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1. Peachy Anne C. Apolo
1K—Atty. Castillo. 
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO
JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth
Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and
SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24,
1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its
owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein
petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI)
figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of
Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue
in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota
van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18,
1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein
petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple
physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13,
1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the
van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against
petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the
assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as
well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00
(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an
independent civil action based on quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no
reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain
an independent civil action during the pendency of
a criminal action when no reservation of the right
to file an independent civil action was made in the
criminal action and despite the fact that the private
complainant is actively participating through a
private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal
case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April
3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior
reservation is the standing rule that shall govern
the institution of the independent civil actions
referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past
pronouncements that view the reservation
requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to
substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no
longer be controlling. There must be a renewed
adherence to the time-honored dictum that
procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to
safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for
this noble reason, no less than the Constitution
itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules
concerning the enforcement of rights with the end
in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
which should not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Far from altering substantive
rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to
borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee
under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt
from the reservation requirement with respect to
its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from
the same act or omission of petitioner Javier
complained of in the criminal case. As private
respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of
Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then
it is bound to observe the procedural requirements
which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself
instituted the civil case.
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2. LRTA V NAVIDAD| VITUG
GR 145804, 6 February 2003
FACTS
• On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past
7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad
was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks,
Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the
area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or
an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated
by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
• On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor,
Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for
the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and
Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a
demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned
task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered
its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin
to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual
damages of P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory
damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the
death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of
P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c)
Attorney’s fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit.
The court also dismissed the complaint against
LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the
compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman.
• Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27
August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding
the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
The appellate court modified the judgment
ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to
pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; (b)
P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; (d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 as
and for attorney’s fees. The appellate court denied
LRTA’s and Roman’s motion for reconsideration in
its resolution of 10 October 2000. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N LRTA liable for tort arising from contract
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. The premise for employer’s liability for
tort (under the provisions of Article 2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault
on the part of the employee. Once such fault
is established, the employer can then be
made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be
negated by showing due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.
Herein, such a factual matter that has not
been shown.
• The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract
of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge
of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the
task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
• A contractual obligation can be breached by tort
and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort
to apply.
REYES TRUCKING VS. PEOPLE| Pardo
G.R. No. 129029 April 3, 2000 |SCRA
FACTS
o Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of
transporting beer products for the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC for short).
o Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer described above driven by Romeo
Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver.
o At around 4:00 o’clock in the morning while the
truck was descending at a slight downgrade along
the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road which
was uneven because there were potholes about
five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this
damaged portion is smooth.
o Before approaching the potholes, Dunca and his
truck helper saw the Nissan with its headlights on
coming from the opposite direction. They used to
evade this damaged road by taking the left lane
but at that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it.
o This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca
lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to
the left invading the lane of the Nissan.
o The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two
passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and
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3. Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly
o Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of
Balcita. The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the
criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case
quasi ex delicto they filed against Reyes
Trucking. They also withdrew their reservation to
file a separate civil action against Dunca and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil
aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.
o TC consolidated both criminal and civil cases and
conducted a joint trial of the
same. TC held:
o Accused Dunca guilty of the crime of Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and liable to
indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages.
o Dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil
case.
o TC rendered a supplemental decision ordering
Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for all the
damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy,
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
1. May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the heirs
of Dy in the criminal action against Dunca,
despite the filing of a separate civil action
against Reyes Trucking?
2. May the Court award damages to the heirs
of Dy in the criminal case despite the filing of
a civil action against Reyes Trucking?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
1.) No. Reyes Trucking, as employer of the
accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, can
not be held subsidiarily liable because of the
filing of the separate civil action based on
quasi delict against it. However, Reyes
Trucking, as defendant in the separate civil
action for damages filed against it, based on
quasi delict, may be held liable thereon.
o Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence
cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between
(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code [civil liability ex delicto]; and (2) a separate
action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines [civil liability quasi
delicto]. Once the choice is made, the injured party
can not avail himself of any other remedy because
he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused (Article
2177 of the
Civil Code).
o In the instant case, the offended parties elected
to file a separate civil action for damages
against Reyes Trucking as employer of Dunca,
based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
o Under the law, the vicarious liability of the
employer is founded on at least two specific
provisions of law:
Art. 2176 in relation to Article 103
of the
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code Revised
Penal Code
o Preponderance of
Evidence
o Proof Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
o Liability of employer is
Direct and Primary subject
to the defense of due
diligence in the selection
and supervision of the
employee.
o Liability of
employer is
Subsidiary to the
liability of the
employee.
o Employer and employee
are solidarily liable, thus, it
does not require the
employer to be insolvent.
o Liability attaches
when the employee
is found to be
insolvent.
2. No. The CA and the TC erred in holding
Dunca civilly liable, and Reyes Trucking
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from
crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the
offended parties in fact filed a separate civil
action against the employer based on quasi
delict resulting in the waiver of the civil
action ex delicto. IN SHORT, THE TC ERRED IN
AWARDING CIVIL DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE AND IN DISMISSING THE CIVIL ACTION.
o Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the heirs of Dy reserved the right to
file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act
or omission of Dunca. Such civil action includes the
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission of the accused.
o Civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the
crime committed [Ramos vs. Gonong].
Note: Dunca is guilty of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property and
not double homicide through reckless imprudence.
There is no such nomenclature of an offense under
the Revised Penal Code.
o In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
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4. (BOOK)
ELCANO VS. HILL | Barredo
G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977| 77 SCRA 98
FACTS
• Reginald Hill was a married minor living and
getting subsistence from his father, co-
defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano,
son of petitioners, for which he was criminally
prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
• Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action
for recovery of damages against defendants,
which the latter countered by a motion to
dismiss. Trial court
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• Whether the action for recovery of
damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill
is barred by res judicata.
• Whether there is a cause of action
against Reginald’s father, Marvin.
Respondents: Marvin Hill is relieved as
guardian of Reginald through emancipation by
marriage. Hence the Elcanos could not claim
against Marvin Hill.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
• There is need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation, which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607).
• In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality
of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case
and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for civil liability arising from
his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
• Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code
provides that: “Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.”
• Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.
Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However,
since Reginald has come of age, as a
matter of equity, the former’s liability is
now merely subsidiary.
• Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company. In
the case at bar, Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the killing.
• The joint and solidary liability of parents with
their offending children is in view of the
parental obligation to supervise minor children
in order to prevent damage to third persons.
On the other hand, the clear implication of Art.
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to
enter into transactions or do not any act that
can give rise to judicial litigation.
Order appealed from REVERSED. Trial court
ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion.
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