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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by
his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS,
REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO
AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA
LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO,respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case
No. 2012 — for certiorari, injunction and damages — on the
ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action,
and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying
the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of
dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago,
Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year
1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the
teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With

the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and
Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas,
Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna
Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and
third honors, respectively. The school's graduation
exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three
days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago,
Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor
students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned
civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against
the above-named committee members along with the
District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the
place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that
plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader
at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled
to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with thehonor rank of
third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school
had been made respondents as they compose the
"Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose
grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while
the other defendants were included as Principal, District
Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil
from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School,
while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking
in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner
before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that

Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival
had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the
latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the
summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the
teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the
far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
committee referred to in this case had been illegally
constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI
teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for
Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides
that the committee to select the honor students should be
composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are
direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven
during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave
abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing
of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina
and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers
giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which
proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a
much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several
district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and
other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were
heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings,
whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting
Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district
examinations were not advisable; that there was a
unanimous agreement and understanding among the
respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and
third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score,
which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in
petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced
with the words "second place", which is an instance of the

unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the
respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor
pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the
matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and
to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the
buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to
appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other
speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances;
and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed
the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor
students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that
school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the
suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and
formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in
Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The
injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its
order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the
graduation exercises were then already set on the following
day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would
be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the
community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of
that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation
exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year
1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list
of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to
answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved
for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24,
1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that

the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought
before the court had already become academic. This was
opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of
respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition
for being improper and for being academic. In
order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court
has carefully examined the petition to determine
the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action
constituting the special civil action of certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging
'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be
substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3
alleges that since grades one to six, the students
closely contending for class honors were Socorro
Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican
and Patricia Liñgat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades
I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and
twice third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once
(grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III,
and V) and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades
II, III); once third place (grade I).

Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second
place (grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is
given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is
given the third place only. This is the ranking now
disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was
tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda
Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth
grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored
Socorro against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who
composed the committee on honor students are all
grade six teachers while the Service Manual For
Teachers provides that the committee shall be
composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth
grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and
circumstantial evidence showing the change of
ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from
80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a
lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district
examinations upon which ratings were partly
based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated
Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.

Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade
certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place"
was erased and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally
appealed to the school authorities but they only
'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings,
as the law requires, of such tribunal,
board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or
order subject thereof, together with
copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto.'

It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order complained of, together with all
pleadings and documents which are relevant
thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of
the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is
no written formal judgment or order of respondents
that is submitted for revision or correction of this
Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner
personally appealed to the school authorities who
only 'passed the buck to each other.' This
allegation does not show that petitioner formally
availed of and exhausted the administrative
remedies of the Department of Education. The
petition implies that this is the first formal complaint
of petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of
Education could have investigated the grievances
of the petitioner with dispatch and give effective
remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned
them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of
discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors,
mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave

abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the
exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by
means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion,
and so holds, that the petition states no cause of
action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the
petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the
same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his
petition states no cause of action on the grounds —
discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-
quoted — (1) that the petition does not comply with the
second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not
been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment
or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that
administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and (3)
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On
the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did
not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they
argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal upon the
additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of
students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by
appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may
lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

The last point raised by appellees deserves first
consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers
does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65,
further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no
longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the following
tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action
instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.)
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of
judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is
the doing of something in the nature of the action
of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special
civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this
jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:
(1) that there must be a specific controversy
involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or
officer for hearing and determination of their
respective rights and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon
the rights of parties who in general
appear or are brought before the tribunal
by notice or process, and upon whose
claims some decision or judgment is
rendered. It implies impartiality,
disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse
claims, and is inconsistent with discretion
on the one hand — for the tribunal must

decide according to law and the rights of
the parties — or with dictation on the
other; for in the first instance it must
exercise its own judgment under the law,
and not act under a mandate from
another power. ... The character of its
action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial,
or legislative, or whether it be simply that
of a public agent of the country or State,
as in its varied jurisdictions it may by
turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338,
cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v.
Georgia Public Service Commission, 181
S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise
of judicial function is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of
Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al.
v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the
controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a

decision on the controversy construing and
applying the laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not
capable of a precise definition which
would be applicable to all cases. The
term has been variously defined as the
authority to determine the rights of
persons or property by arbitrating
between adversaries in specific
controversies at the instance of a party
thereto; the authority exercised by that
department of government which is
charged with the declaration of what the
law is and its construction so far as it is
written law; the authority or power vested
in the judges or in the courts; the
authority vested in some court, officer, or
persons to hear and determine when the
rights of persons or property or the
propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication; the power
belonging to or emanating from a judge
as such; the power conferred upon a
public officer, involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion in the
determination of questions of right in
specific cases affecting the interest of
persons or property, as distinguished
from ministerial power or authority to
carry out the mandates of judicial power
or the law; the power exercised by courts

in hearing and determining cases before
them, or some matter incidental thereto,
and of which they have jurisdiction; the
power of a court to decide and pronounce
a judgment; the power which adjudicates
upon and protects the rights and interests
of individual citizens, and to that end
construes and applies the law. "Judicial
power" implies the construction of laws
and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine
but not everyone who may hear and
determine has judicial power. The term
"judicial power" does not necessarily
include the power to hear and determine
a matter that is not in the nature of a suit
or action between the parties.' (34 C.J.
1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that
branch of the sovereign power which belongs to
the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to
the legislative or executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial
functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not
depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the
importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to
the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In
the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of
discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of
the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to
make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought,
and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within
that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or,
at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to
either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial.
As to what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the

nature of a thing, than its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co.
Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.)
[Emphasis supplied]
1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI
JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are
judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is
considerable conflict in the decisions in
regard thereto, in connection with the law
as to the right to the writ ofcertiorari. It is
clear, however, that it is the nature of the
act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it,
that determines whether or not it is the
discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which
that word is used when applied to the
courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi judicial. It is enough if the
officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public
character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of
Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304),
the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative
or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or
ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions
is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is

clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.'
2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so
called committee on the rating of students for honor whose
actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial
nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the
decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board,
or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine what
that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties. As pointed out by
appellees,3
however, there is nothing on record about any
rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to
assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions.
Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by
appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual
of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated
in the composition of the committee they constituted
thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's
duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the
seemingly one of first impression, is not without substantial
parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4
the

issue presented for determination was whether or not the
courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board
of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared
that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the
board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would
not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar
competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been
held periodically by schools and colleges in this
islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are
of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their
school days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual
oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to
Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice
Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of
judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts
did not reflect the audience's preference and that
errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award
of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to
invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in
such contests that the board's decision is final and
unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these
tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets
of sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No
alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are
supposed to join the competition to contribute to its
success by striving their utmost: the prizes are
secondary.

No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants, because theirs was merely the
privilege to compete for the prize, and that
privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless and until they were proclaimed winners of
the competition by the appointed arbiters or
referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been
imported from the United States. We found in
American jurisprudence no litigation questioning
the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no
precedent during a long period affords some
reason for doubting the existence of the right
sought to be enforced, especially where occasion
for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts
are cautious before allowing it, being loath to
establish a new legal principle not in harmony with
the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S.
Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the
matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that
courts of first instance are courts of general
jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption
that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of
the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the
part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not

mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the
aforesaid principle is the deprivation or violation of
a right. As stated before, a contestant has no
right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury,
yet in law there are instances of 'damnum absque
injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had
been proven, it would be a different proposition.
But then her action should be directed against the
individual judge or judges who fraudulently or
maliciously injured her. Not against the other
judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court
below apparently did, that judicial intervention might be
sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to
sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on
the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of
Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding
that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy
of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the
provision of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case
of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5
where it
was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in estimating
certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans
instead of cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in

Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R.
No.
L-6191,6
and in ordering thereafter the division of the said
rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants,
this Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground,
among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to
attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly
violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this
Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first
place, it is not even sufficient in form and
substance to justify the issuance of the writ of
certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of
Industrial Relations abused its discretion in
disregarding the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings
No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it
does not attach to the petition the decisions
allegedly violated by the Court below and point out
which particular portion or portions thereof have
been disregarded by the respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case
of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7
wherein
this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In the
following language, this Court emphasized the importance
of complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:

While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the
complaint filed by the respondent municipality with
the respondent court for recovery of property with
damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the
decision rendered by the respondent court on
December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is
attached to the petition.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the
order of default entered by the respondent court
and of the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no
copy of the order of default is attached to its
petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under
consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining
the respondent court from executing the decision
rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance
of the missing pleadings is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of
securing an order commanding the respondent
court to approve either the original or the amended
record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of
either is attached to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under
consideration is dismissed.

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he
received a copy of the programme of the graduation
exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the
morning of the very day of that graduation exercises,
implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof
(to show the decision of the committee of teachers in the
ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The
stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of
such decision of the said committee of teachers much
earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him,
even before the filing of his petition with the lower court on
the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said
committee's decision with various higher authorities of the
above-named school, who merely passed the buck to each
other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various
other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for
Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution
of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in
his Grade I certificate — which appellant never bothered to
attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he
miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65
above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer
necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by
appellant.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Ruperto vs. Torres, et al., L-8785, February 25, 1957,
(Unreported).
2 Municipal Council of Lemery vs. Provincial Board of
Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268.
3 See pp. 5-6, Brief for Appellees.
4 91 Phil. 482 (May 30, 1952).
5 G.R. Nos. L-8174 and L-8280-86, October 8, 1955,
97 Phil. 675.
6 Republic of the Philippines vs. Baylosis, et al., 96
Phil. 461.
7 L-27197, May 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 337.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41315 November 13, 1986
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.

THE OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION and MANUEL B.
YAP, respondents.
Angara, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Office for
petitioner.
J. T. Barrera & Associates for respondent Manuel B. Yap.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari assailing certain orders issued
by respondent Oil Industry Commission (hereinafter known
as OIC) in OIC Case No. 144.
Briefly the facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of
a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with
petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter
known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded
in the year 1969 (Annex "A") of the petition). The latter was
filed and registered with the OIC on April 30, 1971 as
required by Republic Act #6173 (R.A. #6173).
While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual
commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations
upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other
petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to
respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these
demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its
contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell
sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to

terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their
"Sublease and Dealer Agreement, " to wit:
5. Effective Date, Direction and Termination of
Agreement. -This Agreement, duly signed by the
DEALER, shall become effective for both parties
first of January, 1969 and shall continue
indefinitely thereafter, until terminated by either
party giving to the other ninety (90) days notice in
writing of such termination.
Respondent Yap filed a complaint with the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo docketed as Civil Case No.
9507 for damages with preliminary injunction against
petitioner Shell Respondent Yap questioned the validity of
the exercise by petitioner of its contractual right to terminate
the contract. Barely less than a month from the filing of his
complaint, respondent Yap again filed with the respondent
OIC Case #144 where he likewise raised the same issue.
Without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard
on the matter, respondent OIC issued anex-
parte preliminary mandatory injunction commanding
petitioner to perform the following acts: 1) to continue selling
to respondent Yap petroleum products 2) to maintain
the status quo insofar as the operation by respondent Yap
of the gasoline station is concerned 3) to sub t a verified
statement of the unpaid accounts of respondent Yap.
Petitioner Shell also filed a complaint with the then CFI of
Cebu docketed as Civil Case No. 13675 to collect the long
overdue debts of respondent Yap. Shell filed with the OIC
an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Dissolve the Writ (Annex "I")
and filed its answer to complaint of respondent Yap

principally impugning the jurisdiction of the OIC. A decision
was rendered in Civil Case No. 13675 ordering respondent
Yap to pay his overdue liabilities: 1) P47,537.30
representing the value of petroleum products he bought
from the petitioner 2) P1,000, litigation expenses 3) P5,000,
attorney's fees.
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary
civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by
rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon
the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's
contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such
right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade
practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap
reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to
pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in Civil
Case No. 13675.
Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent
OIC denied it. However, a modification was made by
declaring that the permission it gave respondent Yap to pay
his judgment debt was "merely a suggestion." OIC ordered
that petitioner must comply within ten (10) days from notice.
The issues now of the petition are the aforementioned
orders of the respondent OIC, petitioner Shell submitting
that they are null and void on any, or all, of the following
grounds:
1. Respondent OIC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil
company.

2. Respondent Manuel B. Yap himself first invoked the
jurisdiction of the then CFI of Iloilo to resolve the dispute so
that he is now estopped from impugning the jurisdiction of
the civil courts.
3. Peremptory declaration by respondent OIC that the
contractual stipulation that either party may declare the
contract terminated after a 90-day written notice constitutes
an "unfair and onerous trade practice" is an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligation of contracts and a deprivation
of property without due process of law.
4. There is no factual basis for respondent OIC's conclusion
and ruling that the disputed contract is an "unfair and
onerous trade practice."
The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed
reading of the entire OIC Act (R.A. #6173) will reveal that
there is no express provision conferring upon respondent
OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes
between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of
course a well settled principle of administrative law that
unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like
respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. As We
declared in Miner vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):
. . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may
confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-
judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, as incident to the performance of
administrative functions, but in so doing, the
legislature must state its intention in express terms
that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-

judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to
be valid, only to those incidental to, or in
connection with, the performance of administrative
duties which do not amount to conferment of
jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the
courts.
Sec. 6 of R.A. #6173 restricts the extent and scope of the
OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub-paragraphs "a" to "f".
A contrary interpretation would collide with the familiar
principles of statutory construction that, in making a detailed
enumeration, the law-making body intended to accomplish a
purpose and that the all-embracing and general word
"jurisdiction" must be restricted to mere regulatory and
supervisory (not judicial) powers.
The phrase "to set the conditions" under subparagraph "a"
refers to the right to prescribe rules of conduct. It appertains
to rule-making functions and cannot include quasi-judicial
powers. The limitations of supervision and regulation are
reiterated in the provisions of Sec. 7 (4) (d), to wit:
(4) (d) To regulate the operations and trade
practices of the industry in order to encourage
orderly competition, prevent monopolies and
collusive practices within the industry, giving due
regard to the ecological and environmental needs
of the country;
There is no question that respondent Yap first invoked the
jurisdiction of the then CFI of Iloilo to resolve the dispute
and without waiting for the determination of the issues, he

filed a complaint with respondent OIC raising the same
issues. Respondent Yap thus submitted a single and
indivisible controversy to two different entities. This cannot
be permitted without making a mockery of justice.
It is not amiss to mention that even before the creation of
the OIC in 1971, petitioner Shell and respondent Yap were
already bound by their dealership agreement. From the time
said agreement was registered with the OIC as required by
R.A. 6173, respondent OIC never informed the petitioner
that said agreement or any of its provisions was contrary to
the provisions of R.A. No. 6173. Neither did respondent Yap
show any disapproval of the provisions of Sec. 5 of their
agreement. Said provision is not contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of respondent OIC, in
OIC Case #144 are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr, and Cruz, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, J., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent
of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO
BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN
LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO,
ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be
formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists
of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or
order issued by a court of justice or government agency or
official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that
relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is
placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same
purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the
respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct
for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the
present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved

in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or
otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day,
some 800 public school teachers, among them members of
the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what
they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize
and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention. According
to them they had decided to undertake said "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS
premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes
as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass
actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned
to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions"
were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at
the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had

agreed to support the non-political demands of the
MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five
(5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of
P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR
Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS
90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr.,
Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were,
among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed
separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also
moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings
pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was
denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which later also denied their
motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits
and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the

suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition
for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a
similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as
G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in
behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals,
and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers
too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted
sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also
"ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering
forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR
Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance
therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not
certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena
which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with
the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the
case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his
clients had been "denied due process and suspended
without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join
the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which
were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers,
(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following
disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the
case and be accordingly guided in its investigation
and resolution of the matter, considering that these
forty two teachers are now suspended and
deprived of their wages, which they need very
badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda
Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the
Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19,
1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and
all documents relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this
matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the
complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary
Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to
dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on
November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has
no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion
to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were
promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No.
DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue
return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively
suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent
Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and
required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their
counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on
the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It
held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of
law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a
chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had
been a violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission was empowered to investigate; and while
expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the
facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case

decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being
unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6,
1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28,
1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner
Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and
prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its
position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also
made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e.,
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It
intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due
process, and just cause exists for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of
the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their
mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is
to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness,
the same issues which have been passed upon and decided
by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in

fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected
may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on
Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do
so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-
judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine,
certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be

provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional
provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on
Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as
an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded
and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad,
and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to provide
for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's
compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance
to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the power
toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt
and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in

accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions,
in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether
in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct
an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course,
is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same:
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to

inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise
of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter
or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule
on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try
and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there
be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has

no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a)
whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by
the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on
and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and
regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions,
or are justified by the grievances complained of by them;
and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly
be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him
under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated,
already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved
them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably
taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to
pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions
reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases
are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents
due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education

had in truth committed "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the
event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in
this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the
jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the
Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the
same ground traversed by the latter and making its own
judgment on the questions involved. This would accord
success to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment
of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be adverse to
them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on
Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal
thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission
and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can
do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of
December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
respondent Commission on Human Rights and the
Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for
exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary
act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human
Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other
similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking
teachers but also the human rights of students and
their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused
but also the human rights of the victims and the
latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise
against the government but also those who defend
the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers
but also those who as a consequence of strikes
may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a
government agency (such as the Commission on
Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility
of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of
ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there
are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human
obligations."
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in
my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.

# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for
exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary
act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human
Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other
similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking
teachers but also the human rights of students and
their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused
but also the human rights of the victims and the
latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise
against the government but also those who defend
the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers
but also those who as a consequence of strikes
may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a
government agency (such as the Commission on
Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility
of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of
ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there
are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human
obligations."
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in
my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 6-13.
2 G.R. No. 95445 (Manila Public School Teachers
Association, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laguio, Jr.,
etc., et al) and G.R. No. 95590 (Alliance of

Concerned Teachers [ACT], et al. v. Hon. Isidro
Cariño, etc., et al.).
3 (Joint) Resolution, G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
prom. Aug. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Id., p. 7.
6 Also impleaded as respondents were other
teachers, Adelaida dela Cruz, Ma. Teresa Rizardo,
Rita Atabelo and Digna Operiano (Rollo, p. 77).
7 Rollo, pp. 77-78.
8 Id., pp. 77-81.
9 Id., pp. 7-8, and 47-50 (Annex "I," petition:
Decision of Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio in Civil
Case No. 90-54468 of the RTC of Manila [Branch
18] entitled Manila Public School Teachers
Association, et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño and Hon.
Erlinda Lolarga).
10 Id., pp. 8; 51-52 (Annex J,
Petition: Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of 7
affiants including respondents Budoy, Babaran,
and del Castillo), and 53-54 (Annex K, petition:
sworn statement given by Apolinario Esber under
questioning by Nicanor S. Agustin, CHR).
11 Id., p. 56: Order in Striking Teachers CHR Case
No. 90-775, 1st par., p. 1.

12 Id., 1st and 2nd pars., p. 1.
13 Id., pp, 56-57.
14 Id., pp, 11-58-76 (Annex M, petition).
15 SEE footnote 8 and related text, supra.
16 SEE footnote 3, supra.
17 Rollo, p. 11.
18 Id., pp. 12-13.
19 Including Regional Trial Courts designated and
acting as Special Agrarian Courts, and the Court of
Tax Appeals. SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 1-
91 eff. April 1, 1991.
20 Vested with judicial authority or quasi-judicial
powers are such agencies, boards or officers like
the Securities & Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Government Service Insurance System,
Employees' Compensation Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission. SEE Circular No. 1-
91, supra. Also possessed of quasi-judicial
authorities are department heads and heads of

office under the Civil Service Law, and the
Ombudsman.
21 The nature of a "judicial function" was inter
alia described in Republic of the Philippines
(PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478
as follows: "The resolution of controversies is, as
everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This
essential function is accomplished by first, the
ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts
from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced
by the parties, and second after that determination
of the facts has been completed, by the application
of the law thereto to the end that the controversy
may be settled authoritatively, definitively and
finally."
. . . "It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is,
and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially." . . . Mun. Council of Lemery v. Prov.
Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 270, citing State
ex rel. Boards of Commrs. v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301,
304.
It has been held that a special civil action
of certiorari "would not lie to challenge action of the
"Integrity Board" set up by Executive

Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950, because that
board, like the later Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission, was not invested with judicial
functions but only with power to investigate
charges of graft and corruption in office and to
submit the record, together with findings and
recommendations, to the President." Ruperto v.
Torres G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep.,
100 Phil. 1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest, Vol.
1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).
Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of
"jurisdiction" in relation to a criminal case, states it
to be "the power of a court to inquire into the fact,
to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in
a regular course of judicial proceeding . . ." In
Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed., "adjudge" is
defined as: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle
or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies
a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment (emphasis supplied).
22 A distinguished Member of the Constitutional
Commission that drew up the 1987 Constitution,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the Commission's
official records, states that the "principal function of
the Commission (on Human Rights) is
investigatory. In fact, in terms of law enforcement,
this pretty much is the limit of its function. Beyond
investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice
Department which has full control over
prosecutions. Thus, under Section 18 (9) it can

only request assistance from executive offices."
(Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, a Commentary, 1988 ed., Vol. II p.
503/).
23 Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1).
24 Id., Sec. 17. (3).
25 Id., Sec. 18.
26 E.g.: the prosecution of persons guilty of
crimes, or institution of civil or administrative
proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over
jails, prisons, or detention facilities; the submission
of recommendations to the Congress of measures
to promote human rights provide for compensation
to victims of violations thereof, etc.
27 Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961)
definition is: "To search or inquire into; to examine
(a matter) systematically or in detail; to make an
inquiry or examination into." The American College
Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a)
"investigate" as "to search or examine into the
particulars of; examine in detail;" and (b)
"investigation," an act or process of investigating; a
searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a
detailed or careful examination.
28 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
29 Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.

30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961)
definition is "To adjudge; to award; "to give
something controverted to one of the litigants, by a
sentence or decision. . . . To try and determine
judicially; to pronounce by sentence of court. . . .
To sit in judgment and pronounce sentence; to act
as a judge, or court of judgment."
31 Id., the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961)
definition is "To settle, determine, or decide
judicially; to adjudicate upon; . . . To pronounce or
decree by judicial sentence . . . To award judicially;
to grant, bestow, or impose by judicial sentence . .
. ."
32 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentine's
Law Dictionary, "adjudicate" is defined as: "To give
judgment; to render or award judgment," and
"adjudge" as: "To give judgment; to decide, to
sentence." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary Third
Revision (8th Ed.), "adjudication" is defined as "A
judgment; giving or pronouncing judgment in a
case. Determination in the exercise of judicial
power."
33 SEE footnotes 6 to 8, and 15, and related
text, supra.
34 SEE footnotes 16 and 17 related text, supra.
35 SEE footnote 26, supra.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day,
some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private
respondents who were members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to
“dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary
of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human
rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to
say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the
same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court
having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still
timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power
under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a

controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,”
cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.

ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK
EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her
capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development
Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on
promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of
their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994.
Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator,
received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995.
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper
despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them
to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been
filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the
Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining

Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of
Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to
set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to
prohibit her from enforcing the same.
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor
dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the
basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties
who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation
on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a
dispute are compelled by the government to forego their
right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of
their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1
The
essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a
dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party
whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in
compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a
dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary
arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an
impartial third person for a final and binding
resolution. 2
Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be
complied with by both parties without delay, such that once
an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left

to be done by both parties but to comply with the same.
After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen
arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular
dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually
acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case.
Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said
arbitrator's decision.
In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein
provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA
or company personnel policies. 3
For this purpose, parties to
a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for
their selection, preferably from those accredited by the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article
261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive
original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of
the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them,
but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise
jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the
Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated
cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of

the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of
this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on
a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite
limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4
The state of
our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that
"(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall
be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties," 5
while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders." 6
Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal
from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the
Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari,7
in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court
of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and
imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8
on the
settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite
time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators
determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have
the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic
Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 9
this Court ruled

that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or
in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial
agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since
his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel
of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a
quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and

the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-
judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to
meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial
functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the
subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11
that the
broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in
the above-quoted provision.
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or
agency. 12
Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or
"instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a
certain government act or function is performed. 13
The word
"instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power
for the performance of a state function. 14
An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, 15
in the same
manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is
an instrumentality of the court,16
and a trustee in bankruptcy
of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. 17
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function
pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under
the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls,
therefore, within the contemplation of the term
"instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The
fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the
Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said
Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the

Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for
in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner
of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to
the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and
this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in
amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the
Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of
the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the
original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities 18
not expressly excepted from the
coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or
another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative
intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases
within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary
arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or
the labor arbiter.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section
22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration
Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which
the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none
be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city
in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in

which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party
to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month
after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction
for an order confirming the award and the court must grant
such order unless the award is vacated, modified or
corrected. 19
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary
arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently,
in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the
Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy,
this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals
petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to
the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J. are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Seide, A Dictionary of Arbitration (1970).
2 Ibid.
3 Art. 260, Labor Code.

5 Art. 262-A, par. 4, Labor Code.
7 Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v.
Romero, et al., 130 SCRA 392 (1984); Sime
Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 180
SCRA 177 (1989).
8 98 SCRA 314 (1980).
9 Supra.
10 Art. 262-A, in relation to Art. 217 (b) and
(c), Labor Code, as amended by Sec. 9, R.A.
6715.
11 Executive Order No. 1008.
12 Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 112 S.E. 2d
716, 719, 236 S.C. 2.
13 Govt. of P.I. v. Springer, et al., 50 Phil.
259, 334 (1927).
14 Ciulla v. State, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 545, 550, 191
Misc. 528.
15 In re Turncock's Estate, 300 N.W. 155,
156, 238 Wis. 438.

16 In re Brown Co., D.C. Me., 36 F. Supp.
275, 277.
17 Gagne v. Brush, D.C.N.H., 30 F. Supp.
714, 716.
18 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, et al.,
231 SCRA 30 (1994).
19 Section 23, R.A. No. 876.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK
FORCE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE
TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and
KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents.
K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and
prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country
(per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as
null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its
Decision, dated October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside
an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial
Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. The
Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and
granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co.,
Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986
Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn,
denied the petitioner's own motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not in controversy. We quote:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B.
Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential

Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred
to as PADS Task Force for purposes of
convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156,
157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises
Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation,
Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation,
Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-
trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U.
Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman
Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants
was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of
Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task
Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of
Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of
the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the
sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants
involved in this case. The application filed by Atty.
Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro
are all dated March 12, 1985. 5
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner
below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to
enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in
question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5)
days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18,
1985.

In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material
issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed
by the petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by
respondent State Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search
warrants sought to be quashed had already been implemented and executed. 8
On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its
challenged Orders, and held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void.
Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered
to return and surrender immediately all the
personal properties and documents seized by
them from the petitioners by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrants.
SO ORDERED. 9
On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest,
on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court
held:

Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body
with express powers enumerated under PD 1936
to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined
and punished under P.D. No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial
powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and
the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to
declare the search warrants in question null and
void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.10
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.
sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of
whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and
seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's
motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated
September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated
May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so
issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent
Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction," 11 specifically:

a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of
the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts
may countermand or restrain the enforcement of
lawful writs or decrees issued by a quasi-judicial
body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS
Task Force;
b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its
erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous
Decision dated October 24, 1986 (see Annex "I")
and thus promulgated the questioned Resolutions
(Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of powers;
c) In not resolving directly the other important
issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-
G.R. No. 08622-SP despite the fact that petitioner
has demonstrated sufficiently and convincingly that
respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders
in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes
"C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction:
1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to
be seized as stated in the contested search
warrant were too general which allegedly render
the search warrants null and void; (b) the
applications for the contested search warrants
actually charged two offenses in contravention of
the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become
moot and academic, even if the contested search

warrants had already been fully implemented with
positive results; and
2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936
'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential
questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-
equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court,
and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (ii) may
the said presidential body be said to be "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue
search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we
take up seriatim.**
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner
states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions
under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange
violations as defined and punished under PD No.
1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as
conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are
decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to
conduct preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign
exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending
upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to
file the corresponding information in court of Executive
Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner
exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication
." 14

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