2010 03 23 NERA NYC Nuclear Power Briefing Final With Notes


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2010 update of annual nuclear industry briefing - includes league tables and recent insights

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2010 03 23 NERA NYC Nuclear Power Briefing Final With Notes

  1. 1. 2010 Nuclear Power Briefing Edward Kee Vice President New York 23 March 2010
  2. 2. Disclaimer The slides that follow do not provide a complete record of this presentation and discussion. The views expressed in this presentation and discussion are mine and may not be the same as those held by my clients or my colleagues. 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 2
  3. 3. Nuclear energy is valuable Low carbon energy Low cost energy High availability and reliability Profitable for unregulated owners Low rates for regulated utility and public power ratepayers 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 3 Existing nuclear power plants are valuable resources Nuclear energy is low-carbon and low-cost Existing US nuclear power plants are operating well, with very high availability to produce: •significant profits for unregulated utility or merchant generation company owners •low rates for customers of regulated and public power utility owners
  4. 4. Low nuclear production costs 9 8 7 cents / kWh 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: NEI Coal Gas Nuclear 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 4 Nuclear power low and stable production costs are a key advantage Marginal costs of nuclear energy are even lower, perhaps equal to zero. Short-run marginal costs are the costs that change due to a small change in output for a short time period – for nuclear power plants, this is at or close to zero If carbon costs (or other emissions costs) were included in fossil power plant costs, nuclear energy would be even more competitive Of course, production costs for gas generation are down this year. If there is a real shale- based gas bubble, there is a possibility of a return to the low and stable gas prices prior to 2000.
  5. 5. Long nuclear plant operating life Wind CT CCGT Nuclear 0 20 40 60 80 Typical operating life 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 5 Long nuclear power plant operating life is a positive attribute. Nuclear units operate for a long time after capital recovery is complete While cash flows more than about 25 years into the future add little to NPV using any reasonable discount rates, a 25-year old nuclear plant is a valuable and profitable asset (whether for shareholders of a non-regulated company or ratepayers of a regulated utility) A key challenge is getting investors/shareholders/ratepayers comfortable with investing today’s dollars in new nuclear projects with upside that is 25 years or more into the future High capital costs over a long life suggested a role for government and/or regulation
  6. 6. How to get more nuclear energy? Increase output of existing plants – Improve performance – Nuclear power plant roll-up License renewal / life extension Uprate and . . . Build new nuclear power plants 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 6 The first way to get more nuclear energy is to work existing nuclear plants harder and longer Companies that developed a superior organizational approach to running nuclear power plants (e.g., Constellation, Dominion, Entergy, Exelon) were able to make money by transferring this institutional knowledge to other plants they acquired This nuclear “fixer-upper” strategy has gone well, but there are few fixer-uppers left in the US. Is it time for industry leaders to consider an international fixer-upper strategy? License renewal - Most US nuclear units have already gotten NRC approval for a 20-year license renewal, most other units have applications in the review process. 80 year (or longer) life is not out of the question for existing nuclear plants Uprate - Many US units have already received approval for uprates and have implemented them, with some units including extensive secondary plant re-works to accommodate higher electrical output. Other units have or will apply for uprates Building new nuclear power plants is the biggest way to get more nuclear energy, but is the most difficult
  7. 7. NEW nuclear plant economics New nuclear plants have high value . . . – Low energy cost – Long operating life But face some hurdles – Long lead time – High overnight capital cost – High degree of regulatory oversight 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 7 Developing a new nuclear power plant built is not easy; nuclear power projects (especially the first few new nuclear power projects) may not fit well into commercial project development/project finance framework New nuclear power projects are: (a) very capital intensive; and (b) invested capital is at risk for a long time before revenue is received (lead time) and even longer before payback Nuclear projects face a level of regulatory oversight that is much higher than other commercial power plant technologies; this is a key driver of the long development period (e.g., time to get a COL), raises cost and increases risk for developers Many of the risks for a nuclear power plant are during the long development and construction phase - when significant capital has been spent but before there is any revenue or profits.
  8. 8. Long lead time PV CT Wind CCGT Nuclear 0 4 8 12 Years prior to Operation Development Construction Source: EIA 2009 Annual Energy Outlook input assumptions for construction (lead time); development period is estimate 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 8 Long lead time brings additional costs and risks IDC: Interest during construction (IDC) is much higher for nuclear, a combination of high capital cost and longer development/construction period. A solution for investor-owned utilities is to get approval to put IDC into rates as it is incurred (i.e., get a return on CWIP), rather than capitalizing the IDC and putting it into rate base at commercial operation Decision under uncertainty: Key decision factors (e.g., need for new capacity, the market price outlook) may change during the 11 year lead time for a nuclear power plant. Shorter lead time for other technologies lowers this risk; an investor/utility relying on a CT or CCGT may be able to wait longer to commit (i.e., closer to need for more capacity), so that decisions can be made with additional (and better) information. Disruptions: Once a commitment to construction is made, the longer construction period for a nuclear plant may mean longer exposure to risk from disruptions Nuclear power lead time could be shorter if a developer had an approved (and banked) ESP, then used an approved certified design in a COL application Nuclear construction might be shorter (4 years or less) if modular construction works well and the industry gets down the learning curve with a mature supply chain
  9. 9. High overnight capital cost 6,000 5,000 4,000 $ / kWe 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 NUCLEAR Wind IGCC IGCC w/CCS PV Hydro Wind Offshore Biomass Fuel Cells Conv. Coal CCGT w/ CCS CT CCGT Geothermal Solar Thermal Source: EIA 2009 Annual Energy Outlook; 2008 overnight cost including contingency in 2007 $/kW; nuclear increased from $3,318 to $4,000 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 9 Nuclear is one of the most capital intensive energy technologies, per unit of capacity output Even with this high capital cost, nuclear energy life-cycle costs in $/kWh are low due to high capacity factor, low marginal cost, and long operating life Importantly, nuclear overnight capital cost is significantly higher than CT, CCGT and conventional coal options $4,000/kWe used in this chart is only an estimate of overnight costs; until there is more experience with completed and operational nuclear plants, nuclear capital costs will be less certain than the capital costs of other generation technologies with significant completed project experience
  10. 10. Reactor Design Evolution 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 10 Areva explained the UAE loss as the result of a “cheap Generation II” reactor design sold by the Koreans, yet the Korean APR1400 (based on System 80+) is similar to the EPR, with active reactor safety There is no real definition of Generation III/III+; here are some attributes: •Large size •Aircraft crash resistance •Passive safety - no active controls or operator intervention to avoid accidents •Low accident probability (e.g., less than 1 core damage event in 20 million years for EPR, compared to 1 event in 100,000 years for Gen II •Modular construction and design for fewer components, less materials, less welding •Improved fuel design for longer refueling cycle and higher fuel burnup •Standardized design to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and construction time •Higher availability and operating life of 60 years or more •Better load-following capability Source: DOE (http://nuclear.energy.gov/genIV/neGenIV1.html
  11. 11. Vendor share - Gen III inside USA AP1000 4 6 3 EPR 1 1 2 ABWR 2 APWR 2 ESBWR 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 First Wave COL - active NRC review Proposed 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 11 Source: EDK global nuclear database, Mar 2010 First Wave – those units that are likely to start construction as soon as NRC approves their COL application (i.e., DOE Loan Guarantee finalists) COL-Active NRC Review – these units are officially still on the NRC active list and are proceeding. However, some of them are likely to slow down (i.e., put NRC review on hold) and none is expected to be in the First Wave Proposed – these units are those that have either (1) asked the NRC to suspend COL application review, or (2) have not yet filed a COL Application.
  12. 12. League table - Gen III inside USA Design First Wave Active COL review Proposed AP1000 4 - Vogtle (2), 6 - Lee/Duke (2), Levy 3 - Turkey Point/FPL (2), Summer (2) County (2), Harris (2) Bellefonte (1) EPR 1 - Calvert Cliffs 1 - Bell Bend 2 - Callaway, Nine Mile Point ABWR 2 - STP APWR 2 - Comanche Peak ESBWR 2 - Dominion, DTE 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 12 The first wave is now looking like no more than 4 projects, with the DOE loan guarantees being the deciding factor. Vogtle is on its way, having locked in a commitment for $8.3 billion of the $18.5 billion available Now the battle is for second place, as the remaining $10.2 billion may not be enough for two more large projects. NRG/NINA’s STP project and the UniStar Calvert Cliffs project are contending for the next tranche of loan guarantees – with SCE&G’s Summer project moving slower. TVA is completing the Gen II Watts Bar 2 unit and is considering whether to complete the old Gen II Bellefonte unit or to proceed with a new Gen III unit at the site.
  13. 13. US Nuclear Power First wave & Second wave clearer Obama support for nuclear power – State of the Union speech – First DOE Loan guarantee speech NRG & CPS settle STP dispute Vermont Yankee & Enexus Yucca Mountain dead – what next? 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 13 4 projects contending to be in the first wave, and two of them may not make it, due to limited loan guarantee funds Obama’s recent public support for nuclear power (e.g., Jan 2010 State of the Union Address and the Feb 2010 announcement of the Vogtle loan guarantee) Large increase in news/pundit coverage and may have pushed public opinion toward support of nuclear power Settlement announced in dispute between NRG and CPS Energy over the South Texas Project (STP). NRG/NINA now has a large share (93.375%) of the project Vermont senate votes to not approve Vermont Yankee license renewal; coupled with NY push back, may mean end of Enexus spin-off MEAG debt offering is oversubscribed – refutes the common view that new nuclear is not financeable; may mean that MEAG uses little of their Loan Guarantee Yucca Mountain now seems really dead, since the DOE withdrew the license application from the NRC. Blue ribbon panel will try to find another way, but on-site storage will be okay for many decades.
  14. 14. Vendor share - Outside USA CPR1000 4 14 24 32 AP1000 3 13 54 VVER 2 8 21 32 ABWR 4 3 9 & APR-1400 2 10 OPR1000 6 4 EPR 3 6 2 APWR 3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 In operation Under construction Planned Proposed 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 14 Source: EDK global nuclear database, Mar 2010 In operation = connected to grid and producing power Under construction = at first nuclear concrete pour Planned = units that typically have vendor, site, and other details firmed up; range from pre- construction to only a little more advanced than proposed unit Proposed = units that have been mentioned, but not yet planned; ranges from detailed project plans to press release/news story Big story here is that KNHP was NOT in the export market until the end of 2009
  15. 15. League table – Outside USA Design Op. Construction Planned Proposed CPR1000 4 - China 14 - China 24 - China 32 - China AP1000 3 - China 13 - China 54 - China (48), India (6) VVER 2 - China 8 - Russia (3), India 21 - India (8), 32 - Russia (28), (2), Bulgaria (2), Russia (7), China China (2), Iran (2) Iran (1) (4), Belarus (2) ABWR 4 - Japan 3 - Japan (1), 9 - Japan Taiwan (2) APR1400 2 - Korea 10 - Korea (6), UAE (4) OPR1000 6 - Korea 4 - Korea EPR 3 - Finland, 6 - India (4), 2 - India France, China China, France APWR 3 - Japan 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 15 This table (and the chart on the prior slide) Includes two designs that are usually considered as Gen II – the Chinese CPR1000 and the Korean OPR1000. Both these designs have features (e.g., digital I&C, 60-year life) that are similar to Gen III, but they are being built now and are much cheaper • CPR1000 is mostly Chinese clone of Daya Bay/Ling Ao; design is licensed from Areva • OPR1000 is based on Westinghouse/Combustion Engineering design There are differing views on which Russian VVER units are Gen III and which are Gen II – this table and the chart on the prior slide includes only recent units that are thought to be Gen III (e.g., the recently completed Rostov/Volgodonsk Unit 2 is Gen II, Units 3 and 4 are Gen III)
  16. 16. International Nuclear Power UAE reactor vendor selection changes the game French nuclear industry discord & review Other – Lithuania, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Poland – Bulgaria – Czech Republic – Turkey, Armenia – Jordan, Egypt, 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 16 Dec 2009 UAE selection of a South Korean consortium for 4 nuclear plants changed the reactor vendor situation in a big way – Koreans move up the league tables French nuclear industry review – Roussely, former EdF head, appointed to complete review in April 2010 – some predict that this will mean big changes for Areva Baltic region – Lithuania’s Ignalina 2 is shut down and a search for investors for a replacement is on; meanwhile the Russians start a new nuclear plant next door in Kaliningrad and plan a new nuclear plant in Belarus (at Lithuanian border), and Poland announces plans for nuclear power Bulgaria – RWE walks away from Belene deal, Bulgaria is looking for new strategic investor, Rosatom has offered to fund the deal (as well as build the plant) and may prevail Czech – Temelin tender includes Russian designs, moves ahead Turkey – cancels 2009 nuclear deal with Rosatom, may re-open tender; Armenia may get new Russian nuclear plant(s) Jordan and Egypt – both have retained consulting/engineering firms to move toward tenders; much recent interest in Korean reactors after UAE selection South Africa – news stories suggest a new nuclear tender process in late 2010 Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia – all talking about nuclear
  17. 17. Cost estimates escalating 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 17 Source: Mark Cooper; “The Economics of Nuclear Reactors,” June 2009, page 3 Large increase in cost estimates (pink dots); Cooper suggests that this is a repeat of the situation in the last wave (blue dots) While Cooper puts actual costs (blue dots) and cost estimates (pink dots) on same chart, cost estimates are different from actual completed plant costs; not much information on real plant costs for new units (i.e., few are completed and the Russian, Chinese and Korean unit completed costs are not easy to know) An increase in cost estimates is not the same thing as an increase in actual costs Actual costs in the earlier wave went up for some specific reasons (TMI, IDC, design changes during construction, etc.) Why are cost estimates going up today?
  18. 18. Nuclear plant costs Concept phase Mature phase Concept to first-of-a-kind FOAK unit learning used in (FOAK) unit building multiple units FOAK Unit Cost Concept Years 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 18 Cost estimates are increasing because of the transition from concepts to FOAK real units. Concept phase - Cost estimates increase as concepts become real offers to build the first- of-a-kind (FOAK) units - “Paper reactors are always cheaper than real reactors” FOAK costs are high due to sparse supply chain, semi-custom fabrication of components, little competition; A lot of risk for buyers (T&M contract) and sellers (firm, fixed price contracts) leads to high contingencies and high transaction costs FOAK plants built - The first units built will be among the most expensive. A lot of learning at all levels – will lead lower risk and lower costs as real units are completed; Areva in Finland = FOAK EPR; Sanmen in China (and Vogtle in US) = FOAK AP1000 Mature phase - More units are built, costs decline; vendors, constructors and suppliers move down the learning curve; mature and competitive supply chain is established; long production lines; competition among vendors and suppliers; risk and transaction costs are lower The nuclear power industry, if it reaches the mature phase, should have costs that are much lower than the FOAK costs now seen. Experience from Korea, Russia, China and Japan demonstrate this.
  19. 19. First Wave = more hurdles First Wave projects – Face higher risks and higher costs – Blaze the path for Second Wave projects New nuclear unit hurdles and issues – NRC regulatory process – State regulation / electricity markets – Infrastructure and supply chain – Schedule & capital cost risk 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 19 First Wave units will face higher costs and risks Later projects will benefit from First Wave experience and have lower risks and costs First Wave of new nuclear in the US will be only the 2 or so projects that get DOE loan guarantees The reasons that a First Wave nuclear plant project is difficult include: NRC regulatory process State regulation / electricity markets Infrastructure and supply chain Schedule & capital cost risk The timing and number of nuclear projects in the Second Wave is highly uncertain
  20. 20. EPAct of 2005 Focused on First Wave (e.g., FOAK) – DOE Loan Guarantees are key benefit First Wave will test and refine – COL & ITAAC process – Gen III detailed design & EPC contracts – Financing, infrastructure and supply chain Build industry experience and confidence 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 20 EPAct of 2005 provides incentives for a limited number of First Wave projects DOE Loan Guarantees are a key incentive, even though some see the program as moving slowly and the important subsidy cost issue remains open When First Wave projects are completed and placed in commercial operation, industry confidence and experience will be higher and industry infrastructure/ supply chain will have been established Second Wave projects (benefiting from First Wave efforts) may not need these incentives EPAct of 2005 benefits were defined before recent nuclear capital cost estimates With higher nuclear capital costs and no carbon benefits, there are two large issues: 1. Will the EPAct incentives be enough for a First Wave (original concept was no more than 6 units, now it looks like fewer) 2. Will the Second Wave need incentives to be developed?
  21. 21. DOE Loan Guarantees First Conditional Commitment issued Subsidy fee amount still uncertain Funding when COL is approved MEAG in bond market already 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 21 Conditional Commitments issued • There are a lot of conditions (for DOE and applicant) • Some of the $18.5 billion is committed and no longer available to remaining applicants • Applicant with strong credit sees Loan Guarantee as option for lower-cost funding (MEAG seems to have found funding already) • Loan Guarantee seems to be requirement for merchant nuclear projects Subsidy fee amount still uncertain – OMB is key player • Subsidy fee depends on project (credit quality, corporate guarantees, project risk) • If fee is high, applicants may not take Loan Guarantee • Applicant with strong credit, can afford to get commitment and wait • Merchant generators needs certainty on subsidy fee NOW to proceed • Conditional commitment for Vogtle without subsidy fee decided took pressure off OMB Loan Guarantee Closing in about 2012 • Conditions include receipt of NRC COL approval (2012?)
  22. 22. New nuclear ownership Commercial power projects Public participation – State cost-of-service regulation – DOE Loan guarantees Government projects – Fast and clear commitment – Government finance – Fewer parties - lower transaction costs 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 22 Commercial projects (e.g., US) Merchant nuclear plants will have a hard time, especially those in the first wave Public participation State regulators can make resource planning decisions today that benefit future ratepayers The low-cost, long-term, high-leverage debt from the DOE Loan Guarantee program will help, but is now only available (so far) to a few First Wave projects Government Projects (e.g., China, UAE) Fast and clear commitment – governments can decide quickly and make strong commitments, unlike commercial nuclear projects that need agreement from multiple stakeholders (investors, lenders, shareholders, regulators, etc.) Government cost of capital - lower IDC, lower cost of capital Lower transaction costs – A government that is builder, owner, regulator and operator can internalize the multiple transactions (each with risk sharing, contingencies, and profits) that are in a commercial project, to get lower transaction costs and faster schedules
  23. 23. Role of government Gov’t / public role in existing nuclear power plants Most new nuclear power plants gov’t-owned US - EPAct of 2005 reflects limited gov’t role UK - similar to US merchant projects 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 23 All operating nuclear plants built with government or public support • In most countries, investment by governments or government-owned utilities • In US, a mix of regulated IOUs and public power (municipals, coops, TVA) New nuclear power plants are mostly being built by governments; some countries are using domestic nuclear plant build to establish national nuclear industrial capability and vendors - France, Russia, Japan, and ROK – China is close behind Electricity industry restructuring usually means lower incentives for baseload projects – this is true in some US regions, and in all of UK US EPAct of 2005 intended to re-start US nuclear industry & facilitate FOAK investment by • Demonstrating that the new NRC licensing process works • Getting a few standard designs certified and licensed • Getting some site ESP permits approved • Getting a few FOAK units built • Kick-starting the nuclear industry supply chain UK new nuclear is in hard spot; Public government position = “no support” yet EdF and other developers may not build nuclear without support; Ofgem consultation paper in Feb 2010; includes re-nationalizing industry (seen as cover for government assistance to nuclear)
  24. 24. Country perspective China 60 New Nuclear planned (GWe) 40 Japan 20 Russia USA ROK India UK France UAE 0 Role of Government Size of bubble is operational nuclear plants (GWe); red countries have national vendor 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 24 Premise: Countries with a large role for government in electricity sector and nuclear power (e.g., China, France, Russia, India, UAE, etc.) will: • Build large fleets of nuclear power plants inside their countries • Establish a large, experienced and credible nuclear industrial base • Create a National nuclear power plant vendor to compete in the global market Japan – the relatively loose coalition between utilities, industrial companies and government may not be as effective as the tight link in Russia, China, France, and even South Korea. Market timing - reactor vendors peaked early, with ABWR units completed in the 1990s Vendors invested in the US reactor market; Toshiba = Westinghouse; GE-Hitachi JV. Toshiba/Westinghouse big winner in China and US; GE/Hitachi has not made a single sale yet; MHI has a single sale in Texas, but seems well back in the pack France – Areva’s strategy a decade ago to sell a firm fixed price unit in Finland was good; execution has been poor
  25. 25. SMA reactors - potential benefits Lower total plant cost – easier to fund Shorter construction time – factory build Smaller size with dispersed locations – Lower transmission build – Lowers single shaft risk Longer fuel cycle – with exotic reactor designs Safer – lower accident and proliferation risk 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 25 SMA is Small, Modular, Alternate SMA reactors come in different sizes, reactor types (LWR, IFR, liquid metal), fuel types, and power production approaches Lower total plant cost – avoids the issue of having a single new plant be a significant portion of balance sheet value Shorter construction time – factory build and truck/rail transport lowers time on construction in field, also may allow higher quality and lower cost for inspections Smaller size with dispersed locations • Lower transmission build – especially if sited near existing (soon-to-be-extinct) coal plants • Lower single shaft risk • Lower planning and decision risk with multiple small commitments Longer fuel cycle – exotic reactor designs, such as IFR (Integral Fast Reactor), have 1:1 breeder ratio that replenishes fuel as it runs Safer – lower accident risk and lower proliferation risk Today, entrepreneurs trying to raise capital for these SMA reactors.
  26. 26. SMA reactors - key questions Can these designs get an NRC license? When will a commercial product be available? What is delivered cost ($/kWe; $/MWh)? Will the benefits be enough to overcome the loss of scale economies? Will any operational issues arise? Will there really be a market? 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 26 Some SMA designs concepts may not fit with NRC safety approach without major changes SMA commercial product may not be available for 10 years (or more) from now The delivered cost ($/kWe; $/MWh) might be much higher than large light water reactors SMA benefits may not be enough to overcome the loss of scale economies? SMA operational issues are unknown - Large LWRs have a half-century of experience (hundreds of operating units, millions of operating hours, thousands of refueling outages) built into large Gen III designs SMA business models may be based on large production runs – need to sell a lot of units PBMR is a cautionary tale: seen as “promising” for over 50 years, multiple prototypes built, still not a commercial product. Key industry lessons from PBMR: • Promising technology concepts do not always work in reality • A lot of detailed engineering & development needed to get to real power plant • SMA reactors may not easily reach commercial product stage, even if they work • Adding technology risk and licensing risk to a difficult nuclear project will be hard for market to buy • Marketing/sales/promotion is not enough to get real nuclear power plants built
  27. 27. Front end - Uranium $140 $120 $100 $/lb of U3O8 $80 $60 $40 $20 $0 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Mar-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jul-09 Mar-06 May-06 Sep-06 Nov-06 May-07 Nov-07 Mar-08 May-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 Mar-09 May-09 Sep-09 Nov-09 Jan-10 Mar-10 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 27 This is the nominal “spot price” for uranium yellowcake (U3O8) Fundamental supply and demand have not changed much over this period, despite the price spike. Increased world production is being matched by major purchases by India and China. Areva has recently announced lower production levels in response to soft uranium prices. The supply-demand fundamentals may change in 2013 (i.e., the end of the US-Russian HEU deal) and change again in later years as new nuclear power plants commence operation (e.g., Finland, China, etc).
  28. 28. Back end - Spent Fuel Yucca Mountain option seems gone – Over $30 billion paid into fund – About $10 billion spent on facilities Spent fuel stored at reactor site Potential for future use of “spent” fuel Multiple approaches to High Level Waste 23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 28
  29. 29. Contact Us Edward Kee Vice President Washington, DC +1 (202) 370-7713 edward.kee@nera.com © Copyright 2010 National Economic Research Associates, Inc. All rights reserved.