U p To N o w : A H i s t o r y o f A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r e F r o m J e f f e r s o n to R e v o l u t i o n to C r i s i s R i c h a r d S. K i r k e n d a U Richard S. Kirkendall is the Henry A. Wallace Professor of History at Iowa State University. A former president of the Agricultural History Society, his contributions to agricultural history include Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt, first published in 1966 and republished in 1982, and service as general editor of the Henry A. Wallace Series in Agricultural History and Rural Studies, published by Iowa State University Press. Currently, he is working on a "documentary profile" of "Uncle Henry" Wallace and an "intellectual biography" of H. A. Wallace. A B S T R A C T Written as a contribution to the Social Science Agricultural A g e n d a Project, this essay in historical inter- pretation assumes that the main contribution that historians can make to the planning process is to describe and explain how the situation facing the planners came to be. Organized around three concepts--Jeffersonian or democratic agrar- ianism, the Great A m e r i c a n Agricultural Revolution, and the farm crisis of the 1980s, the main implication of the paper may be that Jeffersonianism, once so filled with promise, now gets in the way of realistic thinking about farming and rural life. To implement agrarian values in existing circumstances, we would need to do more than end the crisis. We would need to move back against the revolution. Introduction To define t h e a g e n d a for t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d r u r a l social sciences, w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n s in a g r i c u l t u r e a n d r u r a l life a n d t h e w a y s in w h i c h t h e y a r e moving, b u t to accomplish t h a t , we m u s t first c o m p r e h e n d t h e forces a n d decisions t h a t b r o u g h t u s to t h e pres- e n t a n d t h a t a r e i n f l u e n c i n g t h e future. We m u s t , in o t h e r words, g a i n historical perspec- tive. We m u s t go as far b a c k as t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e n a t i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n A m e r i c a n v e r s i o n of i d e a s a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l impor- t a n c e of farming. We m u s t also t r a c e t h e devel- o p m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a t t i t u d e s t h a t w o u l d m a k e t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Revo- lution. We m u s t explore t h a t revolution, t h e s e n s e o f p o w e r t h a t it, a l o n g w i t h t h e needs of o t h e r n a t i o n s , gave s o m e A m e r i c a n leaders, a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t s e n s e o f g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t e m e r g e d a m o n g f a r m people in t h e 1970s. Only t h e n will w ...

1. U p To N o w : A H i s t o r y o f A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l
t u r e F r o m
J e f f e r s o n to R e v o l u t i o n to C r i s i s
R i c h a r d S. K i r k e n d a U
Richard S. Kirkendall is the Henry A. Wallace Professor of
History at Iowa State University. A former president of the
Agricultural
History Society, his contributions to agricultural history include
Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt,
first
published in 1966 and republished in 1982, and service as
general editor of the Henry A. Wallace Series in Agricultural
History and
Rural Studies, published by Iowa State University Press.
Currently, he is working on a "documentary profile" of "Uncle
Henry"
Wallace and an "intellectual biography" of H. A. Wallace.
A B S T R A C T Written as a contribution to the Social
Science Agricultural A g e n d a Project, this essay in historical
inter-
pretation assumes that the main contribution that historians can
make to the planning process is to describe and explain
how the situation facing the planners came to be. Organized
around three concepts--Jeffersonian or democratic agrar-
ianism, the Great A m e r i c a n Agricultural Revolution, and
the farm crisis of the 1980s, the main implication of the
paper may be that Jeffersonianism, once so filled with promise,
now gets in the way of realistic thinking about farming
and rural life. To implement agrarian values in existing

2. circumstances, we would need to do more than end the crisis.
We would need to move back against the revolution.
Introduction
To define t h e a g e n d a for t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d
r u r a l social sciences, w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e
p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n s in a g r i c u l t u r e a n d r u r a
l life
a n d t h e w a y s in w h i c h t h e y a r e moving, b u t to
accomplish t h a t , we m u s t first c o m p r e h e n d t h e
forces a n d decisions t h a t b r o u g h t u s to t h e pres-
e n t a n d t h a t a r e i n f l u e n c i n g t h e future. We
m u s t , in o t h e r words, g a i n historical perspec-
tive. We m u s t go as far b a c k as t h e b e g i n n i n g of
t h e n a t i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n A m e r i c
a n
v e r s i o n of i d e a s a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
impor-
t a n c e of farming. We m u s t also t r a c e t h e devel-
o p m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a t t i t u d e s t h a t
w o u l d
m a k e t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l
Revo-
lution. We m u s t explore t h a t revolution, t h e
s e n s e o f p o w e r t h a t it, a l o n g w i t h t h e needs
of
o t h e r n a t i o n s , gave s o m e A m e r i c a n leaders, a n
d
t h e c o n s e q u e n t s e n s e o f g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t
i e s t h a t
e m e r g e d a m o n g f a r m people in t h e 1970s. Only
t h e n will we b e a b l e to i n t e r p r e t t h e present, t h e
s e n s e of crisis t h a t n o w p e r v a d e s A m e r i c a n
ru-
r a l life, a n d t h e possibilities t h a t a p p e a r to lie

3. ahead. T h e social sciences should, I a s s u m e , ex-
plore, clarify, a n d define t h o s e possibilities, pro-
viding b a s e s for decisions.
A m e r i c a n Agrarianism
F a r m i n g a n d f a r m people h a v e a l w a y s occu-
pied special positions in t h e A m e r i c a n mind.
The b e l i e f t h a t t h e y d e s e r v e h i g h s t a t u s
and
t h a t t h e n a t i o n should b e b a s e d u p o n t h e m w
a s
p a r t of t h e A m e r i c a n h e r i t a g e from Europe, run-
n i n g b a c k to A n c i e n t Rome, t h e R e n a i s s a n c e
,
E n g l i s h w r i t e r s o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h and eigh-
t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , a n d t h e F r e n c h p h y s i o c
r a t s
a n d o t h e r c o n t i n e n t a l w r i t e r s of t h e e i g h t
e e n t h
c e n t u r y (Johnstone). This h e r i t a g e m a i n t a i n e d
t h a t f a r m i n g w a s t h e b e s t w a y of life a n d t h e
m o s t i m p o r t a n t economic activity, t h a t it con-
f e r r e d psychological as w e l l as economic bene-
fits, a n d t h a t it p r o d u c e d t h e b e s t citizens a n d
soldiers. T h e s e i d e a s e n c o u r a g e d people to be-
lieve t h a t A m e r i c a w a s a s u p e r i o r place for it
supplied m o r e a n d b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s to f a r
m
t h a n E u r o p e did (Eisenger).
A m e r i c a n s b o t h a c c e p t e d a n d r e s h a p e d t h
e s e
ideas. In t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t T h o m a s Jefferson

4. was expecially important (Griswold). The great-
est "agrarianizer, TM he tried to construct a na-
tion with an agricultural base. He took ideas
t h a t had not been identified with democracy, at
least not exclusively, and democratized them,
arguing t h a t to be democratic a nation must
have a farm foundation. Although a planter
himself, Jefferson emphasized the political
value of the family farm, a farm owned and
worked by members of one family and large
enough to supply their needs. In his view, such
a farm conferred independence, since the people
on it worked for themselves, not others, and it
required self-reliance and hard work. Its most
important product was the personality type re-
quired for a democracy, r a t h e r t h a n the debased
type t h a t appeared to grow out of European ur-
ban conditions. With family farms as democra-
cy's essential foundation, farming's importance
transcended t h e economic goods produced by
farmers.
Jefferson did not advocate fully self-sufficient,
non-commercial farms. He saw value for the
United States in Europe's need for food. It m e a n t
t h a t there would be m a n y good opportunities to
farm in America. To prosper, American farmers
should produce a surplus; t h e y should grow
more t h a n farm families needed and more t h a n
the nation needed. Thus, the agrarian politician
opposed obstacles to American trade with Eu-
rope, including protective tariffs and French
control of the mouth of the Mississippi River
(Appleby, McCoy).

5. Jefferson and other American agrarianizers
saw western lands as even more valuable t h a n
the European market. More perhaps t h a n any
other feature, they distinguished the United
States from Europe. They must be available to
farmers, free of control by Indians and Europe-
ans, and sold at a low price or given away. Their
importance justified t h e purchase of Louisiana,
for, by greatly enlarging the land possessed by
the United States, the purchase guaranteed the
success of American democracy and the contin-
uation of American superiority (Pearce, pp. 56,
67, 70, 153; Berkhofer, p. 157; Henry Nash
Smith, prologue and ch. 11).
Jefferson came to accept manufacturing but
within narrow confines. Fascinated by technol-
ogy and fearful of over-dependence on Europe,
he also feared an urban proletariat. Thus, he
insisted t h a t American factories must be small
and placed in rural settings and must employ
only a small percent of the total American pop-
ulation. F a r m e r s must continue to be the Amer-
ican majority (Bender, pp. 21-28).
Jefferson's democratic agrarianism achieved
its most spectacular victory in 1862 with the
Kirkendall: Up to Now
passage of the Homestead Act. Giving 160 acres
to those who would m a k e farms out of them, this
land policy seemed to be a way of m a k i n g the
lands t r u l y valuable and the nation h e a l t h y and
strong. And giving lands away seemed benefi-

6. cial to urban workers as well as farmers, for it
offered those workers a "safety valve:' Giving
t h e m a way of escaping or avoiding oppression,
it enabled t h e m to develop a personality t h a t
differed from t h a t of the European proletariat
and was compatible with democracy. Or so it
seemed to American agrarians (Henry Nash
Smith, chs. 15, 20).
A l t e r n a t i v e V i s i o n s
The Jeffersonian vision competed with alter-
native conceptions of what the United States
should be. The competitors included plantation
agriculture. Its defenders m a i n t a i n e d t h a t plan-
tations, which were larger t h a n family farms
and worked by slaves, were the basis for good
citizenship for t h e y freed planters from constant
toil in t h e fields, but critics condemned t h e m as
violations of democratic agrarianism and in-
sisted t h a t t h e y m u s t not be spread over the
West (Henry Nash Smith, chs. 12-14).
The Civil War and Reconstruction abolished
slavery but did not redistribute southern land
in family-owned units. It substituted sharecrop-
ping r a t h e r t h a n family farming for plantations
worked by slaves. Involving heavy dependence
of croppers on landlords and merchants, share-
cropping violated t h e a g r a r i a n democratic creed
(Woodman; Fite, 1984, ch. 1). Midwestern agri-
culture, composed mainly of commercial family
farmers, conformed much more closely to the
Jeffersonian model.
Democratic a g r a r i a n i s m did not even domi-

7. nate t h e distribution of western land (Schieber,
Winters). The national government sold land to
speculators and gave it to railroad builders as
well as farm makers. Champions of land grants
to railroads often argued t h a t they would help
farmers and encourage growth of the farm pop-
ulati'on, but the policy also served another vi-
sion of w h a t the nation should be: t h a t of the
industrializers.
The granting of land for educational purposes
constituted y e t another way of using land at the
time. A g r a r i a n i s m exerted some influence on
this. F a r m i n g and farm people were so impor-
tant, advocates of land-grants for colleges main-
tained, t h a t t h e y deserved help from govern-
m e n t and higher education. The benefits of
those institutions should not be monopolized by
other groups. Education for farmers, the argu-
m e n t ran, Would hold people on the land and
encourage others to settle it by raising the sta-
A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
t u s of f a r m i n g a n d f a r m e r s a n d i n c r e a s i n g
t h e
chances for success in t h a t occupation.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , m a n y a g r a r i a n s a n d m o s t
farm-
ers opposed l a n d for colleges. T h e y d o u b t e d t h a t
f a r m people w a n t e d or n e e d e d help of t h i s t y p e
for t h e y could l e a r n from e x p e r i e n c e a n d from

8. one another, r a t h e r t h a n from books. S u c h crit-
ics of t h e i d e a p r e f e r r e d giving l a n d to farmers;
t h e y f e a r e d t h a t s p e c u l a t o r s w o u l d g a i n
control
of t h e l a n d g r a n t e d to t h e s t a t e s for e d u c a t i
o n a l
purposes, c h a r g e h i g h prices for it, and slow t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e West (Gates, 1943, pp. 8 - 2 6 ;
Rainsford, pp. 87-95). T h e y also f e a r e d t h a t col-
lege e d u c a t i o n w o u l d e n c o u r a g e f a r m boys to
d e s e r t farming. A f t e r t h e l a n d - g r a n t colleges
w e n t into operation, a g r a r i a n s often criticized
t h e m for i n a d e q u a t e service to farmers.
The g r e a t e s t p u s h for t h e l a n d - g r a n t s y s t e m
c a m e from critics of t h e f a r m e r s . M e n such as
J u s t i n Morrill m a i n t a i n e d t h a t A m e r i c a n
farm-
ers w e r e n o t good f a r m e r s . Inferior to Europe-
ans, t h e y e x h a u s t e d t h e soil a n d t h e n m o v e d
west. Consequently, A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e could
b e c o m e i n c a p a b l e of s e r v i n g A m e r i c a n
needs,
a n d f a r m e r s n e e d e d colleges so as to become
m o r e efficient a n d t a k e b e t t e r care of t h e l a n d
( K i r k e n d a l l , 1986a, pp. 6-10).
In a d d i t i o n to t h e hope of c h a n g i n g f a r m prac-
tices, t h e i d e a of social m o b i l i t y also influenced
t h e l a n d - g r a n t college act. Its advocates, Morrill
a b o v e all, insisted, as t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e law
indicates, t h a t t h e c u r r i c u l u m of t h e n e w col-
leges s h o u l d n o t b e l i m i t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e b
u t
should include " o t h e r scientific a n d classical
s t u d i e s " a n d s h o u l d p r o m o t e t h e "liberal" as

9. well as t h e "practical e d u c a t i o n of t h e i n d u s t r i a l
classes in t h e s e v e r a l p u r s u i t s a n d professions
of life." B e h i n d t h i s l a n g u a g e l a y a n o n - a g r a
r i a n
v e r s i o n of d e m o c r a c y t h a t identified it w i t h so-
cial mobility, d o u b t e d t h a t f a r m life w a s supe-
rior to city life in all w a y s , r e g a r d e d t h e f a r m as
p r e f e r a b l e o n l y a s a t r a i n i n g ground, not as an
o u t l e t for t a l e n t a n d a m b i t i o n , a n d e n c o u r
a g e d
m o v e m e n t a w a y f r o m t h e f a r m (Wyllie, p. 28).
According to t h i s conception of things, colleges
should p r e p a r e people for a b r o a d r a n g e of op-
p o r t u n i t i e s . E s t a b l i s h e d colleges w e r e too
nar-
row in c u r r i c u l u m a n d s t u d e n t body; t h e n e w
colleges should n o t r e p e a t t h a t m i s t a k e b y be-
coming a n o t h e r k i n d of n a r r o w college; educa-
tion s h o u l d n o t lock people into a place in soci-
ety, e v e n a farm. Morrill a n d o t h e r s w h o t h o u g h t
like h e did h o p e d to open u p e d u c a t i o n a l oppor-
t u n i t i e s a n d t h u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s for u p w a r d
mo-
b i l i t y for f a r m boys, a m o n g o t h e r s (Kirkendall,
1986b).
T h e Morrill Act, in o t h e r words, w a s influ-
enced b y a vision of A m e r i c a t h a t differed sig-
nificantly from Jefferson's. The act's vision w a s
l i n k e d w i t h t h e vision of t h e industrializers. In
fact, Morrill w o r k e d for t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n for
A m e r i c a n m a n u f a c t u r e r s as well as l a n d - g r a
n t s
for colleges.

10. The i n d u s t r i a l i z e r s h o p e d to b u i l d a m a n u f a
c -
t u r i n g b a s e for t h e nation. A t first, t h e y h a d
t r i e d to deal w i t h t h e a g r a r i a n f e a r s of factories
as i n e v i t a b l y c r e a t i n g a large, debased, corrupt
w o r k i n g class. T h e y a r g u e d t h a t m a c h i n e s
w o u l d e n a b l e w o m e n a n d children to do t h e
m a n u f a c t u r i n g w h i l e m e n c o n t i n u e d to
farm;
t h e y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t E u r o p e a n m e r c h a n t s
w e r e
t h e c o r r u p t i n g influences m o s t to b e feared; t h e y
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s h a d
alter-
n a t i v e s in t h e West, a n d t h e y developed facto-
ries in s m a l l c o m m u n i t i e s . As t i m e passed, how-
ever, t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e r s g r e w bolder, no longer
felt compelled to m a k e concessions to a g r a r i a n
fears, a n d p r o c l a i m e d t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o
n
w o u l d s u p p l y t h e m e a n s of d e v e l o p i n g t h e
wil-
derness, t h e r e b y f r e e i n g it from savagery, a n d
w o u l d l i b e r a t e people from d r u d g e r y a n d scarc-
ity (Marx, pp. 1 4 5 - 2 2 6 ; Bender, pp. 1-52; Kas-
son, pp. 3 - 5 1 ) .
As it a d v a n c e d , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n affected
f a r m i n g a n d f a r m e r s in m a j o r w a y s . Most ob-
viously, it p r o m o t e d t h e u r b a n i z a t i o n of A m e r
-
ica. N e a r l y all A m e r i c a n s h a d lived a n d w o r k e
d
on f a r m s w h e n t h e n a t i o n began. B y 1890, only
42.3 p e r c e n t of t h e people did (Historical Statis-
tics, p. 457). R a t h e r t h a n t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t u s

11. t h a t J e f f e r s o n h a d r e g a r d e d as essential, farm-
ers h a d b e c o m e a minority, a l t h o u g h still a l a r g e
one (Fite, 1981, ch. 1). In addition, t h e a d v a n c e
of i n d u s t r y a n d t h e city d r e w f a r m e r s increas-
i n g l y into t h e m a r k e t ( H a h n a n d P r u d e , A t a
c k
a n d B a t e m a n ) . F r o n t i e r f a r m families d e p e n
d e d
a l m o s t e n t i r e l y on t h e m s e l v e s , p r o d u c i n g
t h e i r
food, c l o t h i n g a n d m a n y o t h e r p r o d u c t s
(Riley,
1981, 1988). E a s t of t h e frontiers, n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y f a r m e r s p r o d u c e d m u c h of t h e i r
food
a n d clothing a n d also s u c h i t e m s as energy, seed,
a n d fertilizer, b u t as p r o d u c e r s of food a n d f b e r ,
t h e y m o v e d m o r e a n d m o r e into t h e m a r k e t .
In
fact, t h e i r a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e a s u r p l u s b e y o
n d
t h e n e e d s of t h e i r f a m i l i e s m a d e it possible for
a
g r o w i n g n u m b e r of A m e r i c a n s to live in cities
a n d w o r k in factories. In o t h e r words, t h e expan-
sion of A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e a n d a g r i c u l t u r
a l
p r o d u c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to t h e frus-
t r a t i o n of t h e hope for a n a t i o n composed m a i n l y
of f a r m e r s .
The decline of f a r m e r s to a m i n o r i t y position
as well a s o t h e r f e a t u r e s of t h e n e w A m e r i c a
c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y
m a s s
u p r i s i n g k n o w n as t h e P o p u l i s t R e v o l t

12. (Good-
wyn). L a r g e l y white, middle-class, l a n d o w n i n g
6
farmers in the South and on the Great Plains,
the participants produced cotton and wheat,
crops t h a t sold now in an over-crowded world
market. Served by an inadequate money sys-
tem, farmers suffered falling prices and thus
had difficulty paying their debts or achieving
prosperity. Influenced by democratic agrarian-
ism, t h e y felt t h a t the America they believed in
had been displaced and t h a t they were exploited
in the new America by an immoral, unproduc-
tive "money power" or "monopoly capital." Con-
vinced t h a t t h e y were virtuous, hard-working
people, they believed t h a t they deserved to
flourish, so they tried to change, not farmers and
farming, but the political and economic systems
within which t h e y functioned. Not seeking a
"Golden Age" free of cities and factories, they
pressed for political reforms t h a t would give
farmers political power and for economic re-
forms t h a t would destroy monopolies, change
t h e money system, and free farmers from depen-
dence on off-farm economic institutions and
thereby permit family farmers to enjoy indepen-
dence and good times. They failed, although
some of t h e i r specific proposals became laws
later on. The new America of factories and cities
moved forward.
The Land-Grant Colleges

13. Some of those who envisioned a new urban
industrial America hoped to fit the farmer into
it by means of agricultural science and educa-
tion. Congress gave t h e m a boost in 1887 by
passing the Hatch Act t h a t supplied federal
funds for experiment stations connected with
land-grant colleges (Marcus), and the stations
quickly enlarged the body of knowledge the col-
leges could pass on to farmers. Emphasizing re-
search to make farmers more productive, the
colleges gained some strength by the beginning
of the t w e n t i e t h century. Not m a n y future farm-
ers enrolled in the four-year programs. Instead,
t h e y educated agricultural teachers and scien-
tists and people for off-farm agricultural busi-
nesses. To reach farmers, the colleges developed
extension programs with the farmers' institutes
as the main feature in the early days. These
institutes encouraged farmers to change their
ways so as to become more efficient and produc-
t i v e - t o diversify their production, to use more
fertilizers, to substitute technology for people
and m a k e other alterations. Some farm organi-
zations, the Wisconsin Dairyman's League, for
example, became enthusiastic supporters, but
m a n y farmers resisted the advice (Kirkendall,
1986a, pp. 8-11).
In hope of overcoming t h a t resistance, Con-
gress passed a major piece of legislation in 1914,
Kirkendall: Up to Now
the Smith-Lever Act. To a significant degree, it
was a product of the Country Life Movement.

14. Not a farmers movement, it was composed
mainly of people who h a d been born on farms
but had moved to cities. A number of features of
farm life in the early years of the Twentieth
C e n t u r y - - l a r g e - s c a l e migration to cities, ten-
ancy and absentee ownership, overworked
women, poor health, inadequate roads, poor
schools and churches, misuse of the land, ineffi-
c i e n c y - t r o u b l e d them, causing t h e m to fear
t h a t soon the nation would not have the large,
productive, and politically responsible farm pop-
ulation it m u s t have to survive and prosper. The
high food prices of the time seemed a sure sign
of trouble ahead. Thus, the Country Lifers,
people such as Liberty Hyde Bailey and "Uncle
Henry" Wallace, tried to persuade people ca-
pable of becoming good farmers to r e m a i n on
farms. To accomplish this goal, they assumed,
r u r a l life must be improved and made more like
urban life. Thus, t h e y promoted a number of
changes, including the consolidation of schools,
and, in spite of considerable resistance from
farmers, t h e y exerted influence (Bowers, Dan-
bom, Fuller, Madison).
The most significant victory for the Country
Life Movement, the Smith-Lever Act supplied
federal funds for extension programs. It re-
flected a strong desire to change farm practices
and assumed t h a t persuading farmers to do so
was not an easy task. Many were poorly edu-
cated, even illiterate, and did not have a high
regard for colleges and science. The legislation
helped to finance a new i n s t r u m e n t of change:
the county agent. Educated in the agricultural
sciences, these officials resided and worked in

15. farm communities throughout the year so as to
bring the developing knowledge into the daily
lives of farm people (Scott; Rasmussen, 1960, pp.
180, 187-8, 195-6).
In spite of the fact t h a t m a n y farmers were
black, the land-grant system offered little to
black farmers. Because most of t h e m were in the
South and the system of segregation prevailed
there, few blacks could enroll in the institutions
aided by the 1862 legislation. Special legisla-
tion, a second Morrill Act, had been passed in
1890 to develop a land-grant system for blacks,
and t h e legislation contributed to the growth of
colleges, but t h e y emphasized teacher training,
not agriculture, and derived few benefits from
federal support for agricultural experiment sta-
tions or extension. Federal support for research
and extension in these institutions would
a m o u n t to little until at best the late 1960s and
would not become substantial until the 1980s
(Williams and Williamson, 2-11).
A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
R e v o l u t i o n a n d E v o l u t i o n
The c o u n t y a g e n t s a n d t h e forces t h a t stood
b e h i n d t h e m , i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
De-
p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e , t h e n p r i m a r i l y a
re-
s e a r c h i n s t i t u t i o n , w e r e p o t e n t i a l

16. revolution-
aries, b u t t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l
R e v o l u t i o n w o u l d n o t b e g i n for a q u a r t e r
cen-
t u r y a f t e r p a s s a g e of t h e S m i t h - L e v e r Act.
Some
p a r t s of A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e h a d e x p e r i e
n c e d
a technological r e v o l u t i o n in t h e n i n e t e e n t h
century. R o o t e d in a n u m b e r of i n v e n t i o n s j u s t
before t h e Civil War, it h a d m o v e d f o r w a r d dur-
ing t h e w a r b e c a u s e of t h e s h o r t a g e of f a r m
la-
bor r e l a t i v e to t h e d e m a n d for f a r m products a n d
h a d c o n t i n u e d a t a r a p i d pace for a n u m b e r of
y e a r s a f t e r 1865. The r e v o l u t i o n involved t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d u s e of m a c h i n e s such as culti-
v a t o r s a n d r e a p e r s a n d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of
ani-
m a l p o w e r for h u m a n p o w e r in some f a r m j o b s
( R a s m u s s e n , 1962, 1965; Gates, 1965). L a t e in
t h e century, i n v e n t o r s , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , a n d
farm-
ers also p u t t h e s t e a m e n g i n e to u s e in t h e w h e
a t
h a r v e s t . The n e w t e c h n o l o g y p e r m i t t e d f a r
m e r s
to w o r k f a s t e r a n d accomplish m o r e a n d r e d u c e
d
t h e h u m a n d r u d g e r y on t h e farm, b u t it did not
e l i m i n a t e h a r d w o r k for f a r m people. Work w i t h
h o r s e s w a s o f t e n h o t or cold a n d difficult; farm-
ers, e s p e c i a l l y in t h e cotton South, c o n t i n u e d to
do n e a r l y all of t h e i r w o r k b y hand. E v e n in t h e
Corn Belt, f a r m e r s t h e m s e l v e s did such s w e a t y
t a s k s as pick a n d h u s k corn. A n d t h e revolu-

17. tion's i m p a c t on t h e f a r m h o m e w a s l i m i t e d
l a r g e l y to t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e s e w i n g
ma-
chine (Fite, 1981, ch. 2, 1984, chs. 1-2; H u r t ;
Quick).
G i v e n t h e a v a i l a b l e technology, t h e n a t i o n
still n e e d e d a l a r g e n u m b e r of f a r m s and farm-
ers. The n e w m a c h i n e s did r e d u c e t h e n e e d s for
h i r e d h a n d s on e s t a b l i s h e d f a r m s in t h e
Middle
West (Argersingers), b u t t h e city p o p u l a t i o n w a s
g r o w i n g r a p i d l y w h i l e overall a g r i c u l t u r a l
effi-
ciency w a s g r o w i n g slowly. In 1830, before t h e
r e v o l u t i o n hit, one f a r m w o r k e r in t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s s u p p l i e d t h e n e e d s of 4 people; b y 1890,
a f t e r t h e r e v o l u t i o n h a d w o r k e d its wonders,
one
f a r m w o r k e r s e r v e d 5.8 people (Historical Statis-
tics, p. 498). R a t h e r t h a n p r o m o t e a decline in
t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g y
en-
c o u r a g e d expansion, especially on t h e G r e a t
P l a i n s w h e r e l a n d w a s a v a i l a b l e a n d m a c h
i n e s
a n d h o r s e s could be p u t to work, helping to
plant, c u l t i v a t e , a n d h a r v e s t w h e a t . Thus, t h e
n e w t e c h n o l o g y w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h
Jefferso-
n i a n a g r a r i a n i s m in a t l e a s t t w o m a j o r
ways: it
r e d u c e d t h e f a r m family's n e e d to h i r e l a b o r a
n d
e n c o u r a g e d f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n of t h e f a r m
pop-

18. ulation. P e r h a p s it w o u l d be a c c u r a t e to s u g g e s
t
t h a t t h e t e c h n o l o g y helped to prolong t h e life of
t h i s form of a g r a r i a n t h o u g h t into t h e t w e n t i e
t h
centuryY
In t h e e a r l y y e a r s of t h e t w e n t i e t h century,
f a r m i n g c o n t i n u e d to d e p e n d on t h e l a b o r of
people a n d a n i m a l s , l a r g e n u m b e r s of both. The
f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a d g r o w n to n e a r l y 25
million
b y 1890, w h i c h w a s m o r e t h a n six t i m e s t h e
p o p u l a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y a c e n t u r y
ear-
lier, a n d A m e r i c a n f a r m people i n c r e a s e d t h e
n u m b e r of f a r m s from less t h a n 1.5 million in
1850 to o v e r 4.5 million in 1890, m a k i n g t h a t
f o r t y - y e a r period t h e g r e a t e s t e r a of f a r m m a
k -
ing in A m e r i c a n history. The pace of c h a n g e in
t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s slowed a f t e r t h a t , b u t t h e
n u m -
b e r of f a r m people c o n t i n u e d to grow, r e a c h i n g
32.5 m i l l i o n b y 1916 w h i l e t h e n u m b e r of f a r
m s
i n c r e a s e d to n e a r l y 6.5 million (Historical Sta-
tistics, p. 457; Cochrane, chs. 5 - 6 ) .
Technological d e v e l o p m e n t in a g r i c u l t u r e
m o v e d a t a p r e d o m i n a n t l y e v o l u t i o n a r y r a
t h e r
t h a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y pace d u r i n g t h e first four
decades of t h e t w e n t i e t h century. A n e w device
w i t h r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l - - t h e gasoline-

19. p o w e r e d t r a c t o r - - b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e e a r l y
in t h e
century, b u t only a t h o u s a n d w e r e in u s e on
A m e r i c a n f a r m s b y 1910. W a r t i m e d e m a n d
for
f a r m p r o d u c t s e n c o u r a g e d t h e u s e of tractors,
w h i c h r e a c h e d 85,000 b y 1918, w i t h m o s t of
t h e m on t h e G r e a t P l a i n s w h e r e f a r m e r s
b r o u g h t e v e n m o r e l a n d into production. The
f a r m p o p u l a t i o n dropped s l i g h t l y d u r i n g t h e
war, f a l l i n g to 32 million a n d r e v e r s i n g a t r e n d
t h a t e x t e n d e d b a c k to t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e
na-
tion, a n d declined f u r t h e r d u r i n g t h e 1920s,
m o v i n g to 30.5 million as t h e n a t i o n c o n t i n u e d
to g r o w m o r e u r b a n . The n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s
m o r e t h a n t r i p l e d d u r i n g t h e decade, rising to
920,000 b y 1930, b u t t h a t w a s less t h a n one for
e v e r y six farms. A n d t h e coming of t h e G r e a t
D e p r e s s i o n r e v e r s e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n t r e n
d t h a t
h a d b e e n r u n n i n g since 1916 for some people
s a w f a r m s a s a r e f u g e from u r b a n u n e m p l o y -
ment. T h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n e x p a n d e d to 32.4
million b y 1933. The n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s in-
c r e a s e d o n l y to 1 million b y 1935 (Historical
Statistics, pp. 457, 469).
T h e F a r m B u r e a u a n d M c N a r y - H a u g e n
B y t h e 1930s, a s t r o n g f a r m o r g a n i z a t i o n h a
d
e m e r g e d a n d w a s b a t t l i n g for c h a n g e in f a r
m i n g
a n d profit for t h e f a r m business. This w a s t h e
A m e r i c a n F a r m B u r e a u F e d e r a t i o n . It w a s

20. a n
a n t i - r a d i c a l g r o u p v e r y different from t h e Pop-
u l i s t Revolt. It h a d e m e r g e d in t h e second dec-
ade o f t h e c e n t u r y in c o u n t i e s a n d states, aided
b y u r b a n b u s i n e s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t e r e s t
e d in
t h e farmer, t h e e x t e n s i o n services a n d t h e i r
c o u n t y a g e n t s , a n d t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of
Ag-
r i c u l t u r e , a n d h a d become a n a t i o n a l organiza-
t i o n b y 1920, t h o u g h one t h a t recognized t h e
m i n o r i t y s t a t u s of f a r m e r s , did n o t a t t e m p t
to
b e c o m e a m a s s m o v e m e n t , a n d t r i e d i n s t e a
d to
d e r i v e s t r e n g t h from o r g a n i z a t i o n - - o r g a n i
z a -
t i o n of t h e "right" people. C o n c e i v i n g of f a r m i n
g
as e s s e n t i a l l y a b u s i n e s s a n d composed m a i n l
y
of t h e m o r e s u b s t a n t i a l c o m m e r c i a l f a m i l
y farm-
ers in t h e Middle West a n d South, t h e organi-
zation j o i n e d in efforts to m a k e f a r m e r s m o r e
efficient b y m e a n s of education, organized farm-
ers into cooperatives, a n d p r e s s e d for legislation
f a v o r a b l e to f a r m e r s (McConnell, Campbell).
B y t h e mid-1920s, t h e A F B F w a s t h e m a i n
f a r m o r g a n i z a t i o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e M c N a r y
-
H a u g e n plan. D e s i g n e d l a r g e l y b y a f a r m ma-

21. c h i n e r y m a n u f a c t u r e r , George N. P e e k (Fite,
1954), w h o recognized t h a t he could not sell
plows to " b u s t e d " f a r m e r s a n d f e a r e d a g r a r i
a n
r a d i c a l i s m , t h e p l a n s o u g h t to solve t h e " f a r
m
p r o b l e m " of t h e 1920s b y finding n e w m a r k e t s
a b r o a d a n d g u a r a n t e e i n g a profitable price for
t h e crops sold on t h e A m e r i c a n m a r k e t . The
p l a n defined t h e p r o b l e m as low prices, not t h e
p o w e r of b i g b u s i n e s s or p o v e r t y a m o n g t e n
a n t
f a r m e r s a n d f a r m e r s w i t h poor l a n d or n o t
e n o u g h l a n d a n d e q u i p m e n t , a n d it focused on
r a i s i n g f a r m prices, n o t r e s h a p i n g r u r a l life
or
t h e r u r a l social s t r u c t u r e or r e d u c i n g b u s i n e
s s
power.
R a t h e r t h a n a t t a c k t h e g i a n t corporations as
t h e P o p u l i s t s had, t h e M c N a r y - H a u g e n move-
m e n t a d v i s e d f a r m e r s to accept t h e h i g h protec-
t i v e t a r i f f a n d e m p l o y a two-price s y s t e m , one
price for t h e domestic m a r k e t a n d a l o w e r one
for t h e foreign m a r k e t , as m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l
firms
did. C o n g r e s s e n d o r s e d t h e p l a n in 1927 a n d
1928; P r e s i d e n t Coolidge d e f e a t e d it w i t h v e t o s
b o t h times, b u t it h e l p e d to p r e p a r e t h e w a y
for
action b y t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t on b e h a l f of
h i g h e r f a r m prices.
T h e N e w D e a l for A g r i c u l t u r e
The N e w D e a l for a g r i c u l t u r e t h a t b e g a n in

22. 1933 s o u g h t to m a i n t a i n a l a r g e f a r m popula-
tion, a n d t h e n u m b e r of f a r m people did r e m a i n
l a r g e a t t h e e n d of t h e decade, b u t this politi-
cal m o v e m e n t did f a c i l i t a t e t h e s u b s t i t u t i o
n of
t e c h n o l o g y for people in a g r i c u l t u r e . The N e w
D e a l e r s a t t e m p t e d to s a f e g u a r d a n d s t r e n g
t h e n
A m e r i c a n f a r m i n g b y r a i s i n g prices for f a r m
p r o d u c t s a n d t r i e d to do t h a t b y t a k i n g p a r t
s of
f a r m s o u t of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of m a j o r crops. T
h e y
a s s u m e d t h a t excess o u t p u t h a d become t h e ba-
sic f a r m p r o b l e m a n d rejected s u g g e s t i o n s t h a
t
n a t u r a l forces should be relied u p o n to s h r i n k
t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s a n d f a r m e r s to t h e size t
h a t
w o u l d e n a b l e A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e to o p e
r a t e
K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w
a t a profit. B u t t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n did decline,
d r o p p i n g to 30.5 million b y 1940, a d e c r e a s e of
n e a r l y 2 million since F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t h a d
come to power. T h e decline c a m e m a i n l y in t h e
Middle West w h e r e m e c h a n i z a t i o n m o v e d for-
w a r d a n d on t h e S o u t h e r n P l a i n s w h e r e d r o
u g h t
a n d d u s t e n c o u r a g e d people to m i g r a t e o u t of
t h e region. The n u m b e r of f a r m s fell from 6.8
million in 1935 to 6.1 million five y e a r s l a t e r
w h i l e t h e n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s on t h o s e f a r m

23. s rose
from 1 to 1.6 million as N e w D e a l agencies
h e l p e d f a r m e r s o b t a i n f u n d s t h a t t h e y i n v
e s t e d
in t h e s e m a c h i n e s . As t h e l a r g e s t g o v e r n m e
n t
p a y m e n t s a n d l o a n s w e n t to t h e l a r g e s t
opera-
tors, t h e y w e r e t h e ones m o s t c a p a b l e o f invest-
ing in t h e n e w technology, u s i n g it to f a r m e v e n
l a r g e r u n i t s , a n d b u y i n g l a n d from t h e i r
neigh-
b o r s so a s to u s e t h e t e c h n o l o g y efficiently.
B y t h e l a t e 1930s, t h e pace of technological
c h a n g e in r u r a l A m e r i c a w a s accelerating.
W h i l e n e a r l y 25 p e r c e n t of t h e f a r m s h a d
trac-
t o r s b y 1940, e q u i p m e n t d e s i g n e d to be u s e d
w i t h t r a c t o r s w a s also b e i n g introduced, a n d
f a r m e r s h a d m o r e c a r s a n d t r u c k s . Also b y
1940,
75 p e r c e n t of t h e f a r m e r s in t h e C o r n B e l t w
e r e
u s i n g a n o t h e r n e w technology, h y b r i d seed corn
(Bogue, Brown), a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e nation,
f a r m e r s w e r e m a k i n g g r e a t e r u s e of
commercial
fertilizers a n d electricity. S u c h c h a n g e s frus-
t r a t e d efforts to c u t b a c k on p r o d u c t i o n b y re-
d u c i n g t h e a c r e a g e d e v o t e d to m a j o r crops, a
n d
t h u s f a r m prices r e m a i n e d b e l o w goals a n d sur-
p l u s e s piled u p (Historical Statistics, p. 469; Kir-
k e n d a l l , 1975, 1980; Saloutos; Fite, 1981, ch. 4).

24. S o m e c h a n g e t o o k place in t h e r u r a l South,
b u t t h e o b s t a c l e s to it t h e r e , i n c l u d i n g t h e
n e e d
for a l a r g e l a b o r force to c u l t i v a t e a n d h a r v e s
t
cotton, r e m a i n e d strong. The n u m b e r of f a r m s
o p e r a t e d b y s h a r e c r o p p e r s fell 30 p e r c e n t d
u r i n g
t h e decade, in p a r t b e c a u s e of t h e i n c r e a s e d u
s e
of t r a c t o r s , b u t t h e n u m b e r of f a r m l a b o r e r
s in-
c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y a n d t h e t o t a l s o u t h
e r n
f a r m p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d b y a s m a l l a m o
u n t .
A l t h o u g h s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s did e x p a n d t h e i
r u s e
of t r a c t o r s , only 8 p e r c e n t of t h o s e f a r m e r s h
a d
t r a c t o r s b y 1940 w h i l e 55 p e r c e n t of Iowa's farm-
ers h a d t h e m . To e n c o u r a g e w i d e s p r e a d u s e
of
t h o s e m a c h i n e s , t h e S o u t h n e e d e d o t h e r
tech-
nological changes, a b o v e all t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
a m e c h a n i c a l cotton p i c k e r (Fite, 1984, chs. 6 -
7; Daniel, 1985, b o o k s 2 - 3 ) .
S u r p l u s P e o p l e
The a g r i c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e l a t e 1930s
e n c o u r a g e d a n u m b e r of people in t h e agricul-
t u r a l colleges, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t
of
A g r i c u l t u r e , a n d o t h e r places to a r g u e t h a t

25. t h e r e w e r e too m a n y people in a g r i c u l t u r e .
This,
A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
r a t h e r t h a n o t h e r factors, s u c h as class exploi-
t a t i o n a n d racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , explained, it
w a s a r g u e d , t h e l a r g e v o l u m e of p o v e r t y a
m o n g
f a r m people. The proposed s o l u t i o n w a s t h e sub-
s t i t u t i o n of t e c h n o l o g y for people. T h a t c h a n g
e
w o u l d p e r m i t t h e o p e r a t i o n of l a r g e r farms,
in-
c r e a s e efficiency, r e d u c e costs, a n d m a k e farm-
ing profitable for t h e people w h o r e m a i n e d in it
(Fite, 1984, pp. 143, 148, 151-2, 161).
The S e c r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , H e n r y A. Wal-
lace, h a d b e c o m e a n e s p e c i a l l y significant pro-
p o n e n t of t h e t h e o r y of t h e s u r p l u s f a r m
popu-
lation. Earlier, as a p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e b a t t l e
o v e r f a r m policy in t h e 1920s, he h a d e m b r a c e d
t h e old a g r a r i a n t h e o r y a b o u t t h e n e e d for a
l a r g e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n a n d h a d i s s u e d w a r
n i n g s
a b o u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of f u r t h e r u r b a n i z
a t i o n
of t h e A m e r i c a n people ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1983,
1984). B y t h e l a t e 1930s, however, he w a s ar-
g u i n g t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e nation's f a r m
p r o b l e m d e p e n d e d h e a v i l y on e x p a n d e d

26. indus-
t r i a l production, low i n d u s t r i a l prices, full ur-
b a n e m p l o y m e n t a t h i g h wages, a n d t h e migra-
tion of l a r g e n u m b e r s of people to t h e cities
( K i r k e n d a l l , 1967). " T h e r e is a n o r m a l excess
of
b i r t h s over d e a t h s of from 400,000 to 500,000 on
t h e f a r m s of A m e r i c a e v e r y y e a r " he advised
E l e a n o r R o o s e v e l t in 1939. " W h e n t h e N a t i o
n
w a s e x p a n d i n g , t h i s i n c r e a s e in p o p u l a t i o
n h a d
o p p o r t u n i t y e i t h e r on n e w l a n d or in t h e
grow-
ing cities. The closing of o p p o r t u n i t y in t h o s e
t w o directions h a s r e s u l t e d in d a m m i n g u p on
t h e f a r m s of millions of people who n o r m a l l y
w o u l d h a v e b e e n t a k e n care of e l s e w h e r e "'3
This
i n t e l l e c t u a l c h a n g e on t h e h i g h e s t level in f a
r m
politics w a s a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e p r e p a r a -
tion for a r e v o l u t i o n t h a t w o u l d s u b s t i t u t e
tech-
nology for people in f a r m i n g a n d m o v e millions
of people from f a r m s to cities a n d towns. On
o t h e r levels a n d in o t h e r p l a c e s - - i n colleges a n
d
c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d on f a r m s - - o t h e r p r e p a r a
t i o n s
w e r e also b e i n g m a d e .
T h e I m p a c t o f War
World War II n o t o n l y e n d e d t h e g r e a t f a r m
crisis of t h e 1920s a n d 1930s; it also b e g a n t h e

27. G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Revolution. The
w a r a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e first b y c r e a t i n g a v a s
t
n e w m a r k e t for A m e r i c a n f a r m products a n d
b r i n g i n g a h i g h level of p r o s p e r i t y to A m e r i c
a n
f a r m e r s . A n d as f a r m e r s m o v e d into t h e n e w
economic boom, technological c h a n g e m o v e d for-
w a r d a t a s t e p p e d up pace, e n a b l i n g f a r m e r s
to
e x p a n d p r o d u c t i o n in spite of only a s m a l l in-
c r e a s e in l a n d d e v o t e d to crops a n d a s h a r p de-
cline in t h e f a r m population. F o r some years,
t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l colleges, t h e f a r m m a c h i n e r
y
companies, a n d o t h e r p r o d u c e r s of n e w f a r m
t e c h n o l o g i e s h a d e n c o u r a g e d f a r m e r s to i
n v e s t
in t h e m , b u t financial difficulties h a d r e s t r i c t e d
t h e a b i l i t y of f a r m e r s to do so. Now, t h e decline
in t h e f a r m l a b o r s u p p l y provided a d d e d stimu-
lus, a n d i m p r o v i n g economic conditions re-
m o v e d t h e m a i n obstacle. E v e n in t h e South,
m a n y f a r m e r s could n o w afford to accept t h e ad-
vice. T h u s , f a r m e r s i n c r e a s e d t h e n u m b e r of
t r a c t o r s on A m e r i c a n f a r m s from 1.6 million in
1940 to 2.4 million five y e a r s l a t e r a n d also
m a d e g r e a t e r u s e of h y b r i d corn, m e c h a n i c a l
corn a n d cotton pickers, combines, h a y balers,
p e a n u t h a r v e s t e r s , m i l k i n g m a c h i n e s , a n
d
chemicals. In spite o f h e a v y w a r t i m e d e m a n d for
c o m m o d i t i e s like steel a n d chemicals, govern-
m e n t policies e n c o u r a g e d t h e production of
t h i n g s f a r m e r s n e e d e d to m e e t w a r t i m e

28. goals.
The technological d e v e l o p m e n t s r e s u l t e d in
o t h e r changes. The size of f a r m s e x p a n d e d w h i l e
t h e n u m b e r declined, t h o u g h b y only a small
a m o u n t , m o v i n g f r o m 6.1 to 5.9 million. Yields
i n c r e a s e d m u c h m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n t h e y h a
d for
m a n y years; t o t a l f a r m o u t p u t a n d o u t p u t p e
r
f a r m w o r k e r rose e v e n m o r e rapidly.
A n e w t y p e of a g r i c u l t u r e w a s t a k i n g shape,
one t h a t n e e d e d f e w e r a n i m a l s a n d f e w e r
people.
D u r i n g t h e war, l a r g e n u m b e r s of people m o v e
d
off of t h e f a r m s a n d into t h e a r m e d forces a n d
city jobs. M a n y m o v e d eagerly, h o p i n g to escape
u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t a n d low incomes.
The m i g r a t i o n r e d u c e d t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o
n
sharply, m o r e so t h a n e v e r before. It dropped b y
m o r e t h a n 6 million from 1940 to 1945, from
30.5 to 24.4 million. F r o m 1916 to 1920, t h e
f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a d declined 1.5 percent; from
1920 to 1925, t h e drop h a d b e e n 2.5 percent;
from 1925 to 1930, 2.2; from 1933 to 1940, 6.
N o w t h e decline w a s 20 percent!
W a r t i m e conditions r e d u c e d t h e n u m b e r of
f a r m s b y a m u c h s m a l l e r p e r c e n t a g e , only
s l i g h t l y a b o v e 3. The m i g r a t i o n consisted
m a i n l y of y o u n g people, n o t f a r m owners. It w a s
also a m o v e m e n t of s h a r e c r o p p e r s , w i t h t h e

29. n u m b e r o f f a r m s o p e r a t e d b y s h a r e c r o p p e
r s in
t h e S o u t h falling from 541,291 to 446,556 or
17.5 p e r c e n t as m a c h i n e s r e p l a c e d people. Tech-
nology p u s h e d people off of farms; opportunities,
b o t h civilian a n d military, pulled t h e m off (His-
torical Statistics, pp. 457, 465; Cochrane, ch. 7;
Fite, 1981, ch. 5, 1984, ch. 8).
T h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l
R e v o l u t i o n
The r e v o l u t i o n c o n t i n u e d long a f t e r t h e war,
c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n a t i o n t
h a t
w a s v e r y different from w h a t J e f f e r s o n h a d en-
v i s i o n e d (Shover, i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d ch. 5; Fite,
1981, ch. 6 - 1 3 ) . U n l i k e t h e r e v o l u t i o n of t h e
10
n i n e t e e n t h century, t h i s one affected f a r m i n g
e v e r y w h e r e in t h e nation, n o w h e r e m o r e t h a n
t h e South, a n d w a s d e m o g r a p h i c as well as tech-
nological. The technological side of t h e revolu-
tion r e d u c e d n e e d s for people in t h e e s t a b l i s h e
d
f a r m i n g areas, and, in c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e nine-
t e e n t h century, t h e r e w e r e no l a n d s a v a i l a b l e
for
m a k i n g n e w farms.
L o n g e s t a b l i s h e d agencies of c h a n g e p r o m o t e
d

30. t h e technological d i m e n s i o n of t h e revolution.
T h e y included t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l colleges, t h e ex-
p e r i m e n t s t a t i o n s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n
services.
T h e s e a g e n c i e s t r a i n e d people for t h e off-farm
p a r t s of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m , conducted
m u c h of t h e b a s i c r e s e a r c h on t h e n e w
technol-
ogies, a n d e n c o u r a g e d f a r m e r s to a d o p t t h e m
.
T h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s w o r k e d m a i n l y w i t h f a
r m e r s
w h o w e r e m o s t c a p a b l e of a c c e p t i n g a n d m
a k i n g
good u s e o u t of t h e advice, t h e s u b s t a n t i a l com-
m e r c i a l ones, a n d w e r e influenced significantly
b y o n l y one p a r t of a g r a r i a n i s m : t h e e n t h u s
i a s m
for f a r m e r s as producers. S e e k i n g to m a k e t h e
f a r m e r s m o r e efficient a n d productive, t h e insti-
t u t i o n s w e r e n o t s w a y e d b y a desire to hold a
l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n on t h e land. Instead, t h e b e l i e
f
t h a t t h e r e w e r e too m a n y people t h e r e affected
t h e w o r k ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1986a, pp. 1 5 - 2 1 ) .
C o r p o r a t i o n s s u c h as J o h n Deere, Pioneer,
a n d M o n s a n t o also f u n c t i o n e d as r e v o l u t i o n
-
aries. I m p o r t a n t p a r t s of t h e r a p i d e x p a n s i o
n of
A m e r i c a n i n d u s t r y d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s , t h
e y pro-
duced t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d p r o m o t e d t
h e i r
u s e (Broehl, Williams, Lee, Kloppenburg).

31. The f a r m e r s w h o could afford t h e c h a n g e s wel-
comed t h e p r o d u c t s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .
The
n e w w a y s s e e m e d c a p a b l e of r e d u c i n g w o r
k a n d
i n c r e a s i n g efficiency, t h e r e b y m a k i n g f a r m
life
e a s i e r a n d t h e f a r m b u s i n e s s m o r e profitable.
F a r m e r s w e r e no longer a c o n s e r v a t i v e group,
a t l e a s t in t h e i r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d technological
change. Two decades of low financial r e w a r d s for
t h e i r h a r d w o r k h a d h e l p e d to m a k e t h e m
recep-
t i v e to s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t t h e y should c h a n g e
t h e i r w a y s . T h e y gave up t h e i r old h o s t i l i t y
to
"book f a r m i n g " a n d w e r e n o t h e l d b a c k b y
a g r a r i a n i s m .
T h e technological c h a n g e h a d s e v e r a l compo-
nents. The m o s t obvious w a s t h e mechanical:
t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e gasoline e n g i n e for ani-
m a l a n d h u m a n p o w e r ( R a s m u s s e n , 1962).
This
involved f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e in t h e u s e of tractors.
B y 1970, f a r m e r s e m p l o y e d 5 million of t h e m ,
well o v e r one for e a c h A m e r i c a n farm. A n d t h e y
b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y p o w e r f u l a n d fast, p u l
l i n g
t w o - r o w p l a n t e r s a n d c u l t i v a t o r s a t first b
u t ca-
p a b l e o f h a u l i n g e i g h t a n d t w e l v e - r o w
devices
b y t h e 1970s. C o r n p i c k e r s i n c r e a s e d from
110,000 in 1940 to 792,000 in 1960; g r a i n com-

32. K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w
b i n e s rose from 190,000 to I million in t h e s a m e
period (Historical Statistics, p. 469).
T h e r e w e r e also biological a n d chemical com-
p o n e n t s to t h e r e v o l u t i o n . H y b r i d corn h a d
com-
p l e t e l y d i s p l a c e d its c o m p e t i t i o n b y t h e l a
t e
1940s; t h e c o n s u m p t i o n of c o m m e r c i a l fertilizer
i n c r e a s e d from 9.4 million t o n s in 1940 to 39.6
million in 1970 (Historical Statistics, p. 469).
O t h e r c h e m i c a l s a t t a c k e d weeds, insects, a n d
o t h e r e n e m i e s of crops, e l i m i n a t i n g j o b s t h a
t
h a d b e e n p e r f o r m e d b y hand.
A m e r i c a n f a r m s w e r e also electrified. F e w
h a d h a d e l e c t r i c i t y in t h e e a r l y 1930s; v i r t u
a l l y
all f a r m s h a d it soon a f t e r World War II. This
c h a n g e w a s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t for f a r m
women. M a k i n g it possible for t h e m to u s e a
w i d e a r r a y of appliances, it r e d u c e d t h e i r w o r k
loads in t h e i r h o u s e s a n d gave t h e m m o r e t i m e
for o t h e r activities. E l e c t r i c i t y affected men's la-
b o r a s well, m a k i n g possible, for example, a n
i n c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s w i t h m i l k i
n g
m a c h i n e s from 175,000 in 1940 to 712,000 fif-
t e e n y e a r s later.
T h e s e s p e c t a c u l a r technological c h a n g e s
m a d e t h e people w h o w o r k e d on f a r m s m u c h

33. m o r e p r o d u c t i v e of food a n d fiber for h u m a n
con-
s u m p t i o n . T h e m e c h a n i c a l component, for ex-
ample, r e l e a s e d s o m e f o r t y to fifty million acres
f r o m feed production; t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of chemi-
cals a n d h y b r i d s e e d i n c r e a s e d yields p e r acre.
t
Consequently, t h e n u m b e r of people s e r v e d b y
one f a r m w o r k e r rose from less t h a n 11 in 1940
to m o r e t h a n f o r t y - s e v e n t h r e e decades l a t e r
(Historical Statistics, p. 498). T h u s A m e r i c a n
f a r m e r s d e v e l o p e d t h e c a p a c i t y to s e r v e a
rap-
idly e x p a n d i n g u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n t h a t m o r e
t h a n
d o u b l e d in t h o s e t h i r t y years. A n d t h o s e f a r
m s
p r o d u c e d m u c h t h a t could b e sold in foreign
m a r k e t s as well.
As t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r
e
c h a n g e d a t a r e v o l u t i o n a r y pace, t h e n a t i o n
also
e x p e r i e n c e d a d e m o g r a p h i c revolution. People
m o v e d in m a s s i v e n u m b e r s from f a r m to city
a n d t o w n w i t h t h e v o l u m e - - o v e r t h i r t y
mil-
l i o n - s i m i l a r in size to t h e m o v e m e n t of Euro-
p e a n s to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from 1815 to 1914.
T h i s t i m e t h e pace w a s m u c h m o r e r a p i d for
only
a t h i r d of a c e n t u r y w a s r e q u i r e d to accomplish
t h e shift t h a t e a r l i e r h a d t a k e n a full century.
The technological c h a n g e s s u p p l i e d m u c h of

34. t h e force b e h i n d t h e m o v e m e n t of people. T h e y
c u t farming's n e e d for people b y r e d u c i n g t h e
a m o u n t of h u m a n e n e r g y r e q u i r e d to produce a
u n i t of o u t p u t or, to p u t t h i s a n o t h e r way, b y
i n c r e a s i n g t h e goods t h a t each p e r s o n on t h e
l a n d could t u r n out, b u t t h e n e w m a c h i n e s and
o t h e r t e c h n o l o g i e s w e r e m o r e e x p e n s i v e t
h a n
t h e w a y s t h e y displaced, a n d t h e y p u t p r e s s u r
e
11
A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
on f a r m e r s to e x p a n d t h e i r l a n d holdings so as
to c a p t u r e t h e full p o t e n t i a l of t h e technology.
Consequently, f a r m e r s w h o could do so s o u g h t
to b u y o u t t h e i r n e i g h b o r s , a n d m a n y f a r m
e r s
chose to sell t h e i r l a n d for t h e y could not hope
to m a t c h t h e c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of a
modern-
ized f a r m 2 T h u s , as some f a r m e r s p a r t i c i p a t e
d
in t h e r e v o l u t i o n b y a d o p t i n g t h e n e w
technol-
ogy, o t h e r s did so b y m i g r a t i n g a w a y from farm-
ing.
H a d t h e prices t h a t f a r m e r s r e c e i v e d for t h e i
r
p r o d u c t s b e e n h i g h e r m o r e f a r m e r s m i g h t

35. h a v e
b e e n a b l e to r e s i s t t h e p r e s s u r e from t h e
tech-
nology a n d hold on to t h e i r farms. E c o n o m i s t s
spoke of t h e "cost-price squeeze," giving it m u c h
of t h e credit for t h e m i g r a t i o n , a n d price levels
did p e r s u a d e m a n y f a r m e r s to sell t h e i r l a n d
a n d o t h e r s to f a r m o n l y p a r t t i m e a n d rely u
p o n
off-farm j o b s for m u c h of t h e i r income. F a r m
prices t h a t s e e m e d too low also s t i m u l a t e d some
f a r m e r s to rebel, such a s t h o s e who j o i n e d t h e
N a t i o n a l F a r m e r s O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d partici-
p a t e d in efforts to force price rises b y holding
c o m m o d i t i e s off t h e m a r k e t . B u t h o w
different
w o u l d t h e r e s u l t s h a v e b e e n if prices h a d b e e
n
h i g h e r ? P e r h a p s t h e m o r e efficient f a r m e r s
w o u l d h a v e u s e d t h e i r e x p a n d e d r e s o u r c e
s to
m a k e offers for l a n d t h a t o t h e r f a r m e r s could
n o t h a v e refused.
H i g h e r f a r m prices m i g h t h a v e w e a k e n e d
s o m e w h a t t h e pull from t h e cities a n d towns. As
t h i n g s were, off-farm j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s h a d
m u c h to do w i t h t h e m i g r a t i o n . T h e y w e r e
un-
u s u a l l y a b u n d a n t m o s t of t h e t i m e from 1941
to
1969, a n d t h e y p u l l e d people off of t h e l a n d b y
offering, or a t l e a s t a p p e a r i n g to offer, b e t t e r
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a n it s u p p l i e d Apparently,
m a n y f a r m people did n o t b e l i e v e t h a t f a r m i n
g

36. p r o v i d e d a s u p e r i o r w a y of life.
T h u s , t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n dropped sharply.
The n u m b e r of people on A m e r i c a n f a r m s
d r o p p e d from 30.5 million in 1940 to 9.7 million
in 1970. In 1940, t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n m a d e up
23.1 p e r c e n t o f t h e total; b y 1970, t h e p e r c e n t a
g e
h a d d r o p p e d to 4.8 (Historical Statistics, p. 457).
As people m o v e d off of farms, t h e c o u n t r y church
declined, a n d t h e one-room school h o u s e s u r r e n -
d e r e d to t h e forces of consolidation (Fuller, p.
245)
In t h e South, t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w a s espe-
cially l a r g e (Fite, 1984, chs. 9 - 1 0 ; Daniel, 1985,
book 4). The r e g i o n e x p e r i e n c e d a n e n o r m o u s
r e d u c t i o n in t h e n u m b e r s of f a r m s a n d f a r m
people. F a r m s d r o p p e d from 3 million in 1940 to
1.16 million in 1969. In t h e Middle West from
Ohio a n d M i c h i g a n to N o r t h D a k o t a a n d K a n
-
sas, t h e decline in t h e s a m e period w a s from 2.1
to 1.15 million; in Iowa, t h e n u m b e r m o v e d from
213,000 to 140,000. The s o u t h e r n f a r m popula-
tion d r o p p e d e v e n m o r e s h a r p l y t h a n t h e n u
m -
b e r of farms, falling from 16.4 to 4 million. B y
comparison, t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n of t h e Middle
West m o v e d from 9.3 to 4.5 million; of Iowa,
from 931,000 to 565,000 (Historical Statistics,
pp. 4 5 8 - 9 ) .
C h a n g e s t r u c k all p a r t s of s o u t h e r n agricul-
t u r e . T h e cotton South, u n t o u c h e d b y t h e first

37. technological r e v o l u t i o n , w a s t r a n s f o r m e d b y
t h i s one. O n l y 11.7 p e r c e n t of t h e cotton f a r m s
h a d t r a c t o r s in 1945; 73 p e r c e n t h a d t h e m in
1970. M e c h a n i c a l c o t t o n p i c k e r s h a r v e s t e d
only
5 p e r c e n t of t h e cotton in 1949 b u t 96 p e r c e n t
t w e n t y y e a r s later. Scientists, technicians, and
m a n u f a c t u r e r s also c h a n g e d t h e cotton p l a n t
it-
s e l f so t h a t it w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e n e w
ma-
chines, a n d t h e y s u p p l i e d chemical w e e d killers
a n d insecticides a n d m o r e chemical fertilizers.
The technological c h a n g e s e n d e d t h e h a r d l a b o r
t h a t h a d b e e n involved in chopping a n d picking
cotton arid c u t t h e h o u r s r e q u i r e d to produce a
b a l e of cotton from 140 to 25 (Fite, 1980).
T h e r e g i o n long d o m i n a t e d b y cotton b e c a m e
a v e r y different place. It h a d f e w e r mules, f e w e r
croppers, f e w e r blacks, a n d m o r e w a g e laborers.
P l a n t a t i o n s , w h i c h h a d b e e n f r a g m e n t e d
in t h e
s h a r e c r o p p e r era, w e r e i n t e g a t e d once again,
al-
t h o u g h w i t h m a c h i n e s a n d d a y l a b o r e r s r a
t h e r
t h a n t h e g a n g s of slaves n o w doing t h e w o r k
(Kirby). A n d t h e r e g i o n r a i s e d m u c h less cotton
t h a n before as m u c h of it w a s shifted w e s t to
f l a t t e r lands. In its place, s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s grew
grass, hay, corn, s o y b e a n s , w h e a t , a n d t i m b e r
a n d r a i s e d livestock a n d poultry. The l a s t w a s
t r a n s f o r m e d from a m i n o r e n t e r p r i s e p r e s e n
t on
m o s t f a r m s to a h u g e f a c t o r y - s t y l e o p e r a t i

38. o n in
c o n f i n e m e n t facilities.
The sections of t h e S o u t h d e v o t e d to tobacco
a n d rice also changed. T h e tobacco h a r v e s t re-
lied m a i n l y on t h e l a b o r of people u n t i l t h e
1960s w h e n t h e s e f a r m e r s b e g a n to u s e mechan-
ical h a r v e s t e r s . T h e r e s u l t s w e r e a r a p i d
expan-
sion in t h e size of tobacco farms, a d e c r e a s e in
t h e n u m b e r of t h e m , a n d a decline in t h e n u m -
b e r of people. Rice, a p a r t of s o u t h e r n agricul-
t u r e t h a t h a d b e e n affected b y t h e first techno-
logical r e v o l u t i o n , w a s r e m e c h a n i z e d b y t h e
second a s t h e combine w a s p u t to w o r k in t h e
rice h a r v e s t . This technological change, like
t h e others, r e s u l t e d in a s h a r p r e d u c t i o n in t h e
n u m b e r of people i n v o l v e d in a g r i c u l t u r e (Dan-
iel, 1984).
O t h e r c h a n g e s a c c o m p a n i e d t h e s e transfor-
m a t i o n s . T h e y r a i s e d t h e income of t h e a v e r a
g e
s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y , t h o u g h t h
e y did
n o t w i p e o u t t h e p o v e r t y t h a t h a d long p l a g
u e d
t h e r u r a l South. (It r e m a i n e d s u b s t a n t i a l ,
espe-
12
cially among r u r a l blacks.) The region became
increasingly u r b a n and industrial. The devel-

39. oping southern factories provided jobs for people
moving off of farms. In 1940, more t h a n 43 per-
cent of the southerners worked on farms; by
1970, less t h a n 7 percent did.
In spite of this mass movement off of farms,
the United States did not become totally urban.
Instead, the r u r a l population remained quite
large, declining only from 57.2 to 53.9 million
from 1940 to 1970, a decline of less t h a n 7 per-
cent t h a t left the nation more t h a n 26 percent
rural (Historical Statistics, p. 11). Many rural
communities survived and prospered by chang-
ing their economic base, shifting from agricul-
t u r e to manufacturing, trade, services, and
government. The n u m b e r of r u r a l counties de-
pendent on farming declined from over 2,000 to
about 700 from 1950 to 1970. Thus, m a n y farm
people moved into towns r a t h e r t h a n cities, and
some, including some farm women, continued to
live on farms while t a k i n g on jobs in towns as a
consequence of industrialization and other eco-
nomic changes in rural areas. The industriali-
zation of r u r a l areas and increased participation
in the labor force by farm women raised the
standard of living of and reduced the amount of
poverty among farm people. 8 Many rural com-
munities, including m a n y in Iowa, however, did
not reduce their dependence on agriculture
and thus declined as the farm population did
(Korsching).
T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n s o f G o v e r n m e n t
Government policies contributed both nega-
tively and positively to the Great American Ag-

40. riculture Revolution. In spite of the rapidly
shrinking n u m b e r of farmers, the federal gov-
e r n m e n t remained actively involved with agri-
culture (Cochrane and Ryan; Shover, ch. 7; Fite,
1981, chs. 6-11). This was so, in part, because
farmers had effective organizations in Washing-
ton, such as the American Farm Bureau Feder-
ation, the National Farmers Union, and various
commodity groups. Furthermore, skillful and
well-placed representatives of farmers served in
Congress and helped shape policy. Also, agrari-
anism remained a part of the scene, helping
farmers get government programs. Latter-day
Jeffersonians continued to employ the rhetoric
about the value of family farmers, the need to
keep t h e m on the land, and t h e importance of
government programs for t h a t purpose. The pro-
grams emphasized were those designed to m a k e
farming an efficient and profitable business.
Government policies had a somewhat ambig-
uous relationship with the demographic dimen-
sion of the revolution. Washington made no ef-
Kirkendall: Up to Now
fort to plan the migration. There was a strong
tendency to regard planning as "unAmerican"
during much of the period, and Congress had
destroyed the m a i n agricultural planning
agency. Secretary Wallace had given t h a t re-
sponsibility to the USDA's Bureau of Agricul-
t u r a l Economics in 1938, and the BAE had been
authorized to develop state and local planning
committees to help with the work, but these de-
velopments had generated fears in the Farm Bu-

41. r e a u and among its allies in Congress, and they
had killed the planning c o m m i t t e e s during the
war and t a k e n away the BAE's responsibilities
as central planner in 1946 (Kirkendall, 1982,
chs. 9-13). So the migration went forward in an
unplanned way.
The federal government also scrapped efforts
to hold the r u r a l poor on the land by improving
their conditions there. The New Deal had estab-
lished agencies for t h a t purpose, most notably
the Farm Security Administration, but they too
r a n into trouble with the Farm Bureau and
other powerful participants in farm politics, and
Congress destroyed the FSA in 1946, replacing
it with the much less ambitious Farmers Home
Administration t h a t never had much money to
help poor farmers improve their operations and
become owners of farms (Baldwin). There con-
tinued to be talk about the problems of the rural
poor but little action, even during the War on
Poverty during the 1960s.
The nation relied mainly on economic forces
to solve the problems of the r u r a l poor. There
was not even a substantial effort to t r a i n rural
people for urban life. Thus, the migration ad-
vanced without much guidance, regulation, or
assistance and contributed to the major riots in
American cities in the second h a l f of the 1960s.
Washington also failed to enforce the acreage
limitation principle of national reclamation law.
The principle h a d been designed to guarantee
t h a t federal irrigation projects would increase
the n u m b e r of family farmers by opening up

42. new land for farming t h a t would be available
only to t h e m and forcing the breakup of large
farms in established farming areas when recla-
mation projects were established in them, but
enforcement was now defined as unrealistic, es-
pecially in the gigantic Central Valley Project
in California. Enforcement of the principle
there, its foes argued, would deprive corporate
farms of the large holdings they had earned and
interfere with economic growth (Pisani; Kirken-
dall, 1964, 1979; Goldschmidt; Koppes).
The federal government tried but failed to
eliminate the cost-price squeeze. National poli-
cymakers m a i n t a i n e d the price-support system
t h a t had been established by the New Deal.
13
AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN VALUES--WINTER 1987
Some politicians, most notably Ezra Taft Ben-
son, the Secretary of Agriculture during most of
the 1950s, talked of getting the government out
of agriculture (Schapsmeiers, Peterson), but the
real debate focused on the level of price sup-
ports. Washington also tried to enlarge demand,
m a k i n g use of Public Law 480, the school lunch
program, and the food stamp plan, to move
American farm products into foreign and domes-
tic markets. But in spite of such efforts, the cost-
price squeeze remained a problem and was es-
pecially severe in t h e mid-1950s.

43. What all of this means is t h a t the federal gov-
e r n m e n t made some efforts to slow migration
but rejected others. Obviously, given the size of
the movement off of farms, the efforts t h a t were
made to hold people on the land were not effec-
tive. Perhaps the emphasis on farm prices was
misguided. Perhaps the policymakers should
have looked more closely at the problems farm
people faced. And policymakers certainly did
not help the cause of family farming by passing
tax laws t h a t made farm land a tax shelter,
thereby encouraging city people to invest in it.
Government policy had a clearly positive re-
lationship with the technological dimension of
the revolution. As Don Hadwiger argues, the
"special interests" t h a t dominate the shaping of
agricultural policy have been "firmly committed
to a developmental strategy," one t h a t encour-
ages the "trend toward large efficient farms"
and aims at "a productive and efficient U.S. ag-
riculture" (1986). "The support of the Farm Bu-
reau, regional commodity interests, and the co-
ops helped make technology a reality in agricul-
t u r e " William P. Browne wrote in a comment on
an earlier draft of this paper. "It was hardly
imposed from the outside. ''7 National agencies
supported prices and made payments and loans
to farmers, and t h e y frequently used the result-
ing resources to buy technology and land. The
government supplemented what farmers could
obtain from the m a r k e t and from private credit
agencies and made the largest payments and
loans to the largest farmers, thereby helping
t h e m to expand t h e i r operations still more
(Cochrane, 1985, pp. 1005-6). And policymak-

44. ers rejected proposals to place a low cap on pay-
ments, to eliminate subsidies to the largest
farmers, and give special funds to smaller oper-
ators. In addition, the federal government con-
ducted and financed research t h a t contributed
in basic ways to the revolution, and the research
t h a t received federal funding was dominated by
the interest in m a k i n g farming productive and
profitable, not holding people on the land (High-
tower; Hadwiger, 1982; Newby, pp. 130-2,
138-9).
The Agricultural System
With Washington m a k i n g important contri-
butions, the agricultural revolution moved for-
ward, and as it moved, it reconstructed the
agricultural system. Although often called
"agribusiness," the system included government
agencies and public educational and research
institutions as well as urban, town, and farm
businesses (Fusoni; Rasmussen, p . 3408-13;
McGovern, pp. 496-518; Shover, Ch. 6; Merrill;
Goldschmidt). Except for the n u m b e r of farms
and farmers, all parts of the system including
the farms, grew larger, and the farmers grew
more dependent on the system's other compo-
nents.
The revolution reduced the n u m b e r and en-
larged the size of American farms. The number
dropped 56 percent in 30 years, moving from 6.1
million in 1940 to 2.7 million in 1969. The av-
erage size expanded from 175 to 373 acres. By
1960, 23,000 farms grossed over $100,000, per
year and produced and sold 17 percent of the

45. total farm output. A decade later, although the
price rise h a d been small, 53,000 farms grossed
over $100,000, and they, although only 2 percent
of the farms, produced and sold 34 percent of
the national farm product (Cochrane, 1985, pp.
1002-3).
The revolution cut the n u m b e r of family
farms but did not destroy the type. The system
also included plantations and industrialized cor-
porate farms, both of which employed the latest
technology and people who worked for salaries
and wages (Newby, 148-53). Another type, part-
time farms were worked by families who often
used the new technology but depended heavily
on income earned from nonfarm jobs. Owner-
operated farms had reached a peak of 3.96 mil-
lion in 1945, but dropped to 3.92 million by 1950
and 2.95 million in 1959. A decade later, the
n u m b e r h a d fallen to 2.37 million. Yet the
owner-operated family farm continued to be
the most numerous type. In fact, it became
a larger part of the total t h a n ever before. In
1945, owners operated 67 percent of the farms.
By 1969, t h e y operated 87 percent. Tenancy
dropped from approximately 40 percent of the
total in 1940 to about 15 percent three decades
later. And sharecropping in the South virtually
disappeared, falling from 446,556 farms in 1945
to 121,037 in 1959 and becoming so small in
n u m b e r t h e r e a f t e r t h a t the Census Bureau
ceased t r e a t i n g it as a special category (Rhodes;
Rasmussen, pp. 3474-83; Historical Statistics,
p. 465).
The revolution had not substituted industrial-

46. ized corporate farms for family farms. Instead,
n e a r l y all of the family farms t h a t had gone out
14
of e x i s t e n c e h a d b e e n a b s o r b e d b y o t h e r f a
r m s
of t h e s a m e type. C a p a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e n e w
t e c h n o l o g y of f a r m i n g l a r g e r u n i t s , some f a
m i l y
f a r m e r s h a d e x p a n d e d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s b y
b u y -
ing t h e i r n e i g h b o r s ' land. As one critic of t h e
process, Wendell Berry, s u g g e s t e d , " f a r m e r s be-
c a m e convinced t h a t it w o u l d be b e t t e r to o w n a
neighbor's f a r m t h a n to h a v e a n e i g h b o r . . . "'
T h e r e v o l u t i o n also e n l a r g e d t h e size a n d im-
p o r t a n c e of t h e off-farm c o m p o n e n t s of t h e
agri-
c u l t u r a l s y s t e m (Newby, 1 4 6 - 8 ) . T h e y included
all of t h e b u s i n e s s e s involved in t h e production
a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of food a n d fiber, such as t h e
feed, seed, chemical, a n d f a r m m a c h i n e r y com-
p a n i e s a n d t h e firms t h a t processed a n d distrib-
u t e d f a r m products. As t h e r e v o l u t i o n m o v e d
forward, it shifted functions, such as t h e produc-
tion of energy, seed, a n d fertilizer, off of farms,
m a k i n g f a r m e r s m o r e d e p e n d e n t on t h e m a r
-
k e t - a n d on corporations a n d c o o p e r a t i v e s - -
t h a n e v e r before, for t h e y n o w n o t only sold on
it b u t b o u g h t m o r e things, i n c l u d i n g m o r e
food.

47. A n d off-farm c o r p o r a t i o n s also shifted r i s k s a n d
m a n a g e m e n t off of some f a r m s b y d e v e l o p i n g
c o n t r a c t f a r m i n g , m o s t n o t a b l y in t h e p o u
l t r y
b u s i n e s s .
P e r f o r m i n g a wide v a r i e t y of functions, t h e
off-farm firms in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m ob-
t a i n e d m o s t of its income. B e t t e r t h a n h a l f of
t h e dollars c o n s u m e r s s p e n t on food a n d fiber
w e n t to t h e processors a n d d i s t r i b u t o r s , w h i l e
t h e firms t h a t s u p p l i e d c o m m o d i t i e s to f a r m
e r s
o b t a i n e d m o s t of t h e rest, l e a v i n g m u c h less
t h a n h a l f of t h e dollars s p e n t b y c o n s u m e r s on
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s for t h e people on t h e
farms.
F a r m e r s did n o t d e p e n d solely on t h e m a r k e t
for t h e i r income. T h e y r e c e i v e d some from an-
o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e s y s t e m , t h e
federal
g o v e r n m e n t .
A g r i p o w e r , t h e F o o d Crisis, a n d t h e B o o m
B y t h e 1970s, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d devel-
oped a n e w a n d e n o r m o u s l y p r o d u c t i v e
agricul-
t u r a l s y s t e m , a n d d u r i n g t h e decade, t h a t sys-
t e m s e e m e d u n u s u a l l y v a l u a b l e for t h e world
as
well a s t h e nation. It s e e m e d to give t h e U.S.
s u b s t a n t i a l power, c o m p a r a b l e to w h a t some
o t h e r n a t i o n s o b t a i n e d from oil, especially in a
w o r l d in w h i c h food a p p e a r e d to be a scarce com-

48. modity. Thus, once again, as in t h e world w a r s ,
t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t e n c o u r a g e d A m e r i c a
n
f a r m e r s to p u t all of t h e i r l a n d into production,
a n d t h e y e n j o y e d a boom.
T h e idea t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e s u p p l i e d a p o w e r
b a s e t h a t could b e u s e d to accomplish political
objectives h a d a long history, b u t t h e i d e a w a s
n o w g i v e n a n e w n a m e : " a g r i p o w e r " (Weber).
It
K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w
h a d b e e n e x p r e s s e d in s u c h slogans as " K i n g
Cotton" a n d "Food Will Win t h e W a r " in t h e
p r o g r a m s of o v e r s e a s r e l i e f following t h e
world
w a r s , in foreign aid, in P o i n t Four, a n d in Public
L a w 480 ( R a s m u s s e n , pp. 3 1 9 5 - 3 2 0 9 , 3 2 2 9 -
3 7 ,
3 1 0 0 - 5 ; McGovern, pp. 4 5 4 - 6 1 , 5 1 8 - 3 0 ) . Now,
E a r l Butz, a m o n g others, e x p r e s s e d t h e idea
w i t h g r e a t clarity. "Food is p o w e r " he insisted.
" A g r i p o w e r will b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n
petro-
power." "Food is a tool in t h e k i t of A m e r i c a n
diplomacy."
A p p l y i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs t h e b e l i e f
in
t h e s u p e r i o r i m p o r t a n c e of a g r i c u l t u r e ,
espe-
cially A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e , a g r i p o w e r w a s
in-
fluenced b y n e w w o r r i e s a b o u t A m e r i c a n

49. power.
T h e n a t i o n h a d failed to m a n a g e t h e V i e t n a m
War s u c c e s s f u l l y a n d t h e n e n c o u n t e r e d p r e
s s u r e
from t h e oil-producing s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e
A r a b n a t i o n s in t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n of P e t r o l
e u m
E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s w h o e m b a r g o e d t h e
export
of oil to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l a t e in 1973 to p r o t e s
t
a g a i n s t A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t for Israel. The t h e o r
y
a s s u m e d t h a t food w a s of b a s i c i m p o r t a n c e ,
m o r e v i t a l t h a n oil or w e a p o n s , a n d t h e
Ameri-
c a n a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m w a s v a s t l y s u p e r
i o r to
all others, a n d t h e t h e o r i s t s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h
e
U.S. could, i f t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t controlled
t h e nation's a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s w h e n e v e r
and
w h e r e v e r t h a t w a s necessary, b e c o m e once a g a i
n
t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l n a t i o n , c a p a b l e of
influencing
others, i n c l u d i n g t h e A r a b s a n d t h e Soviets.
E v e n b e f o r e t h e oil e m b a r g o , W a s h i n g t o n
em-
p l o y e d t h e t h e o r y in its d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e
Soviet
Union. T h a t n a t i o n faced a n u m b e r of agricul-
t u r a l p r o b l e m s , i n c l u d i n g a n inefficient
agricul-

50. t u r a l s y s t e m , s h o r t a g e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l
machin-
ery, i n a d e q u a t e rainfall, a n d a p e r c e i v e d n e e d
to
i n c r e a s e m e a t c o n s u m p t i o n . The N i x o n
admin-
i s t r a t i o n , h o p i n g for d e t e n t e as well as t h e ex-
p a n s i o n of exports, n e g o t i a t e d a l a r g e g r a i n
deal
in 1972. U s i n g a g r i p o w e r in a positive way, t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s sold to t h e S o v i e t s 19 million tons
of grain, o n e - f o u r t h of t h e A m e r i c a n crop, at low
prices.
Talk of a world food crisis c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e
d e v e l o p i n g s e n s e of p o w e r from A m e r i c a n
agri-
c u l t u r e (Shover, ch. 8). The crisis s e e m e d es-
p e c i a l l y s e v e r e in 1 9 7 3 - 7 4 w h e n w i d e s p r e
a d
d r o u g h t a n d s o a r i n g fertilizer prices dropped
food s u p p l i e s a n d r e s u l t e d in millions of d e a t h s
in p a r t s of A s i a a n d Africa. A l t h o u g h too m u c h
p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n too little h a d b e e n de-
fined r e p e a t e d l y since 1920 as t h e b a s i c f a r m
problem, n o w s o m e s t u d e n t s of such m a t t e r s
m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e n e w crisis w a s a l o n g - t e
r m
r a t h e r t h a n a t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o n , r e s u
l t i n g
from a " p o p u l a t i o n explosion" t h r o u g h o u t t h e
w o r l d a n d i n a d e q u a t e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e
m s in
15

51. A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
m o s t of it. To some, it s e e m e d t h a t t h e predic-
t i o n s of T h o m a s M a l t h u s a b o u t t h e i n e v i t a
b l e
p r e s s u r e of p o p u l a t i o n on food supplies h a d come
t r u e . A n d t h e crisis e x i s t e d in spite of t h e
" G r e e n R e v o l u t i o n : ' R e p r e s e n t e d m o s t
promi-
n e n t l y b y a n a g r i c u l t u r a l s c i e n t i s t from
Iowa,
N o r m a n B o r l a u g , w h o w o r k e d in Mexico a n d
t h e n A s i a a n d r e c e i v e d t h e N o b e l Prize for his
c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e e x p a n s i o n of world food
pro-
d u c t i o n in t h e l a t e 1960s, t h a t r e v o l u t i o n
now
s e e m e d to b e faltering.
E x p o n e n t s of t h e crisis t h e o r y often criticized
A m e r i c a n s . T h e y r e c e i v e d criticism for t h e i r
c o n s u m p t i o n of r e d m e a t , w h i c h h a d i n c r e
a s e d
s p e c t a c u l a r l y since World War II as a conse-
q u e n c e of u n p r e c e d e n t e d prosperity. To t h e crit-
ics, t h i s s e e m e d a w a s t e f u l w a y of u s i n g grain.
T h e y also objected to A m e r i c a n c o n s u m p t i o n of
alcohol, energy, chemicals, c h a r g i n g t h a t Amer-
i c a n p r a c t i c e s d e p r i v e d o t h e r people of food t
h e y
n e e d e d to survive.
The i d e a of a food crisis g e n e r a t e d v a r i o u s pro-

52. posals. One, " T r i a g e " a concept d e r i v e d from
m i l i t a r y medicine, divided n a t i o n s into t h o s e
t h a t could b e s a v e d a n d t h o s e t h a t could not a n
d
r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t efforts b e c o n c e n t r a t e d
on
t h e first group. A few r e f o r m e r s proposed t h a t
t h e a m o u n t of l a n d d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e
should be increased, b u t o t h e r s insisted t h a t
n e a r l y all l a n d c a p a b l e of b e i n g u s e d for agri-
c u l t u r e w a s in use. A m o r e f r e q u e n t l y proposed
solution, p o p u l a t i o n control, e n c o u n t e r e d diffi-
culties for it w a s opposed b y groups as different
as t h e Vatican a n d t h e P e o p l e s Republic of
C h i n a a n d d e p e n d e d u p o n a c h a n g e in a t t i t
u d e s
as well as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e d
tech-
nology. To m o s t of t h o s e concerned a b o u t t h e
food problem, one k e y to its solution w a s agri-
c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d include
t h e
p r o d u c t i o n a n d u s e of n e w crop v a r i e t i e s , t h
e
a p p l i c a t i o n of fertilizer, t h e u s e of insecticides,
i r r i g a t i o n , r e f o r m s in g o v e r n m e n t a n d l a n
d sys-
t e m s , a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of n e w s y s t e m s
of
cropping, i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d incentives.
D e v e l o p m e n t d e p e n d e d on o u t s i d e help. It h a
d
to come from t h e a l r e a d y d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s a
n d
also t h e oil-rich c o u n t r i e s organized in OPEC.

53. T h o s e g r o u p s h a d to s u p p l y capital a n d technol-
ogy on a m a s s i v e scale. The U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d
to c o n t r i b u t e s o m e of t h e capital, m u c h of t h e
"knowhow," a n d m o s t of t h e e m e r g e n c y supplies
of food. To do t h e last, t h e U.S. n e e d e d to stop
l i m i t i n g f a r m p r o d u c t i o n a n d store a n d
distrib-
u t e grain.
M u c h c o n t r o v e r s y a t t e n d e d t h e discussions of
a g r i c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t . A t times, d e b a t e
re-
v o l v e d a r o u n d t h e size of t h e A m e r i c a n contri-
b u t i o n . C o n t r o v e r s y also focused on t h e role of
g o v e r n m e n t , for, w h i l e s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s
in t h e
d i s c u s s i o n i n s i s t e d t h a t only g o v e r n m e n t
could
r e s p o n d a d e q u a t e l y to needs, o t h e r s b e l i e v e
d in
t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of p r i v a t e agencies. This w a s a
d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n t h e R e p u b l i c a n a n d
Dem-
ocratic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e decade.
C o n t r o v e r s y also s w i r l e d a b o u t t h e applicabil-
i t y of t h e A m e r i c a n model. This p a r t of t h e de-
b a t e focused on machinery. Critics of t h e model
e m p h a s i z e d t h e l a r g e supplies of h u m a n l a b o r
in t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s and did n o t
welcome
t h e d e m o g r a p h i c r e v o l u t i o n involved in Ameri-
can d e v e l o p m e n t . Critics also objected to t h e
l a r g e role o f c h e m i c a l s in t h e A m e r i c a n s y s t
e m ,

54. s t r e s s i n g t h e t h r e a t to t h e e n v i r o n m e n t .
As t h e d e b a t e m o v e d along, l e a d e r s in t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e
re-
sponded in 1973 to t h e i d e a of t h e food crisis b y
p r o m o t i n g full production. N o w h e a d e d b y E a r l
Butz, a n a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m i s t from P u r d u e
University, t h e d e p a r t m e n t r e l a x e d controls on
p r o d u c t i o n a n d u r g e d f a r m e r s to p l a n t fence
row
to fence row. F a r m e r s , m o s t of w h o m h a d n e v e r
l i k e d g o v e r n m e n t controls, w e l c o m e d t h e n e
w
advice. To p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l
sys-
t e m , it s e e m e d u n l i k e l y t h a t foreign m a r k e t s
w o u l d d i s a p p e a r or t h a t s u r p l u s e s w o u l d
reap-
pear.
In 1975, t h e food s i t u a t i o n b e g a n to i m p r o v e
s o m e w h a t . The c h a n g e r e s u l t e d in p a r t from
h e a v i e r r a i n f a l l in s o m e areas, t h o u g h t h a t w
a s
offset b y poor h a r v e s t s in t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d
m u c h of E u r o p e a n d c o n t i n u e d r e d u c t i o n in
t h e
u s e of fertilizer. T h e i m p r o v e m e n t r e s u l t e d
also
from a record g r a i n h a r v e s t in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e
s
t h a t e n a b l e d t h e n a t i o n to e x p a n d food aid a n
d
sales.

55. U.S. a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s r e a c h e d a record
high, r i s i n g 70 p e r c e n t above t h e 1970 level b y
1976. W i t h g r a i n e x p o r t s especially large, t h e
n a t i o n b e c a m e t h e l e a d i n g g r a i n exporter,
sup-
p l y i n g m o r e t h a n h a l f of t h e world's exports of
g r a i n c o m p a r e d w i t h a t h i r d in t h e l a t e
1960s
a n d a f o u r t h in t h e mid-1950s. The f a r m exports
c o m p e n s a t e d for t h e i n c r e a s e d cost of oil im-
ports, chiefly from t h e Middle E a s t , a n d of ex-
p e n s i v e i t e m s from J a p a n a n d Europe. A l t h o u g
h
t h e n e w a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m h a d some critics,
i n c l u d i n g J i m H i g h t o w e r a n d Wendell Berry,
t h e s e r e s u l t s s e e m e d to prove its g r e a t v a l u e
(Cochrane, ch. 8; F i t e , 1981, ch. 11).
The exports p l e a s e d f a r m e r s b u t a l a r m e d
s o m e c o n s u m e r s , c r e a t i n g a difficult s i t u a t i o
n
for t h e F o r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h also w a n
t e d
good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d
looked
u p o n g r a i n as c a p a b l e of s e r v i n g t h a t end.
Sell-
ing 10.3 million t o n s of g r a i n to t h e Soviets in
1975, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d p r o t
e s t s
from c o n s u m e r a n d l a b o r groups. So in l a t e s u m -
m e r - e a r l y fall of t h a t year, W a s h i n g t o n u s e d
16

56. agripower negatively, embargoing grain as a
means of pressuring the Soviets into a long-term
agreement and responding to domestic forces,
but farmers, the Farm Bureau, leading Demo-
crats, rural congressmen, including Republicans
from farm states, and the grain companies
howled in protest. In these circumstances, the
administration worked out an agreement to sell
to the Soviet Union at least 6 million tons of
grain per year from 1976 to 1980 as long as
supplies at home were adequate.
Political leaders now backed farther away
from the negative use of agripower, though some
theorists continued to favor that. The Ford Ad-
ministration considered a grain embargo early
in 1976 as a means of pressuring the Soviet
Union to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola
b u t rejected the idea and then joined the Demo-
crats in criticizing negative use of agricultural
resources. J i m m y Carter, the Democratic can-
didate for the presidency, promised t h a t he
would not embargo grain as Ford had. All of this
suggested t h a t agripower would be used only in
positive ways, ones t h a t would enlarge rather
t h a n reduce the m a r k e t for American farm prod-
ucts and thus m a k e use of the great productive
capacity of American agriculture.
Viewed as enormously important in the for-
eign relations of the United States, American
farmers enjoyed a boom similar to those they
had experienced during the world wars. It began
with a doubling of the world prices for wheat,
rice; feed grains, soybeans, and other products

57. from 1972 to 1974 and continued with smaller
increases in 1975. Per capita income from farm-
ing rose above the off-farm level in 1973, reach-
ing 110.2 percent, more t h a n 35 points above
the levels of the 1960s. Although net farm in-
come dropped from the high of $33.3 billion in
1973, it remained quite high in 1974 ($26.1 bil-
lion) and 1975 ($24.5 billion) compared with the
1969 figure ($14.3 billion).
The farm situation weakened in 1976-77 as
farm prices dropped while the costs of commod-
ities like fuel and fertilizer rose, and this trig-
gered a new episode in farm protest. Net farm
income fell to $17.8 billion by 1977, and a new
farm organization, the American Agricultural
Movement, emerged. It staged a series of dem-
onstrations from 1977 to 1980, often with farm-
ers (obviously modern farmers) mounted on
their tractors in Washington, D.C. and other
places of political importance. " . . . these were
large f a r m e r s . . , who had embraced technology,
gotten themselves in trouble with high interest
rates, and wanted a bailout" William P. Browne
maintains. "They might be called technocratic
proponents who wrapped themselves in the . . .
~agrarian m y t h "''8 They criticized established
Kirkendall: Up to Now
farm organizations and programs, demanded
100 percent of parity, and t h r e a t e n e d farm
strikes, seeking to t a k e advantage of the great
importance of farmers by neither planting crops
or buying city-produced goods. The AAM did at-
tract serious attention, and the government did

58. expand its help to farmers in 1977-78, b u t the
strike t h r e a t failed, and the movement did not
get a law g u a r a n t e e i n g parity prices at the 100
percent level. Most commercial farmers and the
established farm organizations refused to sup-
port the movement, and consumer groups and
their political representatives opposed it.
Many farmers had grown concerned about
consumers. Now enormous in size compared
with the farm population, t h e y appeared to have
become too powerful and to lack sympathy for
farmers. So the latter embarked upon public re-
lations campaigns, hoping to gain more appre-
ciation in the nation's cities.
The farm situation improved in 1978 and
1979. N e t income from farming rose from $17.8
to $26.1 and then $31 billion. And the per capita
income for farmers compared with nonfarmers
rose from 87.1 to 102.4 percent.
The boom enhanced the value of land owner-
ship. As farmers continued to substitute tech-
nology for people, the farm population dropped
38 percent during the decade, which exceeded
the percentage drops of the 1940s and the 1950s
and equaled t h a t of the 1960s. Moving from 9.71
to 6.05 million, the farm population fell below 3
percent of the American total by 1980. The in-
crease in yield per acre for most crops slowed
down, so farmers expanded output mainly by
increasing the acres devoted to crops and live-
stock. In these circumstances, land values
soared, rising over 200 percent during the dec-
ade (Cochrane, 1985, p. 1003), and the owner-

59. ship of land provided a rich resource on which
farmers borrowed to b u y technology and addi-
tional land. Credit organizations, including gov-
e r n m e n t ones, promoted the borrowing, even
raising credit limits as land values rose2
The boom slowed b u t did not halt the decline
in the n u m b e r of farms. The number had
dropped 30 percent in the 1950s and 26 percent
in the 1960s, b u t it fell only 18 percent in the
1970s, and nearly all of t h a t took place in the
first h a l f of the decade. The numbers suggest
t h a t the desire and ability to hold on to a farm
had increased, b u t t h e y also indicate t h a t the
desire and ability to expand holdings still had
considerable strength.
The figures also m e a n t t h a t production for the
m a r k e t was concentrating on fewer and fewer
farms. The farms grossing over $100,000 per
year, 11 percent of the total n u m b e r of farms,
now produced and sold 66 percent of the total
17
A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W
I N T E R 1987
f a r m o u t p u t (Cochrane, 1985, p. 1003). This de-
v e l o p m e n t a r o u s e d t h e concern of a liberal Sec-
r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , Bob B e r g l u n d , in 1 9 7
9 -
80, b u t t h i s w a s r a t h e r l a t e to e x p r e s s such a
concern, for t h e n e w s t r u c t u r e of A m e r i c a n

60. f a r m i n g h a d b e e n t a k i n g s h a p e for m a n y
years.
T h e b o o m c o n t r i b u t e d to w h a t some o b s e r v e
r s
called a " r u r a l r e n a i s s a n c e " as r u r a l America,
in spite of t h e c o n t i n u e d decline in t h e f a r m
p o p u l a t i o n , g r e w m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n u r b a
n
A m e r i c a . B u t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o s p e r i t y w a
s n o t
t h e m a i n factor r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e r e n a i s s a n
c e ,
for in places like I o w a w h e r e m a n y r u r a l coun-
t i e s still d e p e n d e d chiefly on a g r i c u l t u r e , t h o s
e
c o u n t i e s lost p o p u l a t i o n d u r i n g t h e decade.
Ob-
viously, e v e n d u r i n g t h e f a r m boom, r u r a l coun-
t i e s n e e d e d to i n d u s t r i a l i z e or r e d u c e t h e i
r de-
p e n d e n c e on a g r i c u l t u r e in o t h e r w a y s in
order
to enjoy g r o w t h (Korsching).
F o r m a n y f a r m e r s , t h e 1970s w a s a r e l a t i v e l
y
good t i m e , one in w h i c h t h e y could o p e r a t e t h e i
r
b u s i n e s s e s a t a profit. H i g h l y productive, t h e y
w e r e e n c o u r a g e d to p r o d u c e e v e n m o r e a n d
re-
ceived p r a i s e a s people who could save t h e world
from s t a r v a t i o n a n d m a k e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
t h e
m o s t p o w e r f u l nation. As a consequence, t h e i r

61. b a s i c r e s o u r c e - - t h e l a n d - - s e e m e d u n u s u a
l l y
v a l u a b l e . G o v e r n m e n t officials a n d b a n k e r s
u r g e d t h e m to f a r m all t h e l a n d t h e y had, ex-
p a n d t h e i r l a n d holdings a n d u p d a t e t h e i r
tech-
nology so as to b e c o m e m o r e efficient a n d pro-
ductive, a n d b o r r o w m o n e y for t h e s e purposes.
T h u s , f a r m d e b t m o u n t e d . F a r m e r s w i t h a
sense
of h i s t o r y m i g h t h a v e recalled t h a t s i m i l a r
cir-
c u m s t a n c e s from 1915 to 1920 h a d e n d e d in dis-
aster, b u t m a n y f a r m e r s - - a n d m a n y people who
a d v i s e d f a r m e r s - - b e l i e v e d t h e y h a d e n t e r
e d a
n e w s i t u a t i o n t h a t w o u l d c o n t i n u e
indefinitely
(Cochrane, ch. 8; Fite, 1981, chs. 11-13; Fite,
1984, ch. 11; Soth).
T h e N e w C r i s i s
In 1981, however, t h e b o o m of t h e 1970s
ended, as t h e b o o m of World War I h a d in 1920.
F a r m i n g a n d r u r a l life h a d b e e n revolutionized
since t h e g r e a t crisis of t h e 1920s a n d 1930s, b u t
t h e n e w crisis, j u s t like t h e one before it, w a s
e s p e c i a l l y s e v e r e for t h o s e w h o e n t e r e d it
heav-
ily in debt. F o r t h e m , t h e crisis t h r e a t e n e d t h e i r
s u r v i v a l a s f a r m e r s . A n d m a n y faced d e a t h
as
f a r m e r s e v e n t h o u g h in m o s t w a y s t h e y w e r
e
good f a r m e r s w h o o w n e d s u b s t a n t i a l f a r m s

62. a n d
t h e l a t e s t technology. T h e y faced extinction
e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e
revo-
l u t i o n a n d in t h e efforts to feed t h e world a n d
m a k e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a p o w e r f u l nation.
S e v e r a l forces p r o d u c e d t h e n e w crisis (Harl,
S t a n l e y J o h n s o n , Gratto). 1° O n e w a s t h e enor-
m o u s p r o d u c t i v i t y of A m e r i c a n farmers. W h a t
h a d s e e m e d a b l e s s i n g n o w felt like a curse. In-
flation also c o n t r i b u t e d . It h a d b e g u n w i t h t h e
nation's fiscal policy d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m War,
h a d w o r s e n e d as a r e s u l t of t h e s h a r p increase
in e n e r g y costs a f t e r 1972, a n d h a d become a n
a n t i c i p a t e d p a r t of life b y t h e l a t e 1970s. Deci-
sions m a d e b y m a n y people a s s u m e d t h a t prices
w o u l d c o n t i n u e to rise a t a r a p i d pace. The h u g e
d e b t b u r d e n on m a n y f a r m e r s w a s still a n o t h
e r
factor. O l d e r f a r m e r s e a g e r to b r i n g y o u n g
fam-
ily m e m b e r s into f a r m i n g h a d s o m e of t h e debt,
b u t y o u n g f a r m e r s s h o u l d e r e d m o s t of t h e
b u r -
den. T h e decisions t h a t t h e s e different groups of
f a r m e r s h a d m a d e r a i s e d t h e f a r m d e b t in t
h e
n a t i o n from less t h a n $50 billion in t h e e a r l y
1970s to over $200 billion b y t h e e a r l y 1980s.
The d e b t s i t u a t i o n m a d e f a m e r s h i g h l y vul-
n e r a b l e to a n y difficulties t h a t m i g h t e m e r g e in
t h e f a r m economy. The s i t u a t i o n w a s especially
d a n g e r o u s for t h o s e w i t h d e b t s e q u a l to or

63. above
40 p e r c e n t of assets. In t h e n a t i o n as a whole,
20 p e r c e n t of t h e f a m e r s w e r e in t h o s e circum-
stances; in t h e Middle West, t h e p e r c e n t a g e w a s
e v e n higher, a s h i g h as 38.3 in Iowa in 1986
(Harl, 1987).
Two m o v e s b y t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t h i t
a n d h a r m e d t h e s e f a r m e r s . B e g i n n i n g in
Octo-
b e r 1979, t h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B o a r d a t t a c k
e d
inflation b y forcing i n t e r e s t r a t e s to rise sharply.
The policy c u t inflation from a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t
to 3 - 4 p e r c e n t w i t h i n a few years. Then, in
1981, P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n proposed a
s h a r p c u t in taxes, a n d C o n g r e s s r e s p o n d e d w
i t h
t h e Economic R e c o v e r y Act. One m a j o r con-
s e q u e n c e w a s m a s s i v e deficits in t h e federal
b u d g e t .
T h e s e policies h a d t w o i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t s for
f a r m e r s . T h e y c u t exports b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g
t h e
dollar; t h e y r a i s e d costs of p r o d u c t i o n b y push-
ing u p i n t e r e s t rates.
O t h e r factors c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e w o r s e n i n g of
t h e s i t u a t i o n . O f these, t h e e x p a n s i o n of food
p r o d u c t i o n in t h e c o u n t r i e s t h a t competed w i t
h
A m e r i c a n f a r m e r s a n d in t h e d e v e l o p i n g
coun-
t r i e s w a s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t . A l t h o u g h
star-

64. v a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to be a p r o b l e m in s o m e
places,
t h e "world food crisis" now a p p e a r e d to be a
m y t h . World corn p r o d u c t i o n b y 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 w a s
m o r e t h a n 40 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n it h a d b e e
n a
decade before w h i l e s o y b e a n production h a d
r i s e n 61 p e r c e n t a n d w h e a t o u t p u t h a d ex-
p a n d e d 20 p e r c e n t (Harl, 1987). F u r t h e r m o r e ,
t h e slowing d o w n of economic g r o w t h a n d o t h e r
economic t r o u b l e s in c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a d b e e n
m a j o r p u r c h a s e r s of A m e r i c a n f a r m p r o d u
c t s re-
duced t h e i r a b i l i t y to i m p o r t food.
The v a r i o u s forces c a m e t o g e t h e r to produce
a n especially l a r g e drop in A m e r i c a n agricul-
t u r a l exports. T h e y fell from $43.8 billion in
18
1981 to $26.3 billion in 1986. Exports of corn
and w h e a t dropped by especially large amounts;
those of cotton and rice decreased by smaller
quantities. American exports to Europe, the So-
viet Union, and the developing nations fell off.
These trends indicated t h a t American agricul-
ture was not as important as had been assumed
in the 1970s and t h a t alternatives to it had more
strength t h a n had been believed.
The Carter administration's negative use of
agripower has also been blamed for the crisis.
Responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghani-