Ejectment Case Digests


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Ejectment Case Digests

  1. 1. 1 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-3621, May 23, 1951 DOMINGO T. DIKIT, petitioner, vs. RAMON A. YCASIANO, ETC. and CONSOLIDATED INVESTMENTS BUILDING, INC., respondents. Statement of the Case Consolidated Investments Building Inc. (Consolidated) filed in the Municipal Court ofManila an ex parte petition against Domingo Dikit (Dikit) for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction. Judge Ycasiano issued such writ ejecting Dikit and his representatives from enteringor making use of the premises leased. Dikit then filed a special civil action of certiorari againstJudge Ycasiano based on the ground that he acted in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in issuingthe said writ. Statement of the Facts Dikit applied for the lease of the lobby and mezzanine of the Consolidated InvestmentsBuilding located at Plaza Goiti, Manila. Among the conditions for the lease were that ofconstructing partitions that will separate the lobby from the side entrances of the building, to payan advance rental of Php 30,000.00 applicable to the last six months under a proposed 5-yearlease contract and to pay in advance the current monthly rental of Php5,000.00 from the timethat the construction of the separating partitions will be completed. On July 1949, the construction of the separating walls was completed and the paymentof the monthly rental of Php5,000.00 accrued. For the months of October and November 1949,however, Dikit failed to pay rentals. Repeated and persistent demands to vacate the premiseswere made but Dikit still failed and refused to comply. Statement of the Issue Was the action instituted by Consolidated against Dikit one of unlawful detainer andtherefore Judge Ycasiano acted in excess of the Municipal Court of Manila’s jurisdiction inissuing the writ of preliminary injunction complained of? Decision Yes, the action was not for forcible entry, but for unlawful detainer. According to Section1 of Rule 72, forcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the material or actual possessionof a land or building or of taking possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy orstealth, against the will or without the consent of the possessor. Unlawful detainer, on the otherhand, is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of a land or building against or from alandlord, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the detainersright to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, thepossession of the intruder is illegal from the beginning because his entry into or takingpossession thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former possessor. Inunlawful detainer the possession of the detainer is originally legal or lawful but becomes illegalonly after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession of the land or building aftertermination of the contract of lease for non-payment of the rents due or violation of the terms ofsaid contract. In the present case, Dikit took possession of the part of the building leased, notagainst the will or without the consent, but with the express consent of Consolidated by virtue ofthe contract of lease. Possession was lawful from the beginning but became illegal only after thetermination of Dikit’s right to continue in possession of said premises for having failed to pay therents. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by therespondent Judge in excess of the courts jurisdiction, and therefore it is set aside with costagainst the respondent Consolidated Investments Bldg. Inc.
  2. 2. 2 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979 ARTEMIO C. REYES and HILARION C. REYES, petitioners, vs.HON. ANDRES STA. MARIA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, HILARIA SANTOS VDA. DE LOPEZ and PILAR SANTOS, respondents. Statement of the Case Artemio Reyes and Hilarion Reyes (petitioners) filed in the Court of First Instance ofBulacan on April 1, 1968 an action which they termed as one to quiet title to a certain residentiallot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners sought to recover the lot’spossession from the Santos (respondents) and to be declared the rightful owner. This wasdismissed for lack of jurisdiction for being an action for unlawful detainer; it should have beenfiled in the proper municipal court. Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for review andsetting aside of such dismissal order. Statement of the Facts Petitioners were owners of the subject property. They allowed Maximo Santos to occupythe property free of charge. There were however conditions - (a) that instead of paying rentalson the premises, respondents will pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b)that respondents will leave and vacate the premises anytime the plaintiffs so demand. Sometime in February 1986, petitioners verbally notified respondents that they alreadyneed the property; thus, they had to vacate and leave the same. Respondents however refusedto do so claiming ownership over it. They allege that they bought the same from a certain PabloAguinaldo. Petitioners, in their complaint, alleged that respondents thru their acts have thereforemaliciously and unlawfully detained the land since February 1968. Statement of the Issue Did the petitioners properly file their action in the Court of First Instance of Manila? Decision Yes. Having been fully apprised of respondents refusal to surrender possession andtheir contrary claim of ownership of the property, petitioners properly filed their accionpubliciana with the Court of First Instance. As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds of actions for therecovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry ordetainer (accion interdictal) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is broughtwithin one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for therecovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Courtof First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (whichincludes the jus utendi and jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First Instance. The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of realproperty - possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a priorpossession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatevermay be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has thesecurity that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having abetter right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners action was notmerely for recovery of possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana forrecovery of possession de jure. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the lower courts dismissalorder of August 15, 1968 and the case is remanded to respondent Court of First Instance withinstructions to expedite the proceedings and trial and determination thereof on the merits. Withcosts against respondents. This decision is immediately executory.
  3. 3. 3 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-18535, May 30, 1962 VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURERS COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. L.S. SARMIENTO CO., INC., HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, Respondents. Statement of the Case Valderrama Lumber Manufacturer’s Company Inc. (petitioner) applied for certiorari andprohibition with preliminary and/or preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioner alleged that therespondent Judge Abbas of the Court of First Instance of Davao committed a clear abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of anappealed decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao. The Justice of the PeaceCourt acted upon the action for ejectment filed by L.S. Sarmiento Co. Inc. (respondent) againstpetitioner and rendered judgment against petitioner. Statement of the Facts Respondent is the lessee from the Republic of the Philippines of the foreshore landoccupied by the petitioner. On September 5, 1960, respondent demanded petitioner to vacatethe premises within ten days from notice as it desired to use said parcel of land itself.Respondent claimed it was entitled to possession and use thereof by reason of the leaseagreement. Petitioner, however, refused to vacate the premises. Because of the "unwarrantedacts of petitioner," respondent then instituted an action for ejectment. Answering the complaint,petitioner interposed the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over the case because it hadbeen in prior, peaceful, and open possession of the premises since 1958, more than one yearbefore the suit was commenced. Moreover, there was a conflict pending between the parties inthe Bureau of Lands over the land which has not been finally resolved. Statement of the IssueDid the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao have jurisdiction over the ejectment case? Decision The allegations in the complaint are what determine the jurisdiction of the court. TheJustice of the Peace Courts have jurisdiction over forcible entry cases (detentacion) - thosewhere possession is deprived by any of the means mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72, of theRules of Court namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. The complaint, nothaving shown that respondent was deprived of possession by any of those means, the Courts ofFirst Instance, not the Justice of the Peace Courts, had jurisdiction. Neither was it alleged thatthe right of possession of the petitioner had terminated, and occupancy was being unlawfullywithheld so as to constitute unlawful detainer (desahucio). The Justice of the Peace Court not having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Courtof First Instance of Davao did not acquire appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the respondents Judgeof the Court of First Instance of Davao and Provincial Sheriff acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution. IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered, making permanent the writ ofpreliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 29, 1961, and declaring all proceedings hadin connection with Civil Case No. 33 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, to bevoid for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against respondent Sarmiento & Co., Inc.
  4. 4. 4 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-14889, April 25, 1960 NORBERTO LOPEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO SANTIAGO, ETC., ET AL., respondents. Statement of the Case The case is an original action for a writ of certiorari and mandamus for the orderrendered by respondent Judge Amado Santiago. Statement of the Facts Norberto Lopez and Gregorio Lopez, Jr. (petitioners) filed an action for forcible entry inthe Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, Pangasinan. Judgment was rendered orderingrespondents to vacate the land and to pay petitioners Php100.00 a month from May 28, 1958until the return of the land, thus, respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance ofPangasinan. Sometime before October 14, 1958, petitioners filed with the CFI of Pangasinan amotion for the execution of the said judgment, owning to the failure of the respondents to paythe monthly rental. By an order dated October 14, 1958, the motion was granted. Prior to that,or on October 1, 1958, respondents had moved for the dismissal of the case upon the groundthat the subject of litigation is a public land and that all administrative remedies should first beexhausted by the petitioners before seeking recourse in civil courts. On November 10, 1958,respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, but reconsidering and settingaside the order of October 14, 1958 and holding in view the administrative proceedings pendingin the Bureau of Lands. With these, petitioners filed this case. Statement of the Issue Was respondent Judge’s decision rendered on November 10, 1958 proper? Decision No. It is well settled in the jurisdiction that, when the decision of a justice of the peace ormunicipal court in a forcible entry case is adverse to the defendant, and the latter has appealedtherefrom, but fails, during the pendency of appeal, to pay the amount of the rental due fromtime to time under the contract or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of thepremises, it is the mandatory duty of the court of first instance to order the execution of thejudgment appealed from. Such principle is under the conditions set forth in Section 8, Rule 72 ofthe Rules of Court. Yet, respondent Judge revoked the order for the execution of the judgmentof the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, despite the failure of the main respondents to makethe payment required. Respondent Judge seems to be under the impression that Rule 72,relative to forcible entry cases, is applicable only to private lands, and that decision renderedmay not be ordered executed when the property involved is a public land. This view howeverfails to consider in its true light the philosophy underlying the law on forcible entry cases. Theaction for forcible entry and detainer is of statutory origin. Its purpose, regardless of the actualcondition of the title to the property, is that the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall notbe turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. Public interest, public policy and public order demand that the party in peacefulpossession of a land, independently of whether it is private in the nature or part of the publicdomain, be not ousted therefrom by means of force, violation or intimidation, regardless of thequality of his alleged right to the possession thereof. Whoever claims to have a better title orright thereto should seek, from the proper authorities, the legal remedies established, instead oftaking the law into their hands. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of respondent Judge, dated November 10,1958, insofar only as it reconsiders and sets aside the aforementioned order of October 14,1958, directing execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, is herebyannulled and said order of October 14, 1958, is, accordingly, reinstated, with costs against themain respondent herein. It is so ordered.
  5. 5. 5 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-20330, December 22, 1966 ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner, vs. SUSANA REALTY, INC., respondent. Statement of the Case On February 10, 1956, Susana Realty Inc. (respondent) filed a complaint for ejectmentin the Municipal Court of Pasay City against Adolfo Racaza (petitioner). This was howeverdismissed on November 23, 1956 for failure of respondent to proceed to trial. On February 19,1958, another ejectment suit was filed and the court then ordered petitioner to vacate thepremises. Accordingly, petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay demandingcounterclaim for what he had spent to finish the construction of the house and for the dismissalof the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. But thenagain, petitioner was ordered evicted and his counterclaim was thrown out for lack ofjurisdiction. Hence, petitioner raised this issue to the Higher Court. Statement of the Facts Petitioner rented a portion of a piece of land owned by respondent located at San JuanStreet, Pasay City. He started renting in 1952 when his wife, Evarista Racaza, bought anunfinished house that was built on it. On assurance of respondent that petitioners family couldstay on the land by paying a monthly rent of Php15.00, petitioner finished the construction of thehouse and lived in it. Years later, respondent asked petitioner to vacate the land because theyalready needed it. Respondent twice filed an ejectment suit; only the second was granted. On appeal, petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. He claimed that the complaint was filed more than oneyear after the alleged unlawful detainer or from July, 1955 when he stopped paying rent. Thefirst complaint for ejectment was dismissed on November 23, 1956, while the second was notfiled until February 19, 1958. Statement of the Issue Did the municipal court have jurisdiction over the ejectment case though the complaintdid not state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started? Decision The case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Municipalcourts shall have jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases where the defendant’s possessionwas originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess and must bebrought before it from the date of last demand. This case, however, was brought not on thetheory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expiredand that respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land. The averment that the lease wason a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end ofevery month. It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since whatmade petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. Rule 70, section 2 requiresprevious demand only when the action is for failure to pay rent due or to comply with theconditions of his lease. Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration ofits term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of thelease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it. If the lessee refuses to vacate thepremises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even beforethe expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, section 2. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
  6. 6. 6 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-29275, January 31, 1972 FLORENTINO PANGILINAN, EDILBERTO PANGILINAN, GERMAN PANGILINAN, ALEJA PANGILINAN, FORTUNATO ANGELES, FORTUNATO SANGIL, TROADIO SANTOS, VIRGINIA DAVID, CARLITO DAVID, EUGENIO DAVID, JUANITO PARAS and TOMAS LIWAG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANDRES AGUILAR, Judge of the CFI of Pampanga, Branch III, MARCELO MENDIOLA, ALEJANDRO SUN, JOSE PANGILINAN and BEATRIZ HENSON, respondents. Statement of the Case On May 4, 1964, respondent spouses Jose Pangilinan and Beatriz Henson filed anunlawful detainer case against petitioners in the Angeles City Court. During the case’spendency, the petitioners on May 28, 1965 filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition withinjunction with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, seeking to nullify the orders issued byCity Judge Aguilar dated February 10, 1965 and April 30, 1965. The judge denied the motion todismiss dated December 11, 1964 and the motion to reconsider the same dated February 8,1965. On December 20, 1965, however, the CFI rendered judgment upholding the validity of thequestioned orders and denied the petition. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals onJuly 19, 1966 but on October 21, 1966, they withdrew their appeal. The trial of the unlawfuldetainer proceeded and judgment was rendered directing respondents to vacate the lot. Statement of the Facts Private respondents acquired a parcel of land by purchase from the Valdez family onAugust 15, 1963. When respondents had the corners of the lot relocated by a surveyor, theydiscovered that the petitioners were occupying portions of the lot. So on March 22, 1964, therespondents gave notice to petitioners to vacate the lot within 15 days. The petitioners,however, refused and failed to leave the premises and remove their respective housestherefrom. This refusal led respondents to institute on May 4, 1964 the detainer case. Statement of the Issue Did the Angeles City Court have jurisdiction over the complaint filed though it does notallege facts showing that the action is for unlawful detainer? Decision “It is a settled principle that the complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it allegesthat the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarilyemploying the terminology of the law; and the other details like the one-year period within whichthe action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules, must beproved but need not be alleged in the complaint.” In this case, respondents on March 22, 1964 notified petitioners to vacate the lot and toremove their houses therefrom. This fact of notice is admitted by herein petitioners in theiranswer to the complaint. On May 4, 1964, they filed the complaint for illegal detainer. It is patentthat the complaint was filed within the one-year period from date of the demand to vacate.Because physical or factual possession is the only issue in an illegal detainer case, mere claimof ownership does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction over such a case, evenif proof of title is submitted at the trial. The Angeles City Court therefore had jurisdiction over theunlawful detainer case filed. The Angeles City Court found that, aside from their bare claim of ownership andcontinuous possession, petitioners "have not presented any tangible or concrete evidence oftheir right to hold and possess the property in suit." In addition, it is an accepted rule that aperson who has a Torrens title over the property, like the respondents, is entitled to thepossession thereof. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary injunction heretoforeissued is hereby lifted and set aside, with costs against herein petitioners. So ordered.
  7. 7. 7 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-20617, May 31, 1965 BRUNO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. DALMACIO ANAS, ET AL., respondents. Statement of the Case Dalmacio Anas filed on August 3, 1957 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Sablan,Mt. Province a complaint for forcible entry against Bruno Garcia. The case was dismissedholding that Garcia was the one entitled to the possession of the land. On appeal, the Court ofFirst Instance of Baguio likewise dismissed the petition on the ground that Anas has failed toidentify the land he claimed to have been dispossessed by Garcia. The case then went to theCourt of Appeals which found the complaint meritorious and ordered Garcia to restore to Anasthe land’s possession. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Statement of the Facts Anas bought 4 of the 10 hectares of the subject land from one Pablo Galbo in 1945. Heoccupied and expanded it by including the 6 hectares he acquired through a patent application.In May, 1957, Garcia entered the land, had the same surveyed over his protest, fenced it andturned loose his carabaos thereon. After sometime, Anas wanted Garcia off the property; thus,filed a complaint. Statement of the Issue Was the Court of Appeals correct in finding Garcia the rightful owner for being the one inactual possession of the land? Decision In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. The purpose ofwhich is merely to protect the owner from any physical encroachment. The title of the land or itsownership is not involved. If a person is in actual possession thereof, he is entitled to bemaintained and respected in it even against the owner himself. The main thing to be proven isprior possession and if the same is lost through force, stealth or violence, it behooves the courtto restore it regardless of its title or ownership. In this sense, the procedure adopted by theJustice of the Peace Court is incorrect, wherein to determine the right to possession, such courtresorted to an analysis of the evidence regarding its title or ownership, and when it found thatthe respondent failed to establish his ownership, it dismissed his complaint. Such finding is notnecessary. What is important is to find out who the actual possessor is and if his possessionhas been disturbed. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
  8. 8. 8 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-53788, October 17, 1980 PHARMA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MELITON PAJARILLAGA OF THE CITY COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY, NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH II, SERGIA A. DEL ROSARIO AND "JOHN DOE/S", respondents. Statement of the Case This case is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of respondent Judge Pajarillagain Civil Case No. 8126 of the City Court of Cabanatuan. Pharma Industries Inc. (petitioner) initiatedthe case for the purpose of ejecting the private respondents from a piece of land. In a "Decision"dated January 7, 1980, the respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. A motion toreconsider the dismissal was denied, hence the present petition. Statement of the Facts On November 12, 1977, Respondent Sergia del Rosario executed in favor of the petitioner aDeed of Sale with the Right to repurchase over a piece of land situated at Cabanatuan City, togetherwith all improvements. Before the expiration of respondent’s right of redemption or on November 12,1978, she exercised such right. Petitioner was then constrained to file a petition for consolidation ofownership. Subsequently, the Honorable Virgilio D. Pobre-Yñigo promulgated a decision declaringpetitioner as the full owner of the property and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City tocancel the old title and issue a new title in the name of the petitioner. So on June 8, 1979, thepetitioner sent a letter to respondent to vacate the premises in question. However, respondent failedand refused to do so. Statement of the Issues 1. Was the case filed by petitioner one for unlawful detainer or forcible entry? 2. Is prior physical possession of the land a condition in filing a case for unlawful detainer orforcible entry? Decision The complaint filed by the plaintiff is for ejectment and such remedy provides for two distinctcauses of action: (1) forcible entry in which the defendants possession of the property is illegal abinitio, and (2) unlawful detainer wherein the defendants possession was originally lawful but ceasedto be so by the expiration of his right to possess. The present case, which is to obtain possessiononly, is one for unlawful detainer because Sergia del Rosario, the vendor, failed to repurchase theproperty. Moreover, after the consolidation of title in favor of the vendee had been confirmed, sherefused to vacate the property upon demand. Her right to possess the land had ceased to be lawful.That a demand to vacate was made upon respondent on June 13, 1979, and the action to eject wasfiled on October 22, 1979, well within the one-year period, are borne by the record. The case thenfalls within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cabanatuan. Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always acondition sine qua non. This is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain possession of the thingsold to him from the vendor. Nevertheless, Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession of theproperty when Sergia del Rosario executed in its favor the deed of sale with right to repurchase andupon the confirmation of the title when del Rosario failed to repurchase the property. WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, it is hereby granted and, as prayed for,the respondent judge is hereby ordered to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 8126 in his court and toresolve the petitioners Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. No special pronouncement as tocosts. SO ORDERED.
  9. 9. 9 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Cases G.R. No. L-4478, May 27, 1953 VICENTE DY SUN, petitioner, vs. RICARDO BRILLANTES and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Statement of the Case This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding in effect that VicenteDy Sun has no cause of action to institute the present case for unlawful detainer against RicardoBrillantes. The Court of First Instance of Rizal affirmed the judgment of the Justice of the PeaceCourt, from whose decision Dy Sun appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Justice of the PeaceCourt of Caloocan, Rizal dismissed the complaint on the ground that Dy Sun, being a Chinesecitizen, has no right to acquire the land in question. Statement of the Facts In 1944, Dy Sun bought a parcel of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal. Long before Dy Sunbought it, Brillantes, a tenant, was already in possession of the land. The land then became thesubject of dispute between the two. Statement of the Issue Is prior physical possession a condition before a person can file an action for unlawful detainer? Decision No. Under the law (section 1, Rule 72), a person has two causes of action: (1) Forcible entry,in which defendants possession of the property is illegal from the beginning and (2) Unlawfuldetainer, wherein defendants possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expirationof his right to possess. Under the first, a person is deprived of the possession of the land by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Thus, prior physical possession must be alleged and proved.Under the second, it is by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possessionof the land is unlawfully withheld, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold it. In actionsfor unlawful detainer, plaintiff need not be in prior physical possession of the property. Having filedan action for unlawful detainer, Dy Sun need not allege prior physical possession of the land. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. It is ordered that this case beremanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against respondent RicardoBrillantes.