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SHAKEN without
the EARTHQUAKE
2
Faythe’s Story:
Protecting Subscribers
From Nuisance Calls
Scenario: Voice service provider, managed by Faythe
Largest client: A major contact center, operated by Bob
Problem: Robocalls interfering with business operations
3
One Small Step for a Service
Provider, One Giant
Leap…
The Solution:
• Engineering team designs a nuisance call
blocking solution to exploit the great
STIR/SHAKEN data they're getting
• They test the solution and put it into production
4
Plot Twist:
Alice Calls Bob
Next Day:
• Alice in Atlanta tries to call Bob in Biloxi…
but the call fails
5
Bob's Emergency
• Bob's call center sales are plummeting.
• Some calls are still coming in – but not
many of them!
6
What's going on?
• Faythe’s Service Provider is blocking
calls without valid STIR/SHAKEN
Identity
• . . . and it’s causing a massive outage!
• Between 25% and 75% of won't have
valid Identity headers.
7
A Top-10 US-Based
Voice Provider
• Neustar / TransUnion
• Sansay
• Transnexus
Our Source of Information
ECG provides engineering staff for voice and internet service providers.
Expert sources:
Microsoft STIR/SHAKEN
Providers
AT&T
8
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
It's hard to verify
an Identity header
that isn't there.
Key Limitation: TDM Gateways
TDM Gateways use the 1960s-2000s
technology and cannot natively deliver the
STIR/SHAKEN Identity header
How many Identity
headers are
making it through?
Hiya - Calls from Mobile to Hiya Customers
89%
Hiya - Calls from Non-Mobile Callers to Hiya
Customers
54%
Calls to TransNexus Clients
33%
Enterprise To
Mobile (Neustar)
20%
Calls to Microsoft Clients
66%
Calls to Service Provider SP-X - one of the top-10 US service providers
75%
Goal of Authenticated calls delivery to all US Service Providers
100%
Copyright 2023, ECG Inc.
11
Low Identity Header Availability
"Neustar estimates that on average more than 80% of
enterprise-to-mobile (consumer) calls do not receive any
STIR/SHAKEN attestation."
12
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
13
Disparity Between the Largest Providers: TDM
In the US, large providers have more prolific SIP end-to-end
(TDM-free) connections to most US phones compared to
smaller providers.
Some of the largest PSTN gateway providers: Bandwidth,
CenturyLink, Sinch, Verizon Business
Gateway providers have TDM infrastructure, which is not
subject to Attestation requirements. Calls flowing through
TDM do not have Identity headers.
14
One TDM Hop in a
call can mean that
no Identity header
is delivered, or
else a different one
is created
Caller
Alice
Callee
Bob
“Yellow”
Originating
Service
Provider Intermediate
Service
Provider 1
Intermediate
Service
Provider 2
“Pink”
Intermediate
Service
Provider 3
TDM
SS7
Intermediate
Service
Provider 4
Intermediate
Service
Provider 5
Terminating
Service
Provider
?
Copyright 2023, ECG Inc.
C
A
A
C
C
15
Big Providers Have
More Identity headers
• Top-10 US provider: 75% of calls arrive with
Identity headers
• Microsoft: 66% of calls arrive with Identity
headers
• Big Providers are less dependent on TDM –
-- more of their calls are SIP end-to-end
16
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
17
Validation Errors Are Rampant
Invalid Attestation. This is when the Identity header is
delivered, but the Attestation fails validation for some reason.
• Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems
• Expired Certificate
• Recycled Identity Header
• Time Synchronization Problems
18
Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems
Number formatting mismatch causing validation failure:
To: <sip:2293160013@1.2.3.4;user=phone>
Identity: Decodes as . . ."dest":{"tn":[ "2293160013" ]}
Call forwarding causing validation failure:
To: <sip:12296305555@1.2.3.4;user=phone>
Identity: Decodes as . . . "dest":{"tn":[ "12293160013" ]}
19
Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems
“Green”
Originating
Service
Provider
Intermediate
Providers
Terminating
Service
Provider
Callee
Bob
Caller
Alice
A
From: 2292442099
orig tn: 2292442099
Incorrect number
formatting; missing CC
A
“Teal”
Originating
Service
Provider
Caller
Frank
A
Date: 1970-01-01
Incorrect Date
timestamp
A
“Red”
Originating
Service
Provider
Caller
Dave
A
Certificate
https://inacccessible
Certificate inaccessible
for Verification
A
“Purple”
Originating
Service
Provider
Caller
Carlos
A
To: 12293160013
dest tn: 12296305553
Forwarded call, reused
token
A
20
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
21
Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations
Limitation #1: Third Party
Certificates
The originating service provider
doesn't sign; instead an
intermediate SP signs with their
own certificate.
In effect, the PSTN Access Provider
is saying they have a direct
relationship with Alice – but they
don’t.
“Green”
Originating
Service
Provider
“Pink”
Intermediate
Service
Provider 1
Other
Intermediate
Providers
Terminating
Service
Provider
Callee
Bob
Caller
Alice
1 2
3
4
5
A
A
22
I'm the originating service
provider with a direct
relationship to the calling end-
user or enterprise, who is using
their own number (which I've
verified).
A
I'm the originating service
provider with a direct
relationship to the calling end-
user or enterprise.
B
I'm receiving this call from
another service provider, or from
someone forwarding the call.
C
Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations
Limitation #2: Incorrect Attestations
When C should be used, A or B are being used.
Credit: Alec Finechel, TransNexus
23
Both TDM & Third-Party Certificates Allow Masking
"The most valuable source of information in SHAKEN should
be the identity of the originating service provider.“
24
I'm the originating service
provider with a direct
relationship to the calling end-
user or enterprise, who is using
their own number (which I've
verified).
A
I'm the originating service
provider with a direct
relationship to the calling end-
user or enterprise.
B
I'm receiving this call from
another service provider, or from
someone forwarding the call.
C
Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations
Some third-party certificate intermediate providers are only using A & B.
25
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
26
90% attested,
10% not attested
The Case of One
Important Caller
One US government caller places millions of robocalls
per month.
Potential explanation: About 10% of calls traverse TDM
(From the perspective of one large service provider)
27
Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking
1 2
4 5
The Case of the
Missing Identity
For Service
Providers, Size
is an Advantage
The Problem of
the Third-Party
Certificate
Look at a
Major, Legal
Robocaller
3
6
Why
Attestations Fail
So, how should
we do blocking?
28
SHAKEN Data Is Valuable for Traceback
"The traceback value of STIR/SHAKEN has been and will
continue to be useful. We believe that calls that ostensibly
would be subject to spam tagging or blocking are going to
be those from enterprises (landline) to (mobile) consumer."
Traceback is the semi-manual process of tracking a call back to the originating service provider.
29
When is it advisable to block calls?
Not yet
• All experts advised against blocking based
solely on available 2023 SHAKEN/STIR data.
• How do you block calls with STIR/SHAKEN?
• Action Item: Begin verifying and analyzing the
STIR/SHAKEN data you are getting today.
• Too many US service providers are sending Identity
headers but not performing verification.
30
How should you
handle blocking?
• Analytics platforms to detect nuisance
robocalling calling detection are crucial (e.g.,
TransNexus, Hiya, First Orion, TrueCNAM,
TNS, Neustar, Mutare, Redshift)
• Plumbing should be built to send
STIR/SHAKEN data should be sent to the
analytics platforms.
• But some argue outright blocking will never
be a good option:
• Perhaps better to send it to voicemail
(Microsoft)
• Or send to a Voice Captcha (Mutare)
31
How should you
handle blocking?
Is SHAKEN Data useable for automated
blocking and labeling today? Yes!
"Calls signed with B-level attestation are far
more more likely to be robocalls than
unsigned calls." -- Transnexus
Bottom Line:
STIR/SHAKEN data will be useful in
ways you don’t expect – and you need
to get verification into all your analytics
systems as soon as possible.
Thank You!
Ready for more effective call blocking?
ECG’s experts are here to help.
https://www.ecg.co/contact
sales@e-c-group.com

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SHAKEN without the EARTHQUAKE - Blocking calls with STIR/SHAKEN in 2023

  • 2. 2 Faythe’s Story: Protecting Subscribers From Nuisance Calls Scenario: Voice service provider, managed by Faythe Largest client: A major contact center, operated by Bob Problem: Robocalls interfering with business operations
  • 3. 3 One Small Step for a Service Provider, One Giant Leap… The Solution: • Engineering team designs a nuisance call blocking solution to exploit the great STIR/SHAKEN data they're getting • They test the solution and put it into production
  • 4. 4 Plot Twist: Alice Calls Bob Next Day: • Alice in Atlanta tries to call Bob in Biloxi… but the call fails
  • 5. 5 Bob's Emergency • Bob's call center sales are plummeting. • Some calls are still coming in – but not many of them!
  • 6. 6 What's going on? • Faythe’s Service Provider is blocking calls without valid STIR/SHAKEN Identity • . . . and it’s causing a massive outage! • Between 25% and 75% of won't have valid Identity headers.
  • 7. 7 A Top-10 US-Based Voice Provider • Neustar / TransUnion • Sansay • Transnexus Our Source of Information ECG provides engineering staff for voice and internet service providers. Expert sources: Microsoft STIR/SHAKEN Providers AT&T
  • 8. 8 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 9. It's hard to verify an Identity header that isn't there. Key Limitation: TDM Gateways TDM Gateways use the 1960s-2000s technology and cannot natively deliver the STIR/SHAKEN Identity header
  • 10. How many Identity headers are making it through? Hiya - Calls from Mobile to Hiya Customers 89% Hiya - Calls from Non-Mobile Callers to Hiya Customers 54% Calls to TransNexus Clients 33% Enterprise To Mobile (Neustar) 20% Calls to Microsoft Clients 66% Calls to Service Provider SP-X - one of the top-10 US service providers 75% Goal of Authenticated calls delivery to all US Service Providers 100% Copyright 2023, ECG Inc.
  • 11. 11 Low Identity Header Availability "Neustar estimates that on average more than 80% of enterprise-to-mobile (consumer) calls do not receive any STIR/SHAKEN attestation."
  • 12. 12 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 13. 13 Disparity Between the Largest Providers: TDM In the US, large providers have more prolific SIP end-to-end (TDM-free) connections to most US phones compared to smaller providers. Some of the largest PSTN gateway providers: Bandwidth, CenturyLink, Sinch, Verizon Business Gateway providers have TDM infrastructure, which is not subject to Attestation requirements. Calls flowing through TDM do not have Identity headers.
  • 14. 14 One TDM Hop in a call can mean that no Identity header is delivered, or else a different one is created Caller Alice Callee Bob “Yellow” Originating Service Provider Intermediate Service Provider 1 Intermediate Service Provider 2 “Pink” Intermediate Service Provider 3 TDM SS7 Intermediate Service Provider 4 Intermediate Service Provider 5 Terminating Service Provider ? Copyright 2023, ECG Inc. C A A C C
  • 15. 15 Big Providers Have More Identity headers • Top-10 US provider: 75% of calls arrive with Identity headers • Microsoft: 66% of calls arrive with Identity headers • Big Providers are less dependent on TDM – -- more of their calls are SIP end-to-end
  • 16. 16 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 17. 17 Validation Errors Are Rampant Invalid Attestation. This is when the Identity header is delivered, but the Attestation fails validation for some reason. • Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems • Expired Certificate • Recycled Identity Header • Time Synchronization Problems
  • 18. 18 Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems Number formatting mismatch causing validation failure: To: <sip:2293160013@1.2.3.4;user=phone> Identity: Decodes as . . ."dest":{"tn":[ "2293160013" ]} Call forwarding causing validation failure: To: <sip:12296305555@1.2.3.4;user=phone> Identity: Decodes as . . . "dest":{"tn":[ "12293160013" ]}
  • 19. 19 Number Formatting / Mismatch Problems “Green” Originating Service Provider Intermediate Providers Terminating Service Provider Callee Bob Caller Alice A From: 2292442099 orig tn: 2292442099 Incorrect number formatting; missing CC A “Teal” Originating Service Provider Caller Frank A Date: 1970-01-01 Incorrect Date timestamp A “Red” Originating Service Provider Caller Dave A Certificate https://inacccessible Certificate inaccessible for Verification A “Purple” Originating Service Provider Caller Carlos A To: 12293160013 dest tn: 12296305553 Forwarded call, reused token A
  • 20. 20 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 21. 21 Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations Limitation #1: Third Party Certificates The originating service provider doesn't sign; instead an intermediate SP signs with their own certificate. In effect, the PSTN Access Provider is saying they have a direct relationship with Alice – but they don’t. “Green” Originating Service Provider “Pink” Intermediate Service Provider 1 Other Intermediate Providers Terminating Service Provider Callee Bob Caller Alice 1 2 3 4 5 A A
  • 22. 22 I'm the originating service provider with a direct relationship to the calling end- user or enterprise, who is using their own number (which I've verified). A I'm the originating service provider with a direct relationship to the calling end- user or enterprise. B I'm receiving this call from another service provider, or from someone forwarding the call. C Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations Limitation #2: Incorrect Attestations When C should be used, A or B are being used. Credit: Alec Finechel, TransNexus
  • 23. 23 Both TDM & Third-Party Certificates Allow Masking "The most valuable source of information in SHAKEN should be the identity of the originating service provider.“
  • 24. 24 I'm the originating service provider with a direct relationship to the calling end- user or enterprise, who is using their own number (which I've verified). A I'm the originating service provider with a direct relationship to the calling end- user or enterprise. B I'm receiving this call from another service provider, or from someone forwarding the call. C Quality Limitations – Even With Valid Attestations Some third-party certificate intermediate providers are only using A & B.
  • 25. 25 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 26. 26 90% attested, 10% not attested The Case of One Important Caller One US government caller places millions of robocalls per month. Potential explanation: About 10% of calls traverse TDM (From the perspective of one large service provider)
  • 27. 27 Let’s Talk Robocall Blocking 1 2 4 5 The Case of the Missing Identity For Service Providers, Size is an Advantage The Problem of the Third-Party Certificate Look at a Major, Legal Robocaller 3 6 Why Attestations Fail So, how should we do blocking?
  • 28. 28 SHAKEN Data Is Valuable for Traceback "The traceback value of STIR/SHAKEN has been and will continue to be useful. We believe that calls that ostensibly would be subject to spam tagging or blocking are going to be those from enterprises (landline) to (mobile) consumer." Traceback is the semi-manual process of tracking a call back to the originating service provider.
  • 29. 29 When is it advisable to block calls? Not yet • All experts advised against blocking based solely on available 2023 SHAKEN/STIR data. • How do you block calls with STIR/SHAKEN? • Action Item: Begin verifying and analyzing the STIR/SHAKEN data you are getting today. • Too many US service providers are sending Identity headers but not performing verification.
  • 30. 30 How should you handle blocking? • Analytics platforms to detect nuisance robocalling calling detection are crucial (e.g., TransNexus, Hiya, First Orion, TrueCNAM, TNS, Neustar, Mutare, Redshift) • Plumbing should be built to send STIR/SHAKEN data should be sent to the analytics platforms. • But some argue outright blocking will never be a good option: • Perhaps better to send it to voicemail (Microsoft) • Or send to a Voice Captcha (Mutare)
  • 31. 31 How should you handle blocking? Is SHAKEN Data useable for automated blocking and labeling today? Yes! "Calls signed with B-level attestation are far more more likely to be robocalls than unsigned calls." -- Transnexus Bottom Line: STIR/SHAKEN data will be useful in ways you don’t expect – and you need to get verification into all your analytics systems as soon as possible.
  • 32. Thank You! Ready for more effective call blocking? ECG’s experts are here to help. https://www.ecg.co/contact sales@e-c-group.com