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Spouses Badua vs Cordillera Bodong Administration
Constitutional Law – Judicial Power
Spouses Badua were occupying a parcel of land in Abra. The said land is
being claimed by Quema. Quema said he sold the land to a certain Dra.
Valera but then he was able to repurchase the land later from the same
doctor. The Baduas however contend that they were the ones who bought
the land from Valera but that they cannot produce the deed of sale
because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued the Baduas not
before the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal Court. The
MTC is composed of elders respected in the community and that it is
alleged that their decision is likewise respected. It is likewise a branch of
the Cordillera Bodong Administration. Non-compliance to the MTC
decision would result to community ostracism. The MTC resolved the
issue by granting the land to Quema. The Baduas were then ordered to
vacate the land. The Baduas refused. Thereafter the Baduas received a
warning order from the CPLA – the military branch of the MTC. This
brought fear t the couple which led to Leonor’s running away and Rosa’s
arrest. They were threatened by the CPLA hence they appeal before the
SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.
HELD: No, the MTC is not a competent court. The Cordillera
AUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence. Hence, the
Cordillera Bodong Council – which would have received judicial power,
granted CAR’s autonomy – never possessed judicial power. Hence, the
MTC its supposed branch likewise never received judicial power.
Therefore, it cannot validly decide on cases neither can it enforce its
decision.
Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973
Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin
the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said
constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because
the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is
w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such
constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

2. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority
of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of
his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to
show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed
that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The
question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question
which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their
ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
De La Llana vs Alba
Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law
involved – BP 129
In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De
la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of
the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred
that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by
the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is
empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,
no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary.In the implementation of the assailed legislation,therefore,
it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as faras incumbent justices and judgesare concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then,it could do so but only by way
of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is
there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remainsin the hands of the Executive
to whomit properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded powerof reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus
be free fromany unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternativesbetween one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”
Almario vs Alba
Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will
go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject
amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105,
110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed
amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered
by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the
submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an
additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and
4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a
social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the
people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no
fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino
v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the
plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning
and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and
effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people
on a later date.

3. HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed
amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely,
whether or not “grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise
or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are
unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions
are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some
members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of
disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is
to vote “NO” in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to
the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an
opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has
nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their
desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is
whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the
dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the
average voter does not know the meaning of “grant” of public land or of
“urban land reform.”
Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC
Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of
its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031
repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The
Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential
Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the
question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of
it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises
a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of
the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power
to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of
Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to
be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the
validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten

4. Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form
a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time.
Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity of the 1973
Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin
the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said
constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because
the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is
w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such
constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority
of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of
his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to
show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed
that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The
question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question
which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their
ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
Taňada and Diosdado Macapagal vs Cuenco
Constitutional Law – Political Question
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The
Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The
lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the
SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members.
It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices,
3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority
party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.
Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if
the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of
the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et
al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of
the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power
to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial
courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of
Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Gonzales vs COMELEC
** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC
Constitutional Law – Political Question vs Justiciable Question
One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of
certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on
the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the
people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the
election. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised
before the courts because it is a political one.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is
nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is
a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate
its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if the
crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or

5. the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political
one.
Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas
Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined
Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections.
Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The
PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that “There shall
be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.” In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal
his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the
PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is
unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also,
since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed
before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET
decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested
in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law”
This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under
our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other
agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely
in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the
courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1)
defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing
remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first
instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that
“Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in
the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA
1793 merely added the court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly
legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the
determining of election contests is essentially judicial.
Ricardo Santiago vs Commissioner Bautista ofImmigrations
Constitutional Law – Judicial Power – Justiciable Controversy –
Citizenship
Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of
registration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino
mother and a Chinese father here in the Philippines. He was sent to
China when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in 1925 and in
his Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he
would like to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations. In his original petition however in the lower court he was
praying for a declaratory relief for him to be declared as a Filipino. He
was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratory
relief is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision
not stating the “declaratory statement” but rather focusing on the
cancellation of the alien certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a
judicial declaration of citizenship.
HELD: The SC ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the
proceeding initiated and originally prayed for is a declaratory relief to
have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be no
action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justifiable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable,an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an accident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for
instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to
the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate
child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to
justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times,
the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization,

6. by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part
of our citizenry.
RADIOWEALTH, INC. VS AGREGADO (1950)
FACTS:
1. A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were
bought for Pho 585 and installed in the second and third floor of
the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court.
2. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed
by the President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation
invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases.
3. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include
purchase of property.
4. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment
be approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused to
countersign the warrant for payment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Judicial Dep’t can make purchases without
the prior approval of the Executive?
HELD: YES, they can.
RD:
Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale
 All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is
independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with
each other in the exercise of special functions.
 Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do
whatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their
dignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of
justice.
 Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the
law cannot deprive the courts ofanything vital to their
functions.
 Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase
offices or court rooms and furnish them. They also have to insure
that the character ofthese rooms would permit the court to
exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner.
 In case ofconflict to, the court shall overpower the officials
as they will be the ultimate “judge” in determining what is
necessary for its efficiency.
 Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court
room to the Court of First Instance and change the assignments
provided that the new rooms are reasonable adequate.
 Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if
they deem that the new room would be inadequate in the
exercise of their duties.
 If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the
court would have the power either to purchase things
directly or by proper proceedings to compel the officials to
perform their duties to the law.
 Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and
other office equipment needed for the convenient transaction of
its business.
 Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it
executive could determine what the courts should have. They
are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition offor
fixtures, equipment and supplies.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE
 Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151,
he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges
as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering
certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title
 The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee,sent a letter to Noblejas,
requiring him to explain.
 Noblejas answered,arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to
that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the
same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He
claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court
 Nevertheless,he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)
 Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES
and his abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank
equivalent to a judge)?
SC: NO.
If the law had really intended to include the generalgrant of “rank and
privileges equivalent to Judges”, the right to be investigated and be
suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine

7. of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with
an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,
simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the
Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it
exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially
legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions.
As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a
judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to
demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon the Court’s recommendation. Said rights would be
violative of the Constitution.
The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a
judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and
binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves.
Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that
they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but
a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.
LINA VS. PURISIMA
 Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.
 Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil.
Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was
removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej.
 It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was
dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being
notoriously undesirable.
 The RTC dismissed the petition because:
o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the
President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or
legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to
review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the
express limitations upon the power of the Courts in
GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.
o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon
the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by
President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.
SC:
The petitioner’s right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC
invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted
abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that
the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically
inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity
among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to
determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case
involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the
authority of martial law proclamations.
Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was
martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.
Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the
case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on
the merits. Yet,this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice
are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it
appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be
heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest
of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure
of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and
instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final
judgment on the merits.
SC reinstated Lina to work.
Garcia vs Macaraig Jr
Political Law – Separation of Powers
Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San
Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1,
1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties
and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be
properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig
realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over
his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had
worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of
duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the
leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed
by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon
respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being

8. extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to
the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint
alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in
violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not
submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that
Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he
has not been performing the duties of a judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and
dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the
bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of
being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other
hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with
favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed
in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with
his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments
of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest
the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by
practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the
public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by
the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and
among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the
serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our
present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the
lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his
actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be
subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they
can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels
very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC
Facts:During the 12th
Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
Prior to its enactment,a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood
bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th
Congress.
During the 12th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However,
the 12th
Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th
Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned
in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption fromRepublic Act No. 9009.- The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under
Republic Act No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to
sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the
equal protection clause
Ratio:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

9. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units
must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot
write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it
has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100)
square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,population
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,and
non-recurring income.
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.
VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the People’s
Court Act.
 Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who
held any office or position under the Philippine Executive
Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic
may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court undersection
thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office
or position under either or both the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch,
instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
"If, on account of such disqualification,or because of any of the
grounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section I of the
Rules of Court,or on account of illness,absence or temporary
disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a
quorumor to renderjudgment in any case is not present, the
President may designate such numberof Judges of First
Instance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, orCadastral Judges,
having none of the disqualificationsset forth in said section one
hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily asJusticesof said
Court, in orderto forma quorumor until a judgment in said case is
reached."
 They claim that:

10. (a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court,
other than those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine
Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court
who do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 4, Article
VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by
means of a procedure other than impeachment, contrary to
Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its
constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the
Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court,
contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification
members of the Supreme Court who rendered said public service
during the Japanese occupation.
"(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws
"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
"(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by
Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the
'packing' of the Supreme court in certain cases,either by Congress or
by the President."
 The Solgen countered that:
"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act
No. 682.
"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not
intended to provide an additional qualification :for members of the
Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in
section 6, Article Vill of the Constitution 'apply to permanent
"appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'
"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to
temporary designations under section 14, commonwealth Act No.
682.
"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the
Supreme Court affected to sit and vote in the particular class of cases
therein mentioned.
"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'
"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court
but merely supplements the Rules of Court.
"8. It is not a bill of attainder.
"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the
Justices of the Supreme Court affected or to the treason indictees;
concerned.
"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."
ISSUES:
1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for
disqualification of a Justice.
2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly
appointed by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as
“DESIGNEE”
3) Whether the manner of “designation” by the President can
constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC.
SC:
1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who
held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission,
would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case,because
the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the
PEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and a
duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the
challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN
short, what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a
clear repugnancy to the fundamental law.
Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene
the provisions of the constitution.
Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and
violative of the constitution.
2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of
the CA,may act as Justice of the SC. The “designation” made by Section
14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An additional
disqualifying circumstance of the “designee” is the lack of confirmation

11. or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a “designee” under Sec 14
sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in the
deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications
of regular members of the SC.
NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided for by law” does NOT authorize
any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no matter how
brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the
length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition of
the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitution
so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and
unaltered.
3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge,
there is no escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations of
the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any regular
Justice. A “temporary member” thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a
position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear that
the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does
not satisfy said requirement.
The “designees” cannot be such members in view of the fact that they
have not been appointed nor confirmed.
SEC 14. NULL AND VOID.
VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC
Facts:
Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month
period. Some three months after thecommencement of their employment,
the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and
benefits. Theseamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on
route to a port in Australia controlled by the InternationalTransport
Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid its
season ITF rates.The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25%
increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, the
seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated.Two
motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by
said Division. Another motion forreconsideration was filed with the
Supreme Court en banc which gave its due course, after finding that
there was aneed to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with
that of the First Division with the Wallen Decision. In thatdecision, the
First Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.
Held:
The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning
contract involves the interests not only of the signatories thereto, such as
the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the
Filipinoseamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to
the power vested in the NSB, the law requires that allmanning contracts
shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino
seamen abroad foreignships are dictated by national interest.
GREGORIO JANDUSAY, EUSEBIO JANDUSAY, DEMETRIA
JANDUSAYand LEONILA FABRO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA SALVA, ESPERANZA
SALVA, PEDRO LAZO, PAULA LAZO BRIGIDO LAZO, JULIO
LAZO, ARCADIA LAZO, and MACARIA LAZO, respondents.
Vicente M. Macabidang, Sergio Angeles & Associates for petitioners.
R. Estrella and P. Funelas forrespondent Macaria Lazo.
NARVASA, J.:
The controversy at bar concerns the ownership of one of two pieces of
land embraced in a Torrens title: ParcelNo. 1 of Original Certificate of
Title No. 61 of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro, issued on
August 7, 1911 in the name of Jorge Lingon, married to Arcadia Ganibo
The lot is situated in Barrio Catiningan Pola Oriental Mindoro and has an
area of 84,964.25 square meters, more or less. 1 [As regards the other
parcel covered by the certificate of title, the record shows that Lingon
had been selling portions thereof to different individuals from 1938 to
1947, a period of nine years,all said sales having been annotated on the
title .] 2 The protagonists are —
1) on the one hand, the collateral relatives of Jorge Lingon, herein private
respondents, who — after the death of Lingon on February 16, 1949
without issue (his wife, Arcadia Ganibo having died earlier) —
adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No. 61 in
virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed on January 14, 1956
and thereafter caused cancellation of said title and the issuance of a new
one in their names, TCT No. T-5420 ; 3 and
2) on the other, the petitioners herein, the heirs of Dominga Marquez,
who claim that in January, 1915 Jorge Lingon had sold the land

12. embraced in OCT No. 61 to a certain Mariano Lontok for P500 by a deed
allegedly thumb-marked by Lingon before the Justice of the Peace of
Pola, Oriental Mindoro, which deed was not however registered; that by
a deed entitled "Escritura de Compraventa"executed on April 30, 1917
and another entitled "Transfer of Real Property" executed on July 24,
1918, Mariano Lontok had conveyed the same property to Dominga
Marquez; and that Dominga Marquez and her children had thereafter
taken possession of the land and declared it for taxation purposes since
1918. 4
Litigation over said ParcelNo. 1 of OCT NO. 61 began with the filing of
a complaint for recovery of possession thereof in the Court of First
Instance of Oriental Mindoro by herein private respondents, the heirs of
Jorge Lingon, hereafter collectively referred to simply as the
SALVAS. 5 The petitioners, hereafter collectively referred to simply as
the JANDUSAYS,instituted their own separate action in the same Court,
for annulment of title and reconveyance of property. 6 The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried and decided. The verdict of the Trial
Court 7 went against the SALVAS, the dispositive portion thereof being
as follows:
WHEREFORE,a decision is hereby rendered in favor of
the JANDUSAYS and against the SALVAS:
1. Dismissing the action of the SALVAS against the
JANDUSAYS in Civil Case No. R-667, with costs
against the former in favor of the latter;
2. Declaring the annulment and the consequent
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420
in the name of the SALVAS over the land in question, as
to ParcelNo. 1 described therein which is the land in
litigation;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro to
issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title on the same
ParcelNo. 1 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420
in the name of JANDUSAYS,specially, Gregorio
Jandusay, Demetria Jandusay, Eusebio Jandusay and
Leonila Fabro, pro-indivisoin equalparts; and
4. Condemning the SALVAS in Civil Case No. R-668 to
pay the costs thereof to the JANDUSAYS in said case.
No pronouncement as to damages in both cases,R-667 and R668.
Both the SALVAS and the JANDUSAYS appealed to the Court of
Appeals. 8 There, their appeals ran an uncertain course; there was no
little divergence of views among the magistrates regarding the merits of
their appeals; first, judgment was rendered in favor of the JANDUSAYS;
but in the end, the SALVAS prevailed.
The three (3) justices of the division to which the appeal was initially
assigned could not agree on a unanimous verdict; 9 hence, a special
division of five (5) had to be constituted. The special division's joint
judgment on the appeals was pronounced on November 8, 1976, on a
vote of three to two: the ponente was Agcaoili, J.,with whom concurred
Fernandez and Domondon, JJ.,and San Diego and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., dissented. Said judgment affirmed the decision of the Trial
Court in toto. The SALVAS moved for reconsideration on November 29,
1976. 10Their motion remained unresolved for about eight (8) months. In
the interim Mr. Justice Fernandez was appointed to the Supreme Court
and Mr. Justice Domondon retired; and Messrs. Justices Hugo Gutierrez,
Jr. and Ricardo C. Puno were selected to take their place, by a re-
raffle. 11 Thereafter the specialdivision ("Former Special Fourth
Division") deliberated on the SALVAS' motion for reconsideration. Mr.
Justice Agcaoili voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. However,
the four (4) others, Mme. Justices San Diego and Melencio-Herrera, and
Messrs. Justices Gutierrez and Puno, voted to grant the motion. On this
basis, a Resolution was drawn up by the Justice Melencio-Herrera; but at
the time of its promulgation on February 28, 1978, Messrs. Justices
Agcaoili and Puno had already presented their candidacies for the
Interim Batasang Pambansa and consequently ceased to be members of
the Court of Appeals; hence, the Resolution was signed only by the three
(3) remaining Justices composing the special division of five, it being
pointed out that this number was,by the way, sufficient for the
pronouncement of a judgment in accordance with Section 2, Rule 51 of
the Rules of Court. 12
The Resolution overturned the Decision of November 8, 1976 and
disposed of the appeals as follows:
WHEREFORE,granting the Motion for
Reconsideration, the judgment appealed from is hereby
set aside, and another one entered 1) dismissing Civil
Case No. 668-R, the suit for Annulment of Title; and 2)
ordering Gregorio Jandusay et al. to surrender
possession of ParcelNo. I covered by TCT No. T-5420,
to Emeterio Salva et al., upon this Decision becoming
final. No costs in both instances.
A motion for reconsideration was in due time submitted by the
JANDUSAYS,and one for amendment of the resolution, by the
SALVAS. The motions were disposed of by a Resolution dated August
3, 1978, 13 as follows:

13. WHEREFORE,1) the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the JANDUSAYS is hereby denied for lack of merit;
2) In respect of the Motion for Amendment of our
Resolution dated February 28, 1978, Bled by the
SALVAS,the Court resolves:
a) The SALVAS are hereby authorized to withdraw the
owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
5420 attached to the records of this case,under proper
receipt;
b) The petition to include compensatory damages in
favor of the SALVAS is denied, their entitlement to
them not having been indubitably established.
The JANDUSAYS are now before this Court, having timely filed a
petition for review on certiorari,14 seeking review and reversalof the
Appellate Court's aforementioned Resolutions of February 28, 1978 and
August 3, 1978. Their appeal was given due course by Resolution dated
November 27, 1978. Withal, their appeal must fail.
The JANDUSAYS argue that the challenged resolutions should be set
aside because they are tainted by several serious errors.
Their first contestation is that the resolutions reversing, and sustaining
reversalof, a special decision of five (5) — having been rendered when
there were only three (3) members of that special division, the other two
(2) having in the meantime ceased to be members of the Court of
Appeals — are "contrary to the letter and spirit of Paragraph 3, of
Section 2, Article X of the 1973 Constitution" which in part states that
"no decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."The theory is palpably
unmeritorious. A reading of the cited paragraph in the context of the
others in the Section at once discloses that it can have no reference
except to the Supreme Court, and that indeed it cannot possibly apply to
the Court of Appeals since, in the exercise of adjudicatory powers, that
Court never sits en banc but only in divisions of three justices (or special
divisions of five).
The next point that the JANDUSAYS try to make is that the resolutions
(a) wrongly concluded that they had failed to establish by preponderance
of evidence: (i) the due execution and delivery of the deed of sale of the
lot in question by Jorge Lingon in 1915 in favor of Mariano Lontok, and
the deed of sale by the latter in 1917 of the same property to Dominga
Marquez; and (ii) "the loss and contents of the deed of sale executed in
1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok over the litigated
property," and (b) wrongly applied "the survivorship disqualification rule
and .. (disregarded) the rules on admission by privy and declaration
against interest made by Jorge Lingon" testified to by Demetria
Jandusay. 15
In the proceedings before the Trial Court the JANDUSAYS could not
present in evidence the original of the deed of sale allegedly executed in
1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok (from whom, in turn,
the Jandusays' predecessor-in-interest had acquired the land in question).
It apparently had been lost. They therefore submitted secondary evidence
to establish the sale, consisting of the sworn declarations of Mariano
Lontok, Severo Geronimo (bilas of Lingon), Enrique Morente, Demetria
Jandusay and Gregorio Jandusay. 16 Whether or not this evidence
satisfactorily proved the existence of the deed of sale, its due execution,
loss, and contents has been subject of considerable disagreement and
extensive analysis among the parties, of course,as well as the Trial Court
and, as already narrated, the Honorable Justices of the Court of Appeals
themselves. The correctness of those conclusions has also still been
subject of debate among the parties before this court. What is not subject
of disputation is the proposition that whatever deductions are drawn from
the evidence are conclusionsof fact,and not of law.
Now, the findings in the Resolution of February 28, 1978 — to the effect
that the evidence had not satisfactorily established "the loss of the deed
of sale between JORGE and LONTOK," 17 or the contents of the lost
document,18 or that it was "the LITIGATED PROPERTY (which) was,
indeed, sold by JORGE to LONTOK,and that it was the (same)
LITIGATED PROPERTY which the latter had sold to
DOMINGA," 19 and that, "(i)n the last analysis," the body of proofs
adduced by the JANDUSAYS was not so clear and convincing as to
defeat the rights of the registered owner 20 — are conclusions of fact.
These findings are quite clearly reasoned conclusions, reached only after
study and assessment of the proofs, an appraisal of testimonial credibility
of witnesses,and a weighing of probabilities regarding the conduct and
reaction of the parties to the alleged sales on the basis of proven past acts
and in light of human experience. They cannot thus be said to be
grounded "entirely on speculation or conjecture," or to have been arrived
at whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily. Therefore,by established
doctrine, they are binding on this Court and may not be reviewed by it, as
the petitioners would wish, absent,as here, any of the recognized
exceptions to the doctrine. 21
The appealed Resolution correctly applied the so-called Surviving Party
Rule or the Dead Man's Act to exclude the testimony of Demetria
Jandusay relative to the statement ascribed to Jorge Lingon that the
Jandusays should "not .. insist in having the deed of sale registered or
annotated .. as according to him before he dies he would sell his property

14. and that in all probability we might as well but his remaining
property." 22 The rule is found in Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship. — The following persons cannot testify as
to matters in which they are interested, directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case,or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, .. upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person .. cannot testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
.. ;
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no doubt that the JANDUSAYS' suit in the Trial Court had
for its essential object the enforcement of a deed of sale allegedly
executed by the deceased Jorge Lingon during his lifetime; so that in
truth, and adapting the language of the Dead Man's Act,the
JANDUSAYS were parties or personsin whose behalf a case wasbeing
prosecuted upon a claimor demand against the estate of Jorge Lingon.
For that sale, supposedly executed about 40 years prior to the institution
of the action, was the definitive foundation of the JANDUSAYS'
asserted cause of action, i.e., the cancellation of the title of the collateral
heirs of the vendor and the reconveyance of the property to them by said
heirs, the theory obviously being that at the time of the vendor's death,
the property no longer formed part of his estate and therefore could not
possibly have been inherited by his heirs. Nor can there be any doubt that
the suit was being prosecuted against representativesof the deceased
person, i.e.,Lingon's collateral relatives, who had adjudicated the
property to themselves as intestate heirs and who, in the action were
asserting a defense (denial of the sale) which the deceased might have
himself set up if living. 23 The heirs of Lingon were not asserting their
status as such heirs to defeat the JANDUSAYS' action,that not being the
chief issue, but were basically contending that the property in question
still formed part of the estate of the decedent at the time of his death and
had not been segregated therefrom by sale to the JANDUSAYS'
predecessor-in- interest.
It is not amiss to state in this connection that the challenged Resolution
refusal to accord veracity to the statement attributed to Jorge Lingon
supposedly asking for deferment of registration of the sale in favor of the
JANDUSAYS because it "runs counter to the fact that the partial sales
made by JORGE of ParcelNo. 2 were all registered," and because the
failure of the JANDUSAYS for an unreasonably long period to resort to
readily available legal remedies to compel the delivery of the certificate
of title and have the sale to them annotated thereon militated against their
averment that Lingon had indeed sold the land to them had refused to
lend them the title so that the sale could be registered. 24
The JANDUSAYS also argue that the failure of Jorge Lingon to
dispossess them and their predecessors-in-interest from the litigated
property for a period of thirty-four (34) years, and a like failure by the
SALVAS to do so for seven (7) years,justify the application of the
equitable doctrine of laches in their (the JANDUSAYS') favor,as wellas
the ruling in Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,100 Phil. 277; Pabalate v.
Echavari,Jr.,37 SCRA 518; and Heirs of Lacamen vs. Heirsof
Laruan, "65 SCRA 605." 25 The argument is effectively confuted by the
following disquisition in the Resolution of February 28, 1978 to which
this Court hereby confers sanction:
If JORGE's inaction in dispossessing the JANDUSAYS
of the LITIGATED PROPERTY can be alleged against
him in a question of title, the inaction of the
JANDUSAYS or their predecessors-in-interest in not
compelling JORGE to formally transfer the title to the
LITIGATED PROPERTY to them for severalyears can
also be alleged against the JANDUSAYS in this
controversy over title. Further, if, as alleged, inaction of
the SALVAS from 1949 when JORGE Lingon died, up
to 1956 when they executed the extrajudicial partition,
betrayed their hesitancy in taking such step knowing too
well the weakness of their claim by the same token, the
legal inaction, the failure to take remedial steps of the
JANDUSAYS from 1930 when they learned of the
existence of the title, up to JORGE Lingon's death in
1949, and thence up to 1956 when they filed their
counter-suit against the SALVAS only after the latter
had instituted their action for recovery of possession,
could also be interpreted as an awareness on their part of
the weakness of their claim of title. In other words,
'Laches' and inaction imputed to the SALVAS may
likewise be laid at the feet of the JANDUSAYS. The
'laches' of one nullifies the 'laches' of the other. One who
seeks equity must himself be deserving of equity. When
parties are in culpability similarly situated in eodem loco
it is a general principle of law that one may claim no

15. advantage over the other – a principle consistently
applied in the 'pari delicto' rule imbedded in our legal
system (Arts. 1411, 1412, 100, 453, Civil Code).
The cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277
(1956), that of Pabalate v. Echavari, Jr.,.. 37 SCRA
518, which applied it, as well as that of Heirs of
Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, .. 65 SCRA 605 cannot be
invoked herein to justify a judgment in favor of the
JANDUSAYS on the ground of laches, due to
fundamental differences: 1) the first two cases involved
the prohibition against the sale of free patents where
under the pertinent law, an original patentee is given
seven years from conveyance within which to bring an
action to recover the property. Plaintiffs therein failed to
exercise that right within the reglementary period but
allowed 37 years (in the Mejia Case) and 32 years (in the
Pabalate Case) to lapse; hence, the Supreme Court ruling
that the original owners' right to recover the possession
of the property and the title thereto from the defendants
had, by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted
into a stale demand. In contrast, an action to recover
possession of aregistered land, such as that brought by
the SALVAS, never prescribes in view of Section 46 of
the Land Registration Act to the effect that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. In fact,as held in J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs.
Macalindong,L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
938, the right to file an action to recover possession
based on a Torrens Title is imprescriptible and is not
bared under the doctrine of laches. And even if laches
were invocable, and that plaintiffs had 'slept on their
rights', with equal vigor can it be said that defendants
themselves are chargeable with 'Laches. 2) In the three
mentioned cases,the fact of sale of the litigated
properties was admitted unlike in this case where such
sale has been challenged,nor has it even been proven. 3)
In addition, the sale in this case to the JANDUSAYS
was not made by the original registered owner himself. It
is merely alleged that he had sold it to LONTOK who, in
turn sold it to the JANDUSAYS.
The JANDUSAYS next attack the very title of the SALVAS. They
contend that the property covered by OCT No. 61 was conjugal property
of the spouses Jorge Lingon and Arcadia Ganibo that upon the latter's
death, the widower, Jorge Lingon, inherited only one-half thereof in
usufruct "while the naked ownership could be inherited" by the
decedent's collateral relatives; that the SALVAS are "not collateral
relatives by blood of Jorge Lingon," and could not therefore have validly
inherited from him and in truth acquired nothing by their execution of a
deed of extrajudicial partition of Lingon's estate,the execution thereof
being, in addition, attended by fraud. 26 The attack is pointless. Even if
consistent with the demonstrated facts,a doubtful proposition at best, it
would not enhance the petitioners' cause one whit Absence of title over
the property in question in Jorge Lingon, or substantial defect thereof,
would not in any manner whatever show valid acquisition of ownership
of said property by the JANDUSAYS. On the contrary,it would
demonstrate invalidity or defect in their own claim of title. Similarly,
absense of the status of heirship in the SALVAS vis-a-vis Jorge Lingon
is utterly inconsequential as far as concerns the JANDUSAYS' claim of
conveyance by Lingon to their predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, being
heirs of neither Jorge Lingon nor Arcadia Ganibo they have no
personality or standing to question the succession to the state of either. In
any event, the Court is satisfied that the Appellate Court has properly
upheld the SALVAS' title to the property in question.
WHEREFORE,finding no error in the Resolutions subject of appeal,
dated February 28, 1978 and August 3, 1978, the same are hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Maniago v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were
used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc.
from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing
Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with
a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a
result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioner’s
driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was
filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner
moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against
him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and
because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had

16. been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioner’s
motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Issue:
whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent
may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the
following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Held:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must
be reserved as required by Rule 111, § 1, otherwise it should be
dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation
must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of
civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with
the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise
“from the offense charged.” In other words the right of the injured party
to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising
from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
On the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3,a civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is, as a generalrule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission,
which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to
bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior
to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was
brought before the institution of the criminal case,the acquittal of the
accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is
based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga, 2004)
Facts:
 On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM).
Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
 In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino
on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the power
of the DPWH.
 On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It
created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which
shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects
and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao
del Sur.
 On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering
District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres.
Estrada.
 On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was
passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to
join ARMM through said law.
 Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as
OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering District
of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning
the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the
ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts
of the ARMM.
Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and
constitutionally infirm.
Held and Ratio:
On RA 8999
 RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or
repealed by a RA 9054. By creating an office with previously
devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA
6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a
plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by
an ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law needs
to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the case
of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH to
ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.
 Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which
is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987
Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by
detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others
Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to reestablisht he
National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent
with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of

17. devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of
the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic
regional autonomy.
On DO 119
- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao
del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the
transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line
with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the
same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as
created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back
powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054
however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer
control and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.
FERNANDEZVS. TORRES
FACTS:
Petitioners seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and
the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1
of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional
Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of
Performing Artists."
The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by public
agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, in
response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints
from entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative working
conditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and
even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers
abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of
Overseas Entertainers was convened on 18 November 1991 to evaluate a
Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment
of Philippine entertainers and performing artists. At the end of the
Conference,the consensus among the management and labor
representatives which emerged was that Government should adopt a
policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of
deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse
effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country's
manpower export program. The labor representative recommended that
the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be
raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years.
Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1
of DOLE Circular No. 01-91.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have an actualcause or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality of the DOLE Circular.
HELD:
The Court finds that the petition does not present a justiciable
controversy. In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled
rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the
courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;(2) the party raising the
constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the
resolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest
reasonable opportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutional
issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the
controversy.
In the first place, Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not
establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment
abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1
itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for
justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage
hereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary
does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary,
fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular
performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of
"Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-
91."
Secondly, petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from
alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials
for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1
of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore,petitioners also do
not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their
applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from
any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have
petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to
deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a
reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and
arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that

18. the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless
and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however,attempted to
support this assertion.
The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public
respondent would deny any and all applications for exemption from
coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions
are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations
are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. The second is that
official duty has been or will be regularly performed.
Santos vs Northwest Airlines
Judicial Review – Warsaw Convention
Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought
a round trip ticket from NOA in San Francisco. His flight would be from
San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo. His scheduled flight was in
December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA
said he made nor reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year,
due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila.
NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention w/c provides that complaints against
international carriers can only be instituted in:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
2. the court of its principal place of business;
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract
had been made;
4. the court of the place of destination.
The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine
courts have jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the
matter to conduct judicial review.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is
bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified
by the Senate. Until & unless there’d be amendment to the Warsaw
Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the place
indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA. It is well-
settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question
only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination; the constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Angara vs Electoral Commission
Judicial Review – Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On
Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec
3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6
of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed
a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC
proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in
cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation
with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

19. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.
Dumlao vs COMELEC
Judicial Review – Requisites
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He
filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the
other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of
Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation
hence uncons titutional. His petitioned was joined by Atty. Igot and
Salapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot
and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials,
the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd
requisite was met. The SC ruled
however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not
run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office
as null and void.
National Economic Protectionism Association vs Ongpin
Judicial Review – Requisites
After the lifting of martial law in 1981, Marcos issued PD 1789 and
some other PDs. The said PD was issued in order to suspend for one year
the requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in the
country it must be compose of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA assailed the
said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be greatly
adversed by such PD. The Sol-Gen commented that NEPA et al have no
personality and standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy
concerning the enforcement of the PD in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are met.
HELD: NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs 1 and 3 of PD
1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981 Investment Priorities Plan and EO
676, as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the 1973 Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of Article 14 thereof, and
seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws. Yet, not even one
of the petitioners has been adversely affected by the application of those
provisions. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein the petitioner
could validly and possibly say that the increase in foreign equity
participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of Dec
2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had any direct bearing on them, such as
considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign investment,
unfair competition with Philippine nationals, exploitation of the
country’s natural resources by foreign investors under the decrees.
Petitioners advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a
petition for an advisory opinion from the SC. The power of courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Bona fide suit.
Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under
the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between litigants.
Allied Broadcasting vs Republic ofthe Philippines
Judicial Review – Declaratory Relief Not Among the SC’s Original
Jurisdiction
In January 1960, RA 3001 was passed granting ABC to operate its
broadcasting stations. ABC subsequently established 10 radio stations. In
November 1974, PD 576-A was passed delineating and restricting radio
station ownership. It basically regulated ABC’s ownership of some of its
stations. One of the law’s provisions is that a broadcasting station should
only own one radio station per municipality or city. This made ABC lose
7 of its radio stations. ABC complained alleging that the law is arbitrary.

20. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a controversy between ABC and the
government by virtue of the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not among
the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only
questions of law are involved. Further, there is no actual case or
controversy involving the law sought to be nullified. ABC does not
allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or
television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is
being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under PD. 576-A.
ABC does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized
for a violation under said PD. There is, likewise, no DIRECT allegation
that any of the petitioner’s stations had been confiscated or shut down
pursuant to PD 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not
being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein
ABC has asserted its rights. All that ABC seeks is the nullification of PD
576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under RA 3001. Judicial review
cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is “the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. The function of
the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give
advisory opinions. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed.
Lagmay vs Court ofAppeals
Judicial Review– Legitimizing Function – Proper Raising of Questions
of Law
Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Lagmay
and 2 others. Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then
sent letters to each of her lessees advising them of her intention to sell
the land and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are
occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did
not collect the rentals of each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2
years, Tuason’s sisters politely advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land
so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3
months and this time they agree to buy the parcel of land. Tuason
however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their
right over the land they’ve been occupying for quite some time now as
guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court
ruled that Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when they
refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer. Lagmay et al appealed before
the CA. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out
that the parcel of land in question is not declared as an “urban land”
under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion
ruling that Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not
raise the same during the trial of merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not to settle the case by virtue of the question of law
raised by Lagmay et al.
HELD: The SC ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality
in this case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The
issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation
must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised
and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its
determination. Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to
resolve the constitutional issue considering that numerous persons are
affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by
which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination.
MDREYES.Salonga vs.Cruz-Pano
J.:FACTS:Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised
Anti-Subversion Act after he wasimplicated, along with other 39
accused,by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila.
Hewas tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a
contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of
RaulDaza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a
violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted
immediately by then President Marcos.ISSUE:Whether or not Salonga s
alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.HELDYes.The
petition is dismissed.RATIOThe petitioner s opinion is nothing but a
legitimate exercise of freedom of thought andexpression. Protection is
especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is
essential tothe ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of
criminal indictments. The constitutionalguaranty may only be proscribed
when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminentlawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar,
there is no threat againstthe government.In PD 885, political discussion
will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in asubversive
organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or
other members of suchassociation or organization in furtherance of any
plan or enterprise thereof. In the case,there is noproof that such
discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government
through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was
not against the government, but directedagainst a particular family. Such