171869880 legres-psychological-incapacity-cases

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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,

that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner
subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September
6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of
Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both
of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even
on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he

got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with
a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set
forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove
that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity
was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that
would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the

obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the
following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings
by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent
did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration ofpsychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal M edical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is

rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected'
by the state.
x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
x x x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part.There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during

this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12]At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation inMolina. Petitioner, however, has
not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in
CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias
Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan
Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16,
1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued
by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also
on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the
back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his
family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few
months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he
indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force
his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him.
Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support
herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor
dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino
remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was
served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on
September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live
in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that
Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been
gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he
would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation
and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to
intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation
dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of
Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda
Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into
his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final
and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until
January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the
law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable
Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of
the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough
to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in
marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological
incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.’
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife
and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present
whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of
time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article
68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and
became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are
manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable.
Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not
common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to
assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce
(See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that
exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration
aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of
error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A
VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of
the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda,
The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino
Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to
him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case.
Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity
were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the
husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following
GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with
the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact,
the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor
was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial
court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial
court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the
evidence presented. We further explained therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of
the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art.
II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
THIRD DIVISION

LOLITA D. ENRICO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND
TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173614
Present:
YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ,
CHICO-
NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 28,
2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli
(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph
Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004,Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married

petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same
was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article
34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage
license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived
together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that
the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin
Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October
1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed
in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only
the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March
2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its
position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme
Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par.
(a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule

is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal
that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is
that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely
belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the
marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint
filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by
petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order[14] dated 3
May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies
only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.[16] Where one or both parties
are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage
void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328
SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division,
held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this
motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now
superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme
Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule
on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the
husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action
for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of
Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court
shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To
reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the
parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a
void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only
an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the
lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent
who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a
vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the
Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive
law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage
entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and
feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the
guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the
marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the
heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both
parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of
the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare
the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed
b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure
which shall be applicable.[17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.[19]
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are
well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead, they should
initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court
of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of
courts.[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to
brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the
deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the
impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of

the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e.,
the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was
celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriagesunder the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the
RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the
ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated
on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.(n)
(Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non
indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a
quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, G.R. No. 162368
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
BRIX FERRARIS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 17, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida
Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30,
2003 andFebruary 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151
rendered a Decision[1] denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does
not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order[2] dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to

such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed[3] in toto the
judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his
“defects” were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.[4] The
Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan’s testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent’s psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how
she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling
factor or an adverse integral element in respondent’s character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.[5]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied[6] for lack of merit; thus,
she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the
petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.[7] The Court required
respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment[8] but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed
to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court
resolves to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case.[9] Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province
of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over
again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.[10] It is a
well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,[11] save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of
the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
or when there is a misappreciation of facts,[12] which are unavailing in the instant
case.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13] As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[14] It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained,[15] which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of
marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish respondent’s psychological condition. Here, appellant contends

that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence
showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital
obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well
about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of
time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner’s lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy.
x x x.
x x x x
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
“schizoid,” and why he is the “dependent and avoidant type.” In fact, Dr.
Dayan’s statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder
is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to
belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan’s
information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the
petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was
vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder “can be
part of his family upbringing” x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input
on the supposed problematic history of respondent’s parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was
really “a natal or supervening disabling factor” on the part of respondent,
or an “adverse integral element” in respondent’s character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent’s supposed psychological or mental malady existed even

before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.[16]
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-
house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17] where therein respondent preferred to spend
more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were
more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[18] that habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however,
is not a null and void marriage.[19] No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity
of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be“protected” by the state.[20]

Thus, in determining the import of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles
35,[21] 37,[22] 38,[23] and 41[24] that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so
that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.[26] Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.[27] Neither it
is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.[28]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure
of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null
and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent
church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on
6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly
died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented
an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of
Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her
as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and
sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was
no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She
presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed
that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident
of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist,
to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted,
led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that
might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS
which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead
that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent
may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case
to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of
civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the
Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45),
and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact,
even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of
nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar
for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are
not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages

with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity
was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect
the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply
would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus]
should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand
the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to
the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court
of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he

was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was
to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret
the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended
by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding
of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account
the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical
thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the
framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely
primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as

well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may
have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower
courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1
and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and
the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that
the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only

constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its

incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate

tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the
trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General,
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation,
income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented
two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I
think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of
concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers
human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should
be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness
for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s

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