Speaking of Annihilation Mobilizing for War Against Huma.docx

"Speaking of Annihilation": Mobilizing for War Against Human
and Insect Enemies, 1914-
1945
Author(s): Edmund P. Russell
Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Mar.,
1996), pp. 1505-1529
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of
Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945309
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"Speaking of Annihilation":
Mobilizing for War against Human
and Insect Enemies, 1914-1945
Edmund P. Russell III
In 1944 and 1945, two periodicals with very different
audiences published similar
images. Both showed half-human, half-insect creatures, talked
of the "annihilation"
of these vermin, and touted modern technology as the means to
accomplish that
end. One piece, a cartoon in the United States Marines'
magazine Leatherneck,
showed a creature labeled "Louseous Japanicas" and said its
"breeding grounds
around the Tokyo area . . . must be completely annihilated."
(See figure 1.) A
month after the cartoon appeared, the United States began mass
incendiary bomb-
ings of Japanese cities, followed by the atomic blasts that
leveled Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Although the Leatherneck cartoon was surely
intended to be humorous
and hyperbolic, calls for annihilation of human enemies had, by
the end of the
war, become realistic.
So too with insect enemies. The second cartoon, an

advertisement in a chemical
industry journal, promoted perfumes to eliminate insecticide
odors. (See figure
2.) Tapping the rhetoric that pervaded World War II, the text
began, "Speaking
of annihilation." The accompanying image showed three
creatures with insect
bodies, each with a stereotypical head representing a national
enemy. The Italian
creature lay on its back, an allusion to Allied victory over the
Italian army. The
German and Japanese creatures remained standing, as guns
blasted all three with
chemical clouds. Like human enemies, the advertisement
implied, insect enemies
could and should be annihilated. That possibility, too, had
come within reach
by the end of World War II. The Allies killed disease-bearing
lice and mosquitoes
over wide areas using a powerful new insecticide called DDT
(dichlorodiphenyltri-
chloroethane), and entomologists called for the extermination
of entire species.
Edmund P. Russell III is assistant professor of technology,
culture, and communication at the University of Virginia.
I am grateful for comments by Susan Armeny, Brian Balogh,
Amy Bentley, Amy Bercaw, Paul Boyer, Alan
Brinkley, Craig Cameron, W. Bernard Carlson, Pete Daniel,
Thomas Dunlap, Paul Forman, Brett Gary, Barton
Hacker, Pamela Henson, Michael Holt, Linda Lear, Gerald
Linderman, Allan Megill, David Nord, Peter Onuf,
Katherine Ott, John Perkins, Beverly Rathcke, Terry Sharrer,
Merritt Roe Smith, David Thelen, Richard Tucker,
John Vandermeer, Earl Werner, Donald Worster, Susan Wright,

an anonymous reviewer, and scholars who
attended presentations at the 1993 meeting of the Society for
the History of Technology, the Johns Hopkins
University, the University of Virginia, and the Smithsonian
Institution. I am also grateful for a predoctoral
fellowship from the Smithsonian Institution and grants from the
University of Michigan and the National Science
Foundation (SBR 9511726). I thank Paul Milazzo for help with
research. This article draws on Edmund P. Russell
III, "War on Insects: Warfare, Insecticides, and Environmental
Change in the United States, 1870-1945" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, 1993).
The Journal of American History March 1996 1505
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1506 The Journal of American History March 1996
Louseous Japanicas
The first serious outbreak of this lice epidemic was officially
noted on Dmber 7,
1941, at Honolulu, T. H. To the Marine Corps, especially
trained in combating this
type of pestilence, was ased the gigantic task of extermination.
Extve e ri-
ments on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan have shown that
this louse inhabits coral

atolls in the South Pacific, particularly pill boxes, palm trees,
caves, swamps and jungks.
1wfrrr
Flame throwers, mortars, grenades and bayonets have proven to
be an effective -
edy. But before a complete cure may be effected the origin of
the plague, the bredin
grounds around the Tokyo area, must be completely
annihilated.
Figure 1. In 1945, United States Marine Sgt. Fred Lasswell
praised efforts to annihilate
"Louseous Japanicas." Fred Lasswell, "Bugs Every Marine
Should
Know," Leatherneck, 28 (March 1945), 37.
Printed with permission of Leatherneck magazine.
Most Americans welcomed technology that brought "total
victory" over national
and natural enemies. They felt grateful for a bomb that saved
the lives of American
soldiers and for a chemical that enabled people to "bomb"
insect pests. As time
passed, however, many came to wonder whether human beings
had struck a Faustian
bargain. Did "weapons of mass destruction" threaten, rather
than promote, human
welfare? Opponents of chemical and nuclear weapons thought
so. Had the ability
of human beings to conquer nature surpassed some limit,
threatening not only
human well-being but the planet itself? After Rachel Carson
published Silent

Spring in 1962, many feared that DDT exemplified this threat.'
Although war and concerns about the impact of human beings
on the environ-
ment have been among the most important forces shaping the
twentieth century,
scholars have tended to analyze these issues separately. Several
historical fields
illustrate this tendency. Military historians have pushed beyond
studies of battles
and armies to examine the impact of military institutions on
society, politics,
and economics- but rarely on the environment. Environmental
historians have
emphasized the role of nature in many events of our past - but
rarely in war.
Historians of technology have analyzed the impact of military
technology on
' Rachel Carson, Silent Sping (New York, 1962).
2016 01:38:13 UTC
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War against Human and Insect Enemies 1507
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.....

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tiid. slay the. kiln agent presto and
quiety departo Ikekiti spent No wasb is.
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.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- we - -to hew PM
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Figure 2. This 1944 advertisement, which appeared in a journal
that served the National
Association of Insecticide and Disinfectant Manufacturers,
took it for granted
that national and insect enemies required annihilation.
Reprinted from
Soap and Sanitary Chemicals (April 1944), 92.
society -but rarely on the environment. Cultural historians have
emphasized the
impact of war on interactions among people-but rarely its
impact on people's
interactions with the environment.2
2 Although war and military institutions are different, I follow

the practice among British historians and use
the former term to encompass the latter. For a sample of works
in military, environmental, technological, and
cultural history, see Peter Paret, "The New Military History,"
Parameters, 21 (Autumn 1991), 10-18; William
H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force,
and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982);
Carolyn Merchant, ed., Major Problems in American
Environmental History (Lexington, Mass., 1993); Jeffrey
K. Stine andJoel A. Tarr, "Technology and the Environment:
The Historians' Challenge," Environmental History
2016 01:38:13 UTC
The tendency to separate war from environmental change (or
military from
civilian affairs) has deep roots. Isaiah's metaphor, "They shall
beat their swords
into plowshares," suggests that people have long seen one of
the most important
ways they change the environment - agriculture - as the
opposite of war. In Carte-
sian philosophy, relations among human beings belong to a
separate sphere from
relations between human beings and other species. Observers
have argued that
Americans in particular "are inclined to see peace and war as
two totally separate

quanta. War is abnormal and peace is normal and returns us to
the status quo ante. " 3
Historians of insecticides have shown, however, that efforts to
control human
and natural enemies have not proceeded independently.
Between them, Emory
Cushing, Vincent Dethier, Thomas Dunlap, and John Perkins
have pointed out
that manufacturing of explosives in World War I produced a
by-product called
PDB (paradichlorobenzene), which entomologists then
developed into an insecti-
cide; that entomologists often used military metaphors; that
World War II stimu-
lated development of DDT; and that some insecticides were
related to nerve gases.
Historians of chemical weapons, too, have noted this last
point.4
These events were, I believe, part of a larger pattern. The
ability of human
beings to kill both national and natural enemies on an
unprecedented scale, as
well as fears about those abilities, developed in the twentieth
century partly because
of links between war and pest control. This article focuses on
three such links:
science and technology, institutions, and metaphor.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the science and
technology of pest
control sometimes became the science and technology of war,
and vice versa.
Chemists, entomologists, and military researchers knew that
chemicals toxic to

one species often killed others, so they developed similar
chemicals to fight human
Review, 18 (Spring 1994), 1-7; Merritt Roe Smith, ed., Military
Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives
on the American Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Barton
C. Hacker, "Military Institutions, Weapons, and
Social Change: Toward a New History of Military
Technology," Technology and Culture, 35 (no. 4, 1994), 768-
834; Elaine Tyler May, HomewardBound: American Families in
the Cold War Era (New York, 1988); and Paul
Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Ltght: American Thought and
Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New
York, 1985).
On war and the environment, see Susan D. Lanier-Graham, The
Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts
of Weaponry and Warfare (New York, 1993); Seth Shulman,
The Threat at Home: Confronting the Toxic
Legacy of the U.S. Military (Boston, 1992); J. P. Robinson,
The Effects of Weapons on Ecosystems (Oxford,
1979); Arthur H. Westing and Malvern Lumsden, Threat of
Modern Warfare to Man and His Environment:
An Annotated Bibliography Prepared under the Auspices of the
International Peace Research Association (Paris,
1979); Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian
Interpretation (Oxford, Eng., 1989); and Alfred W.
Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of
Europe, 900-1900 (New York, 1986).
3 Isa. 2:4; Joseph A. Wildermuth to editor, Washington Post
Book World, Feb. 20, 1994, p. 14. See also
Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the
Modern Sensibility (New York, 1983). For the
suggestion that neoclassical economics (which views the
military as an "externality") and "the peculiarly American

blindness to the presence of the military" contribute to the view
that civilian and military enterprises are separate
endeavors, see David F. Noble, "Command Performance: A
Perspective on the Social and Economic Consequences
of Military Enterprise," in Military Enterprise and
Technological Change, ed. Smith, 329-46, esp. 330-31.
4 John H. Perkins, Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide Crisis:
The Quest for New Pest Management Strategies
(New York, 1982), 4-10; John H. Perkins, "Reshaping
Technology in Wartime: The Effect of Military Goals
on Entomological Research and Insect-Control Practices,"
Technology and Culture, 19 (no. 2, 1978), 169-86;
Thomas R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public
Policy (Princeton, 1981), 36-3 7, 59-63; Emory C.
Cushing, History of Entomology in World War II (Washington,
1957); V. G. Dethier, Man's Plague? Insects
and Agriculture (Princeton, 1976), 112; Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of
Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical,
Technical, Military, Legal, and Political Aspects
of CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures, vol. I: The Rise
of CB Weapons (New York, 1971), 70-75.
2016 01:38:13 UTC
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and insect enemies. They also developed similar methods of
dispersing chemicals
to poison both.
Ideas and hardware moved between civilian and military
spheres partly because
of institutional links. The two world wars stimulated nations to
mobilize civilian
and military institutions to achieve military victory. They also
catalyzed the found-
ing of new organizations that coordinated civilian and military
efforts. Peace also
catalyzed links among institutions. When guns fell silent on
battlefields, military
and civilian institutions worked together to apply military ideas
and technology
to farm fields as a way to survive and meet their institutional
goals.
Shared metaphors helped military and civilian institutions
shape and express
the way people experienced both war and nature.5 As figures 1
and 2 show,
publicists described war as pest control, pest control as war,
and the two endeavors
as similar. On the one hand, describing war as pest control
transformed participation
in war from a potentially troubling moral issue to a moral
virtue. Comparing
chemical weapons to insecticides made it easier to portray
poison gas as natural
and humane. (Ironically, opponents of poison gas used the same

metaphor to
argue that chemical warfare was inhumane because it treated
human beings like
insects.) On the other hand, describing pest control as war
helped entomologists
portray nature as a battlefield, elevate the status of their
profession, and mobi-
lize resources.
The evolution of a word used for both human and insect
enemies, exterminate,
suggests that these metaphors appealed to long-standing values.
The Latin root
meant "to drive beyond the boundaries." People and insects that
did not respect
the boundaries of nations, farms, and homes were enemies, this
meaning implied,
and could or should be driven out. Often, however, twentieth-
century publicists
used exterminate with a connotation that emerged in the fourth
century: "to
destroy utterly," or annihilate. Since people had previously
imagined (and some-
times succeeded in) annihilating enemies, what set the
twentieth century apart?
The scale on which people could plan and carry out killing
stands out. Technology,
industry, and governments grew large enough to enable us to
wage "total war" -
not just against armies, but against insects and civilians. People
could plan, carry
out, and (even when it did not come to pass) fear annihilation
on a breathtaking
scale across geographic and phylar boundaries. Zygmunt
Bauman has suggested
that modernity aimed to make the world into a garden in which

some organisms
belonged and from which others, which did not belong, were
extirpated. The story
told here complements his argument. Warfare resembled
gardening, gardening
resembled warfare, and both were attempts to shape the world
to long-standing
human visions.6
I Military metaphors have been used to describe a variety of
civilian endeavors, so the events described here
are part of a larger pattern. I use the term metaphor to include
simile, analogy, and imagery. On the role of
metaphor in thought and communication, see David E. Leary,
"Psyche's Muse: The Role of Metaphor in the
History of Psychology," in Metaphors in the History of
Psychology, ed. David E. Leary (New York, 1990), 1-78;
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By
(Chicago, 1980); and Mary B. Hesse, Models and
Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, 1966).
6 Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. "Exterminate." On
imagination, technology, and the expansion
of war in the twentieth century, see Zygmunt Bauman,
Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, 1989); Craig M.
Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the
Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-
2016 01:38:13 UTC

This article explores only some aspects of the topic. It focuses
more on alliances
among institutions than on conflicts, more on institutional
politics than on econom-
ics, more on harms than on benefits, and more on similarities
than on differences.
Noting similarities does not mean equating. In World War II,
for example,
Germans, Americans, propagandists, and entomologists all
talked of annihilating
enemies. However, the actions of the United States and
entomologists differed
in critical moral ways from those of Germany and of the
architects of the horrors
of the Holocaust.
This story prompts two reflections about the ways we write
history. First, we
often talk about the impact of one aspect of life (war, science,
politics) on another
(the state, culture, the environment). This framework tells us a
great deal, but
is it complete? Few forces are monolithic, and two-way
interactions may be more
common than one-way impacts. War changed the natural
environment, and the
environment changed war. Metaphors shaped human
understanding of the material
world, and the material world shaped metaphors. Second, we
may tend to tell
stories of progress or decline, but life is a mixture of the two.7
For some people
insecticides and chemical weapons were blessings; for others
they were curses; and
for some they were both. The world gets both better and worse,
and we have yet

to exterminate either good or evil.
World War 1: Chemistry and War, 1914-1918
On April 22, 1915, Germany initiated a new chapter in the
evolution of war.
That day, Allied troops huddled in trenches near Ypres, France,
found themselves
enveloped in a greenish yellow cloud of chlorine gas released
by German troops.
Allied soldiers futilely tried to outrun the cloud, which
reportedly killed 5,000
soldiers and injured 10,000 more. German military leaders lost
the initial advantage
when they failed to mount a large-scale attack, but they
succeeded in demonstrating
the military power that flowed from knowledge and control of
nature.8
Knowledge about nature came in many forms, including
scientific understanding
of molecules, and Germany's preeminence in chemistry
underpinned its initial
success with chemical weapons. This preeminence depended
both on the brilliance
of civilian scientists such as Fritz Haber, the chemist who
oversaw development
of chemical weapons at the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft
(institute) in Berlin, and
1951 (New York, 1994); and Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of
American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon
(New Haven, 1987).
7 For examples of the impact of the weak on the strong, see
Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The

World the Slaves Made (New York, 1974); and James C. Scott,
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance (New Haven, 1985). On stories of progress
and decline as master narratives, see William
Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,"
Journal of American History, 78 (March 1992),
1347-76.
8 See Hugh R. Slotten, "Humane Chemistry or Scientific
Barbarism? American Responses to World War I
Poison Gas, 1915-1930," Journal of American History, 77
(Sept. 1990), 476-98; Robert Harris and Jeremy
Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of
Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York, 1982);
L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the
First World War (Oxford, 1986); and Daniel
Patrick Jones, "The Role of Chemists in Research on War
Gases in the United States during World War I"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1969).
2016 01:38:13 UTC
on Germany's huge chemical industry. Haber relied on chlorine
for Germany's
first gas attack partly because Germany had an ample supply of
this dyestuff inter-
mediate.9
Other nations followed Germany's lead in turning civilian
science and industry

to military research and production. Great Britain set thirty-
three laboratories to
work testing 150,000 compounds as chemical weapons. In the
United St~ates, the
National Research Council (an arm of the National Academy of
Sciences) organized
academic, industrial, and governmental scientists to work on
offensive and defensive
aspects of poison gases. In 1918 the United States Army
incorporated this mammoth
civilian enterprise into its new Chemical Warfare Service.
Other nations created
similar organizations, and tons of poison gases wafted across
Europe. By the end of
the war, gas reportedly had killed 90,000 people and caused 1.3
million casualties.
Observers dubbed World War I "the chemist's war." 10
Chemists relied on their knowledge of laboratory curiosities to
find some new
chemical weapons. The most heavily used gas in World War I,
chloropicrin,
followed this route. Russia introduced chloropicrin in battle in
1916, and other
nations soon followed suit. Although sometimes lethal to
human beings in its
own right, chloropicrin found wide use primarily because it
penetrated gas masks.
The compound induced tearing and vomiting, which led
soldiers to rip off their
masks and expose themselves to less penetrating, but more
lethal, gases mixed
with chloropicrin. ByJanuary 1, 1919, the United States
Chemical Warfare Service's
arsenal at Edgewood, Maryland, could produce 3 million
pounds of chloropicrin

per month. I
Chemical warriors also relied on compounds already known to
kill organisms,
including insects. French soldiers demonstrated this approach
at the battle of the
Somme in 1916, when they fired artillery shells containing
hydrogen cyanide.
Since the nineteenth century, farmers and entomologists had
used hydrogen cyanide
to fumigate insects in orchards and buildings. Arsenic, too,
made its way from
farm fields to battlefields. In the United States, the Chemical
Warfare Service
turned a third of the country's arsenic supply into the poison
gas diphenylchloroar-
sine, causing shortages of arsenical insecticides used to kill
orchard pests.'2
9 Harris and Paxman, Higher Form of Killing, 9-11.
10 In 1915, combatants released 3,600 tons of gas; in 1916,
15,000 tons. In 1916, the National Academy
of Sciences created the National Research Council (NRC) to
promote the "national security and welfare" by
organizing scientific research in government, industry, and
educational institutions for the federal government.
In 1917, the council created a Subcommittee on Noxious Gases
with members from the army, navy, and the
NRC Chemistry Committee. The civilian researchers became
part of the Gas Service of the army, which became
the Chemical Warfare Service three days later. In 1918,
President Woodrow Wilson issued an executive order
asking the National Academy of Sciences to perpetuate the
NRC. Rexmond C. Cochrane, The National Academy
of Sciences: The First Hundred Years, 1863-1963 (Washington,

1978), 209, 231-36; Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham
D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare
Service: From Laboratory to Field (Washington,
1959), 1-27; W. A. NoyesJr., "Preface," in Chemistry: A
History of the Chemistry Components of the National
Defense Research Committee, 1940-1946, ed. W. A. Noyes Jr.
(Boston, 1948), xv-xvi; and Harris and Paxman,
Higher Form of Killing, 22-23, 34.
" Williams Haynes, American Chemical Industry, vol. III: The
World WarI Period, 1912-1922 (New York,
1945), 111; R. C. Roark, A Bibliography of Chloropicrin,
1848-1932 (Washington, 1934), 1-2.
12 Hydrogen cyanide (also called hydrocyanic acid and prussic
acid) dispersed in open air too quickly to kill
soldiers effectively, and only the French persisted in using it
during World War I. (To kill insect pests in orchards,
2016 01:38:13 UTC
War prompted scientists not only to convert insecticidal
chemicals into chemical
weapons but also to reverse the process. Lice, which sometimes
carried deadly
typhus, infested American troops in France. Military and
civilian researchers alike
hoped that war gases might offer a way to conquer this plague
of war. In a
collaborative experiment, researchers from the Chemical

Warfare Service and the
Bureau of Entomology of the United States Department of
Agriculture tested four
chemical weapons on lice. They hoped to find "a gas which can
be placed in a
chamber and be experienced safely for a short period of time
by men wearing
gas masks and which in this time will kill all cooties and their
nits.""13
These experiments stimulated tests of other chemical weapons
as insecticides.
The Chemical Warfare Service, the Bureau of Entomology, and
other agencies of
the Department of Agriculture researched the efficacy of war
gases against dozens
of species of insects. Most of the gases fell short, but
chloropicrin, the compound
that chemical warfare had lifted from obscurity, killed insects
effectively. Chloropic-
rin harmed civilian exterminators as readily as enemy soldiers,
of course, but
entomologists found it less dangerous (as a tear gas,
chloropicrin had good "warning
properties") or more effective than other fumigants. The
battlefields of Europe
approximated, albeit unintentionally, laboratory experiments on
a massive scale,
and entomologists took note. American Miller magazine
reported that the "scarcity
of insect pests around Rheims is attributed to the use of
poisonous gases in that
region during the World War," and French researchers tested
chloropicrin as an
insecticide on grain in closed rooms. 14

While scientists researched ways to use pest control technology
in war, soldiers
and publicists in World War I, like their predecessors in
previous wars, described
military enemies as animals, including insect pests. A British
soldier, for example,
described German soldiers as running around like "disturbed
earwigs under a
rotten tree stump." By dehumanizing enemies, animal
metaphors reduced the
sense of guilt about killing human beings in battle. The "lower"
the phylum,
the lower the sense of guilt, and few phyla ranked lower than
insects. Moreover,
Europeans had long regarded nature, defined as everything on
earth other than
humans and their creations, as something that human beings not
only could but
fumigators enclosed trees in tents before releasing the gas.)
Arsenic found use against insects after it was known
to be poisonous to humans. Haber, Poisonous Cloud, 62-63,
117-18; Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, Chemical
Warfare Service, 55-56; Haynes, American Chemical Industry,
III, 111-12; L. 0. Howard, "Entomology and
the War," Scientific Monthly, 8 (Jan.-June 1919), 109-17; and
Dunlap, DDT, 20.
13 Surviving records do not indicate whether experimenters
tested gases on humans in chambers. W. Dwight
Pierce to L. 0. Howard, n.d., Correspondence on Body Lice,
Vermin, Cooties, in Army, Tests and Recommenda-
tions 1918, Correspondence and Reports Relating to a Study of
Body Lice 1918, Records of the Bureau of
Entomology and Plant Quarantine, RG 7 (Washington National
Records Center, Suitland, Md.); "Report on

Experiments Conducted on October 16, 1918, Testing the
Effect of Certain Toxic Gases on Body Lice and Their
Eggs," ibid.
14 "Killing Weevils with Chloropicrin," abstract, in Roark,
Bibliography of Chloropicrin, 3. The Bureau of
Chemistry, the Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Federal
Horticultural Board helped conduct research at Chemical
Warfare Service laboratories at …
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Environmental Justice and Economic Degrowth:
An Alliance between Two Movements1
Joan Martı́nez-Alier*
Ecological Economics, Social Metabolism, and Political
Ecology
The flows of energy and materials in the world economy have
never been as large
as they are today. This increased metabolism causes more and
more conflicts on
resource extraction and waste disposal and is giving rise to a
movement for
environmental justice around the world (Agyeman, et al. 2003;
Carruthers 2008;
Pellow and Brulle 2005; Pellow 2007; Roberts 2007; Walker
2009). Even an
economy without growth, if based on fossil fuels, would need to
obtain new sources
of energy at the ‘‘commodity frontiers’’ (Moore 2000) because
energy is not recycled.
The words ‘‘environmental justice’’ were initially used in the
United States in the
early 1980s for local complaints against ‘‘environmental
racism,’’ i.e., the
disproportionate pollution burdens in areas primarily inhabited
by disadvantaged
ethnic groups (Bullard 1990, 2005; Pulido 1996; Camacho 1998;
Cole and Foster
2001; Carmin and Ageyman 2010). Now the term is applied to
spontaneous

movements and organizations that resist extractive industries
and organize against
pollution and climate change (Martı́nez-Alier 2002) anywhere
in the world. It also
includes the networks or coalitions they form across borders
(Bandy and Smith
2005). Environmental justice speaks to both intragenerational
and intergenerational
distribution. It addresses non-distributional dimensions of
justice, such as recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of social actors to speak out in protest
(Schlosberg 2007) and
inclusion of all who are affected by resource extraction and
pollution (Agarwal
2001).
EJOs (environmental justice organizations) are potential allies
of the environ-
mental groups in rich countries that criticize the obsession with
the narrow economic
measure of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, which
defines economic growth
in the mainstream and permeates the political sphere. These
groups form the
degrowth movement (Latouche 2007), whose origins partly lie
in the field of
ecological economics.
Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary field born in the
1980s (Costanza
1991, 1996; Ropke 2004; Martı́nez-Alier and Ropke 2008;
Spash 2009) from a
1CES conference on The Revival of Political Economy,
Coimbra, October 21!23, 2010. I am grateful to
Patrick Bond and Larry Lohman for information and comments.

*[email protected]
ISSN 1045-5752 print/ISSN 1548-3290 online
# 2012 The Center for Political Ecology www.cnsjournal.org
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2011.648839
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM VOLUME 23 NUMBER 1
(MARCH 2012)
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2011.648839
confluence of interests between ecologists, who studied the use
of energy in the
human economy (Odum 1971; Jansson 1984), and dissident
economists (Daly
1968, 1973, 2007), who followed Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s
(1966, 1971) and
Kenneth Boulding’s (1966) teachings. Work by K.W. Kapp on
social costs (1950)
and by Kneese and Ayres (1969) on the pervasiveness of
externalities was also
influential. Ecological economics takes a comprehensive view
of the interaction

between economy and ecology. As such, it encompasses the
physical study of the
economy (social metabolism), the study of the effect of property
rights on the
environment and the relation between institutional change and
environmental
management, the study of the environmental sustainability of
the economy (e.g., can
manufactured capital substitute for so-called ‘‘natural
capital?’’), and the economic
valuation of positive environmental services and negative
‘‘externalities.’’ It also
employs multi-criteria evaluation (MCE) methods to rank
alternatives in the
presence of incommensurable values. Thus, instead of reducing
all values to money
by doubtful assumptions and controversial discount rates as is
done in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, participatory MCE methods (Munda, 2008) are able to
establish and rank
alternatives while accepting a plurality of values.
Social metabolism refers to the flows of energy and materials in
the economy.
The study of social metabolism overlaps with industrial
ecology. Sometimes it is
called social ecology (as in the Sozial Ökologie institute in
Vienna led by Fischer-
Kowalski); it measures the links between economic growth and
use of energy (Warr
and Ayres, et al. 2010) and tests the absolute or relative
dematerialization of the
economy (relative to GDP) by studying material flows.
Energy flows in the economy have been analyzed for a long
time (Cottrell 1955;

Martı́nez-Alier and Schlüpmann 1987, Martı́nez-Alier 2007;
Haberl 2001a, 2001b;
Cleveland 2008a, 2008b; Hall, et al. 1986; Sieferle 2001;
Debeir, et al. 1991). One
main point of interest is the rise or decline in the EROI (energy
return on energy
input), the inverse of the energy cost of obtaining energy.
Accounts of material flows
are now done as a matter of course by Eurostat, the E.U.
statistical office. They are
also calculated for Southern countries, with results often
emphasizing the existence of
large physical trade imbalances (Russi, et al. 2008; Perez-
Rincon 2006, 2007; Vallejo
2010; Vallejo, et al. 2010), where exports in tons are larger than
imports in tons (and
also often more energy intensive).
Political ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Robbins 2004;
Peet and Watts
1996; Rocheleau, et al. 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997) studies
ecological
distribution conflicts and the use of power to gain access to
environmental
resources and services, or to shift the burdens of pollution
according to ethnic
origin, social class, caste, or gender. It focuses on local and
international resource
extraction and waste disposal conflicts (of which climate
change is arguably the
largest), and it analyzes the power struggles on the procedures
for decision-making
in environmental issues, including the allowing or banning of
different valuation
52 JOAN MARTÍNEZ-ALIER

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languages. Political ecology also studies environmental
movements, as does
environmental sociology.
This article builds on the knowledge provided by these
sustainability sciences.
Trends
Nearly 20 years after the first Earth Summit, the United Nations
conference in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 that drew more than 100 heads of state,
the environmental
trends are alarming. The E.U. and UN objective of halting the
loss of biodiversity by
the year 2010 has not only failed, it has been abandoned in
practice. The HANPP
(human appropriation of net primary production), a measure of
the consumption of
natural materials such as food, paper, wood and fiber and how
this consumption

‘‘alters the composition of the atmosphere, levels of
biodiversity, energy flows within
food webs, and the provision of important ecosystem services’’
(SEDAC n.d),
indicates increasing pressure on biodiversity (Vitousek, et al.
1986; Haberl, et al.
2009). Biodiversity loss is sometimes seen (as in the TEEB [The
Economics of
Ecosystems and Biodiversity] reports) as a market failure to be
corrected by suitable
pricing. At other times bad governance, unsuitable institutions,
and neoliberal
policies that promote trade and guarantee foreign investments
are also (rightly)
blamed. However, the main underlying cause of the
disappearance of biodiversity is
the increased social metabolism of the human economy. This
driving force would be
similar under social-democratic Keynesian policies*or indeed
under the failed
communist economic systems of the 20th century*if the
technologies and per capita
consumption we see today remained under those systems.
Thus, the production of the main greenhouse gases continues to
grow because of
the increased metabolic flows in the economy. Until 2007
emissions of CO2 were
increasing by 3 percent per year. After a halt in the increase in
2008!09 due to the
global economic recession, they are now bound to increase
again. Yet, according to
the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
greenhouse gases
should decrease as soon as possible by 50 or 60 percent.
Cementing the failure of the

Kyoto Protocol, which was initiated in 1997 and called for
countries to agree to
binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, the UN climate talks
in Copenhagen in
December 2009 resulted in no agreement. The United States
never ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, and President Obama has not succeeded in
getting the U.S. Senate
to agree to carbon caps or taxes*measures that would result in
emission reductions.
Instead, Obama is focussing blame for global climate
destabilization on China,
which has surpassed the U.S. in CO2 emissions, although its per
capita emissions are
still four times less than the United States.
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere was about 300 ppm when
Swedish scientist
Svante Arrhenius (1896) first conceptualized the enhanced
greenhouse effect in 1895.
Now it is nearly 400 ppm and increasing 2 ppm each year. As is
well known, CO2
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DEGROWTH
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emissions by the human economy primarily result from burning
fossil fuels. Since
peak oil is now very near, or perhaps already reached, and peak
extraction of natural
gas will likely occur in 20 or 30 years, a substantial amount of
CO2 emissions will
continue to come from coal and ‘‘unconventional’’ sources of
oil and natural gas,
which are much dirtier and more energy-intensive to extract
(Charman 2010).
Therefore, taking into account other negative trends or events
like the drop in
the availability of many edible species of fish, the accidents at
Fukushima in 2011
and the risks of nuclear military proliferation, the local
scarcities of water, and the
approaching ‘‘peak phosphorous,’’ it is time to go back to the
debates of the 1970s
on the desirability in rich countries of a steady-state economy
and, indeed, of a
period of degrowth in the use of energy and materials in the
economy (Schneider,
et al. 2010). Degrowth in rich economies should lead to a steady
state economy
(Daly 1973), which in turn raises the issue of which variables
should remain steady.
Daly would be the first to acknowledge that the economy cannot
be properly
described by one single unit of measurement. Ecological
economics rests on the
notion of incommensurability of values (Martı́nez-Alier, et al.

1998, 1999).
The small movement for degrowth in the North focuses on both
physical
variables and new social institutions. It breaks with the
unquestioned assumption
that the economy should grow forever. The proliferation of
environmental justice
movements of the South complaining against ecologically
unequal exchange and
environmental liabilities attest to the need for degrowth (Bunker
1984, 1985, 2007;
Hornborg 1998, 2009; Hornborg, et al. 2007, 2010; Muradian
and Martı́nez-Alier
2001; Muradian, et al. 2002; Rice 2007; Roberts and Parks
2007).
Peak Population: Love One Another More, and Do Not Multiply
Among all the alarming trends and impending ‘‘peaks’’
signalling distributional
conflicts, one welcome trend is the rapid decrease in the rate of
growth of the human
population, also known as the world demographic transition.
Peak population might
be reached around 2045 at perhaps 8.5 billion people. As
population stabilizes or
declines slightly, the proportion of old people increases. Hence,
European women are
exhorted to produce more children who will become workers
who will pay for
the pensions of so many old people. This is ridiculous
(Latouche 2007), since the
workers would also become pensioners in due course. The
pyramid of population
(still taught at schools) should be drawn as a rectangle

(admittedly with a little
pyramid on top). The debates between Malthusians and
Marxists, and Malthusians
and some economists who favor population growth, are still
relevant today, as are the
doctrines of the feminist Neo-Malthusians of 1880!1920, e.g.,
Emma Goldman,
Madaleine Pelletier, Nelly Roussel, Margaret Sanger, and Maria
Lacerda de Moura
(Ronsin 1980; Martı́nez-Alier and Masjuan 2005).
The world demographic transition is expected to help usher in a
socio-ecological
transition defined by lower usage of energy and materials,
especially if after peaking, the
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global population goes down to 6 billion, as some projections
expect (Lutz, et al. 2001).
During the 20th century, global population increased four times
from 1.5 billion to

6 billion. The importance of population growth in
environmental impacts was
recognized in Paul Ehrlich’s equation I"PAT
(Impacts"Population#Affl-
uence#Technology).
Environmental awareness is now influencing birth rates. There
was a large
difference between the original Malthusianism of T.R. Malthus
and the neo-
Malthusianism of 1900 that in France took the name of la grève
des ventres, focusing
on what today is called ‘‘women’s reproductive rights.’’
Between 1880 and 1914, an
international network of Neo-Malthusian activists engaged in
strong debates,
including on the question of how many people the Earth could
feed. Much later,
Françoise d’Eaubonne (1974) when introducing the word ‘‘eco-
feminism,’’ again
made the link between women’s freedom and the need to stop
population growth for
environmental reasons. In the current context, it is useful to
revisit the different
varieties of Malthusianism, which are summarized below.
. MALTHUSIANISM of Malthus posited that population
undergoes exponential
growth unless checked by war and pestilence, or by chastity and
late marriages.
Food grows less than proportionately to the labor input because
of decreasing
returns. Hence, subsistence crises result. Helping the poor is
useless because they
immediately would have more children.

. NEO-MALTHUSIANISM OF 1900 held that human
populations could
regulate their own growth through contraception. Women’s
freedom was
required for this, and desirable for its own sake. Poverty was
explained by social
inequality, but ‘‘conscious procreation’’ was needed to prevent
low wages and
the pressure on natural resources. This was a successful bottom-
up movement in
Europe and America against States (which wanted more
soldiers) and Churches.
. NEO-MALTHUSIANISM AFTER 1970 was a doctrine and
practice sponsored
by international organizations and some governments.
Population growth is seen
as a main cause of poverty and environmental degradation.
Therefore it advocates
States introduce contraceptive methods, even without women’s
prior consent.
. ANTI-MALTHUSIANISM is a view that assumes that human
population growth
is no major threat to the natural environment and that it is
conducive to economic
growth. Esther Boserup (1965) and other economists promoted
this argument.
The Environmentalism of the Poor
Recognizing the need to halt the increase in global population
(and the impact
of population on ecosystems and biodiversity) and the growth of
environmentalism

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are both positive trends. The growing environmentalism of the
poor and of
indigenous peoples (Guha and Martı́nez-Alier 1997; Dunlap and
York 2008) is a
particularly important development. Activists and communities
at the commodity
frontiers are sometimes able, together with the EJOs, to stop the
extraction of
minerals and destruction of habitats and human livelihoods. One
celebrated victory
took place in August 2010 when citizens succeeded in defeating
the plans of
transnational mining giant, Vedanta Resources, to mine bauxite
at Niyamgiri Hill in
Odisha (Padel and Das 2010). Initiatives of the
environmentalism of the poor
include exercising the right to previous consent under
Convention 169 of the ILO,
which applies to indigenous communities (when they are

recognized as such) (Urkidi
2010b), introducing measures such as local referendums against
mining in Latin
America (as in the gold mining conflicts of Esquel in Argentina
and Tambogrande in
Peru; Walter and Martı́nez-Alier 2010; Muradian, et al. 2003;
Haarstad and
Floysand 2007), and developing new plans for leaving fossil
fuels in the ground, as
occurred in the Yasunı́ ITT oilfields in Amazon territory in
Ecuador (Martı́nez-Alier
and Temper 2007; Finer, et al. 2010; Larrea and Warnars 2009).
Successful attempts
have been made to prosecute companies like Shell for its
activities in the Niger Delta,
or Chevron-Texaco for the damage it caused in Ecuador (Clapp
and Utting 2009).
Women are often in the lead in such movements (Veuthey and
Gerber 2010).
The EJOs of the South defend local identities and territories
(Escobar 2001);
however, their growth is explained not only by the strength of
identity politics but
also by the conflicts erupting from the social metabolism of the
world economy now
reaching the last frontiers. The EJOs and their networks are,
then, a main force
working to make the world economy less unsustainable. They
are more trustworthy
than the old conservationist movement (represented by
organizations like the WWF
[World Wildlife Fund] and the IUCN [International Union for
Conservation of
Nature]), which is compromised under its present leadership by
the substantial

financial support it gets from the extractive industries in
exchange for its complicity
in ‘‘greenwashing.’’ For instance, the IUCN booklet Transition
to Sustainability,
written by Bill Adams and Sally Jeanrenaud and launched at the
World Conservation
Congress in Barcelona in October 2008, proposed a link
between the conservationist
movement and the environmentalism of the poor. This went
nowhere because of the
very visible cooperation of Shell and Rio Tinto with the IUCN.
John Muir would
have been horrified.
Meanwhile, the traditional Left still sees environmentalism as a
luxury of the rich
rather than a necessity for everybody*particularly for the poor
and the indigenous,
as illustrated by victims such as Chico Mendes in 1988 and Ken
Saro-Wiwa in 1995.
New green politics are gaining fertile ground in some Southern
countries. Brazil’s
former Environment Minister, Marina Silva, a longtime labor,
environmental, and
indigenous rights activist, ran for president in 2010, and the
Peruvian human rights
and environmental activist and former Catholic priest, Marco
Arana, also tried to
make a bid for president of that country in 2011.
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The environmental justice movements are fighting a wide
variety of abuses over
their land, air, and water in traditional indigenous territory to
urban environments.
These include the unsustainable extraction of biomass (e.g.,
deforestation, defending
mangrove forests, the imposition of monoculture tree
plantations, agro-fuels, land
grabbing, overfishing); mining (for gold, bauxite, iron ore,
copper, uranium, and
other minerals); oil and gas exploration and extraction; and the
appropriation of
water, such as the construction of dams, the diversion of rivers,
and the pollution of
aquifers, to name the most important causes of conflicts
(Carrere and Lohman 1996;
McCully 1996; OCMAL 2010; Bebbington, et al. 2007; Bridge
2004; Martı́nez-
Alier 2001a, 2001b; GRAIN 2007; Gerber 2011; De Echave, et
al. 2009; Svampa
and Antonelli 2009; Urkidi 2010a; Urkidi and Walter 2011;
Orta-Martı́nez et al.
2008; Orta-Martı́nez and Finer 2010). There are also conflicts
over transport and the
infrastructures required for transport. Conflicts on waste
disposal in cities, the

countryside, or overseas include fights over waste dumps or
incinerators, air and soil
pollution, electronic waste exports, and ship-breaking (Demaria
2010). The largest
waste disposal conflict is over the property rights to the oceans
and atmosphere to
dump the excessive amounts of CO2 generated by burning fossil
fuels. There are also
many conflicts on the application of new technologies (cyanide
in open pit gold
mining, genetically modified organisms [GMOs,] nuclear
energy) that distribute
uncertain risks unfairly (EEA 2002; Pengue 2005; Pereira and
Funtowicz 2009).
Against Cheap Exports and in Favor of Renewable Energy and
Local People
Movements in countries or regions that are net exporters of raw
materials are
calling for taxes on those exports to help address the
environmental damage
associated with extracting them (Giljum and Eisenmenger 2004;
Muñoz, et al.
2009). For example, in Ghana, Pará in Brazil, Surinam, and
Orissa in India, the
aluminium export industry has profited from incredibly cheap
rates for electricity
from dams that have harmed both the environment and the
people (Padel and Das
2010). The demand to do away with subsidies for fossil fuels
and metal exports
would make these activities much less attractive to the
exporters.
One current case in South Africa arose from opposition to a

World Bank loan of
US$3.75 billion to the electricity company Eskom for the
Medupi power plant,
slated to be the world’s fourth largest (Bond 2011, 10). South
African EJOs
articulate the problem:
[W]e see renewable energy, not coal-fired power stations (or
nuclear power), as
the optimal development path for Southern economies, creating
more jobs,
building local manufacturing capacity, and avoiding the
environmental mistakes
of Northern countries. As in South Africa, most World Bank
coal power projects
are designed to supply industry, not people. They do not
necessarily increase per
capita access to energy. The industries in turn are mostly geared
for export in line
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with the World Bank’s promotion of export-oriented production.
The goods are
then consumed primarily in developed countries. Further, many
industries are
established with foreign direct investments. In the process,
much of the heavy
industry in developed countries has relocated to developing
countries in search of
cheaper energy and cheaper labor. . . (SA and African Civil
Society 2010).
The South African EJOs propose instead a demand-side
management
alternative, beginning by phasing out cheap electricity to
‘‘enclave’’ smelters that
have little linkage with the economy and that are capital- rather
than jobs-intensive.
They contend that the freed-up energy should be redistributed to
provide for a much
larger ‘‘lifeline’’ supply of universal Free Basic Electricity to
consumers, with a rising
block tariff to encourage conservation and help the switch into
renewable energy
technologies.
Controversies on Climate Justice
Energy cannot be recycled, therefore even a non-growing
economy that uses
large amounts of fossil fuels would need ‘‘fresh’’ supplies
coming from the
commodity frontiers. The same applies to materials, which in
practice can
be recycled only partially. For example, only 40 to 60 percent
of commodities like

copper, aluminium, steel, and paper can be salvaged for use in
recycling. When the
economy grows, the search for materials and energy sources is
even greater. This vast
search for resources results in ‘‘accumulation by
dispossession’’ (Harvey 2003) or
Raubwirtschaft (a phrase used by some geographers, meaning
‘‘plunder economy’’).
There is also ‘‘accumulation through contamination,’’ meaning
that capitalist profits
increase by the ability to dispose of the ‘‘effluents of
affluence’’ and other waste at
zero or low cost. This does not indicate so much a market
failure as a (provisional)
cost-shifting success (Kapp 1950).
In addition to Climate Justice activists (Bond 2010a), many
governments of
relatively poor countries now call for the repayment of the
ecological debt, a slogan
first raised in Latin America among EJOs in 1991 (Robleto and
Marcelo 1992;
Smith 1996; Simms 2005; Peralta 2009). The United States, the
European Union,
and Japan refuse to acknowledge this debt. However, in
Copenhagen in December
2009 at least 20 heads of government or ministers explicitly
mentioned the ecological
debt (or climate debt) in their speeches, and some used the
loaded word
‘‘reparations.’’
According to Pablo Solón, then Bolivia’s ambassador to the
United Nations,
Admitting responsibility for the climate crisis without taking

necessary actions to
address it is like someone burning your house and then refusing
to pay for it. Even
if the fire was not started on purpose, the industrialized
countries, through their
inaction, have continued to add fuel to the fire. . . It is entirely
unjustifiable that
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countries like Bolivia are now forced to pay for the crisis. This
creates a huge draw
on our limited resources to protect our people from a crisis
created by the rich and
their over-consumption. . . Our glaciers dwindle, droughts
become ever more
common, and water supplies are drying up. Who should address
this? To us it
seems only right that the polluter should pay, and not the poor.
We are not
assigning guilt, merely responsibility. As they say in the U.S.,
if you break it, you

buy it.
The background to Solón’s speech was Todd Stern’s statement
(as U.S. negotiator) at
a press conference in Copenhagen on December 10, 2009: ‘‘We
absolutely recognize
our historic role in putting emissions in the atmosphere up
there. . . But the sense of
guilt or culpability or reparations*I just categorically reject
that.’’ (Bond 2010b,
also in http://www.climate-justice-now.org/bolivia-responds-to-
us-on-climate-debt-
if-you-break-it-you-buy-it/).
A rejoinder to this controversy came from an unexpected author,
economist
Jagdish Bhagwati (2010). Apparently unaware of the activist
and academic debate on
the ecological debt since 1991, he wrote that the U.S. in
addressing domestic
pollution created the Superfund legislation in 1980 after the
Love Canal accident
that requires hazardous waste to be eliminated by the offending
company.
This tort liability is also ‘‘strict,’’ such that it exists even if the
material discharged
was not known at the time to be hazardous (as carbon emissions
were until
recently). In addition, the people hurt can make their own tort
claims. Rejecting
this legal tradition in U.S. domestic pollution, Todd Stern, the
principal U.S.
negotiator, refused to concede any liability for past emissions . .
. Evidently, the
U.S. needs to reverse this stand. Each of the rich countries

needs to accept a tort
liability …
The Anthropology of Oil: The Impact of the Oil Industry on a
Fishing Community in the
Niger Delta
Author(s): Alicia Fentiman
Source: Social Justice, Vol. 23, No. 4 (66), Environmental
Victims (Winter 1996), pp. 87-99
Published by: Social Justice/Global Options
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766976
Accessed: 12-01-2017 19:41 UTC
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Part Two
The Anthropology of Oil:
The Impact of the Oil Industry on a
Fishing Community in the Niger Delta
Dr. Alicia Fentiman
Introduction
THE AIM OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO EXAMINE, WITH SOME
PARTICULARITY, THE IMPACT
of oil upon the lives of people in a small fishing community in
the Niger
Delta.1 It is hoped that this data will contribute to the scarce
literature
available on the Niger Delta and help shed light on the various
ways in which oil
has affected the institutions of at least one ethnic group.
Although it is a detailed
descriptive study of one community, the basic problems and
tensions discernible
in the case study apply to much of the Niger Delta.
Ethnographic Background
My focus is on the village of Oloma, a rural fishing community

on the Island
of Bonny in the Eastern Niger Delta. Ethnically, the village's
population consists
almost entirely of the Ibani-Ijo. The population of Bonny
Island is centered in
Bonny Town with a number of satellite villages, of which
Oloma is one, and
several fishing ports dispersed throughout the meandering
creeks and waterways.
The island is situated within the tidal mangrove swamps of the
Eastern Niger
Delta. It is bounded by other Ijaw communities, such as those
of the Elem Kalahari
to the west, the Okrikans to the north, and the Andoni, Opobo,
and Ogoni to the
east. Bonny is located approximately 50 kilometers southeast
of the industrial and
commercial center of Port Harcourt. Tributaries of the Bonny
River dissect the flat
surface of the island, creating swamps and creeks that are
bordered by mangrove
trees. Much of the land is uninhabitable; fresh water resources
are scarce.
Dr. Alicia Fentiman is a social anthropologist and Research
Associate at the African Studies Centre,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RE, England. She
has done extensive fieldwork in
southern Nigeria and northern Ghana.
Social Justice Vol. 23, No. 4 87
2017 19:41:58 UTC

88 Fentiman
Historical Overview
Traditionally, the Ibani were fisherfolk dependent on the
creeks, waterways,
and swamps of the Niger Delta for their livelihood. Fish were
found in abundance,
and salt was evaporated from the sea water trapped in the roots
of the mangrove
tree. The Ibani traded their fish and salt to the Ibo hinterland in
exchange for
agricultural produce. This interzonal dependency created the
initial trade routes
between the Ijo fisherfolk and the hinterland agriculturists.
This internal trade
network was well established before European contact and
provided the mercan?
tile infrastructure on which the success of Bonny's European
trade was founded.
Bonny's coastal location certainly contributed to her
involvement in the
burgeoning trade2 that followed the advent of European
adventurers in Bonny as
early as the 15th century. Bonny had a pivotal role as the
fulcrum of a two-way
trade between the Ibo hinterland and the Ibani, on the one
hand, and the Ibani and
the European traders on the other. Food, livestock, and, most
importantly, slaves
that came from the hinterland markets were brought to Bonny
to be traded. The

growing European demand for slaves assured the role of Bonny
traders as
middlemen in the West African-European trade. This lasted
until the 19th century.
In the 19th century, the slave trade was abolished and during
this period
Bonny's merchants turned their attention from slaves to palm
oil. The palm oil
trade particularly flourished because this new commodity was
easily traded along
the old channels involving the same personnel. Fortuitously,
palm oil became at
the same time an important export item because of the
Industrial Revolution in
Europe. Palm oil was in great demand as a lubricant for
machinery as well as for
making soap and candles. Bonny prospered during the palm oil
trade. Such was its
success that the Bonny and Kalahari areas became know as the
"Oil Rivers."
However, in the 20th century, the prosperity of Bonny began to
decline.3 The
major factor was the discovery of coal in commercially viable
quantities further
inland. A new mainland port was built by the British colonial
administration, to
exploit better the new coal fields. In 1913, a new industrial
city, Port Harcourt,
located 50 kilometers up Bonny River was opened. Bonny's
pivotal trading role
was bypassed. "Business gradually moved away from Bonny
and Bonny only saw
ships passing their way up river. In 1916, there was a great

exodus and Bonny faded
away to join the ranks of other ports of the past" (Earl, 1962:
31). Bonny also lost
its leading position with the colonial government as the center
for the administra?
tive, commercial, and religious headquarters of the Niger
Delta. By 1930, Bonny
was observed to be in a "state of decay and utter stagnation"
(Webber, 1931: 52)
and in 1938 moves were made to abolish the third-class
township that was
accorded to Bonny.
Bonny became an economically depressed area and its isolation
from the
mainland further contributed to her decline. The creation of
Port Harcourt
provided the Ibani with two alternatives; one was to remain in
Bonny and return
2017 19:41:58 UTC
The Impact of Oil on the Niger Delta 89
to the subsistence economy of fishing; the second option was to
migrate to Port
Harcourt and compete for jobs in the urban sector.
Revival of Bonny: Discovery of Oil

Although Bonny declined as a port in the first half of the
century, the discovery
of crude oil in commercial quantities led to Bonny's revival.
Evacuation and
production facilities to process the crude oil and move it to
world markets were
needed. At first, a temporary export station was built at Port
Harcourt; however,
it proved unsatisfactory because only small tankers could visit
Port Harcourt and
even then they could load only half their capacity. Bonny
became the ideal
alternative because of its strategic location and its ability to
cater to both inshore
and offshore loading facilities. By 1961, the Shell Petroleum
Development
Company completed the first phase of the Bonny Terminal.
Further terminals were
added throughout the 1960s.
The establishment of the oil terminal in Bonny had a
tremendous impact on the
infrastructure of Bonny Town. There was an influx of people
who migrated there,
and by 1963 the population had risen to 7,740 people. Skilled
jobs, however, were
given predominantly to Europeans, whereas the unskilled jobs
were given to
Nigerians. A study conducted in Bonny on the spatial
organization of the oil
terminal revealed that most migrants to Bonny were from
Rivers State, but were
not necessarily Ibani indigenes.4 A large proportion of Bonny
people works
outside Bonny due to the lack of employment opportunities
within the town and

environs (Green, 1982: 11).
The educational system in Bonny Town was revived. In 1966,
Shell helped to
fund new departments in the Bonny secondary school. In 1977,
the Finima Girl's
Secondary School was opened, which provided further
education for females. In
addition, a teacher training college was reestablished, and it
once again became an
important educational center.
Money generated from the oil industry contributed to new
commercial
developments in Bonny. New buildings were constructed, such
as a post office, a
divisional office, Pan African Bank, a police station, and
maritime clearing and
forwarding houses. In addition, a new hospital was built.
Transportation from
Bonny Town to Port Harcourt was improved, thus ensuring
better communication
between Bonny and the mainland. An intermittent supply of
electricity was
provided by Shell to the main town, but the peripheral Bonny
villages still went
without. Indeed, the surrounding fishing villages did not enjoy
the benefits that the
inhabitants of Bonny Town experienced.
Although it may appear that Bonny Town improved with the
new opportunities
that were a result of the oil industry, there were many
detrimental aspects
associated with the establishment of the oil industry in Bonny,
which often go

unrecorded. The lives of the average Bonny person, especially
those residing in the
fishing villages, have deteriorated because of the impact of oil.
2017 19:41:58 UTC
90 Fentiman
Case Study Oloma, Bonny: The Seen and Unseen Effects of Oil
What of the effect of such changes on a fishing community?
The environmen?
tal impact of oil in and around Oloma is clearly visible.
Throughout the surround?
ing creeks and waterways, the intrusion of oil and oil
excavation are markedly
evident, The canalization and dredging of creeks by oil
companies have signifi?
cantly altered the landscape. A flow station is located at the
end of the creek. Sea
trucks pass daily to and from the flow station; the gas flares
emit light 24 hours per
day. Pipes meander throughout the swamps, and signboards
scattered throughout
the area alert the villagers of "danger." These are the visible
effects of oil. The
presence of oil is all pervading.
However there is another aspect of the impact of oil that often
goes unrecorded.
This is the way in which the culture of the people has been

affected, The
institutions, central to the identity of the Ibani fishing
community, need to be
discussed to understand the overall effect of oil. The
community has experienced
both environmental and cultural degradation. The former is
seen, the latter unseen.
In the course of my research, I frequently asked: How has
Oloma changed?
Each respondent mentioned that the oil industry has affected
their economic
livelihood and that oil has interfered with many aspects of their
lives. The
following interview with a senior male elder vividly portrays
the various ways oil
has affected the lives of the people of Oloma. He was asked
what impact oil has
had on the inhabitants of Oloma.
It wasn't until Shell started dredging the creek that everything
started to
go badly. For example, erosion of land. Before, there was a
beautiful
sandy beach; but look, it no longer exists. In the back of my
house there
was a big playground called ogbo-ngelege, but that land has
eroded, and
now our houses are eroding. Our traditional livelihood is
fishing, but
there are no more fish. We now buy tinned fish or stock fish.
The
chemicals from oil spillage have ruined the fish as well as the
esem
(periwinkles) and mgbe (mangrove oysters). We receive
nothing from

Shell. For example, no electricity, no piped water, no health
facilities,
nothing to make us happy. They were supposed to build a fish
pond, but
look around you, there is nothing. They destroyed our land and
dredged
our creek. Behind Ayaminima, the neighboring village, there
used to be
a small creek that was used when there was a storm and during
the rainy
season when the Bonny River was rough. But now Shell has
closed it;
they dredged it and filled it up with all their oil pipes. They put
up a sign
and did not think that many of our people are illiterate. Even if
they could
read English, the paint has worn off and the message alerting
people of
danger is no longer visible. Our people are told not to go there,
so now
we have to go to the main creek every time to get to Bonny.
This has
caused great problems because the sea becomes very rough and
danger
2017 19:41:58 UTC
ous during the rains, and we no longer have an alternative
route. Shell
promised to fill in our embankment; they came this year and

look what
the rains have done. It is already washing away. They put a
sign on our
soil saying that Oloma is part of their development project; but
we have
suffered. This is not development, but underdevelopment. They
don't
care about us. Some of the mangrove trees used for firewood
spark and
blow up. It used to be the village's major energy source; now
women are
scared and are going into the bush to find fuel; this is not
traditional, and
it takes so long.
Land where we have our shrines to the gods has been taken
away. Parasu,
a sacred area near Oloma where we performed Owu
(masquerades and
sacrifices), has been lost. We were forced to give the
government our
sacred land and our farmland. Economic trees such as mango,
coconut,
banana, plantain, paw-paw, and palm fruit have been taken
away by the
government for the oil industry. At the end of our creek there is
a
houseboat and flow station; the gas flares scare our fish and the
noise of
the sea trucks scares our gods and our fish. Sometimes we fish
at night
depending on the tide, and the sea trucks travel very fast up
and down our
creek, causing many of us to capsize in our canoes and lose our
gear.
Those of us who fish often find our nets destroyed and our

traps broken;
it is so hard to find fish. What are we to do?
Such a view highlights many issues that are associated with the
impact of oil
on the community. Every aspect of people's lives has been
influenced by oil ?
their economic, political, social, and ritual institutions have all
been affected.
Indeed, the very institutions that make them culturally unique
are eroding at an
alarming pace.
Changes in the Fishing Economy
A model of the economy of the past would show that the major
economic
activity of the inhabitants of the Eastern Niger Delta was
fishing. In Oloma, there
was very little farming because the soil was poor and
inadequate. Although most
families farmed small plots of land, they did not yield enough
for subsistence.
However, fish were plentiful and salt was abundant. As a
result, the Ibani
fishermen and women were able to barter their fish and salt
with the hinterland
markets in exchange for agricultural produce.
The fishing economy was unique in many ways and was
structured very
differently from any agricultural economy. Most obviously, the
private owner?
ship of land was unimportant for the village's prosperity.
Instead, the Oloma

villagers' economic livelihood was dependent on common
assets: on the creeks,
waterways, and fishing ports that were owned by the village as
a whole rather
2017 19:41:58 UTC
92 Fentiman
than by individuals. Therefore, there was communal ownership
of the productive
resources. The village claimed exclusive rights of access to
certain waterways
and creeks. This system united village members across lineage
boundaries. It
was thus important for it to remain a united community in order
to protect its
holdings from competing neighboring villages. The fishing
grounds were not
susceptible to demarcation as farmlands were; they were used
by all members of
the village without reference to lineage differentiation (see
Alagoa, 1970;
Horton, 1969).
However, the fishing economy in Oioma has dramatically
changed. There are
two prime reasons for this: one has been outward migration to
urban areas in search
of education and wage labor and the other is oil. It was
reported:

[In the past] it was not unusual to see young and old beaming
with smiles
as they return home with canoe load of fishes of various
description. That
was the days of yore when fishing was really a worthwhile
venture in this
part of the country (Niger Delta).... Fishing has become a very
poor
economic activity due mainly to rural-urban migration of able-
bodied
youths and oil pollution (Tide, February 27, 1982).
Migration from Oloma to Port Harcourt and other urban centers
is frequent.
The lack of young men in the community was observed while
conducting
fieldwork. A census survey revealed that the composition of the
village consisted
primarily of women, children, and the elderly. Men often
migrated to Port
Harcourt and other mainland towns in search of wage labor.
The men who resided
in the village commented that they can no longer rely solely on
fishing as an
economically viable occupation as they had done in the past.
They therefore must
leave the village. Those who remain behind encounter many
obstacles, often
attributable to the oil industry. Fishing as a way of life is
becoming more and more
difficult. Some of the problems they encounter are described
below.
Damage by Sea Trucks: One of the major obstacles to
traditional fishing

methods in the creeks and waterways is a result of the constant
movement of the
sea trucks traveling to and from the flow station located at the
end of the creek.
Fishing lines, nets, and traps are often torn; the sea trucks
continually destroy
property despite protests from the community. The operators of
the sea trucks
appear to have very little concern or compassion for the
fishermen, fisherwomen,
and children. Although there are speed restrictions, it appears
that they are often
not enforced. Canoes are often capsized as a result of the waves
from the sea
trucks. The noise generated by the sea trucks is attributed by
the local commu?
nity as a prime reason for scaring away the fish, which is
evidenced by low fish
yields.
Oil Pollution: Spillage: Despite arguments that over-fishing
and overpopu?
lation are responsible for low fish yields, the community
believes oil pollution has
affected their fishing economy. In Oloma, fewer people reside
in the community
2017 19:41:58 UTC
than in the past and fewer people are fishing. As mentioned

above, migration to
urban areas has become the sought-after choice and necessity
by many. This is
consistent with remarks made in the local Bonny magazine,
Ogolo.
Bonny people like other rivering people depend mainly on their
water
resources for their livelihood. But in the operation of the oil
companies,
all waste products are dumped into the rivers. The water is thus
polluted,
fishes are killed, and the fishermen are forced to find
alternative sources
of livelihood ? which in Bonny is very difficult. Gradually
people
migrate out of the community to other areas to seek beneficial
employ?
ment, which has led to increasing depopulation of Bonny
(Green, 1982:
10-11).
However, those who are left behind in the communities try to
survive by
fishing; there are no alternatives. They are responsible for
feeding their house?
holds, but are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends
meet. The catches are
low, and more and more time is spent gathering shellfish. A
greater burden has
been placed upon the women because of the massive outward
migration of men.
Each day, women spend hours in the mangrove swamps
gathering shellfish such
as winkles and mangrove oysters. As one fisherwoman

remarked, "my life is my
paddle; without my paddle we do not eat." It is, however,
becoming increasingly
difficult to find enough food. The community feels that
chemicals and oil are
affecting the fish production.
Oil spillage is a frequent occurrence in the Niger Delta, and
many communi?
ties, in addition to Oloma, in the oil-producing areas have
provided descriptive
accounts of the impact of oil spillage on their fishing economy.
However,
scientific data examining the impact of oil pollution on the
aquatic life is scarce.
A symposium, The Mangrove Ecosystem of the Niger Delta,
held in Port Harcourt
in 1980, gathered scholars in different disciplines to discuss
and share information
on the changes in the environment; oil was shown to be a major
factor contributing
to the destruction of marine life. It was shown that crude oil
contains compounds
that are toxic to marine organisms and contribute to extensive
mortality in finfish,
shellfish, oysters, and birds. This was observed in the Apoi and
Ojobo areas.
A study in Bonny River examined oil pollution and the
brackish environment.
An experiment that examined the effect of crude petroleum oil
and refined oils on
aquatic organisms confirmed that crude oil and refined
petroleum products in high
concentrations were toxic to marine life. By comparing

different types of fish and
shellfish, it showed that some species were more resilient than
others. Data
revealed that shrimps were more susceptible to pollutants,
followed by oysters and
fish. Periwinkles were the most tolerant. Tainting of the flesh
confirmed that the
effect of oil spillage was lingering. Even small, though
continual, spills affected
the productivity of the water. It also showed that pollutants had
a pronounced
effect on the growth and reproductive capacity of organisms
(Onuoba, 1985:131).
2017 19:41:58 UTC
94 Fentiman
A recent spillage in Nembe in 1995 illustrates the problems
with which oil
producing communities must contend when there is a spillage.
It was reported that,
An oil spill had occurred from an Agip oil pipeline. For several
days, the
oil flowed freely into the creeks and mangrove forest. The area
went up
in flames one night when a woman on a late-night fishing trip
mistakenly
set off the fire with her lantern. The fire destroyed much of the
aquatic life
in the area. In addition, farm crops were destroyed

(Newswatch, Decem?
ber 18, 1995: 12).
A problem that many communities face during oil spillages is
that many of the
oil companies are unwilling to pay compensation during
spillages because they
believe that they are caused by sabotage. The communities,
however, stress that
many of the spillages are "legitimate" ? not caused by sabotage,
but instead by
poorly maintained and faulty equipment. It is therefore
necessary to monitor the
areas regularly and to act immediately during spillages.
The mangrove fauna and flora are also affected by oil spillages;
it was shown
that there can be short- and long-term effects to the mangrove
from offshore
spillage (Odu and Imevbore, 1985: 133). Mangrove is an
essential part of the
Oloma people's economy. Mangrove wood has many uses; it is
used for fuel
and for making various items such as fish traps, trays, and hats.
In Oloma,
women complained that chemicals from the oil have absorbed
into the man?
grove wood, which they use for fuel, and that once ignited, it
explodes and
causes serious burns.
Gas Flaring and Pollution: Large quantities of methane gas are
associated
with oil. During oil production, this gas is burned off at flow
stations above the oil
wells. This introduces sulfur dioxide and oxides of carbon and

nitrogen into the
atmosphere. The impact of this on the environment has not
been substantiated.
However, it is said that this could contribute to global
warming.
Land Filling: Another factor responsible for disturbing the way
of life in
Oloma is land filling. Nearby creeks and waterways have been
filled in because
of oil operations. This has affected the accessibility to
surrounding villages and has
taken from the Oloma villagers an alternative route to reach
Bonny Town. The
Oloma community complained about the landfill because they
relied on a specific
water route to reach Bonny Town during the rainy season,
which has subsequently
been filled in. The alternative route was preferred during the
rainy season because
the Bonny River becomes very rough and dangerous.
Canalization also damages the environment. Oil companies
create canals to
either drain out an area for drilling and pipe laying or create
channels to transport
drilling and other oil production equipment to the site. The
channels alter the
ecology of the area; they can also alter the flood pattern of the
delta by resulting
in perennial flooding of the otherwise well-drained plains as
was observed in many
areas in the Niger Delta (Ekoriko, 1996: 31).

2017 19:41:58 UTC
Erosion: The community believes that the continual movement
of sea trucks
up and down the creek and the dredging of the land and
waterways have
significantly contributed to the erosion of the land. In Oloma,
several households
lost their property due to erosion. Recollections by villagers
mention the sandy
beach area that use to be in front of the village; it has eroded
away, and a sand-bank
was designed to prevent further erosion. The embankment was
promised for
several years; finally, in 1984 a contractor constructed an
embankment, but it did
not last. It quickly washed away during the rainy season. The
community feels this
was done in a substandard way. Interviews with the contractor
at the time of the
job revealed that his company had won the contract with the
cheapest bid, and he
admitted that the job was not going to be sufficient to endure
the rainy season. As
he rightfully predicted, the embankment gave way, and it
became a hazard to the
community. Instead of benefiting and improving the situation,
it worsened the
situation. Gaps in the embankment became dangerous for
children and adults

walking on the sandbags. One child fell in the gap and broke
his leg.
Dredging: Indigenous fishing methods such as dragging a net
along the creek
bottom is very difficult to perform because the creeks have
been dredged during
oil exploration, and the water is now too deep to stand in,
making this form of
fishing obsolete. Dredging also destroys valuable freshwater
and mangrove
vegetation, which can cause an imbalance in the ecosystem
because aquatic
organisms depend on them for food and shelter during part or
all of their life cycles
(Wilcox and Powell, 1985). In addition, during the dredging
process, oil is spilled
into the water and the burning of fuel releases carbon, sulfur,
and nitrogen oxides
into the aquatic environment (Odu and Imevbore, 1985: 142).
Oloma and Social Change: Under the Land Decree Act of 1978,
many
communities throughout the Niger Delta lost valuable
farmland. In addition, oil
production contributed to the contamination of the land.
Although Oloma suffered
in many ways when parts of their land were taken away, they
have suffered more
by losing the access and rights of way to their creeks and
waterways. Further, the
destruction and contamination of their productive resources
have contributed to
vast changes within the economic, political, and social
structure of the community.
As members of the community are forced to migrate because

their resources are
destroyed, various changes are taking place within these
institutions.
Ritual, Belief, and Oil
Another institution affected by oil in Oloma is the villager's
belief system. The
stability and continuity of village life are maintained by
participation in a series of
ritual practices. These ritual activities are a means by which
the community retains
their social identity and social stability in times of radical
changes. Both rural
villagers and urban migrants have in common a shared
adherence to such practices
and the beliefs associated with them. The principal type of
ritual activity is the
masquerades of the owu-ogbo society, which displays elaborate
masquerades in
2017 19:41:58 UTC
96 Fentiman
honor of the water spirits. The owu-ogbo society is central to
the social cohesion
of the Oloma people. It is a time-honored institution and the
practice of the
masquerade was brought to Bonny by the Oloma descendants.
The Oloma people
are known throughout the Delta for their expertise in the owu-

ogbo plays.
Traditionally, when the Ibani engaged predominantly in
fishing, the fishermen
would return to Oloma during a period called Fongu-Mini, the
break in the rains
in August, to be reunited with their families. The masquerade
serves two essential
purposes. First, it honors the water spirits, upon whom the
fishing economy is
thought to be dependent. It is believed that by performing
masquerades, the
fisherfolk will be rewarded with a successful fishing season.
Second, the
masquerades are used as a means to unite all village members
no matter where
they may be.
The rationale of the masquerades is derived from the belief that
they represent
the imitation of the …
University of Arizona Press
Chapter Title: Class and Nature in the Oil Industry of Northern
Veracruz, 1900–1938
Chapter Author(s): Myrna I. Santiago
Book Title: A Land Between Waters
Book Subtitle: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico
Book Editor(s): CHRISTOPHER R. BOYER
Published by: University of Arizona Press. (2012)

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt180r1mz.11
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digitize, preserve and extend access to A Land
Between Waters
This content downloaded from 137.110.39.71 on Sun, 08 Jan
2017 17:42:56 UTC
Edward L. Doheny, Cruz Briones Rodríguez, and countless
American
drillers met in northern Veracruz in the early 1900s, but their
experience
of place differed so much an observer might have never guessed
they shared
the same geography. In 1900 Doheny, an oil magnate who
multiplied his

fortune many times over in northern Veracruz, for example, was
moved by
the “beautiful and awe-inspiring scenery[:] . . . rivers of clear
blue-green
water; . . . a forest so dense[;] . . . [and] jungle-covered country
which ex -
tends clear to the harbor of Tampico.”1 In 1913 he affirmed
categorically
and without a hint of irony that the petroleum companies “have
been a
blessing to the communities in which they have operated,”
congratulating
himself for paving Tampico’s streets with his asphalt and
turning the port
into “one of the happiest communities of any city in the
world.”2 Briones
Rodríguez, an oil worker, was more succinct and critical in his
recollec-
tions. He described northern Veracruz as “the devil’s collection
of plagues.”3
American drillers working in Mexico left little testimony, but
their actions
were recorded by photographers and travelers who witnessed a
life defined
by risk and danger. The differences were rooted in the class
relations that
ruled the industry; that is, class position profoundly shaped how
the men
viewed and experienced the natural world around them.
Class is not yet an explicit concern of environmental history.
The field
is growing robustly among Latin Americanists, but labor does
not figure
much in the literature.4 Similarly, environmental history is not
prominent

in labor and working class history.5 But looking at
environmental history
from a labor perspective and looking at labor history from an
environmental
chapter eight
Class and Nature in the Oil
Industry of Northern Veracruz,
1900–1938
Myrna I. Santiago
173
2017 17:42:56 UTC
perspective is fruitful and rewarding. Insofar as historians are
practitioners
of the craft of disaggregating generalizations in favor of
specifics, disentan-
gling the “humans” of environmental histories into constituent
groups (for
example, classes) sheds light on the very dynamics that explain
changes
(or continuities) in the interactions between humans and nature.
That is,
although humans as a species modify, destroy, or protect their
environments,
not all of them share the same views or experience, wield the
same amount
of power, and play the same role in the process. Doheny,

Briones Rodríguez,
and nameless American drillers worked and lived in the same
place at the
same time, yet they might as well have inhabited separate
universes because
the social class they belonged to created wildly divergent
realities for each
one. While Doheny’s testimony was plentiful, workers were
more circum-
spect about how they felt or what they thought about nature and
their place
within it. Their testimony is parsimonious. Yet there is plenty
of information
about their fortunes, and that material can help the historian
reconstruct
the men’s lives. Doing so with ecology in mind can lead us to
see how class
relations are embedded in environmental history, as the
occupational lad-
der in the work “environment” becomes the point where workers
and the
natural world meet and interact. Thus, a focus on the social
organization
of labor reveals that the labor hierarchy determined, in many
ways, every-
one’s experience in and of nature.
To be specific: those at the top of the socioeconomic structure
wielded
more power over nature than did those at the bottom. Likewise,
the upper
classes exerted significant control over the lives and energies of
human
beings of the lower classes in any given environment.6 That
dual authority
positioned the upper echelons of the companies as masters of

nature’s crea-
tures, subordinate men included. Yet there were gradations of
domination
down the occupational ladder among workers themselves.
Drillers and
craftsmen occupied an intermediate position between the big
bosses and
the less skilled bulk of the workforce. They exercised some
level of control
over their environment through their skills and supervisory
roles, but they
were exposed to extreme bodily danger on a daily basis.
Laborers—Mexi-
cans all and the lowest rung on the ladder—were the most
vulnerable. They
were subject to high levels of occupational risk, toxic
environments, trop-
ical disease, and the vagaries of weather. Those differences
underlined the
intense class conflicts that characterized the oil industry for
decades, leading
Mexican oil workers to develop a strong sense of nationalism
alongside a
blistering critique of foreign capital. In time, the environmental,
ideologi -
cal, and class turbulence in oil country became an issue of
national impor-
tance. Thus, Mexican oil workers played a crucial if not fully
recognized
174 · Myrna I. Santiago
2017 17:42:56 UTC

role in the single most important display of Mexican nationalist
fervor in
the twentieth century—the nationalization of the oil industry
decreed by
President Lázaro Cárdenas in March 1938.7 The nexus of labor
and envi-
ronmental history, then, deepens and enriches our understanding
of both
the Mexican Revolution and modern Mexican history and adds a
new,
environmental, dimension to the history of the politics of
energy produc-
tion in the world.
A Sense of Place, Before and After
The Mexican oil industry was born at the opening of the
twentieth century
in northern Veracruz. The exact location was the Huasteca, so
named after
the dominant indigenous population, the Huastecos, or Téenek.8
Until
1900, the Huasteca was a tropical rainforest, the northernmost
tropical
rainforest in the Americas. Its most prominent feature was the
mass of trees
that covered the territory, but the landscape was composed of
more than
just trees. There were streams and waterfalls and the confluence
of two of
Mexico’s most important rivers, the Tamesí and the Pánuco.
The seasonal
rains, which included hurricanes in the late summer and fall,
flooded all

waterways, forming and feeding numerous lakes and lagoons
between the
two ports that flanked the Huasteca, Tampico (in Tamaulipas)
and Tuxpan.
The precipitation also maintained the marshes and bogs that
surrounded
the lagoons and lined the rivers and streams, as well as the
mangroves that
hugged the coast along the Gulf of Mexico. Fish, shellfish, and
mussels
abounded in that environment. They provided food for
numerous species
of birds, both local and migrant, and for amphibians and
reptiles, from frogs
and turtles to caimans. Inland, the forest provided habitat for a
diverse
population of flora and colorful or fearsome fauna, including
guacamayas,
snakes, jabalí, monkeys, jaguars, and insects capable of
inflicting much
suf fering upon humans.9
The human inhabitants of the Huasteca were also diverse.
Although
their numbers were not great, the population was a mixture of
indigenous
farmers, mestizo rancheros, and a few hacendado families of
colonial Span-
ish descent trying to transform the rainforest into pasture. That
desire had
a history dating to the sixteenth century and had been the cause
of incessant
conflict with native peoples. Through the colonial period and
the whole
of the nineteenth century, peasant farmers and cattle ranchers
had battled

over the ecology of the Huasteca. At the end of the century,
they had reached
a stalemate. Then the oilmen landed.10
Oil Industry of Northern Veracruz · 175
2017 17:42:56 UTC
In 1900, Texas was awash in oil. That fact persuaded two very
astute men
that the neighbor to the south might also be equally rich in
fossil fuels.
After all, nature did not recognize fictitious borders drawn by
statesmen.
Both men came to the Huasteca as experts in the exertion of
power over
nature and workers. Both had a history of causing dramatic
ecological
change. The first was Doheny, an American entrepreneur who
owed his
millions to the transformation of the Los Angeles scrublands
and beaches
into a forest of wooden oil derricks and pools of petroleum. The
second
was Weetman Pearson, an Englishman whose profession, by
definition,
trans formed the environment: he was a civil engineer. Pearson
had already
left a deep ecological imprint in Mexico. He had been the
successful direc-
tor of the drainage works for the Valley of Mexico, the man
who claimed

to put an end to the floods that had plagued Mexico City since
Cortés
destroyed Tenochtitlan in the sixteenth century.11 In four short
decades,
the oil companies the two men founded and others that followed
altered
the Huasteca forever.
The oilmen were never conflicted about using their power over
nature.
They appreciated the landscape before them as unique and
beautiful, to be
sure. Pearson, for instance, took friends on tours of the
“jungle.”12 Doheny,
meanwhile, built a special herbarium for Huasteca specimens in
Los Ange-
les to re-create “the jungle” in his arid backyard.13 For both
entrepreneurs,
the very existence of so much foliage was proof of the absence
of energetic
men to make the land “productive.” They identified human
effort, that is,
labor, with a specific, manufactured landscape, one
incompatible with a
rainforest. It never occurred to them that the Huasteca was
already a man-
made landscape after thousands of years of human occupation.
What the
oil tycoons saw instead was a “wilderness,” a land going to
“waste” because
the local population was lacking in ambition, wanting in
application and
clearly unacquainted with the notion of “progress.”14 Progress
was how the
early twentieth-century oilmen understood capitalist economic
development

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