179432707 crim-pro-rule-111-cases-doc

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G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based
on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular
accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes
Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent
Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol
and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The
race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it
at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car,
which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the
Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver
Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the
poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further
testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was
not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya.
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the
truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left
towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman
who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at
the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep,
which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the
opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria,
rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie
Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227,
and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify
Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages,

with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine
and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense
charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his
bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and
petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a
complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed
Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents
jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel
and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by
his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar
and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was
entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No.
80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal
cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint
against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the aforementioned Motion to
Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that
dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge
also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that
"while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense
from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964,
requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action;
otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2
Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971,
with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a
more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to
review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver
Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing
petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained
Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal
Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried
to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted
jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his
car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must
have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity
of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we
agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal
Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal
case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for
damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as
the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only
against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4
And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising
from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case
No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in.
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal
Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer in this case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-
delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was
driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven
by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That
the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of
skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand
truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the
collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and
that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and
attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist
of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz,
and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's
primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of
Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve
and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-
owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar)
that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file
an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking
section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7
said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance
with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence
and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in
Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,
for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as
exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of
Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as
an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further
observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil
liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in
the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even
if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency
with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."

We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case
No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No.
SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with
criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between
an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner
had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's
civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal
of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this
wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped
and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo
Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-
owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's
car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. "
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver
Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action
must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court 10
which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not
exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not
ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the
criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly
provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we
sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint,
albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803
against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his
successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the
Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965
VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI, defendants-
appellees.
Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court of Appeals, is from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing appellant's complaint in Civil
Case No. 3315 for recovery of damages for the death of Cipriano Capuno.
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit,
Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a
private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his
passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (criminal case No. 1591). The
information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of
the three victims.
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition
on the issues above-discussed. Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude
the scanning of the whole record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the
conferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of unfairness
could have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not previously
passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-known,
having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no excuse for failing to
take them into account.1äwphï1.ñët
On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the
Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon
Elordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the
sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan — the former
being appellants herein — were represented by their respective counsel as private
prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto
M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike
out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the
motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any
interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received
compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate
of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by
the Court in an order dated September 23, 1953, and that of Attorney Navarro was
disallowed in an amending order dated October 23, 1954. No appeal was taken from
either of the two orders.
On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and
Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages,
including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the
heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the
compromise and accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April
15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior
thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil
action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and
Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the
Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal
has been taken.
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the
Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and
(2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of
the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the
said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their
compromise.
The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed by appellants as
erroneous. In our opinion the question of prescription is decisive. There can be no

doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict,
which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code).
Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the
provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon
Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include
an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident
for which Elordi was being prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was subsequently
disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. And when
they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the
Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event
would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal
case.
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely
independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code,
which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi
v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other words, the civil action for
damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of
their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same
would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through
reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
after the lapse of more than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542,
promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is
governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive
period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be
brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year
period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action
against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved
the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without
having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even
during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25,
1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held
in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect
of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires
the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the
question of prescription, we do not now decide. The said rule does not apply in the
present case.
Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations, we do not
consider it necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in their brief.
The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]
ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 23971[1]
and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2]
and the Resolution dated October 18,
1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil
rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although
they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth
to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3]
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in
June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information
charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City on August 9, 1990.[5]
This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14409.[6]
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action
for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was
forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by
another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.[7]
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella
for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each
other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was
already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private
respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage
contract with Santella that he was still single.[8]
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner
filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court
judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the
hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the
prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9]
The
RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.[10]
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo,
for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating
the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration
and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and
failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the
Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is
sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 23971.[11]
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board),
where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was
pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for
bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.[12]
When the
Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,[13]
petitioner filed with
the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is
prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not
holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render
nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does
not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board
despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed
decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of
the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that
the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that

the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15]
The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed
the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set
forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was
able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.[16]
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that
no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is
administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.[17]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE
LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF
THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR
OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19]
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending
both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the
administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC
Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to
emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.[20]
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.[21]
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose
a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.[23]
Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private
respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings
could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza[24]
and People vs. Aragon[25]
cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been
overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in
September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.[26]
In Landicho vs. Relova,[27]
we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.[28]
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question
which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under
the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension
of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the
concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative
and the other is civil.[29]
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation
and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the
administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same
facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed
before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The
Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render
therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-
judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before
the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage
contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private
respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the
benefit of marriage.[30]
The existence of these other charges justified the continuation
of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that
the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of
marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original
copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no
proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness
presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took
place.[31]
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.[32]
In this case, the Court
of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution
established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the
same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action
for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has
or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
In
view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his
proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34]
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by
denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for
the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC
denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation
of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-
blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.[35]
The RTC’s observation that
there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had
presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed
the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same,
such would be the conclusion.[36]
Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed
as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that
the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in
his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced
by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal
Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality
and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he
would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the
proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be
denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second,
when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident
and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely
trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to
support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a
demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that
he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards
petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his
motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against
Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged
the case.[37]
In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38]
this Court held that
while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary

inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39]
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are
not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying
petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of
said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.[40]
The
instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against
petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As
discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that
petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered
an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case
was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s
duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan
Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they
inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the
private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other
respondent, whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.*
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate
estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years
later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for
P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras
and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1
On
the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.

On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu
proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:
. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap
and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and
maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which
must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100
SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a
criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial
question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense
of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed." 3
The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She
then came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view
of the peculiar circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case,
the criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this
suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but
only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the
accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment
in his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was
not the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by
his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for
the order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated
in the regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been
premature and that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double
jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his
Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the
ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did
indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of
dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court
on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear
provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording
of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly
says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of
the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if
the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C.
Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's
misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of
a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. 4
It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. 5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as
to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused". 6
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere
in the decision of Ras v.Rasul. 7
Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but
also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at
bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to
Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never
sold the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of
sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the
same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the
issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension
of the criminal action was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial
question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at
bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in
Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale
in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in
the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be
necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in
the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be
innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were
allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be
set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged
prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil
Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff
(Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of
his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth
or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then
he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of
estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that
the defense in the civil case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had
to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no
motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent
judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge
Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may
proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in
accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the
annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on
the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial
Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence"
and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his
questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D.
Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further
proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 162748-50 March 28, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Division), SEVERINO J. LAJARA, DENNIS LANZANAS,
APOLONIO ELASIGUE, SENADOR C. ALCALDE, EMILIO C. RODRIGUEZ, EFREN M.
GARCIA, FRISCO L. ONA, RENATO S. BUNYI, DIOSDADO J. LAJARA, CRISPIN M.
CONTRERAS, JORGE M. JAVIER, and JESUS V. GARCIA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged by the People of the Philippines via petition for certiorari under Rule 65
are the Sandiganbayan Resolution1
of September 26, 2003 granting the Motion to
Quash2
filed by private respondents and accordingly dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
23153-23155, and the Resolution3
of January 28, 2004 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution.
Private respondents then Calamba Mayor Severino J. Lajara and his fellow local public
officials Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio A. Elasigue, Senador C. Alcalde, Emilio C.
Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado M. Lajara, Crispin
M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier were, together with Jesus V. Garcia, President of
Australian Professional Realty (APRI), charged before the Sandiganbayan under three
separate informations for violation of Sections 3(e), (g) and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which provisions read:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
x x x x
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
x x x x
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of
any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or
entitled.
The charges arose from private respondents public officials’ entering, pursuant to
Municipal Ordinance No. 497, into a Memorandum of Agreement4
(MOA) dated
December 5, 1994 with APRI represented by respondent Garcia for the construction
of the Calamba Shopping Center under the "Build-Operate-Transfer" scheme in
Republic Act 6957,5
as amended by R.A. 7718.
The three separate Informations all dated January 18, 1996 read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23153
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio
C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara,
Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (j)
of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calamba,
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Severino Lajara, as Municipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in
the performance of his official function, conniving and confederating with the other
public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, Apolinio Elasigue, Frisco
Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara,
Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, all Members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia,
President of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally grant to Austalian Professional Realty, Inc., the privilege of
constructing the shopping center located at Calamba, Laguna despite knowledge that
the said construction firm is not qualified not being accredited by the Philippine

Contractor’s Accreditation Board (PCAB) as Class AAA contractor because it has only a
paid-up capital of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P125,000.00),
Philippine Currency, when the subject project would cost from P200 Million to P300
Million, to the prejudice of the government.
Contrary to law.6
(Underscoring supplied)
Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (g)
Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin
Contreras, all Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with
the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president of the Australian Professional
Realty, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Memorandum of Agreement for and in behalf of the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna
with contractor Australian Professional Realty, Inc. represented by its President,
private respondent Jesus V. Garcia, regarding the construction of a shopping center in
Calamba, Laguna, the terms and conditions being manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Municipality of Calamba such that the actual operation and
management of the said shopping center and the income derived therefrom for a
period of twenty five (25) years will be directly under the control and supervision of
the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., thus causing undue injury to the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (e)
Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara,
Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, Members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Calamba, Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president
of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., and acting with evident bad faith did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Memorandum of
Agreement on behalf of the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna with contractor
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. represented by its President, private respondent
Jesus V. Garcia, for the construction of the shopping center in Calamba, Laguna, under
the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme, despite knowledge that the Municipal
Ordinance No. 497 which gave authority to respondent Mayor to enter into the
Memorandum of Agreement was still under study by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna; that Australian Realty, Inc. is not an accredited contractor; and that no pre-
qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was conducted, thus, causing undue
injury to the complainants and to the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On February 6, 1996, private respondents filed a Petition for Reinvestigation9
and
a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest10
due to the pendency of two civil actions for the nullification of the MOA, Civil
Case No. 2180-95-C, "Merlinda Paner, for herself and for the vendors of the Calamba
Public Market v. Mayor Severino Lajara & Australian Professional Realty, Inc.," 11
and
Civil Case No. 2186-95-C, "Calamba Vendors Credit Cooperative and its Members v.
The Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, Mayor Sereriano Lajara and Australian
Professional Realty, Inc.,"12
at Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City
(the trial court), they alleging that the said civil cases raised prejudicial questions
which must first be resolved as they are determinative of their innocence or guilt.
By Order13
of February 16, 1996, the Sandiganbayan held in abeyance the issuance of
orders of arrest pending further study by the prosecution on whether the
informations, as worded, can "reasonably produce conviction."
After reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor submitted to the
Ombudsman a Memorandum14
recommending the dismissal of the criminal cases
upon finding that the Calamba Shopping Center was not listed as a priority project,
hence, no bidding was required; APRI was a project initiator and not a contractor,
hence, it did not have to register and be accredited by the Philippine Contractors

Accreditation Board (PCAB); and for the purpose of constructing the shopping center,
APRI has, aside from its paid-up capital stock, credit line facilities of 150 million
pesos.15
The Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, however, it holding that while "prejudicial question may be attendant, it
does not warrant the dismissal of the criminal cases."16
Private respondents thereupon filed an Omnibus Motion for Re-
investigation,17
contending that the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor’s memorandum-recommendation was anchored on an erroneous
appreciation of the issues and facts discussed therein, and that the recommendation
was based not on the existence of prejudicial questions but on a finding that there
was no violation of RA No. 3019.
By Resolution18
of August 25, 1998, the Sandiganbayan found that no prejudicial
question existed in the civil cases and that, at all events, the Omnibus Motion for
Reinvestigation was no longer proper since only one motion for reinvestigation may
be filed under Section 27 of RA 6770.19
Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion to Quash20
the informations, alleging
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged or over their
persons; the three informations charging three different criminal offenses arising
from one and the same act of entering into a MOA violate their constitutional rights
against double jeopardy; the facts charged in each information do not constitute an
offense, and there is no probable cause to hold them for trial.
In a separate move, private respondents filed on September 10, 1998 a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings21
reiterating that there are prejudicial questions involved in the
pending civil actions.
In the meantime, for failure to prosecute, Civil Case No. 2186-95-C was dismissed on
June 30, 1999.22
As for Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, the trial court, by Decision23
of
September 8, 2000, dismissed it after it found that the MOA was not tainted with
"marks of nullity." The decision was appealed by the plaintiffs to the appellate court
but the appeal was withdrawn and later declared abandoned and dismissed by the
said court by Resolution of January 15, 2003.24
The Sandiganbayan subsequently denied private respondents’ Motion to Quash, by
Resolution25
of February 26, 2001, for lack of merit, and unaware that a decision had
already been rendered in Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, granted the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings after finding that prejudicial questions exist which warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings. The suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal cases notwithstanding, private respondents Frisco L. Ona and Senador C.
Alcalde were respectively arraigned on July 27, 200126
and October 11, 2002,27
it being
necessary for the approval of their motions to travel. Both pleaded not guilty to each
of the charges in the Informations.
Private respondents later filed another Motion to Quash28
alleging that "[t]he
DECISION of the Regional Trial Court in the Civil Cases [sic] raises no iota of doubt that
in these three (3) INFORMATIONS [they] cannot be prosecuted after a clear and
categorical pronouncement in the said decision declaring the elements of the crime
under which they are being prosecuted do not exist."29
Treating the second Motion to Quash as a motion to dismiss, the Sandiganbayan, by
Resolution30
of September 26, 2003, granted the same and accordingly dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155.
The People’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution31
of
January 28, 2004, the present petition for certiorari was filed, attributing to the
Sandiganbayan the commission of grave abuse of discretion:
A.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, BRANCH 92, FINDING THE VALIDITY
OF THE QUESTIONED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT HAS
RENDERED CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155 DEVOID OF ANY
PROBABLE CAUSE.
B.
. . . IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES PUT FORTH BY PETITIONER
AGAINST THE MOTION TO QUASH FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
THAT THERE IS [sic] NO IDENTITIES OF PARTIES BETWEEN CIVIL CASE
NO. 2180-95-C AND CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155, A
CONDITION NEGATING THE EXISTENCE OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.32
This Court notes that instead of assailing the Sandiganbayan resolutions by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner
availed of the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Under Rule 65, petitioner must show that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, an appeal from the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion to quash, which the
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion to dismiss, being a final, not merely
interlocutory33
order, was not only available but was also a speedy and adequate
remedy.
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486
Creating a Special Court to be Known as "Sandiganbayan" and For Other Purposes"),
as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Likewise, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court
on a petition for review on certiorari.
While in the interest of justice, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be treated
as having been filed under Rule 45, a liberal application of the rules does not herein lie
for the present petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review. Parenthetically, petitioner did not even endeavor to
explain why it failed to adopt the proper remedy.34
But even gratuitously resolving the petition on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion,35
the petition just the same fails as no grave abuse of discretion can be
appreciated from the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the informations.
While the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155 was premised on the alleged
violation by private respondents of Sections 3 (j), (g), and (e) of RA No. 3019 for
entering, in behalf of the municipality, into a MOA with APRI, and the filing of Civil
Case No. 2180-95-C was instituted to invalidate the MOA, the following issues,
identified by the trial court in the said civil case as necessary to determine the validity
or nullity of the MOA:
1. Whether or not SB Resolution No. 497 of the Municipality of
Calamba is valid in that it was ratified or not ratified by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
2. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid when APRI is not
accredited with the Philippine Contractors Accredita[tion] Board
(PCAB) and has an authorized capital stock of only 2 Million Pesos
and a paid up capital stock of only P125,000.00;
3. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid without public
bidding of the project;
4. Whether or not the execution of the questioned MOA complies
with the mandatory requirement of the Buil[d] [sic] Operate and
Transfer (BOT) RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR);
5. Whether or not the questioned MOA is grossly disadvantageous
to the Municipality of Calamba.,36
are logical antecedents of the following issues raised in the criminal cases, the
resolution of which logical antecedents belongs to the trial court in the civil case: (1)
whether private respondents granted in favor of APRI the privilege of constructing the
Calamba Shopping Center despite knowledge that APRI was not qualified - not having
been accredited by the PBAC as Class AAA contractor because its paid up capital only
amounts toP125,000 [Information in Criminal Case No. 23153]; (2) whether the terms
and conditions of the MOA entered into by private respondents for and in behalf of
the municipality were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the municipality
[Information in Criminal Case No. 23154]; and (3) whether private respondents
through evident bad faith caused undue injury to the complainants and to the
government for entering into a MOA, knowing that (a) Municipal Ordinance No. 497
which gave authority to the Mayor to enter into said agreement was still under study
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, (b) APRI was not an accredited
contractor, and (c) no pre-qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was
conducted.
While the resolution of Civil Case No. 2180-95-C by the trial court of the issues raised
therein do not conclusively determine the guilt or innocence
of private respondents, still it puts to test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations, particularly whether further prosecution of the criminal cases may be
sustained.37
A challenge to the allegations in the informations on account of the issues
posed for resolution in the trial court, which are deemed prejudicial questions, is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.38
Indeed, there would be no reason to proceed with the criminal cases in light of the
trial court’s findings, which had become final and executory after the appellate court
considered the appeal therefrom abandoned and dismissed, that the MOA was valid
as APRI was qualified to enter into the same; APRI and the municipality through
private respondents complied with all the procedural requirements necessary for

entering into the MOA; and the terms and conditions of the MOA were not grossly
disadvantageous to the municipality.
. . . The fact that APRI is not accredited with the P[hilippine C[ontractors]
A[djudication] B[oard] or has only a capital stock of only 2 Million Pesos and a paid-up
capital of only P125,000.00 will not by itself nullify the MOA. A contractor may or may
not be the project proponent (Sec. 2 (e) RA 7718). A project proponent is the private
sector entity which shall have contractual responsibility for the project which shall
have an adequate financial base to implement said project consisting of equity and
firm commitments from reputable financial institutions to provide sufficient credit
lines to cover the total estimate cost of the project (Sec. 2(k) RA 7718). APRI is a BOT
project proponent and not a contractor to undertake actual construction for the
project and thus, APRI need not register with and be accredited by the PCAB (p. 9, TSN
of November 11, 1999). . . .
x x x x
The Court is convinced by the defendant’s evidence that APRI has sufficient financial
base or capability to implement the project with a[n] estimated project cost of 150
Million Pesos (Exh. "16-A"). The initial authorized capital stock of APRI of 2 Million
Pesos is supplemented by Brilliant Star Capital Lending in the amount of 150 Million
Pesos (p. 10 TSN September 5, 1999 and Exh. "11"). On top of this, the initial
authorized capital stock of 2 Million Pesos is in the process of being increased (pages 3
to 6 TSN of November 11, 1999).
x x x x
. . . The requirement of public bidding, as well as the process and procedures thereof,
mandated by the BOT law do not apply to unsolicited proposals for projects.
Projects to be implemented under unsolicited proposals need not comply with the
requirements, process and procedures of public bidding. Sec. 4 of amendatory RA
7718 provides as follows to wit:
"Unsolicited Proposals – Unsolicited proposals for projects may be accepted by any
government agency or local government unit on a negotiated bases: Provided, that,
all the following conditions are met: (1) such project involve[s] a new concept or
technology and/or not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct government
guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local
government unit has invited by publication, or three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation, comparative or competitive proposals is [sic]
received for a period of sixty (60) working days: Provided, further, that in the event
another proponent submits a lower price proposal, the original proponent shall have
the right to match that price within thirty (30) working days" (Reiterated in Rule 10,
Section 10.2 and Rule 11, Section 11.1 of the IRR).
x x x x
. . . Atty. Marciano likewise testified that the proposal for the construction of the
Calamba Shopping Center is under the Unsolicited Proposal and that there is no need
for bidding based on the letter dated August 17, 1995 to APRI by NEDA Regional
Director Mr. Catalino Boquiren to the effect that the Calamba Shopping Center is not
covered by ICC/NEDA review and approval (p. 9, TSN of September 2, 1999). NEDA
Regional Director Mr. Catalino Boquiren was presented by the plaintiffs as their
witness and he identified his August 17, 1995 letter to APRI marked as Exhs. "10" and
"10-A" (pages 7 to 8, TSN of March 20, 1997). . . .39
The qualification of APRI to enter into the MOA with the municipality having been
duly established, private respondents could no longer be held accountable under
Section 3 (j) which punishes the act of public officers of knowingly granting a license,
permit, privilege or advantage to a person not qualified or legally entitled thereto.
The absence of the element under Section 3 (g) that the MOA was grossly or
manifestly disadvantageous to the municipality reflected in the following findings of
the trial court bears noting:
. . . The Calamba Shopping Center Project, as an Unsolicited Proposal, does not
require government guarantee, subsidy or equity. Indeed the very provisions of the
questioned MOA in its whereas show in unmistakable terms that no cost or expenses
[sic] [o]n the part of the Municipality of Calamba shall be required in the construction
of the project in this wise: WHEREAS, the first party (The Municipality of Calamba)
desires to have a shopping center for the residents of Calamba, Laguna and the
nearby towns and cities that would serve as one of the major trading point[s] in the
Province of Laguna; WHEREAS, the second party (APRI) is willing and able to help the
FIRST PARTY in achieving its aforementioned objectives by constructing and operating
a shopping center with modern and sleek design without cost or expense on the part
of the first party pursuant to Buil[d]-Operate-Transfer Scheme" under RA 6957, as
amended by RA 7718; WHEREAS, the first party sees the benefits and economic
advantages of such project of the second party…."
This very clear and unmistakable terms of the questioned MOA belie the claim of the
plaintiffs that said MOA is grossly disadvantageous to the municipality. On the
contrary, the Court sees the construction of the Calamba Shipping Center under the
MOA [as] a rare happening with tremendous benefits to the citizenry not only of

Calamba but also of the neighboring towns of the province, and this without any cost
or expense on the coffers of the municipality. The Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that at present, the Calamba Shopping Center, which is just about a stone-throw
away from this Court, has been already in operation, albeit still incomplete, with
buildings and infrastructures in modern design constructed without cost to the
municipality to be enjoyed by the constituents now and in the years to come.
As matters stand now, the Municipality of Calamba is the beneficiary of all the
improvements constructed by APRI on its former market site. The parties may differ
as to how to recompense APRI for such improvements and what will guide them in
view of the re[s]cission of the BOT Contract. Certainly, the parties did not sustain
damage by such re[s]cission and they cannot be heard to complain about it.
To the mind of the Court, the BOT Contract did not work any damage to the
municipality, much more placed the municipality in any kind of disadvantageous
position. It did not either place the APRI in any disadvantageous situation, now that
the contract [wa]s rescinded by the municipal council.40
For the charge of Section 3 (e) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1)
the accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) the public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of
his official duties or his relation to his public positions; (3) he causes undue injury to
any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) such injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) the
public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
Assuming arguendo that an ordinance awarding a contract to an unqualified entity
not having been ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could result to prejudice to
the government, the findings of the trial court that (1) the ordinance was indeed
ratified, (2) no public bidding was required, (3) the MOA complied with the mandatory
requirements under RA 6957, as amended by RA No.7718 (Build, Operate and
Transfer Law), and (4) there was no evident bad faith on the part of the parties in
executing the MOA negate the existence of probable cause to justify haling private
respondents into court for violation of above-said Section 3 (e). Pertinent portions of
the trial court’s decision are reproduced hereunder:
. . . Plaintiffs contends (sic) that said SB No. 497 is not valid for the reason that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna disapproved or did not ratify the same. Plaintiffs
offered Exh. "C" which defendants likewise marked and offered as Exh. "3" to prove
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 497. The very Exh. "C"
and Exh. "3" recites [sic] the fact of the approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
this wise –
"January 13, 1995
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
This is to certify that Resolution No. 497 S. 1994 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Calamba, Laguna was received by this Office on November 07, 1994, and calendared
in the agenda of December 14, 1994 and was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan on the same day.
It is further certified that the approval of said Resolution was with[he]ld by [the]
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its session on January 11, 1995, and was referred to the
Committee on Laws and Rules for further study, in view of a letter-request filed by the
Public Market Vendors Association of Calamba."
The approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Resolution No. 497 is not shrouded
by any doubt. The fact [that] the resolution was later referred to the Committee on
Laws and Rules (Exh. "C-1") was only made by the Provincial Board in order to
appease the public vendors association of Calamba after the provincial board received
a letter-request stating that Resolution No. 497 was implemented without public
hearing.
Moreover, SB Resolution No. 497 having been received by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan on November 7, 1994, then on December 8, 1994 or after thirty (30)
days from November 7, 1994, without the Sanggunian Panlalawigan’s action declaring
SB Resolution No. 497 invalid, then said SB Resolution No. 497 shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid. (Sec. 56 (a) Local Government Code). Thus, it
can be said that SB Resolution No. 497 was approved twice, first by the positive action
of approval on December 14, 1994 and second, by inaction on December 8, 1994
upon the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt on November 7, 1994.The reliance by
plaintiffs on Exh. "C-1" (the second par. of Exh. "C") stating that on [sic] January 11,
1995 session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the approval of the Resolution No. 497
was with[h]eld and referred to the Committee on Rules for study is of no moment nor
of any significance because as stated hereinbefore, there was a positive approval on
December 14, 1994 and approval by inaction on December 8, 1994.
Moreover, the establishment, construction and maintenance of municipal markets are
undoubtedly pure proprietary function of the municipality (Mendoza vs. De Leon[,] 33
Phil[.] 508) with[in] the power of any municipality under the provision of Sec. 22 of
the Local Government Code, thus:

"(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their
proprietary functions in the management if their economic enterprises . . ."
It is the opinion of this Court that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may not restrict or
frustrate the exercise of the proprietary function of the municipality because the
power to review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is limited only to a finding that an
ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Pangbayan (Sec. 56 (c) Local Government Code).41
The . . . letter of NEDA Regional Director Boquiren should dispel any doubt that the
proposed shopping center is under the unsolicited proposal and is in conformity with
the IRR of the BOT law. At the very least, said letter the good faith (sic) on the part of
APRI and of the municipality in entering into an agreement (the MOA) for the
Calamba Shopping Center under the unsolicited proposal scheme. This witness
Boquiren was presented by the plaintiffs as their witness and therefore plaintiffs are
bound by his testimony. The attempt of the plaintiffs to impeach their own witness,
Mr. Igancio Santos, Jr., cannot be allowed nor considered by the Court under the
mandate of Rule 132, Sec. 12 of the Revised Rules of Court which proved (sic)
provides that: "Party may not impeach his own witness – except to witnesses referred
to in par. (d) and (e) of Sec. 10. the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility."
It is also observed that when the MOA was entered into between the Mayor and APRI,
the full implementation of the BOT Law and the Amendatory Act (RA 7718) was not
clearly defined, this Court was guided by Exh. "10", the official communication of Mr.
Boqueren categorically stating that the construction of the Calamba Shopping Center
falls under the Unsolicited Proposal of the BOT Law quoted herein before.
In addition to the citation in the letter of Mr. Boquiren, the ICC guidelines and
procedures in Annex B-2 of IRR provides that project of the private sector under
relending program vis special credit facilities are excluded from the ICC
review/decision (III Scope of ICC Review).
The pretension of witness Ignacio Santos, Jr., for the plaintiffs that the Calamba
Shopping Center should be endorsed to Regional Development Council for approval is
not in accord with the provision of the BOT Law because such [e]ndorsement to and
approval by the Regional Development Council is required only on priority projects
(Sec. 4[,] RA 7718, Rule 27[,] IRR).42
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, a prejudicial question is different from the
concept of res judicata. That there is no identity of parties between the civil case and
the criminal cases does not abate the application of a prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court of tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.43
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, petitioner, not having assailed the Sandiganbayan Resolution44
dated February
26, 2001 that "there exists a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of
the proceedings . . . [i]n view of the similarity or close relation of the facts and issues,
the issues to be resolved herein [Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155] may be rendered
moot by a finding in the Civil cases that, under the circumstances, the award of the
contract and/or execution of the Memorandum of Agreement was proper, legal, valid,
and beyond question,"45
is now precluded from questioning the existence of a
prejudicial question.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 26, 2003
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
which affirmed in toto the decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s
fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate
number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board
his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to
the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought
for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar
Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently
on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-
10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified
in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be
sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan
and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep
being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and
straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep
fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4
of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil
case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took
the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to
look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in
Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband’s
hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the

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