170568395 trial-cases-full-text

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EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171271
Appellee,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., JJ.

ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA
y PAHILANGA, Promulgated:
Appellant.
August 31, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an
amended Information[1] that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body
with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab
wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the
dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since
1998. The latter worked as the managing partner of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, a
law firm operated as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31
Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month
as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which he received when
he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Kho’s family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused drove
Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his employer’s bag to Marissa Hiso, the
housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Also in
the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Kho’s three year old daughter Issa and her nanny,
Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty.
Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter,
Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their
kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting “Kuya Bert!”, but the latter
continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employer’s screams,
and locked herself with Issa in the master’s bathroom. When she peeped-out from her
hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter
did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-
Kho’s father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.

When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the
condominium unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of
Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The
accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim’s car. He was arrested soon afterwards in
Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that
she suffered eighteen (18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other
minor injuries. The stab wounds on her chest were considered fatal as they affected
both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and the heart itself. There were four stab
wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left lung. According to the
doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object and that the
incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been
inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, where the
victim worked, related that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had
confided to her about his grudges against the victim, such as being given spoiled food,
that his meals were being measured, that he worked long hours of the day and served
many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her boarding house
where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later he
said “nadedemonyo na ako” and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her
at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go
to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyer’s Advocate Circle, also testified
that before the killing, the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like
his being scolded for being late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and
other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the accused also told him not to get too close,
as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-
Kho, he testified, didn’t want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a
company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in
Tanay. She warned the accused that something bad would happen to him if her husband
would learn about it. In the evening of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged
accused to go to her father’s house, because her husband Daniel Kho would be
arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife
and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest control
of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed
her he was shocked and left the place using the victim’s car. He fled to Mindoro where
he allegedly surrendered to the police.[2]
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection
with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the
victim actual, moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective
sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is
also ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the victim’s life, all

with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from this date until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was
death. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[4] the case was transferred
and referred to the Court of Appeals.[5]
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision
and the complete records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the
Supreme Court on automatic review, immediately upon the promulgation of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellant’s claim of self defense for lack of
evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of wounds
sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. It also noted that treachery
did not attend the commission of the crime as there were no particulars as to how the
killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately
established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of
superior strength as an aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex
and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were
included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of
its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the
rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file
supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no

longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant insisted on his theory
of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
appellant’s claim of self-defense is self-serving hence should not be given
credence. InCabuslay v. People,[7] we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly,
the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying
circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted
in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing
evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self defense.
Appellant’s version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His
testimony that it was Atty. Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and
improbable. Appellant’s alleged use of reasonable means to repel the aggression is also
untenable considering the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim which
demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself.[8] We
note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart
and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was parrying
the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was
running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left
hand and that was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the
room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir.[9]
Moreover, appellant’s act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the
incident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly
indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self defense.[10]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of
a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For

treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of
execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory
acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted
by the offender.[11] Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.[12]
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where
no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the
act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.[13]
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength attended the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident
premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence;[14] that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[15] The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the
act was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be
considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to
his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[16]
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to
appellant’s state of mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the
victim. Both witnesses testified on appellant’s ill-plans against his employer the day
prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to
falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the
lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the
criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder
weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could
not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the
victim. In People v. Espina,[17] we have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse
of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the
amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court,[18] provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is
permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such

amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is
not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.[19]
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,[20] we had the occasion to distinguish between
substantial and formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely
of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as
his right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether
or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the
information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the
amendment is one of form and not of substance.[21]
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is
clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the
effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as
contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely
affect any substantial right of appellant.[22] Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult
or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or
sex.[23] Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived.[24]
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could
have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we
appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly
shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank,
age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the murder was his grudge against the
victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer. Neither did appellant took

into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a woman when he
killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,[25] as amended by R.A. No.
7659,[26] prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of superior strength
without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have been
death.[27]
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006[28], the penalty that should
be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-
Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.[29]
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the
amount of actual damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on
recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs
Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a
party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are
aimed at repairing the wrong done.[30] To be recoverable, actual and compensatory
damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.[31] In the present
case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25[32] is correct, considering that the said
amount has been duly proven.

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her
family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as
in this case. Moreover, as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the
Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01366, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y
Pahilanga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating
circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
CONCHITACARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 230-231.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 91-92.
[3] Records, p. 283. Penned by Judge Leili Suarez Acebo.
[4] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[5] CA rollo, p. 87.
[6] Id. at 99-100. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle.
[7] G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 256.
[8] People v. Galvez, 424 Phil. 743, 755 (2002).
[9] TSN, February 5, 2002, p. 41.
[10] People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499, 518 (2002). See also People v. Atadero, 435 Phil. 888, 904 (2002).
[11] People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20, 34 (1996).
[12] People v. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 148, 162.
[13] People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 676, 693-694.
[14] People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
[15] People v. Derilo, 338 Phil. 350, 375 (1997).
[16] People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 650, 658.
[17] 383 Phil. 656, 668 (2000).
[18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Sec. 14: Amendment or substitution.
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.
[19] People v. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159, 171 (2003).
[20] G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 142.
[21] People v. Degamo, supra at 172.
[22] Id.
[23] Records, pp. 225-226.
[24] People v. Degamo, supra at 173.
[25] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
[26] An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, other Special Penal Laws, and for other Purposes.
[27] See REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 63 and 248.
[28] Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided. On the other hand, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9346 specifically provides that the Act will take
effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation. R.A. No. 9346 was published
in Malaya and Manila Times, two national newspapers of general circulation on June 29, 2006. Accordingly, R.A. No.
9346 took effect on June 30, 2006.
[29] Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 555.
[30] Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 58, 69.
[31] LBC Express, Inc. v. Ado, G.R. No. 161760, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 216, 225.
[32] The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 and the Court of Appeals had a total of P298,202.25 as actual
damages. This amount is comprised of P25,438.25, representing the hospital bill; and P272,772.00, representing the price
of the casket and funeral services for Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho. The total of these two amounts is P298,210.25, not
P298,202.25.

SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 156606
representedby the Regional
Executive Director, Department of Present:
Environment and Natural Resources,
Regional Office IV, QUISUMBING, J.,
Petitioner, Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ILDEFONSOT. OLETA, Promulgated:
Respondent. August17, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
of the Decision[2]
dated 30 July 2002
and the Resolution[3]
dated 3 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66714. The 30 July 2002 Decision set aside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Morong, Rizal (trial court) which
reinstated the complaint filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and
denied respondent Ildefonso Oleta’s (respondent) motion for reconsideration,

respectively. The 3 January 2003 Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of free patent,
original certificate of title, and reversion against respondent and the Register of Deeds
ofRizal. On 17 April 2000, respondent filed his answer. Thereafter, the trial court
issued an Order dated 4 July 2000 directing petitioner “to take the legal steps so that
the case can be expedited.”
On 11 January 2001, the trial court issued an Order[4]
dismissing the complaint
without prejudice because of petitioner’s failure to set the case for pre-trial. Upon
petitioner’s motion and over respondent’s opposition, the trial court reinstated the
complaint on 15 March 2001.[5]
Pre-trial was set for 17 May 2001. However, on 8 May 2001, petitioner moved
that the pre-trial be reset to 14 June 2001 at 10:00 a.m. The trial court granted
petitioner’s motion and reset the pre-trial to 14 June 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The trial court
warned petitioner that failure to appear at the scheduled pre-trial would constrain the
trial court to act accordingly.
On the 14 June 2001 pre-trial, petitioner and petitioner’s counsel failed to
appear. Records also showed that petitioner failed to file a pre-trial brief. In an
Order[6]
dated the same day, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
prosecute.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s counsel explained that
he arrived at the pre-trial conference at 9:55 a.m. because he expected the pre-trial to
start at10:00 a.m., the time requested in the motion for postponement. Petitioner
also explained that the pre-trial brief was filed on 8 June 2001 by registered mail and
that it was unfortunate that neither the trial court nor respondent received it on
time. Petitioner asked the trial court to reconsider its 14 June 2001 Order and reset
the pre-trial to 2 August 2001.

In its 24 July 2001 Order,[7]
the trial court, in the interest of substantial justice,
granted petitioner’s motion and reinstated the complaint. Respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration. In its 6 September 2001 Order,[8]
the trial court denied
respondent’s motion.
On 18 September 2001, respondent filed a petition[9]
for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the 24 July 2001 and 6
September 2001Orders because the trial court disregarded the rules on pre-trial.
In its 30 July 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and set
aside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it reinstated the
complaint even if petitioner’s counsel had no special authority to represent plaintiff at
pre-trial. The Court of Appeals added that the trial court had no discretion on the
matter of petitioner’s failure to file its pre-trial brief on time.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in
its 3 January 2003 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the trial court.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
On Failure to File Pre-trial Brief

Section 6, Rule 18[10]
of the Rules of Court (Rules) mandates that parties shall file
with the court and serve on the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days
before the scheduled pre-trial. The Rules also provide that failure to file the pre-trial
brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.[11]
Therefore,
plaintiff’s failure to file the pre-trial brief shall be cause for dismissal of the action.[12]
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court had “no discretion” on the
matter of a party’s failure to file a pre-trial brief. If the trial court has discretion to
dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to appear at pre-trial,[13]
then the trial
court also has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to file the pre-
trial brief. Moreover, whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the
circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the
sound discretion of the trial court.[14]
In this case, petitioner sufficiently explained that the pre-trial brief was sent by
registered mail to the trial court and respondent on 8 June 2001. That the trial court
and respondent did not receive the pre-trial brief at least three days prior to the pre-
trial was already beyond petitioner’s control. Therefore, the trial court had discretion
to lift the order of dismissal after giving credence to petitioner’s explanation.
On the Absence of a Special Power of Attorney
Petitioner’s counsel admits that he was not equipped with a special power of
attorney when he appeared at the 14 June 2001 pre-trial. However, petitioner’s
counsel claims that the special authority need not be in writing and may be established
by competent evidence or subsequently ratified by the party concerned.[15]
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules provides:
SEC. 4. Appearanceof parties. ― It shall be the duty of the partiesand their counsels to
appearat the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is
showntherefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to
enterintoan amicable settlement,to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and
to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Under the old rules, a representative was allowed to establish the authority
needed by showing either a written special power of attorney or competent evidence
other than the self-serving assertions of therepresentative.[16]
However, the new rules
require nothing less than the authority be in writing. As held in United Coconut
Planters Bank v.Magpayo,[17]
“the rules now require the special power of attorney be
in writing becausethe courts can neither second-guess thespecific powers given to the
representative, nor can the courts assume that all the powers specified in Section 4 of
Rule 18 are granted by the party to his representative.”
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it
reinstated the complaint despite the fact that petitioner’s counsel had no special
authority to represent petitioner at pre-trial. However, abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be
grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily
and despotically.[18]
In this case, there is no showing that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion in reinstating petitioner’s complaint.
Moreover, in Calalang v. Court of Appeals,[19]
the Court ruled that “unless a
party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide
substantialgrounds for dismissalfor non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser
sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end.” In this case, there
is also no showing that petitioner willfully and flagrantly disregarded the trial court’s
authority. There is also no indication that petitioner had manifested lack of interest to
prosecute or acted deliberately with the intention to delay the
proceedings. Therefore, the trial court acted accordingly when it set aside the order of
dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of petitioner’s complaint.
We are not saying that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However,
exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their
application.[20]
In this instance, substantialjustice can be best served if both parties are
given the full opportunity to litigate their claims in a full-blown trial.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 30 July 2002 Decision
and 3 January 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66714. We REINSTATE the 24 July 2001 and 6 September 2001 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 80, Morong, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 26-33. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
[3] Id. at 34.
[4] Id. at 54.
[5] Id. at 56-57.
[6] Id. at 77.
[7] Id. at 79.
[8] Id. at 85-86.
[9] Id. at 88-98.
[10] Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. ― The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such a
manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-
trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of
dispute resolution indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried and resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre- trial.
[11] RULES OF COURT, Section 6, Rule 18.
[12] RULES OF COURT, Section 5, Rule 18.
[13] American Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Phils., 128 Phil. 490 (1967).
[14] Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp., 203 Phil. 606 (1982).
[15] Citing Lim Pin v. Liao Tan, 200 Phil. 685 (1982).
[16] See Fountainhead International Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86505, 11 February 1991, 194
SCRA 12; Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49410, 26 January 1989, 169 SCRA
409; Lim Pin v. LiaoTan, 200 Phil. 685 (1982); Home Insurance Co. v. United State Lines Co., 129 Phil. 106 (1967).
[17] G.R. No. 149908, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 669, 675.
[18] Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, G.R. No. 170232, 5 December 2006, 509 SCRA
532 citing Estate of Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 402 Phil. 271 (2001).
[19] G.R. No. 103185, 22 January 1993, 217 SCRA 462, 470.
[20] See Bahia Shipping Services Inc. v. Mosquera, 467 Phil. 766 (2004).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 76344-46 June 30, 1988
ANG KEK CHEN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ABUNDIO BELLO, as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Eriberto D. Ignacio for petitioner.
YAP, C.J.:
Petitioner questions the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction committed by
respondent Judge Abundio Bello in violating Administrative Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974,
regarding the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431, and prays that the Cour t orders
the outright dismissal of the cases.
It appears from the records that on December 28, 1977, petitioner Ang was charged before the then Manila
City Court (now Metropolitan Trial Court), Branch VIII, with the crimes of "MALTREATMENT," "THREATS,"
and "SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES," committed according to the information as follows:
Criminal Case No. 021429 (Maltreatment)
That on or about December 26, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ill-treat by deed one, LE HE CO Y YU
DE ANG by then and there, slapping her and giving her fist/blows on her head several
times, without, however, inflicting upon said LE HE CO Y YU DE ANG any physical injury.
Criminal Case No. 021430 (Threats)
That on or about December 25, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused in
the heat of anger, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten to commit
a wrong and inflict bodily harm upon the person of Le He Co y Yu De Ang by then and
there threatening to kill her but, accused, however, by subsequent acts, did not persist in
the Idea conceived in his threats.
Criminal Case No. 021431 (Slight Physical Injuries)
That on or about December 26, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one LUCRECIA ANG Y GO by then and there slapping her on
the face and by beating her thereby inflicting upon the said LUCRECIA ANG Y GO physical
injuries which have required and will require medical attendance for a period of more than
one but not more than 9 days and incapacitated and will incapacitate the said Lucrecia Ang
y Go from performing her customary labor during the said period of time.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Ang filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was denied by
the respondent court. Ang elevated the incident to the Regional Trial Court of Manila on certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. The petition was
likewise denied (Order dated November 18,1983). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
Regional Trial Court's Order.
Meanwhile, the then presiding judge of MTC Branch VIII (where the rases were pending) was promoted to
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. As a consequence, respondent judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC
(Manila), directed the return of the case records to the Clerk of Court for "re-raffle." Petitioner, however,
alleged that he received the corresponding order only on August 23, 1984, or AFTER the cases had
already been actually "re-raffled" and assigned to respondent judge on August 16, 1984.

On September 27, 1984, Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 1
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
1. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in the manner he conducted the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429,021430
and 021431 Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'C' hereof in gross violation of Circular No. 7 of this Hon.
Court in his capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
resulting in the assignment to the branch presided by himself of the aforesaid three (3)
criminal cases and in denying peremptorily the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
contesting the manner of said raffle.
2. This Hon. Court in the exercise of its rule making power and supervision over all lower
courts as demonstrated in several cases decided by it since its reconstitution under the
present administration in having displayed judicial statemanship and activism and in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction may order the outright dismissal of the said three (3)
Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431 Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of this
petition."
On November 17, 1986, the Court required the public respondents to comment on the petition. On January
26, 1987, the Solicitor General, in an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, prayed that the entire records of
the case be ordered transmitted from Branch XIII, Metropolitan Court of Manila, to the Solicitor General's
Office, so that a comment may be prepared.
In the Comment dated June 23, 1987, the Solicitor General stated that the issue of the alleged non-
compliance with the Court's circular regarding the raffle of cases was trivial, that the Court's guidelines on
the matter did not vest any substantive right and a violation thereof did not per se infringe any
constitutional right of the accused, and that the raffling of cases did not involve an exercise of judicial
function, but was a mere administrative matter involving the distribution of cases among the different
branches of the court, which could not be the subject matter of a special civil action for certiorari. The
Solicitor General, however, stated in his comment that in Criminal Case No. 021430, for Light Threats, a
review of the records showed no evidence on the alleged threat to kill, hence it should be dismissed. As
regards Criminal Case 021429 (Maltreatment) and 021431 (Slight Physical Injuries) the Solicitor General
opined that it was premature to determine petitioner's guilt or innocence, for unless rebutted, e vidence on
record appeared sufficient to establish the prosecution's cause.
The principal issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion in violation of Circular No. 7 of this Court,
regarding the manner of raffle of cases, not denied or explained by public respondent, is not a trivial one.
The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to insure
impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases public suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
predetermined judges is obviated.
A violation or disregard of the Court's circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be
countenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal.
When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question, apparently in
violation of the Court's Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that he had some ulterior
motive for doing so, but he violated the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above board.
We consider the procedure of raffling cases to be an important element of judicial proceedings, designed
precisely to give assurance to the parties that the court hearing their case would be impartial. On this point,
we found the petition meritorious.
Regarding the other prayer of petitioner for the outright dismissal of the cases invoking the equity
jurisdiction of this Court, we are inclined to adopt the view of the Solicitor General that Criminal Case No.
021430 (for Light Threats) should be dismissed for lack of evidence. Even Hon. Manuel T. Reyes (later to
become Justice of the Court of Appeals), before whom as a Regional Trial Judge the case was brought on
certiorari, was of the opinion that there was "utter paucity" of evidence with respect to the charge of threats
in Criminal Case No. 021430 to put to "serious doubt the legal cogency of the disputed orders of April 21
and July 20, 1983;" however, on procedural grounds he refrained from granting the petition. Considering
the comment of the Solicitor General we find merit in petitioner's contention that Criminal Case No. 021430
should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the order of the respondent court denying petitioner's motion to re-raffle the criminal cases in
question, except Criminal Case No. 021430 for threat which is hereby DISMISSED, is set aside and the
said cases Criminal Cases No. 021429 and 021431 are remanded to the Executive Judge for re-raffle in
accordance with this Court's Circular No. 7.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Respondent Judge was not re-appointed when the judiciary was reorganized pursuant to
the Freedom Constitution of 1986.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31084 May 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG alias "WESTRING", ELIGIO CACAYAN, JULIAN AGUILAR and
FRANCISCO GARLEJO, defendants, ANTONIO BAUTISTA alias "BUCOT", ANTOLIN CASTRO and
MIGUEL BEGENIO alias "ANING", defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:1äw phï 1. ñët
In an Information dated May 15, 1967 filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Westrimundo
Tabayoyong, alias "Westring", Antonio Bautista, alias "Bucot", Antolin Castro, Eligio Cacayan, Alias
"Cadio" Julian Aguilar, Miguel Begenio, alias "Aning", and Francisco Garlejo, were charged with the crime
of murder alleged to have been committed as follows:1äwphï 1. ñët
That on or about 21st day of January, 1966, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, in the
municipality of Manaoag, Pangasinan Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with bolo, knives and hard piece of
bamboo, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation. abuse of
superior strength, treachery, in consideration of a prize or reward and in utter disregard of
the respect due the offended party, MARCELO GUICO Y JACOB, a Barrio Captain of
Barrio Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike with said bolo. knives and hard piece of
bamboo MARCELO GUICO Y JACOB thereby inflicting upon him wounds and injuries
which caused his death.
That in attacking, assaulting and striking and MARCELO GUICO y JACOB, the above-
named accused took advantage of nighttime besides superior strength to insure the
success of their acts and plans.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment, all of the above-named accused pleaded "not guilty". Before trial commenced, the
court, upon petition of the Special Counsel handling the prosecution of the case, discharged the accused
Francisco Garlejo from the Information in order that he may be utilized as a government witness. 2
During
the progress of the trial, accused Eligio Cacayan who was then released on bail, disappeared and was
believed to be dead, while. accused Julian Aguilar escaped from jail and was never found again. Thus. the
trial continued only as to the other four accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antolin Castro, Miguel
Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista. 3
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of: (1) the discharged accused Francisco
Garlejo, (2) Dr. Florencio Mangaliman the Municipal Health Officer of Manaoag, Pangasinan who
conducted the necropsy examination on the body of the deceased Marcelo Guico, (3) Mrs. Encarnacion
Guico, widow of the deceased, (4) Municipal Judge Marcelino Andrada who conducted the preliminary
investigation, and the autopsy report (Exhibit "A"), photographs of the victim after his death (Exhibits "B" to
B-1-b"), the extrajudicial statements of Francisco Garlejo (Exhibit "C"), Julian Aguilar (Exhibit "D") and
Eligio Cacayan (Exhibit "E"), and the transcript of the second stage of the hearing during the preliminary
investigation (Exhibit "F").
The substance of the testimony of the principal witness for the prosecution, former accused Francisco
Garlejo, is summarized by the lower court, thus:1äwphï 1.ñët
... In the night of January 21, 1966, he, Eligio Cacayan, Julian Aguilar, Antolin Castro,
Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista killed Marcelo Guico in Bo. Cabilaoan
Manaoag, Pangasinan. He declared that they killed Marcelo Guico at the instance of the
accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong who promised them a reward of P1,000.00 after killing
Marcelo Guico. According to this witness it all began one late afternoon in January, 1966,
when he and the accused Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan were. together, walking in a
barrio road of Inamotan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, which adjoins barrio Camantiles of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, the four other accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong, Antolin Castro,

Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista arrived and approached the witness and his
companions. The accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong greeted them by saying 'So you are
here.' In that occasion, Westrimundo Tabayoyong proposed to them to kill Marcelo Guico,
Bo. Captain of Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan, offering to pay them P1,000.00 if they
succeeded. The said witness declared that in the conversations that day, the accused
Westrimundo Tabayoyong and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista did most of the talking. Knowing
that the proposal was a bad one, the witness said that he and his companions did not
agree. Before they separated, however, Westrimundo Tabayoyong allegedly told the
witness and his two companions to think it over and to be at the same place on another day
to give their decision.
The witness and his two companions went to the same place on the designated day and
there they met again their four co-accused. Altho the proposal was renewed, the witness
and his companions did not agree. So the latter were told to be at the same place on
another day designated for them to talk over the proposal some more. On this third meeting
when the witness and his companions hesitated to agree to the proposal of Westrimundo
Tabayoyong, the accused Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista forced them to accept the said proposal
by threatening them with bodily harm if they did not agree. Before they parted the witness
and his companions were told to meet with their co-accused once more so that they would
know the other details of their plan to kill Marcelo Guico. And so, about three days before
the execution of their agreement, all the accused met on the same place and the witness
and his companions were told to gather in the house of the accused Eligio Cacayan in the
afternoon of January 21, 1969 (sic), where the other accused would meet them.
In the afternoon of that day, the accused, Julian Aguilar passed for the witness and,
together, they went to the house of the accused Eligio Cacayan in Bo. Barrientos,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, When they arrived there Eligio Cacayan told them that their co-
conspirators were not yet in. After sometime, however, the accused Antolin Castro, Miguel
Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista arrived. Around seven o'clock that evening all six of
them proceeded to the house of the accused Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista in Bo. Cabilaoan,
also in Manaoag, Pangasinan. On the way they stopped by a small store owned by a
certain Sito Escritor where Antonio Bucot Bautista bought four bottles of wine. There they
drank three of the four bottles and moved on. On their way they met the accused
Westrimundo Tabayoyong who reminded them that if they succeeded in killing Marcelo
Guico he would pay them P1,000.00. When they reached the house of Antonio 'Bucot'
Bautista the latter served them dinner and let them drink the fourth bottle of wine which was
left of the four bottles they got from the store of Sito Escritor. Then, Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista
told them that it was time to go. They proceeded to Bo. Cabilaoan. At a certain point in the
barrio road of Cabilaoan Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista stopped them and told them that they
would wait for their intended victim, Marcelo Guico. The time me was between eight and
nine o'clock that night.
They sat by the road side and waited. About two and a half hours later, they saw a man riding
on a bicycle with lights coming down the road. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista stopped him. The man
was Marcelo Guico their intended victim Antonio "Bucot" Bautista held him by pointing a gun at
him. Then he thrust a bamboo club to Eligio Cacayan and ordered: "Club him." Marcelo Guico
pleaded for his life saying: "Please do not kill me for the sake of my children." Eligio Cacayan
hesitated but because he feared Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, he got the bamboo club and struck
Marcelo Guico at the back of the latter's head. The victim was thrown towards Antonio "Bucot"
Bautista and grappled with the latter. Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista ordered his companions to hold
him. Miguel Begenio went behind the victim and held him by the legs. Antolin Castro held one
hand of the victim and the witness helped also by holding the other hand of Marcelo Guico.
Antonio "Bucot" Bautista then got the bamboo club from Eligio Cacayan and struck the victim's
head at the back. Marcelo Guico put his right hand on his head just as Antonio "Bucot" Bautista
hit him anew right where the victim placed his hand. The victim became limp and he was
dropped on the ground. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista drew a bolo which he carried by his side, held
the victim by the head and bolowed him several times slashing his neck and hacking him on the
head and face. Then he gave the bolo to Eligio Cacayan and ordered him to do likewise. Eligio
Cacayan out of fear, hacked and slashed the victim on the face. Antonio "Bucot" Bautista,
Miguel Begenio and Antolin Castro pulled the deceased and deposited him by the roadside
while Julian Aguilar took the victim's bicycle farther down the road. Then Antonio "Bucot"
Bautista ordered them to go home, with assurance to pay them later their share of the Pl,000.00
promised to them by Westrimundo Tabayoyong. The foul deed was all over before 11:30 o'clock
that night. 4
The post-mortem findings of Dr. Florencio Mangaliman showed that the deceased sustained the following
injuries:1äwphï 1. ñët

1. A mortal slash wound about 10-½ inches long across the neck just above the Adam's
apple, from the left side of the neck to the right side, about 2 inches wide and about 5
inches deep, severing the cervical bone, by means of a sharp instrument, thus injuring the
spinal cord.
2. A slash wound about 10 inches long from the lower eyelid of the left eye, cutting the
bridge of the nose and the zygomatic or cheek bone of the right side of the face, about 1
inch wide and about 3 inches deep, by means of a sharp instrument.
3. Another cut wound about 8 inches long from the vicinity of the right nostril to the center
of the nape, right side.
4. A cut v and at the level of the mouth located near its outer canthus, right side, cutting the
right lower jaw and connected to the first wound above mentioned.
5. A shattered lacerated wound, star shaped, over the occipital region of the head about 3
inches long and about 2 inches wide, produced by a blunt instrument.
6. Another lacerated wound about 1 inch long just behind the right ear or mastoid area.
7. Another lacerated wound of about- 1-½ inches long located about 2 inches above the
right ear.
8. A compound fracture with laceration of the terminal phalanx bone of the right little finger,
by a blunt instrument.
9. A chop wound somewhat circular in shape, about 1 inch in diameter, over the first knuckle of
the middle finger of the right hand, produced by a sharp instrument. 5
The necropsy report further stated that the cause of death was "an irreversible shock due to the injury of
the spinal cord and vertebrae of the neck, cerebral concussion and profuse bleeding." 6
At the witness
stand, Dr. Florencio Mangaliman testified that wounds nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 located at the face and neck could
have been caused by a bolo; wound no. 5 in the occipital region or at the back of the head could have
been caused by wood or bamboo; wounds nos. 6 and 7 and fracture no. 8 could have been caused by a
blunt instrument; and wound no. 9 was caused by chopping. 7
The widow of the deceased; Mrs. Encarnacion Guico, testified inter alia: that the accused Antolin Castro
was the defeated opponent of her late husband Marcelo Guico for the office of Barrio Captain of Bo.
Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan; that she did not know the party affiliation of her husband, but since his
opponent Castro was a Nacionalista, then the deceased could have belonged to the Liberal Party; that as
Barrio Captain elected in 1963, the deceased was very strict in the enforcement of regulations against
stealing, gambling and cattle rustling, thus he made many enemies; that several times during his lifetime,
the deceased told her (Mrs. Guico) that he had apprehended and issued warnings to the accused Antolin
Castro, Antonio Bautista and Miguel Begenio several times for their gambling activities; that on one
occasion, she was present when the accused Antolin Castro and Antonio Bautista were investigated for
gambling (playing cards) but the case was settled amicably after they were warned by the deceased not to
play gambling again; and, that the wife of accused Miguel Begenio was her first cousin. Mrs. Guico also
stated that her deceased husband mentioned to her that he had an altercation with the accused
Westrimundo Tabayoyong during which the latter almost shot the deceased on account of his strictness in
enforcing regulations. 8
The then Municipal Judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, Marcelino Andrada, who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the three original accused, namely, Francisco Garlejo, Julian Aguilar and Eligio Cacayan,
testified that he personally typed the statements given by said accused which the witness identified as
Exhibits "C", "D" and "E", respectively. Judge Andrada also identified the records of his preliminary
investigation presented in the lower court as Exhibit "F". He further stated that during the preliminary
investigation, he purposely planted one Bernabe Manlepes 9
the janitor of the Mayor of the town, whom
former accused Francisco Garlejo pointed to as one of his companions in the execution of the gruesome
murder. He, however, also admitted that said Bernabe Manlepes looked very much like the real accused
Miguel Begenio. 10
To the accusation filed against them, the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong Antonio "Bucot" Bautista,
Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio, with respect to whom the trial proceeded, all interposed the defense of
alibi, independently of each other as follows:

Accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong alleged that on the night the heinous crime was committed, he was in
the company of Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala, former Vice-Mayor Legaspi, Atty. Ireneo Salinas, one Atty.
Aquino and then Governor Conrado Estrella, at the Carbungco Restaurant in Quezon City where the latter
invited and took them to dinner. The said accused claimed that he left Pangasinan for Manila on January
19, 1966 with Zabala, Legaspi and Salinas, and returned to Pangasinan only on January 22, 1966, or the
day after Marcelo Guico was killed. 11
Corroborating the allegations of Tabayoyong was the testimony of
his witness, Assistant Fiscal Leon Zabala. 12
Accused Antonio "Bucot" Bautista accounted for his whereabouts on the fateful night of the murder as
follows: On January 19, 1966, he went to Barrio Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac to collect the debt of P50.00 owed
to him by his uncle, Eusebio Melegrito and stayed in that place up to January 22, 1966. 13
Melegrito who
was presented as a defense witness, confirmed the testimony of Bucot Bautista. This witness also averred
that the accused Bautista had to stay for three days in Toledo because he (Melegrito) was able to sell his
palay only on January 21, 1966 and paid Bautista only on that night, so that the latter left for Pangasinan
only at dawn of the following day, January 22, 1966. This witness further declared that during the three
days that the accused Bautista waited to be paid, he helped the witness in the piling of his palay, and
never left the witness' house in Bo. Toledo. 14
Accused Antolin Castro testified that from January 13 to January 20, 1966, he was in Manila following up
his application papers in connection with his intended trip to Vietnam. 15
He presented his uncle-in-law,
Simon Bilog, who claimed to have visited the accused Castro and conversed with him in the evening of
January 20, 1966 up to midnight. 16
The same accused, however, failed to account for his whereabouts
and activities on the night of the murder, and when interrogated on his alleged participation in the
conspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico, he merely denied having any knowledge of it and averred that the
accusation against him was untrue. 17
Lastly, accused Miguel Begenio testified that in the evening of January 21, 1966, he was in his own house
at Barrio Cabilaoan, Manaoag, Pangasinan sleeping with his wife and children, and that he learned of the
death of Marcelo Guico only on the next day, January 22, 1966. He further testified that he was even
present during the embalming of the deceased, and together with his wife, he attended for several nights
the vigil over the remains of the murdered man and the nightly prayers after the burial with the family of
deceased, the latter's widow being a first cousin of his (Begenio's) wife. 18
After trial, judgment was rendered on July 24, 1969, the dispositive portion of which reads:1äwphï 1. ñët
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused WESTRIMUNDO TABAYOYONG not
guilty of the crime charged, his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
bond he has filed for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
The accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista are hereby found
to have conspired and caused the death of Marcelo Guico and are, therefore, guilty of the
crime of murder as charged in the information. In the commission of the said offense, the
aggravating circumstances of:1äwphï 1.ñët
1) that the crime was committed in consideration of a price or reward, or at
least a promise thereof;
2) abuse of superior strength;
3) nighttime, purposely sought to facilitate its commission; and
4) that the wrong done was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission when, after the victim was killed,
the accused deliberately slashed his throat and sliced his face several times
on several places,
were found to be present. No mitigating circumstance has been offered by the accused
Pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the said accused, each and all of
them, are hereby sentenced to death. They are likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Marcelo Guico in the amount of P12,000.00. May God have mercy on their
souls.
SO ORDERED. 19

On August 29, 1969, the accused Miguel Begenio moved for reconsideration and/or newtrial on the
grounds of: (1) insufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
newly discovered evidence. The motion, however, was denied on September 9, 1969.
On October 13, 1969, the records of the ease were elevated to Us for an automatic review of the death
penalty imposed on the accused Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, herein
appellants, who have filed their respective briefs.
Appellant Miguel Begenio raises the following Assignment of errors:1äwphï 1.ñët
I. The lower court erred in accepting the testimony of the discharged accused Francisco
Garlejo without any convincing corroborative evidence.
II. The lower Court erred in finding that the evidence established a positive Identification of
the accused Miguel Begenio.
III. The lower Court erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.
IV. The lower Court erred in not accepting the defense of alibi interposed by the accused
Miguel Begenio.
Appellant Antonio Bautista alias "Bucot" makes the following Assignment of Errors:1äwphï 1. ñët
I. The trial Court erred in attaching full complete and absolute credence to the testimonies
of Francisco Garlejo the liberated accused turned witness for the prosecution, against the
herein defendant-appellant Antonio Bautista, notwithstanding that, aside from corning from
a polluted source, his testimonies were so apparently forced, unreliable, uncorroborated
and contrary to the common sense and the ordinary course of things.
II. The trial Court erred in attaching any more significance, weight or value to the rest of the
testimony of Francisco Garlejo against the herein appellant, after having rightly and
correctly found, held and dismissed as mere "second thought" and "someone else's Idea
not Garlejo's" those portions thereof against the accused Westrimundo Tabayoyong.
III. The trial Court erred in finding and holding that there was sufficient motive for the
appellant to COMMIT the cold-blooded murder as charged in the information.
IV. The trial Court erred in completely disregarding and in not giving any credit, weight or
value to the testimony of the appellant to the effect that, at the time of the incident, he was
in Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac in the house of his uncle Eusebio Melegrito who corroborated his
testimony simply on the ground that, in the words of the trial court itself, "It is too good and
too perfect to be true," a conclusion which is not only, biased, unjust, unreasonable and
apparently malicious, but also absolutely without any real basis in fact, in evidence and in
law.
V. The trial Court erred in not declaring the appellant absolutely innocent of the charge and,
accordingly, in not ordering his complete and absolute acquittal for the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.
Appellant Antolin Castro interposes the following Assignment of Errors:1äwphï 1. ñët
I. The trial Court erred in giving any weight to the testimony of Francisco Garlejo.
II. The trial Court erred in not aquitting Antolin Castro in the face of a reasonable doubt in
the guilt, if any, of herein appellant.
A perusal of the foregoing assignments of errors shows that a common error is assigned, that is, that the
trial Court erred in according credence to the testimony of the accused turned State witness Francisco
Garlejo. Herein appellants Miguel Begenio, Antonio "Bucot" Bautista and Antolin Castro join together in
seeking to discredit and cast doubt on the testimony of the aforenamed discharged accused and in
assailing the latter's credibility. At this point, it is important to mention the significant fact that in convicting
herein appellants and sentencing them to death, the trial Court relied heavily and principally, if not solely,
on the testimony of Garlejo. For purpose of this automatic review, therefore, it is imperative that Garlejo's
testimony be carefully studied and meticulously scrutinized.

The main thrust of the arguments of herein appellants in support of their common assigned error is that
Garlejo's testimony comes from a polluted source and the same was not validly and convincingly
corroborated in any of its material points by any other witness or witnesses, nor by any other evidence for
the prosecution, hence it cannot and should not be legally accepted and made the basis for the imposition
of the supreme penalty of death.
We find the contention meritorious. However, before delving into the merits of appellants' arguments, a
brief discussion on the pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence governing the discharge of an accused
to become a state witness is in order.
In allowing the discharge of a defendant who is a participes criminis to become a witness for the
prosecution and against his co-defendants, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:1äwphï 1.ñët
Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution. – When
two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the competent
court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, man, direct one or more of
them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for the
government when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
A competent court within the above section means the court before which the trial is held. 20
The discharge
of an accused who may turn a state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court which
has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. 21
A discharge
amounts to an acquittal and is a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the released
defendant fails or refuses to testify against the other remaining accused, 22
and such failure is attributable
to the former's will or fault. 23
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the testimony of a discharged defendant, though admissible,
is still subject to the tests on credibility as any other testimonial evidence. Thus, although an order of
discharge of an accused issued by the trial Court may raise a presumption that all the requisites for its
issuance in fact exist, and therefore that the discharge is in order, the same Court is not duty bound to
believe the testimony of the discharged defendant and pronounce a judgment of conviction against the
remaining accused merely on the strength of such testimony. The Court must be satisfied that the State
evidence consisting of the testimony of a liberated participes criminis is credible.
Furthermore, it is also a well-settled rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame for the killing and implicating his co-accused cannot by itself and without
corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter had committed or participated in
the commission of the crime. Thus it is required that the testimony be substantially corroborated by other
evidence in all its material points.1äwphï 1. ñët
The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of accomplices, or what may be,
variously termed principals, confederates, or conspirators, is not in doubt. The evidence of
accomplices is admissible and competent. Yet such testimony comes from a 'polluted
source.' Consequently, it is scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If
not corroborated credibility is affected. Even then, however, the defendant may be
convicted upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice. If corroborated absolutely or
even to such an extent as is indicative of trustworthiness, the testimony of the accomplice
is sufficient to warrant of conviction. ...
To quote from one of many decisions of this court, which concerns both the credibility of
witnesses as determined by the trial court and the competency of testimony by an

accomplice, we turn to the case of The United States vs. Ambrosio and Falsario (1910, 17
Phil., 295), wherein it is said:
It is unquestionably true that the testimony of an accomplice must be taken faith great care and
caution It must be assayed and weighed with scrupulous care. The corroborating testimony
must be strong and convincing. It is also true, however, that when the testimony of an
accomplice is corroborated by unimpeachable testimony and by strong circumstances, it may
be given its due weight and force against the person in regard to whom it is presented. ... 24
Counsel for the appellants assigns as error the action of the trial court in dismissing the
information as to some of those who were included in the same charge upon which they were
convicted and permitting the Government to make use of the persons thus discharged as
witnesses; having admitted their guilt of the crime of which appellants were convicted, their
evidence should not have been taken into consideration. While it is true that the evidence of
witnesses of this character is subject to the gravest suspicion and, taken by itself, might not be
sufficient to justify a conviction, nevertheless, the proceeding subjected to is specifically
authorized ...; and in this case the evidence offered by these witnesses were substantiated by
that of many others, both as to the existence of the band of brigands and the connection of the
accused with the same, and there was no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the interests of
the accused. 25
...The witness who testified were those released from prosecution for that purpose. Such
testimony, while under proper circumstances entirely acceptable, is at the outset always subject
to suspicion and it requires only very little credible evidence to ripen that suspicion into a
certainty. 26
It is elementary law that a defendant in a criminal action cannot be convicted on the evidence of
art accomplice only, and that to sustain such a conviction there must be other evidence
corroborating that of the accomplice, which tends to show the guilt of the defendant. 27
... But this witness was evidently a party in the conspiracy and his testimony should not be
accepted without corroboration, of which there is none; for it is a well recognized rule that the
testimony of one of several conspirators should not be accepted, as against his fellows; without
some corroboration. This is especially applicable in a situation where the facts testified to would
if fully accepted, necessarily result in the imposition of the death penalty. 28
Defendant and appellant Rufo Dizon in this case complains that he was convicted by the lower
court, mainly on the strength of the testimony of his cousin and co-accused Tomas Dizon. In
this jurisdiction, a co-accused or a co-defendant who has been found guilty or innocent in the
same case, is always a competent witness for, or against, any of his co-accused (United States
vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 170). And it has even been held that the uncorroborated
testimony of a co-accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment
of conviction (United States vs. Wayne Shoup 35 Phil. 56; United States vs. Remigio, 37 Phil.
610); although the better rule is that to serve as a legal basis for conviction the testimony of an
accomplice must always be corroborated by some other witness or evidence (People vs.
Asinas, 53 Phil. 59; People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 834). And the testimony of defendant Tomas
Dizon, a cousin of herein defendant and appellant, as a witness for the prosecution, as to the
taking of the carabaos in question from the municipality of Labrador to the municipality of
Mabini, where defendants disposed of them, has been fully corroborated by said witness
Domingo Victorio and by the chief of police and the justice of the peace, who testified as to the
admissions made by herein defendant and appellant as to their taking and disposition of the
carabaos in question, and his plea of guilty. 29
And although it is true that the declarations of an accomplice should be taken with
caution, coming as they do from a polluted source, we are satisfied from a reading of the whole
record that his version, corroborated on important points by the circumstances disclosed, may
be made the basis or one of the bases of a judgment of conviction. The contention is not true
that the Faltados are convicted 'solely and exclusively, on the strength of the testimony' of
Aquilino Agno. They were Identified among others by the offended parties, Angel Biscocho,
Raymunda Perez and Silveria Biscocho. 30
... Such testimony may warrant conviction if corroborated to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest (People vs. Riparip 86 Phil. 526; 47 Off. Gaz. (12th Supp
15P.). In the present case, Tomas Carandang's testimony finds ample corroboration in the
written confessions of Eugenio Mendoza and Eliseo Carandang, as well as in that of Modesto
Leviste, who confirmed the truth of their contents in open court. 31
The requirements of credibility and corroboration in material points apply with greater reason to the
testimony of a defendant discharged under Rule 119, section 9 above-quoted considering that the

condition of a discharge is that the liberated defendant should testify against his former co-defendants. As
succinctly elucidated in the case of Bernardo vs. Del Rosario 32
:1äwphï 1. ñët
When a defendant is discharged from the information, a contract is entered between him
and the State. The discharge will be secured if the defendant will honestly and fairly make
a full disclosure of the crime. It is incumbent upon him to keep his part of the contract if he
hopes to receive the promised immunity; and if his testimony is corrupt or his disclosure is
only partial, he gains nothing but forfeits his rights under the contract (15 Am. Jur. sec. 32,
p. 17; U.S. v. Grant & Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; V. Francisco's Rules of Court, par. II, p. 330,
Rev. Ed.). Courts should not give a premium to a culprit who worked himself into gaining
his acquittal, upon a deception and a contumacious disregard of an agreement validly
entered into.
Thus, "(i)f the testimony of the accomplice is corrupt or his disclosure is only partial, he gains nothing but
forfeits his right to exemption." 33
Stated otherwise, the benefits of acquittal and freedom from further
prosecution may be enjoyed fully and completely by a discharged defendant only if he testifies for the
prosecution and against the rest of the accused. "(I)t is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit,
confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others rather than himself. Even though a court may well
credit the statement of such a witness that other particular persons were engaged in the crime, it is unsafe
to accept without corroborating evidence, his statements concerning the relative blame to be attached to
different members of his gang." 34
It is for this reason that the Rules of Court require that several conditions
be met before an accused may be discharged to act as a government witness.
The very nature of a discharge makes it more imperative that the testimony of a discharged defendant be
received with utmost care, caution and circumspection.
Guided by the principles laid down by the law and jurisprudence set forth above, We shall now proceed to
consider the facts and circumstances at bar.
There is no question as to the correctness of the premise of appellants' contention that the testimony of
Garlejo comes from a polluted source. We fully agree. As earlier stated, Garlejo was one of the original
defendants in this murder case, hence one of those whom the Municipal Judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation found reasonable ground to believe was guilty of the crime charged. Not only that.
This State witness also unconditionally, unmistakably and voluntarily admitted his participation in the
conspiracy ' to commit the murder and the actual killing of the deceased Marcelo Guico, both in the
preliminary investigation, as evidenced by his Extrajudicial Statement (Exhibit "C") and the record of the
proceedings of said investigation (Exhibit "F"), and during the trial itself, when he was presented as the
prosecution's star witness. His testimony is, therefore, regarded as the testimony given by an accomplice
or co-conspirator.
Alerted by this fact, the next inquiry is whether Garlejo's testimony withstands the test of credibility. We
hold in the negative. Even the lower Court was not absolute in giving credence to the whole testimony of
Garlejo. The decision under review states:1äwphï 1. ñët
... The principal evidence laid against Westrimundo Tabayoyong is found in the testimony of
Francisco Garlejo. This witness testified that altho he to see the accused Westrimundo
Tabayoyong on several campaign meetings, he and the accused were never acquainted and
have never spoken together until one day in early January, 1966, while the witness and Eligio
Cacayan and Julian Aguilar were walking on the roadside in Bo. Inamotan, Manaoag
Pangasinan , Westrimundo Tabayoyong, in company with Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and
Antonio "Bicot" Bautista, allegedly accosted them, Westrimundo Tabayoyong saying to them:
So you are here.' Right on that occasion this witness testified that Westrimundo Tabayoyong
proposed to then-. the killing of Marcelo Guico for the consideration of Pl,000.00. This story is
hard to believe. It could not be imagined how Westrimundo Tabayoyong, a municipal councilor
and budding politician could propose to people he has never known before and whom he was
meeting for the first time, right then and there by the roadside, the liquidation of a barrio captain.
Francisco Garlejo testified that he and his companions have met with Westrimundo Tabayoyong
and also his companions three times more afterwards, and in all these meetings Westrimundo
Tabayoyong has proposed to them the liquidation of Marcelo Guico for reward. If we have to
stretch our imagination to believe Francisco Garlejo's testimony on this point, no mater how
stupid Westrimundo Tabayoyong would be, the Court cannot just believe that he would himself
personally propose to people he was meeting for the first time the killing of Marcelo Guico-
Matters of this kind are not done except in secrecy- and only after the proponent has the
confidence of the persons to whom he makes the proposal. 35
We agree with the trial court's holding that Francisco Garlejo's testimony to the effect that Westrimundo
Tabayoyong proposed and was the mastermind in the killing of the victim Marcelo Guico by offering a

reward of P1,000 to all the accused is inherently improbable, and accordingly, We find as justified the
acquittal at the accused Tabayoyong based on the ground that, in the words of the Court, independent of
Westrimundo Tabayoyong weak defense of alibi, the latter can not be convicted because the evidence
given against him was weak, unreliable and even unbelievable. No motive was given by the prosecution for
Westrimundo Tabayoyong to wish the killing of Marcelo Guico. No evidence was given why he should pay
P1,000.00 to have Marcelo Guico killed. It is not on the weakness of an accused's alibi that he should be
convicted but it should be on the showing beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty (upon which) a
conviction must be made. (CFI Decision, p. 47, Records).
The reasoning for Tabayoyong's acquittal however was ignored or brushed aside by the Court in convicting
the three remaining accused Antonio Bautista, Antolin Castro and Miguel Begenio. For while the trial court
acquitted the accused Tabayoyong because it refused to give credence to the evidence given by the
discharge defendent Francisco Garlejo as Tabayoyong's alleged participation in the conspiracy to commit
the murder, the said Court nevertheless convicted the remaining three accused on the very same
testimony of the defendant Garlejo. Rationalizing its decision of conviction, the Court said:1äwphï 1. ñët
But although the testimony of Francisco Garlejo in the conspiracy allegedly broached to
them by Westrimundo Tabayoyong were to be detached from the facts in this case, this
does not impair the testimony of Garlejo against the other accused. For, as this Court has
already observed, implicating Westrimundo Tabayoyong appears more to be some one
else's Idea than Garlejo's. And, as also observed earlier in this decision, the more probable
time a conspiracy to kill Marcelo Guico was made was in the afternoon of January 21,
1966, either in the house of Eligio Cacayan or in the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista.
The Court recalls that on that day, Julian Aguilar picked up Francisco Garlejo from his
house and together they went to the house of Eligio Cacayan. Julian Aguilar was with a
quitar and thought they might do some serenading on that night (Exhibit "D"). It is therefore
clear that murder was not in their minds. But Francisco Garlejo in his preliminary
investigation stated that in the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista that evening, after they
were wined and fed the agreement to kill Marcelo Guico was 'cooked'. In that occasion all
the accused, Westrimundo Tabayoyong excepted, were present. While this finding may
perhaps affect the credibility of Francisco Garlejo, it still remains believable considering that
this Court finds this charge reconcilable with probability and the truth. (CFIDecision, pp.
48-49, Records).
In convicting the accused Antolin Castro, the trial court said:1äwphï 1. ñët
Evidence exists Chat this accused was the rival of the deceased in the election of a barrio
captain. He lost to the deceased for this position. The next election of a barrio captain was
coming up. This is a plausible cause to make the accused want the deceased eliminated
evidence also exists that this accused and Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista
were seen several tunes by the witness Francisco Garlejo in gambling dens and were also
connected with thefts in the neighborhood. The wife of the deceased testified that her
deceased husband as barrio captain has been quite strict against gambling and cattle
rustling. She has testified that Antolin Castro, Miguel Begenio and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista
had in fact been apprehended by the deceased and were released only after warning them
against a repeated violation of law. To cap it all the accused was positively Identified as
one of those who were present arid who cooperated when Marcelo Guico was mercilessly
murdered. His alibi that on January 20, 1966, he arrived from Manila where he worked out
his travel papers for Vietnam and that his relatives and his father-in-lawvisited him and
stayed with him until midnight of that day, did not make an accounting of his whereabouts
on the day and in the night of the murder of Marcelo Guico.
However, Francisco Garlejo positively tagged him as one of those who arrived in the house
of Eligio Cacayan in the afternoon of January 21, 1966, went with them to the house of
Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, drank wine with them along the way and was with them when
they left the house of Antonio "Bucot" Bautista to that part of the barrio road in Cabilaoan
where they waited for almost two hours for the deceased. Francisco Garlejo also positively
testified that when Marcelo Guico was being murdered the accused Antolin Castro gave aid
by holding the deceased Marcelo Guico. (CFI Decision, pp. 49-51, Records).
In the case of the accused Miguel Begenio his conviction by the trial court is reasoned out in the decision
under review as follows:1äwphï 1. ñët
In the case of Miguel Begenio after making a lame denial of his implication by Francisco
Garlejo, he alleged that on the night Marcelo Guico was killed he and his family went to
sleep at 8:00 o'clock. He came to know of the death of Marcelo Guico only the following

morning when he followed people who went to see the body of the deceased which was
lying by the roadside. He also said that his wife and the wife of the deceased are second
cousins that he watched the embalming of the body of Marcelo Guico and attended the vigil
of the deceased. Beyond saying that he did not know the witness Francisco Garlejo and
the accused Eligio Cacayan and Julian Aguilar before they were accused together in this
case, he did not have explanation to offer why he was implicated in so serious an offense
which carries the penalty of death. Close as he claimed to be to the widow of Marcelo
Guico, he never denied to her his alleged participation in the killing of her husband or
asked her why he was ever accused of the same. This circumstance is quite unnatural
because if he was innocent the usual thing for him to have done was to remonstrate with
the deceased, denying his alleged participation therein and asked why he was ever
implicated in the murder of Marcelo Guico. Unfortunately, he was likewise Identified to be
with the group that ambushed and murdered Marcelo Guico. Even when he was not in the
courtroom when the Municipal Judge of Urdaneta was conducting the preliminary
investigation of this case, the witness Francisco Garlejo readily pointed to the one in the
court, admittedly planted therein by the judge to test the witness, who was strikingly similar
in appearance with the accused Miguel Begenio, as one of the murderers of Marcelo
Guico. This spontaneous Identification of someone who looked very much like Miguel
Begenio convinced this Court that the accused was one of the plotters and was there on
the road when Marcelo Guico was killed. Miguel Begenio like his co-accused does not only
belong to but is an assistant auditor of the party against which the deceased campaigned
and won as a barrio captain. Altho he claimed he was in good terms with the widow of the
deceased and attended the vigil for the latter, he has never talked with the said widow
about the death of her husband or told her of his vaunted innocence. He has not rebutted
the testimony given against aim by the widow of the deceased that he, in company with his
co-accused Antolin Castro and Antonio "Bucot" Bautista, was on several occasions
apprehended by the deceased for gambling and warned against repeated violations of the
law. Finally, the Court cannot find any explanation, unless it was true why Francisco
Garlejo in his preliminary investigation and in the court charged the accused Miguel
Begenio as a co-conspirator and co-principal in murdering Marcelo Guico, a very serious
offense which carries with it the penalty of death. When Miguel Begenio denied that he
never knew Francisco Garlejo, he practically affirmed the truth of the testimony of
Francisco Garlejo because it is inconceivable that the latter should Testify against the
former if they did not know each other at all. (CFI Decision, pp. 51-53, Records).
As to the accused Antonio Bautista, the Court after discrediting his alibi, relied on "the fact that Francisco
Garlejo unmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing," so his defense of alibi becomes weaker still.
Thus, said the Court: 1äwphï 1. ñët
Finally, Antonio 'Buco' Bautista, like his co-accused, also sought the defense of alibi. He
said that the clay before Marcelo Guico was killed he went to Toledo, Ramos, Tarlac, to
Collect P50.00 which his uncle has borrowed from him and he stayed until 4:00 o'clock in
the morning of January 22, 1966, alleging that when lie was finally paid it was only in the
night of January 21, 1966. His uncle, testimony was corroborated by his alleged debtor I
saw Eusebio Meligrito who testified that Antonio 'Bucot' Bautista went to his house on
January 19, 1966 to collect what he owed from him. He became indebted to the accused at
a tune when tile accused was his visitor. As a reason for the prolonged stay of the accused
in his house, the witness said that the accused arrived only when he was piling up his
harvest and had to wait until he was able to sell his palay on the 21st of January and,
having arrived late in his house, he was able to pay the said accused only that night.
This defense appears too good to be true. First the obligation was unusually created. – The
witness borrowing money from the accused when the latter was his visitor. The Court
knows that borrowing does not. usually happen that way. The accused had to go and
collect just before the crime was committed. He had to wait here for barely three days
without going anywhere apparently to preclude the possibility of being placed in the vicinity
where the incident occurred. Even tile payment has been time to be in night of the crime so
that, considering the distance Toledo Ramos Tarlac and Manaoag, Pangasinan, it could
not be said of the accused that he was in Manaoag when Marcelo Guico was killed. This
newfangled defense is too perfect to be true but it cannot fool anyone lt was corroborated
only by his uncle who cannot even tell at once the name of the alleged buyer of his palay
who gave him the money which to pay the accused. So the Court says s that this defense
of alibi is weak and unreliable because it easily fabricated and concocted without much
opportunity of checking or rebutting it and when we consider the fact that Francisco Garlejo
unmistakably placed him in the scene of the killing this defense of alibi becomes weaker
still. accused appalled perhaps by, the evidence against him even neglected to file his own
memorandum.

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