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  1. 1. Punjab-Haryana High CourtShyam Sunder And Ors. vs Brij Lal Chaman Lal PuraniAnd Ors. on 6 September, 1966Equivalent citations: AIR 1968 P H 28Author: P PanditBench: I Dua, P PanditJUDGMENTP.C. Pandit, J.1. Shyam Sunder and his two brothers Madan Mohan and ManoharLal were the owners of the premises in dispute which consist of abuilding used for business purposes in Amritsar City. This buildingwas g ven on rent to firm Brij Lal Chaman it with effect from 1st ofFebruary 1957 on a monthly rent of Rs. 97 per mensem. The rent deedwas, however, executed on 11th of October 1957 by Brij Lal on behalf ofthe firm which had two partners Brij Lal and Chaman Lal. Brij Lal diedon 16th of June 1961, leaving behind a widow and two sons as his legalrepresentatives. On 12th of October 1961 the partnership firm wasdissolved and a deed of dissolution was executed between Chaman Laland the legal representatives of Brij Lal.Under this document, the rights in the .shop in dispute fell to theshare of Chaman Lal who alone carried on his business in thisbuilding. Later on Chaman Lal took his brother Madan Lal and theletters son as partners with him and started his business under thename and style of Madan Lal Chaman Lal. On 15th of April, 1963,Shyam Sunder and his two brothers filed an application under section13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinaftercalled the Act), against the firm Brij Lal Chaman Lal, the widow andtwo sons of Brij Lal, and Chaman Lal, respondents 1-5, praying fortheir eviction from the premises in dispute on two grounds, but we arein the present petition concerned with only one of them, namely-
  2. 2. "That the firm respondent 1 was dissolved by the death of Shri Brij Laland in any case by voluntary dissolution between Shri Chaman Lal andother respondents Nos. 2-4 about a year ago. The firm respondent No.1 thus ceased to exist about a year ago. Furthermore, the possession ofthe building has been parted with and given to Messrs. Madan LalChaman Lal since about a year ago."2. This application was resisted by Chaman Lal both in his individualcapacity as well as being the proprietor of the dissolved firm Messrs.Brij Lal Chaman Lal. According to him -"The firm was riot dissolved on the death of Brij Lal, but it continued.Thereafter a dissolution took place between heirs of Shri Brij Lal andthe replying respondent, vide deed of dissolution of 12-10-1961 and thegood-will along with the lessee rights of the shop in disput fell to theshare of the replying respondent (Chaman Lal) and as the tenancyrights were of the co-lessee and by dissolution one of the lesseesbecame the owner thereof, the said change does not fall within themischief of Rent Act. The question of firms name of respondent No. 1having ceased to exist is of no avail to the landlord. This fact is deniedthat the replying respondent has parted with possession of thedemised premises. Madan Lal Chaman Lal is nobody else than thereplying respondent his brother and son, who were carrying onbusiness in the demised premises and replying respondent is also oneof the proprietors of the same. The allegations as made do not fallwithin the ambit of any of the provisions of the Rent Restrictions Actand as such the replying respondent is not liable to ejectment.The allegations do not make up the case of sub-letting or assignmentof lessee rights nor has there been any sub-letting or assignment oflessee rights. As such the present application is liable to be dismissed,even otherwise the petitioners having accepted the rent from thereplying respondents in the name of Madan Lal Chaman Lal for morethan three months are estopped by their act and conduct frompleading otherwise now."
  3. 3. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the Kent Controller framed only oneissue in the case, viz., "Are the applicants entitled to an order ofejectment on the grounds pleaded in para. 5(ii) of the application?".He held that Brij Lal and Chaman Lal were the joint tenants of thepremises in dispute under the applicants and that being so both ofthem had a right to occupy the entire tenanted premises and they werenot tenants in respect of their shares only. One co-tenant could notsurrender the tenancy rights so as to bind the other co-tenant. Onsurrender of his rights by one of the co-tenants, the other had a righteither to recognise the surrender or to insist on the performance of theoriginal lease deed. A co-tenant who surrendered his rights in the jointtenancy had no interest left in the tenancy rights after the surrenderand the other co-tenant could continue as the sole tenant.A transfer of a right in the lease by a co-lessee in favour of the otherlessee would not be a breach of the covenant against assignmentwithout the consent of the landlord. After the dissolution of the firmBrij Lal Chaman Lal, according to the Rent Controller, Chaman Lalbecame the sole tenant under the applicants. He himself being apartner in the firm Madan Lal Chaman LaT, Chaman Lal could not besaid to have parted with possession of the premises in favour of thefirm Madan Lal Chaman Lal. There was no provision in the Act whichprevented a tenant from taking a third person as a partner in hisbusiness. Chaman Lal was a partner of the firm Madan Lal ChamanLal and since he himself worked in the premises in dispute in thatcapacity he could not be deemed to have parted with possession of thedemised building or assigned his rights in the lease in favour of thefirm Madan Lal Chaman Lal. In view of these findings, he dismissedthe ejectment application.4. Against this decision, the owners of the premises in dispute went inappeal before the appellate authority. There it was conceded by theircounsel that there could be no objection to Chaman Lal taking otherpartners with him. His argument, however, was that therelinquishment of the rights of Brij Lal as a co-lessee in the premisesby his heirs and legal representatives in favour of Chaman Lal
  4. 4. amounted to a transfer of Brij Lals right of tenancy and the same washit by Section 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act.This contention was, however, repelled by the appellate authority whowas of the view that Brij Lals death had the effect of not onlyautomatically dissolving his partnership with Chaman Lal, but it alsooperated to extinguish his rights in the tenancy. That, however did notmean that the rights of tenancy enjoyed by Chaman Lal as a co-lesseewith Brij Lal were affected by the latters death in any manner. In spiteof Brij Lal being his co-lessee, Chaman Lal himself was a lessee of theentire shop in his own right and he continued to enjoy that status evenon Brij Lals death. Even if it be assumed that Brij Lals right as a co-lessee survived to his legal representatives, the position, according tothe appellate authority, remained unchanged, because transfer by aco-lessee in favour of another co-lessee of a right in the lease wouldnot be a breach of the covenant against assignment without theconsent of the landlord. The appeal was, consequently, dismissed.5. Against this decision, the present revision petition was filed in thisCourt by the owners under section 15 (5) of the Act. The same came upfor hearing before Falshaw, C. J. According to him, the view taken bythe learned appellate authority was based on a decision ofRajamannar, C. J. and Mack, J. in Devarajulu Naidu v. E-Thayaramma, AIR 1950 Mad 25, which was a case under the MadrasBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946, wherein it was held thatwhere one of the two partners, after dissolution of the partnership,assigned to the other partner the interest of the partnership inpremises which had been taken on lease by the partnership, it did notamount to a breach of the covenant prohibiting assignment of thelease without the consent of the lessor. According to the learned ChiefJustice, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court had based theirconclusion on a decision of a single Judge of that Court regarding thenon-applicability of the principles laid down by the English Courts tolandlord and tenant relationship. Since the learned Chief Justice didnot, prima facie, agree with the view taken by the Madras High Court,
  5. 5. he referred this case to a Division Bench. That is how the matter hasbeen placed before us.6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the firm Brij LalChaman Lal, being the tenant of the premises in dispute, the tenancycame to an end on the dissolution of this partnership either on thedeath of one of its partners Brij Lal or at any rate when the deed ofdissolution was executed between the heirs of Brij Lal and Chaman Lalon 12-10-1961. The relinquishment of the leasehold. rights of Brij Laldeceased in the shop in dispute by his heirs and legal representativesin, favour of Chaman Lal amounted to a transter of the fights in thetenancy within the meaning of section 13 (2) (ii) a) of the Act. That,being so, the application of the petitioners for cjectment ought to havebeen allowed.He also contended that Chnme Lals taking his brother Madan Lal andthe latters son as partners with him and starting his business in thename and style of Madan Lal Chaman Lal in the premises in disputealso afforded the petitioners a ground for ejectment under section 13(2) (ii) (a). It was proved on the record that firm Madan Lal ChamanLal was a different entity from the firm Brij Lal Chaman Lal and theformer came into existence when the latter was dissolved. Firm MadanLal Chaman Lal were not the tenants of the petitioners and thepossession of the shop in dispute had been parted with in their favourand under these circumstances, an order of ejectment should havebeen passed against the respondents on this ground as well.7. The sole question for determination is whether the petitioners havebeen able to make out a case for the ejectment of the respondentsunder section 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act. This is the only provision, whichaccording to the petitioners applies to the instant case. That sectionreads-"13. (1) .....(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to theController for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving
  6. 6. the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against theapplicant, is satisfied-(i) .....(ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without thewritten consent of the landlord-(a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building orrented land or any portion thereof; or******the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put thelandlord in possession of the building, or rented land and if theController is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting theapplication:******8. On going through the pleadings in the present case, I am of the viewthat the petitioners have not even alleged the grounds of ejectmentgiven in Section 13 (2) (ii) (a). All that is stated in the application forejectment is that the firm Brij Lal Chaman Lal had rented the premisesin dispute through their partner Brij Lal and a rent note incorporatingthe terms of the tenancy was executed on 11-10-1957. Thereafter BrijLal died more than a year ago before the filing of the ejectmentapplication, leaving behind respondents 2-4 as his heirs and legalrepresentatives. Chaman Lal respondent No. 5, was the other partnerof this firm and two grounds had been given for ejectment, first thatthe firm Brij Lal Chaman Lal was dissolved by the death of Brij La! andin any case by the voluntary dissolution of the partnership betweenChaman Lal and the legal representatives of Brij Lal and the firm thusceased to exist about a year ago; and second that the possession of thebuildings had been parted with and given to Messrs. Madan LalChaman Lal since about a year ago.
  7. 7. 9. Under section 18 (2) (ii) (a). In order to succeed the landlord has toestablish to tha satisfaction of the Rent Controller that the tenant has,without his consent, either transferred his right under the lease orsublet the entire building or a portion thereof. In the ejectmentapplication referred to above, the landlord has not alleged as to whohad transferred his rights under the lease or sub-let the tenantedbuilding. A reading of this application shows that according to thepetitioners, firm Brij Lal Chaman Lal, which was their real tenant, hadceased to exist about a year before the institution of the ejectmentproceedings and since that very time firm Madan Lal Chaman Lal hadgot into possession of the tenanted premises without any title. That isto say, firm Madan Lal Chaman Lal was occupying the premises asmere trespassers. That being so, the petitioners were not entitled totake the benefit of the provisions of section 13 (2) (ii) (a) and theejectment application should have been dismissed on that shortground alone.10. Let us now examine the case in the way in which it was dealt withby the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and the manner inwhich it was argued before us. The first question that arises fordecision is--Has the landlord been able to prove that the tenant hastransferred his rights under the lease without his consent? Accordingto the petitioners, when the legal representatives of Brij Lal deceasedrelinquished their leasehold rights in the premises in dispute in favourof Chaman Lal, that act amounted to the transfer of their rights underthe lease and since this was done without their consent, therespondents were liable to ejectment.It will be noticed that this sub-section does not mention the person orpersons in whose favour the rights under the lease should betransferred by the tenant. As I read this provision, to me it appearsthat the idea of the Legislature was that in order to attract theapplicability of this sub-section it was necessary that the tenant shouldtransfer his rights under the lease in favour of some stranger, thereason being that a tenant was not authorised to impose a stranger onhis landlord without his consent. If A is the tenant of X, he is not
  8. 8. entitled to transfer his rights under the lease to B and inflict him as atenant on X. Applying this test to the case in hand, let us see who wasthe original tenant of the petitioners. It is common ground that thefirm Brij Lal Chaman Lal consisting of only two partners, namely BrijLal and Chaman Lal, was the tenant of the shop in question. In otherwords, these two persons were the tenants and owners of the leaseholdrights and not the firm as such- A firm is not an entity or person inlaw, but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is onlya collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In otherwords, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious modeof designating the persons who nave agreed to carry on business inpartnership. (See in this connection Dulichand Laxminarayan v.Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur, AIR 1956 SC 354). It isundisputed that all the members of an ordinary partnership areinterested in the whole of the partnership property. No partner has aright to take any portion of the partnership property and say that it ishis exclusively (Vide Lindley on Partnership, Eleventh Edition, page426). In a partnership each partner has a right to enjoy and use theentire joint property for his own benefit as any other co-owner.Community of interest and unity of possession are the necessaryattributes of partnership property. By the deed of dissolution dated12th October, 1961, the goodwill along with the leasehold rights in theshop in dispute which were a part or the partnership assets had fallento the share of Chaman Lal. The relinquishment of the rights by thelegal representatives of Brij Lal in favour of Chaman Lal in lieu ofsome other partnership property could not, in my view, be strictly saidto be covered by the word transfer occurring in section 13 (2) (ii) (a).By dissolution, each partner got specific property in place of hisundivided right in the entire partnership property.To put it differently, at the time of the dissolution of the partnership,various partners got exclusive title to the joint partnership propertycoming to their share and relinquished their rights in the remainingpartnership property going to the other partners. Before dissolution,all the partners jointly enjoyed the entire partnership property, ofcourse as full owners, whereas after dissolution, they exclusively
  9. 9. enjoyed the part of the joint property coming to their share. That is tosay, the property coming to the share of each partner after dissolutionwas already owned by him as full owner and consequently it could notbe said that if on account of the dissolution of a partnership firm thelease hold rights in a certain shop came to the share of one partner, itwould be a transfer by the remaining partners of their rights under thelease within the meaning of Section 13(2)(ii)(a). Moreover, as I havealready indicated above, the transfer by the tenant of his rights underthe lease, as contemplated by this sub-section must be in favour ofsome stranger. On the dissolution of the partnership in the instantcase, the tenancy rights in the shop in dispute had fallen to the shareof Chaman Lal, who was no stranger to the landlord. As a matter offact he was the original tenant of the entire premises as explainedabove. On this ground also therefore, the relinquishment of the lease-hold rights in the shop in dispute by the legal representa lives of BrijLal in favour of Chaman Lal would not in any way amount to atransfer of their rights under the lease as envisaged under Section13(2)(ii)(a).11. The view that I have taken above finds support in a Bench decisionof the Nagpur High Court in Mathuradas v. Purushottam Das, 1959Nag LJ (Notes) 11. where it was held -"If the tenancy of a house is an asset of the partnership and if ondissolution of the partnership, the asset goes to one of the partners, itcannot be said that he becomes a subtenant only by virtue of the factthat the partnership was dissolved. If the tenancy is a partnershipasset then the position is that during the period of the partnership theasset was of the joint ownership of both the partners, and if ondissolution, that asset goes to the share of one of the partners it onlymeans that the part ownership which he enjoyed in the asset wasenlarged into full ownership".Similarly a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Koragalva v.Jakri Beary, AIR 1927 Mad 261, held that an alienation in favour of aco-lessee by another lessee of his right in the lease is not an alienation
  10. 10. which will work a forfeiture unless such is prohibited by the leasedeed. This Single Bench was later on followed by A Division Bench ofthe same Court consisting of Rajamanner C. J., and Mack J., in AIR1930 Mad 25, where it was observed-"Where one of two partners after the dissolution of the partnershipassigns to the other partner the interest of the partnership in premiseswhich had been taken on lease by the partnership, it does not amountto a breach of the covenant prohibiting an assignment of the leasewithout the consent of the lessor. The landlord therefore is not entitledto eviction on that ground".So far as these two Madras authorities are concerned, Falshaw, C.J.,while referring this case to a larger Bench observed-"It would thus seem that the learned Judges of the Madras High Courtbased their decision on a decision of a Single Judge of that Courtregarding the non-applicability of the principles laid down by theEnglish Courts to landlord and tenant relationship and I am by nomeans sure that I agree with this view".No reasons, however, I say so with respect, had been given by thelearned Chief Justice for differing from the view taken by the learnedJudges of the Madras High Court.12. Reference may also be made to a recent decision of the SupremeCourt in V.N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai, 1966-68 Pun LR 164(D) = (AIR 1966 SC 482). In that case the premises in disputebelonged to the joint Hindu Family consisting of father and his twosons. The three members of this undivided Hindu family partitionedtheir coparcenary property and as a result of the said partition, thepremises in question fell to the share of one of the sons who then filedan application for the ejectment of the tenant who had been inductedby the father before the said partition. One of the defences taken bythe tenant was based on Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958 which provided that where a landlord had acquired any premisesby transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such
  11. 11. premises would lie under Sub-section (1) on the ground specified inClause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years haselapsed from the date of the acquisition.The argument raised by the tenant was that when, by the partition ofthe joint Hindu Family property, the premises in dispute had fallen tothe share of the son, it should be held that he had acquired thosepremises by transfer within the meaning of Section 14(6) andconsequently he could not file an ejectment application unless a periodof five years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Whiledealing with this contention of the tenant, the Supreme Courtobserved thus -"Mr. Purshottam, however, contends that when an item of propertybelonging to the undivided Hindu family is allotted to the share of oneof the coparceners on partition, such allotment in substance amountsto the transfer of the said property to the said person and it is,therefore, an acquisition of the said property by transfer. Prima facie,it is not easy to accept this contention. Community of interest andunity of possession are the essential attributes of coparcenaryproperty; and so, the true effect of partition is that each coparcenergets a specific property in lieu of his undivided right in respect of thetotality of the property of the family. In other words, what happens ata partition is that in lieu or the property allotted to individualcoparceners they, in substance, renounce their right in respect of theother properties; they get exclusive title to the properties allotted tothem and as a consequence, they renounce their undefined right inrespect of the rest of the property. The process of partition therefore,involves the transfer of joint enjoyment of the properties by all thecoparceners into an enjoyment in severality by them of the respectiveproperties allotted to their shares. Having regard to this basiccharacter of joint Hindu family property, it cannot be denied that eachcoparcener has an antecedent title to the said property, though itsextent is not determined until partition takes place. That being so,partition really means that whereas initially all the coparceners havesubsisting title to the totality of the property of the family jointly, that
  12. 12. joint title is by partition transformed into separate titles of theindividual coparceners in respect of several items of propertiesallotted to them respectively. If that be the true nature of partition itwould not be easy to uphold the broad contention raised by Mr.Purshottam that partition of an undivided Hindu family property mustnecessarily mean transfer of the property to the individualcoparceners. As was observed by the Privy Council in Girja Bai v.Sadashiv Dhundiraj, "Petition does not give him (a coparcener) a titleor create a title in him; it only enables him to obtain what is his own ina definite and specific form for purposes of disposition independent ofthe wishes of his former co-sharers".These observations also in a way support the view that I have takenabove.13. In view of the foregoing, I would hold that the relinquishment ofthe lease-hold rights in the shop in dispute by the legal representativesof Brij Lal deceased in favour of Chaman Lal did not amount to atransfer by a tenant of his rights in the lease without the consent ofthe landlord within the meaning of Section 13 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act.14. The second question that is now left for determination is this.When Chaman Lal started business in the shop in dispute under thename and style of Madan Lal Chaman Lal after joining with him hisbrother Madan Lal and the letters son, could it be said that he hadsub-let the shop to Madan Lal and his son within the meaning ofSection 13(2)(ii)(a)? It is undisputed that Chaman Lal himself carriedon business in the shop and he was the tenant of the landlord. It hasnot been established by the petitioner that Madan Lal and his sonswere given a share in the lease-hold rights in the shop and they toohad become the tenants of the said shop. All that is stated is that thepartnership business was carried on jointly by these two with ChamanLal. There was no transfer of any interest in the lease-hold rights intheir favour, because they had not been made partners in the lesseerights of the shop in question. Neither they nor even the partnershipas such had been proved to be liable to pay any rent to the petitioners.
  13. 13. This was the sole responsibility of Chaman Lal. All this shows thatMadan Lal and his son never became tenants of the petitioners eitherin their individual capacity or as partners of the firm Madan LalChaman Lal. They were merely carrying on the business along withChaman Lal who remained the sole tenant of the petitioners. It couldnot, therefore, be said that Chaman Lal had in any way sub-let theshop to them. Sub-letting necessarily implies the transfer of some ofthe lease-hold rights in the tenanted premises.15. My view that Madan Lal and his son would have become sub-tenants only if the lease-hold interest in the shop in dispute was alsotransferred to them by Chaman Lal while taking them as partners inthe business, finds support in the decision of Subba Rao, J. inGundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rangiah, AIR 1954 Mad182, where he held-"It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that there cannot be a sub-letting, unless the lessee parted with legal possession. The mere factthat another is allowed to use the premises while the lessee retains thelegal possession is not enough to create a sub-lease. Section 105 of theTransfer of Property Act defines a lease of immovable property astransfer of right to enjoy such property. Therefore to create a lease orsub-lease a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of theproperty should be conferred on another. In the present case theexclusive possession of the premises was not given to the secondrespondent. The first respondent continued to be the lessee, though inregard to the business carried on in the premises he had taken in otherpartners. The partners are not given any exclusive possession of thepremises or a part thereof. The first respondent continues to be inpossession, subject to the liability to pay rent to his landlord. Thepartnership deed also as I have already stated, does not confer anysuch right in the premises on the other partners. I, therefore, hold thatin the circumstances of the case the first respondent did not sub-letthe premises to the second respondent, and therefore he is not liableto be evicted under the provisions of Act No. 25 of 1949".
  14. 14. Similar view was taken in a Bench decision of the Saurashtra HighCourt in Karsandas Ramji v. Karsanji Kalyanji, AIR 1953 Sau 113.16. So far as this Court is concerned, Bishan Narain, J. in Ajit Parshadv. Gian Singh 1956-58 Pun LR 124, held that the mere fact that thetenant allowed his partners to use the rented premises in furtheranceof the partnership business did not amount to sub-letting of thepremises. This observation was subsequently followed by Chopra, J. inDarshan Singh v. Kulwant Rai, 1958-60 Pun LR 650.17. Reliance by the learned counsel tor the petitioners was placed on aBench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Tansukhdas Chhaganlal v.Smt. Shambai. AIR 1954 Nag 160, where it was held -"Where, in the first instance A alone was the tenant of the premisesand he allowed other persons to enter into partnership along withhimself to carry on business in those premises, the partnership whichA entered into along with the third parties was a personality in lawdistinct from that of A himself. A thus brought himself within thepurview of the law prohibiting subletting except with the permission ofthe landlord, and was therefore liable to ejectment on the ground ofunauthorised subletting".In the first place, it is not clear from the report whether the otherpersons with whom A entered into partnership for carrying onbusiness in the premises in dispute were made partners in the lease-hold rights as well or not. Secondly, the finding of the learned Judgesthat the partnership which the petitioner in that case entered intoalong with third party was a personality in law distinct from that of thepetitioner himself, if I may say so with great respect, runs counter tothe supreme Court decision in AIR 1956 SC 354, where it was held thata firm was not an entity or person in law but was merely anassociation or individuals and a firm name was only a collective nameof those individuals who constituted the firm.18. During the course of arguments, reference was also made by thelearned counsel for the petitioners to three unreported decisions of
  15. 15. this Court in Civil Revn No. 728 of 1951, Tirloki Nath v. Seth ChiranjiLal, decided by G.D. Khosla, J. on 20-6-1952 (Punj), Civil Revn No.372 of 1961, Lala Jogi Parshad v. Firm Hukam Chand Bhagwan Dassdecided by S.B. Capoor, J. on 18-12-1961 Punj and Civil Revn. No. 291of 1961, Sheo Narain v. Dull Chand, decided by my learned brotherDua. J. on 4-5-1962 (Punj).19. 1 may at once state that none of these cases supports thecontention of the petitioners. In Tirloki Naths case, C.R. No. 728 of1951, D/-20-6-1952 (Fun)), what was held was this:"The simple question in my view is this. Tirloki Nath hired thesepremises for a certain purpose and he is still in possession of thesepremises and the business carried on is exactly the same business or atany rate very similar business. There is no evidence whatever to showthat Tirloki Nath has sub-let the premises to anyone else and has beenreceiving rent from any one. Nor is there any evidence of assignmentand the evidence showing that he has parted with the premises is of awitness who does not appear to know anything whatever about thismatter and his evidence has not been considered by the learned SeniorSubordinate Judge. I must therefore hold that there is no evidencewhatsoever to show that any of the grounds set out in Section 9 (1)(b)have been proved and that being the case the plaintiffs relief for thevacation of the premises cannot be granted".In the case of Lala Jogi Parshad, C. R. No. 372 of 1961, D/-18-12-1961(Punj), the facts were that the shop in dispute was originally let out tofirm Hukam Chand Bhagwan Dass and the ground on which evictionwas sought was that the firm had sub-let or assigned its rights in theshop to firm Jiwan Dass Mehar Chand without the landlordspermission. The learned Judge, agreeing with the trial Court, found asa fact that the shop in dispute was occupied by the firm Jiwan DassMehar Chand which was a distinct entity from the firm Hukam ChandBhagwan Dass and both these firms were working separately, RamLal, one of the partners of firm Hukam Chand Bhagwan Dass was nota partner of the firm Jiwan Dass Mehar Chand and he had been
  16. 16. excluded from the possession of the shop in dispute. There was noevidence whatsoever to show that these two firms were doing the samebusiness or had any link between them. As a matter of fact they werepaying income-tax separately and were being separately entered in therecords of the marketing committee. On these facts, it had been Foundthat the tenant had transferred his rights under the lease or sublet thebuilding to some other party.In Sheo Narains case, C. R. No. 291 of 1961 D/-4-5-1962 (Punj), theposition was that the shop in dispute was taken on lease by one DuniChand owner of the firm Dewan Chand Radha Kishan. The landlordapplied for eviction of Duni Chand and others on the ground thatDuni Chand had sublet the shop to others without the landlordsconsent. In the written statement the plea taken on behalf ofdefendants was that they had been tenants of the landlord from thevery inception and that there was no subletting in the case. The RentController found that Duni Chand alone was the tenant of the landlordand that he had sublet the shop to three other persons without theconsent and authority of the landlord.On appeal, the Appellate authority reversed the decision of the RentController and held that the appellants had been working in the shopas partners and agents of each other with the result that no question ofsub-letting by one to the other arose On these findings, the applicationfor eviction was dismissed. On revision, it was found as a fact by Dua,J. that it had not been established that the lease was in favour of thefirm constituted by the respondents, at the time when the leaseactually came into existence On that finding the decision of theappellate authority was reversed and that of the Rent Controllerrestored20. Counsel for the petitioners also referred to a decision of mylearned brother Dua, J. in Bhag Singh v. Surjan Sing. 1966-68 Pun LR466, where it was held -
  17. 17. "That, transfer of rights under a lease to a partnership consisting ofthe lessee and a stranger is clearly hit by Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of theEast Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. But it is unnecessary todecide the question as to how far assignment of to right under thetenancy to a partnership which is a personality distinct from thetenant, would be covered by the expression sub-let used in the sectionbecause there is no genuine partnership.This authority again does not advance the case of the petitioners,because as already held above, it has not been established in thepresent case that the lease-hold rights had been transferred byChaman Lal in favour of Madan Lal and the letters son, with whom hewas running business under the name and style of Madan Lal ChamanLal.21. I would, therefore, hold that when Chaman Lal took into businesshis brother Madan Lal and the letters son, it could not be laid that hehad sublet the shop in dispute to them so as to attract the provisions ofSection 13(2)(ii)(a).22. In view of what I have said above, this petition fails and isdismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, I leave theparties to bear their own costs in this Court as well.Inder Dev Dua, J.23. I agree.

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