nominalor temperate damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney'sfees; and
(4) Costs ofsuit. 8
On December23, 1986, Cagayan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the respondentcourt in its resolution dated May 5,1987, hence the present petition,with
the following assignmentoferrors:
I. The Court ofAppeals gravely erred in the
decision granting that "there is,therefore,no need
for plaintiff to display the words "Reg.Phil.Pat.
Off." in orderfor it to succeedin bringing any
injunction suit against defendantforthe illegal use
of its bottles.Rep.Act No.623, as amended by
Rep. Act No.5700 simply provides and requires
that the marks or names shallbe stamped ormarked
on the containers."
II. The Court ofAppeals gravely erred in deciding
that "neitheris there a reason to distinguish
between the two (2)sets ofmarked bottles-those
which contain the marks "PropertyofLa Tondeña,
Inc., Ginebra San Miguel," and thosesimply
marked La Tondeña Inc.,Ginebra San Miguel'.By
omitting the words "propertyof" plaintiffdid not
open itselfto violation ofRepublic Act No.623, as
amended,as havingregistered its marks ornames it
is protected underthe law."
III. The Honorable Court ofAppeals gravely erred
in deciding that the words"La Tondeña,Inc.and
Ginebra San Miguel" are sufficient notice to the
defendant which should haveinquired fromthe
plaintiff or the Philippine Patent Office,if it was
lawful forit to re-use the empty bottlesofthe
plaintiff.
IV. The Honorable Court ofAppeals gravely erred
in deciding that defendant-appellee cannot claim
good faith fromusing the bottlesofplaintiffwith

62. marks "La Tondeña,Inc." alone,short forthe
descriptioncontained in the sworn statementofMr.
Carlos Palanca,Jr., which was a requisite ofits
original and renewalregistrations.
V. The Honorable Court ofAppealsgravely erred
in accommodating the appealon the dismissals of
the five (5) contempt charges.
VI. The Honorable Court ofAppeals gravely erred
in deciding that the award ofdamagesin favorof
the defendant-appellee,petitionerherein,is not in
order.Instead it awarded nominalortemperate,
exemplary damages and attorney's feeswithout
proofofbad faith. 9
The pertinent provisionsofRepublic Act No.623, as amended by Republic Act No.
5700, provides:
SECTION 1. Persons engagedorlicensed to engage in the
manufacture,bottling,orselling ofsoda water,mineral oraerated
waters,cider,milk, creamorotherlawful beveragesin bottles,boxes,
casks,kegs,orbarrels and othersimilar containers,orin the
manufacturing,compressingorselling ofgasessuch as oxygen,
acytelene,nitrogen,carbondioxide ammonia, hydrogen,chloride,
helium, sulphur,dioxide,butane,propane,freon,melthylchloride or
similar gases containedin steelcylinders,tanks,flasks,accumulators
or similar containers,with the name orthe names oftheirprincipals or
products,orothermarks ofownership stampedormarked thereon,
may registerwith the Philippine Patent Office a descriptionofthe
names ormarks, and the purpose forwhich the containerssomarked
and used by them,underthe same conditions,rules,and regulations,
made applicable by lawor regulation to the issuance oftrademarks.
SEC. 2. It shallbe unlawful for any person,without the written
consent ofthe manufacturer,bottler,orseller,who has succesfully
registered the marks ofownership in accordance with the provisionsof
the next preceding section,to fill such bottles,boxes,kegs,barrels,
steelcylinders,tanks,flasks,accumulatorsorothersimilar containers
so marked orstamped,forthe purpose ofsale,orto sell,disposed of,
buy ortraffic in, or wantonly destroy thesame,whetherfilled ornot,
to use the same,fordrinking vesselsor glassesordrain pipes,
foundationpipes,forany otherpurpose thanthatregisteredby the
manufacturer,bottlerorseller.Any violation ofthis sectionshallbe
punished by a fine ofnot more than one thousandpesosor
imprisonment ofnot more than one yearorboth.
SEC. 3. The use by any personotherthan the registeredmanufacturer,
bottlerorseller, without written permissionofthe latterofany such
bottle,cask,barrel,keg, box, steelcylinders,tanks,flask,
accumulators,orothersimilar containers,orthe possessionthereof
without written permission ofthe manufacturer,by any junkdealeror
dealerin casks,barrels,kegs boxes,steelcylinders,tanks,flasks,
accumulators orothersimilar containers,the same being duly marked
or stamped and registered asherein provided,shallgive rise to a prima
facie presumptionthatsuch use orpossessionis unlawful.
The above-quotedprovisionsgrantprotection to a qualified manufacturerwho
successfully registeredwith the Philippine Patent Office its duly stampedormarked
bottles,boxes,casks andothersimilar containers.The mere use ofregisteredbottlesor
containerswithout the written consent ofthe manufactureris prohibited,the only
exceptions being whentheyare usedas containersfor"sisi," bagoong," "patis"and
similar native products. 10
It is an admitted fact that herein petitionerCagayan buysfromjunkdealers and retailers
bottles which bearthe marks ornames La Tondeña Inc." and"Ginebra San Miguel" and
uses themas containersforits own liquorproducts.The contention ofCagayan that the
aforementioned bottles without the words"property of" indicatedthereonare not the
registered bottlesofLTI, since they do notconformwith the statementordescription in
the supportingaffidavitsattachedto the originalregistration certificateand renewal,is
untenable.
Republic Act No.623 which governstheregistrationofmarked bottles and containers
merely requires that the bottles,in orderto be eligible forregistration,must be stamped
or marked with the names ofthe manufacturers orthe names oftheirprincipals or
products,orothermarks ofownership.No drawingsorlabels are required but,instead,
two photographsofthe container,duly signed by theapplicant,showingclearly and
legibly the names and othermarks ofownership sought to be registeredand a bottle
showing the name orothermark orownership,irremovably stamped ormarked,shallbe
submitted.11
The term"Name or OtherMarkof Ownership" 12 means the name ofthe applicant orthe
name ofhis principal, orof the product,orothermark of ownership.The secondsetof
bottles ofLTI without the words"property of"substantially complied with the
requirements ofRepublic Act No.623, as amended,since they bearthe name of the
principal,La TondeñaInc.,and ofits product,Ginebra San Miguel.The omitted words
"propertyof" are not ofsuchvitalindispensability such that the omission thereofwill
remove the bottles fromthe protection ofthe law.The ownerofa trade-mark ortrade-
name, and in this case the marked containers,doesnot abandon it by making minor
modifications in the mark orname itself. 13
With much more reason will this be true
where what is involved is the mere omission ofthe words "property of"since even
without said words the ownership ofthe bottles is easily Identifiable.The words "La
Tondeña Inc."and "Ginebra San Miguel" stampedon the bottles,evenwithout the words
"propertyof," are sufficient notice to the public that those bottles somarked are owned
by LTI.

63. The claim of petitionerthat hard liquoris not included underthe term"otherlawful
beverages"as provided in Section IofRepublic Act No.623, as amended by Republic
Act No.5700, is without merit. The title of the law itself, which reads " An Act to
Regulate the Use ofDuly Stamped orMarked Bottles,Boxes,Casks,Kegs,Barrels and
OtherSimilar Containers" clearly showsthe legislative intent to give protection to all
marked bottles and containersofalllawful beveragesregardlessof the nature oftheir
contents.The words "otherlawfulbeverages" is used in its generalsense,referring to all
beveragesnotprohibitedby law.Beverage is defined as a liquororliquid for
drinking.14
Hard liquor, althoughregulated,is not prohibited by law,hence it is within
the purviewand coverage ofRepublic Act No.623, as amended.
Republic Act No.623, as amended,hasforits purpose theprotection ofthe health ofthe
generalpublic and the prevention ofthe spreadofcontagiousdiseases.It furtherseeksto
safeguardthe propertyrightsofan important sectorofPhilippine industry. 15 As held by
this Court in DestileriaAyala,Inc.vs.Tan Tay & Co., 16
the purpose ofthen Act3070,
was to afford a person a means ofIdentifyingthe containers he usesin the manufacture,
preservation,packingorsale ofhis productsso that he may secure theirregistration with
the Bureau ofCommerce and Industry andthus prevent otherpersonsfromusing them.
Said Act 3070 was substantially reenactedas Republic Act No.623. 17
The proposition that Republic Act No.623, as amended,protects only the containersof
the soft drinks enumerated by petitionerand those similarthereto,is unwarranted and
specious.The rule ofejusdemgeneriscannotbe applied in this case.To limit the coverage
of the law only to thoseenumerated orofthe same kind orclass as those specifically
mentioned will defeat the very purpose ofthe law.Such rule of ejusdemgeneris is to be
resorted to only forthe purpose ofdetermining what the intentofthe legislature wasin
enacting the law.If that intent clearly appears fromotherparts ofthe law,and suchintent
thus clearly manifested is contrary to theresult which would be reachedby the
appreciation ofthe rule of ejusdemgeneris, the lattermust give way. 18
Moreover,the aboveconclusionsare supportedby the fact that the Philippine Patent
Office, which is the properand competent governmentagency vestedwith the authority
to enforce and implement Republic Act No.623, registered thebottlesofrespondent LTI
as containersforgin and issued in its name a certificate of registration with the following
findings:
It appearing,upon due examination that the applicantis entitled to
have the said MARKSORNAMES registered underR.A. No.623,
the said marks or names have been duly registered thisday in the
PATENT OFFICE underthe said Act,forgin,Ginebra San Miguel. 19
While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts,it is entitled to
great weight and consideration.The reasonforthis is that such construction comesfrom
the particularbranch ofgovernmentcalled uponto implement the particularlaw
involved.20
Just as impuissant is petitionerscontention that respondent court erred in holding that
there is no need forLTI to display the words"Reg Phil.Pat. Off." in orderto succeed in
its injunction suit againstCagayan forthe illegaluse ofthe bottles.To repeat,Republic
Act No.623 governs theregistrationofmarked bottles and containersandmerely
requires that the bottlesand/orcontainers be marked orstamped by thenames ofthe
manufacturerorthe names oftheirprincipals orproductsorothermarks ofownership.
The ownerupon registrationofits marked bottles,is vestedby lawwith an exclusive
right to use the same to the exclusion ofothers,except as a containerfornative products.
A violation ofsaid right gives use to a cause ofaction against the violatororinfringer.
While Republic Act No.623, as amended,providesfora criminal action in case of
violation,a civil action fordamages is properunderArticle 20 ofthe Civil Code which
provides that everypersonwho,contrary to law,wilfully ornegligently causesdamageto
another,shallindemnify the latterforthe same. This particularprovision ofthe Civil
Case was clearly meant to complement all legal provisionswhich may have inadvertently
failed to provide forindemnification orreparation ofdamages whenproperorcalled for.
In the language ofthe Code Commission "(t)he foregoing rule pervades the entire legal
system,and rendersit impossible that a person who suffersdamage because anotherhas
violated some legalprovisions,should find himselfwithout relief." 21
Moreover,under
Section 23 of Republic Act No.166, as amended, a person entitled to the exclusive use of
a registered markor tradename may recoverdamagesin a civil action fromany person
who infringes his rights.He may also,upon propershowing,be grantedinjunction.
It is true that the aforesaid lawon trademarks provides:
SEC. 21. Requirementsofnotice ofregistration oftrade-mark.-The
registrant ofa trade-mark,heretofore registered orregistered underthe
provisionsofthis Act,shallgive notice thathis markis registered by
displaying with the same as used thewords'Registeredin the
Philippines Patent Office'or 'Reg Phil. Pat. Off.'; and in any suit for
infringement underthis Act bya registrantfailing so to mark the
goodsbearing the registeredtrade-mark,no damages shallbe
recovered underthe provisionsofthis Act,unlessthe defendanthas
actualnotice ofthe registration.
Even assuming thatsaid provisionis applicable in this case,the failure ofLTI to make
said marking will not barcivil action againstpetitionerCagayan.The aforesaid
requirement is not a condition sine qua nonforfiling ofa civil action against the infringer
for otherreliefs to which the plaintiff may be entitled.The failure to give notice of
registration will not deprive the aggrievedpartyofa cause ofaction against the infringer
but,at the most,such failure may barrecovery ofdamages but only underthe provisions
of Republic Act No.166.
However,in this case an award ofdamages to LTIis ineluctably called for.Petitioner
cannot claimgood faith.The record shows that it had actualknowledge that thebottles

64. with the blown-in marks "La Tondeña Inc."and "Ginebra San Miguel" are duly
registered.In Civil Case No.102859 of the Court ofFirst Instance ofManila,entitled "La
Tondeña Inc.versus Diego Lim, doing businessunderthe name and style 'Cagayan
Valley Distillery,' " a decision was renderedin favorofplaintiff therein on the basisof
the admission and/oracknowledgmentmade by the defendant that the bottles marked
only with the words "La TondeñaInc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" are registered bottles
of LTI. 22
Petitionercannotavoid theeffect ofthe admissionand/oracknowledgment made by
Diego Lim in the said case.While a corporationis an entity separate anddistinct fromits
stock-holdersand fromothercorporationswith which it may be connected,where the
discretenessofits personality is used to defeat public convenience,justify wrong,protect
fraud,or defend crime, the law will regard the corporationas an association ofpersons,or
in the case oftwo corporations,merge theminto one.When the corporation is the
mere alterego orbusinessconduit ofa person,it may be disregaded. 23
Petitioner's claimthat it is separate anddistinct fromthe former Cagayan Valley
Distillery is belied by the evidenceon record.The following factswarrant the conclusion
that petitioner,as a corporate entity,and Cagayan Valley Distillery are one and the same.
to wit: (1) petitioneris being managedby Rogelio Lim, the son ofDiego Lim, the owner
and managerofCagayan Valley Distellery; (2) it is a family corporation; 24
(3) it is an
admitted fact that before petitionerwas incorporatedit was undera single
proprietorship;25
(4) petitioneris engagedin the same businessas Cagayan Valley
Distillery, the manufacture ofwines and liquors; and (5)the factory ofpetitioneris
located in the same place as the factory ofthe formerCagayan Valley Distillery.
It is thus clearthat herein petitioneris a mere continuation andsuccessorofCagayan
Valley Distillery. It is likewise indubitable thatthe admission made in the former case,as
earlier explained,is binding on it as cogentproofthat evenbefore thefiling of this case it
had actualknowledge that thebottlesin dispute were registeredcontainersofLTI As held
in La CampanaCoffee Factory,Inc.,et al.vs. Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La
Campana(KKM),et al.,26
where the main purpose in forming the corporationwas to
evade one'ssubsidiary liability fordamages in a criminal case,the corporationmay not
be heard to say that it has a personality separate anddistinct fromits members, because to
allow it to do so would be to sanctionthe use ofthe fiction ofcorporateentityas a shield
to furtheran end subversive ofjustice.
Anent the severalmotions ofprivate respondent LTIto have petitionercited for
contempt,we reject the argument ofpetitionerthat an appealfroma verdict ofacquittal
in a contempt,proceeding constitutesdouble jeopardy.A failure to do something ordered
by the court forthe benefit ofa party constitutescivilcontempt. 27
As we held inConverse
RubberCorporationvs.JacintoRubber& PlasticsCo.,Inc.:
...True it is that generally,contemptproceedingsare characterized as
criminal in nature,but the more accurate juridical concept is that
contempt proceedingsmay actually be eithercivil or criminal, even if
the distinctionbetween one and theothermay be so thin as to be
almost imperceptible.But it does exist in law. It is criminal when the
purpose is to vindicate the authority ofthe court andprotect its
outraged dignity.It is civil when there is failure to do something
ordered by a court to be done forthe benefit ofa party (3 Moran Rules
of Court,pp.343-344, 1970 ed.; see also Perkins vs.Directorof
Prisons,58 Phil. 272; Harden vs.DirectorofPrisons,81 Phil. 741.)
And with this distinction in mind,the fact that the injunctionin the
instant case is manifestly forthe benefit ofplaintiffs makes ofthe
contempt herein involved civil,not criminal. Accordingly, the
conclusionis inevitable that appelleeshavebeenvirtually foundby the
trial court guilty ofcivil contempt,not criminalcontempt,hence,the
rule on double jeopardy may not be invoked. 28
The contempt involved in this case is civil and constructive in nature,it having arisen
from the act ofCagayan in violating the writ of preliminary injunction ofthe lowercourt
which clearly defined the forbiddenact,to wit:
NOW THEREFORE, pending the resolutionofthis case by the court,
you are enjoined fromusing the 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the
marks La Tondeña Inc.,'and 'Ginebra San Miguel'blown-in or
stamped into the bottlesas containersforthe defendant's products. 19
On this incident,two considerationsmust be borne in mind.Firstly, an injunction duly
issued must be obeyed,howevererroneous theactionofthe court may be,untilits
decision is overruled by itselforby a highercourt. 30
Secondly,the American rule that the
powerto judge a contempt restsexclusively with the court contemned doesnot apply in
this Jurisdiction.The provision ofthe present Section4,Rule 71 of the Rules ofCourt as
to where the charge may be filed is permissive in nature and is merely declaratory ofthe
inherent powerofcourtsto punishcontumaciousconduct.Said rules do not extend to the
determination ofthe jurisdiction ofPhilippine courts. 31
In appropriate case therefore,this
Court may, in the interest ofexpedient justice,impose sanctionson contemnersofthe
lower courts.
Section 3 ofRepublic Act No. 623, as amended,createsa prima facie presumption
against Cagayan forits unlawfuluse ofthe bottlesregisteredin the name ofLTI
Corollarily, the writ of injunction directing petitionerto desistfromusing the subject
bottles was properly issued by the trialcourt.Hence,said writ could not be simply
disregardedby Cagayan without adducingproofsufficient to overcome the aforesaid
presumption.Also,based on thefindingsofrespondent court,and the records before us
being sufficient forarbitrament without remandingthe incident to thecourt
a quo petitionercan be adjudgedguilty ofcontempt andimposed a sanction in this appeal
since it is a cherished rule ofprocedure forthis Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, 32
We so impose suchpenalty concordantwith the
preservative principle and asdemanded by the respectdue theorders,writs and processes
of the courts ofjustice.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision ofrespondentCourt ofAppeals.Petitioneris hereby declared

65. in contempt ofcourt and ORDERED to pay a fine of One ThousandPesos(P1,000.00),
with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras,PadillaandSarmiento,JJ.,concur.
Melencio-Herrera(Chairperson),J.,ison leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19337 September 30,1969
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Laurea,Laurea and Associatesforpetitioner.
Office of the SolicitorGeneralArturoA.Alafriz,Assistant SolicitorGeneral Esmeraldo
Umali and SolicitorSumilang V.Bernardo forrespondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition forreviewof the decision ofthe Court ofTaxAppeals of
November20, 1961, which denied recovery ofthe sumofP28,629.42, paid by the
petitioner,underprotest,in the concept ofcustoms dutiesandspecialimport tax, as well
as the petitioner'salternative remedy to recoverthe said amount minus onepercent
thereofby way ofa drawbackundersec.106 (b) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The petitionerAsturias SugarCentral,Inc.is engaged in the productionand milling
of centrifugalsugarforexert, the sugarso producedbeingplaced in containersknown as
jute bags.In 1957 it made two importations ofjute bags.The first shipment consistingof
44,800 jute bags and declaredunderentry48on January 8,1967, entered free ofcustoms
duties and specialimport tax upon the petitioner's filing ofRe-exportation and Special
Import Tax Bond no.1 in the amountsofP25,088 and P2,464.50, conditionedupon the
exportation ofthe jute bags within one yearfromthe date ofimportation.The second
shipment consistingof75,200 jute bags and declaredunderentry243on February 8,
1957, likewise entered free ofcustoms dutiesand specialimport tax upon the petitioner's
filing ofRe-exportation and SpecialImport Tax Bond no.6 in the amounts ofP42,112
and P7,984.44, with the same conditionsasstatedin bond no.1.
Of the 44,800 jute bags declared underentry 48,only 8,647 were exported within
one yearfromthe date ofimportation as containersofcentrifugalsugar.Ofthe 75,200
jute bags declared underentry 243,only 25,000 were exported within the said period of
one year.In otherwords,ofthe totalnumberofimported jute bags only 33,647 bags were
exported within one yearaftertheirimportation.The remaining 86,353 bags were
exported afterthe expiration of the one-yearperiodbut within three years fromtheir
importation.

66. On February 6, 1958 the petitioner,thru its agentTheo.H.Davies & Co., Far East,
Ltd., requested theCommissionerofCustoms fora week's extension ofRe-exportation
and SpecialImport TaxBond no.6 which was to expire the following day,giving the
following as the reasonsforits failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period
of one year:(a) typhoons andsevere floods; (b)picketing ofthe Centralrailroad line
from November6 to December21, 1957 by certain union elementsin the employ ofthe
Philippine Railway Company,which hampered normaloperations; and (c)delay in the
arrival of the vesselaboardwhich the petitionerwas to ship its sugarwhich was then
ready forloading.This request was denied by theCommissionerperhis letterofApril
15, 1958.
Due to the petitioner's failure to showproofofthe exportation ofthe balance of
86,353 jute bags within one yearfromtheir importation,the CollectorofCustoms of
Iloilo, on March 17, 1958, required it to pay the amount ofP28,629.42 representing the
customs dutiesand specialimport tax due thereon,which amount thepetitionerpaid
underprotest.
In its letterofApril 10, 1958, supplemented byits letterofMay 12, 1958, the
petitionerdemanded the refund ofthe amountit had paid,on the ground that its request
for extension ofthe period ofone yearwas filed on time, and that its failure to export the
jute bags within the required one-yearperiod was due to delayin the arrivalof the vessel
on which they were to be loaded and to the picketingofthe Centralrailroad line.
Alternatively,the petitionerasked forrefund ofthe same amount in the formof a
drawbackundersection 106(b)in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
Afterhearing,the CollectorofCustoms ofIloilo rendered judgment on January21,
1960 denying the claimfor refund.Fromhis action,appealwas taken to the
Commissionerof Customs who upheld the decisionofthe Collector.Upon a petition for
review the Court ofTax Appeals affirmed the decisionofthe CommissionerofCustoms.
The petitionerimputes three errors to theCourt ofTaxAppeals,namely:
1. In not declaring that force majeure and/orfortuitousevent is a sufficient
justification forthe failure ofthe petitionerto export the jute bagsin question
within the time required by the bonds.
2. In not declaring that it is within the powerof the Collectorof Customs and/or
the CommissionerofCustoms to extend the period ofone (1)yearwithin which
the jute bags should be exported.
3. In not declaring that the petitioneris entitled to a refund by way ofa
drawbackunderthe provisionsofsection 106,par. (b), of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
1. The basic issue tendered forresolution is whetherthe CommissionerofCustoms
is vested,underthe Philippine TariffAct of1909, the then applicable law,with discretion
to extend the period ofone yearprovided forin section 23ofthe Act.Section 23reads:
SEC. 23. That containers,suchas casks,large metal,glass,orother
receptacleswhich are,in the opinion ofthe collectorofcustoms,ofsuch a
characteras to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the importerthereof
upon identificationand thegiving ofa bond with sureties satisfactory to the
collectorofcustoms in an amount equalto double the estimated dutiesthereon,
conditioned forthe exportationthereoforpayment ofthe correspondingduties
thereon within one yearfromthe date ofimportation,undersuch rulesand
regulationsas the InsularCollectorofCustoms shallprovide.1
To implement the said section 23,Customs AdministrativeOrder389 dated
December6, 1940 was promulgated,paragraph XXVIII of which providesthat "bonds
for the re-exportation ofcylinders andothercontainers are good for12 months without
extension," and paragraphXXXI,that "bondsforcustoms brokers,commercialsamples,
repairs and those filed to guarantee the re-exportationofcylinders andothercontainers
are not extendible."
And insofaras jute bagsas containersare concerned,Customs Administrative
Order 66 dated August 25,1948 was issued,prescribing rulesand regulationsgoverning
the importation,exportation andidentificationthereofundersection23of the Philippine
Tariff Act of1909. Said administrative orderprovides:
That importation ofjute bags intendedforuse as containersofPhilippine
productsforexportation to foreigncountriesshallbe declared in a regular
import entry supportedby a suretybond in an amount equalto double the
estimated duties,conditionedforthe exportation orpaymentofthe
corresponding dutiesthereonwithin one yearfromthe date ofimportation.
It will be noted that section23of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the
superseding sec.105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code,while fixing at one yearthe
period within which the containerstherein mentionedmust be exported,are silent as to
whetherthe said period may be extended.It was surely by reason ofthis silence that the
Bureau ofCustoms issued Administrative Orders 389and 66, already adverted to,to
eliminate confusionand provide a guide as to howit shallapply the law, 2
and,more
specifically,to make officially known its policy to considerthe one-yearperiod
mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisionsin questionhavenot been thesubject of
previous judicialinterpretation,then the application ofthe doctrine of"judicialrespect
for administrative construction," 3
would,initially, be in order.
Only where the court oflast resort has not previously interpreted thestatute is the
rule applicable that courtswill give consideration to construction byadministrative or
executive departmentsofthe state.4
1awphîl.nèt

67. The formal orinformal interpretationorpracticalconstruction ofan
ambiguous oruncertain statute orlawby the executive department orother
agency chargedwith its administration orenforcement is entitled to
considerationand the highestrespectfromthe courts,and mustbe accorded
appropriate weight in determining the meaningofthe law,especially when the
construction orinterpretation is long continuedand uniformoris
contemporaneous with the first workings ofthe statute,orwhen the enactment
of the statute was suggested bysuch agency.5
The administrative ordersin questionappear to be in consonance with the intention
of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containersto one
year,without extension,fromthe date ofimportation.Otherwise,in enactingthe Tariff
and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine TariffAct of1909, Congresswould have
amended section 23of the latterlaw so as to overrule the long-standing viewofthe
Commissionerof Customs that the one-yearperiod therein mentionedis not extendible.
Implied legislative approvalby failure to change a long-standing
administrative constructionis not essentialto judicialrespect forthe
construction but is an element which greatly increasesthe weight given such
construction.6
The correctnessofthe interpretation given a statute by theagency
charged with administering its provisionis indicatedwhere it appearsthat
Congress,with full knowledge ofthe agency'sinterpretation,hasmade
significant additionsto the statute without amendingit to depart fromthe
agency's view.7
Considering that the BureauofCustoms is the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisionsofourTariffand Customs Code,the construction placedby
it thereon should be given controlling weight.1awphîl.nèt
In applying the doctrine orprinciple ofrespect foradministrative orpractical
construction,the courtsoften referto severalfactors which may be regarded asbasesof
the principle,as factors leading the courts to give theprinciple controlling weight in
particularinstances,oras independent rules in themselves.These factors are the respect
due the governmentalagencieschargedwith administration,theircompetence,
expertness,experience,and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters ofthe law they interpret;thatthe agencyis the one on which the legislature must
rely to advise it as to the practicalworking out ofthe statute,and practicalapplicationof
the statute presents the agencywith unique opportunity andexperiencesfordiscovering
deficiencies,inaccuracies,orimprovements in the statute; ... 8
If it is furtherconsidered that exemptions fromtaxation are not favored, 9
and that
tax statutesare to be construedin strictissimi juris againstthe taxpayerand liberally in
favorof the taxing authority, 10
then we are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it
was entitled to an extension oftime within which to export the jute bags and,
consequently,to a refund ofthe amount it had paid as customs duties.
In the light of the foregoing,it is ourconsideredviewthat the one-yearperiod
prescribed in section23of the Philippine Tariff Act of1909 is non-extendible and
compliance therewith is mandatory.
The petitioner'sargument that force majeure and/orfortuitouseventsprevented it
from exporting the jute bags within the one-yearperiod cannot be accorded credit,for
severalreasons.In the first place,in its decision ofNovember20,1961, the Court ofTax
Appeals made absolutely nomention oforreference to this argumentofthe petitioner,
which can only be interpreted to mean that the courtdid not believe that the "typhoons,
floods and picketing" adverted to bythe petitionerin its brief were of such magnitude or
nature as to effectively prevent the exportation ofthe jute bags within the required one-
yearperiod.In point offact nowhere in the record doesthe petitionerconvincingly show
that the so-called fortuitouseventsorforce majeure referred to by it precluded the timely
exportation ofthe jute bags.In the second place,assuming, arguendo,that the one-year
period is extendible,the jute bags were not actually exported within the one-week
extension the petitionersought.The record shows that althoughofthe remaining 86,353
jute bags 21,944 were exported within the period ofone week afterthe request for
extension was filed,the rest ofthe bags,amounting to a totalof64,409, were actually
exported only during the period fromFebruary 16to May 24, 1958, long afterthe
expiration ofthe one-weekextension sought by the petitioner.Finally,it is clearfrom the
record that the typhoonsandfloodswhich,according to thepetitioner,helpedrender
impossible the fulfillment of its obligation to export within the one-yearperiod,assuming
that they may be placed in the category offortuitouseventsorforce majeure,all occurred
prior to the execution ofthe bondsin question,orpriorto the commencement ofthe one-
yearperiod within which the petitionerwas in law required to export the jute bags.
2. The next argument ofthe petitioneris that granting that Customs Administrative
Order 389 is valid and binding,yet "jute bags"cannot be included in the phrase
"cylinders andothercontainers"mentioned therein.It will be noted,however,that the
Philippine Tariff Act of1909 and the Tariff and Customs Code,which Administrative
Order 389 seeks to implement,speakof"containers"in general.The enumeration
following the word "containers"in the said statutesservesmerely to give examples of
containersand not to specify the particularkinds thereof.Thus,sec.23of the Philippine
Tariff Act states,"containerssuchas casks large metals,glassor otherreceptacles,"and
sec.105 (x) ofthe Tariff and Customs Code mentions"large containers," givingas
examples "demijohn cylinders,drums,casks and othersimilarreceptacles ofmetal,glass
or othermaterials."(emphasis supplied)There is,therefore,no reason to suppose that the
customs authoritieshad intended,in Customs Administrative Order389to circumscribe
the scope ofthe word "container," any more than thestaturessoughtto be implemented
actually intendedto do.
3. Finally, the petitionerclaims entitlement to a drawbackofthe dutiesit had paid,
by virtue ofsection 106 (b)of the Tariff and Customs Code, 11
which reads:
SEC. 106. Drawbacks:...
b.On Articles Made fromImported Materials orSimilar Domestic
Materials and WastesThereof. — Upon the exportationofarticles

68. manufactured orproduced in the Philippines,including the packing,covering,
putting up,marking orlabeling thereof,eitherin whole orin part of imported
materials, or fromsimilar domestic materials ofequalquantityand productive
manufacturing quality and value,suchquestionto be determined by the
Collectorof Customs,there shallbe allowed a drawbackequalin amount to the
duties paid on the imported materials so used,orwhere similar domestic
materials are used,to the dutiespaid on theequivalentimported similar
materials, less one percent thereof:Provided,That theexportationshallbe
made within three years afterthe importation ofthe foreign materialused or
constitutingthe basisfordrawback....
The petitionerargues that not having availed itselfofthe full exemption granted by
sec.105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Codedue to its failure to export the jute bags
within one year,it is nevertheless,by authority ofthe above-quotedprovision,entitled to
a 99% drawbackofthe duties it had paid,averring furtherthatsec.106(b)does not
presuppose immediate payment ofduties andtaxes at the time of importation.
The contentionis palpably devoid ofmerit.
The provisions invoked bythe petitioner(to sustain his claimfor refund)offertwo
optionsto an importer.The first,undersec.105 (x), gives himthe privilege ofimporting,
free from import duties,the containersmentioned therein as long ashe exports them
within one yearfromthe date ofacceptance ofthe import entry,which period as shown
above,is not extendible.The second,presented by sec.106(b), contemplatesa case
where import dutiesare first paid,subject to refundto the extent of99% of the amount
paid,provided the articles mentionedtherein are exported within three yearsfrom
importation.
It would seemthen that theGovernment would foregocollectingduties onthe
articles mentioned in section 105(x) of Tariff and Customs Code as longas it is assured,
by the filing of a bond,thatthe same shallbe exported within the relatively short period
of one yearfromthe date ofacceptanceof the import entry.Where an importercannot
provide suchassurance,then the Government,undersec.106(b) ofsaid Code,would
require payment ofthe corresponding dutiesfirst.The basic purposeofthe two
provisionsis the same,which is,to enable a localmanufacturerto compete in foreign
markets,by relieving himof the disadvantagesresulting fromhaving to paydutieson
imported merchandise,therebybuilding up export trade andencouragingmanufacture in
the country.12
But there is a difference,and it is this:undersection105(x) full exemption
is granted to an importerwho justifies the grant ofexemption by exporting within one-
year.The petitioner,having opted to take advantage ofthe provisionsofsection 105(x),
may not,afterhaving failed to comply with the conditionsimposedthereby,avoid the
consequencesofsuch failure by being allowed a drawbackundersection 106(b)of the
same Act without havingcomplied with the conditionsofthe lattersection.
Forit is not to be supposedthatthe legislature hadintendedto defeatcompliance
with the terms ofsection 105(x) thru a refuge underthe provisionsofsection 106(b).A
construction should be avoidedwhich affordsan opportunity to defeat compliance with
the terms of a statute. 13
Rathercourtsshould proceedon the theorythat partsofa statute
may be harmonized and reconciled with each other.
A construction ofa statute which createsan inconsistencyshould be avoided when
a reasonable interpretation canbe adopted which will not do violence to the plain words
of the act and will carry out the intentionofCongress.
In the construction ofstatutes,the courtsstart with the assumption that
the legislature intendedto enactan effective law,and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have donea vain thing in the enactmentofa statute.Hence,it is a
generalprinciple,embodied in the maxim, "ut res magis valeat quampereat,"
that the courtsshould,ifreasonably possible to do so without violence to the
spirit and language ofan act,so interpret the statute to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole.An interpretationshould,ifpossible,be avoided under
which a statute orprovision beingconstrued is defeated,oras otherwise
expressed,nullified, destroyed,emasculated,repealed,explained away,or
rendered insignificant,meaningless,inoperative,ornugatory. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment ofthe Court ofTax Appeals ofNovember20,
1961 is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
Concepcion,C.J., Dizon,Zaldivar,Fernando,Capistrano,Teehankee andBarredo,JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal and Sanchez,JJ.,took nopart.
Reyes,J.B.L., J., is on leave.

69. EN BANC
[G. R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO
NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee.
D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J.:
Act No.1780 is entitled as follows:chanrobles virtualawlibrary “An Act to regulate the
importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the
possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. ”
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles
virtualawlibrary Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in
possessionofpersonswho have secured a license therefororwho are entitled to
carry same under the provisions of this Act. ”
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No. 1780,
committed as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and
criminally, had in his possession and concealed about his person a deadly
weapon,to wit: chanrobles virtualawlibrary One (1) iron bar, about 15inches in
length providedwith an iron ball on one end and a string on the other to tie to
the wrist,which weapon had been designed andmade foruse in fighting,and as
a deadly weapon.
“With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the
Philippine Commission. ”
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government has
appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that —
“The words or other deadly weapon’ only signify a kind of weapon included
within the precedingclassification.In other words, the rule of ejusdemgeneris
must be applied in the interpretation of this law, which rule is as
follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific
and generic terms ofthe same nature are employed in the same act,the
latterfollowing the former. While in the abstract, general terms are to
be given their natural and full signification, yet where they follow
specific words ofa like nature they take their meaning fromthe latter,

70. and are presumed to embrace only things or persons of the kind
designated by them. ’“
In short,the court belowheld that the carrying ofa revolverconcealed about the person
would not be a violation ofthis Act.The rule of constructionabove referred to is resorted
to only for the purpose ofdetermining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting
the law. If that intent clearly appears fromother parts of the law, and such intent thus
clearly manifested is contraryto the result which would reached by applicationofthe rule
of ejusdemgeneris,the latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly
indicates thatin the viewof the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would
be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999]
E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO I.
BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati
City and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance ofa temporary restrainingorderand/orwrit of preliminary injunction seeking to
annul and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the
public respondent Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 132 and praying thatthe public respondent court be ordered to desist fromfurther
proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824.
Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal
office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo,Parañaque,MetroManila and Kolambog,Lapasan,Cagayan de Oro
City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the formeragreed to develop certain parcels ofland located at Barrio
Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the
construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation
regarding any dispute arising therefrom,the venue shallbe in the propercourtsofMakati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against petitioner,as defendant,before the RegionalTrialCourt of
Makatiallegedly for failure of the latterto comply with its contractual obligation in that,
other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments
therein.[1]
Summons,togetherwith the complaint,were served upon the defendant,throughits
Branch ManagerEngr.WendellSabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City[2]
but the Sheriff’s Return ofService[3]
stated that the summons was
duly served “upondefendantE.B. Villarosa & PartnerCo., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager
Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the
original copy of the summons.”
On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss[4]
alleging thaton May 6, 1998, “summons intended for defendant” was served
upon Engr.WendellSabulbero,an employee ofdefendant at its branch office at Cagayan
de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its
person since the summons wasimproperly servedupon its employee in its branch office
at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one ofthose persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whomservice of summons may be made.
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default[5]
alleging that defendant hasfailed to file an Answerdespite its receipt allegedly
on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriff’s Return.

71. On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss[6]
alleging that the records show that defendant, through its branch manager,
Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the complaint on May 8,
1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on
May 5, 1998 as statedin the Sheriff’s Return noron May 6,1998 as stated in the motion
to dismiss; that defendant hastransferredits office fromKolambog,Lapasan,Cagayan de
Oro to its new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the
purpose ofthe rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
On August5,1998, the trial court issuedan Order[7]
denyingdefendant’s Motion to
Dismiss as well as plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was
given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trialcourt stated that
since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation
through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with
the rule on service ofsummons andconsequently,it validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.
On August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[8]
alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize
but,on the contrary,restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein;
and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word “manager” was
changed to “general manager”, “secretary” to “corporate secretary”, and excluding
therefromagent and director.
On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration[9]
alleging that defendant’s branch manager “did bring home” to the
defendant-corporation the notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a
motion to dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after receipt of the summons
and the complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to dismiss.
On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a
Reply[10]
contendingthatthe changesin the newrules are substantialand not just general
semantics.
Defendant’sMotion forReconsiderationwas denied in the Order dated November
20, 1998.[11]
Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its
discretion tantamountto lackorin excess ofjurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motions
to dismiss and for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was
improperly served. Petitioner invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases of Kanlaon
Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC[12]
wherein it was held that service upon a
construction project manager is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC[13]
which held that a
corporation is bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.
The only issue forresolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure was already in force.[14]
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
“When the defendant is a corporation,partnership orassociationorganized underthe
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,service may be made on the president,
managing partner, generalmanager,corporate secretary,treasurer,orin-house counsel.”
(underscoring supplied).
This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
provided that:
“SEC. 13. Service upon privatedomestic corporation orpartnership. – Ifthe defendant is
a corporationorganized underthe laws ofthe Philippines ora partnership duly registered,
service may be made on the president, manager,secretary,cashier,agent,orany ofits
directors.” (underscoring supplied).
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whomsummons may be
served is “restricted, limited and exclusive” following the rule on statutory
construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language.
We agree with petitioner.
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project
manager[15]
; a corporation’s assistant manager[16]
; ordinary clerk of a corporation[17]
;
private secretaryofcorporate executives[18]
;retainedcounsel[19]
;officials who had charge
or controlofthe operationsof the corporation, like the assistant general manager[20]
; or
the corporation’s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer[21]
. In these cases, these
personswere considered as“agent”within the contemplation of the old rule.[22]
Notably,
underthe newRules,service ofsummons uponan agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized.
The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.
In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
summons on the respondent shallbe servedpersonally orby registered mail on the party
himself; if the party is represented bycounsel or any other authorized representative or
agent,summons shallbe served on such person. In said case, summons was served on
one Engr. Estacio who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City
(although theprincipaladdressofthe corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the
work of the employees. It was held that as manager,he had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on himand to relay the
same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that summons for
petitioner was validly served on him as agent and authorized representative of
petitioner. Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private respondent, the summons was
received by the clerkin the office of the Assistant Manager (at principal office address)

72. and underSection 13ofRule 14 (old rule), summons may be made upon the clerk who is
regarded as agent within the contemplation of the rule.
The designationofpersonsorofficers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation orpartnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule nowstates“generalmanager”
instead ofonly “manager”; “corporate secretary” insteadof “secretary”; and “treasurer”
instead of“cashier.” The phrase“agent,orany ofits directors” is conspicuously deleted
in the new rule.
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired
Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:[23]
“x x x the then Sec.13 of this Rule allowed service upona defendantcorporation to ‘be
made on the president,manager,secretary,cashier,agent orany ofits directors.’ The
aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous andsusceptible ofbroad and sometimes
illogical interpretations, especially the word ‘agent’ofthe corporation. The Filoil case,
involving the litigation lawyerofthe corporation who precisely appeared to challengethe
validity of service ofsummons but whose very appearance forthat purposewas seized
upon to validate thedefective service,is an illustration ofthe need forthis revised section
with limited scope andspecific terminology. Thustheabsurdresult in the Filoil case
necessitatedthe amendmentpermitting service only on the in-housecounselofthe
corporation who is in effect an employee ofthe corporation, as distinguishedfroman
independent practitioner.” (underscoring supplied)
Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court
Revision Committee, stated that “(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be
made to one named in (the) statute xxx”.[24]
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,strict compliance with the rules hasbeenenjoined. In the case ofDelta Motor
Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing,[25]
the Court held:
“A strict compliance with the mode ofservice is necessary to conferjurisdiction ofthe
court overa corporation. The officerupon whomservice is made must be one who is
named in the statute;otherwise theservice is insufficient. xx x.
The purpose is to renderit reasonably certain thatthe corporation will receive prompt and
propernotice in an action against it orto insure that the summonsbe served on a
representative so integrated with the corporationthat suchperson will knowwhat to do
with the legalpapers served onhim. In otherwords,‘to bring home to the corporation
notice ofthe filing of the action.’x x x.
The liberal constructionrule cannot be invokedand utilized as a substitute forthe plain
legal requirements as to the mannerin which summons should be served on a domestic
corporation. xx x.” (underscoring supplied).
Service of summons uponpersonsotherthanthose mentioned in Section 13 of Rule
14 (old rule) has been held as improper.[26]
Even under the old rule, service upon a
generalmanagerofa firm’s branch office has beenheld as improperas summons should
have been served at the firm’s principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co.,
Inc. vs.Dizon,[27]
it was held that the service ofsummons on the general manager of the
insurance firm’s Cebu branch was improper; default ordercould have been obviated had
the summons been served at the firm’s principal office.
And in the case ofSolarTeamEntertainment,Inc.vs.Hon.Helen Bautista Ricafort,
et al.[28]
the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar,
“strictest” compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(on Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule
otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to
obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitionerat its branch office at Cagayande Oro,instead ofupon the general manager at
its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The fact that defendantfiled a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service ofsummons.[29]
Before,the rule was that
a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special
appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised
othergroundsorinvoked affirmative relief which necessarily involvesthe exercise of the
jurisdiction ofthe court,the party is deemed to have submitted himselfto the jurisdiction
of the court.[30]
This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug
Corporation vs.Court ofAppeals,et al.,[31]
which became the basis of the adoption of a
new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules. Section 20 now provides that “the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.” The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the
purpose to enforcestrict enforcementofthe rules on summons. Accordingly,the filing of
a motion to dismiss,whetherornot belatedly filed by the defendant,his authorized agent
or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. There being no properservice ofsummons,the trialcourt cannot take cognizance
of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding
undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
public respondent trialcourt are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection
therewith are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

73. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32441 March 29,1930
DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretaryof the Interior of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
Jose Varela Calderonforappellant.
Attorney-General Jaranillaforappellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this cause,the plaintiffprays forjudgment,as follows:
1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementionedinvestigation proceedings,
and particularly the decisionofthe Board ofMedicalExaminers of the
Philippine Islands dated March30,1926, foreverrevoking the plaintiff's license
to practice medicine and surgery.
2. Ordering the defendantsto restore the plaintiffto his status before the
investigation andthe decisionofMarch 30,1926, that is,as if there had never
been an investigation andan adversedecision.
3. Ordering said defendantsto issue in favorofthe plaintiffa license forthe
practice ofmedicine and surgeryin the Philippine Islands,such as he hadprior
to the investigationand adverse decision.
4. Granting the plaintiff any properlegalremedy.(Pages 5and 6, bill of
exemptions.)
The defendantsanswered with a generaldenialand prayedthatthe complaint be
dismissed.
Aftertrial the Court of First Instance ofManila dismissed the complaint with costs
against the plaintiff.
Counselforplaintiff contendsthat the court belowerred:

74. 1. In holding that Assistant FiscalAlfonso Felixofthe City of Manila was
authorized to appearand institute administrative proceedingsagainstDr.
DominadorGomez before the Board ofMedicalExaminers ofthe Philippines.
2. In not holding that AssistantFiscalAlfonso Felix, of the City ofManila, had
personality norpowerto instituteadministrative proceedings against Dr.
DominadorGomez before the Board ofMedicalExaminers ofthe Philippines.
3. In admitting in its decision that section 9ofAct No.2381, known as the
OpiumLaw, is valid.
4. In not holding that section 9ofAct No.2381, known as the OpiumLaw, is
unconstitutional,and therefore nulland void.
5. In holding that section 9Act No.2381, known as the OpiumLaw, is in force.
6. In not holding that section 9Act No.2381 has been repealed,even on the
supposition that it was valid.
7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
8. In denying the motion foravoidance,and fora newtrial, filed by appellant.
The first two assignmentsoferrorrelate to the validity ofthe chargesagainstthe plaintiff,
preferred by Assistant FiscalAlfonso Felixofthe City of Manila,who,according to the
plaintiff is not authorized by lawto file charges with the Board ofMedicalExaminers,
which therefore acquired no jurisdiction overthe matter.
According to section 780of Administrative Code,as amended byAct No.3111, the
procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate ofregistrationis the following:
Proceedingsforrevocation ofa certificate ofregistration shallbe begunby
filing a written charge orcharges against the accused.These chargesmay be
preferred by any person orpersons,firm orcorporation,orthe Board ofMedical
Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges.Said
charges shallbe filed with the executive officerof the Board of Medical
Examiners and a copy thereof,togetherwith written notice ofthe time and place
when they will be heared and determined,shallbe served uponthe accusedor
his counsel,at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing.
(Sec. 12, Act No.3111.)
The law does not require thatthe chargesbe preferred bya public officeror by any
specified person;it even permits the Board ofMedicalExaminers itself to require its
executive officer to prefersaid charges.Fromthe wording ofthe law we infer that any
person,includinga public officer,may preferthe charges referred to in the above-quoted
provision.Wherefore,the fact that thechargeswere filed by Assistant FiscalAlfonso
Felix of the City ofManila, does notdeprivethe Board ofMedicalExaminers of
jurisdiction to hearsaid chargesand to take the properactionaccordingto law.
The appellant contendsin his third and fourthassignments oferrorthat section9ofAct
No. 2381 is null and void on the ground ofunconstitutionality,since said section is
foreign to the subject ofsaid Act,in violation ofsection3of the Jones Lawprohibiting
the enactment ofany billembracing more than one subject and providingthat the subject
be expressed in the title of the bill.
Our opinion is that the mattercontainedin section9ofAct No. 2381 is not foreign to the
end pursued in said Act,andthat in viewin the provision ofsaid section it cannot be
maintained that Act No.2381 includes more than one subject.The penaltyprovidedin
said section forthe physician ordentist who prescribesopiumfora patient whose
physicalconditiondoesnotrequire the use ofsaid drug,is one ofthe means employed by
the Legislature to attain the purpose ofAct No.2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary
use ofopium; it is one ofthe details subordinate to the purpose in view.Such punishment
is not the end contemplated in Act No.2381, but,as we have just said,it is a means
employed to regulate the use ofopium.
In passing said Act No.2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power
expressly grantedby the Act ofCongressofMarch 3,1905, forthe protection ofthe
health,comfort,and generalwelfare of the people ofthe Philippine Islands.
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON
THE SUBJECT. — The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the
Act ofCongress ofMarch3,1905, to adopt legislationupon theimportationand
sale of opiumin the Philippine Islands.The purposeofsuch legislation wasto
protect the health,comfort,and generalwelfare of the people ofthe Philippine
Islands.Such legislation was an exercise ofthe police powerofthe State.
(United States vs.Wayne Shoup,35Phil., 56.)
And,as we have stated,the provisionscontained in section 9ofAct No.2381 relative to
the physiciansand dentist are simply detailes andmeans conducive to the ultimate
purpose ofsaid Act,which details and means need not be stated in the title ofthe Act for
the very reason that properly speaking,theyare not foreign matter.
The generalpurpose ofthese provisions is accomplished when a lawhas but
one generalobject,which is fairly indicated by its title.To require every end
and means necessaryorconvenient forthe accomplishment ofthis general
object to be provided forby a separate act relating to that alone,would not only
be unreasonable,but would actually renderlegislationimpossible.(Cooley on
ConstitutionalLimitations,pp.296-297.)
The constitutionalrequirement is addressedto the subject,notto the details of
the act.The subject must be single; the provisions,to accomplishedthe object
involved in that subject,may be multifarious.. . . None of the provisionsofa
statute will be held unconstitutionalwhen they allrelate,directly or indirectly,

75. to the same subject,have naturalconnection,and are not foreign to thesubject
expressed in the title.As very frequently expressedby the courts,any
provisionsthat are germane to the subjectexpressedin the title may properly be
included in the act.(I Sutherland on Stat.Const.,par.118.)
In orderto hold that section 9ofAct No.2381 is unconstitutionalon the ground alleged
by the plaintiff, the violation ofthe constitutionalprovisionmust be substantialand
manifest.It is not so in the case at bar.
2. To warrant the settingaside ofstatutes because theirsubjectsare not
expressed in the titles,the violation ofthe rule must be substantialand plain.
(Posadas vs.Menzi,Decision ofthe United States Supreme Court,page 388,
No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme Court AdvanceOpinions.)
At all eventsthe validity ofthis OpiumLaw, Act No.2381, has already been upheld by
this court,not only in the above cited case,United States vs.Wayne Shoup,supra,but
also in the subsequent case ofUnited States vs.Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211).
Passing to the fifth and sixth assignmentsoferror,wherein counselforappellant contends
that even granting that section 9ofAct No.2381 is valid,it was repealed by Act No.
2493 and laterby section 780ofthe Administrative Code,we note,first,that there is no
express repealofsection 9ofAct No. 2381. Secondly,it cannot be held thatit has been
impliedly repealed,forthe reason that the provisions ofsection9,Act No.2381, are
neithercontrary to,norincompatible with, the provisionsofsection 780of the
Administrative Code,as amended.Uponthis point,we approve and adopt the following
statements made by the trialjudge:
Counselcontends,in support ofthe above,thatAct No.2493 being complete,
and "coveringthe field" by implication repealed alllaws relating to the practice
of medicine, powers ofthe Board ofMedicalExaminers and allied matters;
hence,the said law,expressly providingthe causesforrevocation ofmedical
licenses,necessarily excluded all others, eventhoughembodied in prior
enactments.
Act No.310 provided that the Board ofmedicalExaminers could revoke
licenses for"unprofessionalconduct," without definingthe term.Act No.1761
(the OpiumLaw) provided that illegaly prescribing opiumshould be cause for
revocation ofmedicallicenses.Clearly,the OpiumLaw did not repealAct No.
310. Act No. 2381 — also an OpiumLaw — in its section 9,repeated the
provision as to doctorsand dentists.The repetitiondid not repealAct No.310.
Act No.2493, section 11(Ad.Code,sec.780), provided thatcertificatesof
physiciansare revocable for"unprofessionalconduct,"without defining the
phrase.In otherwords,so faras revocation oflicensesis concerned,Act No.
2493 is mere reenactment ofAct No.310. The reenactment ofthe said portion
of Act No.310 did not repealsection9ofthe OpiumLaw. If said section9has
been repealed,it must be by Act No.3111, which amends Act No.2493 (Ad.
Code,sec.780), by an addition afterthe words "unprofessionalconduct"ofthe
following:
"The words "unprofessionalconduct,immoral, or dishonorable
conduct"as used in this chaptershallbe construedto include the
following acts:(1) Procuring,aiding orabeting a criminal abortion; (2)
advertising,eitherin his own name or in the name of any otherperson,
firm, association,orcorporation,in any written orprinted paper,or
document,ofmedicalbusinessin which untruthfulorimprobable
promises are made,or being employed by,orin the service ofany
person,firm, association orcorporationsoadvertising,oradvertising
in any obscenemannerderogatory to goodmorals; (3)habitual
intemperance oraddition to the use ofmorphine,opium,cocaine or
otherdrugs havinga similar effect; (4) convictionofa crime or
misdemeanorinvolving dishonorable conduct; and(5)willfully
betraying a professionalsecret."
It cannot be seriously contendedthataside fromthe five examples specified
there can be no otherconduct ofa physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct
theretofore deemed groundsforrevocation licenses.The maxim expressio unius
est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means ofdiscovering
legislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated
purpose ofthe Legislature.It doesnot apply when wordsare mentionedby way
of example, or to remove doubts.(See Cyc.,1122.) If, therefore,there exists,
"unprofessionalconduct"not specified in the laws,with more reason doesthe
criminal use ofopiumremain a specific cause forrevocationoflicense.(Pages
11, 12 and 13, bill of exceptions.)
As to the seventh andeighthassignmentsoferror,we find the judgment and appealed
from correctly rendered,and the motion ofavoidance and newtrialproperly denied.
As the Attorney-Generalcorrectly observes,the powers vestedin the Board ofMedical
Examiners to suspendorrevoke a physician's certificate ofregistration andthe authority
granted the Secretary ofthe Interiorofconfirming orreversing the decision ofsaid board
of examiners, partake ofa quasi-judicialcharacter,that is,involve the use ofdiscretion.
For this reason,the exercise thereofcannot be reviewed by mandamus,which is the
nature ofthis causeon its merits.
As in the case ofcourts andjudicialofficers,it is a rule of generalapplication
that mandamus will not lie to review or controlthe actsofexecutive officers
and boardsofstate and federalgovernmentsin respect ofmatters as to which
they are vestedwith discretion.In otherwords,theycannotbe compelled to act
or rendera decision in any particularway,and this is so,eventhough the
exercise ofthis discretion requiresthe constructionand interpretationof
statutes.Where public officials exercise their discretion,it is said that their
conclusions,although disputable,are impregnable to mandamus.(38 C. J., 659-
660.)

76. That this action is really a mandamus proceeding,appearsclearly fromthe terms of the
complaint filed herein.
Finding no merit in the assignmentsoferror,the judgment appealed fromis affirmed,
with costsagainstthe appellant.So ordered.
Malcolm,Ostrand,JohnsandVilla-Real,JJ.,concur.
Villamor,J.,reserveshisvote.
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents’ and
intervenors’separate motionsforreconsiderationof our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for
reconsiderationinasmuchas themattershould have been referred to the Court sitting en
banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and
intervenorsalso assailourResolutiondated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without
action the intervenors’“MotionForReconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc” filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to
wit:
“the movantshaveno legalpersonality to furtherseekredressbefore the Court aftertheir
motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April24, 1998
Decision. Theirsubsequent motion forreconsideration ofthe said decision,with a prayer
to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc,was alsodeniedin the November17, 1998
Resolution ofthe Court. Besides,theiraforesaid motion ofDecember3,1998 is in the
nature ofa second motion forreconsiderationwhich is a forbidden motion (Section2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 ofthe 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure). The
impropriety of movants’December3,1998 motion becomes allthe more glaring
consideringthatallthe respondents in this case did not anymore join them(movants)in
seeking a reconsideration ofthe November17,1998 Resolution.”[1]
Subsequently,respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
“Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For
Issuance Of A Restraining Order)” on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a
“Manifestationand Motion”[2]
and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill[3]
evidencing filing
of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.
In theirrespective motions forreconsideration, both respondents and intervenors
pray that this casebe referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions forreconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved
by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not

77. met. Consequently,the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc,
relying on the following constitutional provision:
“Cases ormatters heard by a division shallbe decided orresolvedwith the concurrence
of a majority ofthe Members who actually tookpart in the deliberationson the issuesin
the case and votedthereon,and in no case without the concurrence ofat least three of
such Members. Whenthe required numberis not obtained,the case shallbe decided en
banc: Provided,that no doctrine orprinciple oflaw laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en bancorin division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.”[4]
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that casesare “decided” while matters, which include
motions,are “resolved”. Otherwise put,the word “decided” must referto “cases”; while
the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words
appear.[5]
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc fordecision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely,the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolutionofa motion for reconsideration. Hence,the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”. The
reason is simple. The above-quotedArticle VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition
of cases bya division. Ifthere is a tie in the voting,there is no decision. The only way to
dispose ofthe case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting doesnotleave the case undecided. There is stillthe decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsiderationis lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17,
1998.
It is the movants’furthercontention in support of their plea for the referral of this
case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the
resolution ofthe motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was
expressed:
“Regrettably,the issuespresented before us by themovantsare matters ofno
extraordinary import to merit the attentionofthe Court en banc. Specifically,the issue of
whetherornot the powerofthe localgovernmentunitsto reclassify landsis subject tothe
approvalofthe DARis no longernovel,this havingbeen decidedby thisCourt in the
case ofProvince ofCamarinesSur,et al.vs. Court ofAppealswherein we held that local
government units need not obtain theapprovalofthe DARto convert orreclassify lands
from agriculturalto non-agriculturaluse. The dispositive portionofthe Decision in the
aforecited case states:
‘WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decisionof the Court of
Appeals is setaside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court’s orderallowing the
Province ofCamarines Sur to take possession ofprivate respondents’property;(b)orders
the trial court to suspendthe expropriation proceedings;and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of AgrarianReform to
convert or reclassifyprivate respondents’ property from agricultural tonon-
agricultural use.
‘xxx xxx xxx’ (Emphasis supplied)
“Moreover,the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimousvoteof
all five (5) members of the Second Division ofthis Court. Statedotherwise,thisSecond
Division is of the opinion that the mattersraisedby movantsare nothing newand do not
deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus,the participationofthe full Court
in the resolution ofmovants’motions forreconsideration would be inappropriate.”[6]
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not
dispose ofthe earliermotions forreconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is
flawed. Consequently,the presentmotionsforreconsideration necessarily partake of the
nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
True,there are exceptionalcases whenthis Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration,such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then,
we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be filed with express
leave of court first obtained.[7]
In this case,notonly did movants failto askfor priorleave
of court,but more importantly,they have beenunable to show that there are exceptional
reasonsforus to give due course to theirsecondmotionsforreconsideration. Stripped of
the arguments forreferralof this incident to the Court en banc,the motions subject ofthis
resolution are nothingmore but rehashesofthe motions for reconsideration which have
been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations
containedtherein have alreadybeenraised before and passed upon by this Court in the
said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the “Win-Win” Resolution dated
November7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and ofno legal effect considering
that the March 29,1996 decision ofthe Office of the President had already become final
and executory even priorto the filing of the motion forreconsiderationwhich became the
basis of the said “Win-Win” Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a
litany of protestationson the part ofrespondentsand intervenors including entreaties for
a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its
importance and far-reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The
situation,however,is not as simple as what the movantspurport it to be. While it may be
true that on its face the nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution was grounded on a

78. procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the
substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez,viz: “Just as a losing partyhasthe right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.”[8]
In otherwords,the finality ofthe March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and otherparts ofthe country who stand to be benefitedby the development of
the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.[9]
Before finally disposing ofthese pending matters,we feel it necessary to rule once
and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenorsinsist thattheyare realparties in interest inasmuchas they have already been
issued certificates ofland ownership award,orCLOAs,and that while they are seasonal
farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries ofthe property. These argumentsare,however,nothing newas in fact they
have already been raised in intervenors’ earlier motion for reconsideration of our April
24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez,
intervenors,who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or
actualand substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to
own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the
land.[10]
Moreover,the “Win-Win” Resolution itselfstates that the qualified beneficiaries
have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform.[11]
Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
intervenorscannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficientinterest in the controversy as
to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them
does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win”
Resolution. No legal rights can emanate froma resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors’ “Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc,” dated December3,1998; respondents’“Motion ForReconsideration Of
The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order),”
dated December 2, 1998; and intervenors’ “Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme
Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Division’s Resolution Dated 27 January
1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By
The Intervenors,” dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further
motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno,J.,in the result,he maintain his original position that the case should go to
CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO, J.:
On the merits,I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should
be referred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under
the rules is generally proscribed,the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in
regard to cogent procedural points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the
Court En Banc’s Resolution No. 99-1-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the
issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I amconstrained to vote with the majority in
denying allof the subjectmotionsin the above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to
express my views on this issue and put themon record, so, in the event that the Court
decides to re-openand re-discussthis issueat some future time,these considerations may
be referred to.
I continue to havesome reservations regardingthe majority’s positionregarding an
even (2-2) vote in a division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required
majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided
by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides that:
x x x
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shallbe decided orresolvedwith the
concurrence ofa majority ofthe members who actually tookpart in the deliberationson
the issuesin the case andvoted thereon,andin no case, without the concurrence of at
leastthree of suchmembers. When the requirednumber is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: provided,that no doctrineor principle oflaw laid down by the
court in a decision rendered en banc orin division may be modified orreversed except by
the court sitting en banc.
The deliberationsofthe 1986 ConstitutionalCommission disclose that ifthe case is
not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a
larger division. Moreover,the elevation ofa case to the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: MadamPresident, may I ask some questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO: Underthese provisions,there are 3kinds ofdivisions : one would
be a division composed of 3 justices in which case there will be 5 divisions;
another division is composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3
divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in which case, there
will be 2 divisions.

79. Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3
votes. Should it immediately go to the court en banc of 15 justices or should it
first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, MadamPresident.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is
2-1, automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this
last phrase would operate automatically – “WHEN THE REQUIRED
NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN
BANC.”
x x x x x x x x x
(V Record 635,Oct.8, 1986)
Explicit, therefore,is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any
case or matter heard by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3
votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th
member having
inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a
minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any valid decision or
resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur,
i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal
provisionsofthe 1986 Constitution,ifthe required majority is not reached in a division,
the case shouldautomatically go to Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between “cases” and “matters” referred to in the
above-quoted constitutional provision. “Cases” being decided, and “matters” being
resolved. Only “cases” are referred to the Court En Banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained. “Matters” are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that “cases” would only referto deliberations at first instance
on the merits of a case filed with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions,
including motions forreconsideration,are “matters” to be resolved. To give flesh to this
distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of “cases”, no
decision is passed,whereas,ifa tie occurs in the voting on motions for reconsideration,
the decision which had already been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to
appealed cases, filed with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the only original cases which are taken cognizance of by this Court are those
wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But,invariably,these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So, there will be no instance when a
division will be ever taking cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that casestaken cognizance ofby the divisions are either petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for review
on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on
deliberation of a “case” by the division, although apparently no action is passed, a
decision may still be rendered-the petition is hereby DENIED due course, and it is
forthwith DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the majority’s line of
reasoningin the 2-2 vote on motions forreconsideration. But why is that, the 2-2 vote in
the deliberation ofthe “case” at the first instance should still be referred to the Court En
Banc? The reason is simple. Because the expressprovision ofthe Constitution requires
a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid and binding decision of the
Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to motions forreconsideration? Even on
this score alone,it is my view that,in all instances,whetherit be in the deliberations of a
case at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote
cannot pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for
reconsiderationbecause the provision contemplates “cases” or “matters” (which for me
has no material distinctioninsofaras divisionsare concerned) heard by a division, and a
motion for reconsiderationcannotbe divorced fromthe decision in a case that it seeks to
be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimummajority of 3 votes is not met,
the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par.3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in
the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a
reading ofthe Constitution. To argue thata motion forreconsideration is not a “case”but
only a “matter” which does not concerna case,so that, even though the vote thereon in
the division is 2-2, the matterorissue is not required to elevated to theCourt En Banc, is
to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore,I humbly submit that the theory ofleaving the issue hanging on a 2-2
vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1
abstaining)would result in the motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannotbe recourse to theCourt ofAppeals En Banc which,doesnot act on judicial
matters. In a legislative body,an evenvoteresultsin the failure of the proposition, only
because there is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if the
voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or
disqualifying himself,the motion shall,ofcourse,not be carried because that is the endof
the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being
recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being expressly directed by the
Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration should, by all means, be
decided by the Court En Banc.

80. EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138381. November 10, 2004]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondent.
[G.R. No. 141625. November 10, 2004]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO D.
PINEDA, DANIEL GO, FELINO BULANDUS, FELICIMO J.
FERRARIS, JR., BEN HUR PORLUCAS, LUIS HIPONIA, MARIA
LUISA A. FERNANDEZ, VICTORINA JOVEN, CORAZON S.
ALIWANAG, SILVER L. MARTINES, SR., RENATO PEREZ, LOLITA
CAYLAN, DOUGLAS VALLEJO and LETICIA ALMAZAN, on their
own behalf and on behalf of all GSIS retirees with all of whom they share a
common and general interest, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On April 16, 2002, the Court promulgated a decision on these two consolidated
cases partially granting the petition in G.R. No. 138381 (“first petition”) thereby
reversing the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of certain fringe benefits
granted to GSIS employees. As a result, the Court ordered the refund of amounts
representing fringe benefits correspondingto those allowed in the first petition in favorof
the respondents in G.R. No. 141625 (“second petition”).
The benefits which the Court ordered to be refundedincludedincreases in longevity
pay,children’s allowance andmanagementcontribution to the Provident Fund as well as
premiums for group personalaccident insurance. On the other hand, the Court affirmed
the COA disallowance ofloyalty andservice cashaward as wellas housing allowance in
excess of that approved by the COA. Amounts corresponding to these benefits were
previously deducted byGSIS from respondents’ retirement benefits in view of the COA
disallowance in the first petition. COA did not seek reconsideration of the judgment
ordering said refund, which thus became final and executory.
On August7,2002, the respondentsin the second petition, all GSIS retirees, filed a
motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment (“amendatory motion”).[1]
They
averred that we did not categorically resolve the issue raised in the second petition,
namely: whetheror not the GSIS may lawfully deduct any amount fromtheir retirement
benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.
According to respondents, said provision of law clearly states that no amount
whatsoever could be legally deducted from retirement benefits, even those amounts
representing COA disallowances. They posit that we should have ordered refund not
only of benefits allowed in the first petition, but all amounts claimed, regardless of
whether or not these were allowed by the COA. These include items which were
correctly disallowed by the COA in the first petition,as well as disallowed benefits under
the second petition. The latter consists of initial payment of productivity bonus,
accelerated implementation of the new salary schedule effective August 1, 1995, 1995
mid-year financial assistance and increase in clothing, rice and meal allowances.
Respondentsfurtherinsist that we should have awarded damagesin theirfavor,citing the
GSIS’ alleged bad faith in making the deductions.

81. GSIS filed a comment[2]
to respondents’ amendatory motion, as directed by the
Court in a resolution dated September 3, 2002. GSIS posited that the other benefits not
passed uponin the main judgment should be understoodby respondents as having been
impliedly denied by this Court. It also sought clarification of our decision insofar as it
declared that there was noidentityofsubject matterbetweenthe COA proceedings, from
which the first petition stemmed,and respondents’claimunderthe secondpetition,which
emanated froman order of the GSIS Board of Trustees (“Board”). As for the damages
claimed by respondents,GSIS insiststhat it made the deductions in good faith for these
were done in accordance with COA directives.
Respondents filed a reply[3]
to the comment of GSIS on September 9, 2002.
Meanwhile,respondents filed a second motion, this time for leave to file a motion
for discretionaryand partialexecution[4]
(“motion forexecution”).They prayedthat GSIS
be ordered to effect the refund,as finally adjudged in ourdecision,pending resolution of
theiramendatory motion as to the other deducted amounts. We granted the motion for
execution on September 3, 2002.
Subsequently, on December 26, 2002, counsel for respondents, Atty. Agustin
Sundiam, filed a motion for entry and enforcement of attorney’s lien[5]
(“motion for
charging lien”)and a supplement[6]
to thismotion on January 10, 2003. He sought entry
of a charging lien in the records of this case pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 138. He
prayed for an order directing the GSIS to deduct, as his professional fees, 15% from
respondents’refundvoucherssince the GSIS was already in the process of releasing his
clients’ checks in compliance with our judgment in the first petition. The payment
scheme was allegedly authorized by the Board of Directors of his clients, the GSIS
Retirees Association,Inc.(GRIA), through a board resolution[7]
that he has attached to
the motion.
Atty.Sundiam’s motion for charging lien was opposed by petitioner GSIS on the
ground thatit was through its efforts,and notAtty.Sundiam’s,that the retirees were able
to obtain a refund.[8]
Meanwhile, the GRIA confirmed the payment scheme it adopted
with Atty. Sundiamand prayed for its approval.[9]
Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, respondents filed another manifestation and
motion as well as supplement thereto, claiming that GSIS was deducting new and
unspecified sums from the amount it was refunding to respondents. These new
deductions purportedly pertain to another set of COA disallowances.[10]
On January 21,2003, respondents again filed a motion[11]
praying for the inclusion
in the refundable amountofdividendson the management contribution to the Provident
Fund (“motion forpayment ofdividends”). Respondents claimed that the contribution,
which amounted to Fifty Million Pesos (P50M),was retained by GSIS for more than five
years and thus earned a considerable sum of income while under its control. GSIS
declared and paid dividendson said contribution to incumbent officials and employees,
but refused to extend the same benefits to respondents/retirees.
On March 6, 2003, GSIS filed a joint comment[12]
to respondents’ two foregoing
motions contendingthat thenewdeductions are legitimate. The deductionspertain to car
loan arrearages, disallowed employees’ compensation claims and the like. As for the
dividendson the ProvidentFund contributions,respondents are not entitled to the same
because while the first petition was pending,the contributionswere not actually remitted
to the fund but were withheld by COA pursuant to its earlier disallowance.
On October2,2003, respondentsfiled anothermotion[13]
foran orderto compel the
GSIS to pay dividends onthe Provident Fund contributions pending resolution of their
other motions. They also sought refund of Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits
that GSIS supposedly paid to some of the respondents, but once again arbitrarily
deducted fromthe amount which the Court ordered to be refunded.
In a minute resolution[14]
dated November 11, 2003, we denied the last motion for
lack of merit. We likewise denied with finality respondents’ motion for reconsideration
from the denial of said motion.[15]
We now resolve the matters raised by the parties.
On the amendatorymotion,it must be clarified that the question raised before this
Court in the second petition was the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction to resolve
respondents’claimfor refund ofamounts representing deductions fromtheir retirement
benefits. Whatwas assailed in the second petition was the appellate court’s ruling that
the Board had jurisdiction overrespondents’claimsince there was no identity of subject
matter between the proceedingsthen pending before the COA and the petitionbrought by
respondentsbefore the Board. The Court ofAppeals did notrule on the main controversy
of whetherCOA disallowancescould be deducted fromretirement benefits because the
Board ordered the dismissalofrespondents’ claimfor alleged lack of jurisdiction, before
it could even decide on the principal issue.
Consequently,the only matterthat was properly elevatedto this Court was the issue
of whether or not the Board had jurisdiction over respondents’ demands. We did not
resolve the issue of whether or not the deductions were valid under Section 39 of RA
8291, for the simple reason that the Board, as well as the appellate court, did not tackle
the issue. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction[16]
would ordinarily preclude us from
resolving the matter,which calls fora ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter
that is vestedby lawwith exclusive and originaljurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto.[17]
However,both the GSIS and respondentshave extensively discussed the merits of
the case in theirrespective pleadingsand did not confine their arguments to the issue of
jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that we should resolve the main issue on the
ground thatit is a purely legalquestion. Respondents further state that a remand of the
case to the Board would merely result in unnecessarydelay and needless expense for the
parties.They thus urge the Court to decide the main question in order to finally put an
end to the controversy.
Indeed,the principalissue pending before the Board does not involve any factual
question,as it concernsonly the correct application of the last paragraph of Section 39,
RA 8291. The parties agreedthat the lone issue is whetherCOA disallowances could be
legally deducted fromretirement benefits on the ground that these were respondents’
monetary liabilities to the GSIS under the said provision. There is no dispute that the
amounts deductedby GSISrepresentedCOA disallowances. Thus,the only question left
for the Board to decide is whether the deductions are allowed under RA 8291.

82. Undercertain exceptionalcircumstances,we have taken cognizance ofquestions of
law even in the absence of an initial determination by a lower court or administrative
body. InChina Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[18]
the Court held:
At the outset,the Court’sattentionis drawn to the fact that since the filing ofthis suit
before the trial court,none ofthe substantialissueshave beenresolved.To avoid and
gloss overthe issuesraisedby the parties,as what the trialcourt and respondentCourt of
Appeals did,would unduly prolongthis litigationinvolvinga rathersimple case of
foreclosure ofmortgage. Undoubtedly,this will run counterto the avowedpurpose ofthe
rules,i.e., to assistthe partiesin obtainingjust,speedyand inexpensive determination of
every action orproceeding.The Court,therefore,feels thatthe centralissuesofthe case,
albeit unresolvedby the courtsbelow,should nowbe settledspecially as theyinvolved
pure questionsoflaw. Furthermore,the pleadingsofthe respective partieson file have
amply ventilated theirvarious positionsandargumentson the matternecessitating
prompt adjudication.
In Roman Catholic ArchbishopofManilav.Court ofAppeals,[19]
the Court likewise
held that the remand ofa case is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve
the disputebasedon the recordsbefore it. The Court will decide actions on the merits in
orderto expedite the settlement ofa controversy and if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a remand of the case.
Here, the primary issue calls for an application of a specific provision of RA 8291
as well as relevant jurisprudence onthe matter. No usefulpurpose will indeed be served
if we remand the matter to the Board, only for its decision to be elevated again to the
Court of Appealsand subsequently to this Court. Hence,we deemit soundto rule on the
merits of the controversy rather than to remand the case for further proceedings.
The last paragraph of Section 39, RA 8291 specifically provides:
SEC. 39. Exemption fromTax, Legal Process and Lien.-
x x x x x x x x x
The funds and/orthe propertiesreferred to herein as wellas the benefits,sums ormonies
corresponding to thebenefits underthis Act shallbe exempt fromattachment,
garnishment,execution,levy orotherprocessesissuedby the courts,quasi-judicial
agencies oradministrative bodies including CommissiononAudit (COA)
disallowances andfromall financialobligations ofthe members,including his pecuniary
accountability arising fromor caused oroccasioned by his exercise orperformance ofhis
official functionsorduties,orincurred relative to orin connectionwith his position or
work except whenhismonetary liability,contractual orotherwise,isinfavorofthe
GSIS.
It is clear fromthe above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted
from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law fromsuch
deductions.Retirement benefitscannot be diminished by COA disallowances in view of
the clearmandate ofthe foregoing provision. It is a basic rule in statutory construction
that if a statute is clear,plain and free fromambiguity,it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without interpretation. This is what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba
legis.[20]
Accordingly,the GSIS’ interpretation of Section 39 that COA disallowances have
become monetary liabilities of respondents to the GSIS and therefore fall under the
exception statedin the lawis wrong. No interpretation ofthe said provision is necessary
given the clearlanguage ofthe statute. A meaning that doesnot appearnoris intendedor
reflected in the very language ofthe statutecannotbe placed therein by construction.[21]
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS’ interpretation, then it would be
unnecessary to single out COA disallowancesas amongthosefromwhich benefits under
RA 8291 are exempt. In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the
enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply
consider COA disallowances as monetary liabilities in its favor. Such a construction
would empowerthe GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted by
law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officermay not be withheld and applied to
his indebtedness to the government hasbeensettledin severalcases. In Cruzv.Tantuico,
Jr.,[22]
the Court,citing Hunt v. Hernandez,[23]
explained the reason for such policy thus:
x x x we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in favorof
the pensioner.Pension in this case is a bounty flowing fromthe graciousnessofthe
Government intendedto reward pastservicesand,at the same time, to provide the
pensionerwith the means with which to support himselfand his family. Unless otherwise
clearly provided,the pensionshould inure wholly to the benefit ofthe pensioner.It is true
that the withholdingand applicationofthe amount involvedwas had undersection 624of
the Administrative Code andnot byany judicialprocess,but ifthe gratuity could not be
attachedorlevied upon executionin viewof the prohibition ofsection 3ofAct No.4051,
the appropriationthereofby administrative action,ifallowed,would lead to the same
prohibited result and enable the respondents to do indirectly what theycan not do directly
undersection3ofAct No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a laterstatute havingbeenapproved
on February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of1917 which embodies section
624 relied upon by the respondentswas approvedon March10of that year.Considering
section 3ofAct No. 4051 as an exception to the generalauthoritygranted in section 624
of the Administrative Code,antagonismbetween the two provisionsis avoided.
(Underscoringsupplied)
The above ruling was reiterated in Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo,[24]
where the Court
similarly declared that benefits under retirement laws cannot be withheld regardless of
the petitioner’s monetary liability to the government.
The policy of exempting retirement benefits fromattachment, levy and execution,
as well as unwarranted deductions, has been embodied in a long line of retirement
statutes. Act No. 4051,[25]
which provides for the payment of gratuity to officers and
employees ofthe Insular Government upon retirement due to reorganization, expressly
provides in its Section 3that “(t)he gratuityprovidedforin this Act shallnot be attached
or levied upon execution.”

83. The law which established the GSIS, Commonwealth Act No. 186 (“CA No.
186”),[26]
went further by providing as follows:
SEC. 23. Exemptionsfromlegal processand liens.– No policy oflife insurance issued
underthis Act,orthe proceedsthereof, except those correspondingto the annual
premium thereon in excess offive hundredpesosperannum,when paid to any member
thereunder,shallbe liable to attachment,garnishment,orotherprocess,orto be seized,
taken,appropriated,orapplied by any legalorequitable processoroperation oflawto
pay any debt orliability of such member,or his beneficiary,orany otherperson who may
have a right thereunder,eitherbefore orafterpayment;norshallthe proceeds thereof,
when not made payable to a named beneficiary,constitute a part ofthe estate ofthe
member for payment ofhis debt.
PresidentialDecree No.1146,[27]
which amended CA No. 186, likewise contained a
provision exempting benefits from attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.
However,the exemption was expressly made inapplicable to “obligations of the member
to the System, or to the employer, or when the benefits granted are assigned by the
member with the authority of the System.”[28]
The latest GSIS enactment, RA 8291,[29]
provides for a more detailed and wider
range of exemptions under Section 39. Aside from exempting benefits from judicial
processes, it likewise unconditionally exempts benefits from quasi-judicial and
administrative processes, including COA disallowances, as well as all financial
obligations of the member. The latter includes any pecuniary accountability of the
member which arose out ofthe exercise orperformance ofhis official functionsorduties
or incurred relative to his position or work. The only exception to such pecuniary
accountability is when the same is in favor of the GSIS.
Thus,“monetaryliability in favorof GSIS” refers to indebtedness ofthe member to
the Systemotherthanthose which fallunderthe categories ofpecuniary accountabilities
exempted under the law. Such liability may include unpaid social insurance premiums
and balanceson loansobtained by theretiree fromthe System, which do not arise in the
performance ofhis duties and are not incurredrelative to his work.The generalpolicy,as
reflected in our retirement laws and jurisprudence, is to exempt benefits fromall legal
processes or liens, but not from outstanding obligations of the member to the
System. This is to ensure maintenance ofthe GSIS’ fund reserves in order to guarantee
fulfillment of all its obligations under RA 8291.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, we find it necessary to nonetheless
differentiate between those benefits which were properly disallowed by the COA and
those which were not.
Anent the benefitswhich were improperly disallowed,the same rightfully belongto
respondentswithout qualification. As for benefits which were justifiably disallowed by
the COA, the same were erroneously granted to and received by respondents who now
have the obligation to return the same to the System.
It cannot be denied that respondentswere recipients of benefits that were properly
disallowed by the COA. These COA disallowanceswould otherwise have been deducted
from theirsalaries,were it not forthe fact that respondents retired before such deductions
could be effected. The GSIS can no longerrecoverthese amountsby any administrative
means due to the specific exemption of retirement benefits from COA disallowances.
Respondentsresultantly retained benefits to which they were not legally entitled which,
in turn,gave rise to an obligation on theirpart to return the amounts under the principle
of solutio indebiti.
Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code,[30]
if something is received and unduly
delivered through mistake when there is no right to demandit,the obligation to return the
thing arises. Payment by reason of mistake in the construction or application of a
doubtfulordifficult question of law also comes within the scope of solutio indebiti.[31]
In the instant case, the confusion about the increase and payment of benefits to
GSIS employees and executives, as well as its subsequent disallowance by the COA,
arose on accountofthe applicationofRA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Lawand its
implementing rules, CCC No. 10. The complexity in the application of these laws is
manifested by the several cases that have reached the Court since its passage in
1989.[32]
The application of RA 6758 was made even more difficult when its
implementing rules were nullified for non-publication.[33]
Consequently, the delivery of
benefits to respondents under an erroneous interpretation of RA 6758 gave rise to an
actionable obligation for themto return the same.
While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against respondents’ retirement benefits, it
can nonethelessseekrestorationofthe amounts bymeans ofa proper court action for its
recovery. Respondentsthemselvessubmit that this should be the case,[34]
although any
judgment rendered therein cannot be enforced against retirement benefits due to the
exemption provided in Section 39of RA 8291. However,there is no prohibition against
enforcing a final monetary judgment against respondents’ other assets and
properties. This is only fair and consistent with basic principles of due process.
As such, a proper accounting of the amounts due and refundable is in order. In
rendering such accounting, the parties must observe the following guidelines:
(1) All deductionsfromrespondents’retirement benefitsshould be refunded
except those amounts which may properly be defined as “monetary
liability to the GSIS”;
(2) Any other amount to be deducted from retirement benefits must be
agreed upon by and between the parties; and
(3) Refusalon the part ofrespondentsto returndisallowedbenefits shallgive
rise to a right of action in favor of GSIS before the courts of law.
Conformably,any fees due to Atty. Sundiamfor his professional services may be
charged against respondents’ retirement benefits. The arrangement, however, must be
covered by a proper agreement between himand his clients under (2) above.
As to whether respondents are entitled to dividends on the provident fund
contributions, the same is not within the issues raised before the Court. The second
petition refers only to the legality of the deductions made by GSIS fromrespondents’
retirement benefits. There are factualmatters thatneed to be threshed out in determining
respondents’ right to the payment of dividends, in view of the GSIS’ assertion that the
management contributionswere not actually remitted to the fund. Thus, the payment of

84. dividendsshould be the subjectofa separateclaimwhere the parties can present evidence
to prove their respective assertions. The Court is in no position to resolve the matter
since the material facts that would prove or disprove the claimare not on record.
In the interest of clarity, we reiterate herein our ruling that there is no identity of
subject matterbetween the COA proceedings,fromwhich the first petition stemmed, and
respondents’ claim of refund before the Board. While the first petition referred to the
propriety of the COA disallowances per se, respondents’ claim before the Board
pertained to the legality of deducting the COA disallowances fromretirement benefits
under Section 39 of RA 8291.
Finally, on respondentsclaimthat the GSIS acted in bad faith when it deducted the
COA disallowancesfromtheirretirement benefits,except forbare allegations,there is no
prooforevidence ofthe alleged bad faith and partiality ofthe GSIS. Moreover,the latter
cannot be faultedfortaking measures to ensure recoveryofthe COA disallowancessince
respondentshave alreadyretired and would be beyondits administrative reach.The GSIS
merely acted upon its bestjudgment and chose to err in the side of prudence rather than
suffer the consequence of not being able to account for the COA disallowances. It
concededly erred in taking this recourse but it can hardly be accused of malice or bad
faith in doing so.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the April 16, 2002 Decision in G.R. Nos.
138381 and 141625 is AMENDED. In addition to the refund ofamounts corresponding
to benefits allowed in G.R. No. 138381, the GSIS is ordered to REFUND all deductions
from retirement benefits EXCEPT amounts representing monetary liability of the
respondentsto theGSIS as well as all otheramounts mutually agreed uponby the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J., Panganiban,Quisumbing,Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J. on official leave.
Corona and Tinga, JJ., on leave.
Callejo, Sr., J., no part, Ponente in CA Decision.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143047. July 14, 2004]
RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution[1]
of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division), which denied the petitioner’s omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and its
Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the
same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,[2]
committed as follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a
Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of his official functions,
particularly in theoperation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against
alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim or collect from thecoffers of thecity
government a totalamount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred
during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the
said police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city
government a totalamount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to thegovernment as
well as thepublic interest.[3]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[4]
for the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the
case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate
proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270 which
prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He
asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by
officials of local government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or
higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the “Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.” He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction
over the crime charged against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice
of Adm. Order No. 270.

85. In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted that
the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of theSangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who, by
express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7975,[5]
is classified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original
jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the
petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which
amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.[6]
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus
motion,[7]
citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
Sandiganbayan,[8]
where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the
law creating the Sandiganbayan, “collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan,” and that “the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was
made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its
jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.”
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and
entered a plea of not guilty.[9]
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s September 23, 1999 Resolution.[10]
The motion was, however, denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.[11]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but
on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in “Lilia B. Organo versus The
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,” G.R. No. 133535, 09
September 1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and employees
with rank and salary grade 27 and above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed,
he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG
25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC
and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He
asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,[12]
Dapitan City is only a component city, and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang PanlungsodMembers
I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
without qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress
approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions
specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were
specifically included therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod are specifically included as among thosefalling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.
A reading of theaforesaid provisions, likewise, show that thequalification as to Salary Grade
27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other than theregional
director and higher and thosespecifically enumerated. To rule, otherwise, is to give a
different interpretation to what thelaw clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as thesole factor to
determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then thelawmakers could
have simply stated that theofficials of the executive branch, to fall within theexclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a
Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No.
8249 specifically including themembers of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as
thosewithin the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the
said sangguniang members shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court
regardless of their Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to statethat the lawmakers are very well aware that not all the
positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, thelegislature has explicitly made
the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of theseofficials’ functions
and responsibilities as well as thepower they can wield over their respectivearea of
jurisdiction.[13]
The threshold issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of DapitanCity,
who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled “An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606,” took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by
Rep. Act No. 8249, entitled “An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” The amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and
Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No.
8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the

86. offense.[14]
Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
the crime.[15]
However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an
exception thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of these two provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive][16]
original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book
II][17]
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principalaccused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
…
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime
charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The
applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:[18]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code,[19]
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of theoffense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwiseclassified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;[20]
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippinearmy and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;[21]
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of theOmbudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, stateuniversities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of ConstitutionalCommissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by thepublic officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.[22]
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principalaccused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade “27”or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan TrialCourt, Municipal
Trial Court, and MunicipalCircuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[23]
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the
government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of ConstitutionalCommissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;and

87. (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippinearmy and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of theOmbudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, stateuniversities or educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the general
qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as “occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.” In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019
committed by officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials
specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive branch
with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase “officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.” Or the
category in paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to “[a]ll other national and local
officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of
1989” would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress included specific officials,without any
reference as to their salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials,
regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan’s
original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such
enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute should not be
construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction which will give them some force and
meaning is possible.[24]
That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their salary
grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative
history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No.
1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No.
7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies thepresent jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan such that only
thoseoccupying high positions in the government and themilitary fall under thejurisdiction of
the court.
As proposed by theCommittee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over
cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of theprincipal accused are officials
occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher by the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity at thetime of thecommission of the offense. The jurisdiction,
therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of the
Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
The bill provides for an extensive listing of otherpublic officers who will be subject to the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of Congress,
judges and justices of all courts.[25]
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No.
844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No.
8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975,
thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO
…
By way of sponsorship, Mr. President – we will issue the full sponsorship speech to the
members because it is fairly technical – may we say thefollowing things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the “larger fish” and leave the “small fry” to the lower courts. This law
became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of
the dockets of that court, to wit:

88. It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whosesalary grades were at
Grade “26” or lower, devolving thereby these cases to thelower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan only over public officials whosesalary grades were at Grade
“27” or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in
government regardless of salary grade;[26]
Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them “big fish” and their
positions important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in
(a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management in
1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example:
Category New Position Title Grade
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
…
Foreign Service
…
Foreign Service Officer, Class II[27]
23[28]
Foreign Service Officer, Class I[29]
24[30]
…
18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE
…
Local Executives
…
City Government Department Head I 24[31]
City Government Department Head II 26[32]
…
Provincial Government Department Head 25[33]
…
City Vice Mayor I 26
City Vice Mayor II 28
City Mayor I 28[34]
City Mayor II 30
19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
Sangguniang Members
…
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 26[35]
Office of theCity and Provincial Prosecutors[36]
Prosecutor IV 29
Prosecutor III 28
Prosecutor II 27
Prosecutor I 26
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act
No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan’s original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into account, these
officials’ respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the amendments to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975,
specifically including them within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing
so, it obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g)
thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is
the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.[37]
From the congressional records and
the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid
subsequent laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,[38]
can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included
in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom

89. the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the
jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is
given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole.[39]
And courts should adopt a construction that will give
effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.[40]
In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among those
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,[41]
or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No.
8249[42]
for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the
petitioner’s case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.