17Case,Since 1989, there have been 35 major indu.docx

1
7
Case,
Since 1989, there have been 35 major industrial accidents in
Contra Costa County, California. This makes it one of the most
dangerous places to live in the nation. In fact, between 1989 and
1995, there were over 1900 different incidents reported in the
county, making it the eleventh worst area in the entire United
States with regards to toxic accidents.
One of the worst industrial offenders is Chevron. The oil
company operates a refinery and other industrial facilities in
Richmond, California. Chevron stores over 11 million pounds of
toxic, explosive, and corrosive chemicals at this refinery, often
very close to large population centers. When it accidentally
releases these chemicals into the environment, Chevron
endangers the lives of the local community members.
In fact, Chevron had 304 accidents between 1989 and 1995 --
major fires, spills, leaks, explosions, toxic gas releases, flaring,
and air contamination. The people of Richmond are subject to
severe injuries and illnesses. As Henry Clark, leader of the
West County Toxics Coalition, reported after a toxic release in
1992, "There's stuff here that's deadlier than (in) Bhopal."
(Bhopal was the site of the Union Carbide chemical leak in
1984 that killed 2,000 people and injured 20,000 more.)
Richmond was an area waiting to explode.
Problem
In 1993, Chevron made plans to increase its chemical storage
and the number of hazardous chemicals in the Richmond area. It
claimed that it was just trying to comply with the mandates of
the Clear Act. In the company's opinion, it was all part of the

process of developing a cleaner burning gas to stop the air
pollution problem in the San Francisco Bay Area. Unfortunately
these changes were going to pose increased risks to the local
community. This community was mostly poor and mostly
African American. It was a clear case of environmental
injustice.
The stage was set for a confrontation. The local citizens were
going to battle for their lives -- for their health, for their safety,
and for the future of their town.
Key Actors
The West County Toxics Coalition
Up to 1000 members of the Richmond community have come
together under the banner of this community organization. Led
by Henry Clark, the Executive Director of the West County
Toxics Coalition, these citizens have been fighting toxics since
1986. The group is an outgrowth of the National Toxics
Campaign.
Communities for a Better Environment (CBE)
An environmental group based in the San Francisco Bay Area,
CBE has provided much technical and scientific assistance to
local community groups. CBE helped provide scientific
information and expertise about the Chevron refineries and
other industrial plants to the residents of Richmond.
Golden Gate University Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
Golden Gate University Law School in San Francisco helps
provide legal information and expertise to local community
groups that cannot afford expensive corporate attorneys. The
school has established an Environmental Law where students,
under the direction of a supervising lawyer and faculty member,
can assist in resolving local environmental disputes through
legal means. The clinic was instrumental in providing legal
information to the citizens of Richmond in their fight against
Chevron. Other public interest law organizations also provided
pro bono legal services to the Richmond community. These
included California Rural Legal Assistance in San Francisco and
the Environmental Law Community Clinic in Berkeley.

Chevron
One of the largest oil companies in the world, Chevron operates
refineries and industrial plants in Richmond, California, in
close proximity to a poor, African-American community.
Chevron is a large multinational corporation, with profits in the
billions of dollars. Chevron is also one of the wealthiest
companies in the world -- a member of the Fortune 500. The
company has spent millions of its dollars on a populist
advertising campaign to promote its concern for environmental
issues. "Do people care about the environment?" Chevron asks
in its ads. Then it answers its own rhetorical question: "People
do." (Community groups have responded with protest signs that
say "Do people destroy the environment? People do.")
The West County Toxics Coalition used several strategies in its
successful fight against Chevron:
1. Try To Work It Out with the Polluter
The first strategy was to sit down at the table with Chevron. The
citizens of Richmond wanted to express their concerns for their
health and safety. Rather than choosing an antagonistic strategy,
the citizens hoped to cooperate with the corporation for an
agreeable solution for all parties involved. Thus, Henry Clark
and his cohorts sat down with Mike Hannan, plant manager of
the Chevron facilities in Richmond.
Essentially, the members of the West County Toxics Coalition
asked for a policy of Zero Emissions . The citizens were
completely supportive of Chevron's cleaner burning fuel
programs, so long as the development of these programs did not
endanger their health. They did not want any increased risks to
the Richmond community. Therefore, they requested some
mitigations from Chevron: the repair of leaking pumps and
valves, the shutdown of older parts of the Chevron plant, etc.
Chevron refused to cooperate. This strategy was unsuccessful.
2. Lobby the public officials
What could the citizens of Richmond do next? Chevron refused
to listen to their concerns. The local residents thought of an
alternative strategy: They would lobby the Planning

Commission for the City of Richmond. After all, Chevron
needed a land use permit from the city in order to carry out its
operations. The residents believed that they had a strong case to
present to this Planning Commission with hard scientific data to
document the risks to their health and safety from Chevron's
operations. Because of this detrimental impact of Chevron's
presence in Richmond, the West County Toxics Coalition urged
that Chevron must put up 10 percent of the cost of its Clean
Fuels Program into a community development fund. This would
give citizens of Richmond over $50 million!
The Planning Commission agreed with the citizens. They
ordered Chevron to pour $50 million into community
development in order to be granted the new land use permit.
This strategy was successful because of the power and influence
of the community organizing, as well as the hard scientific and
legal expertise behind the citizens' efforts. The West County
Toxics Coalition had the power of numbers behind them --
mobilizing hundreds of citizens to these Planning Commission
boards, and working with the local environmental groups like
CBE and the Golden Gate Law Clinic. These were the two other
successful parts of the citizens' strategy:
3. Mobilize hundreds of concerned citizens
The West County Toxics Coaltion was able to successfully
lobby the Planning Commission in Richmond because it could
rally hundreds of committed, impassioned citizens. This is the
foundation of any good community organizing effort. The
WCTC urged citizens to make phone calls to public officials
and make their voices heard. They started letter writing
campaigns, demonstrations, and protests, all of which attracted
media and turned the tide of public opinion away from Chevron.
4. Find allies with legal and scientific expertise
Too often community groups do not have access to legal power
or scientific data that will support their cause. By making allies
with so many groups in the San Francisco Bay Area, WCTC was
able to overcome these traditional barriers to power. For
example, the Golden Gate Law Clinic helped interpret laws like

CEQA (the California Environmental Quality Act) to the
community's advantage. Scientists at CBE were able to provide
the Planning Commission with powerful evidence that the
reformulated fuel plan would have detrimental impacts on
children and other vulnerable local residents close to the
refinery.
Strengths and Weaknesses of these Strategies
The West County Toxics Coalition did an outstanding job of
mobilizing the community. It quickly attracted the attention of
local media and activists to the nature of the problem. It put
pressure on public officials to rule in its favor. Moreover, it
scored a great coup in recruiting important allies from the legal
and scientific community. All of these were important in the
success of the Richmond citizens' efforts.
However, the victory would prove to be short-lived. The
citizens of Richmond may have been excellent in resource
mobilization with regards to people power, but Chevron had the
power of money. Chevron appealed the Planning Commission
decision at the City Council, and had the decision overturned.
The wealthy corporation argued that the citizens were trying to
"extort $50 million" and denied that it had any responsibility to
mitigate the problem.
The citizens still won a historic battle but it was not as large as
anticipated. Chevron did not respect the West County Toxics
Coalition and it tried to discredit their efforts altogether.
Chevron had a history of giving local politicians large campaign
contributions, and it always threatened to leave town if the
citizens became too disruptive. So the strategy was weak in its
ability to deal with the larger problem of corporate control of
City Hall. Perhaps a future strategy for the West County Toxics
Coalition would be to mobilize their resources to elect their
own local candidates to City Hall. They could take power into
their own hands, rather than being dependent on public officials
who are beholden to Chevron.

Solution
s
In a historic agreement, Chevron agreed to pay up to $5 million
to community development projects in Richmond. This money
would help fund such important local projects as:
· the Martin Luther King, Jr. Health Center
· more jobs and job training for local community members
· reduced toxic emissions in the area
· pollution prevention measures
· safety improvements at the Chevron plant,
· community beautification projects around the Chevron
facilities, and
· police and youth athletic leagues.
The West County Toxics Coalition had succeeded in getting
millions of dollars for the local community. Chevron did not
pay the full $50 million that the citizens had initially demanded,
but they still had achieved a major breakthrough. Chevron had
promised comprehensive economic benefits for members of the
fence-line communities. The full details of the project are
enumerated in a Memorandum of Understanding reached on
June 2, 1994.
In the aftermath of this agreement, the West County Toxics

Coalition has continued to work with local citizens, scientific
experts, and legal advocacy organizations to win further
concessions from Chevron. In 1996, the citizens managed to
shut down a dangerous Chevron incinerator that had been
jeopardizing the health and safety of local residents for almost
three decades. Working with Greenpeace and local community
organizations, the residents of Richmond were able to mobilize
enough support to close down the hazardous facility. They sent
more than 1500 letters to the California EPA, urging an
Environmental Impact Report, plans for immediate closure of
the incinerator, and community participation in the project. Two
weeks later, Chevron announced it would shut down the
incinerator by 1997. The residents of Richmond are currently
working in close collaboration with the California EPA to
finalize plans for the closure.
http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/sherman.html

Original Articles
The Environmental Injustice of ‘‘Clean Coal’’:
Expanding the National Conversation on Carbon Capture
and Storage Technology to Include an Analysis
of Potential Environmental Justice Impacts
Stephanie Tyree and Maron Greenleaf
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, the coal industry has created a multi-
million dollar public relations campaign to
insulate coal from the green energy revolution and the
anticipated public backlash against dirty and
unsustainable fuels. This campaign, promoting ‘‘clean coal,’’
has effectively shifted the national conver-
sation on energy and climate change to situate coal as a viable
clean energy source and the best option

available to mitigate climate change. As the U.S. gets closer to
passing national climate legislation and the
deadline for achieving significant global reductions in carbon
emissions draws near, opposition to the coal
industry and its Clean Coal Campaign is organizing on a number
of fronts. The environmental justice
movement, through its leadership on climate justice, can serve
as a centralizing force for these disparate
advocacy efforts, bringing together students, scientists, policy
advocates, community residents, and others
engaged to fight clean coal and advance real green energy
solutions. This article will look at the history of
the Clean Coal Campaign and weigh the arguments for and
against clean coal, focusing particularly on
carbon capture and sequestration. It will then overview the
advocacy efforts occurring across the U.S. to
oppose coal and expose the fallacy of clean coal. Finally, it will
defend the centralization of these efforts in
an environmental justice-based climate justice movement that
utilizes the varied resources, expertise and
energy of the current advocacy efforts to stop coal and achieve
a clean, green renewable energy economy.
INTRODUCTION

As the scientific understanding of climate changehas improved,
and U.S. policymakers have become
more aware of the looming impacts of the global fossil
fuel lifestyle, the national debate on sustainable energy
options has captured the attention of the public. Much of
this debate has been on what alternatives exist to shift
America away from its fossil fuel dependence and the
feasibility of these alternatives being implemented to scale
in time to combat global climate change. While some
sectors are attempting to shift the national energy options
in new directions, much of the debate has been captured
by the traditional fossil fuel industry, particularly the coal
industry, which has a vested interest in maintaining its
dominance over America’s energy choices. The coal
industry has jumped on the green bandwagon by pro-
moting the concept of ‘‘clean coal,’’ a theoretical model of
coal production that would burn coal in a carbon-neutral
way.
While the public relations and media campaigns pro-
moting ‘‘clean coal’’ have pumped millions into the idea
that ‘‘clean coal’’ is the only feasible alternative to our
current coal use, the industry has failed to create a
working model of the idea that can be implemented to

scale in the timeline needed to address climate change. In
fact, the industry has failed to put sufficient resources into
the research and development necessary to establish
‘‘clean coal’’ as a viable energy alternative. In addition,
even if ‘‘clean coal’’ was feasible and successful, it would
not address the myriad cradle-to-grave public health,
economic, and environmental impacts that coal has on
communities throughout the world. Calling coal clean
merely because its carbon emissions are captured ignores
the extensive dirty impacts of coal use.
Ms. Tyree is at the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition
in Huntington, West Virginia. Ms. Greenleaf is at New York
University School of Law.
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Volume 2, Number 4, 2009
ª Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089=env.2009.0040
167
Used by permission from
Liebert Publications

Moving into the energy future, it is essential that a sub-
stantive dialogue on the reality of ‘‘clean coal’’ and the to-
tality of coal’s impacts be undertaken to counterbalance the
millions being spent to promote this potential future tech-
nology. In addition, it is important to establish a clear public
understanding of what ‘‘clean coal’’ means so that the na-
tion can decide whether ‘‘clean coal’’ is worth investing our
national resources in and gambling our global future on.
This article attempts to assist that conversation by provid-
ing a broad overview of what ‘‘clean coal’’ means and what
‘‘clean coal’’ technology would entail. Finally, this article
lays out the environmental justice critiques of ‘‘clean coal.’’ It
is imperative that any future energy resource be used in a
way that reduces and mitigates its impacts on the most
burdened and vulnerable communities. While this article
does not purport to answer these concerns for the ‘‘clean
coal’’ industry, it advances the conversation around clean
coal by ensuring that those potential impacts are included in
the national energy dialogue.
OVERVIEW OF ‘‘CLEAN COAL’’
Defining ‘‘clean coal’’

The term ‘‘clean coal’’ is used to refer to burning coal in
a way that reduces emissions or otherwise lessens coal’s
environmental impact. ‘‘Clean coal’’ technology includes
‘‘washing’’ coal of minerals and other polluting compo-
nents, gasification, and the treating of flue gases to lessen
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), and mercury
emissions. In the context of climate change, the term
‘‘clean coal’’ is used most frequently as shorthand for
technology that burns coal more efficiently and=or de-
creases its CO2 emissions.
Carbon capture and storage:
background and methods
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a potential tech-
nology that would enable coal to be burned without
emitting CO2, eliminating the public health and environ-
mental impacts created by CO2 emissions. CCS has three
parts: capture, transport, and storage of CO2.
While there are three possible ways to capture carbon,
none are economically and technologically viable. Pre-
combustion capture, in which coal is converted into a gas
before it is burned and the resulting CO2 is removed, is

efficient in terms of capture but costly to build, and is
therefore not widely used.1 Post-combustion capture, in
which CO2 is removed from plant emissions, is techno-
logically possible but inefficient in terms of capture.2 Fi-
nally, oxyfuel capture, in which coal is burned in pure
oxygen, allows for efficient CO2 removal but has yet to be
operationalized at scale.3
Despite the multiple potential4 forms of carbon capture,
the necessary technology is not ready for wide scale adop-
tion. Even the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), a CCS pro-
ponent, admits that the technology is not yet cost effective.5
If CO2 could be captured, it would then have to be
transported, primarily via pipelines, to storage sites. While
some pipelines are already in use in the United States,6
many more would have to be constructed to transport CO2
at the necessary scale—requiring a huge upfront invest-
ment.7
Finally, after transport, the captured CO2 would have
to be stored deep underground. Carbon storage is theo-
retically possible in depleted oil and gas reserves, un-

mineable coal seams, deep saline aquifers, oil reserves,8
1Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, IPCC Special Report: Carbon Dioxide Capture and
Storage,
Summary For Policymakers, at 5 (2005), available at
<http:==arch.
rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_media=SRCCS-
final=SRCCS_Summary
forPolicymakers.pdf> (pre-combustion technology is currently
utilized in fertilizer manufacturing and hydrogen production).
2The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) re-
port on CCS states that post-combustion capture is
‘‘economically
feasible under specific conditions,’’ meaning that the
technology
has been operationalized and is understood, and could be cost
effective in the correct regulatory setting. However, it seems
doubtful that such a regulatory regime will be adopted in
enough
time to effectively mitigate climate change. Post-combustion
CO2
capture is used in the natural gas processing industry. Working
Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,

IPCC Special Report: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage,
Summary
For Policymakers, at 5 (2005),
<http:==arch.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=
pages_media=SRCCS-final=SRCCS_SummaryforPolicymakers.
pdf>.
Storage,
<http:==arch.
rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_media=SRCCS-
final=SRCCS_Summary
forPolicymakers.pdf>.
Change, Ibid.
5U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Carbon Capture Research (2007),
<http:==www.fossil.energy.gov=programs=sequestration=captur
e=
index.html> (the DOE states that ‘‘existing capture technologies
… are not cost-effective when considered in the context of se-
questering CO2 from power plants’’).

62,500 km of CO2 pipelines currently exist in the United States,
transporting 40MtCO2=year. Working Group III of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report:
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, Summary For
Policymakers,
at 5 (2005), available at
<http:==arch.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_
media=SRCCS-final=SRCCS_SummaryforPolicymakers.pdf>.
7Emily Rochon et al., Greenpeace International, False
Hope: Why Carbon Capture and Storage Won’t Save the
Climate 12 (2008), available at <http:==www.greenpeace.
org=usa=press-center=reports4=false-hope-why-carbon-
capture>
(citing P. Ragden et al., Federal Environmental Agency,
Technologies for CO2 Capture and Storage, Summary,
F.R.G. 18 (2006)).
8Storing CO2 in oil reserves is called Enhanced Oil Recovery
(EOR) because it supports oil flow by maintaining pressure.
EOR
thereby partially offsets the cost of CCS. U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
Carbon Capture Research (2007), <http:==www.fossil.energy.
gov=programs=sequestration=capture=index.html>. However,

EOR’s financial impact is questionable, because potential EOR
projects are too limited in size and number to make a significant
dent in CCS’ substantial cost. Emily Rochon et al., Green-
peace International, False Hope: Why Carbon Capture
and Storage Won’t Save the Climate 14 (2008), available at
<http:==www.greenpeace.org=usa=press-center=reports4=false-
hope-why-carbon-capture> (citing Carbon Sequestration
Technolo-
gies: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Science, Technology,
and
Innovation, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dr. Bryan Hannegan, Vice
President, Environment Electric Power Research Institute)).
168 TYREE AND GREENLEAF
deep saline reservoirs, and ocean waters or seabeds.9
Practically, however, many technological and economic
barriers remain, limiting its utility as part of the necessary
short-term carbon mitigation strategy. Again, the tech-
nology has yet to be demonstrated at scale.10

More importantly, the long-term nature of storage rai-
ses concerns about the feasibility of safe sequestration.
Technology has yet to demonstrate that carbon could be
safely stored for the centuries and millennia required.
Even CCS proponents like the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) admit its limitations: the panel
found that by 2050, only 30–60 percent of CO2 emissions
from electricity generation ‘‘could be technically suitable
for capture.’’11 This statistic is revealing: even in the
IPCC’s best case scenario, in which the plethora of re-
maining scientific questions are answered to the benefit of
CCS development, only a mid-range of CO2 emissions
from the power sector will be eliminated. Putting all other
concerns about coal and CCS aside, at best, the technol-
ogy will be only one part of climate change mitigation. It
is not a silver bullet.
THE DEFENSE OF ‘‘CLEAN COAL’’
AS A CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION STRATEGY
Despite the lack of science supporting industrial-scale
CCS and its limited utility, the technology is still consid-
ered by many to be an important way of reducing CO2

emissions. The primary reason for CCS’ popularity—
besides the strong push from coal lobbyists12—is coal’s
apparent low cost and its abundance.
Coal is has consistently been one of the cheapest energy
sources available for the past two centuries. Coal is cheap
because its price does not incorporate the totality of the
resource’s costs: from resource extraction, production and
combustion. This artificially low price creates a competi-
tive advantage over more expensive natural gas, oil, and
renewable options, despite the many environmental and
social costs of coal.
In addition to its low price, coal produces a large per-
centage of the world’s power supply, and probably will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Coal is par-
ticularly abundant in three key countries: the United
States, China, and India.13 The United States, for example,
gets more than half its electricity from coal,14 accounting
for almost 40 percent of CO2 emissions,
15 and a full 78
percent of China’s electricity came from coal in 2006.16
These national trends are reflected globally where coal

use continues to expand exponentially each year. China
alone builds the equivalent of two coal-fired plants every
week, adding the electrical generation capacity of the U.K.
each year.17 These new coal-fired plants, accounting for
the recent large increase in global CO2 emissions,
18 in-
crease the growing country’s reliance on coal. India is
projected to consume six percent more coal each year,
meeting current U.S. usage rates by 2020.19 The energy
demand from modernizing countries like China and India
is expected to continue growing unabated into the fore-
seeable future.
Proponents of ‘‘clean coal’’ argue that since coal is likely
to remain a important source of electrical power for the
foreseeable future and is also such a major contributor to
climate change, investment in CCS research and devel-
opment (R&D) is essential. They argue that even if the
U.S. stops using coal, India and China will continue to use
Storage,

<http:==arch
.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_media=SRCCS-final=SRCCS_
SummaryforPolicymakers.pdf>.
10Matthew L. Wald, The Energy Challenge: Mounting Costs
Slow
the Push for Clean Coal, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2008, available
at
<http:==www.nytimes.com=2008=05=30=business=30coal.html
?
scp!1&sq! 22clean%20coal%22&st!cse>. The IPCC states that,
under ‘‘specific conditions,’’ storage in oil and gas fields and
sa-
line formations have been shown to be ‘‘economically feasible’’
by
the oil and gas industry. Storage in coal beds has not been
demonstrated. Working Group III of the Intergovernmental
Panel
on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report: Carbon Dioxide
Capture
and Storage, Summary For Policymakers, at 6 (2005), available
at
<http:==arch.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_media=SRCCS-
final=

SRCCS_SummaryforPolicymakers.pdf>.
11Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, IPCC Special Report: Carbon Dioxide Capture
and
Storage, Summary For Policymakers, at 9 (2005), available at
<http:==arch.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_media=SRCCS-
final=
SRCCS_SummaryforPolicymakers.pdf> (italics added).
12For example, in the first two quarters of 2008, the American
Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity spent $4,650,759 on
lobbying.
Center for Responsive Politics, Alternate Energy Pro-
duction & Services, <http:==www.opensecrets.org=lobby=
induscode.php?lname!E1500&year!2008>.
13The United States, China, Russia, and India have the largest
proven coal reserves. British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review
of World Energy, June 2008 32 (2008), available at
<http:==www
.bp.com=sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId!9023784&contentI
d!
7044480>.

14U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Coal (2007), <http:==www.energy
.gov=energysources=coal.htm>.
15Sierra Club, The Dirty Truth About Coal: Why Yes-
terday’s Technology Should Not Be Part of Tomorrow’s
Energy Future 3 (2007), available at <http:==www.sierraclub
.org=coal=dirtytruth=report=> (citing U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and
Sinks: 1990–2005 (2007)). The DOE states that 30 percent of
carbon
emissions come from power plants and other large point
sources.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy (2007), Sequestration, <http:==www
.fossil.energy.gov=programs=sequestration=overview.html>.
16World Coal Institute, Coal Facts 2007, <http:==www.
worldcoal.org=pages=content=index.asp?PageID ! 188>.
17Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of
Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World ix (2007),
available at
<http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>.

Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World 63 (2007),
available at
<http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>.
available at
<http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>
(citing Planning Comm’n of Gov’t of India, Draft Report of
the Expert Committee On Integrated Energy Policy (2005),
<http:==planningcommission.nic.in=reports=genrep=intengpol
.pdf>).
THE ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE OF ‘‘CLEAN COAL’’
169
it to provide for their billions of citizens.20 Ignoring the
massive energy needs of China and India is unrealistic,
CCS advocates maintain. It is more practical to help these
countries use their coal as cleanly as possible instead of
imposing unworkable requirements on them.
A sustainable energy future cannot ignore the need the

developing world has for increased energy access. Yet, the
energy dialogue cannot focus on these needs without also
considering the public health, environmental, and eco-
nomic impacts of our energy choices.
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUES OF CCS
CCS perpetuates and could increase environmental
injustices related to coal use
The term ‘‘clean coal’’ implies that we can keep consum-
ing coal without suffering any detrimental consequences.
The costs of the expected consequences of functional CCS
belie this implication. There is no such thing as clean coal;
burning coal always costs too much.
Advocates for CCS fail to acknowledge the social im-
pact that coal has on communities located near its ex-
traction, processing, and burning sites. These communities
are still subject to the devastating impacts of coal, even
when the carbon created by coal is captured and stored.
In fact, the total social and environmental impacts of
coal use may increase with the use of CCS. Even if CCS
eventually reduces carbon emissions from coal-burning

plants, the long-term impacts of a shift to CCS technology
could have unanticipated and far-reaching impacts on the
environment that outweigh the benefits of short-term
climate change mitigation. CCS technology is inherently
more resource-intensive and expensive than conventional
coal use. To work most efficiently, carbon capture needs
to utilize pre-combustion technology because the CO2
released from conventional coal-fired plants is very dilute.
Pre-combustion gasification plants, however, consume 25
percent of the energy they produce, requiring that more
coal be mined and burned to sell the same amount of
energy.21 Another 20 percent of the energy produced is
typically consumed in compressing the CO2 for storage.
22
CCS also uses 90 percent more fresh water than conven-
tional coal-fired plants.23 As a result of these inefficiencies,
it has been estimated that the adoption of CCS as a pri-
mary component of climate change mitigation—as some
argue it must be24—would require a 33 percent increase in
resource consumption and would eliminate improve-
ments in efficiency made in the last 50 years.25
Such an increase in coal consumption would negatively

impact the communities and ecosystems where coal is
mined. The environmental and human costs of coal
mining and burning are numerous and well docu-
mented.26 Briefly, they include the contamination of local
air and water with pollutants (including mercury, NOx,
SO2, and particulate matter), the violent destruction of
areas containing coal through dynamiting, strip mining,
and mountaintop removal, the health risks of black lung
disease and mining itself,27 and the release of methane, a
greenhouse gas 20 times more powerful than CO2. All
these would increase with the adoption of CCS.
CCS storage creates unacceptable risks
and potential new environmental injustices
CCS includes a multitude of unacceptable high risks
beyond those typically associated with coal-fired power
plants. These risks arise from the uncertainty and danger
associated with long-term carbon storage and include the
potential health impacts of abrupt CO2 escape, contami-
nation of water supplies, ecosystem destruction, and
20For example, the World Bank justified funding a huge con-
ventional coal-fired plant in India because the country ‘‘faces
power shortages that leave more than 400 million people

without
access to electricity, mainly in poor rural areas. The country
needs to expand generation capacity by 160,000 megawatts over
the next decade, and this new project helps address this gap.’’
Quoted in Andrew C. Revkin, Money for India’s ‘Ultra Mega’
Coal
Plants Approved, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2008, available at
<http:==
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com=2008=04=09=money-for-indias-
ultra-
mega-coal-plants-approved=>.
21Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: How Man Is
Changing the Climate and What It Means for Life on
Earth 252 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2005).
22Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: How Man Is
Changing the Climate and What It Means for Life on
Earth 253 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2005).
Climate 6 (2008), available at
<http:==www.greenpeace.org=usa=
press-center=reports4=false-hope-why-carbon-capture> (citing

Erik Shuster et al., National Energy Technology Labora-
tories Estimating Freshwater Needs to Meet Future
Thermoelectric Generation Requirements, DOE=NETL-400=
2007=1304, at 60 (2007), available at
<http:==www.netl.doe.gov=…=
coalpower=ewr=pubs=2007%20Water%20Needs%20Analysis%2
0-
%20Final%20REVISED%205-8-08.pdf>.
24See National Resources Defense Fund, Climate Facts:
Return Carbon to the Ground 2, available at <http:==www
.nrdc.org=globalwarming=coal=return.pdf> (‘‘Long-term
geolog-
ical disposal of CO2 (for thousands of years) is viable now and
must be implemented quickly if we are to meet the challenge of
sharply reducing global emissions this century’’); Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: Options
for a Carbon-Constrained World x (2007), available at
<http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf> (‘‘We
con-
clude that CO2 capture and sequestration (CCS) is the critical
enabling technology that would reduce CO2 emission signifi-
cantly while also allowing coal to meet the world’s pressing en-
ergy needs’’). The National Resources Defense Fund received
$437,500 from the Joyce Foundation to ‘‘promote alterna-

tive plants using coal gasification with carbon sequestration.’’
The Joyce Foundation, <http:==www.joycefdn.org=Programs=
Environment=GrantDetails.aspx?grantId ! 29414>.
P. Ragden et al., Federal Environmental Agency, Technolo-
gies for CO2 Capture and Storage, Summary, F.R.G. 24
(2006)).
26See Sierra Club, The Dirty Truth About Coal: Why
Yesterday’s Technology Should Not Be Part of Tomor-
row’s Energy Future 5–15 (2007), available at <http:==www
.sierraclub.org=coal=dirtytruth=report=>.
27Jeff Biggers, ‘Clean’ Coal? Don’t Try to Shovel That,
Washington Post, Mar. 2, 2008, at B02, available at <http:==
www.washingtonpost.com=wp-
dyn=content=article=2008=02=29=
AR2008022903390.html>.
170 TYREE AND GREENLEAF

increased CO2 emissions from leakage.
28 The environ-
mental burden and potential public health calamity
caused by carbon storage particularly concern environ-
mental justice communities.
These are the communities that have historically borne
the burden of housing energy facilities, waste sites, and
other undesirable land uses and are likely to bear the
burdens and risks of CO2 storage if CCS is implemented.
While geological constraints would play a part in deter-
mining storage sites, history indicates that waste disposal
facilities are almost always located in or near communi-
ties of color and low-income communities. There is no
reason to think that CCS facilities will be any different, as
wealthier and more powerful communities are likely to
organize to ensure CO2 storage facilities are not located in
their neighborhoods.
The risks associated with CO2 storage are real: should
CO2 quickly leak from a storage site, it could asphyxiate

residents located nearby. Instances of this event have
occurred naturally, such as the 1986 disaster at Lake Nyos
in Cameroon.29 Additional public health impacts from
CO2 storage could also occur on a less dramatic scale. For
example, surrounding communities would suffer if CO2
contaminated local drinking water or storage required the
destruction of the surrounding environment.
Beyond these real public health risks, potential CO2
leakage would undermine the entire purpose of CCS
plants. The leakage of CO2 would contribute directly to
the climate change CCS is supposed to protect against.
Even such a small-scale escape of stored CO2 might
eliminate the gains in CO2 emissions reductions from
CCS.30 Though the likelihood of such an escape is ap-
parently small, 31 the lack of advanced technology on
the subject (as discussed below) leaves this an open
question.
CCS will require long-term storage monitoring and
upkeep. This requirement both increases the cost of the
technology and creates a potential environmental justice
problem, as communities surrounding the sites located
farthest from those who hold power may not have the
power or knowledge to ensure proper monitoring and

upkeep.
We simply do not—and cannot—understand the long-
term consequences of CCS well enough to ensure that
disastrous leakage does not occur.32 These are unaccept-
able risks to impose on the communities that will inevi-
tably be tapped to house CO2 storage facilities, and
unacceptable long-term risks to require future generations
to inherit.
CONCLUSION
The American public seems eager to transition to a
new, clean, renewable energy economy. This economy
could mean more jobs, safer workplaces, cleaner envi-
ronments, improved national public health, and even
locally-distributed energy sources. It could, in short, be a
transformation of our country and a renewed under-
standing of how energy use impacts and affects public
health, the environment, and the economy. Most impor-
tantly, there is the opportunity to lift up those commu-
nities that have been the most traditionally burdened and
underserved by our fossil fuel economy.

CCS fails to take advantage of any of these opportu-
nities, hides business-as-usual behind the rhetoric of
change and new technology, and locks us into a contin-
ued fossil fuel economy for the foreseeable future. For the
communities located near the coal mines, beside the
processing plants, and on the other side of the fence from
coal-burning power plants, continued reliance on coal
does not create an alternative energy future. Moreover,
the promotion of ‘‘clean coal’’ as a sustainable energy
option without consideration of the potential impacts of
this technology on communities of color and low-income
communities continues the practice of externalizing im-
pacts of our energy use on the most vulnerable commu-
nities across the country.
Address correspondence to:
Stephanie Tyree
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition
P.O. Box 6753
Huntington, WV 25773-6753
E-mail: [email protected]

press-center=reports4=false-hope-why-carbon-capture>.
29Over a few short hours one night, CO2 bubbled up from the
volcanic-crater lake, killing 1,700 people and thousands of ani-
mals in the town bordering the lake. Peter J. Baxter, M. Kapila,
and D. Mfonfu, Lake Nyos Disaster, Cameroon, 1986: the
Medical
Effects of Large Scale Emission of Carbon Dioxide?, 298 Brit.
Med. J.
1437 (1989), available at <http:==www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov=
articlerender.fcgi?artid ! 1836556>. While there is this
historical
example, an MIT study states that the likelihood of a leak on the
scale of the Lake Nyos disaster is ‘‘exceedingly small.’’ Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal:
Options for a Carbon-Constrained World 67 (2007), available
at <http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>.

Christian Azar, Carbon Capture and Storage from Fossil Fuels
and
Biomass—Costs and Potential Role in Stabilizing the
Atmosphere, 74
Climactic Change 47–79 (2006)).
31The MIT study found that it is ‘‘very likely’’ that over 99
percent of stored CO2 will remain below ground over 100 years,
and ‘‘likely’’ that the same percentage will remain for 1,000
years.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of
available at
<http:==web.mit.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>
(Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Storage
(2005), available at <http:==arch.rivm.nl=env=int=ipcc=pages_
media=SRCCS-final=SRCCS_SummaryforPolicymakers.pdf>).
32The MIT study indicates the limitations of current scientific
knowledge: ‘‘[T]he state of science today cannot provide
quanti-
tative estimates of their likelihood,’’ though the experience we

do
have indicates the risks are small. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-
Constrained World 50 (2007), available at <http:==web.mit
.edu=coal=The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE OF ‘‘CLEAN COAL’’
171

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