Drupal security

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Gabor Hojtsy

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  • LA PERSONA QUE ME LO ENVIO ESTA TODAVIA ASOMBRADA DE LO OCURRIDO, YA QUE ELLA DICE QUE LO HIZO POR HACERLO Y QUE PIDIO ALGO QUE CREIA CASI IMPOSIBLE DE LOGRAR PROBEMOS. * Para ti mismo di el nombre de la unica persona del sexo opuesto con quien quieras estar (tres veces...)... * Piensa en algo que quieras lograr dentro de la proxima semana y repitelo para ti mismo(a) (seis veces)... * Piensa en algo que quieras que pase entre tu y la persona especial (que dijiste en el no. 1) y dilo a ti mismo/a (doce veces)... * Ahora haz un ultimo y final deseo acerca del deseo que escogiste. * Despues de leer esto tienes 1 hora para mandarlo a 15 temas y lo que pediste se te hara realidad en 1 semana. A la mayor cantidad de gente a quien lo mandes mas fuerte se hara tu deseo. Si tu escoges ignorar esta carta lo contrario del deseo te sucedera, o esto no sucedera jamas.............. Que tus días estén llenos de logros y tus noches de sueños copia y pega esto en 15 o + tema
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Drupal security

  1. 1. Drupal security Gábor Hojtsy , Acquia February 27. 2010, Drupalcamp Bratislava With special thanks to Four Kitchens, Greg Knaddison and Jakub Suchy
  2. 2. Why I’m here? • Stepping in for Jakub Suchy • Co-maintainer to Drupal 6 • De-facto member of the security team
  3. 3. Are you affected?
  4. 4. With relatively simple holes, your administrator user can be taken over.
  5. 5. Open Web Application Security Project’s Top 10 risks http://www.owasp.org/images/0/0f/OWASP_T10_-_2010_rc1.pdf
  6. 6. Security misconfiguration
  7. 7. Secure server • Avoid using FTP at all cost (Total Commander is the enemy) • Who do you share your server with? Are you confident? • Keep your OS, PHP, SQL server, etc. up to date
  8. 8. Secure Drupal • Is your admin password “admin”? • Look at all “administer *” permissions • “administer filters” can take over a site • Use update.module, watch the security news (Wednesdays)
  9. 9. Secure Drupal • Avoid any kind of PHP input, write your own modules instead • Watch your input formats (you can be googled)
  10. 10. Injection
  11. 11. index.php?id=12 mysql_query(“UPDATE mytable SET value = ‘”. $value .”’ WHERE id = ”. $_GET[‘id’]);
  12. 12. Drupal approach • db_query(“UPDATE {mytable} SET value = ‘%s’ WHERE id = %d”, $value, $id); • If you need to include dynamic table or column names in your query, see db_escape_table()
  13. 13. Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  14. 14. index.php?id=12 print $_GET[‘id’]; $output .= $node->title; Giving full HTML access.
  15. 15. 66% likeliness a website has Cross site scripting issues http://www.whitehatsec.com/home/assets/presentations/09PPT/PPT_statsfall09_8th.pdf
  16. 16. jQuery.get('/user/1/edit', function (data, status) { if (status == 'success') { var p = /id="edit-user-edit-form-token" value="([a-z0-9]*)"/; var matches = data.match(p); var token = matches[1]; var payload = { "form_id": 'user_edit', "form_token": token, "pass[pass1]": 'hacked', "pass[pass2]": 'hacked' }; jQuery.post('/user/1/edit', payload); } } ); Example from Heine Deelstra, Drupal Security team lead http://heine.familiedeelstra.com/change-password-xss
  17. 17. Drupal approach • check_plain() to escape text to HTML • check_markup() to format text to HTML • filter_xss() to filter text to HTML • filter_xss_admin() to filter admin text to HTML • node_view($node) instead of $node->body
  18. 18. Drupal approach • t(), format_plural() placeholders: %name, @url, !insecure t(‘%name has a blog at <a href=”@url”>@url</a>’, array(‘@url’ => valid_url($user->profile_blog), ‘%name’ => $user->name)); • Use Drupal.t(), Drupal.formatPlural() in JS.
  19. 19. Authentication & sessions
  20. 20. • Weak password storage and account management • Session hijacking / fixation • Lack of session timeout / logout
  21. 21. Drupal approach • Passwords are stored encrypted • Session IDs changed when permissions change • Drupal works with Apache’s SSL transport • Modules to set certain URLs to use SSL
  22. 22. Insecure direct object references
  23. 23. index.php?id=12 db_query(“SELECT * FROM {user} WHERE id = %d”, $_GET[‘id’]);
  24. 24. Drupal approach • Menu system handles permission checking • user_access(‘administer nodes’, $account) • node_access(‘edit’, $node, $account); • db_query(db_rewrite_sql(‘SELECT title FROM {node} n’)); • Form API checks for data validity
  25. 25. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
  26. 26. http://example.com/index.php? delete=12 <img src=”http://example.com/ index.php?delete=12” />
  27. 27. Drupal approach • Form API works with POST submissions by default (makes it harder) • Form API includes form tokens, requires form retrieval before submission, checks valid values • drupal_valid_token() provided to generate/validate tokens for GET requests
  28. 28. Failure to restrict URL access
  29. 29. Drupal approach • Menu system uses access callback and access arguments • Continually review permissions
  30. 30. Unvalidated redirections
  31. 31. http://example.com/index.php? target=evil.com
  32. 32. Drupal approach • Drupal has various internal redirections, which use local paths and generate URLs based on them • Look for use of drupal_goto() and Form API #redirect instances in your modules to validate their compliance
  33. 33. Insecure cryptographic storage
  34. 34. Drupal approach • Drupal stores user passwords encrypted with a one-way hash • Different randomly generated private key is provided on each site, which can be used to do reversible encryption • Up to you to ensure backups are properly protected
  35. 35. Insufficient transport protection
  36. 36. Drupal approach • Run Drupal on top of full SSL • Use securepages and securepages_prevent_hijack to wall your important pages • http://crackingdrupal.com/blog/ greggles/drupal-and-ssl-multiple- recipes-possible-solutions • Use a valid certificate
  37. 37. Is Open Source secure?
  38. 38. “Open Source is secure” • Open Source makes people look at it • Popularity gets more eyes • There are always more smart people to find and fix problems
  39. 39. “Open Source is insecure” • People can equally find holes • Some people (inadvertently) disclose issues in the public • Fix becomes public and can / will be reviewed
  40. 40. Is Drupal secure?
  41. 41. Developers and users • Drupal APIs are designed to be secure • It is eventually up to programmers to use them that way • http://drupal.org/writing-secure-code • Tools designed for security can still be misconfigured
  42. 42. Drupal security team A team of volunteers working to ensure best security of Drupal and thousands of contributed modules
  43. 43. Design. Educate. Fix.
  44. 44. What’s supported? • Drupal core and all(!) contributed project on drupal.org • Not actively looking for vulnerabilities in contributed modules • Stable releases and development versions (for very popular modules) • Only current and one earlier versions are supported: now 6.x, 5.x
  45. 45. Points of contact • Releases at http://drupal.org/security • Reporting issues: http://drupal.org/ node/101494 • Reporting cracked sites: http:// drupal.org/node/213320
  46. 46. These slides are (CC) Images used: http://www.flickr.com/photos/rtv/2398561954/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/jonk/19422564/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/duncan/2693141693/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/duncan/2742371814 http://www.flickr.com/photos/jontintinjordan/3736095793/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/djbrady/2304740173/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/inkytwist/2654071573/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/duncan/2741594585/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/shellysblogger/2924699161/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/blogumentary/434097609/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/glamhag/2214986176/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/duncan/2693140217/ This presentation is © Gábor Hojtsy Licensed: Licensed: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/
  47. 47. Questions?
  48. 48. Thank you! Gábor Hojtsy, Acquia http://twitter.com/gaborhojtsy

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