3. In 2004, 30% of American
Children were overweight
and 14% were obese.
In Europe, childhood obesity
rates in developed countries
doubled from 1997-2003.
Experts characterized
childhood obesity as
epidemic in US and Europe
was not far behind.
4.  INCREASED PORTION
SIZES.
 EATING OUT MORE
OFTEN.
INCREASED
CONSUMPTION OF
SUGAR-SWEETENED
FOODS.
LACK OF EXCERCISE.
ALONG WITH THESE.......
5. Many experts decried
television advertisement as
primary factor for obesity.
IN 2005, the average child
viewed more than 40,00
television commercials annually
– 50% of which were for high
calorie and high fat foods and
beverages.
7. They were synonymous
with fun and magic-
characteristics children also
associated with food treats.
Their portfolio mainly
consist of sweets and
treats.
Their 10 year deal with
McDonalds, who were
constantly criticised for this
obesity epidemic, to
provide toys.
8. Disney faced criticism for
contributing to obesity
epidemic.
 Pressure from activists,
government and parents to
check their offerings and
advertisement activities.
Strict guidelines from
USDA regarding the
nutritional values.
10. THEY EMBARKED ON
A MISSION TO
IMPROVE THE
NUTRITIONAL VALUE
OF ITS LICENSED
PRODUCTS, AND
THOUGHT TO
PROVIDE LEADERSHIP
FOR THE REST OF THE
FOOD INDUSTRY
USING ITS BRAND
STRENGTH TO REACH
THE CHILDEREN.
11. Will they be able to bring all of their products into
compliance with newly developed nutritional
requirements?
12. Will they be able to establish credibility with
U.S. Government, parents and nutritionists?
13. CAN THEY OVERCOME THE CHALLENGES GIVEN THE
COMPANY’S EXISTING LICENSING DEALS WITH CANDY AND
TREAT MANUFACTURES AND ITS LONG-STANDING ROLE AS A
TOY SUPPLIER TO McDonalds?
18. DISNEY CONSUMER PRODUCT
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
EXTENDING THE DISNEY BRAND
TO MULTIFARIOUS
MERCHANDISE.
DISNEY-BRANDED
MERCHANDISE ACCOUNTED FOR
RETAIL SALES OF $23 BILLION IN
90 COUNTRIES IN 2006.
19.
20. In 2000 they shifted away
from their licensing-only
business model the company
had relied on since its
inception.
DCP continue using its
traditional licensing model
along with two other models:
sourcing and direct-to-retail.
Food and beverage segment
rely heavily on “Disney-
branded, value priced, active
licensing model.”
21. IN 2004, DCP
ESTIMATED
THAT ITS
BRANDED FOOD
PRODUCTS
ACCOUNTED
FOR LESS THAN
1% OF THE
CHILDREN FOOD
MARKET.
22. THE COMPNAY’s
CHANGING LICENSING
MODEL, RETAIL
INDUSTRY
CONSOLIDATION AND
THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC
OFFERED DISNEY AN
OPPORTUNITY TO
SIMULTANEOUSLY
BROADEN AND
RATIONALIZE ITS
PRODUCT OFFERING.
24. IN WINTER 2004, DCP
CONDUCTED
RESEARCH TO SIZE THE
FOOD BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITY AND TO
DISCOVER IF DISNEY’S
BRAND EQUITY
WOULD TRANSFER TO
A LINE OF CHILDREN”S
FOOD PRODUCT.
25. DCP discovered a gap between
food children requested and
mothers preferred.
DCP also discovered that children
influenced purchase decisions
whether they were in the stores
with there mothers- or not.
Research also showed mothers
transferred perception of Disney as
high quality, trustworthy and
familiar to a line of food and
beverages.
26. DCP DECIDED A NEW
TO BE “MODERATLY
PRICED” AND BE
POSITIONED AS A
“FUN LINE OF
PRODUCTS
DEVELOPED
SPECIFICALLY FOR
CHILDEREN”.
27. They determined that
key product categories
were water, fresh food,
frozen food, juices,
pasta, soup, cereal,
baked goods and
dairy/milk. These were
“high quality, good
taste and nutritional
food”, requested by
children.
28.
29.
30. DCP DERIVED MANY OF ITS
RECCOMENDATIONS FROM
THE FDA’S DIETARY
GUIDLINES. DCP BEGAN
REFORMULATING SOME
PRODUCTS AND SHRINKING
PROTIONS FOR OTHER. THE
COMPANY PLANNED TO
HAVE ALL ITS PRODUCTS
BROUGHT INTO
COMPLIANCE OR PHASED
OUT BY 2008.
31. CREATING FOOD THAT
MET TOUGH
NUTRITIONAL
GUIDLINES WAS ONLY
HALF THE BATTLE --
FOOD HAD TO APPLEAL
TO CHILDREN AND
DELIVER ON THE
BRAND’S PROMISE OF
DISNEY MAGIC.
32. They offered products that
already had a broad appeal
such as milk and peanut
butter.
They took the products
that were already healthy
and made them more fun.
They used packaging to
inspire products sampling.
33. DISNEY BEGAN
LICENSING ITS
CHARACTERS TO
IMAGINATION FARMS
A NATIONAL FRESH
PRODUCE MARKETING
COMPANY FOUNDED
SPECIFICALLY TO SERVE
AS A LICENSEE TO DCP,
IN MARCH 2006.
“For Disney, taste, nutrition and magic- in
that order- is the strategy, and we
understood that.”
35. “Whatever promotions we develop must fit
Our mission of increasing consumption of fruits and
vegetables among children”
36. KORGER AND DISNEY MAGIC SELECTION
“We want to have one major DTR
relationship in a country where the retailer
has 10-20% share of the market and the rest
of the market will be served using the source
and traditional licensing models.”
37. Disney and Kroger sized the
opportunity at $250 million
annual revenue.
The companies were
committed to ensuring that the
Disney-branded products would
fit Disney’s “good for you”
nutritional guidelines.
Pricing and brand exclusivity
were the key to Disney’s DTR
strategy.
38.
39.
40. They also changed their
nutritional values and
many products like
spinach, baby carrots
and Clementine bearing
SpongeBob and Dora
images began to
emerge on supermarket
shelves.
41. Warner Bros. signed a
deal with Ready Pac,
a produce company
that packaged
washed, cut and
ready-to-eat fruits
and vegetables for
supermarket.
42. Del Monte Foods, a $3
Billion U.S. Manufacturer
of branded and private
label canned vegetables
and fruit signed a
licensing deal with
Sesame Street, and
products like peas, corns
and green beans featuring
Elmo, Grover and Cookie
Monster characters came
to the market.
44. They developed a balanced
portfolio.
They made “nutritionally
beneficial changes” to their
food offerings.
Planned to eliminate all the
products that were not in
compliance with nutritional
values.
They were doing the right
thing and getting the good
business.