The following is a memorandum of law that I wrote for a pro bono case that went before the State of New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. I won the initial hearing before an administrative law judge and I submitted this memorandum after the employer chose to appeal the case. The Appeal Board ultimately ruled in my client’s favor. Other than help with proofreading, I received no assistance in preparing this pleading. The parties’ names and locations have been changed to protect confidentiality.

1. STATE OF NEW YORK
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD
Appeal Board No. 1414
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF LINDA TYLER’S
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
For seven years, Linda Tyler worked for St. Jude’s Child Care Center as an
assistant teacher, earning approximately fourteen dollars an hour. According to Lisa
Clemmons, the center’s director, Mrs. Tyler was a good employee who performed her job
well. Mrs. Tyler, who currently lives in Crown Point, New York, previously resided in
White Plains, New York, located several miles away from St. Jude’s. Mrs. Tyler’s
mother, Estelle Thomas, is an 87-year-old ailing widow living in Crown Point, who has
lived by herself for the past nineteen years. Crown Point is a small, rural town. Mrs.
Thomas lives miles away from downtown Crown Point and requires transportation to get
into town for her errands and medical appointments, including trips out-of-state. She
lives in a two-story home with several bedrooms, which requires frequent care and
maintenance. Mrs. Thomas suffers from a kidney disease, anxiety, and depression.
In the past nineteen years, since becoming widowed, Mrs. Thomas had relied on
the help of family members for her daily care and upkeep of her home. One of these
family members was her sister, who resided in a small house on Mrs. Thomas’s property,
locating within walking distance from Mrs. Thomas’s home. Her sister would frequently
check in on Mrs. Thomas, help her with the home and her cooking, and provide
transportation for errands. Mrs. Thomas grew more reliant on her sister’s care after her
decision to stop driving in early 2011, due to safety concerns from her elder age. In June
2011, Mrs. Thomas’s sister decided to move away from Crown Point.
1
The Statement of Facts is supported by the September 26, 2011 hearing before Administrative Law Judge
Jane Kramer.

2. In the last year, aware that her mother needed additional care, Mrs. Tyler visited
Mrs. Thomas on weekends to check on her and assist with the home. In June 2011,
around the time that Mrs. Thomas’s sister decided to move away from Crown Point, Mrs.
Tyler’s brother, who lives in Crown Point, told Mrs. Tyler he would be unable to
continue providing care for Mrs. Thomas. Along with Mrs. Thomas’s sister, this brother
was the other family member who had helped care for Mrs. Thomas, but due to personal
reasons―including running his own business and caring for his daughter’s illness―he is
unable to continue this support. Mrs. Tyler’s other brother, residing in Florida, has
expressed no interest or willingness to provide a similar level of care for Mrs. Thomas.
Also around the time that Mrs. Thomas’s sister moved away from Crown Point,
Mrs. Thomas’s doctor diagnosed her with a kidney illness. Mrs. Thomas’s doctor told
Mrs. Tyler that she was specifically needed to care for her mother. In addition to the
kidney illness, Mrs. Thomas also suffers from anxiety and depression, which is being
treated by prescription medication. She testified that having Mrs. Tyler move to Crown
Point and live near her helps with these problems, and she is unwilling to rely on the
assistance of a non-family member due to this anxiety and depression. Mrs. Thomas also
testified that she is unwilling to leave her home and move to an assisted-care facility.
For these reasons, Mrs. Tyler made the decision to leave her position at St. Jude’s
and move to Crown Point. Mrs. Tyler testified that she had no intention of moving to
Crown Point prior to these circumstances that required her mother’s care. She also
testified that she did not seek a leave of absence from St. Jude’s for two reasons. First,
her mother’s care is needed for an undefined period of time, with no end date in the
foreseeable future. Second, even if her care for Mrs. Thomas was no longer needed, she
would have no way of returning to St. Jude’s after moving to Crown Point. She relied on
her personal savings to live in Southern New York while working at St. Jude’s, and the
move to Crown Point and expenses of living there while caring for her mother makes it
financially impossible for her to move back to Southern New York and return to St.
Jude’s. Mrs. Clemmons testified that Mrs. Tyler’s position requires her to be physically
present at the child care center, making it impossible for Mrs. Tyler to continue her
position while living in Crown Point.
2

3. Mrs. Tyler presently lives in the same home that Mrs. Thomas’s sister lived in and
provides the same level of care required for Mrs. Thomas that Mrs. Thomas’s sister and
son had previously done. She checks in on Mrs. Thomas several times during the day,
cooks for her, assists with the upkeep and maintenance of her home, and provides
transportation for her medical appointments, including trips out-of-state. Mrs. Tyler is
presently seeking employment and is searching for a position that will allow her to
continue caring for her mother.
Mrs. Tyler applied for unemployment insurance benefits after leaving her position
with St. Jude’s in June 2011. After being denied benefits from the Unemployment
Insurance Division, she appealed to the Unemployment Appeal Board before
Administrative Law Judge Jane Kramer on September 26, 2011. ALJ Kramer ruled in
Claimant’s favor and St. Jude’s has appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mrs. Tyler had a compelling family reason for separating from her employment
with St. Jude’s because her mother suffered from both an illness and disability requiring
Mrs. Tyler’s care. Mrs. Thomas suffers from a kidney disease that her doctor―a medical
professional―said required Mrs. Tyler’s move to Crown Point. Mrs. Thomas also
suffers from anxiety and depression, requiring Mrs. Tyler’s specific care and preventing
the option of a part-time caregiver to assist Mrs. Thomas. Mrs. Tyler took all reasonable
steps towards preserving her position with St. Jude’s before separating from her
employment to care for her mother. She attempted to continue her position at St. Jude’s
by caring for Mrs. Thomas on weekends, before the circumstance of her mother’s case
made it necessary for her to move to Crown Point. Additionally, the undefined period of
time required for Mrs. Thomas’s care and her financial constraints made it unnecessary
for her to seek a leave of absence as a means of preserving her employment. For these
reasons, the Appeal Board should uphold ALJ Kramer’s decision.
3

4. ARGUMENT
New York unemployment insurance law provides that a claimant is disqualified
from receiving benefits after a voluntary separation from employment without good
cause. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(a). A claimant can show good cause through a
“compelling family reason,” which includes the “illness or disability of a member of the
individual's immediate family.” Id. § 593(1)(b)(ii).
A claimant must make an effort to preserve his or her employment in order to
have good cause for separating from employment. In re Jing Ying Zeng, 702 N.Y.S.2d
169, 170 (3rd. Dept. 2000). Requesting a leave of absence is not always required to show
good cause. See In re Appeal Board No. 550619, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.labor.ny.gov/uiappeal-decisions/550619-appeal-decision.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011) ("[T]here is no absolute requirement that a claimant specifically seek
a leave of absence in order to establish good cause to quit."). The circumstance of the
claimant’s case determines whether a request for a leave of absence was necessary as a
means of preserving employment. See Comment 1, Referee’s Case Number 512-661-
50R: Voluntary Leaving to Visit Critically Ill Mother in Foreign Country, Unemployment
Insurance Division Adjudication Services Office, available at http://www.labor.state.
ny.us/ui/aso /10.htm#1007 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (“Requesting a leave of absence
rather than arbitrarily quitting is generally the action of a reasonably prudent person. The
absence of such request when it would have been granted, together with the absence of
any credible reason for failure to do so, could be considered a voluntary leaving of
employment without good cause.”) (emphasis added).
Mrs. Tyler had a compelling family reason for separating from her employment
with St. Jude’s and took all reasonable steps for preserving her employment.
4

5. I. MRS. TYLER HAD A COMPELLING FAMILY REASON FOR
SEPARATING FROM HER EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE HER MOTHER
SUFFERED FROM BOTH AN ILLNESS AND DISABILITY REQUIRING
MRS. TYLER’S CARE
Mrs. Tyler had a compelling family reason for separating from her employment
because her mother suffered from both an illness and disability requiring Mrs. Tyler’s
care. New York’s unemployment insurance law provides that a family member’s illness
or disability is a compelling family reason for separating from employment, entitling a
claimant to benefits. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(b)(ii). Mrs. Tyler’s mother has both an
illness and disability requiring Mrs. Tyler’s care.
A. Illness
Mrs. Thomas has an illness that provided Mrs. Tyler with a compelling family
reason for separating from her employment with St. Jude’s. For the purposes of a
compelling family reason, New York unemployment law defines an illness as a “verified
illness which necessitates the care of the ill person for a period of time longer than the
employer is willing to grant leave (paid or otherwise).” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(b)(ii)
(a).
Mrs. Thomas suffers from an illness because her doctor―a medical
professional―told Mrs. Tyler that she was needed for her mother’s care. This illness
required care for a period of time longer than St. Jude’s was willing to provide. As Mrs.
Tyler testified, her leave was going to last for an undefined period of time and she was
unable to move back to Southern New York and continue her employment at St. Jude’s,
due to financial constraints. Here, Mrs. Tyler is not unwilling to return to her
employment, she is unable to. Because her period of time away from St. Jude’s was
going to be indefinite, this was longer than any period of time that St. Jude’s would have
offered through a leave of absence.
In its notice of appeal, St. Jude’s cites several cases to argue that, with few
exceptions, caring for a sick relative is not a compelling reason to leave employment.
However, in all of these cited cases, the claimant did not have a medical professional’s
5

6. opinion that they were needed for their family member’s care, as Mrs. Tyler did. See In
re Esther H. Kuhns, 790 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (3rd. Dept. 2005) (“Here, there is no
evidence that claimant was advised by her husband's physician that she needed to stop
working to care for him.”); In re Livio A. Nunez, 798 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805 (3rd. Dept.
2005) (“Here, claimant made no showing of medical necessity inasmuch as the record
discloses that his son's health improved shortly after he resigned . . .”); In re Jiro
Uemura, 764 N.Y.S.2d 213, 213 (3rd. Dept. 2003) (“Claimant made no showing of
medical necessity here and, indeed, the record discloses that it soon became unnecessary
for him to relocate.”); In re Walberto Lugo, 741 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (3rd. Dept. 2002)
(disqualifying a claimant for unemployment insurance benefits because claimant's
relative only required treatment of daily medication and a bland diet, and did not require
claimant's care); In re Nelida Carrasquillo, 672 N.Y.S.2d 513, 513 (3rd. Dept. 1998)
(“As no proof was presented to show that claimant's relocation was medically necessary
for her father's well-being, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ruling that
claimant left her employment without good cause.”) (citations omitted); In re Hope
Dameron, N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (3rd. Dept. 1997) (“[N]o medical evidence was presented
to show that the presence of either claimant or her companion was medically necessary.”)
(citations omitted). Unlike these cases, Mrs. Tyler did rely on the opinion of a medical
expert in deciding that it was necessary for her to move to Crown Point.
St. Jude’s also argues that Mrs. Tyler’s current search for full-time employment
means Mrs. Thomas does not need full-time care, and therefore Mrs. Tyler did not have a
compelling family reason for separating from her employment. Here, Mrs. Thomas’s
own doctor said that Mrs. Tyler was needed for her care. Her doctor is a medical expert
who is thoroughly familiar with Mrs. Thomas’s condition and knows what is best for her
care. St. Jude’s offered no evidence or cross-examination to dispute this fact. In her
decision, ALJ Kramer correctly ruled that “[w]hile the claimant’s mother admittedly does
not need round the clock attention, she is in need of daily care in that she can no longer
cook for herself or drive herself to her medical appointments.” Here, the Appeal Board
should defer to the opinion of Mrs. Thomas’s own doctor in determining what care is best
for Mrs. Thomas.
6

7. Further, in circumstances similar to Mrs. Tyler’s case, the Appeal Board has
allowed unemployment insurance benefits for a claimant caring for a family member’s
illness while holding a full-time position. In Re Appeal Board No. 546635, at 3 (2010),
available at http://www.labor.ny.gov/uiappeal-decisions/546635-appeal-decision.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2011). Here, claimant left her position―without requesting a leave
of absence―to care for her ailing husband who required physical assistance. Id. at 1–2.
The Appeal Board ruled that the claimant had a compelling family reason for leaving her
employment, due to an immediate family member’s illness. Id. at 3. In its decision, the
Appeal Board noted “[Her husband] requires the claimant's personal care in the activities
of daily living in order to survive, notwithstanding the fact that she can leave him alone
for periods of time while she works.” (emphasis added). Id. The facts of this case are
nearly identical to Mrs. Tyler’s situation. Here, according to her doctor, Mrs. Thomas
requires Mrs. Tyler’s personal care. This care, however, does not require full-time care
assistance and permits Mrs. Tyler to hold a full-time position. As Mrs. Tyler testified,
she is seeking a position that will allow her to continue caring for her mother―an
arraignment the Appeal Board held in In Re Appeal Board No. 546635 to be consistent
with a compelling family reason for separating from one’s employment. Therefore, even
though Mrs. Thomas does not require Mrs. Tyler’s full-time care, ALJ Kramer correctly
ruled that Mrs. Tyler still had a compelling family reason for separating from her
employment.
St. Jude’s also argues that because Mrs. Thomas has a son living near her, Mrs.
Tyler was not specifically needed for her mother’s care. Here, Mrs. Tyler testified that
her brother told her he was unable to continue caring for Mrs. Thomas. Regardless of
where Mrs. Thomas’s son lives, there is no possibility of him being able to help with
Mrs. Thomas’s care. ALJ Kramer correctly held that “[w]hile the claimant has a brother
that lives in that area, he has his own concerns, including a business and a daughter who
is also ill.” Therefore, his residency in Crown Point is irrelevant in determining whether
other relatives besides Mrs. Tyler are available for Mrs. Thomas’s care.
For these reasons, Mrs. Thomas’s illness is a compelling family reason for Mrs.
Tyler to have separated from her employment with St. Jude’s.
7

8. B. Disability
Mrs. Thomas also suffers from a disability, giving Mrs. Tyler another compelling
family reason for separating from her employment with St. Jude’s. For the purposes of a
compelling family reason, New York unemployment law defines a disability as a
“verified disability which necessitates the care of the ill person for a period of time longer
than the employer is willing to grant leave (paid or otherwise).” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)
(b)(ii)(b). This definition of disability includes a mental disability. Id.
Mrs. Thomas suffers from anxiety and depression. As she testified, having Mrs.
Tyler move to Crown Point helps her with these problems. Additionally, because of this
disability, she is unwilling to rely on a non-family member for her care. For these same
reasons, Mrs. Thomas could not consider the possibility of a non-family member to assist
with her care. These circumstances of Mrs. Thomas’s case support the specific need for
Mrs. Tyler’s care. For twelve years, Mrs. Thomas has relied on her sister and son for her
care. Her sister lived in a home within walking distance to Mrs. Thomas and her son was
able to make frequent visits to Mrs. Thomas’s home. Given her reliance on these family
members for this long period of time, it would be unreasonable to expect anyone besides
a family member to help care for Mrs. Thomas.
For the same reason as that of the illness, this disability also required care for a
period of time longer than St. Jude’s was willing to provide, due to the undefined period
of time this care requires and Mrs. Tyler’s financial constraints. Therefore, Mrs.
Thomas’s disability is a compelling family reason for Mrs. Tyler to have separated from
her employment.
8

9. II. MRS. TYLER TOOK ALL REASONABLE STEPS TO PRESERVE HER
EMPLOYMENT
Mrs. Tyler took all reasonable steps to preserve her employment. Prior to leaving
St. Jude’s, and after the events that required additional care for Mrs. Thomas, Mrs. Tyler
visited Crown Point on the weekends to help care for her mother. She did this while
continuing her employment at St. Jude’s. However, after Mrs. Thomas’s sister decided to
move and Mrs. Thomas’s son was unable to continue providing care, Mrs. Tyler had no
other option but to move to Crown Point. ALJ Kramer correctly ruled that Mrs. Tyler
“attempted to deal with situation long distance while her aunt resided next door to her
mother, but once her aunt moved out of the house situated next door to her mother, the
claimant realized that she could not leave her mother alone, what with the various
ailments from which she suffers.” The Appeal Board should therefore also find that Mrs.
Tyler took reasonable steps towards preserving her employment.
St. Jude’s argues that Mrs. Tyler’s move was based on her desire to relocate.
However, Mrs. Tyler testified that she had no intention of moving to Crown Point before
her mother needed her care. Her decision to move was based solely on the need to help
her mother. As discussed above, Mrs. Tyler is unable to move back to Southern New
York and return to her employment at St. Jude’s. Therefore, her requesting a leave of
absence would have been impractical and unnecessary, given that she had no means of
returning to her position at St. Jude’s.
The Appeal Board has allowed unemployment insurance benefits for claimants
not requesting a leave of absence. In re Appeal Board No. 551103, at 2 (2011), available
at http://www.labor.ny.gov/uiappeal-decisions/551103-appeal-decision.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011). In this case, claimant voluntarily separated from her employment to care
for her elderly mother, based on the medical opinion of her mother’s doctor. Id. at 1–2.
No other relatives besides claimant were available to provide this care. Id. at 1.
Claimant had difficulty paying her monthly expenses prior to relocating for her mother’s
care and therefore did not seek a leave of absence, which her employer was willing to
provide. Id. at 1–2. The Appeal Board ruled that claimant did have good cause for
separating from her employment, and noted “[a]s the claimant had difficulty meeting her
9

10. own monthly living expenses and as the claimant needed to relocate to provide such care,
it would have been impractical to accept a limited FMLA 12 week leave of absence . . .
the claimant could not afford to continue to maintain her apartment while she was in
upstate New York providing care to her mother.” Here, Mrs. Tyler also had difficulty
paying her monthly expenses before moving to care for her mother, making it impractical
for her to have requested a leave of absence from St. Jude’s. Given the circumstances of
Mrs. Thomas’s care and Mrs. Tyler’s financial constraints, Mrs. Tyler’s decision to not
seek a leave of absence still means she took all reasonable steps towards preserving her
employment. See also In Re Appeal Board No. 546635 (2010), available at
http://www.labor.ny.gov/uiappeal-decisions/546635-appeal-decision.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011) (allowing unemployment insurance benefits for a claimant who did not
request a leave of absence who left her employment to care for her ailing husband).
CONCLUSION
Because Mrs. Tyler had a compelling family reason for separating from her
employment with St. Jude’s and took all reasonable steps to preserve her employment,
she is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. The decision of ALJ Kramer should
be upheld.
Respectfully Submitted,
__________________
Adam T. Sherwin, Esq.
10