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Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections assails the
constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that
Comelec's resolutions implementing the same
for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA
4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a
change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the
municipality of Buldon in the Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan
are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the
President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until
"clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute
should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is
entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur",
but which includes barrios located in another
province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for
embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void

2. 1. The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject thereof. Of
relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement
"breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House
where the bill, being of local application,
originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in
the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or
not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need
not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which
is so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" —
projects the impression that only the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig
and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different
from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of
Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.
Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill.
David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSA¶s
20th
anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency and
thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to
immediately carry out necessary and appropriate

3. actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This
declaration led to cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the EDSA People Power
I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and
warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities,
including the media, were implemented.
Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along
with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested
without warrant.
A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued
lifting the state of emergency.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual
controversy or case subject for judicial review.
Whether or not there petition is with legal
standing particularly on his qualification to sue.
Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor General¶s refute
that the case has been moot and academic was
not upheld by the Court. According to the
Supreme Court, courts will decide cases
otherwise found moot and academic if: there is
grave Constitutional violation, the situation¶s
exceptional character and paramount public
interest involved, issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was
found to be of legal standing on the grounds that
his personal rights were involved. The petitioner
qualifies under the direct injury test. The
personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
qualifies him to impugn the validity of the
statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he
sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful
search he experienced. Given this fact, the court
entertained his petition as he has adequately
shown that he entitled to judicial protection.
However,the court does not liberally declare
statutes as invalid although they may be abused
and misabused and may afford an opportunity
for abuse in the manner of application. The
validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not
from its effects in a particular case. The Court
ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees,
taking into consideration that legislative power
is vested only in congress. The Court partly
grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional
insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However,commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence are declared
unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not
also authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utilities or business
affected with public interest without prior
legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional
as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP
would implement PP1017, but portion where
³acts of terrorism´ has not been defined and
punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the following acts of the
government were held unconstitutional:
warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and
warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of
proof that said petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of
media standards and any form of prior restraint
on the press,as well as warrantless search of the
Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials

4. BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES,
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESARSARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER
CENTER and CHAIRMANOF THE
COMMISSIONON AUDIT
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on
the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the
revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays
that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System"on two
important constitutional grounds, viz:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997,
petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Issue: WONthe petitioner has the stand to assail
the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling: YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation,
respondents raise the threshold issues relating to
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More
specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has
no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to
be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our
sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. 4
As taxpayer and member of
the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality
of the misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at
bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to
be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.
His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have

5. started the implementation of A.O. No. 308
without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security
System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice
to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national
identification system.
All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and
we need not wait for the formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this
light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the
rule on standing is not a commendable stance as
its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
ROMULO,MABANTA,BUENAVENTURA,
SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES, petitioner,
vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL
FUND, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: CODES
Once again, this Court is confronted with the
issue of the validity of the Amendments to the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic
Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a
plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits for exemption from the
Pag~IBIGFund coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Pursuant to Section 19[1]
of P.D. No. 1752, as
amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo,
Mabanta, Buenaventura,Sayoc and De Los
Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER),a law firm,
was exempted for the period 1 January to 31
December 1995 from the Pag~IBIGFund
coverage by respondent Home Development
Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a
superior retirement plan.[2]
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of
Trustees,pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,
Series of 1995, amending and modifying the
Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII
provides that for a company to be entitled to a
waiver or suspension of Fund coverage,[3]
it
must have a plan providing for both provident/
retirement and housing benefits superior to those
provided under the Pag~IBIGFund.
On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with
the respondent an application for Waiver or
Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its
superior retirement plan.[4]
In support of said
application, PETITIONER submitted to the
HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995
Amendments to the Rules are invalid.[5]
Jksm
In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President
and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF
disapproved PETITIONER's application on the
ground that the requirement that there should be
both a provident retirement fund and a housing
plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or,"
and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742
did not amend nor repealSection 19 of P.D. No.
1752 but merely implement the law.[6]
PETITIONER's appeal[7]
with the HDMF Board
of Trustees was denied for having been rendered
moot and academic by Board Resolution No.
1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of
waiver of the mandatory coverage of the
Pag~IBIGFund, except for distressed
employers.[8]
On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a
petition for review[9]
before the Court of
Appeals. On motion by HDMF,the Court of
Appeals dismissed[10]
the petition on the ground
that the coverage of employers and employees
under the Home Development Mutual Fund is
mandatory in character as clearly worded in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A.

6. No. 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner
is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption
from the Fund coverage. As to the amendments
to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 7742, the same are valid. Under P.D. No.
1752 and R.A. No. 7742 the Board of Trustees
of the HDMF is authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations, as well as amendments thereto,
concerning the extension, waiver or suspension
of coverage under the Pag~IBIGFund. And the
publication requirement was amply met, since
the questioned amendments were published in
the 21 October 1995 issue of the Philippine Star,
which is a newspaper of general circulation.
PETITIONER's motion for
reconsideration[11]
was denied.[12]
Hence,on 6
November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition
before this Court assailing the 1995 and the
1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 for being
contrary to law. In support thereof,
PETITIONER contends that the subject 1995
Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent
with the enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as
amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely
requires as a pre~condition for exemption from
coverage the existence of either a superior
provident/ retirement plan or a superior housing
plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
Hence,considering that PETITIONER has a
provident plan superior to that offered by the
HDMF, it is entitled to exemption from the
coverage in accordance with Section 19 of P.D.
No. 1752. The 1996 Amendment are also void
insofar as they abolished the exemption granted
by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The
repeal of such exemption involves the exercise
of legislative power, which cannot be delegated
to HMDF. Kycalr
PETITIONER also cites Section 9 (1), Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides:
SEC. 9. Public Participation
~~ (1) If not otherwise required
by law, an agency shall, as far
as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed
rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption
of any rule.
Since the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7742 involve an imposition of an additional
burden, a public hearing should have first been
conducted to give chance to the employers, like
PETITIONER,to be heard before the HDMF
adopted the said Amendments. Absent such
public hearing, the amendments should be
voided.
Finally, PETITIONER contends that HDMF did
not comply with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides that "[e]very agency shall file with the
University of the Philippines Law Center three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it."
On the other hand, the HDMF contends that in
promulgating the amendments to the rules and
regulations which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident and housing
benefits for exemption from the Fund Coverage,
the respondent Board was merely exercising its
rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No.
1752. It had the option to use "and" only instead
of "or" in the rules on waiver in order to
effectively implement the Pag-IBIGFund Law.
By choosing "and," the Board has clarified the
confusion brought about by the use of "and/or"
in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
As to the public hearing, HDMF maintains that
as can be clearly deduced from Section 9(1),
Chapter 2, book VII of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, public hearing is
required only when the law so provides, and if
not, only if the same is practicable. It follows
that public hearing is only optional or
discretionary on the part of the agency
concerned, except when the same is required by
law. P.D. No. 1752 does not require that pubic
hearing be first conducted before the rules and
regulations implementing it would become valid
and effective. What it requires is the publication
of said rules and regulations at least once in a

7. newspaper of general circulation. Having
published said 1995 and 1996 Amendments
through the Philippine Star on 21 October
1995[13]
and 15 November 1996,[14]
respectively,
HDMF has complied with the publication
requirement.
Finally, HDMF claims that as early as 18
October 1996, it had already filed certified true
copies of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations with the University of the
Philippines Law Center. This fact is evidenced
by certified true copies of the Certification from
the Office of the National Administrative
Register of the U.P. Law Center.[15]
We find for the PETITIONER. Calrky
The issue of the validity of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically
Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension,
has been squarely resolved in the relatively
recent case of China Banking Corp. v. The
Members of the Board of Trustees of the
HDMF.[16]
We held in that case that Section 1 of
Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and
HDMF Circular No. 124~B prescribing the
Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by
R.A. No. 7742, are null and void insofar as they
require that an employer should have both a
provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan
superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in
order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the
Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion,
we ruled:
The controversy lies in the legal signification of
the words "and/or."
In the instant case,the legal meaning of the
words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., "either and or; e.g. butter
and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or
eggs."The term ‘and/or’ means that the effect
shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and
the disjunctive "or"; or that one word or the
other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended
by the legislature as gathered from the whole
statute. The term is used to avoid a construction
which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone
will exclude the combination of several of the
alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive
"and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone."
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the
intention of the legislature in using the term
"and/or" is that the word "and" and the word
"or" are to be used interchangeably.
It ... seems to us clear from the language of the
enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752 intended that an employer with a provident
plan or an employee housing plan superior to
that of the fund may obtain exemption from
coverage. If the law had intended that the
employee [sic] should have both a superior
provident plan and a housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would have used the
words "and" instead of "and/or." Notably,
paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual
certification of waiver or suspension, that the
features of the plan or plans are superior to the
fund or continue to be so. The law obviously
contemplates that the existence of either plan is
considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an
exemption; needless to state,the concurrence of
both plans is more than sufficient. To require the
existence of both plans would radically impose a
more stringent condition for waiver which was
not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By
removing the disjunctive word "or" in the
implementing rules the respondent Board has
exceeded its authority. Slx
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has
rule~making power as provided in Section
5[17]
of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13[18]
of P.D.
No. 1752. However,it is well~settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the

8. administrative agency.[19]
It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.[20]
In the present case,when the Board of Trustees
of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of
the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that
employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all
its employees in order to qualify for exemption
from the Fund, it effectively amended Section
19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board
subsequently abolished that exemption through
the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent
repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are
not within the delegated power of the Board.
The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its
rule~making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not override,
supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry
out.[21]
Only Congress can repealor amend the
law. Scslx
While it may be conceded that the requirement
of having both plans to qualify for an exemption,
as well as the abolition of the exemption, would
enhance the interest of the working group and
further strengthen the Home Development
Mutual Fund in its pursuit of promoting public
welfare through ample social services as
mandated by the Constitution, we are of the
opinion that the basic law should prevail. A
department zeal may not be permitted to outrun
the authority conferred by the statute.[22]
Considering the foregoing conclusions, it is
unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed decision of 31 July 1997 of the
Court of Appeals in CA~G.R. No. SP~43668
and its Resolution of 15 October 1997 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
disapproval by the Home Development Mutual
Fund of the application of the petitioner for
waiver or suspension of Fund coverage is SET
ASIDE, and the Home Development Mutual
Fund is hereby directed to refund to petitioner
all sums of money it collected from the latter.
SO ORDERED. Slxsc
Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares~Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part. Related to a party.
Executive Secretary vs Southwing Heavy Inds.
Inc
Facts:
EO 156 was issued by PGMA in 2002,
prohibiting the importation into the country of
used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.
Article 2, Section 3.1 enumerates the vehicles
excluded/exempted from the prohibition. Three
separate actions for declaratory relief were filed
before an Olongapo RTC, asserting that Article
2, Section 3.1 is unconstitutional and illegal. The
RTC granted all the petitions and declared the
EO unconstitutional.
Issue:
W/N EO 156 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
EO 156 is VALID insofar as it applies to the
Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-
in former Subic because
1. Its promulgation is actually authorized
by the legislature (Tariff and Customs
Code, Omnibus Investment Code,
Safeguard Measures Act); and
2. It is presumed that the EO duly
complied with the procedures and
limitations imposed by law, absent any
strong evidence to the contrary.
However, the proscription in the importation of used
motor vehicles should be operative only outside

9. the Freeport and he inclusion of said zone within
the ambit of prohibition is an invalid
modification of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992). When the
application of an administrative issuance
modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended
scope, the issuance becomes void, not only for
being ultra vires but also for being
unreasonable.
For an administrative issuance to be valid, it
must comply with the following:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by
the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance
with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the
authority given by the legislature; and
4. It must be reasonable.
Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his
car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he
was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series
of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of
First Instance decided that from the action
initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was
null and void and had been repealed by Republic
Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of
Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not
definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is
an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general
rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law
and any conflict between a municipal order and
a national law must be ruled in favor of the
statute.
2. Yes,the terms of Municipal Order 3 was
ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic”
is not defined and no distinctions were made
between cars,trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local
Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had,
on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code,
null and void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of
Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained
the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
procedural requirements had been observed.
More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments
in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of
the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments. The court cited the
familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being “the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of

10. the former for the latter,” while the second is
“the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions is
accordance with law.”
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is unconstitutional; and
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can
exercise control, rather than supervision, over
the local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in
so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the
Local Government Code is unconstitutional but
affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the
procedural requirements in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice
to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted,to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may,
in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done
by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less
than this, and so performed an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully
examined every exhibit and agree with the trial
court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. The only exceptions are
the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering
that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due
process.
Summary: Francisco vs. House of
Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November
2003)
Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR
160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc,
.Facts:
On28 November2001,the12th CongressoftheHouseof
Representativesadoptedandapprovedthe Rules
ofProcedure in Impeachment Porceedings,
superceding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July
2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee
onJustice "to conductaninvestigation, inaid oflegislation,
onthemannerofdisbursementsandexpendituresby
theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June
2003, former President JosephE.Estradafiledan
impeachmentcomplaint (firstimpeachmentcomplaint)
againstChiefJusticeHilario G.Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal

11. of thepublic trustandotherhigh crimes."Thecomplaint
wasendorsedbyHouseRepresentatives,andwasreferred
tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August
2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform,"
butvotedtodismiss thesameon22October2003for
being insufficient in substance.Fourmonthsand
threeweekssincethefiling ofthe firstcomplaint oron23
October2003,adayaftertheHouseCommittee onJustice
votedtodismiss it,thesecondimpeachmentcomplaint was
filed with theSecretaryGeneraloftheHouseby
HouseRepresentativesagainstChiefJusticeHilario G.
Davide,Jr.,founded onthealleged resultsofthelegislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a"Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House
of Representatives,et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is
conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating
power" to "determine the proper allocation
of powers" of the different branchesofgovernment
and"todirectthecourseofgovernmentalong
constitutional channels"isinherentin allcourtsasa
necessaryconsequenceofthejudicial poweritself,whichis
"the powerofthecourttosettle actual
controversiesinvolving rightswhicharelegally
demandable andenforceable."Asindicated in Angarav.
ElectoralCommission, judicial reviewisindeedanintegral
componentofthedelicate systemofchecksandbalances
which,togetherwiththecorollary principle ofseparationof
powers,formsthebedrockofourrepublican formof
governmentandinsuresthatitsvastpowersareutilized only
forthebenefitofthe people forwhichitserves.The
separationofpowersisafundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actualdivision inour
Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them
to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. TheConstitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of
thevarious departments of the government. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter,effectively checkstheother
departmentsinthe exerciseofitspowertodeterminethe
law,andhencetodeclareexecutiveandlegislative actsvoid
ifviolative ofthe Constitution.The major difference
between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court isthat while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted
to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just apowerbutalsoaduty,andit
wasgivenanexpandeddefinition toinclude thepowerto
correctanygraveabuseofdiscretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the
U.S
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446)April 24,
1985
Tañada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees,letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and

12. administrative orders, invoking the right to be
informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential
decrees,letters of instructions, generalorders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is
necessary before its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided ” The Court has ruled that publication
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of
a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures,fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore,mandatory.
Tanadav.Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA
446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication to the
OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect. Decision was concurred only
by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration
/ clarification of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the
motion is a request for advisory opinion.
February Revolution took place,which
subsequently required the new Solicitor General
to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of
the clause ³unless otherwise provided´.
Held:
The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to thedate of
effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event
beomitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective
immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. The legislature
may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1)
all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or
directlyconferred by the Constitution; (3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4)
Charter of a citynotwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects onlythe inhabitants of that place;
(5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in the
details´ of the CentralBank Act which that body
is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must
be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws.
Reasoning:

13. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upontheir
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette,
to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by
thelegislature, in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria
de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel
while on its way to Bulacan because the driver
could not produce the required documents for
the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the
confiscation of the truck and required the owner
to explain. Private respondents failed to submit
required explanation. The DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents
brought the case to the DENR Secretary.
Pending appeal, private respondents filed a
replevin case before the RTC against petitioner
Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case
contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied
their motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin
because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls
within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The
Court has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processed afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before court’s judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1)
when there is violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppels on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is
a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained
against the petitioners for the subject truck taken
and retained by them for administrative

14. forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections
68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view
of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the
proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case
and consequently issuing the writ ordering the
return of the truck.
Aisporna v CA (1982)
Aisporna v CA (1982)
Facts
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo
Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the
application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla
Compana de Seguros without the certificate of
authority to act from the insurance
commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife
was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy.
After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal
action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of
the Insurance code for feloniously acting as
agent when she solicited theapplication form.
In the trial court, she claimed that she helped
Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal,
not a new policy from Isidro through the phone.
She did this because her husband was absent
when he called. She only left a note on top of
her husband’s desk to inform him of what
transpired. (She did not accept compensation
from Isidro for her services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with
subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in
the Cabanatuan city court.
In the appellate court, she was found guilty of
having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the
insurance code.
The OSG kept on repeating that she didn’t
violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversalof the judgment, Aisporna
assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a
necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec
189 of the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F,
F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner
Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having
violated the 1st
par of the sec 189 of the IC
without reference to the 2nd
paragraph of the said
section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the
agent mentioned in the 1st
paragraph of the
aforesaid section is governed by the definition
of an insurance agent found on its second
paragraph
Decision: Aisporna acquitted
Ruling:
Sect 189 of the I.C.,par 1 states that “No
insurance company doing business with the
Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall
pay any commission or other compensation to
any person for services in obtaining new
insurance unless such person shall have first
procured from the Insurance Commissioner
a certificate of authority to act as an agent of
such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or
broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance without obtaining a
certificate from the Insurance Commissioner.
Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION
solicits or obtains insurance for any for any
insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in
the negotiating of such insurance shall be an
insurance agent in the intent of this section and
shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to
which an insurance agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company
violating the provisions of the section.

15. The court held that the 1st
par prohibited a
person to act as agent without certificate of
authorityfrom the commissioner
In the 2nd
par, the definition of an insurance
agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty for
violating the 1st
2 rules
The appellate court said that the petitioner was
penalized under the1st paragraph and not the
1nd. The fact that she didn’t receive
compensation wasn’t an excuse for her acquittal
because she was actually punished separately
under sec 1 because she did not have
a certificate of authority as under par 1.
The SC held that the definition of an insurance
agent was made by CA to be limited to
paragraph 2 and not applicable to the
1st
paragraph.
The appellate court said that a person was an
insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits
insurance for compensation, but in the
1st
paragraph, there was no necessity that a
person solicits an insurance compensation in
order to be called an agent.
The SC said that this was a reversible error.
The CA said that Aisporna didn’t receive
compensation.
The SC said that the definition of an insurance
agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189
(check the law) The definition in the
2nd
paragraph qualified the definition of an agent
used in the 1st
and third paragraphs.
DOCTRINE:The court held that legislative
intent must be ascertained from the
consideration of the statute as a whole. The
words shouldn’t be studied in isolated
explanations but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to
pronounce the harmonious whole.
Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular
word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in
itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the
company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court
held that the definition of an insurance agent in
the 2nd
paragraph was applicable in the
1st
paragraph.
To receive compensation be the agent is an
essential element for violation of the
1st
paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didn’t receive
compensation by the receipt of compensation
wasn’t an essential element for violation of the
1st
paragraph.
The SC said that this view wasn’t correct owing
to the American insurance laws which qualified
compensation as a qualifying factor in
penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited
insurance (Texas code and snyder’s law)
CHINA BANKINGCORP vs. Ortega
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
Facts:
Petitioner refuses to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor
by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No.
1405 (Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which
allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits.
Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly
refuse to comply with a court process garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act No.
1405.
Held:
No. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing
discussion of the conference committee report of
the two houses of Congress that the prohibition
against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no
real inquiry in such a case,and if the existence
of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is
purely incidental to the execution process. It is
hard to conceive that it was ever within the
intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade

16. payment of their just debts, even if ordered by
the Court, through the expedient of converting
their assets into cash and depositing the same in
a bank
National Federation ofLabor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of
Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment(Labor Relations Division,
Zamboanga City), a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusivecollective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing
plantof the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc.
(Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such
employees charged the firmbefore the same
office for underpayment of monthly living
allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued
anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of
the said localunion; unfair labor practice;
nonpayment of living allowances; and
“employment of oppressive alienmanagement
personnel without proper permit. The strike
began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982,
Zambowood filed a complaint with the
trial court against the officers and members of
theunion, for “damages for obstruction of private
property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/orrestraining order.” The union filed
a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution
of the restrainingorder, and opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, contending that the incidents
of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the
Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence,the petition forcertiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required
to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law. Construction and interpretation
comeonly after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without
them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in
a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority whichorganizes the court;
and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never
presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction
of courts and judicial tribunals is
derivedexclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statutein force. Therefore,
since (1) the original wording of Article 217
vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since
(2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the
jurisdiction with respect to money claims
of workers orclaims for damages arising
from employer-employee relations to the
labor arbiters after PresidentialDecree 1367
transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary
courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130
madeno change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
with respect to moneyclaims of workers or
claims for damages arising from employer-
employee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied
the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided
forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a
court of first instance judge then, a regional trial
court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope
of the authority conferred on him by law when
he entertained thesuit for damages, arising
from picketing that accompanied a strike.The
Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of
certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July
1982 orderissued by the court a quo. It granted
the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of
said court, orwhoever acts in his behalf in the
RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking
any further action on thecivil case (Civil Case
716 [2751]), except for the purpose
of dismissing it. It also made permanent the
restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
Board of Administration of the P.V.A. vs. Bautista
Facts:
Calixto Gasilao was a veteran who was disabled
during the last war. He filed his claim with the

17. PVA board as early as July 1955, but his
claim was denied because his supporting papers
were incomplete. Itwas in only 1968 that
Gasilao was able to complete all the necessary
papers and the Board thereafter approved his
pension, starting from the date of approval.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the
board to recover the pension which he claims he
is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed
his application for pension, up to 1968 when his
pension was finally approved.
CFI Ruling:
The trial court granted the amount claimed. The
Board filed a petition to review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to the pension
from 1955 instead of 1968?
Petitioner's (PVA Board) Contention:
Petitioner cited Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 65
(Veteran's Bill of Rights)which provides:
"Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take
advantage of the rights and
privileges provided for in this act should file his
application with
the Board"
Petitioner contends that since the foregoing
section impliedly required that the application
filed should first be approved by the
Board of Administrators before the claimant
could receive his pension, therefore,an award of
pension benefits should commence
from the date of approval of application.
Held:
The stand to the petitioner does not appear to be
in consonance with the spirit and the intent of
law. Considering that R.A. No. 65 is a
veteran's pension law which must be accorded a
liberal construction and interpretation in order to
favor those entitled to rights,privileges, and
benefits granted thereunder, among which are
the right to resume old positions is government,
educational benefits, the privilege to take
promotional examinations, a life pension for
the incapacitated, pension for widow and
children, and hospitalization and medical care
benefits.
The purpose of the Congress in granting
veterans pensions is to compensate, as far as
may be, a class of men who suffered in the
service for the hardships they endured and the
dangers they encountered, and more particularly,
those who have become incapacitated for work
owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained
while in the line of duty. A veteran pension law
is, therefore,a governmental expression of
gratitude to and recognition of those who
rendered service for the country, especially
during times of war and revolution, by extending
to them regular momentary aid. For this reason,
it is a general rule that a liberal construction is
given to pension statutes in favor of those
entitled
pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but
such constructional preference is to be
considered with other guides to interpretation
and a construction of pension laws must depend
on its own particular
language. On the other hand, if the pension
awards are made effective only upon approval of
the application, this would be dependent upon
the
discretion of the Board which had been abused
in this case through inaction extending for 12
years. The noble and humanitarian purposes
for which the law had enacted could easily be
thwarted or defeated.
Gasilao's claim was sustained.
People v.Mapa

18. GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20
SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in
aninformation dated 14 August 1962 in violation
of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative
Codein connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused
admits to possession of firearm on ground of
being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano
Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the
lower courtrendered a decision convicting the
accused of the crime and sentenced him to
imprisonment for one year and one day to two
years. As the appeal involves a question of law,
it was elevated tothe Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed
and qualified as such of the governor isexempt
from the requirement of having a license of
firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for
any person to possess any firearm, detached
partsof firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be
usedin the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition except when such
firearms arein possession of such public officials
and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties; as those firearms and
ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully
issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the
Philippines Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal
treasurers,municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails.It is the first and
fundamental duty of courts to apply the law;
Construction and interpretationcome only after it
has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate withoutthem. The law
cannot be any clearer,there being no provision
made for a secret agent.Reliance in the decision
in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the
case no longer speakswith authority to the extent
that the present decision conflicts with. It may
be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang,a secret
agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption
that the appointmentof the accused as a secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns anddetection of crimes
sufficiently put him within the category of
a µpeace officer equivalent evento a member of
the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore,
the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court
affirmed the appealed judgment.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos. However,minors Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an
opposition to the said adoption. They contended
that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
had a legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1
March 1971, and therefore said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the
Civil Code, which provides that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or children by legal fiction cannot
adopt.
Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335
of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it

19. changed the word “descendant,” found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil
Code was patterned,to “children.” The children
thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning
in law and do not include grandchildren. Well
known is the rule of statutory construction to the
effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its
face need not be interpreted. The rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subjects of statutory
construction. In the present case,Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot
assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and
affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings
37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave
birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed
signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the
early stages of the marriage, observed from his
tendency to spend time with his friends and
squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents,and his dishonesty
on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the
sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and
proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and
their child a week later. The couple is separated-
in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel
consisted of her own testimony, that of two of
her friends, a social worker,and a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Hence,the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting
personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the
Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws
on personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage; where said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because
it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court
of Appeals, where psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity, existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological
incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity,

20. juridical antecedence,and incurability. In the
present case,there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences”
and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case,promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any
visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must
be clinically or medically permanent or
incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles
220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents
and their children; (7) interpretation made by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the
fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appealas
counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and
reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.