1) Iran began its nuclear program in the 1980s with help from Western countries but later developed it secretly with assistance from AQ Khan. The program had both civilian and military aims including developing nuclear weapons. 2) Iran engaged in deception to conceal its nuclear activities from inspectors. Sites were hidden underground and covered up after being exposed. 3) The 2015 nuclear deal placed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program including limits on enrichment levels and inspections in exchange for relief from sanctions. However, it did not eliminate Iran's nuclear knowledge and only extended its potential "breakout time" to develop a bomb.

1. STOPPING THE BOMB
Iran’s Nuclear Program
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2. THE ‘ORIGINAL DEAL’, FROM ENRICHMENT TO A BOMB
Background
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3. NPT 1968
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4. Enrichment 101
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5. Enrichment 101
Centrifuge cascade
• 1,200 – 1,600 Centrifuges – 3-4% HEU
• Each centrifuge needs 3-4 weeks to
create enough separation.
• 1 bomb = 25Kg if 85% HEU
• Breakout time – from LEU to HEU
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6. The Plutonium path
Arak 238 239
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7. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Iran’s nuclear program
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8. The supplier - AQ Khan
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9. Origins of AQ Khan
Network
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10. The AQ Khan network proliferation
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11. Iran’s Nuclear program
1. Initially from the west – US and France during the Shah regime. Busher was originally built by
France, US and Germany; completed in the 1990s by the Russians and Chinese.
2. Military initiated in 1984 – “Drinking the Poison Cup” in response to Iraq’s Ballistic missiles.
Meetings with AQ Khan middle man in Dubai in 1987.
3. A source of national pride.
4. A deterrent against Sunny regional states, India/Pakistan and Israel.
5. Immediate danger – A possible umbrella for terrorist proxies.
6. Globally – A second resounding NPT failure to stop a country from becoming Nuclear (NK), a
threat to world and regional order.
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12. 12

13. 13

14. Iran’s Nuclear Map
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15. HOW IRAN TRIED TO TRICK THE WORLD
Deception
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16. A history of deception
Natanz Enrichment Complex: 70,000 Sqr meters fortified & concealed,
Agricultural cover story (anti desertification), Dummy buildings
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17. A history of deception
Arak Heavy Water reactor has No Justification – TRR supplies Isotopes,
modeled after Koshan Pakistani Plutonium reactor for nuclear weapons
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18. A history of deception
Lashkar Abad - Atom Vapor Laser Isotope Separation
Cover up, Equipment removed and burried, 15% U-235 Sampled
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19. A history of deception
Levizan Shian – Army Garrison, BW and Nuclear War head R&D site
Complete razing (vegetation, Asphalt) after being exposed.
The excuse – A new park. “Whole body counters” missing. Later detected with contamination.
Aug 2003 Mar 2004
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20. PATHWAYS
STOPPING THE BOMB
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21. • Diplomacy – negotiate a deal (2015)
• Direct attack
• Slowing down – procurement, knowledge attainment
• Sabotage
Possible pathways
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22. • Knowledge can not be erased
• ‘There are unknowns unknown to us’ – Clandestine
• Intelligence is hard to attain
• The Iraqi debacle
• The Iranians have learnt from the past
• The effects of sanctions is limited (NK)
Stopping the bomb – Challenges
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23. DIPLOMACY
THE DEAL 2015
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24. Enrichment
• Fordo to become a center for science research.
• Natanz – cut down to 5k centrifuges.
• Enrichment capped to 3.7 percent ; stockpile at 300 kilograms
for 15 years.
The 2015 ‘deal’
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25. Plutonium path
• Arak to be redesigned.
• Original core – inoperable.
• Spent fuel – to be shipped out of Iran.
• No new heavy water reactors for 15 years.
The 2015 ‘deal’
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26. Inspection – IAEA (25 years)
• More access to information.
• Investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert facilities
anywhere in Iran.
• Access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear
program, including uranium mines and mills.
• Continuous surveillance of centrifuge manufacturing and
storage facilities.
The 2015 ‘deal’
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27. • Iran is beyond the ‘Point of no return’
• ‘Breakout-time’ increased to one year.
The 2015 deal – in a nutshell
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28. IRANIAN LESSONS
STOPPING THE BOMB
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29. • Suspect the inspectors – UNSCOM (Iraq)
• Cast doubt – NIE (2007)
Iranian lessons (Iraq)
Powell at the UN 2003
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30. • Operation ‘Opera’
• Osirak was a reactor in the making
Iranian lessons - Israel
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31. • Underground facilities
• Dispersed geographically
• Heavily defended by anti-aircraft missiles and guns
• Hiding
Iranian lessons - Israel
Anti aircraft guns in Natanz
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32. EFFECTS
SANCTIONS
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33. • Since 1995, against companies and people:
• Missile/arms industry
• Revolutionary Guard Corps
• Nuclear industry
• Energy/petroleum industry
• Banking (Central Bank of Iran)
• Shipping industry
• International trade - nuclear related equipment and materials
• Insurance
• Foreign firms dealing with Iran
Courses of action - Sanctions
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34. • Economy in deep recession
• Internal political dissatisfaction
• Procurement efforts under tougher scrutiny
IMPACT on Nuclear program:
slowed BUT not stopped
Courses of action – Sanctions: impact
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35. WHY NOT
DIRECT ATTACK
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36. • Israel
• Has the knowledge and experience – Iraq (1981), Syria (2007)
• Needs to keep the attack as a ‘viable option’
Courses of action – Attack: by Whom?
Israeli F-15i
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37. • Israel - challenges
• Capabilities – weapons (aircrafts, bunker busters), distance, danger
• Expensive – 40B shekels (would double the security budget)
• Political – endanger delicate alliances, the ‘deal’
• Practical – May only delay the program by a few months.
• Iran’s retaliation ability – direct, via Lebanon
Courses of action – Attack: by Whom?
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38. • US -
• Lack of political will – ‘leading from behind’
• A clear choice of diplomacy
• Too much at stake – ISIS, US forces spread thin
Courses of action – Attack: by Whom?
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39. AIMS AND METHODS
SABOTAGE
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40. • Toppling down of the regime
• Slowing down the R & D
• Slowing down / stopping production/activity
HOW?
AIMS
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41. Selling faulted materials and equipment
Urs TinnerAli Ashtari
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42. • 15 January 2007: Ardeshir Hosseinpour reportedly died of gas poisoning from a faulty heater, though
claims or suggestions have since been made of foul play.
• 12 January 2010: Masoud Alimohammadi was killed on his way to work by a booby-trapped motorcycle
parked near his car in north Tehran.
• 29 November 2010: Majid Shahriari was killed in northern Tehran by a magnetic bomb attached to his
car by a motorcyclist. Shahriari's wife was wounded in the attack.
• 29 November 2010: An attack identical to that which killed Shahriari was made on Fereydoun Abbasi,
but Abbasi managed to escape the vehicle before the bomb exploded. Both he and his wife were
wounded in the attack.
• 23 July 2011: Darioush Rezaienejad was returning home with his wife and five-year-old daughter when
he was shot and killed by motorcycle-borne gunmen.
• 11 January 2012: Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan was killed by a magnetic bomb attached to his car.
• 3 January 2015: Iran claimed to have thwarted an attack on another Iranian nuclear scientist
‘Removal’ of points of knowledge
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43. Assassination of an Iranian Scientist (Press TV)
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44. NEXT WEEK…
CYBERWAR
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45. • Iran’s nuclear threat timeline - pushed back
considerably.
• A mix of actions, with diplomacy ‘riding the
wind’ of all other measures.
• Iranian leaders proved to be ‘rational actors’
to an extent.
• The main problem – easing of sanctions
means less pressure on the population,
increase in regime sustainability.
FINAL NOTES
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