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1. Slide 1
Dear ladies and gentlemen.
I’d like to offer to your attention a briefing on “Verified cases of Russian
armaments and ammunition being transferred to the occupied territories of
Ukraine”
Slide 2
Despite the multiple appeals of both Ukraine and other countries, including
the UN Security Council, OSCE and other international organizations to stop illicit
transfer of the Russian armaments and military equipment to the Ukrainian
territory, Russia goes on with it, thus bluntly violating the international law.
The respective bodies of Ukraine regularly observe the cases of the large
amount of armaments and materiel, ammunition, POLs being transported from
Russia to the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
through the uncontrolled part of the Ukrainian state border.
Since the start of 2016 we have detected modern Russian armaments’
presence near DONETSK, MAKIYIVKA, ILOVAYSK, TOREZ, ZAITSEVE,
LUHANSKE, NOVOSELIVKA, SHYROKYNE (DONETSK region) and
LUHANSK, POPASNA, KRASNYI LUTCH, ZOLOTE (LUHANSK region).
I would like to emphasize that this materiel in many cases is very
sophisticated systems, manufactured in Russia to be used for the air defence,
SIGINT, EW and communications. The use of such equipment requires the
operators to be specially trained in respective Russian educational military schools.
Now let’s look more closely into the cases of particular Russian armament
and materiel being identified in occupied areas of Donbas. I’d like to stress, that
I’m going to talk about the armaments and materiel which were produced in Russia
and are in service of its Armed forces or its allies and never been in the inventory
of the Ukrainian military.
Slide 3
First, a Russian T-72BM main battle tank of 1989 year model was
detected on March 26, 2016 during an exercise of the 100th
Separate motorized
rifle brigade of the 1st
AC, of the Russian occupation force in the TOREZ training
area, in Donetsk region. This type of the Russian main battle tank was seen earlier
in February 2016 during an exercise of the 4th
Separate tank battalion of the same
AC at the training area near the town of MOSPYNE, in Donetsk region.
This modification of T-72 main battle tank has never been and is not in the
inventory of Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Among the specific features of the T-72BM MBT, by which it can be
identified are, as follows:
1. “Luna” spotlight mounted to the right of the gun;
2. “Kontakt-5” turret-mounted dynamic protection system;
3. Body-mounted dynamic armour;
4. Specific shape of tracks.

2. 2
Slide 4
In April 2016 a Russian “Pantsir-S1” air defence system was detected in
the city of LUHANSK. This system was multiply seen in the occupied territories in
2014-2015. Such a system is usually used by Russian military command to cover
the Russian military convoys illegally entering Ukraine from Russia.
The “Pantsir-S1” guided missile/gun air defence system came into service
of the Russian Armed Forces in 2012. It is designed to cover troops and command
posts of the Russian Army or Air Defence battalions armed with S-300 or S-400
AD systems in the so-called short range Air Defence Zone.
The “Pantsir-S1” AD system is used exclusively by the Russian military. It
has been tested in combat conditions in Ukraine and Syria.
The identification features of the “Pantsir-S1” AD system are:
1. 12 pcs. ready to launch missile containers and 2 pcs. of 30-mm 2A38
twin-barrel automatic anti-aircraft guns;
2. Specific shape of the tracking radar;
3. Stern ladders;
4. Onboard technological equipment;
5. Four-axle chassis of Kamaz 6560 heavy utility truck.
This AD system is not in service of the Ukrainian military.
Slide 5
On April 8, 2016 a 9S482M7 Army Air Defence command post vehicle
was identified in the town of MAKIYIVKA (DONETSK region).
This command vehicle is designed to provide command and control for the
short and medium range Army Air Defence systems.
Such vehicles are not in service in the Armed forces of Ukraine.
The prototype of this command vehicle was demonstrated by Russia at
“MAKS-2007” aviation show in ZHUKOVSKYI (Moscow oblast of Russia) in
2007.
The identification features of 9S482M7 Army Air Defence command post
vehicle:
1. The bigger hull has a specific shape;
2. The turret is unarmed.
Slide 6
On May 10 and 12, 2016 a “Torn” SIGINT system was detected at the
combat position in the Northern part of YASYNUVATA. This brigade-level
SIGINT system is a standard equipment of the reconnaissance companies, which
are the part of either separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian
Armed forces.
Presumably, “Torn” SIGINT system is heavily used in Donbas occupied
areas to reconnoitre the distant positions of the Ukrainian forces.

3. 3
Slide 7
“Torn” SIGINT system is able to detect radio emitters at the range up to
70 km for HF band and up to 30 km for UHF band.
Moreover, it can intercept paging, cellular and trunking communications.
Number of simultaneously controlled users – up to 1024.
The identification features of “Torn” SIGINT system are:
1. A distinctive shape of the antenna;
2. A "КаmАZ-4310" chassis.
The system is not in the functionary of the Ukrainian military.
Slide 8
In early April, 2016 a RB-531B “Infauna” Electronic Warfare system
on a base of BTR-80 APC was detected in the town of MAKIYIVKA
(DONETSK region).
This system is designed to protect road vehicles and personnel from radio
fused explosive devices, and to jam the adversary communication system at the
battalion level.
The system is composed of: SIGINT and radio jamming system,
C3 equipment, optic-electronic reconnaissance means and aerosol-screen
equipment.
First “Infauna” type systems were put into service in EW units of
98th
Airborne division (IVANOVO) and 7th
Mountain air assault division
(NOVOROSSIYSK) of Russian Airborne Forces. It is not in service of the Armed
forces of Ukraine.
Action range: for radio fuses jamming – up to 1 km, for radio
communication jamming – up to 20 km.
The identification features of the system are:
1. An antenna system cover;
2. A toolbox;
3. The bigger hull has a specific shape;
4. The turret is unarmed.
Slide 9
On April 7, 2016 an R-330Zh “Zhitel” EW system was observed at the
position ready for use near the town of MAKIIVKA (Donetsk region).
Slide 10
Later on April 12, 2016 the R-330ZH “Zhitel” EW system was observed
while on march in the town of MAKIIVKA.
The system is designed for jamming GSM base stations, satellite
communication terminals and GPS signals as well as for direction finding.
Jamming range – up to 30 km. Deployment time – 40 min.
The system came into service of Russian Armed Forces in 2008.

4. 4
This brigade-level system is a standard equipment of the EW companies,
which are the part of either separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian
Armed forces.
On May 9, 2016 another R-330ZH “Zhitel” EW system was also detected
near the city of LUHANSK. As the result of its use during the military parade of
the Victory Day all mobile operator signals in the area were jammed.
The identification features of the system are:
1. An automobile chassis of Russia-manufactured “Ural-43203” or
“КаmАZ-43114” military truck with trailer;
2. A distinctive shape of the GSM antenna system located on the trailer of
power generator;
3. A distinctive shape of the direction finder antenna.
Slide 11
On April, 19 an RB-341V “Leer-3” electronic warfare system was
detected in DONETSK, which is the organic jamming equipment of the EW
companies of the separate motorized rifle or tank brigades of the Russian Armed
forces.
It is designed to jam basic satellite communication stations, GPS devices,
“Inmarsat” and “Iridium” satellite communication terminals and also to imitate the
work of GSM base communication stations, conduct direction finding of GSM user
devices for the targeting of artillery. The system is equipped with “Orlan-10” UAV
with radio jamming equipment. It is able to block mobile user terminals in a radius
of 3,5-6 km. The combat range of UAV is 120 km.
The work of no less than 2 x RB-341V “Leer-3” EW system was
observed during 1st
AC artillery attack on ATO Forces in AVDIYIVKA on May,
16.
The system was put into service in Russian Armed Forces in 2015.
The identification features of RB-341B “Leer-3” EW system are:
1. The distinctive wooden flooring over the roof that facilitates the antenna
system deployment;
2. UAV Remote Control module antenna mast in transport position is hung
at the top right of the shelter;
3. A hermetic shelter of “Leer-3” EW system;
4. A Kamaz-5350 three-axle vehicle chassis.
This system is purely Russian and not in the inventory of the Ukrainian
military.
Slide 12
On the 9 of March, 2016 a RB-636 “Svet-KU” electronic warfare system
was detected in DONETSK. It is designed for control of radio environment, radio
emission finding, detection and analysis, and also HF and UHF radio sources
position-finding. Action range up to 40 km. Deployment time – 10 min.
The system was put into service in Russian Armed Forces in 2012.

5. 5
The identification features of the system are:
1. A chassis of Russia-manufactured KamAZ-5320 two-axle vehicle;
2. A cover for special equipment and distinctive wooden flooring over the
roof that facilitates the antenna system deployment;
3. A distinctive transmitter module antenna mast mounted at the rear
board of the shelter;
4. A shape and technologic features of “Svet-KU” EW system shelter.
Slide 13
On March 9, 2016 an automated R-934 BMV jamming station was
observed in Artema str., the city of DONETSK.
It is designed to jam UHF aviation C3 lines, tactical aviation aiming
systems, land and mobile communication lines, cellular and trunking
communication systems. Action range on air targets – up to 400 km, action range
on land targets – up to 75 km.
The system came into service of the Russian military in 2014.
Distinctive features:
1. A three-axle chassis of Russia-manufactured KаmАZ-5350 truck;
2. A towed power unit;
3. A shape and technologic features of the automated R-934BMV
jamming station special universal hermetic shelter.
Slide 14
A Russian ZALA 421-08M tactical UAV was downed near the village of
NOVOSELIVKA (DONETSK region) on April 12, 2016. It is in the inventory
of the Russian military since 2008.
Slide 15
Earlier on March 28, 2016 another Russian "Granat-1" tactical UAV was
downed near the village of LUHANSKE (DONETSK region). It is in the inventory
of the Russian military since 2014.
External features, markings on parts and microchips indicate their
manufacture by the Russian defence industry enterprises (except for separate
elements made in China).
Both ZALA 421-08M and Granat-1 tactical UAVs are the aerial
components of “Grusha” and “Navodchik” Unmanned Aerial Systems, designed
for ISR, artillery spotting and real time intelligence transfer to command posts.
Their operation range is 10 km.
Slide 16
Since late 2014 up to date Ukrainian soldiers have regularly identified and
captured in the conflict area a large amount of the Russian small arms and
ammunition which have never been in production in Ukraine or in use by our
power structures.

6. 6
Slide 17
In particular: in January 2016, after the clash with the “DNR” militants
who infiltrated deep into the territory of Donbas controlled by the Ukrainian
military, the troopers of Ukrainian Armed forces picked up couple of used tubes of
MPO-A "Borodach" man-portable thermobaric rocket launcher.
The distinctive markings on the tubes (year of manufacture and rocket
launcher indexes) revealed the Russian identity of that weaponry. It is in service of
the Russian Armed forces only and was put into service in Russian Armed Forces
in 2004. This particular piece was produced in 2008.
Slide 18
One used tube of another type of the Russian man-portable
thermobaric rocket launchers, which is RPO-A Shmel, was picked-up in late
February, 2016 by the Ukrainian troopers during the patrolling mission near
SHYROKYNE (DONETSK regions). According to the markings it was produced
in 2011.
Slide 19-20
Another used tube of the same RPO-A “Shmel” man-portable
thermobaric rocket launcher was picked up in February 2016 by the Ukrainian
Armed Forces troops after the exchange of fire with the militants near ZAITSEVE
(DONETSK region).
This weapon was put into service in 1988. It is exclusively used by the
nuclear bacterial chemical (NBC) units of the Russian Army.
Slide 21
On March 25th
, 2016 an improvised explosive device reworked out of
Russian RPO-A “Shmel” thermobaric rocket launcher was found near
ZOLOTE (Luhansk region). The rocket launcher was manufactured in Russia,
which is confirmed by the distinctive markings.
Slide 22
On March 29, 2016 an OG-7V fragmentation shell for RPG-7V antitank
rocket launcher was found between ZAITSEVO and MYKYTIVKA (Donetsk
region). According to the markings it was manufactured in 2007 at the factory
No. 56, “Planta” federal state unitary enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil, Russia).
Slide 23
Another projectile - a TBG-7V thermobaric rocket for RPG-7V rocket
launcher was found at the same day at the same position.
Slide 24
According to the markings it was manufactured in 2008 by the at the factory
No. 56, “Planta” federal state unitary enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil, Russia.

7. 7
Slides 25
At the following slides you can see additional samples of the Russian munition,
captured by the Ukrainian troops in the occupied territories of Donbas. The
examination of the markings reveals that they were manufactured in Russia.
For instance, an outdated Russian RPG-26 anti tank rocket.
Slide 26-27
In particular the RShG-2 assault grenade and PG-7VR projectile were
produced at the Russian “Planta” Federal State Unitary Enterprise in Nizhniy Tagil
city.
Slide 28
On March 21, 2016 near the 177,2 elevation which is 7 km to the S-E from
Popasna, Luhansk region, Ukrainian Armed forces servicemen bumped the МОN-
50 directional anti-personnel mine with MD-5M detonator manufactured in 2003
in Russia. Although it is widely used all over the world, the markings on it make it
unique. According to the markings it was manufactured in 2003 at the factory
No. 15, which is the “Promsintez” Joint Stock Company, Chapayevsk city, Samara
region of Russia).
At present the mine is neither in the inventory of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, nor manufactured in Ukraine.
Slide 29
In conclusion I would like to emphasize, that being a party to the negotiation
process and a warrantor of the Minsk agreements abidance, Russia at the same time
does not stop the illegal transferring of the armament and materiel to support the
illegal armed formations, bluntly violating the international law.
Despite the multiple requests, Russia has not provided any reasonable
explanation on how the sophisticated Russia-manufactured armament and materiel
appear in the conflict area. Such equipment neither has ever been in service of the
Ukrainian Armed forces nor has the Ukrainian government ever provided any
permission for its entry.
Thank you for your attention.