1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx

1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an
organization of your choosing (Intel). Please read the Course
Project - Introduction page in this module before attempting this
assignment. Now it's time to select a company that you'd like to
use for the course project. It's important that you choose a
company that is easily researched. You're going to need to find
information on their current business practices and makeup.
That can be very hard to do with small local businesses, but
easier with larger publicly traded companies. It's also important
to choose a company that you're interested in and want to learn
about. This will make the project more engaging.
For the first part of your assignment this week, write a paper
that's at least a page in length and completes the following:
· Identify a company for which you wish to develop a strategic
management plan. You may wish to conduct some preliminary
research to help you understand a little more about the company
you chose. Intel is the company we are using
· Provide a brief description of the company including what
they do, what they're known for, and their reputation within the
current business environment.
· Provide your reasons for selecting this company. Be thorough
and specific with your explanation.
2 The next phase of your strategic management plan will require
you to research your company's history and existing strategic
goals. Before we can make major improvements to the business,
we first have to understand where they came from and what
they're currently trying to accomplish. Use reliable business
sources, the company website, and any traditional appropriate
sources to gather as much background information that you can.
For the second part of your assignment this week, write a paper
that's at least two pages in length and addresses the following:
· Detail the history of the business. Explain how they got their
start but focus mostly on how their business has changed over

the last 15 years. Provide a picture of how they adapt to change
and any major obstacles that they've had to overcome.
· Include some information on the top executives at the
company and the role that they've played in those last 15 years.
· Provide the company's existing mission statement and code of
ethics. In what way do they articulate their ethical practices
through policies and public outreach and why is this important?
· Identify two areas of concern ethically and explain those
choices. Make sure to discuss why you feel that are areas of
ethical concern. Think critically about where your chosen
company has the potential for ethical dilemmas. For example,
an accounting firm would be concerned with fraud.
· Rewrite your company's mission statement. The idea is to
provide clarity and set the new strategic direction that you think
the company should be moving towards. Include a paragraph
explaining the changes that you've made and why.
Be sure to document your sources using APA notation.
Information on APA can be found in the Online Library which
is accessible through the Resources tab.
Running head: THE PROPOSAL PAPER 1
THE PROPOSAL PAPER 5
THE PROPOSAL PAPER
Motivation: Comparative Analysis of Leadership in IT
companies in India offshore and the US Onshore Model
A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Education (Ph.D.)

By
Nagamani Palla, B.S., M.S.
May 2019
University of the Cumberlands
Proposal Paper
Motivation: Comparative Analysis of Leadership in IT
companies operating in onshore and offshore model
The rapid growth of Indian-based Information Technology
companies is due to the changes in the global society. This
growth is significant when compared to many U.S. Information
Technology companies that are downsizing or reorganizing.
This expansion is good for the Indian economy, but the concern
is there is little to no consideration given to the motivation of
the employees. Inaccurately defined job duties and
responsibilities in IT companies can leave employees feeling
bored, experiencing repetition, and often has one person
performing the same job. Consequently, management of human
capital must become important to Indian IT companies.
According to Cappelli, Singh, Singh, and Useem (2010),
investing in upskill employees, promoting internally versus
hiring from outside of the company, engaging in cultural events,
and designing incentives should be an important role.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate employee motivation
within Indian IT companies operating in the offshore and
onshore model and focusing on job characteristics other than
money. A good leader can motivate their employees by earning
respect in various ways. To create a motivating work

environment, a leader must have “the best interests of the
community as their priority rather than their own self-interests”
(Davis, 2019c, slide 5).
I plan to use the Hackman and Oldham Model for the study.
During the review of the literature, I have found suggestions for
further research to test the model in other countries and
industries. Research indicates employees are strongly
motivated when they have the proper balance between work and
family life (Buelens & Van Den Broeck, 2007). Therefore, I am
very interested in the motivation of individuals in IT companies
where they operate in Onshore and Offshore model. I have
found examples of the instrument, which consist of 23 survey
questions, used in various countries which does not include
India. This will allow me to use the validated instrument in a
country not previously studied, then I will evaluate the
motivation of the employees in Indian IT companies operating
in offshore and onshore model.
Hackman and Oldham (1976) established the Job Characteristics
Model (also referred to as the Hackman & Oldham Model) to
define how the individual behaviors and job characteristics
combine to affect the satisfaction, motivation, and productivity
of employees while at work. This design is applicable in
planning and carrying out modifications in the design of jobs.
Initially, Herzberg’s two-factor theory (Herzberg, Mausner &
Synderman, 1959) provided the foundation for developing the
Hackman and Oldham Model.
Research Questions
Is there a relationship between autonomy and the motivation of
employees in IT Indian companies operating in an offshore and
onshore model?
Ha: There is a relationship between autonomy and the
motivation of employees in IT Indian companies operating in an
offshore and onshore model.
Ho: There is not a relationship between autonomy and the

Is there a relationship between feedback and the motivation of
employees in IT Indian companies operating in an offshore and
onshore model?
Ha: There is a relationship between feedback and the motivation
of employees in IT Indian companies operating in an offshore
and onshore model.
Ho: There is not a relationship between feedback and the
motivation of employees IT Indian companies operating in an
Is there a relationship between task identity and the motivation
of leaders in companies in IT Indian companies operating in an
offshore and onshore model?
Ha: There is a relationship between task identity and the
offshore and onshore model
Ho: There is not a relationship between task identity and the
The Hackman and Oldham Model of Job Redesign and
Motivation
Outcomes
Critical
Psychological
States
Core Job
Characteristics
Skill variety Experienced
High internal work

Task identity meaningfulness of
motivation
Task design the work
High “growth”
Experienced
satisfaction
Autonomy responsibility for
outcomes of the work
High general job
Satisfaction
Knowledge of the actual
Feedback from job results of the work
High work
activities
effectiveness
Moderators
1. Knowledge and skill
2. Growth needs strength
3. “Context” Satisfaction
Motivating potential score (MPS) =
Skill variety + Task identity + Task significance x Autonomy
x Feedback.

Skills Application 4.2 Job Diagnostic Survey
Hackman and Oldham developed a self-reporting instrument for
managers to diagnose their work environment. The first step in
calculating the “Motivating Potential Score” (MPS) of your job
is to complete the following questionnaire:
1. Use the scales below to indicate whether each statement is an
accurate or inaccurate description of your present or most recent
job. After completing the instrument, use the scoring key to
compute a total score for each of the core job characteristics.
5=Very descriptive
4=Mostly descriptive
3= Somewhat descriptive
2=Mostly non-descriptive
1=Very non-descriptive
_____1. I have almost complete responsibility for deciding how
and when the work is to be one.
_____2. I have a chance to do a number of different tasks,
using a wide variety of different skills
and talents.
_____3. I do a complete task from start to finish. The results
of my efforts are clearly visible and identifiable.
_____4. What I do affects the wellbeing of other people in very
important ways.
_____5. My manager provides me with constant feedback about
how I am doing.
_____6. The work itself provides me with information about
how well I am doing.
_____7. I make insignificant contributions to the final product
or service.
_____8. I get to use a number of complex skills on this job.
_____9. I have very little freedom in deciding how the work is
to be done.
____10. Just doing the work provides me with opportunities to
figure out how the work is to be done.
____11. The job is quite simple and repetitive.

____12. My supervisors or coworkers rarely give me feedback
on how well I am doing the job.
____13. What I do is of little consequence to anyone else.
____14. My job involves doing a number of different tasks.
____15. Supervisors let us know how well they think we are
doing.
____16. My job is arranged so that I do not have a chance to do
an entire piece of work from beginning to end.
____17. My job does not allow me an opportunity to use
discretion or participate in decision making.
____18. The demands of my job are highly routine and
predictable.
____19. My job provides few clues about whether I’m
performing adequately.
____20. My job is not very important to the company’s
survival.
____21. My job gives me considerable freedom in doing the
work.
____22. My job provides me with the chance to finish
completely any work I start.
____23. Many people are affected by the job I do.
References
Ali, S., Said, N., Yunus, N., Kader, S., Latif, D., & Munap, R.
(2014). Hackman and Oldham’s Job characteristics Model to
Job Satisfaction, Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 129,
46-52.
Ayandele, I. & Nnamesh, M. (2014). Hackman and Oldham Job
Characteristics Model (JCM) and Akwa Ibom State Civil
Servants’ Performance. Canadian Social Science, 10(2), 10.
Benard, C. (1938). The Functions of the Executive. Boston,
MA: Harvard University Press.

Brown, M. M. (2002). An exploratory study of job satisfaction
and work motivation of a select group of Information
technology consultants in the Delaware Valley. (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation) Wilmington College, Delaware.
Buelens, M., & Van den Broeck, H. (2007). An analysis of
differences in work motivation between public and private
sector organizations. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 65-
74.
Camilleri, E. (2007). Antecedents affecting public service
motivation. Personnel Review,
36(3), 356-377. doi:10.1108/00483480710731329
Cappelli, P., Singh, H., Singh, J., & Useem, M. (2010). The
India Way: Lessons for the U.S. Academy of Management
Perspectives, 24(2), 6–24. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.24.2.6
Casey, R., & Robbins, J. (2009). A comparison of the elements
of motivation in the hospital industry versus the retail and
manufacturing sectors. Journal of Diversity Management, 4(3),
13-20.
Davis, D. (2019c). Historical Leadership: Aristotle and
Nicomachean Ethics
https://ucumberlands.blackboard.com/webapps/blackboard/
content/listContentEditable.js
p?content_id=_766013_1&course_id=_58778_1
Outline
I will be following the format below for the headings and
subheadings:
Chapter Two
Introduction (Center)
Heading 1 (Left Align)
Motivational Theory
Leadership Theory
Motivational Factors?
Maslow’s

Herzberg
McClelland
Leadership Style
Authoritative
Transitional
Servant
Transformational
Transformational and Motivation
Previous research work (studies)
India
Summary/GAP
Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Morality is intrinsically connected to leadership behavior
(Ciulla, 1995). Chapter
two describes leadership behavior within the context of a full
range of leadership and
cognitive moral development in terms of Rest’s schema theory.
The chapter also
examines research into the moral development of educators and
educational leaders and
the studies that look into the relationship between leadership

behavior and moral
reasoning. Finally, chapter two will conclude by looking into
the connections that have
been made between leadership behaviors and cognitive moral
development.
Styles of Leadership
Researchers have long sought the alchemy that results in
effective leadership. In
their search, they initially found the Great Man or the traits and
skills that result in a great
man. They have since rested on the notion that an effective
leader embodies a full range
of leadership behaviors that are used as the situation dictates.
Vann, Coleman, and
Simpson (2014) offer a compelling description of this full range
of leadership behavior.
Borrowing from the Leadership Styles Scale, Vann and
colleagues (2014) propose that
leadership behavior is not monolithic in character but is instead
a hybrid of traits.
Democratic and autocratic leadership. Democratic and
autocratic leadership
exist on opposite ends of a spectrum. Democratic leaders “seek
advice and input from

their followers” and “motivate their followers by engaging their
followers, listening to
their ideas and treating both the individual and their ideas as
equals” (Vann, Coleman &
Simpson, 2014, p. 31). By contrast, autocratic leaders
“concentrate all decision-making
with themselves” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Under democratic
leadership, organizational
hierarchy is irrelevant, whereas autocratic leaders promote a
strong sense of hierarchy.
And while autocratic leadership embraces a more
Machiavellian-style of leadership,
democratic leadership blurs, if not undermines entirely, the
distinction between leader
and follower as leadership becomes a “process of influence in
which determining who is
leading and who is following may be difficult to assess” (Bass,
2000, p. 29).
Transformational leadership. Transformational leadership’s
goal is to promote
change and transformation (Vann et al., 2014). Northouse
(2013) defines

transformational leadership as “the process whereby a person
engages with others and
creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and
morality in both the leader and
the follower” (p. 186). Transformational leaders are attentive to
their followers needs
and to their motives (Northouse, 2013; Vann et al., 2014).
Vann et al. (2014) observe
that “these leaders achieve their results through personal
charisma, charm, clear vision,
and passion” resulting in followers that “believe themselves
valued as an individual, and
often empowered to perform better” (p. 31).
Transformational leaders raise the awareness of their
constituencies about
what is important, increase concerns for achievement, self-
actualization and
ideals. They move followers to go beyond their own self-
interests for the
good of their group, organization, or community, country or
society as a
whole (Bass, 2000, p. 21).
There are four recognized dimensions of transformational
leadership: idealized

influence, individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation,
and inspirational
motivation (Ghasabeh, Soosay & Reaiche, 2015). While
idealized influence attempts to
create a shared vision between leader and follower,
individualized consideration focuses
on the needs of the followers (Ghasabeh et al., 2015).
Intellectual stimulation induces
knowledge sharing to promote innovation within the
organization, and inspirational
motivation inspires followers, motivating them to attain higher
expectations (Ghasabeh et
al., 2015).
Transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is often
contrasted with
transformational leadership and is a common form of leadership
that focuses on an
exchange between leader and follower (Northouse, 2013), a
“quid pro quo approach to
leading others” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Whereas
transformational leadership attempts
to move followers beyond self-interest, transactional leaders

“cater to the self-interests of
their constituencies by means of contingent reinforcement”
(Bass, 2000, p. 22). The
behaviors of the followers may be reinforced positively or
negatively (Bass, 2000) to
achieve a task-oriented goal. Compared to the transformational
leader’s motivation to
promote innovation and change in an organization, transactional
leaders focus on the
management of personnel and achieving results (Vann et al.,
2014).
Laissez-faire leadership. A laissez-faire style of leadership
borrows from the
economic theory of the same name and implies a hands-off
approach to leadership (Vann
et al., 2014). Laissez-faire leadership is an absence of
leadership (Northouse, 2013), in
which a leader avoids the responsibilities of leadership,
providing neither direction nor
support to subordinates. Bass (2000) refers to it as passive
leadership and Northouse
(2013) calls it non-leadership.
Full range of leadership. Although transactional leadership and
transformational

leadership are often described as a dichotomy, Bass (2000)
states that they are “not two
ends of one dimension” (p. 22) as he once originally suggested.
Rather, a laissez-
approach is placed at the opposite end of a spectrum that
includes transformative
leadership on one end and transactional leadership in the middle
(Bass, 2000). For Bass
(2000), this spectrum of leadership is the “full range of
leadership.” The full range of
leadership includes inspirational leadership (a combination of
inspirational motivation
and idealized influence), intellectual stimulation, individualized
consideration, contingent
reward, active management-by-exception (in which leaders
correct mistakes and
otherwise react to problems), and passive leadership. Each
style of leadership
“contributes to the creation and maintenance” of an
organization (Bass, 2000, p. 26),
suggesting that each has their place when called upon.
Situational leadership. While Bass’s full range of leadership

(Bass, 2000) states
that each style of leadership should be utilized in an
organization and implies that one
style of leadership may be better than another depending upon
the situation, Hersey and
Blanchard’s situational approach to leadership clearly operates
under the premise that
“different situations demand different kinds of leadership” and
“an effective leader
requires that a person adapt his or her style to the demand of
different situations”
(Northouse, 2016, p. 99). This approach requires the leader to
evaluate the development
level of their subordinates—a combination of behavioral
maturity and task-completion
ability—and apply a leadership style appropriate to the
situation.
As Northouse (2014) describes it, a subordinate may be said to
be highly capable
and highly committed to the completion of the task (a
developmental level labeled D4);
highly capable but not committed to the task’s completion (D3);
said to have some
capability but low commitment (D2); or have low capability but

high commitment (D1).
Each of these developmental levels are then matched with a
style of leadership. A D1
employee is matched with a directing style that is highly
directive but low supporting
(S1). A coaching approach (S2)—which is highly directive and
highly supportive—is
matched with D2. A supporting style (S3) of leadership
provides high support but low
direction to a D3 subordinate. And an S4, or delegating
approach, includes low support
and low direction and is matched with a D4 employee.
Vannsimpco model. If trait theory and skills theory are theories
of leadership
limited to characteristics of a leader in the case of trait theory,
and to the capabilities of a
leader in the case of skills theory, then it follows that their use
is limited to descriptive
theories of leadership. However, since a styles theory of
leadership “focuses exclusively
on what leaders do and how they act” (Northouse, 2016, p. 69),
its value as a prescriptive

theory of leadership is considerable since it implies leaders
have some agency in the
effectiveness of their leadership. Vann, Coleman, and Simpson
(2014) acknowledge the
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire’s (MLQ) recognized
styles of leadership, which
includes transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire styles,
but concede that “most
leaders cannot be described in monolithic terms” (p. 30).
Rather than embodying a single
leadership style, most leaders “employ a hybrid of various
styles based upon their
contextual situation” (p. 30). This hybrid of various styles is
categorized per the
Leadership Style Scale (LSS) and its five dimensions, or styles,
of leadership:
democratic, autocratic, transformational, transactional, and
laissez-faire. This hybrid
form of leadership is situational in nature, “permit[ting] the
leader to employ various
leadership methods to different situations and groups, allowing
the context of events to
shape the leadership’s methods” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 32).

Ethics and Leadership Behavior
The link between leadership style and organization outcomes
has been studied in
detail. The link between transformational leadership, “the
darling of the leadership
studies discipline” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 30) and personal and
organizational outcomes
has been noted elsewhere (Bass, 1997). Givens (2008), citing
Tucker and Russell,
concludes with blanket affirmation: “transformational
leadership is needed in all
organizations” (p. 5).
However, Sendjaya (2005) points out that leadership
effectiveness—an evaluation
that is often conveyed in terms of profits (Sendjaya, 2005;
Vann, Coleman & Simpson,
2014), perhaps to justify its relevance in research—and its
relationship to leadership style
are studied to the exclusion of other leader traits, particularly
morality. This is at odds

with ethics’ centrality elsewhere, with Ciulla (1995) arguing
that “ethics is located in the
heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage” (p. 6).
Thus, the moral judgment
and reasoning of leaders should be central to the study of
effective leadership.
Within this paper no distinction is made between ethics and
morals and the terms
are used interchangeably. The choice in doing so is both for the
sake of simplicity and
because whatever distinction in terms there may otherwise be
are insubstantial. This
choice is not without precedent. Ciulla (2004) explains:
Some people like to make a distinction between these two
concepts, arguing
that ethics is about social values and morality is about personal
values. Like
most philosophers, I use the terms interchangeably. As a
practical matter,
courses on moral philosophy cover the same material as courses
on ethics.
There is a long history of using these terms as synonyms of
each other,

regardless of their roots in different languages (p. 303).
Moral Judgment Development
What is a moral judgment, and how far does its domain extend?
Judgments are
moral insofar as they are
judgments of value, not of fact. This distinguishes them from
cognitive
reasoning and judgment studied by Piaget. Second, they are
social
judgments, judgments involving people. Third, they are
prescriptive or
normative judgments, judgments of ought, of rights and
responsibilities,
rather than value judgments of liking and preference (Colby,
Kohlberg,
Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987, p. 10).
Moral judgments are, by their nature, prescriptive since “it is
only when social cognition
is extended into prescriptive judgments as to what is right or
good that we can identify a
moral judgment” (Colby et al., 1987, p. 10).

In their overview of the schema theory of moral development,
Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) credit Lawrence Kohlberg with a
legacy of major ideas for
psychological research in morality, observing that “it is no
coincidence that the first and
last words of [Postconventional Moral Thinking] are ‘Lawrence
Kohlberg.’ He died over
10 years ago, but his significance to the field of moral
psychology endures” (p. ix).
Kohlberg credits Piaget with defining moral development
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977), but
it is ultimately Kohlberg who illuminates the field of moral
judgment development (Rest,
Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999).
Kohlberg and Moral Development
Moral judgments, and in particular cognitive moral judgment
development, are
understood in this paper in light of Rest’s neo-Kohlbergian
schema theory. However,
Rest’s theory, as the name Rest adopted implies, owes much to

Kohlberg’s stage theory
of moral development. Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral
development mirrors Piaget’s
stages of cognitive development, with moral reasoning
developing across a series of six
advancing stages and each stage representing a consistent level
of moral judgment.
Development is a progression to the next stage, and individuals
tend to operate at the
highest available stage (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). The
development of moral judgment
is the result of social interaction, “from the dialogue between
the person’s cognitive
structure and the complexity presented by environment”
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p.
57). Moral judgment arises from the conflict that results from
situations that cannot be
adequately resolved from a present level of moral reasoning: the
individual can only
resolve the situation by developing more complex
understandings or otherwise
inadequately resolving it by oversimplifying the situation.
Levels of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, the six stages
occur on three

different levels of reasoning, each from its own sociomoral
perspective and each
comprising two stages: preconventional, conventional, or
postconventional (Colby,
Kohlberg, Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987). At
the preconventional
level the individual’s viewpoint is concrete and rules are
external to the self (Colby et al.,
1987). Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) add:
the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and
bad, right or
wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical
or the
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward,
exchange of
favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who
enunciate the rules
and labels (p. 54).
At Stage 1, individuals, usually in their very early childhood,
are motivated by and
ultimately value the avoidance of punishment and the power of
authority itself, finding no

meaning in the underlying values that the punishment may
represent. The rightness of an
action is determined by the level of punishment it brings
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;
Colby et al., 1987). At Stage 2, children are motivated by
fulfilling their own needs but
recognize that others have needs as well (Kohlberg & Hersh,
1977; Colby et al., 1987).
Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) liken this stage to a marketplace of
quid pro quo rather than
reciprocity based upon higher values such as gratitude or
loyalty.
At the conventional level, the individual’s perspective is that
of a member-of-
society (Colby et al., 1987) and “there is a clear effort to define
moral values and
principles that have validity and application apart from the
authority of the groups or
persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s
own identification with
these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). At Stage 3, the
rightness of behavior is
determined by its approval from others and motivated by
conformity. Kohlberg and

Hersh (1977) note that at this stage “behavior is frequently
judged by intention [and it is
when] ‘he means well’ becomes important for the first time” (p.
55). At Stage 4,
individuals fully internalize the social system as conscience,
maintaining social order for
the sake of itself, and acting according to a sense of duty
(Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;
Colby et al., 1987).
At the postconventional level “there is a clear effort to define
moral values and
principles that have validity and application apart from the
authority of the groups or
persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s
own identification with
these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). A Stage 5 level
of moral development
understands the relativity of individual values and reasons
according to generally
utilitarian principles. Rightness at Stage 5 is determined by
rationally-based standards
generally agreed upon by the society as a whole with a utility

calculated to do the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. At a Stage 6, the
highest level of moral
development and most sophisticated level of moral reasoning,
individuals act according
to universal ethical principles. According to Kohlberg and
Hersh (1977),
right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with
self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness,
universality, and
consistency… At heart, these are universal principles of
justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the
dignity of
human beings as individual persons (p. 55).
Moral judgment interview. Kohlberg and his associates
developed the Standard
Issue Moral Judgment Interview and Scoring System (MJI) to
measure individual moral
development (Colby et al., 1987). The basis of the system is the
interview, which
Kohlberg claimed was “theoretically the most valid method of
scoring, since it is

instrument free. . .” (Kohlberg, 1999). The interview uses three
hypothetical situations
along with questions meant to probe for answers related to the
two moral issues (e.g., life
and law) thought to be central to the situation’s moral conflict.
The MJI requires
participants to reflect upon the decisions made and accurately
convey their reasoning for
those decisions, and the interviews are transcribed and require a
scoring guide of over
800 pages to score for stage. The resulting data presumably
illuminates the justifications,
elaborations, and clarifications of the moral judgment of the
individual.
A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Ethics
While Kohlberg sought to build a stage theory of moral
development in the mold
of Piaget, others came to the conclusion that Kohlberg’s
theories and methods were too
problematic to be resolved (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma,
1999). Kohlberg, rather
than dismiss the criticism outright, seemed also aware of the

deficiencies in his research
and invited critics and followers alike to help develop his
research into moral
development (Rest et al., 1999). Indeed, Kohlberg made many
changes to his model of
moral development over the course of his life including
reformulating both definitions of
his stages and his method of scoring, shifting his approach to
moral education, and
narrowing the parameters of his stages (Rest et al., 1999).
However, other limitations and
just criticisms remained.
James Rest and his colleagues, in developing their “neo-
Kohlbergian” approach to
moral development, did not, as others did, dismiss Kohlberg’s
theory outright. Rest found
Kohlberg’s theory “still fruitful—although some problems
warrant modification” (Rest et
al., 1999, p. 1). Indeed, Rest et al. (1999) identified several
“fruitful” ideas in Kohlberg’s
theory as guides for their own research, namely that a.) to
understand moral behavior the
researcher must also understand how the person makes sense of
the world, b.) the

individual actively constructs meaning and does not merely
absorb cultural ideology, c.)
that not all differences in morality are equally defensible, and
d.) concepts in moral
development can be understood in terms of advancement.
Rest was also careful to draw a distinction in morality itself,
dividing it into
concepts much in the same way economics distinguishes micro-
and macroeconomics.
Rest proposed that Kohlberg’s theory is more useful when
distinguishing between micro-
and macromorality, the latter of which is more appropriate for
both Kohlberg’s stage
theory and his own schema theory (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau,
Rest, Narvaez & Thoma,
1999). Macromorality “concerns the formal structures of
society that are involved in
making cooperation possible at a society level” (Rest et al.,
1999, p. 2). By contrast,
micromorality “concerns developing relationships with
particular others, and with an
individual’s creating consistent virtues within him- or herself

through everyday life”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 2). For micromorality, traits of loyalty,
dedication, and caring for
loved ones are held in esteem while equivalent macromoral
traits include impartiality and
acting on principle (Rest et al., 1999). Though both areas of
morality concern themselves
with society, and presumably a better society, they are not
always compatible. This, Rest
acknowledges, is a limitation of both stage theory and schema
theory.
Schema theory. Where Rest and colleagues diverged most
notably is in
Kohlberg’s conception of stages. For Kohlberg, the stages of
moral development are a
staircase in which the individual seeks solutions at the highest
available level of moral
reasoning (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). For Rest, the
stages are best
understood in terms of schema, a term adopted to differentiate
their neo-Kohlbergian
“soft” stages from Kohlberg’s “hard stages” (Rest et al., 1999;
Bebeau et al., 1999).
Rest’s schemas still represent a developmental sequence, but

individuals do not, notably,
always reason from the highest level of reasoning available to
them since they may be in
more than one stage at a given time (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et
al., 1999).
Nevertheless, similarities remain, and Rest and colleagues
further differentiate
their theory by providing different labels for their three schemas
of development. First,
the preconventional level of reasoning is relabeled as the
Personal Interests schema (Rest
et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). The Personal Interests
schema includes Kohlbergian
Stages 2 and 3 and functions on a “presociocentric” level,
without awareness or to the
exclusion of an organized society. The Personal Interests
schema “justifies a decision by
appealing to the personal stake that an actor has in the
consequences of an action,
including prudential affectional relationship” (Bebeau et al.,
1999, p. 305). The research
resulting from Rest’s schemas are notably devoid of attention to
the Personal Interests

schema since the reasoning involved typically predates
adolescence, whereas Rest’s
research requires individuals of at least twelve years of age.
The Maintaining Norms schema shares traits with Kohlberg’s
Stage 4, where
morality is defined by the established social order. For a
Maintaining Norms disposition,
without law “there would be no order; people would act instead
on their own special
interests, leading to anarchy, a situation that responsible people
want to prevent” (Bebeau
et al., 1999, p. 307). This schema is characterized by a need for
norms; a society-wide
scope; the uniform, categorical application of laws; the
establishment of reciprocity
through law, though partial in nature and therefore not
necessarily equitable in benefit for
everyone; and a duty orientation and deference to authorities
(Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et
al., 1999). Moral reasoning within this schema is limited to law
and the established order
and therefore what is also ought to be (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau
et al., 1999).

The Postconventional schema—though similarly labeled—is
broader in scope
than its Kohlbergian counterpart. Whereas the postconventional
level of Kohlberg bore
strong resemblance to the deontological perspective of Kant, the
Postconventional
schema is nonpartisan though less exacting (Rest et al., 1999).
However, a less exacting
understanding of postconventional thinking may be called for:
Kohlberg eventually
abandoned his Stage 6 from his scoring system while Stage 5
was also found lacking in
evidence, leaving postconventional thinking in question
altogether (Rest et al., 1999).
Rest and colleagues, in developing a broader understanding of
postconventional thinking,
began with its “defining characteristic… that rights and duties
are based on sharable
ideals for organizing cooperation in society, and are open to
debate and tests of logical
consistency, experience of the community, and coherence with
accepted practice” (Rest
et al., 1999, p. 41). Thus, postconventional thinking, holds

moral criteria above all other
criteria, particular norms and laws; it constructs an ideal society
and is not merely a
rejection of the establishment for the sake of contrarianism; it
includes sharable ideas
rather than idiosyncratic, personal intuition, or ethnocentric
preference; and it offers full
reciprocity through recognition that laws may be biased and
favor some over others (Rest
et al., 1999).
Defining issues test. Rest and colleagues also diverged from
Kohlberg in another
key way. Whereas Kohlberg understood moral reasoning as a
single facet of
understanding, moral judgment, Rest et al. (1999; Bebeau et al.,
1999) propose a four-
component model of the psychology of morality. Rest’s model
offers a multifaceted
understanding of moral reasoning that consists of moral
sensitivity, or acknowledging a
moral problem and interpreting its significance and potential
impact; moral judgment, or
deciding which action is morally justifiable; moral motivation,
or the extent to which an

individual is willing to act morally; and moral character, which
is akin to a kind of moral
grit.
For their schema theory of cognitive moral development, Rest
and associates
developed a new test called the Defining Issues Test (DIT) in
the 1970s (Rest et al.,
1999), now in its second iteration since its inception. The DIT
eschews Kohlberg’s use
of interviews for a more simplistic multiple-choice rating and
ranking system. Though
Kohlberg dismissed the DIT as “quick and dirty” (Thoma, Rest,
Narvaez & Bebeau,
1999, p. 646) Kohlberg’s interview data from the MJI had been
found problematic,
resulting in reports by researchers in which:
participant’s theories about their own inner processes are
quoted to support
the psychologist’s theories of how the mind works… When
Kohlberg
reported interviews, the participants sounded like the
philosopher John

Rawls (e.g., Kohlberg et al., 1990; Rawls, 1971); when Gilligan
reported
interviews, the participants sounded like gender feminists (e.g.,
Gilligan,
1982); when Youniss and Yates (e.g., this issue) report
interviews, the
participants say that they do not engage in deliberative
reasoning at all about
their moral actions (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295).
Indeed, interview data is a verbal production by nature and
therefore assumes a high
degree of verbal articulation. It also assumes “participants can
verbally explain the
workings of their minds” (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295) and it
may not, as Kohlberg
maintained, be “theoretically the most valid method of scoring”
(Kohlberg, 1979, p. 47).
The most current version of the DIT, the Defining Issues Test
Version 2 (DIT-2),
consists of five, paragraph length stories, or dilemmas, followed
by twelve short and
cryptically phrased issues or questions representing the

different schemas. The
participant then rates and ranks according to their importance to
the individual (Thoma et
al., 1999, Rest et al., 1999). Rest and associates derived the
test items from Kohlberg’s
research, using items derived from responses given in the MJI
(Rest et al., 1999). As for
how the DIT functions, according to Rest et al. (1999)
the DIT is a device for activating moral schemas. We presume
that reading
moral dilemmas and the DIT issue statements activates moral
schemas (to
the extent that a person has developed them). As the participant
encounters
an item that both makes sense and also activates a preferred
schema, that
item is given a high rating and ranked of high importance.
Alternatively,
when the participant encounters an item that either does not
make sense or
seems simplistic and unconvincing (is not activating a preferred
schema),
the item receives a low rating (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 301).

Because Rest’s schema theory suggests individuals do not
always operate at a single
stage or schema, the results of the DIT do not provide a single
consistent schema.
Instead, the results provide an aggregate of responses from
which a “P,” or principled,
score is derived from weighting responses that are considered
postconventional (Rest et
al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). A more recent scoring
innovation for the DIT, the N2
index, is a hybrid index incorporating the P score, or the degree
to which the individual
chooses items reflecting postconventional reasoning, along with
the degree to which the
individual rejects more simplistic reasoning, calculated by how
often the individual
chooses items of representing lower schemas as least preferable
(Rest et al., 1999; Rest,
Thoma, Narvaez & Bebeau, 1997). Though the P score has been
in use longer, the N2
index generally outperforms the results of the P score alone in
capturing information on
moral judgment development (Rest et al., 1999; Rest et al.,

1997).
DIT research. As befits research ongoing for the better part of
forty years, DIT
research is extensive and its results more or less consistent. P
scores range from zero to
95, and Bebeau and Thoma (2003) found that, in general,
middle school students score in
the 20s, high school seniors score on average in the 30s, the
average adult at 40, college
students in the 40s, graduate students score in the 50s, and
moral philosophy and political
science doctoral students are expected to score in the 60s. The
relationship between P
score and education is not an accident: formal education and
moral development are
highly correlated (Rest & Thoma, 1985; Rest et al., 1999; Rest
et al., 1997). Rest and
Thoma (1985) interpret this correlation as reinforced sociomoral
attitudes at the college
level, with “the progressive increase in moral judgment scores
[reflecting] the cumulative
impact of particular external social pressure” and “an increasing
capacity to comprehend
higher level thinking” (p. 712). Other interpretations for this

link between P score and
formal education include relationships between moral reasoning
and skill and knowledge,
moral reasoning and general intellectual stimulation, and the
possibility that college
students, as a population, are simply predisposed to higher
levels of moral reasoning
(Rest & Thoma, 1985).
While colleges in particular have a positive effect on P scores,
age has also been
found to have a positive impact on P scores (Rest, 1979) and
there appears to be a close
link to life experiences and moral development as well. Deemer
(1986) found that when
life experiences are coded as continued intellectual stimulation,
life richness, or richness
of social environment, there is a significant correlation with the
P score, even when
formal education is corrected for (Rest & Deemer, 1986).
The DIT has also linked political ideology to moral
development and has been
criticized as little more than a measurement of political attitude

(Rest et al., 1999).
However, Narvaez, Getz, Rest and Thoma (1999) reject this
claim, concluding that only
when political identity, religious fundamentalism (determined
by the individual’s belief
in the literalness of the Bible), and moral judgment (as
determined by an individual’s P
score) are combined can stances on public policy issues be
explained. Further, each
individual element cannot be reduced to another or to a common
liberal-conservative
factor. Rather, Narvaez et al. (1999) along with Rest et al.
(1999) theorize that cultural
ideology—the “values, norms, and standards that exist
independently of a single person
and that are shared by a group as part of its mutual culture”
(Narvaez et al., 1999, p.
478)—is but one process that shapes moral thinking. Moral
thinking, not to be confused
with moral judgment, is a broader concept than moral judgment
encompassing “people’s
judgments about right and wrong and the rationale behind such
thinking” (Narvaez et al.,
1999, p. 478).

This theory proposes that autonomy, “the self-initiated, agentic
side of morality”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), and heteronomy, “the external,
conforming side of morality”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), codetermine moral thinking and that
both the “individual’s
construction of meaning” (p. 177) and cultural ideology “co-
occur to produce moral
thinking” (p. 178). In this context, Orthodoxy, characterized by
belief in a moral center
found in traditional religion (Narvaez et al., 1999), and
religious fundamentalism,
characterized by authoritarianism and belief in the literalness of
the Bible, are likely to
coincide with a maintaining norms schema. Further moral
judgment development is then
stunted by beliefs that discourage the questioning of authority
(Rest et al., 1999). Thus, it
is not surprising that religious fundamentalism is related to high
scores in the maintaining
norms schema (Narvaez, 2005), nor that political views are also
related to moral

judgment development (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009).
Educators and Moral Reasoning Development
Ethical conduct is central to education (Cummings, Harlow &
Maddux, 2007),
with ethically complex problems arising daily that require
decisions based on values and
moral judgment (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009). Indeed, as
Cummings et al. (2007) observe,
“teachers should be able to make sound moral judgments, look
beyond their own self-
interest and take a broad view of morality that considers the
perspectives of all students
who represent diverse racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds”
(p. 67). Moreover, “the
teacher’s level of moral reasoning affects students’ perceptions
of moral atmosphere of
the classroom and… teachers with higher moral reasoning are
more likely to motivate
student learning and healthy social development than teachers
with lower moral reason”
(Cummings, Dyas, Maddux & Kochman, 2001, p. 145). Further,
“teachers who reason at
lower levels are not effective teacher mentors, they negatively

and inaccurately evaluate
student teachers who function at higher levels, and they take a
singular approach to
instruction” (Cummings et al., 2007, p. 69). It follows that
teaching, and by extension
educational leadership, should require advanced moral
reasoning ability; however,
research indicates that this is not the case.
Teachers and moral reasoning development. To wit, educators
generally show
moral reasoning ability equal to or below that of the average
adult (Cummings, Dyas,
Maddux & Kochman, 2001; King & Matthew, 2002; Derryberry,
Snyder & Wilson,
2006; Livingstone, Derryberry, King & Vendetti, 2006).
Preservice teachers, in
particular, have been the subject of several studies, which have
found that their moral
reasoning ability is lower than that expected of college educated
adults, who should
easily exceed a P score of 40 (Cummings et al., 2007). Of even
more concern, education

majors may actually lose moral reasoning ability over the
course of their undergraduate
education, with freshmen DIT P score averaging 33.52 and
senior DIT P scores averaging
22.57 (Lampe, 1994; McNeel, 1994; Yeazell & Johnson, 1988).
This contrasts
significantly with findings that consistently show education
plays a positive role in the
development of moral reasoning
While other studies are not so dire in their impression of
education majors
(Cummings et al., 2001), there is an indication that the
curriculum for education majors
does play a role in their moral development, or lack thereof.
The DIT scores of education
majors has been found, for example, to be lower than those of
liberal arts majors
(McNeel, 1994), though they are consistent with the scores of
business majors. And
although isolated findings show that education majors may be
on par with other majors
(Cummings et al., 2001), the moral reasoning ability of
education majors (P=24) still
remains lower than the adult average P score of 40 (Derryberry

et al., 2006). Many
theories have been offered to explain this discrepancy, but one
of the more convincing
theories for why education majors fail to advance and may, in
some cases, regress in
moral reasoning development is that the education curriculum
relies heavily on technical
ability as opposed to critical reasoning skills, upon which moral
reasoning development
relies. There is also little reason to believe that moral
reasoning ability improves over the
course of a teacher’s career. The moral reasoning level of
inservice teachers reflect little
improvement: postconventional reasoning was found only 30 to
50 percent of the time
(P=30, P=50, respectively).
Educational leaders and moral reasoning development. As with
teachers,
principals also appear to have a lower than expected level of
moral judgment. Vitton and
Wasonga (2009), in their study of elementary school principals,
concluded as much,

finding that their participants had an average P score of 38.7,
below the average adult
(P=40) and above the average senior high school student
(P=31.8). In their study of
educational leadership graduate students, Greer, Searby and
Thoma (2015) found an
average P score of only 29.98, or a score equivalent to what one
would expect of a senior
high school student. Although Slavinsky (2006) found higher P
scores than Vitton and
Wasonga (2009) and Greer et al. (2015), with scores just above
that of the average adult
(P=41.94 compared to P=40), his study is ungeneralizable with
only nine percent of
mailed surveys returned.
These results, when taken together, indicate that school faculty
and administration
operate at lower levels of moral reasoning. Jordan, Brown,
Trevino, and Finkelstein
(2013) found a positive link between employee perception of
ethical leadership and
leadership moral reasoning. Building on Kohlberg’s (1981)
theory that a significant
relationship exists between cognitive moral development and

normative behavior, their
findings suggest that employees are likely to emulate the level
of moral reasoning
perceived in their leadership. The sampling of educational
leaders—former teachers—
indicate little progress from their preservice moral reasoning
level. This is also
unsurprising. Teachers impact the moral atmosphere of their
classroom and therefore the
moral development of their students. Educational leaders
likewise provide a similar
influence in their role as leader, with research indicating that
ethical leadership begets
ethical employees (Jordan et al., 2013). Thus, teachers are
likely to be no more advanced
than their leaders in moral reasoning, and it therefore comes as
no surprise that—given
the relationship between teacher and student—students should
not be expected to grow in
reasoning ability either.
Ethics and Leadership Theory

Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) propose three pillars upon which
the ethics of leadership
rest:
1. The moral character of the leader
2. The ethical legitimacy of the values embedded in the leaders’
vision, articulation,
and program which followers either embrace or reject; and
3. The morality of the processes of social ethical choice and
action that leaders and
followers engage in and collectively pursue (p. 182).
However, key amongst these pillars is the moral legitimacy of a
leader’s decisions (Bass
& Steidlmeier, 1999). Both transformational and transactional
leadership have the
potential for moral legitimacy and ethical leadership. In
transactional leadership, ethical
leadership is associated with a “free contract,” in which the
transactions between leader
and follower are freely made and “depends on granting the same
liberty and opportunity
to others that one claims for oneself, on telling the truth,
keeping promises, distributing to
each what is due, and employing valid incentives or sanctions”

(p. 185). Furthermore,
moral transactional leadership recognizes a “pluralism of values
and diversity of
motivations” (p. 185).
Transformational leadership, by definition, is a relationship
entered upon by
choice, by which in choosing to follow a particular leader both
follower and leader are
changed as a result. A moral component of transformational
leadership has existed since
its inception (Ciulla, 1995; Burns, 1978). Indeed,
transformational leaders “have very
strong values. They do not water down their values and moral
ideals by consensus, but
rather they elevate people by using conflict to engage followers
and help them reassess
their own values and needs” (p. 15). Transformational
leadership is very much
concerned with values synonymous with ethical behavior—such
as liberty, justice, and
equality (Ciulla, 1995)—which likely explains why
transformational leadership is

associated with subordinate outcomes like improved trust and
respect for the leader
(Engelbrecht, van Aswegan & Theron, 2005).
Transformational leadership is complicated by the limits of its
definition. Burns
from the beginning held that transformational leaders must be
morally uplifting (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999). In contrast, Bass operationalized the
transformational-transactional
dyad and held that transformational leaders could be either
virtuous or villain (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999). Thus, according to Bass, both Adolf Hitler
and Martin Luther King,
Jr. could be compared as transformational leaders.
It was not until later that Bass came to see a distinction
between an authentic and
inauthentic transformational leader, distinguishing them by
labeling the latter pseudo-
transformational (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). In distinguishing
between these types, Bass
(1998) explains:
Leaders are authentically transformational when they increase
awareness of

what is right, good, important, and beautiful, when they help to
elevate
followers’ needs for achievement and self-actualization, when
they foster
in followers higher moral maturity, and when they move
followers to go
beyond their self-interests for the good of their group,
organization, or
society. Pseudo-transformational leaders may also motivate and
transform
their followers, but, in doing so, they arouse support for special
interests at
the expense of others rather than what’s good for the
collectivity. They will
foster psychodynamic identification, projection, fantasy, and
rationalization
as substitutes for achievement and actualization. They will
encourage ‘we-
they’ competitiveness and the pursuit of the leaders’ own self-
interests
instead of the common good. They are more likely to foment
envy, greed,
hate, and conflict rather than altruism, harmony, and

cooperation (p. 191).
Although Bass distinguishes between the two, he felt they were
ultimately two idealized
types and that most leaders would have traits of both, though
authentic transformational
leaders would have more traits considered authentic more often
than not, and vice versa
for pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999).
DIT and Leadership
As for the relationship between cognitive moral development
and leadership style,
less has been said, and even less studied. On a theoretical
level, Kuhnert and Lewis
(1987) proposed a stage-theory for the development of
leadership traits in individuals.
Like the model for moral development proposed by Rest and his
colleagues (1999),
Kuhnert and Lewis’ model of leadership development also
includes three stages which
may also provide insight into a link between moral reasoning
and leadership style.
Building from the work of Kegan’s (1982) adult development
model, Kuhnert and Lewis

(1987) associated their three leadership developmental stages
with the second, third, and
fourth stages of Kegan’s model. The two lower stages included
transactional
leadership—distinguished as lower order (second stage) and
higher-order (third stage)—
and the highest stage (fourth stage) consists of transformational
leadership (Kuhnert &
Lewis, 1987). For Kuhnert and Lewis (1987), higher-order
transactional exchanges
include exchanges that augment an interpersonal bond, such as
support; lower-order
transactional exchanges are characterized by exchanges of
goods or rights, such as those
that are contractually agreed upon (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987).
If transactional leadership does represent a lower stage of
development than
transformational leader on a spectrum of leadership behavior, a
la the full range of
leadership, then it might be theorized that a connection could be
made between this
spectrum of leadership development and a spectrum of moral

development. Indeed, there
is a relationship between the description of Kuhnert and Lewis’s
(1987) frames of
references for each stage of development and Rest’s schema
theory. This relationship is
an unsurprising development since Kegan’s and Kohlberg’s
stages are both based upon a
Piagetian model of cognitive development (Kuhnert & Lewis,
1987; Rest et al., 1999).
Kuhnert and Lewis’s lower-order transactional stage is
organized around personal goals
and agendas (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) and bears a resemblance
to both the Personal
Interests and Maintaining Norms schema (Bebeau et al., 1999).
The third stage, Kuhnert
and Lewis’s higher-order transactional stage, includes a more
subjective understanding of
needs that allows a person to take into consideration the needs
of themselves and others
in mutual support (Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987). Kuhnert and
Lewis’s (1987) third stage
seems to bear both a resemblance to conventional and
postconventional moral reasoning.

Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, and Milner (2002) may
have been the first
to look at the relationship between moral reasoning
development, as measured by the
DIT, and leadership behaviors. In their study of 111 managers
across three organizations,
Turner et al. (2002) did find a connection between level of
moral development and
leadership behaviors. Their study found that higher levels of
moral reasoning are
perceived as exhibiting more transformational leadership
behaviors (Turner et al., 2002).
Moreover, they found that leaders of differing levels of moral
development were not
perceived any differently when exhibiting transactional
leadership behaviors (Turner et
al., 2002). Thus, they concluded that there is a connection
between higher levels of
moral reasoning and transformational leadership. Transactional
leadership, by contrast,
could be found at each level of moral reasoning for the simple
reason that transactional
relationships between leader and follower existed in every
leader-follower relationship.

In their study of Norwegian naval cadets, Olsen, Eid and
Johnsen (2006) came to
similar conclusions. They found that, like Turner and his
colleagues (2002), that
transformational leadership was positively correlated with
postconventional reasoning
(Olsen et al., 2006). Olsen et al. (2002) also expected to find a
relationship between
transactional leadership and conventional reasoning under the
assumption that
transactional leadership represents less developed leadership
behavior. However, they
found no association between transactional leadership behaviors
and the Maintaining
Norms schema. Unsurprisingly, they did find that moral
behavior was negatively
correlated with passive leadership styles and an absence of
leadership, particularly
management-by-exception-passive and laissez-faire. (Olsen et
al., 2002).

Summary
Joanne Ciulla (1995) argues that “ethics lies at the heart of
leadership studies and
has veins in leadership research” (p. 18). This chapter has
sought the heart and veins of
leadership studies and research by covering the relevant
literature for understanding the
full range of leadership, moral cognitive development, research
related to educator and
educational leader moral reasoning levels, and research that
connects leadership behavior
with moral development. Leadership behaviors are neither
static nor simple, embodying
a host of traits and characteristics that are at once
transformational and transactional.
Beyond the characteristics of leadership styles, leadership
behavior encompasses a moral
component linked to certain leader characteristics.
The most popular conceptions of moral cognitive development
are based on
Piaget’s stage theory. Kohlberg developed a model of moral
reasoning development
similar in style and concept to Piaget’s model. Rest and his

colleagues, building upon the
work of Kohlberg, suggest that moral cognitive development is
not static and individuals
do not always reason on a single level of development. Rather,
by discovering the level
at which the individual most frequently reasons researchers can
then determine the
approximate level at which the individual does reason, a level
Rest characterized as
schemas. To test an individual’s level of moral reasoning, Rest
and his colleagues
proposed a multiple-choice assessment, the Defining Issues
Test, to replace the interview
format used for Kohlberg’s stage theory.
Research indicates a lack of high-level moral reasoning in
education, with both
teachers and administrators scoring lower, on average, than the
average adult, and
certainly lower than their levels of education would suggest.
This is problematic for any
number of reasons, not least of all the moral nature of the
school’s work. Moreover,

early studies indicate that higher-level moral reasoning is linked
to transformational
leadership. With transformational leadership so closely
associated with positive
employee and organizational outcomes, the lower cognitive
moral development of
educational leaders is concerning in a culture that includes
broader reform efforts. This
study seeks to discover whether a link between cognitive moral
development and
leadership behavior also exists in education leaders. However,
it goes a step further by
examining the link between moral cognitive development and a
survey of leadership
behavior that attempts to embody a more accurate representation
of leadership behavior.
This more accurate picture of leadership behavior is
accomplished by including not only
the full range of leadership but characteristics of situational
leadership as well, as
represented by the Vannsimpco model.

1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx

1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to 1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx

Similar to 1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx (20)

More from jeremylockett77

More from jeremylockett77 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

1 The course project is a strategic management plan for an organiz.docx