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Hack Proof: Software Design
for a Hostile Internet
Robert Bogue
(317) 844-5310
Rob.Bogue@ThorProjects.com
Objective
Secure Code
= Good Code
Agenda
• Vulnerabilities
• Account Management
• Session Management
• Encryption
• Principles
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Types
• Buffer Overflow
• Replay
• Man-in-the-Middle
• Injection
• Forgery
Buffer Overflow
• The user provides more
information than was allocated
in memory
• Very few concerns in managed
languages
Replay
• Taking a valid sequence
• Injecting new malicious
commands
• Replaying the modified
sequence
Man-in-the-Middle
• Intercept traffic
• Monitor the traffic
• Pass it on to the real system
Injection
• SQL
• Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
• CR/LF
SQL Injection
• Example:
• a’; UPDATE users SET
password = ‘WooHoo’ --
• Mediation:
• Stored Procedures
• Clean/Screen User Input
• Parameterized Queries
Cross Site Scripting
• Example:
• <SCRIPT type="text/javascript">
var adr =
'../evil.php?cakemonster=' +
escape(document.cookie);
</SCRIPT>
• Mediation
• Clean/Screen User Input
• Screen User Output
CR/LF Injection
• Example:
• http://www.yoursite.com/somepa
ge.php?page=%0d%0aContent-
Type: text/html%0d%0aHTTP/1.1
200 OK%0d%0aContent-Type:
text/html%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Chtm
l%3EHacker Content%3C/html%3E
• Mediation:
• Clean/Screen User Input
Forgery
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF/XSRF)
• Example
• <img
src="http://bank.com/transfer.do?ac
ct=MARIA&amount=100000"
width="0" height="0" border="0">
• Mitigation
• Require session ID with request
• Use POST with CORS (restricted)
Account
Management
Authentication Management
• Password Requirements
• Complexity
• History
• Operations
• Password Reset
• Login Failure
• Consistent Response
• Account Lockout
Authentication Technique
• HTTP
• Basic
• NTLM
• V1
• V2
• Kerberos
• Forms
• Claims
Claims
• Parties
• Issuers
• Relying Parties
• Benefits
• Single Sign On
• Transfer of responsibility
• Flexibility
User Validation
• Email
• Account Setup
• Multifactor
• Tokens (RSA)
• Grid Card
• Phone
• Text
• Phone Call
• App
Session Management
Timeout
• Fixed
• Sliding
Cookies
• Scope (Parent Domain)
• Sensitive (HTTP Only, Secure)
• Session IDs (Not Secure info)
Encryption
GoalsofEncryption
History of Encryption
• Symmetric (Private)
• Hash (One-Way)
• Asymmetric (Public-Private)
Symmetric
• One Key Encrypts and Decrypts
• Called Private/Secret Key
• Computationally Fast
• Problem: Exchanging the Secret
Key
CC BY-SA 4.0 – Alessandro Nassiri
Hash
• Large message converted to
smaller hash value
• Small change in source causes
large change in hash
• Add “secret” salt to accomplish
authentication
Asymmetric
• Pair of keys – one public and one
private
• Computationally expensive
Encrypt a Verifiable Message
1. Add salt (randomness)
2. Hash message
3. Encrypt message with private
key
Authenticate a Message
1. Get Public Key and Decrypt
2. Generate your hash of the
message
3. Compare your hash to the one
provided
Certificates
• Host Identifiers
• Approved Uses
• Public Key
• Other Certificates (Signed with
Private Key)
Certificate Chain
1. Trusted a 3rd party
authenticates party B
2. 3rd Party issues certificate with
encrypted certificate of party
B enclosed
3. Party A knows party B by
matching host identifiers and
decrypting a message from
them with the public key
Transport Layer Security
(Simplified)
1. Initiate conversation with list
of ciphers
2. Server responds with ciphers
and certificate
3. Client confirms certificate,
generates session keys,
encrypts with server public
key, and sends
WhentoEncrypt
Principles
Don’t Share
• Don’t
• Transmit information you don’t have to
• Display errors to the user
• Let browsers control caching
• Do
• Provide least privileges
Resources
• http://www.owasp.org
• Information and resources about web application security
• Education about vulnerability / fault categories and protection
strategies
Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE)
• http://cwe.mitre.org
• Listing of weakness types
• Categorization of weaknesses
Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
• http://capec.mitre.org
• Listing of vectors of attack
against applications
NVD Common Vulnerability
Scoring System
• https://nvd.nist.gov/CVSS/v3-
calculator
• Unified scoring of vulnerabilities
• Built in calculator
Discussion
Thank
You
Rob.Bogue@ThorProjects.com
(317) 844-5310

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Hack Proof: Software Design for a Hostile Internet

Editor's Notes

  1. Footprints… Key milestones Talk about the types, show a few techniques for solving, create awareness If you’re an app dev – good summary/breadth/tools If you’re a app security guy – Tools for discussing w/ developers
  2. Simultaneous toilet flushing causing problems.
  3. Or running aground… that’s why we have lighthouses… ways to keep us from running around.
  4. i.e. if you’re not programming in C++, it’s probably not a problem. By the way, does anyone know what an interrupt table is? (Very start of memory.)
  5. Yogi Berra “You can observe a lot just by watching.”
  6. Stored procedures don’t help if you end up doing dynamic SQL inside of them.
  7. Note example from OWASP.org site (Open Web Application Security Project)
  8. From Acunetix web site. Mostly not a problem in .NET / Encoding on by default/ IIS 7+ will block
  9. Require a session for calls… use to transition to Session Management Require Session as a part of submitted information POST HTTP Method CORS = Cross-Origin Resource Sharing / Allows Javascript to make requests across domains.
  10. Claims example… Drivers License. Including identity, method of verification, and additional attributes. Transfer of responsibility = pass the buck. (Good thing here.)
  11. Secrecy/Privacy Authenticity/Non-Repudiation
  12. Hieroglyphs show used in Egypt circa 1900 BC Symmetric – Enigma (German encryption) Public-Private- Computationally expensive – used to securely exchange keys for symmetric Hash – One way – Passwords…
  13. Picture is an enigma machine. World War II era encryption/cypher device We captured U-505 June 4, 1944 and got the largest cache of intelligence recovered in WWII – including two Enigma machines.
  14. Diamonds start as carbon and are heated and compressed to form diamonds… they have hidden signatures (flaws) in them. They are small but expensive… Hashs like the weather… a butterfly flapping wings in Brazil causes tornado in Texas. A small change (or misobservation) can lead to a large change in results.
  15. This is to START SSL – to trade the private key
  16. In Transit – SSL… Use HTTP Strict Transport Security to force SSL At Rest – We can’t force them to use hard drive encryption – too many machines disappear.