CRJ 200 1Running head CRIMINAL PROCEDURECrimi.docx

CRJ 200 1
Running head: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Evidence
Fredick Watson
Allied American University
Author Note
This paper was prepared for CRJ 200: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, MODULE 2
HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT taught by PROFESSOR
CAMILLE ARMSTEAD.
Case Development:
Choose the role of Prosecutor of Defense Attorney. You are
charged with preparing two witnesses. You must chronicle what
is needed to determine what relevant testimony the witness can
provide, whether the witness fits the generally accepted
requirements to be a witness and whether this individual has
any defects that need attention. Make a list of all things related

to each witness that you think are necessary to prepare the
witness for testimony. Cite your work based on the chapters
you have read and any information researched related to witness
preparation.
Journal of Social Development in Africa (2000), 15. 1,61-78
Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in
Nigeria: The Marginalisation Question
EDL YNE E ANUGWOM*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the issue of ethnic conl1icts and thcir
implications for
democracy in Nigeria. Ethnic conflict and distrust is identified
as the bane of
former democratic experiments in Nigeria. Moreover, since the
late 1980s,
ethnicity in Nigeria has assumed disturbing new dimensions.
The most crucial of
these arc the issues of marginalisation and agitations by ethnic
minorities.
Marginalisation breeds suspicion, distrust, heightens ethnic
tensions and may
eventually lead to conl1ict over the sharing and allocation of
power and national
resources. Democratic tradition, which is imperative lor
development, cannot
blossom in the context of ethnic conflict. Thus,marginalisation,
whether apparent
or real, has the potential for disrupting the drive towards
democracy. With cries

for marginalisation so rife among ethnic groups, a need arises to
address the issue
squarely. This is particularly important given that Nigeria is
presently engaged in
another attempt at democracy. Ethnic conflicts in whatever form
need to be
resolved in order to allow for democracy to thrive. This paper
examines ways in
which ethnic problems in Nigeria may be resolved through the
creation of a
realistic and workable federalism modelled largely on the
American model.
Introduction
Ethnic conflict has been rightly defined as one of the greatest
obstacles to
meaningful development in Africa (see The Courier 1993). In
Nigeria, this sort
of competition and rivalry among various ethnic groups is seen
as a product of
colonial contact. The ethnic factor, however, did not diminish
with the advent of
independence; rather, it bccame a yardstick for measuring
contribution to the
national development effort and especially for allocating and
distributing power
and national resources. As Nigeria is c urrentl y engaged in
another exercise aimed
at establishing a sustainable form of democracy, there is urgent
need to address
*Lccturer, Department of Sociology, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, Nigeria; email:
[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]
62 Edlyne E Anugwom
perceived factors that may militate against the success of this
endeavour. In
certain quarters, the annulment of the dl.:mocratic transition
programme by the
military in 1993 at the conclusion of the presidential polls, is
believed to have been
motivated by ethnic sentiments.
On a sim ilar note, the 30- month senseless slaughter occasioned
by the Nigerian
civil war from 1967 to 1970 was anchored on ethnic rivalry.
This was due to the
efforts on the part of thL' prl.:dominantly Igbo peoples in the
south-eastern region
to carve out an indcpen(knt nation for themsel ves. In fact, the
history of present-
day Nigeria is prl.:valent with cases of ethno-rcIigious
conflicts. Since the
annulment of the 1993 elections, there have been increased
demands and counter-
demands for marginalisa1ion by various ethnic groups in the
country (see The
Nsukka Analyst 1(94). These allegations have worsened because
the various
ethnic groups see themselves as the victims and point accusing
fingers at one
another.
In view of this, as well as the implications of pronounced
conflict over power-
sharing and resource allocation, the ethnic question demands

continuous exami-
nation if efforts to achieve a beLler Nigeria arc to succeed. In
addition, this type
of analysis may go a long way in preventing ethnic conflict,
since it proffers
suggestions on how to lessen ethnic tensions and resolve
contentious issues.
Feasible solutions to ethnic problems can only emanate from
well-grounded
examinations of the phenomenon itself. Ethnic conflict
obviously affcclS the
development of a society, since this can only take place within a
peaceful and
democratic context thaI is devoid of rancour.
There is a dire need for elTcctive devclopmcnt in Nigl.:ria and
Africa in general.
And as Kankwenda (1004) has posikd, African nations arl.:
currently engaged in
what may bl.: considerL'd 'trafficking' in development
i(kologies. This scenario
evolved from the realisation that (kspile several decades of
independence,
African nations arc still faced with SI.:'L'feproblems of
underdevelopment.
Olukoshi (I (96) contends, u ..'refore, that it is high time efforts
were made to
resolve thL~lingcring political and social crisis in Nigeria by
groups and individu-
als inside and outside the country.
This paper examines the nature of ethnicity and ethnic conllicts
in Nigeria, a~
well as its implications f()r democracy, particularly with

regards to perceptions
of marginalisation by ethnic groups. In this way, suggestions on
how toameliorate
ethnic conflicts in the emerging democratic tradition in Nigeria
arc proffered.
Ethnicity in PCI'spective
A seminal work onethnicily in Nigeria has been done by Nnoli
(l97R). In his
Ethnic COfiflict and Democracy in Nigeria 63
work, Nnoli views ethnic rivalry as a product of the colonial
contact situation.
Ethnicity may be seen as the latter-day version of the concept of
tribalism in
Africa. The term "tribalism" has its roots in the colonial
experience and was used
pejoratively to denigrate Africans ami things African. The use
of this term lacked
intellectual purpose and scientific leaning. lLs main purpose
was to represent
African people in the colonial myth as primitive and barbaric,
needing the
"redeeming" inlluence of colonial experience to embrace
civilisaLion.
The intellectual sterility imbued in the concept of tribalism was
succinctly
unmasked by rvlafeje (1971). He sees it as an anachronistic
misnomer which
impedes cross-cultural analysis by drawmg invidious and highly
suspect distinc-

tions between Africans and othcr peoples. Therefore, it over-
simplifies and
obscures the very nature of economic and power consolidation
among Africans
and between Africans and others. Tribalism, as it were, rcrerred
to distinct socio-
cultural groups in pre-independent Africa, but also implied that
these groups were
living a hrutish, short, nasty and barharous l'Xistence
reminiscent of the dark ages.
In this light, I'vlaguhane's (1969) assertion that because
tribalism is rooted in
human nature and primordial identities, African societil's will
always be wrecked
by irremediabk, internal conflicts; becoll1l's suspect. Such an
assertion is not only
illogical, hut it may stifle acadcmic allempts to ameliorate
ethnic conflicts in
Africa.
The use of the term "'tribalism" is now considered to be
unacademic and as
implying neo-impl'rialistic revisionisttendellcies. The term
"ethllicity", on the
other hand, tends to cut across continental boundaril's and
capture contemporary
African realities and socio-cultural processes. Till' concept of
ethnicity is there-
fore prefe.rred in any allemptto capture thl' nature of
differences and contlicts
among socio-culLurally distinct groups in Nigeria.
Ethnicity should be regarded as a complex phemHl1l'non ami
extremely Iluid
reality. !:noli (197X) defiIll's ethnicity as a soeial phenomenon
that is associated

with interaetions among membl'fs of difre.rent ethnic groups.
Ethnic groups, from
his perspective, arc social formations distinguished by the
communal nature of
their boundaries. Such groups may be distinct in terms of
language, culture, or
both. According to Nnoli, language has clearly been the most
crucial dividing
factor in Africa. Although in Nigeria, the present ethnic
conflicts may be seen as
lying also in what !:noli called the sub-ethnic group or the so-
called ethnic
minorities, which are groups with minor linguistic and cultural
dilTerences, yet are
members of one big geographic group. Thl' Ogoni problem in
Nigeria, therefore,
is basically an ethnic issue, due to similar cultural and
linguistic patterns with
other groups in the south-eastern riwrine arl'a. However, one
may not easily
perceive it as thus. Thl're is often a tl'Illk'ncy to classify all
minor ethnic groups
as one, in the proccss forgl,tling that thl'rl' arl' significant
difre.rcnccs between
64 Edlyne E Anugwom
them.
The definition of ethnicity according to the three main ethnic
and geographic
groups in Nigeria viz the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, or
North, South-West
and South-East; may be one of the reasons why tlle Ogoni

problem has remained
intractable.
Ethnicity should be seen as arising in any situation where a
group of people, no
maLlerhow small, with different cultural and linguistic
attributes from those of its
neighbours; uses this as the basis of solidarity and interaction
with others. In so
doing, the group sees iL~elfnot only as distinct, but as a "group
in itself and for
itseIr'. In other words, socio-cultural consciousness of oneness
develops and
forms the basis of interaction with and participation in other
socio-cultural
processes, especially in power and resource allocation, within a
larger social
group or state. And this consciousness is most crucial in the
definition of an ethnic
group.
Ethnicity implies the fact that the group feels ethnocentric
towards others; that
is, it sees other groups as relatively inferior and more or less as
rivals. This feeling
brings about certain attitudes, which distort reality and breed
subjectivity in the
evaluation and perception of events.
Ethnicity is also characterised by a common consciousness of
being. And this
factor, more than any other, defines the boundary of the group
that is relevant for
understanding ethnicity at any point in time (Nnoli 1978: 6).
Ethnicity, in
addition, often contains an obscured class component. In this

sense, it becomes a
tool for the elite members of society to hold on to their
privileges.
The class bias often imbued in ethnicity has been well
articulated by Sklar
(1967). Sklar views ethnicity as implying the fact that in Africa,
ethnic move-
ments may be created and instigated to action by privileged men
in a bid to further
their own interests. Such men of power may be seen as the
emerging elites of
society who may use ethnic sentiments to consolidate their
power base and further
their own selfish interesL~.
In fact, NnoIi (1978) sees ethnicity as a class phenomenon,
which emerged
from the desire of the colonisers to exploit the colonised. In
NnoIi's words,
"ethnicity in Africa emerged and persisted either as a
mechanism for adaptation
to the imperialist system or as an instrument for ensuring a
facile and more
effecti ve domination and exploitation of the colonised." (1978:
5) Thus Ibrahim
and Pereira (1993) see this form of ethnic control as having
repercussions in terms
of distribution of national resources, ultimately leading to
ethnic tension.
The end of the colonial era, however, does not mean that the
objective realities
upon which ethnicity was built have disappeared. The selfish
need for the
privileged classes to further their interests and subjugate the

underprivileged by
instigating and intensifying etlmic sentiments, stilI abounds. At
best, one privi-
Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria 65
leged group, the white colonisers, has been replaced by another
privileged group,
the indigenous agents of ileo-imperialism. A brief examination
of colonial
administrative processes, would have made this occurrence
easily predictable. In
fact, the selective access to education which colonialism
favoured, created an elite
which was able to collude with the colonial power (see Drayton
1995) even after
colonial rule. And this may be the case in many African nations
now.
When colonial rule ended in 1960, this elite group took charge
of affairs and
ensured the maintenance of the status quo. This explains why,
in spite of the
negative consequences of ethnicity in Nigeria, the ruling class
has not seriously
confronted the factors that create and deepen ethnic cleavages.
One of these is the
issue of marginalisation.
Marginalisation, whether apparent or real, has the potential for
disrupting the
socio-cultural fabric of a society, particularly when several
ethnic groups single
but one group alone as the perpetrator.

The Ethnic Composition of Nigeria
Any effort at unravelling the precise ethnic composition of
Nigeria, is inevitably
fraught with the problem of what to take into account and what
to exclude. In fact,
it was during the colonial era that the British introduced some
measure of "order"
by amalgamating the various ethnic and social groups in Nigeria
under one
umbrella. Before this, however, the various socio-ethnic groups
in Nigeria were
engaged in one form of exchange or the other. This exchange
facilitated interac-
tion. In addition, the virtual non-existence of unsurmountable
natural barriers
boosted inter-group migration. Olukoju (1997), howeer, sees
the mistake of the
colonial masters as lying in the fact that their unification
exercise took no
cognizance of the existing pattern of inter-group relations.
In other words, this unification was not only externally
imposed, but intro-
duced some discontinuity in the hitherto existing inter-group
dynamics. This
discontinuity not only introduced new elements, but ironically,
sharpened the
distinctions between these groups. Thus, the British exercise at
unification was
over-ambitious and showed little regard for the so-called natural
boundaries. This
has led to the popular belief among Nigerians that Nigeria is no
less than a
geographical expression created by colonialism. This opinion

has received
various forms of intellectual endorsement (see Adejuyibe 1983)
.
. In view of the fact that new ethnic groups are still being
"discovered" in
Nigeria, the British attempt at unification may be seen as a
genuine effort to use
constitutional power to overcome a socio-linguistic problem.
Nigeria's diversity,
both in "tongue" and "tribe" makes it a very difficult region to
subject to precise
66 Edlyne E Anugwom
classification.
This has led to the tendency among many scholars to focus on
the three major
ethnic or geographic zones in the country viz the Hausa-Fulani
(Northern
Nigeria), the Yoruba (Western Nigeria) and the Igbo (Eastern
Nigeria).
These geographic zones arc not in any way solely occupied by
the three ethnic
groups. A plethora of smaller socio-ethnic groups may be
located in these zones.
The persistent problems of the minority ethnic groups indicate
the futility of this
type of scholarship, as the focus on the three major ethnic
groups leads to the
neglect of other ethnic minorities.
All the same, no authentic claim can be made for complete

documentation of
ethnic groups in Nigeria. The fact that over three hundred
identified language
groups exist in Nigeria, has created some confusion as one may
equate each
language group with an ethnic group (see Adejuyibe 1983) and
thereby arrive at
over three hundred ethnic groups.
As Iwaloye and Ibeanu (1997) and Anugwom (1997) have
argued, however,
languages and ethnic groups do not necessarily COIncide.One
language may be
spoken by more than one ethnic group and one ethnic group may
have linguistic
variations of the same root language.
Moreover, while language may be one of the important factors
for defining an
ethnic group, some ethnic groups in Nigeria may have lost their
original linguistic
roots, while retaining their identity, as a result of intense
interaction with larger
socio-ethnic groups. And in the same vein, many ethnic groups
may use the same
language to case communication, as is the case of the smaller
ethnic groups in the
North of Nigeria, where Hausa has become more or less a lingua
franca.
Therefore, there is no direct relationship betwccn language and
ethnic group in
Nigeria.
With this in mind, the 56 ethnic groups identified by Iwaloye
and Ibeanu (1997)
as the existing ethnic groups in contemporary Nigeria arc

adopted. Itis important
to point out, however, that the ethnic groups in Nigeria may
exceed this number
by far, though these 56 groups arc both visible and easily
identifiable. The 56
ethnic groups arc presented in the table below.
As the table shows, quite a number of minority ethnie groups
exist in Nigeria.
However at a rough estimate, one may regard the Hausa-Fulani
as making up
approximately 35% of the population, the Yoruba and the
IgOO,25% and 20%
respectively, while the remaining 20% is made up of the
minorities spread all over
the country. This is only an informed estimate as mentioned
above.
'1. Yoruba 15. Dulawa 29. Buri 43. Migili
2. Ora 16. Kamaku 30. Balta 44. Eggon
3. Yekhee 17. Ebira 31. Kanuri 45. Bokyi
4. Edo 18. Nupe 32. Margi 46. Ekon
5. Bassawa 19. Gwari 33. Delta Minorities 4/. Agoi
6. Igala 20. Tiv 34. Gwadara 48. Efik
7. Idoma 21. Jukun 35. Chamba-Daka 49. Ibibio

8. Igbo 22. Chomo-karim 36. Mambila 50. Annang
9. Ijo 23. Jarwa 37. Katang 51. Mumuye
10. Isoko 24. Angas 38. Berom 52. Waja
11. Urhobo 25. Hausa-FuIani 39. Kadara 53. Busa
12. Itshekiri 26. Karekare 40. Kurama 54. Dendi
13. Baatonum 27. Eloyi 41. Mada 55. Buduma
14. Karnbari 28. Gade 42. Alago 56. Shuwa
Adopted from Iwaloye and Ibcanu (1997)
Ethnic Conflict and Democracy
According to Nnoli (1978), conl1ict as an aspect of ethnicity is
more pronounced
in societies where the inter-ethnic competition for scarce
resources is the rule,
particularly when inequality is accepted as agiven and weaILhis
greatly esteemed.
In this type of set-up, no group wants to be consigned to the
bottom of the ladder.
Hence groups exploit every means in a bid to remain at the top.
In a democratic
society, where the fight to choose is a guiding principle, ethnic
groups may show
undue interest in who gets what, how and when. In other words,
democratic
traditions in ethnically plural societies may be influenced by
keen competition,
ethnic rivalries and jostling for power and resources. These
societies, therefore,

may witness social protest which often takes the form of ethnic
conflicts (see
Ismagilova 1978). While the spirit of competition may be seen
as heaILhy for
democracy, anchoring this competition on ethnicity or ethnic
factors may be
counterproductive to the move towards democracy.
The expansion of democracy began in the mid 1970s in
Southern Europe (see
Lipset 1994). This wave of change reached the African
continent for the most part
in the late 1980s, alLhough many of these early attempts came
to a standstill.
Authoritarian one-party rule and military juntas replaced such
movements. Since
68 Edlyne E Anugwom
the early 1990s, however, democracy and strong democratic
sentiments have
emerged across the globe. And this has greatly inl1uenced the
African continent,
which along with Latin America, has been a late starter in
popular democracy. In
fact, Nnoli (1994) argues that the historical struggle of African
people for
democracy reached a critical stage in 1989.
It may be correct to argue that one of the greatest appeals of
democracy is the
prospect it offers for guaranteeing individual and group rights.
This can only
occur, however, where democracy is not burdened with negative

inl1uences such
as conl1ict. Neither can it be achieved where largely primordial
ethnic sentiments
arc placed above the ideals of democracy. Such situations
debilitate any attempts
at creating a democracy and furthering the development of
society. Democracy,
in the opinion of Schumpeter (1950), is the institutional
arrangement for arriving
at political decisions, in which individuals acquire the power to
decide, by means
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. While this
definition may be
considered broad, it emphasises one salient fact about
democracy. It involves
keen competition. In this type of competition, individuals can
exploit whatever
loopholes they perceive in their opponents' political strategy
and thereby rise to
power. Despite this, democracy can be perceived as government
by the people, in
which supreme power is retained and exercised by them, either
directly, as in pure
or absolute democracy of the Greek city states, or indirectly, as
in representative
democracy of modern times. Thus Blair (1972) argues that
democracy should be
based on four basic principles viz majority rule, minority rights,
political equality
and regular elections.
In other words, democracy provides constitutional opportunities
for the people
to freely exercise their franchise in the selection of their
representatives and
leaders. In this type of exercise, no group or individual is

singled out for exclusion
by undue manipulation of socio-cultural and biological factors.
Generally speak-
ing, democracy in its orthodox and original Greek or pure
version is no longer
feasible. Hence the ideal nowadays is representative democracy.
In representative
democracy, the people do not gather every day to make
decisions by casting votes
on matters of state, but delegate this power to representatives
who exercise it
overtly in the interest of the people. According to Elekwa
(1995: 56) "represen-
tation is a workable compromise that avoids both the dangers of
selfperpctuating
leaders and the difriculties of participatory democracy."
Obviously, as he aptly
argued, in a plural society or any modern society at that, it may
be impossible for
all citizens to come together in order to make important
political decisions.
As a result of the imperative of representation, any democracy
must meet three
basic requisites or conditions. These are free and extensive
competition among
individuals and groups for power and positions (group as used
here refers to a
political party); exhaustive participation of citizens in the
process of leader
selection and policy options, mainly through the ballot box

which should be free,
fair and regular; and a significant level of political liberties and
civil rights (see
Woolley and Keller 1994, Diamond et ai. 1988) .
. The link between ethnic conflict and democracy is especially
crucial in view
of the popular assumption that democracy engenders
development. Much histori-
cal evidence shows, however, that development has not been
possible where there
are marked divisions or intense conflicts between groups in a
given society.
Therefore, ethnic conflicL<;negate the developmental function
of democracy and
may ultimately attack the roots of democracy in a society.
Ethnic conflicts,
according to Osaghae (1994), are conl1icts arising from
situations in which people
from varying ethnic groups decide to employ their differences
in the pursuit of
competing interests. Osaghae sees the crucial word in the above
definition as
"decide". This is because ethnicity comes into play a<;a
conscious ploy by the
actors. In as much as the above argument is plausible, it
obscures the fact that it
may be more characteristic of the major ethnic groups, who
might use the
advantage of numbers to exploit others. But in the case of minor
ethnic groups,
ethnicity may be deliberately brought into play, in order to
ensure fair treatment
in the ensuing distribution of resources and allocation of power.
The Ogoni
dilemma in Nigeria may be interpreted in part from this
perspective.

One could, however, regard ethnic conl1icts as existing in a
continuum, in
which minimal ethnic rivalry may be considered as healthy for
the development
of the society. From such a perspective, ethnic rivalry could be
seen as prevalent
throughout the sociopolitical history of even the most developed
nations of the
world. But when this conflict goes beyond the minimal level, it
becomes a threat
to the survival of the social entity concerned. In this sense, the
kind of ethnic
conl1ict ravaging African countries can be appropriately
situated at an extreme
position in the continuum. Ethnicity, as experience ha<;shown,
is not a phenom-
enon that can be totally eradicated. As Osaghae (1994) pointed
out, it may be
delusive to expect ethnicity to die out: ethnic cleavages simply
do not die out in
this way.
Hence the existence of at least minimal ethnic conflicts or
rivalry in ethnically
plural societies is to be expected. When these conflicL<;are
minimal or dissociated,
they may be regarded as dynamic forces which help to propel
the development of
a society. Dahrendorf (1976) identified such conflicts as one of
the principal
variables for explaining social change in society. On the other
hand, when these
ethnic conflicts become extreme, either as a factor for impeding
democracy like
in Nigeria, oras the basis for senseless violence as in Rwanda,

Burundi, Zaire, etc.;
it becomes a major disintegrating force in society.
70 Edlyne E Anugwom
Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria
Since independence from British colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria
has experimented
three times with democracy and is presently engaged in the
fourth attempt. The
first two democracies were derailed by coup d' etats, while the
third one hardly got
off the ground before it was again overruled by the military.
According to Ungar
(19H9), the first five years of Nigeria's post-indcpendence were
chaotic and
bloody, ending with two coups in 1966 which eventually
brought Yakubu Gowon
to power.
The bitterness and infighting which characterised these five
years, was due to
the fact that Nigeria had been a federation of three large regions
before independ-
ence; so when this all changed, ethnic rivalries became
exacerbated. The demo-
cnnic experience of the 1960s was not only derailed by the
military, there were
severe ethnic rivalries due to competition for power and
national resources. A
strong senseofethnic consciousness, resulting oftcn in unhealthy
competition had
also becn deliberately machinated by British colonial rule

before the 1960s.
As Ibrahim and Pereira (1993) have argued, during the colonial
period,
linguistic groups were categoriscd as tribes and dilTerences
between them were
emphasised. Hence severe ethnic rivalry, distrust and fierce
competition for
power and resources, could bc regarded as a colonial carryover.
This eventually
corroded the first attempt at democracy in the country.
Faiola (1986) pointed out, for example, that the Yoruba
speaking people never
perceived themselves to be a single sociopolitical unit during
the precolonial era.
According to Faiola, the consciousness and manipulation of a
pan- Yoruba
identity only began in the 19thcentury. This was heightened and
intensified in the
20th century through colonial politics and the politicisation of
ethnicity following
Nigeria's independence. This argument has also been put
forward by NnoH
(1978). Historical evidence points to the fact that precolonial
Yorubaland was
made up of different kingdoms, which were involved in
internecine wars and
boundary skirmishes with one another.
The same can be said of the Igbo, who never achieved any
significant measure
of unity or exclusiveness. The Hausa-Fulani group did not
consider itself to be a
distinct ethnic group either, before the advent of colonial rule.
As a matter of fact,

the Fulanis were originally a religious group led by Othman Dan
Fodio in an
Islamic evangelisation of pagan Hausaland. Even after the
Jihad, which enabled
Islam to become a state religion, the Hausa-Fulani kingdoms
were not united as
one until the era of colonialism.
The First Republic
Ethnic factors may be seen as responsible for the confusion and
distrust that
marked this first attempt at democracy, especially towards the
end of 1965. Given
the intensity of ethnic sentiments and sectionalism, the first
republic was destined
to a brieflife. In fact, the first republic was based mainly on
ethnic considerations.
The three main political parties: Nigeria Peoples' Congress
(NPC), National
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group
(AG), were all
ethnically based, as were their leaders. In effect, no single party
was broadly based
or cut across ethnic lines. In this way, ethnicity soon became
the bane of the first
republic (see Ismagilova 1978). The alliance between the NPC
and the NCNC
following independence, was merely a marriage of convenience,
lacking in any
significant political cohesiveness. Meanwhile, the AG
consolidated its ethnic
ground, i.e., Yorubaland, and became the official opposition,

viewing all govern-
ment aetions and policies through an ethnic prism. Itis not
surprising that less than
twenty-four months after the NPC/NCNC central alliance, the
two parties
resorted to intensifying their own ethnic hold to power. The
NPC was fully aware
of its large basis of support in the Hausa-Fulani in the North
and had deliberately
formed an alliance with the NCNC, in order to completely
dominate the central
legislature. The same ethno-regionalism informed the NCNC's
unassailable
position in the Eastern region. Against this background, the
evenL<;of 1966 and
1967 can be regarded as ofl-shoots of the ethnic basis of
partisan polities in
Nigeria. The next attempt at partisan politics did not escape
either what Joseph
(1981) called the "cthnic trap".
The Second Republic
During the next republic (1979-83), one would have hoped that
the politicians had
learnt a few lessons from the errors made in the 1960s. This was
not to be, for the
second republic was also debilitated by ethno-regional
conOict(seeJoseph 1987).
The three major political parties: National Party of Nigeria
(NPN), Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN), and Nigeria Peoples' Party (NPP), were all
ethnic and regional in
outlook. They were ethno-regional in nature first and foremost,
rather than central
or national political parties. As a result, the ultimate decay of
the second republic

was not hard to foresee. While ethnicity mired the policies of
both the first and
second republics; the second republic was characterised, in
addition, by the
immaturity of its politicians and the absurdity of their politics.
This became so
bad, that in the end, the politicians themselves were calling
upon the military to
take control.
Other factors such as widespread corruption, mismanagement of
the economy,
worsening social infrastructure, etc., certainly added to the
predictable demise of
72 Edlyne E Anugwom
the republic. As the military junta who took over were to argue,
the corruption, the
deplorable state of the economy and mass unemployment
featuring the Shagari-
led second republic were too high a price to pay for democracy.
All the same, the
ethnic factor and its twin evil of "do or die politics" can
arguably be considered
as the basis upon which all other negative elements rested.
The Third Republic
The Buhari-Idiagbon junta, needless to say, heeded the calls of
the politicians and
annexed the government in a bloodless coup d' etat. Another
attempt at democracy
that was to be the third republic, thus never came to fruition.
This was preceded

with the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections by a
military order. Prior to
this, the official results so far released and others predicted by
competent
observers, indicated that Moshood Abiola was easily in the lead.
Moshood Abiola
would have been the first Southerner to win a presidential
election in Nigeria.
Incidentally, the military junta that annulled the election
process was headed by
a Hausa-Fulani, Ibrahim Babangida. Moreover, international
observers monitor-
ing the election, saw it as the fairest and most free election ever
conducted in
Nigeria. In this context, it was felt in certain quarters that the
annulment was
nothing but an attempt to ensure the perpetuation of the Hausa-
Fulani hegemony
in power, and hence ethnically motivated.
While a lot of dissension has been expressed by the Northerners
or the Hausa-
Fulani over the annulment, the plausibility of an ethnic
rationale behind it still
appears to be strong. Once more, Nigeria is currently on its way
towards a
sustainable form of democracy, yet the ethnic factor is still
rearing its ugly head.
This time the catch-phrase is "marginalisation" of ethnic groups
in the power
process and allocation of resources. The fear of marginalisation,
whether real or
perceived, is anchored in the belief that ethnic orientation
determines one's access
to crucial resources and power.

Marginalisation and Democracy in Nigeria
The new men created seven new states, most of them in the
ethnic majority areas
of the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba, increasing thereby their
access to the oil
revenue while exacerbating ethnic tension. They went further to
revise the oil
revenue allocation formula agreed before independence, so as to
give the ethnic
majorities an even greater share. The regions involved in oil
extraction were now
forced to accept twenty percent instead of fifty percent of the
proceeds of mining
rents and royalties (Saro- Wiwa 1992:85).
The above contention made by Saro-Wiwa dearly captures the
increasing
Ethnic Conflict and Derrwcracy in Nigeria 73
complexity of the ethnic phenomenon in Nigeria. Whereas
ethnic rivalry and
schism had previously been between the three dominant ethnic
groups; sinee the
late eighties, the minority ethnic groups have started to redefine
the ethnic terrain
of Nigeria. What emerges from this is that even after the bitter
civil war, the ethnic
question remains a crucial one in the development scheme of the
nation. In this
context of ethnicity, feelings of marginalisation arise and
become strong among
a given group.

Marginalisation, which stems from a people's perception of their
treatment in
the allocation or distribution of power and resources, may be
real and apparent.
For instance, a case of marginalisation may be made for the
Ogoni, who despite
"having provided the nation with an estimated $30,000 million
in oil revenues,
their people had no pipe borne water or electricity, and lacked
edueation, health
and other social facilities: it is intolerable that one of the
richest areas of Nigeria
should wallow in abject poverty and destitution" (Saro-Wiwa
1992:97). In this
light, the Ogoni ethnic group has concrete rea<;onsto consider
itself marginalised,
especially since these facilities can be found in other ethno-
regional areas of
Nigeria. However, some cases of marginality may result from
the shortcomings
of the in-group and are not due to acts of deliberate aggression
on the part of other
groups. Thus, the ca'ie of fewer people from Northern Nigeria
than those from the
South gaining admission to tertiary institutions, based on
examinationsconductcd
by a central examination body (see The Sentinel 1994), may be
seen as a case of
marginality. This kind of disadvantage occurs, as it were, from
the inability of
these students from the North to meet the requirements of the
examination board.
Adedeji (I993) sees marginality as the relative or absolute lack
of power to

influence a defined social entity, while being a recipient of the
exercise of power
by other parts of that entity. In this sense, the sub-social entity
lacks the
sociopolitical or natural ability to influence significant others,
who are in charge
of the allocation of power and resources in the larger social
entity. According to
The Nsukka Analyst (I994: 1), "marginalisation is the deliberate
disempowerment
of a group of people in a federation politically, economically,
socially and
militarily by another group or groups which during the relevant
time frame wield
power and control the allocation of materials and financial
resources at the centre
of the federation". In as mush as one may acknowledge the
insightful nature of the
above definition, it may also be necessary to add that
marginalisation is usually
more apparent than real. Therefore, it hinges more on feelings,
perceptions (which
may be selective) and attitudinal orientations. In fact, it is these
features that
confuse marginalisation with marginality. Marginalisation
exists when an ethnic
group or any other kind of group feels disenchanted with the
working of things in
a society of which it is a constituent part. There is a sense that
the status quo ante
is imbued with obvious disadvantages to it as a group, resulting
from the exercise
74 Edlyne E Anugwom

of crucial privileges by an external group.
The group feels that it occupies an inferior or disadvantageous
position in the
process of power allocation, distribution of amenities, and
access to societal
resources. These valuable resources, access to power and
amenities are perceived
as being unfairly used by some other group in control. Such
feelings, especially
within ethnic groups, tend to lead to various forms of protest,
agitation and
conOic.:twith other groups or the group that is seen to be ,he
perpetrator. As The
Nsukka Analyst (1994) point., out, marginalisation presupposes
the existence of
an agent, group or groups with the capacity to disempoweror
disadvantage others.
Therefore, it sees marginalisation as "exogenously" imposed,
while marginality
is "endogenously" imposed. In Nigeria today, feelings of
marginal isat ion are rife
in the society. Almost all the ethnic groups have accused one
another of acts of
marginalisation. After the June 12, 1993 presidential election
annulment, how-
ever, most ethnic groups now regard the Hausa-Fulani, who
have wielded central
power for most of Nigeria's independent existence, as the main
perpetrator of
marginalisation against others.
The Nsukka Analyst (1994), in fact, has made use of some
interesting statistics
to make a case of marginalisation against the Igbo ethnic group

in Nigeria. It
argues that since 1970, the Igbo have been jointly marginalised
by the Hausa-
Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups. To prove this, it states that in
1989, out of 154
officers of the rank of Brigadier and above in the army, only 8
were Igbo, while
37 and 51 were Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani respecti vely. This is
a disproportionate
representation even if one argues that the North is equal to the
West added to the
East. However, it is particularly skewed against the Igbo, who,
despite their
considerable numbers in the army, have only eight high-ranking
officers to show
for it. Protests againstmarginalisation have also been taken up
by the Yoruba, who
see the annulment of the 1993 election, which was won by a
Yoruba, as a move
by the Hausa-Fulani militocraey to maintain power at all cost.
Even minor ethnic
groups, particularly the Ogoni, have cried out against
marginalisation. In fact, the
"supposed" plight of the Ogoni has attracted intcrnational
attention. As a result,
the hanging of the prominent Ogoni activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa,
for alleged
involvement in the murder of four of his kinsmen, attracted
severe international
reprisals in the last three years.
Even the supposcdly "privileged" Hausa-Fulani have raised
questions of
marginal isation in the areas of education and the private sector
economy, although
their "disadvantages" in these areas have been seen by the other

groups as self-
innicted or a case of marginality (see The Nsukka Analyst
1994). The serious
threat of marginalisation to the survival of democracy in
Nigeria and the use of
ethnicity as a class weapon remains a fact, as expressed by
Musa (1994:24), "the
clique from the North which dominated and still dominates
political power, is
selfish, shorL<;ighted, unpatriotic and corrupt, just like its
counterpart in the
South."
Conclusion: Towards a Resolution
Itis clear that democracy in Nigeria can only endure if
perceptions of marginalisation
and acts portending the marginalisation of ethnic groups are
directly confronted.
In this sense, the present attempts at democracy as a form of
sustainable socio-
cultural formation in Nigeria, can only be attained iffears of
ethnic marginalisation
are erased. While ethnic cleavages may endure, practices and
actions that give the
impression that an ethnic group is being marginalised or singled
out for discrimi-
nation should be curbed. It is in this vein, that means and ways
of doing this need
to be examined.

One way of tackling ethnic connict is by adopting a political
culture that makes
adequate provision for all the interests and groups in a given
society. Nigeria
should therefore learn from the experiences of multi-ethnic
developed nations. As
Woolley and Keller (1994) rightly pointed out, African
countries should emulate
one of the fundamental principles of American democracy,
which is the notion of
majority rule and its complementary precept of minority rights.
Federalism as a
form of goverument and political arrangement is a viable way of
achieving the
above. Federalism may help to ameliorate ethnic rivalry where
it is implemented
to the letter. In this sense, federalism in Nigeria should be
geared towards the
American system. Woolley and Keller view federalism as ideal
for the multi-
ethnic and religious character of most African states, where
certain national rights
are established for all citizens, while at the same time allowing
regional govern-
ments to make laws, rules and regulations that do not conflict
with national codes.
This kind of thinking must have informed the provision made in
the new draft
constitution in Nigeria for a representation formula, addressing
the core ethno-
geographical zones in the country. Itrecommends that the six
most powerful and
prestigious positions in central government should be zoned
towards the six
different geographical regions of the country. While this is a

step in the right
direction, it nevertheles~ falls short of matching the
representational formula
through strict rotation. In this case, it would be illegal for any
region to corner one
position indefinitely for itself, such as the presidency.
Another way of confronting the ethnic question, is through the
elimination of
hitherto accepted practices which invariably reinforce ethnic
differences. One of
these, is the so-called federal character principle or quota
system. Ironically, the
federal character principle emerged as an ethnicity management
method. Accord-
ing to Ekeh and Osaghae (1989), it is a distributive principle
which is aimed at
76 Edlyne E Anugwom
preventing the domination of government and its resources by
one group or a few
groups, thereby guaranteeing every group access to power and
resources. Un-
doubtedly, this principle was not without its merits, particularly
in the early days
of independence. Up until now, however, its implementation has
bred mediocrity
and heightened ethnic competition. The quota system should be
discarded in
favour of meritocracy, or it may be modified to lackie issues of
ethnic rivalry. In
fact, its perverse nature was aptly captured by Osifeso (1997:9)
when he argued

that, "ethnic purity under the guise of the obnoxious federal
character clause has
become the hackneyed word in education, employment and
housing."
In addition, there is urgent need to confront the realities of
ethnic minorities,
who have thus far been neglected in the dynamics of the
Nigerian power and
resource game. Ethnic minorities are full members of the
Nigerian federation and
should be treated as thus. The Ogoni debacle brought to the
fore, that minority
geographical areas often form the basis of the Nigerian
economy. Hence in
allocating power and resources, they should be treated as
equally important. In
this era of Nigeria's almost total dependence on petrodollars, it
may be wise to
treat fairly the people from whose soil oil flows. This makes it
necessary to
redefine the revcnue allocation systcm in such a way that a
reasonable percentage
is allocated for the purpose of tackling environmental problems,
which oil
exploitation causes in these areas, as well as improving general
living conditions.
In addition to the above, other clements of the sociopolitical
system reinforc-
ing the ethnic divide, need to be addressed. The use of forms for
employment,
university admission, contract bids/tender, lease applications,
election, etc., with
unnecessary questions as to the state of origin rather than
residence should be

minimised. While some of these may well be innocuous in
themselves, they are
often utilised by ethnically parochial bureaucrats and
government functionaries
in perpetuating ethnic cleavages and marginalisation in Nigerian
society. Only
proof and length of residence in a state should be made crucial,
especially for the
purpose of politics and clectoral privileges. Even though the
solutions given
above are by no means exhaustive, we may rest our case at this
point with the
following insightful comment made by Ismagilova (1978: 178):
"The objective circumstances for solving ethnic problem~ will
seemingly
be more favourable in those states that have adopted the
objective of
reconstructing African society by democratic methods relying
on the
broad popular masses. And in which the movement for
economic inde-
pendence and social progress is led by national democratic
parties and
organisations. "
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Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research Vol. 3(2)
pp. 28-33 February 2011
Available online http://www.academicjournals.org/jpapr
ISSN 2141-2480 ©2011 Academic Journals
Review
Ethnic politics and its implications for the survival of
democracy in Nigeria
B. Salawu
1
* and A. O. Hassan
2
1
Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.
2
Department of Political Science and Industrial Relations,
Fountain University, Osogbo, Nigeria.

Accepted 19 August, 2010
Nigeria is a multi-ethnic nation with cultural differences
between its component ethnic groups. From
the north to the coast, the range in types of social system, dress,
diet and languages far exceeds that
to be found elsewhere in the world. This diversity has resulted
into two major problems namely:
problems arising between the larger ethnic groups and the
hostility that derives from competition
between peoples for wealth and power. This paper examines the
political implication of this diversity
and the problems created by it for the survival of democracy in
Nigeria.
Key words: Ethnic group, ethnicism, politics, democracy.
INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace fact that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic
nation state with socio-cultural differences between its
component ethnic groups all of which have resulted into
cultural dissimilarity. This cultural dissimilarity has been
manifested by, for instance, the differences in language,
diet, dress and types of social system. Shrewd observers
have noticed that the recent event such as globalisation
have not significantly diminished these differences. This
static situation has been due to a number of reasons: (1)
The indigenous languages, which help to identify the
various ethnic groups, are still spoken by almost the
entire population of Nigeria. (2) The style of life has not,
for the majority people, changed to such a degree as to

produce appreciably greater uniformity. Against this
diverse background, many ethnic problems abound in
Nigeria, which arise principally from the hostility that
derives from competition between ethnically different
peoples for wealth and power.
About five decades after Nigeria gained independence,
the Nigerian diverse social structure in terms of her
heterogeneity has not changed significantly. The diversity
nature of the society has made identification with the
‘nation’ a difficult task. Today, identification is easier at
both family and ethnic levels. A consequence of this is
that many of the citizens may never develop a proper
concept of nation. This kind of ethnic group relations
signifies a negative dimension and which may mean
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
much for the Nigerian political system. Therefore, a
discussion of the effects of ethnic politics on the survival
of democracy is or seems to be highly desirable. It even
becomes necessary given the cry of political
marginalisation coming from various ethnic groups in the
new democracy. In all political activities in Nigeria, the
factor of ethnicity is reflected. It is particularly obvious in
areas like voting, distribution of political offices,
employment and government general patronage of the
citizens. It is against this background that this paper
discusses the effect of ethnic politics on democratic
governance in Nigeria.
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES
Like any other terminology employed by social scientists,

the concept of ethnicism is a term that does not lend itself
to easy definition. To fully understand this, some related
concepts like ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnicity’ need to be
defined. Ethnic group is an informal interest group whose
members are distinct from the members of other ethnic
groups within the larger society because they share
kinship, religious and linguistics ties (Cohen, 1974). This
means that ethnic groups are social formations, which are
distinguished by the communal character of their
boundaries (Nnoli, 1978). In an explanation of the idea
above, Nnoli emphasized that the most important or
crucial variable in ethnic identity is language. This then
means that an ethnic group consists of those who are
themselves alike by virtue of their common ancestry,
language and culture, and who are so regarded by
others. Ethnicity is another related word, which needs to
be conceptualised in this paper. By definition it means the
interactions among members of many diverse groups
(Nnoli, 1978). On the other hand, the term ethnicism
denotes ethnic loyalty. This is a feeling of attachment to
one’s ethnic group (Pepple, 1985). The concept of loyalty
in the above definition carries with it the willingness to
support and act on behalf of the ethnic group. Thus,
ethnic loyalty or ethnicism usually involves a degree of
obligation and is often accompanied by a rejective
attitude towards those regarded as outsiders (that is,
members of other ethnic group).
From the conceptualisation of these two related

concepts, it can be seen that ethnicity is a phenomenon,
which involves interaction among various ethnic groups
and which by itself does not pose any serious threat to
either development or democracy. On the contrary, it is
the phenomenon of negative ethnicism (a hangover of
ethnicity), which is the rejective attitude towards those
regarded as outsiders that threatens development
process. It is important to note that it was the
phenomenon of ethnicity that was found among Nigerians
before the coming of the Europeans, while the second
phenomenon (ethnicism) is a product of competition for
both economic and political resources.
The problematic nature of ethnicism as conceptualised
above can be explained in the context of some theoretical
positions. In the first instance, one can examine the
negative aspect of ethnicism by linking it to the theoretical
framework of Talcott Parsons’ pattern variables. To
understand this, it is important to make reference to
(1960), who argued that while developed countries are
characterised by the pattern variables of universalism,
achievement orientation and functional specificity, the
under-developed ones are characterized by the
opposites, namely particularism, ascription and functional
diffuseness. For the under-developed countries to
develop, they must adopt the pattern variables that are
characteristic of the developed societies. Whatever the
criticism against this position, it is important to note that
ethnicism breeds the pattern variables that are
characteristic of under-development, particularly those of
particularism, ascription and functional diffuseness.
Another explanation for why ethnicism has become a
problem to contend with is possible in the context of
conflict theory. Social conflict can be defined as a
struggle over values or claims to status, power and

scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting
parties are not only to gain desirable values but also to
neutralize, injure and/or eliminate their rivals. This is why
Nnoli, (1978) has described conflict as an important
aspect of ethnicism. The implication of this is that conflict
is inevitable under conditions of inter-ethnic competition
for scarce valuable resources. There is no doubt that this
type of ethnic conflict will strengthen the in-group and
out-group feelings of the members of ethnic groups
Salawu and Hassan. 29
involved in the conflicts. The fact remains that such
conflicts will have negative impacts on certain institutions
of the society including the political institutions.
A conclusion that can be drawn from our discussion so
far is that it has led us to belief that ethnicism leads to
primordial sentiments in multi-ethnic society. This position
is supported by the theory of ethnocentrism. On a general
note, the theory of ethnocentrism simply denotes
differentiation according to origin. This is to say that it is a
kind of behaviour where a group of people look down on
others and discriminate against them. Thus, one can see
ethnocentrism as a belief in the unique value and
rightness of one’s own group. This human attitude
manifests in form of prejudice and tribalism (ethnic
communalism and conflict). The aspect of prejudice that
is relevant to our discussion here is the one that has to
do with group solidarity. Peil (1977) claims that group
solidarity provides security in situation of potential conflict
and informal support when official agencies cannot or will
not help. Prejudice can be turned to discrimination. If this
happens, there will be strong pressure to exclude

outsiders in the sharing of scarce resources such as
political power.
At this point, it is necessary to give a brief insight into
the concept of democracy. Democracy, just like
ethnicism, is a concept that is not amenable to
definitional unanimity, more so as there exist several
versions of it. Common among the versions are the
Athenian classical democracy, Liberal democracy,
Marxist-Leninist democracy and lately, Radical
democratic conception to mention a few. Democratic
discussion is often embroiled in controversies, over which
ideally is true democracy, given scholars’ divergence of
views on the concept and practice of democracy. For the
sake of this paper however, we are concerned with liberal
democracy otherwise known as representative
democracy and how it is aided or impeded by ethnic
politics in Nigeria. Democracy, in the liberal perspective,
is government by popular representation; a form of
government in which the supreme power is retained by
the people, but is indirectly exercised through a system of
representation and delegated authority periodically
renewed; a constitutional representative government.
Among the major features of democracy is equality of
individuals before the law; freedom, liberty and universal
suffrage enjoyed by the people. The paper examines how
competition for wealth and power among various ethnic
groups in Nigeria affects institutionalisation of democracy
in the country.
From our discussion so far, it is logical to argue as
Nnoli (1978) did that the Nigerian politics have presented
an image of struggle among various ethnic groups for the
sharing of national resources. Thus, as observed by
Crawford (1993) social competition in Nigeria first for
place and preferment, political competition in Nigeria

arena subsequently placed ethnicity in the centre of
public cognition of political struggle. It is in this context
30 J. Public Adm. Policy Res.
that this paper examines ethnicism and its resultant
ethnic politics as an important factor that contributes to
political instability and which subsequently has always
threatened democratic rule in Nigeria.
ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE NIGERIA’S SOCIO-
POLITICAL HISTORY: A REVIEW
Nigeria is undoubtedly a plural society with different
ethnic groups, religions, languages, cultures and
institutional arrangements. As a heterogeneous society,
374 ethnic groups have been identified each interacting
with one another in competition for power and wealth.
This has resulted into ethnic conflict. A major contributor
to ethnic conflict in Nigeria is what some observers have
described as constitutional factor. The focus of this line of
argument is that constitutional developments in Nigeria,
particularly the colonial constitutions, tended to engender
ethnicism and hinder national integration of particular
interest is Arthur Richard Constitution of 1946. This
constitution established the first regional governments in
Nigeria. Although the constitution achieved the
integration of North and South in a common legislative
council, it actually brought to force the concept of
regionalism. Many political observers and commentators
have observed that the 1946 constitution formed the

beginning of the process of fragmentation along ethnic
line in Nigeria. The Nigerian constitutional changes all
along the colonial rule encouraged factionalism, which
later resulted into ethnic nationalism. By definition, ethnic
nationalism is seen in this paper as the tendency to see
one’s self as a member of an ethnic group rather than as
a member of a nation. This tendency is shown in the
allegiance individuals in this country pay to their ethnic
groups. Consequently, many still prefer to identify
primarily with their ethnic groups rather than with the
state. This manifestation of strong allegiance to ethnic
group encourages primordial sentiments among Nigerian
people. Thus, the individuals are concerned with socio-
economic and political development of their own group
and not the nation as a whole.
It is important to note here that ethnic politics has
manifested itself in many ways in Nigeria. Particularly
interesting is the one that is related to party formation.
The whole process of party formation began in the capital
of Lagos with the formation of the Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1923. The first two parties,
namely: Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and
the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) might be
understood for not been national in structure. This was
because the elective principle introduced by the Clifford
Constitution in 1922 was a limited one that restricted
elective representation to only Lagos and Calabar. The
NNDP, which was basically a Lagos affair, was founded
by Herbert Macaulay in response to the introduction of
the elective principle. The constitution gave Lagos three

elective unofficial seats in the legislative council. The
NYM came later in 1934 only as a challenge to NNDP
domination of Lagos politics. The first political party that
began with a national outlook was the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroon (later renamed National
Convention of Nigeria Citizens – NCNC). Although the
NCNC started with a national orientation and nationalist
commitment, an ethnic perception of it emerged mainly
as a result of what Crawford, (1993) called the
flamboyant and controversial personality of the NCNC
leader, Nnamdi Azikwe. In response to the perceived
threat of Ibo domination, the Yoruba group founded a
political party named the Action Group. Although it was
originally conceived to be a national party, it could not
escape from its ‘Yoruba genesis’. The Action Group soon
disclosed its ethnic identity because of the close
association between its birth and establishment of a pan-
Yoruba cultural association, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa.
For the same fear of ethnic domination, the Hausa-Fulani
emirates of the North floated the Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC). According to Crawford (1993), the NPC
was built upon a triple cultural support, which includes:
the fear shared by all classes of Southern (and especially
Ibo) dominations, the linked role of religious notables and
emirs as defenders of faith, and the social discipline
enforceable through the authoritative hierarchy of the
emirates. Consequently, the fear shown by all the three
ethnic groups produced the three parties, which were
mainly ethnic in their origin, composition and the interest
they served.
Another interesting manifestation of ethnic politics in
Nigeria is the administrative division of the country into
three regions. Each of these regions is dominated by one
of the three ethnic groupings thereby reinforcing the
popular philosophy of three-player of ethnic game. Many

things have been affected by this tri-polar pattern.
Particularly interesting was the move for self government,
which if attained would usher in a democratic government
in Nigeria. The north was unwilling to see a self-rule at
the centre. The position taken by the north on this issue
was indeed another expression of fear of domination. The
north then felt that the enlightened south could use their
advantage position to marginalize its people. The fear
continues till today, almost five decades after
independence.
CAUSES OF ETHNIC PROBLEM IN NIGERIA
Nigeria at the age 49 is still searching for a new political
order. The full realisation of this objective has been made
impossible because of the dominance of the factor of
ethnicism, a factor which has affected the survival of
democratic rule in Nigeria. One of the main causes of
ethnic problem is ethnic nationalism. By definition, this
means a tendency to see one’s self, first and foremost as
a member of an ethnic group rather than as a member of
a nation. This tendency has been shown in some ways
and particularly in the allegiance people pay to their
ethnic group. In Nigerian society today, many prefer
identification with their ethnic group rather than with the
nation or even state. The above shows that Nigerians still
exhibit a strong allegiance to ethnic group and which has
consequently encouraged primordial sentiments among

Nigerian people.
The origin of ethnicism in Nigeria is traceable to the
nation’s colonial experience, particularly the
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern
protectorates of Nigeria in 1914. According to Osadolor
(1998), the act of amalgamation was not a federal idea.
Lugard did not conceive of a federal state for Nigeria. In
the statement of the colonial office when Lugard
submitted his proposals on 9 May, 1913, it was stated
that ‘Sir Lugard’s proposals contemplate a state which is
impossible to classify’ (Osadolor, 1998). Lugard had
neither a unitary nor a federal or confederal agenda for
the country. Rather, the two regions were brought
together for administrative convenience and reduction in
administrative cost. This explains why the successive
constitutions developed for governing the country
between 1914 and 1951 can hardly be categorised either
as unitary, federal or confederal. It was the turbulent
political climate, which brought the 1951 Macpherson
constitution to a premature end, which led to the
production of the first federal-like constitution for Nigeria
in 1954. The colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton,
convened a constitutional conference in London from July
30 to August 22 1953 to revise the 1951 constitution,
which was originally expected to last for five years. At the
conference, a federal constitution was accepted by the
leaders of the main political parties. The solution was not
reached easily, but it was the only feasible answer to the
problem of national integration (Osadolor, 1998). The
political restructuring produced the 1954 constitution that
established a federal framework for Nigeria. The federal
framework notwithstanding, the seed of mutual suspicion
and fear of domination has geminated and was fast
growing among the major ethnic groups in the country
such that the workings of the new constitution became

difficult. The point being made here is that federalism in
Nigeria was not a deliberate design of the founding
fathers but an accidental adoption, having found
themselves in a tight situation with no better alternative
available. The implication of this was that Nigerian
federalism lacked the requisite foundation for a
formidable federal system, the resultant effect of which is
loyalty to ethnic groups rather than loyalty to the nation.
In a circumstance of mutual suspicion and fear of
domination, competition for power among ethnic groups
becomes unavoidable. And it is on the basis of this fear
of domination that formation of political parties in Nigeria
always reflects a strong dose of ethnicism.
Colonialism left behind for Nigeria a non-hegemonic
state that further aggravated the crisis of ethnicism in the
Salawu and Hassan. 31
country. This is succinctly captured by Osaghae (2001)
when he writes that:
...the pervasiveness of ethnic politics in the country
is taken to be symptomatic of aggravated crisis of
legitimacy that has engulfed the state, and is
explained in terms of the proven efficacy of the
ethnic strategy, the weakness of alternative
identities and political units, the prevailing milieu of
lawlessness that has enveloped the country’s
political landscape, and the inability of the state to
act as an effective agency of distributive justice.

In a similar work, Aluko (2003) identifies the Legacy of
Colonialism and monopoly of power by the major ethnic
groups and their consequent marginalisation of the
minority groups as major factors promoting ethnic
nationalism in Nigeria. Other causes of ethnicism
identified include poverty of leadership in terms of forging
national integration among the multiple ethnic
nationalities in the country (Babangida, 2002). Babangida
argues further that mass poverty and unemployment
creates alienation and insecurity, which in turn encourage
Nigerians to experience and prefer accommodation within
the social insurance system of ethnic nationalities.
Further identified causes of ethnic problems in Nigeria
have to do with competition for employment and political
exploitation. The former has been caused by the ever-
increasing number of school leavers who now troop to the
urban centre in search of jobs, which many a time are not
found. And where such jobs are found they are given
according to ethnic affiliation. The latter has to do with
politicians who manipulate ethnic loyalties in order to
increase their winning chance at the polls. This aspect of
ethnicism in the Nigerian situation has set one ethnic
group against another with immeasurable consequences.
MANIFESTATION OF ETHNIC POLITICS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF
DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA
The effort made so far in this paper has been to show
that the inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria has been one of
conflict largely caused by ethnic chauvinism, which
manifests in form of ethnic nationalism. There is no doubt

that this has implications for the survival of democracy in
Nigeria. The question to answer here is how does
ethnicism and the resultant ethnic politics affect
democracy in an institution? It is common knowledge that
the mode of governance in which Nigeria achieved her
self-rule, was civil democracy. Since independence,
(1960 to date), Nigeria has experimented with three
distinct republican governments at times punctuated by
long spells of military rule and now on fourth experiment.
The constant military incursions have made the
development of democratic political culture a difficult task
in Nigeria. A survey of the political scenario in Nigeria
32 J. Public Adm. Policy Res.
since independence will show the extent to which ethnic
loyalty has affected the nation’s dream to have
democratic governance. The discussion here starts with
an assessment of the political scenario in the First
Republic. When Nigeria attained independence in 1960,
she had a federal structure that was made up of three
regions namely: the North, East and the West. Soon after
Nigeria became an independent nation, the differences
among the three regions became clear and amplified by
the emergence of three regionally-based and
tribally/ethnically sustained political parties. They were
the Northern People’s Congress (NPC, the National
Convention of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) and the Action
Group (AG) led by late Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello,
Sardauna of Sokoto from the North, Dr. Azikwe from the
East and Chief Obafemi Awolowo from the West
respectively.

It was against this seemingly simple background that
the problem of Nigeria’s first attempt at democracy
started. Between 1960 and 1965 the ethnically loaded
political arrangement described above coupled with other
factors threatened the continual existence of Nigeria as a
nation. In the bid to win the most political power by these
ethnic leaders, the situation degenerated into political
riots, arsons, killings and other acts of vandalism
especially in the west. Subsequently, there was a bloody
military coup, which terminated the First Republic in
1966.
After 13 years of military rule, the Second Republic was
born on October 1, 1979. The politics in this Republic
was not better than what was obtained in the first one. As
in the First Republic, parties were formed along ethnic
line. The political scene and actors were almost the
same. The Second Republic was little or no improvement
upon the experience of the First Republic in terms of
ethnicism. The Second Republic political parties were but
reincarnations of the ethnically aligned parties of the First
Republic. Both their formation and leadership
conspicuously reflected ethnic affiliation. This does not
mean that the parties of the Second Republic absolutely
did not enjoy membership from other ethnic groups
outside their domain, but where they did, such
memberships were weak and insignificant. The problem
of ethnic politics, particularly the reckless struggle by the
ethnically inclined political leaders to gain control at the
centre, and controversies that surrounded the general
elections of 1979 and 1983 contributed largely to the
demise of the Second Republic
Ethnic politics was downplayed significantly in the
aborted Third Republic owing to two factors: (1) the

process of formation of the two political parties, namely
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican
Convention (NRC), did not give room to ethnic influence
because the parties were military creation and the two-
party system prevented ethnic dominance of any political
party. (2) the emergence of M.K.O. Abiola, who was
considered to be truly a national figure with little or no
passion for ethnicity, as the Presidential candidate of the
SDP. However, annulment of the June 12 presidential
election that was believed to have been won by M.K.O.
Abiola eventually led to the truncation of the Third
Republic and rejuvenation of ethnicism in Nigeria. The
experience of the aborted Third Republic was an
indication of existence of an inverse relationship between
ethnicism and good governance. This is so because, it
was the hope of good governance that Nigerians
expected from M.K.O. Abiola that made them voted for
him across the nation irrespective of ethnic and religious
affiliations.
In the present 4
th
Republic, ethnic politics has less
prominence than it had in the first and Second Republics.
This may not be unconnected with the informal rotation
arrangement of principal political offices of the federation
among the six geo-political zones in the country. This
could be seen from the arrangement that compensated
the South - West in the 1999 Presidential Election in
which the two presidential candidates filled were from the

region in compensation for annulment of June 12 1993
presidential election, which was believed to have been
won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola from the South-West. The
rotation arrangement returned the presidency to the
North after two terms of stay in the South. Other national
elective offices involved in the rotation arrangement
include: Vice President, Senate President and Deputy
Senate President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the
House of Representatives. Each of the offices is held by
an elected person from one of the six geo-political zones
in the country and none of the regions simultaneously
enjoy two of the offices. The rotation and zoning system
will however only be a short-term therapy for the problem
of ethnicism in the absence of good governance.
Ethnic nationalism has had a lot of negative
consequences for the nation’s movement towards
democratisation to the extent that it remains an enduring
threat to institutionalisation of democracy in Nigeria.
Among its resultant negative consequences as observed
by Babangida (2002), are wastage of enormous human
and material resources in ethnically inspired violence,
encounters, clashes and even battles, heightening of
fragility of the economy and political process, threat to
security of life and property and disinvestments of local
and foreign components with continuous capital flight and
loss of confidence in the economy; and increasing gaps
in social relations among ethnic nationalities including
structural suspicions and hate for one another. Ethnic
nationalism is equally responsible for upspring of ethnic
militias across the country; the Oodua Peoples Congress
of the southwest, Arewa Peoples Congress in the north
and Egbesu in the east among others.

CONCLUSION
From what has been discussed so far, it can be seen that
as a nation, Nigeria has failed to properly manage her
political relations in a manner that is characteristic of the
civilized societies of the world. Nigeria has performed
poorly on the political plane as a result of which the
country’s economic performance has been predictably
affected. All the efforts that should have been directed to
establishing a sound economic order for economic self-
reliance had been unintelligently expended on political
power struggle, political anarchy and political thuggery,
all of which are compounded by the factor of ethnicism.
Osadolor (1998) identifies the structural imbalance of
Nigeria’s federal framework, as the most potent source of
fear of domination among various groups. This fear
promotes competitive federalism, which intensified the
politics of “winner takes all”. Unless this fear is removed,
ethnicism will continue to be a bane of democratisation in
Nigeria. The Federal Character principle is enshrined in
the constitution to ensure social justice and equity
particularly in distribution of federal positions. The
principle needs to be properly reviewed to enable it
perform integrative function without compromising merit.
As rightly suggested by Babangida (2002), the quality,
content, profile and temper of political leadership can go
a long way either in undermining multiple ethnic

nationalisms or in promoting national integration in
Nigeria. More space should be provided for Nigerians to
participate in the affairs of the country as well as those of
their various communities. This will go a long way
reducing alienation, which oftentimes is a major promoter
of ethnic nationalism.
For institutionalisation of lasting democracy in Nigeria,
her ethnic plurality notwithstanding, the wrongs of
ethnicism must be righted. This can best be done by
good governance. The nation needs a purposeful
leadership that has a vision of how to place its citizens at the
centre of political project without recourse to ethnic

Salawu and Hassan 33
chauvinism and sees acquisition of political power as not an
end in itself but a means for serving the collective welfare of
its people regardless of their ethnic origin. A leadership that
recognizes and respects the many peoples that make up this
nation, and treats all communities as its constituency
thereby allaying the fear of ethnic domination
With the suggestions above, the Nigerian society will
be able to reduce the incidence of ethnicism in the
country’s body polity. This will transform particular
loyalties to loyalty to the nation. It will reduce the common
syndrome of ethnic loyalty, which has always resulted into
unhealthy political struggle and which has manifested in
various types of political protests and instabilities.
REFERENCES
Aluko MAO (2003). Ethnic Nationalism and the Nigerian
Democratic
Experience in the Fourth Republic. Anthropologist, 5(4): 253–
259.
Babangida (2002). Ethnic Nationalities and Nigeria State.
Excerpts from
a Lecture delivered at NIPSS, Kuru, Jos.
Cohen A (1974). Urban Ethnicity. London. Taristock
Publications Ltd.
Crawford Y (1993). The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. London.

The
University of W isconsin Press.
Nnoli O (1978). Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu. Fourth
Dimension
Publishing Co. Ltd.
Osadolor OB (1998). “The Development of the Federal Idea and
the
Federal Framework, 1914 – 1960.” In Amuwo K et al. (eds).
Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan.
Spectrum
Books Ltd.
Osaghae EE (2001). “Ethnic Mapping Project: A Brief Concept”
In
Osaghae eds.) Ethnic Group and Conflict in Nigeria. Ibadan
PEFS,
Vol. 1.
Pepple IA (1985). Ethnic Loyalty and National Identification.
Conference
Paper Proceedings on Rural Resources and National
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University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.
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Introduction to Sociology Addison-W esley Longman Ltd.
European Scientific Journal June 2013 edition vol.9, No.17

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178
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC
POLITICS AND ITS IMPACTS ON POST
COLONIAL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA
Felicia H. Ayatse
Akuva, Isaac Iorhen
Department Of Political Science, Federal University,
Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State
Abstract
Nigeria party politic has been polluted by ethnic chauvinism.
This
problem is one of the major qualms confronting the progress of
liberal
democracy in Nigeria since 1960, to the extent that ethnic
sentiment has
gradually crept in to find a place in every faced of Nigerian
political activity.
Ethnic sentiment has been one of the factors responsible for
most of the
inefficiencies and low productivity in Nigeria. The major focus
of this paper
is to trace the historical origin, growth and development of
ethnicity and the
effects it has had on post-colonial governance in Nigeria. In the

findings of
this paper, it was discovered that ethnic sentiment was
deliberately
introduced and propagated in the polity by the British colonial
government to
realize colonial and imperialist economic and political
objectives. It was also
found that since the end of colonialism in 1960, Nigeria has
carried forward
the spirit of ethnicity into the post-colonial Nigeria, this vice
has been
discovered to have been responsible for most of the political,
administrative,
economic, social and cultural maladies in Nigeria. The data that
was used to
support this argument was got from the secondary method of
data
acquisition. At the concluding remark, it is suggested that,
indigene-settle
phenomenon should be strong discouraged while the Federal
Character
principles be genuinely implemented at the federal, state and
local
government levels in other to remove the age long ethnic unrest
in the
governance of Nigeria.
Keywords: The Origin, Development, Ethnic Politics, Impacts,
Post-
Colonial Governance
Introduction
It has been estimated that Nigeria has as much as 350 ethnic
groups
based on lingual classification. However, the “United Nations

says there are
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179
250 ethnic groups in Nigeria many consider this as
underestimated. A federal
government demographic survey in 1976 identified 394
language groups,
one estimate put it as high as 400 with the highest density of
languages in
Taraba and Adamawa States” (www.thenation onlineng.net).
The above
statement clearly depicts that Nigeria is multi-lingual in nature.
The diverse
nature of the Nigeria state as a result of tribal differences, this
therefore lays
the foundation for the exploitation of what goes on in the
country. This is
further precipitated on the fact that these ethnic groups though
housed in one
country, they do not have the same needs, objectives and
aspirations. Based
on these ethnical inclinations, it seems cumbersome as it were
to treat the
Nigeria project without considering the ethnic formation of
country.
Ethnicity therefore has become a strong factor in the political
life of

Nigeria. Most often ethnic sentiments are used to replace merit
and skills,
such that round pegs are no longer found in round holes. This
chauvinistic
behavior affects the efficiency and productivity of Nigeria.
Nonetheless, is fundamental to inquire where this, feeling of
“we and
they” notion came from. When did Nigerians start feelings that
the other
person does not belong to his enclave or he is better than the
other group or
ethnic?
It seems ethnicity was a colonial heritage bequeathed to
Nigeria at
independence by the colonial masters. In effect, whatever
damage ethnicity
has generated in the process of governing Nigeria it could be
trace to
colonial arrangement.
The major objectives of this paper are to carefully trace the
historical
origin, growth and development of ethnicity and the impacts it
has on the
governance of Nigeria.
Definition of Ethnicity
The concept ethnicity and tribalism has always been a confused
matter. Some scholars use the two concepts as though they carry
the some
meaning and strongly inseparable. However, it is pertinent to
note that there
is a difference between ethnicity and tribalism even though the
difference is
water-tight. Nnoli (1978:5) for instance sees ethnicity as a:
… Social phenomenon associated with the identity of members

of the
largest possible competing communal groups (ethnic groups)
seeking to
protect and advance their interest in a political system. The
relevant
communal factor may be language, culture, race religion and/or
common
history. Ethnicity is only one of the phenomena associated with
interactions
among communal groups (ethnic groups). Others include trade,
diplomacy,
friendship enmity, corporation, self-abnegation and self
extension. What is
peculiar to ethnicity is that it involves demands by one group on
other
competing groups …
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180
From the definition above by Nnoli, ethnicity exists where the
communal groups comprise either of: language, culture, race,
religion or
common history. If we go by Nnoli’s position, tribalism which
has to do with
a tribe is only an element that could constitute ethnicity hence
ethnicity in
this case is wider in context than tribalism. Ethnicity in the
words of Nnoli

above shows that it does not yet exist until a demand is made by
one group to
seek for advantage and benefits for its group relative to what
another group
is seemingly enjoying. In support of this argument of the
difference between
ethnicity and tribalism, Eteng (2004:45) says that:
An ethnic group, however, is not necessarily linguistically or
culturally, homogeneous, insofar as it often subsumes sub-
cultural, linguistic,
dialectic occupational and class differences, depending on the
prevailing level of socio-economic development and cultural
differentiation.
Similarly, according to Thomson (2000:60) a basic definition of
ethnicity is:
… a community of people who have the conviction that they
have a
common identity and common fate based on issues of origin,
kinship, ties,
traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a
shared
language. In this sense, an ethnic group is much like the
imagined
community of the nation. Ethnicity, however, focuses more on
sentiments of
origin and descent, rather than the geographical considerations
of a nation.
From the definition above, ethnicity obvious is a smaller
community
found within a larger society which of cause is the implication
of Thomson
“… imagined community of the nation”. So, it has to do with a

unique group
behavior seeking for favor restrictive to its group members.
Ethnicity
involves the display of sentiments in bias to a special set of
group one
belongs to. In concord to the foregoing, Omu (1996:170) says
that:
…ethnicity applies to the consciousness of belonging to,
identifying
with, and being loyal to a social group distinguished by shared
cultural
traditions, a common language, in-group sentiment and self-
identity.
On the whole, ethnicity has to do with a unique group with
distinct
and peculiar features which are sources of common ties on
which the feeling
of sentiment and emotion is being expressed in protest or
support of an
action taken against or in favor of such a group.
In sum, ethnicity is the deliberate and consciousness of tracing
of
one’s identity to a particular ethnic group and allowing such
feeling to
determine the way one relates with people and things, ethnicity
creates the
brackets of ‘we’ ‘they’ ‘ours’, ‘theirs’ feeling. Ethnicity makes
it very
difficult for different ethnic groups to agree on anything.
The Historical Origin, Growth and Development of Ethnicity in
Nigeria
If we understand ethnicity as an in-group feeling and expression

of
sentiments by such a group against another in order to attract
favor for its
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181
members, how do we explain pre-colonial Nigeria when the
different ethnics
lived separately and independently? These groups were not even
aware of
the existence of some ethnics let alone to express ethnic
sentiment against
any. This clearly means that in the beginning of the Nigerian
entities before
the arrival of the colonial masters, the people who lived in the
territories
today called Nigeria were not in any serious conflict with any
group hence,
there was none to compete with around them. It becomes clear
to say that;
ethnicity was a deliberate and conscious creation of the colonial
masters in
order to use such sentimental expression to perpetually have
dominion and
control over the colonies in Africa. That is the more reason
Nnoli’s
(2011:66) submission is accepted when he says that:

… the British colonialist introduced various policies that
emasculated
the revolutionary potential of the working class and the trade
unions some of
these policies were part of the overall colonial strategy and
tactical of
subjugating the colonized people as a whole. Others were design
specifically
to counteract working class consciousness. In the specific case
of the
working class in Nigeria, the imperialists used ethnicity to
destroy working
class collective action… consequently the working class could
not provide
political leadership to the more militant peasantry, its natural
political ally.
Initially, the different ethnics were living in small autonomous
villages of 100 to 500 persons (www.mongabay.com) in
different
geographical locations without any problem of envying or being
jealous of
another ethnic hence their locations were far apart. For instance
the Hausa
Yoruba and the Igbo’s were far apart located that there was no
need for
chauvinistic feelings. It was the colonial maters who gradually
gather these
ethnic entities in provinces, protectorates, regions and finally
brought these
different ethnics together into one geopolitical entity to be
governed by one
person using a common treasury.
The origin of ethnicity began with the evolution of the Nigeria
federalism. It was Sir Bourdillon who initiated the idea of
federalism for

Nigeria in 1939. He divided the country into provinces and
regional councils
along the three major ethnics in the country. According to
Nwabughuogu
(1996:49):
Bourdillon himself now begun to develop the federal idea
… which
would provide for regional councils in the provinces with a
central council
in Lagos… Bourdillon took a practical action to implement his
ideas. He
divided the protectorate of southern Nigeria into: eastern and
western
provinces… But he had not yet built a true federal structure
before he left
Nigeria in 1943. For he still left the North intact thereby
worsening the
imbalance which is inimical to the growth of true federation.
Nevertheless,…Bourdillon had created a skeleton of a
federation.
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182
The federal structure which Bourdillon laid generated the nation
of
divide and rule. The west and the east that was initially intact as
the southern
protectorate got spited to separate the Yoruba (west) from the

Igbo (east)
however the Hausa/Fulani (North) was left not divided, whose
size was
bigger than the west and the east put together. One question
which remains
unanswered is the non-divisions of the Northern region, perhaps
the
Hausa/Fulani ethnic was the major dominant of the north. At
this point, the
West and the East who used to do things together under the
notion of
southern protectorate solidarity withdrew into identifying with
their unique
ethnics.
By 1951, Nigeria was already clearly structured into three
major
regions: the Northern Region (Hausa/Fulani); the Western
Region (Yoruba)
and the Eastern Region (Igbo). These major ethnic regional
entities became
the basis for many political administrative and economic
policies in Nigeria.
These groups became conscious of their groups and insisted on
wooing
favors from the central government to the regions which they
belongs to.
Buttressing further on the ethnic consciousness created by the
British
colonial masters in Nigeria, Ekeh (2004:21):
Under British colonial rule, in the old Provincial
Administration of
Eastern Nigeria before 1950, the component ethnic groups
developed
separately. Igbos were largely separated from the Ijaw, the Efik
and the

Ibibios in Calabar province and several other small ethnic
groups in Ogoja
province this had their own administrative divisions in the
region. With the
political changes in of the 1950s all such ethnic autonomics in
Eastern
dissolved. The rationalization that occurred turned the Igbos
into the
majority ethnic group, both demographically and politically.
Just the same way the Igbos emerged as the dominants ethnic
group
in the Eastern Region as a result of the provincial
rationalization, the same
thing applied to the Yoruba in the Western Region. Initially, the
Yoruba was
not the dominant ethnic among the ethnics it found itself. This
is what Ekeh
(2004: 19-20) says:
Under the British rule, Western Nigeria had six provinces. Four
of
these were Yoruba. Two of them Benin and Warri provinces
were areas that
had very little contact with the Yoruba before colonial rule.
With colonialism
there was considerable labour migration that brought Yoruba
and non-
Yoruba in the western region into contact. However, politically,
the
provinces including the Yoruba ones, were administered
separately. All of
these political arrangements changed dramatically with the
political
rationalization of Nigeria, beginning in 1954, that dissolved
provincial

administrative autonomy. In a spate of a few years, the Yoruba
emerged as
the political power of western Nigeria and the non-Yoruba
ethnic groups in
Warri and Benin provinces became ethnic minorities.
ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
183
Consequent upon the above political events of the federal move,
the
reactions from the new minority ethnic groups in Warri and
Benin Provinces
were varied. While a Yoruba-led political party, called the
Action Group had
important following among the Yoruba linguistic kinsfolk of
Itsekiri and a
good amount of support in Northern Benin Province and Urhobo
in Warri
later Delta Province. The political relations between the new
ethnic majority
Yoruba and the new minority ethnic groups in Delta and Benin
provinces
were fiercely brittle (Ekeh, 2004:22).
Another factor that gave birth to ethnic sentiment was the
implication
of the incorporation of Nigeria into the world capitalist system.
This meant
that the British colonial masters needed raw materials from their

African
colonies to feed their home industries at the same time look out
for market to
dispose of their finished goods which were brought from Europe
for sale. To
get away with the raw materials from Nigeria they need to move
the raw
materials from their different production joints to the seaports
or hinterlands
for evacuation to Europe. The process of gathering the raw
materials
necessarily required the establishment of infrastructures such as
roads,
railways, and telecommunications. The people were coerced
into force labor
to be part of these public works, besides the local people needed
money (the
British currency) to pay the taxes that were imposed on them by
the colonial
masters. This resulted to several persons migrating from the
rural areas to the
urban centres were there was job opportunities in the European
rail way
constructions and other public works.
As a result of this rural-urban migration, the urban cities
became a
place of high concentration of the different ethnic groups who
came to work.
The different ethnics groups began to identify with themselves
in groups. It
was at this time that ethnic and cultural organizations were
formed in the
cities by the different ethnics to pursue their common goals.
These ethnic
unions later became powerful unions /associations to the extent
that they

started responding to the needs of their members beyond what
the
government could do for them. Some of these unions were the
Idoma Hope
Rising (for the Idoma ethnic group); the Egbe Omo Oduduwa
(for the
Yoruba ethnic group), the Tiv Progressive Union (for the Tiv
ethnic group),
Jamyyan Mutanen Arewa (for the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group).
According to
Fafowora (2011:2)
The emergence of urban centers in colonial Nigeria … brought
many
migrants into the new urban area to look for employment
following the
introduction of tax regime by the colonial government.
Economic
integration made colonial rule easier and more profitable. But
this
development set in motion a process that was to lead to greater
contact and
Competition among the various ethnic groups for dominance
and the
ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431
184
economic advantage one other ethnic group that would

CRJ 200 1Running head CRIMINAL PROCEDURECrimi.docx

CRJ 200 1Running head CRIMINAL PROCEDURECrimi.docx

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