Prepared by: Lara Bartels, Thomas Falk, Björn Vollan, Vishwambhar Duche

1. Incentivized Payments in Experimental Games can
Lead to Behavioural Change?
Lara Bartels1, Thomas Falk2, Björn Vollan3, Vishwambhar Duche2
1 ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
2 International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
3 University of Marburg
Tropentag 2021,
September 15-17

2. • Games are increasingly applied as intervention tools in natural resource governance
with a strong capacity development purpose promoting behavioral change
• Based on the Induced Value Theory (Smith, 1976) the convention is to use incentive
compatible payments in research games/experimental economics
➢ Our focus: We investigate whether the choice of payments – either incentivized and
consistent with scientific rigor, or not-incentivized and consistent with common
development practices – affect i) behavior in the game, and ii) real-life behavioral
changes.
MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
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3. • Interventions were carried out in Madhya Pradesh
in India
• Massive government investments in
climate smart agriculture and watershed
development;
• Management often not sustainable (crop choices,
infrastructure maintenance);
• Currently promoted mechanisms
(e.g. water funds) little effective;
STUDY SITE & PROBLEM CONTEXT
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4. • Interventions in 60 villages, total of 860
participants;
• Players were farmers relying on irrigation
water for their livelihood;
• In half of the treated villages, players received
performance-based individual payments (IP).
In the other session, the players received no
payment (CP);
• Baseline and endline
assessments in treated and 30
control villages
THE EXPERIMENT DESIGN
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BEHAVIOR/MANAGEMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE CHANGES
(rules and organisations)
DISCUSSIONS IN
COMMUNITY ON GAME
AFTER SESSION
DISCUSSIONS IN COMMUNITY ON
GAME-RELATED NRM AFTER SESSION
GAME INTERVENTIONS
BEHAVIOR IN GAME
I
NCENTIVIZED
P
AYMENT
ENGAGEMENT IN
GAME DISCUSSIONS

5. THE GAME INTERVENTION
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Net return per
ha in INR
Water requirement per
ha in cum
Wheat 15000 5500
Gram 13000 3000
• Contribute to dam
maintenance;
• total group investment ➔
irrigation water availability;
• Choose crop A or B with
different water use &
returns;
• Sequential water access.
• Community debriefing.

6. • We observe no significant differences in game behavior between IP and CP treated
villages
RESULTS I
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7. More discussion in and after game in groups with incentivized payments.
RESULTS II
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8. • There seems to be some evidence for a behavioral change after the game
• This change is more likely to occur when using incentivized payments, however, the
differences between IP and CP are rather small and insignificant
RESULTS III
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9. • Based on our framed, multiple rounds experimental groundwater game conducted
with resource users in which we compare incentivized payments to the same game
played without incentives we find:
o Incentivized payments do not lead to significantly different behavioral patterns
in the game;
o Incentivized payments seem to affect the learning success after the game
slightly better;
➢ Discussions about the merits of incentivization within experimental economics
could benefit from further testing the conditions under which incentivized
payments are essential to reveal “true” behavior.
CONCLUSION
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10. THANK YOU!
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11. • To investigate the effect of experimental games on social learning (depending on the payment form)
we carried out interviews with village leaders on rules and water management related to collective
action, e.g. maintenance activities, rules concerning maintenance and water appropriation, and
conflicts
• 90 villages in total (60 with experimental game & 30 control), randomly selected based on 2011
Census data
• Baseline survey in February 2017
• Endline survey in January 2019
SURVEY DATA
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Relationship between Investment and Available Water
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