1. 1
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-3621, May 23, 1951
DOMINGO T. DIKIT, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON A. YCASIANO, ETC. and CONSOLIDATED INVESTMENTS BUILDING, INC.,
respondents.
Statement of the Case
Consolidated Investments Building Inc. (Consolidated) filed in the Municipal Court of
Manila an ex parte petition against Domingo Dikit (Dikit) for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Judge Ycasiano issued such writ ejecting Dikit and his representatives from entering
or making use of the premises leased. Dikit then filed a special civil action of certiorari against
Judge Ycasiano based on the ground that he acted in excess of the court’s jurisdiction in issuing
the said writ.
Statement of the Facts
Dikit applied for the lease of the lobby and mezzanine of the Consolidated Investments
Building located at Plaza Goiti, Manila. Among the conditions for the lease were that of
constructing partitions that will separate the lobby from the side entrances of the building, to pay
an advance rental of Php 30,000.00 applicable to the last six months under a proposed 5-year
lease contract and to pay in advance the current monthly rental of Php5,000.00 from the time
that the construction of the separating partitions will be completed.
On July 1949, the construction of the separating walls was completed and the payment
of the monthly rental of Php5,000.00 accrued. For the months of October and November 1949,
however, Dikit failed to pay rentals. Repeated and persistent demands to vacate the premises
were made but Dikit still failed and refused to comply.
Statement of the Issue
Was the action instituted by Consolidated against Dikit one of unlawful detainer and
therefore Judge Ycasiano acted in excess of the Municipal Court of Manila’s jurisdiction in
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction complained of?
Decision
Yes, the action was not for forcible entry, but for unlawful detainer. According to Section
1 of Rule 72, forcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the material or actual possession
of a land or building or of taking possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, against the will or without the consent of the possessor. Unlawful detainer, on the other
hand, is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of a land or building against or from a
landlord, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the detainer's
right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession of the intruder is illegal from the beginning because his entry into or taking
possession thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former possessor. In
unlawful detainer the possession of the detainer is originally legal or lawful but becomes illegal
only after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession of the land or building after
termination of the contract of lease for non-payment of the rents due or violation of the terms of
said contract. In the present case, Dikit took possession of the part of the building leased, not
against the will or without the consent, but with the express consent of Consolidated by virtue of
the contract of lease. Possession was lawful from the beginning but became illegal only after the
termination of Dikit’s right to continue in possession of said premises for having failed to pay the
rents.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the
respondent Judge in excess of the court's jurisdiction, and therefore it is set aside with cost
against the respondent Consolidated Investments Bldg. Inc.

2. 2
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979
ARTEMIO C. REYES and HILARION C. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES STA. MARIA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
II, HILARIA SANTOS VDA. DE LOPEZ and PILAR SANTOS, respondents.
Statement of the Case
Artemio Reyes and Hilarion Reyes (petitioners) filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan on April 1, 1968 an action which they termed as one to quiet title to a certain residential
lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners sought to recover the lot’s
possession from the Santos (respondents) and to be declared the rightful owner. This was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for being an action for unlawful detainer; it should have been
filed in the proper municipal court. Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for review and
setting aside of such dismissal order.
Statement of the Facts
Petitioners were owners of the subject property. They allowed Maximo Santos to occupy
the property free of charge. There were however conditions - (a) that instead of paying rentals
on the premises, respondents will pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b)
that respondents will leave and vacate the premises anytime the plaintiffs so demand.
Sometime in February 1986, petitioners verbally notified respondents that they already
need the property; thus, they had to vacate and leave the same. Respondents however refused
to do so claiming ownership over it. They allege that they bought the same from a certain Pablo
Aguinaldo. Petitioners, in their complaint, alleged that respondents thru their acts have therefore
maliciously and unlawfully detained the land since February 1968.
Statement of the Issue
Did the petitioners properly file their action in the Court of First Instance of Manila?
Decision
Yes. Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to surrender possession and
their contrary claim of ownership of the property, petitioners properly filed their accion
publiciana with the Court of First Instance.
As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or
detainer (accion interdictal) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought
within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court
of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which
includes the jus utendi and jus fruendi) also brought in the Court of First Instance.
The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real
property - possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior
possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the
security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action was not
merely for recovery of possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana for
recovery of possession de jure.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the lower court's dismissal
order of August 15, 1968 and the case is remanded to respondent Court of First Instance with
instructions to expedite the proceedings and trial and determination thereof on the merits. With
costs against respondents. This decision is immediately executory.

3. 3
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-18535, May 30, 1962
VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURER'S COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
L.S. SARMIENTO CO., INC., HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS and THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF, Respondents.
Statement of the Case
Valderrama Lumber Manufacturer’s Company Inc. (petitioner) applied for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary and/or preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioner alleged that the
respondent Judge Abbas of the Court of First Instance of Davao committed a clear abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of an
appealed decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao. The Justice of the Peace
Court acted upon the action for ejectment filed by L.S. Sarmiento Co. Inc. (respondent) against
petitioner and rendered judgment against petitioner.
Statement of the Facts
Respondent is the lessee from the Republic of the Philippines of the foreshore land
occupied by the petitioner. On September 5, 1960, respondent demanded petitioner to vacate
the premises within ten days from notice as it desired to use said parcel of land itself.
Respondent claimed it was entitled to possession and use thereof by reason of the lease
agreement. Petitioner, however, refused to vacate the premises. Because of the "unwarranted
acts of petitioner," respondent then instituted an action for ejectment. Answering the complaint,
petitioner interposed the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over the case because it had
been in prior, peaceful, and open possession of the premises since 1958, more than one year
before the suit was commenced. Moreover, there was a conflict pending between the parties in
the Bureau of Lands over the land which has not been finally resolved.
Statement of the Issue
Did the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao have jurisdiction over the ejectment case?
Decision
The allegations in the complaint are what determine the jurisdiction of the court. The
Justice of the Peace Courts have jurisdiction over forcible entry cases (detentacion) - those
where possession is deprived by any of the means mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72, of the
Rules of Court namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. The complaint, not
having shown that respondent was deprived of possession by any of those means, the Courts of
First Instance, not the Justice of the Peace Courts, had jurisdiction. Neither was it alleged that
the right of possession of the petitioner had terminated, and occupancy was being unlawfully
withheld so as to constitute unlawful detainer (desahucio).
The Justice of the Peace Court not having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the Court
of First Instance of Davao did not acquire appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the respondents Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Davao and Provincial Sheriff acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered, making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 29, 1961, and declaring all proceedings had
in connection with Civil Case No. 33 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, to be
void for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against respondent Sarmiento & Co., Inc.

4. 4
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-14889, April 25, 1960
NORBERTO LOPEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO SANTIAGO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Statement of the Case
The case is an original action for a writ of certiorari and mandamus for the order
rendered by respondent Judge Amado Santiago.
Statement of the Facts
Norberto Lopez and Gregorio Lopez, Jr. (petitioners) filed an action for forcible entry in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, Pangasinan. Judgment was rendered ordering
respondents to vacate the land and to pay petitioners Php100.00 a month from May 28, 1958
until the return of the land, thus, respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. Sometime before October 14, 1958, petitioners filed with the CFI of Pangasinan a
motion for the execution of the said judgment, owning to the failure of the respondents to pay
the monthly rental. By an order dated October 14, 1958, the motion was granted. Prior to that,
or on October 1, 1958, respondents had moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground
that the subject of litigation is a public land and that all administrative remedies should first be
exhausted by the petitioners before seeking recourse in civil courts. On November 10, 1958,
respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, but reconsidering and setting
aside the order of October 14, 1958 and holding in view the administrative proceedings pending
in the Bureau of Lands. With these, petitioners filed this case.
Statement of the Issue
Was respondent Judge’s decision rendered on November 10, 1958 proper?
Decision
No. It is well settled in the jurisdiction that, when the decision of a justice of the peace or
municipal court in a forcible entry case is adverse to the defendant, and the latter has appealed
therefrom, but fails, during the pendency of appeal, to pay the amount of the rental due from
time to time under the contract or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises, it is the mandatory duty of the court of first instance to order the execution of the
judgment appealed from. Such principle is under the conditions set forth in Section 8, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court. Yet, respondent Judge revoked the order for the execution of the judgment
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, despite the failure of the main respondents to make
the payment required. Respondent Judge seems to be under the impression that Rule 72,
relative to forcible entry cases, is applicable only to private lands, and that decision rendered
may not be ordered executed when the property involved is a public land. This view however
fails to consider in its true light the philosophy underlying the law on forcible entry cases. The
action for forcible entry and detainer is of statutory origin. Its purpose, regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, is that the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not
be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror.
Public interest, public policy and public order demand that the party in peaceful
possession of a land, independently of whether it is private in the nature or part of the public
domain, be not ousted therefrom by means of force, violation or intimidation, regardless of the
quality of his alleged right to the possession thereof. Whoever claims to have a better title or
right thereto should seek, from the proper authorities, the legal remedies established, instead of
taking the law into their hands.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of respondent Judge, dated November 10,
1958, insofar only as it reconsiders and sets aside the aforementioned order of October 14,
1958, directing execution of the judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alcala, is hereby
annulled and said order of October 14, 1958, is, accordingly, reinstated, with costs against the
main respondent herein. It is so ordered.

5. 5
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-20330, December 22, 1966
ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner,
vs.
SUSANA REALTY, INC., respondent.
Statement of the Case
On February 10, 1956, Susana Realty Inc. (respondent) filed a complaint for ejectment
in the Municipal Court of Pasay City against Adolfo Racaza (petitioner). This was however
dismissed on November 23, 1956 for failure of respondent to proceed to trial. On February 19,
1958, another ejectment suit was filed and the court then ordered petitioner to vacate the
premises. Accordingly, petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay demanding
counterclaim for what he had spent to finish the construction of the house and for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. But then
again, petitioner was ordered evicted and his counterclaim was thrown out for lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, petitioner raised this issue to the Higher Court.
Statement of the Facts
Petitioner rented a portion of a piece of land owned by respondent located at San Juan
Street, Pasay City. He started renting in 1952 when his wife, Evarista Racaza, bought an
unfinished house that was built on it. On assurance of respondent that petitioner's family could
stay on the land by paying a monthly rent of Php15.00, petitioner finished the construction of the
house and lived in it. Years later, respondent asked petitioner to vacate the land because they
already needed it. Respondent twice filed an ejectment suit; only the second was granted.
On appeal, petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it. He claimed that the complaint was filed more than one
year after the alleged unlawful detainer or from July, 1955 when he stopped paying rent. The
first complaint for ejectment was dismissed on November 23, 1956, while the second was not
filed until February 19, 1958.
Statement of the Issue
Did the municipal court have jurisdiction over the ejectment case though the complaint
did not state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started?
Decision
The case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Municipal
courts shall have jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases where the defendant’s possession
was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess and must be
brought before it from the date of last demand. This case, however, was brought not on the
theory that petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired
and that respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land. The averment that the lease was
on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of
every month. It is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since what
made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. Rule 70, section 2 requires
previous demand only when the action is for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
conditions of his lease. Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of
its term, no such demand is necessary. In the latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the
lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it. If the lessee refuses to vacate the
premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before
the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, section 2.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

6. 6
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-29275, January 31, 1972
FLORENTINO PANGILINAN, EDILBERTO PANGILINAN, GERMAN PANGILINAN, ALEJA
PANGILINAN, FORTUNATO ANGELES, FORTUNATO SANGIL, TROADIO SANTOS,
VIRGINIA DAVID, CARLITO DAVID, EUGENIO DAVID, JUANITO PARAS and TOMAS
LIWAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANDRES AGUILAR, Judge of the CFI of Pampanga, Branch III,
MARCELO MENDIOLA, ALEJANDRO SUN, JOSE PANGILINAN and BEATRIZ
HENSON, respondents.
Statement of the Case
On May 4, 1964, respondent spouses Jose Pangilinan and Beatriz Henson filed an
unlawful detainer case against petitioners in the Angeles City Court. During the case’s
pendency, the petitioners on May 28, 1965 filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, seeking to nullify the orders issued by
City Judge Aguilar dated February 10, 1965 and April 30, 1965. The judge denied the motion to
dismiss dated December 11, 1964 and the motion to reconsider the same dated February 8,
1965. On December 20, 1965, however, the CFI rendered judgment upholding the validity of the
questioned orders and denied the petition. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals on
July 19, 1966 but on October 21, 1966, they withdrew their appeal. The trial of the unlawful
detainer proceeded and judgment was rendered directing respondents to vacate the lot.
Statement of the Facts
Private respondents acquired a parcel of land by purchase from the Valdez family on
August 15, 1963. When respondents had the corners of the lot relocated by a surveyor, they
discovered that the petitioners were occupying portions of the lot. So on March 22, 1964, the
respondents gave notice to petitioners to vacate the lot within 15 days. The petitioners,
however, refused and failed to leave the premises and remove their respective houses
therefrom. This refusal led respondents to institute on May 4, 1964 the detainer case.
Statement of the Issue
Did the Angeles City Court have jurisdiction over the complaint filed though it does not
allege facts showing that the action is for unlawful detainer?
Decision
“It is a settled principle that the complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law; and the other details like the one-year period within which
the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules, must be
proved but need not be alleged in the complaint.”
In this case, respondents on March 22, 1964 notified petitioners to vacate the lot and to
remove their houses therefrom. This fact of notice is admitted by herein petitioners in their
answer to the complaint. On May 4, 1964, they filed the complaint for illegal detainer. It is patent
that the complaint was filed within the one-year period from date of the demand to vacate.
Because physical or factual possession is the only issue in an illegal detainer case, mere claim
of ownership does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction over such a case, even
if proof of title is submitted at the trial. The Angeles City Court therefore had jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case filed.
The Angeles City Court found that, aside from their bare claim of ownership and
continuous possession, petitioners "have not presented any tangible or concrete evidence of
their right to hold and possess the property in suit." In addition, it is an accepted rule that a
person who has a Torrens title over the property, like the respondents, is entitled to the
possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is hereby lifted and set aside, with costs against herein petitioners. So ordered.

7. 7
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-20617, May 31, 1965
BRUNO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
DALMACIO ANAS, ET AL., respondents.
Statement of the Case
Dalmacio Anas filed on August 3, 1957 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Sablan,
Mt. Province a complaint for forcible entry against Bruno Garcia. The case was dismissed
holding that Garcia was the one entitled to the possession of the land. On appeal, the Court of
First Instance of Baguio likewise dismissed the petition on the ground that Anas has failed to
identify the land he claimed to have been dispossessed by Garcia. The case then went to the
Court of Appeals which found the complaint meritorious and ordered Garcia to restore to Anas
the land’s possession. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Statement of the Facts
Anas bought 4 of the 10 hectares of the subject land from one Pablo Galbo in 1945. He
occupied and expanded it by including the 6 hectares he acquired through a patent application.
In May, 1957, Garcia entered the land, had the same surveyed over his protest, fenced it and
turned loose his carabaos thereon. After sometime, Anas wanted Garcia off the property; thus,
filed a complaint.
Statement of the Issue
Was the Court of Appeals correct in finding Garcia the rightful owner for being the one in
actual possession of the land?
Decision
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. The purpose of
which is merely to protect the owner from any physical encroachment. The title of the land or its
ownership is not involved. If a person is in actual possession thereof, he is entitled to be
maintained and respected in it even against the owner himself. The main thing to be proven is
prior possession and if the same is lost through force, stealth or violence, it behooves the court
to restore it regardless of its title or ownership. In this sense, the procedure adopted by the
Justice of the Peace Court is incorrect, wherein to determine the right to possession, such court
resorted to an analysis of the evidence regarding its title or ownership, and when it found that
the respondent failed to establish his ownership, it dismissed his complaint. Such finding is not
necessary. What is important is to find out who the actual possessor is and if his possession
has been disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

8. 8
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-53788, October 17, 1980
PHARMA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MELITON PAJARILLAGA OF THE CITY COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH II, SERGIA A. DEL ROSARIO AND "JOHN DOE/S", respondents.
Statement of the Case
This case is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of respondent Judge Pajarillaga
in Civil Case No. 8126 of the City Court of Cabanatuan. Pharma Industries Inc. (petitioner) initiated
the case for the purpose of ejecting the private respondents from a piece of land. In a "Decision"
dated January 7, 1980, the respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. A motion to
reconsider the dismissal was denied, hence the present petition.
Statement of the Facts
On November 12, 1977, Respondent Sergia del Rosario executed in favor of the petitioner a
Deed of Sale with the Right to repurchase over a piece of land situated at Cabanatuan City, together
with all improvements. Before the expiration of respondent’s right of redemption or on November 12,
1978, she exercised such right. Petitioner was then constrained to file a petition for consolidation of
ownership. Subsequently, the Honorable Virgilio D. Pobre-Yñigo promulgated a decision declaring
petitioner as the full owner of the property and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to
cancel the old title and issue a new title in the name of the petitioner. So on June 8, 1979, the
petitioner sent a letter to respondent to vacate the premises in question. However, respondent failed
and refused to do so.
Statement of the Issues
1. Was the case filed by petitioner one for unlawful detainer or forcible entry?
2. Is prior physical possession of the land a condition in filing a case for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry?
Decision
The complaint filed by the plaintiff is for ejectment and such remedy provides for two distinct
causes of action: (1) forcible entry in which the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab
initio, and (2) unlawful detainer wherein the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased
to be so by the expiration of his right to possess. The present case, which is to obtain possession
only, is one for unlawful detainer because Sergia del Rosario, the vendor, failed to repurchase the
property. Moreover, after the consolidation of title in favor of the vendee had been confirmed, she
refused to vacate the property upon demand. Her right to possess the land had ceased to be lawful.
That a demand to vacate was made upon respondent on June 13, 1979, and the action to eject was
filed on October 22, 1979, well within the one-year period, are borne by the record. The case then
falls within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cabanatuan.
Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always a
condition sine qua non. This is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain possession of the thing
sold to him from the vendor. Nevertheless, Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession of the
property when Sergia del Rosario executed in its favor the deed of sale with right to repurchase and
upon the confirmation of the title when del Rosario failed to repurchase the property.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, it is hereby granted and, as prayed for,
the respondent judge is hereby ordered to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 8126 in his court and to
resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. No special pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.

9. 9
Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer Cases
G.R. No. L-4478, May 27, 1953
VICENTE DY SUN, petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO BRILLANTES and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Statement of the Case
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding in effect that Vicente
Dy Sun has no cause of action to institute the present case for unlawful detainer against Ricardo
Brillantes. The Court of First Instance of Rizal affirmed the judgment of the Justice of the Peace
Court, from whose decision Dy Sun appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Justice of the Peace
Court of Caloocan, Rizal dismissed the complaint on the ground that Dy Sun, being a Chinese
citizen, has no right to acquire the land in question.
Statement of the Facts
In 1944, Dy Sun bought a parcel of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal. Long before Dy Sun
bought it, Brillantes, a tenant, was already in possession of the land. The land then became the
subject of dispute between the two.
Statement of the Issue
Is prior physical possession a condition before a person can file an action for unlawful detainer?
Decision
No. Under the law (section 1, Rule 72), a person has two causes of action: (1) Forcible entry,
in which defendant's possession of the property is illegal from the beginning and (2) Unlawful
detainer, wherein defendant's possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
of his right to possess. Under the first, a person is deprived of the possession of the land by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Thus, prior physical possession must be alleged and proved.
Under the second, it is by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession
of the land is unlawfully withheld, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold it. In actions
for unlawful detainer, plaintiff need not be in prior physical possession of the property. Having filed
an action for unlawful detainer, Dy Sun need not allege prior physical possession of the land.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. It is ordered that this case be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against respondent Ricardo
Brillantes.