Effects of texting while driving and synthesizing psychology sources

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Write a paper from five pages in length on the subject of
“dealing with the effects of texting on driving”.
You should synthesize (meaning combine elements of several
sources—to help you make a point. Synthesizing is a matter of
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to combine clearly and coherently the ideas of more than one
source with your own) the findings of at least four psychology
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http://gateway.proquest.com.zeus.tarleton.edu:82/openurl?url_v
er=Z39.88-
2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=x
ri:pqm&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:10027727
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Ps choto icul Bulletin
19%, vå. 73, No. 4, 258-302
ALTRUISM—AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT AND A

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE I
DENNIS L. KREBS
Harvard University
Literature relating to altruism is reviewed. It is suggested that
the study of altruism is important at three levels: as it relates to
the main goal of socialization, to a core attribute of personality,
and to theories concerned with human nature. The concept of
altruism is examined. Independent variables associated with
altruism are organized in a 2 X 4 framework on the basis of the
source of experimental measurement and level of generality.
Characteristics of the benefactor and characteristics of the
recipient are categorized as state variables, trait variables,
social roles and demographic attributes, and characteristics
influenccd by social norms. Research at each level is critically
reviewed. Positive and negative affective states, and states
induced by the observation of models are found to influence the
altruism of benefactors; and dependency and interpersonal
attractiveness are found to influence the altruism-eliciting
capacity of recipients. Research relevant to personality traits is
criticized. Effects are found for sex, age, ordinal position,
social class, and nationality in relation to benefactors, and for
friendship status, ingroup affiliation, and social class in relation
to recipients. The normative level of analysis is criticized.
278 DENNIS L. KREBS
ALTRUISM 259
In 1956 Louis J. Budd reviewed the history of a "forgotten
aspect of social thought" in America. He concluded that
although concern with altruism had "threatened to become a
fad" in the 1890's, it had quickly died away. Of late, though,
there has been a renewed interest in altruism—less, however, as
a social panacea or religious ideal, and more as an aspect of
behavior worthy of scientific investigation.
It is not difficult to see why altruism has captured the interest
of social scientists. In view of its practical and theoretical

importance, it may well be wondered why the study of altruism
has only recently gained popularity. As the anthropologist
Bohannan (1963) pointed out, the most basic tenet of all major
religions of the world is that "unselfishness is the primary
virtue and that selfishness lies at the root of the world's ills [p.
336] But altruism is of interest for reasons other than its status
as a virtue or its role in the main-
1 The author appreciatively acknowledges the help and
inspiration supplied by Judith Anne Krebs and Robert
Rosenthal, both of whom worked overtime in his behalf. The
critical comments of Terence D. Creighton at' the University of
British Columbia are also acknowledged.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dennis L. Krel)S,
Department of Social Relations, William James Hall, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusctts 02138.
tenance of the social system. The study of altruism is important
at at least three distinct (yet interrelated) levels.
At the first level, it supplies information about a set of behavior
that constitutes the central goal of early socialization. As
pointed out by Anna Freud (1963) :
We know that the child acts throughout the period of
development above described [from birth to age five] as if there
was nothing more important than the gratifying of his own
pleasures and fulfilling of his powerful instincts, whereas
education proceeds as if the prevention of these objects was its
most important task [p. 101].
At the second level, altruism is important as a personality
attribute. People who are considered altruistic are reacted to
differently from those who are considered selfish. Because the
way people act is not always a veridical representation of the
way they feel, the attribution of altruism poses a particularly
difficult problem for self-theory and the study of person-
perception.
258
Finally, the study of altruism raises important questions about
the ability of several influential theories to account for the

apparently altruistic aspects of general human behavior.
Reinforcement theory, psychoanalytic theory, and the theory of
evolution seem to suggest that human behavior is essentially
egoistic. Yet, behavior that seems quite altruistic is apparent in
everyday life.
The bulk of research on altruism has not attempted to establish
the existence of altruism. The problems associated with the
identification of altruism, however, have not escaped
researchers. An examination of the contribution of the study of
altruism to the understanding of social behavior, personality,
and human nature must orient itself around the ways
investigators have dealt with the specification of the
phenomenon.
Altruism as a Social Behavior
Most behavioral research has skirted the problem associated
with the specification of altruism by employing operational
definitions. It has examined antecedents of behavior that
seemed altruistic, and assumed that motivations were congruent.
Although the antecedents of operations with undefined
motivational bases can be elucidated, it is important to make
sure that the conclusions that are drawn about them do not
relate back to the motivation implied by the category of
behavior in question. Motivational specification is particularly
important in relation to a moral behavior such as altruism. As
Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1964), and others have demonstrated,
it is more the intention behind an act than its consequences that
determines its moral value.
Fortunately, due to the constraints of experimental situations,
the range of ulterior motives in laboratory studies is usually
limited and the motivation behind the behavior in question quite
apparent. It must be realized, however, that although terms such
as prosocial behavior (Bandura & Walters, 1963), helping
behavior (Berkowitz, 1967), volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956),
gift-giving (Blake & Rosenbaum, 1955), sharing (Staub &
Sherk, in press), and aiding (Midlarsky, 1968b) all imply self-
sacrificial other-directed behavior, they do not establish it.

Altruism as a Personality Attribute
While researchers concerned with the antecedents of altruistic
behavior have generally chosen to define altruism operationally,
investigators concerned with altruism as a personality attribute
have usually sought a definition in the attributional processes of
average people. It could, of course, be argued that the layman's
implicit definition of altruism is of little concern to the social
scientist. It must be realized, though, that whatever errors the
layman may make in his attribution of altruism in specific
situations, the category of altruism is what he thinks it is—it
has no existence outside of the consensual agreements of people
(cf. Bruner, 1958) ; and it is the layman's definition that
determines his reactions.
Although new research may supply a more meaningful and
precise definition of altruism, it is interesting to note that social
scientists have generally employed everyday definitions. Leeds
(1963), for example, defined altruism on the basis of the same
three criteria that Heider (1958) identified as determinants of
the attributions of laymen. According to Leeds (1963), an
altruistic act (a) is an end in itself; it is not directed at gain, (b)
is emitted voluntarily, and (c) does good. Heider's (1958)
treatment of the determinants of gratitude (where gratitude is
the result of the attribution of altruism) mirrors Leeds' (1963)
definitional outline:
We do not feel grateful to a person who helps us [Leeds' point
c] fortuitously [a] or because he was forced to do so [b], or
because he was obliged to do so [b]. Gratitude is determined by
the will, the intention of the benefactor [p. 265].
Several recent studies have supported Heider's (1958)
propositions and Leeds' (1963) assumptions. Tesser, Gatewood,
and Driver (1968), for example, found that undergraduates
thought they would feel more gratitude when the benefit they
received was intentional, when it was valuable, and when it cost
the benefactor a great deal. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966),
Frisch and Greenberg (1968), Lerner and Lichtman (1968), and
Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968) found that help was most

liable to be reciprocated (and, by implication, considered
altruistic) when it was perceived as voluntary and intentional.
Brehm and Cole (1966), Kiesler (1966), and Schopler and
Thompson (1968) demonstrated that inappropriate favors
(favors whose intentions were in doubt) elicited less help than
appropriate favors. When the legitimacy of apparent altruism is
questioned, reciprocity is less likely to prevail.
Although research on attribution of altruism has elucidated
some common principles of judgment, it has not supplied any
information about the validity of common attributions. It has
classically been the problems associated with the validity of
judgments of altruism, and the existence of altruism itself, that
have concerned thinkers—it has seemed less important to know
why judgments are made than whether they are correct.
Altruism as a Part of Human Nature—its Challenge to Grand
Theories
In relation to the theory of reinforcement, psychoanalysis, and
the theory of evolution, the existence of behavior that seems
altruistic has created problems, Critics have asked, for example,
how behavior that sacrifices rewards can be consistent with the
principle of reinforcement. Intrinsic to the challenge that the
existence of altruism presents to antithetical theoretical
positions is the challenge that such positions present to the
existence of altruism itself.
Altruism in the theory of reinforcement. The problem of the
place of reinforcement in altruistic behavior really involves two
often confused questions. The first asks whether self-sacrificial
behavior can continue in the absence of positive reinforcement.
The second asks whether the average person includes behavior
that benefits another yet gains rewards in his category of
altruism. The first question cannot be answered in the form in
which it stands—it requires proof of the null hypothesis. The
second question is a matter of attribution.
Although no research has been reported which is directly
relevant to the attribution of altruism in situations of varying
rewards, some research on moral judgment seems relevant.

Kohlberg (in press) outlined three great stages in the
development of moral judgment. At the least mature stage
(Stage 1) judgments are made on the basis of the hedonic
consequences of an act (whether it elicits reward or punishment
from external sources) . At the second stage, morality is seen as
a function of the approval and disapproval of others. And at the
third stage it is judged in relation to internal standards.
Inasmuch as altruistic behavior is moral behavior, the
attribution of altruism should pass through the three
qualitatively different stages of moral development, and mature
judgments of altruism should be based on internal standards of
reciprocity and justice.
Reinforcement theorists have not generally concerned
themselves with the attribution of altruism. They have, rather,
attempted to demonstrate that although specific rewards do not
always follow altruistic responses, altruistic behavior can still
be a function of reinforcement.
In a study with Paskel (reported by Aronfreed, 1968), Aronfreed
found that children who were exposed to expressions of joy
(conditioned stimulus) at the same time as they were hugged
(unconditioned stimulus) and experienced positive affect
(unconditioned response) sacrificed candy in order to elicit
expressions of joy (which in turn evoked reinforcing positive
affect). Once learned, it was expected that internal
representation of expressive signs in the recipient would be
enough to reinforce altruistic responses. Aronfreed's position
implies that altruism involves a Cyrano de Bergerac type of
sacrifice.
Goldiamond (1968) identified three ways by which behavior
that seems to receive no immediate gains can be perpetuated. In
the first place, even though particular responses are not
rewarded, the net gains of the behavioral strategy may
ultimately be maximal. Second, the reinforcer, as in the case of
masochism, may be subtle. And finally, the behavior may
endure in the absence of reinforcement because the original
program of reinforcement rendered it resistant to extinction.

Altruism in Psychoanalytic theory. Although the challenge that
altruism has presented to reinforcement theory is more serious
than its challenge to psychoanalysis, Freud's contention that
children are basically selfish, iddriven animals has had
repercussions. As early as 1929, Wodehouse objected to
a certain doctrine which, ostensibly connected with [Freud I,
does seem to be bringing real danger into educational
psychology. It comes often in a broad and vague form which
needs a broad and vague name, and I will call it the doctrine of
Natural Selfishness [p. 39].
Partially as a result of psychoanalytic theory's inability to
explain altruistic behavior and other adaptive undefensive
behavior (Maddi, 1968), new developments tended to stress
adaptations of the ego (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Murray, 1938;
Sullivan, 1953; White, 1963). Deemphasis on id-driven behavior
served to soften the theory's insistence on natural egoism.
Altruism in the theory of evolution—theoretical arguments and
animal research. While the reaction to the egoistic assumptions
of psychoanalysis was largely theoretical, the reaction to the
apparent egoism of the theory of evolution came from both
theoretical and empirical sources. Theoreticians attempted to
show that the theory of evolution did not propose, or even
imply, the existence of innate egoism; and empiricists attempted
to demonstrate that infrahumans are capable of altruism.
Holmes (1945) argued against the popular egoistic
interpretation of Darwinian theory and insisted that altruistic
instincts were as basic as egoistic instincts. Derived from
"instincts subsidiary to the basic function of reproduction [p.
111]," he saw the function of altruism as the preservation of the
species, even at the cost of individual lives.
Campbell (1965) argued against the prevalence of "skin-surface
hedonism" and, on the basis of research demonstrating ingroup
solidarity and sacrifice in the face of outgroup threat, suggested
that altruistic motives are not only a function of sociocultural
evolution (are acquired), but also have a basis in biological
evolution (are innate). Altruism, he suggested, is likely to have

genetic determinants because of the survival value of ingroup
identification and outgroup hostility: "The tremendous survival
value of being social makes innate social motives as likely on a
priori grounds as self-centered ones [p. 3011 ." Both Holmes
(1945) and Campbell (1965) suggested that egoism, whose aim
is the survival of the individual, and altruism, whose aim is the
survival of the group, are in conflict, and that the conflict offers
the optimal evolutionary compromise.
While the arguments of theoreticians seem cogent (and, in fact,
are supported by a close reading of Darwin) the arguments of
empiricists have not fared so well. Empiricists have argued that
the demonstration of a phylogenetic increase in altruism would
implicitly support the likelihood of innate altruism in man. With
this in mind, researchers attempted to demonstrate the existence
of altruism in infrahumans.
Starting low on the phylogenetic scale, Rice and Gainer (1962)
found that albino rats were more likely to press a bar when it
lowered a struggling rat than when it lowered a styrofoam
block. Rice (1965) also found that rats (but not guinea pigs)
would press a bar to remove a companion from a tank of water.
The attribution of altruism in these cases, though, can be
questioned. It is posSible that the rat's reaction was a function
of the presence of another rat or the noxiousness of the screams
of the distressed rats. The latter suggestion received support
from a study by Lavery and Foley (1963), who found that rats
which were exposed to white noise made more noise-
terminating bar-presses than rats exposed to the recorded
squeals of other rats. The fact that more bar-presses were
elicited in the white-noise condition suggests that the white
noise was more noxious than recorded squeals, and that the
"altruism" of the Rice and Gainer (1962) and Rice (1965)
studies was simply a reaction to a noxious stimulus.
More doubt was placed on the existence of altruism in the
albino rat by another study by Rice (1964). Rats pressed a bar
less when it served to terminate a companion's shock than when
it did not. Rats which were exposed to a shocked companion

crouched in fear at the other side of their cages. A further
finding showed that rats failed to press a bar to terminate the
recorded squeals of other rats, as reported by Lavery and Foley
(1963). All considered then, no real support for the existence of
altruism in rats has been supplied.
More support for the existence of altruism in infrahumans,
though, has appeared in relation to higher forms of animals.
Summarizing research on primates, Hebb and Thompson (1954)
suggested that "there is definite evidence in other animals of a
phylogenetic development of something we call altruism,
defined as intrinsically motivated concern for others [p. 744] ."
Unfortunately, though, evidence for altruism came from mainly
anecdotal sources. In one of the only studies on altruism in
primates, Nissen and Crawford (1936) found that two of six
preadolescent chimpanzees sometimes gave food, and tokens
which could be exchanged for food, to chimps in adjoining
cages. The chimpanzees tended, though, to give only their least
preferred food, and to give only when food was solicited.
Although solicited giving (and prostitution) in wild chimps is
common (Yerkes & Yerkes, 1935), it is possible that the small
amount of unsolicited giving was an experimenter effect —a
result of modeling. Nissen and Crawford (1936) reported, in
fact, that experimenters were able to facilitate unsolicited food
passing.
It is very difficult to draw any conclusions from comparative
research. Infrahuman animals do perform acts which benefit
other animals, but the reasons behind these acts are almost as
ambiguous as those behind the behavior of humans. Although
the existence of genetic or biochemical determinants of altruism
is a fascinating possibility, it must remain only that until further
evidence appears.
In summary, the study of altruism is important at three
conceptually distinct levels, relating to behavior, personality,
and human nature. These levels are interrelated—judgments
about human nature are made on the basis of representative
personalities, and personalities are determined by samples of

behavior. The study of altruism is particularly important to the
understanding and implementation of socialization practices. It
is also significant to person-perception and selftheory as a core
personality attribute. And finally, it is important because it has
stimulated examination and change in several important
theoretical positions.
The question of the definition of altruism, and the related
question of whether altruism exists, have posed difficult
problems. Behavioral researchers have generally avoided the
definitional issue, which involves establishing the intention
behind apparently selfsacrificial other-oriented acts, by
employing operational definitions. Investigators concerned with
altruism as a personality characteristic have generally dealt with
the definitional issue by attempting to determine the principles
which underlie the attribution of altruism. They have not,
though, attempted to determine whether the altruism that was
attributed actually met the criteria of attribution. Finally,
research has been conducted and theoretical positions amended
in order to accommodate altruistic behavior. Positions which
seemed to pose challenges to the existence of altruism have
come to accept the fact that altruistic behavior occurs (within
the definitional constraints of the theory in question), and have
set out to explain it.
All in all, though, the definitional problem, which involves the
status of altruism as a dependent variable, has attracted very
little attention from recent researchers. They have generally
been content to assume that behavior that seems altruistic is
altruistic, and to concern themselves with its determinants. It is
to determinants and correlates of apparent altruism, then, that a
review of the literature must turn.
AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FORVARIABLES
ASSOCIATED WITH ALTRUISM
In the past few years researchers on altruism have studied so
many variables that an integrated perspective is already
difficult. It seems possible, however, to attain some integrative
clarity by ordering the variables along two dimensions. To

begin with, the prototypical altruistic situation involves
someone who gives (a benefactor), and someone who receives (a
recipient). In some cases, characteristics of the benefactor
affect altruism, and in other cases it is characteristics of the
recipient. Independent variables, then, can be divided into those
which relate to characteristics of the benefactor, and those
which relate to characteristics of the recipient. It is, of course,
true that all variables have an ultimate effect on the benefactor,
but the effect is often achieved by varying characteristics of
recipients. The first dimension of classification, then, separates
variables which relate to the characteristics of benefactors that
cause or correlate with altruism from the altruism-eliciting
characteristics of recipients.
Independent variables can also be classified according to their
level of generality. Research on altruism has manipulated
independent vari-
TABLE 1
A CLASSIFICATION or INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
EMPLOYED IN RESEARCH ON ALTRUISM
Categories of independent variables
Source of experimental variation
Characteristics of the benefactor
Characteristics of the recipient
Situational state variables
Trait variables
Social roles and demographic variables
Social norms
Positive affective states
Negative affective states
States induced by the observation of models
Increased salience of social norms and behavior alternatives
Information about appropriateness
Information about consequences
Internalization of altruistic dispositions
Experimenter effects

Variables that relate to rating-scale measures of altruism
Variables that relate to pencil-and-paper measures of altruism
Variables that relate to behavioral measures of altruism Sex
Sex differences in children
Sex differences in adults
Age
Ordinal position
Social class and group affliation
Nationality
Norm of social responsibility
Norm of giving
Dependency
Interpersonal attractiveness
As an independent variable
As a mediating variable
Locus of dependency
Other trait characteristics
Friendship status
Ingroup affliation
Social class
Norm of reciprocity
Reciprocity
Generalized reciprocity
ables at four more or less distinct levels of generality. The first
level involves temporary psychological states, such as those that
accompany experiences of success, failure, dependency,
interpersonal attraction, and the observation of models. Most of
the research on altruism relates to state variables, probably
because they are the easiest to manipulate in laboratory
experiments. Independent variables of the state type are largely
situational. They have an immediate, temporary, and relatively
limited effect, and they usually say little about the nature of the
people whom they affect.
The second level of generality involves personality traits.
Although states and traits may well interrelate, trait variables

such as cyclothymia, need for approval, and conservatism refer
to more general and lasting attributes of people. In some cases,
traits seem to correspond to the characteristic states of people.
Studies which examine trait variables are usually less
manipulatively experimental than studies which examine state
variables. They generally correlate rating-scale or
questionnaire-derived measures of personality traits with an
index of altruism.
At the third level—that which involves social roles and
demographic variables such as social class, age, and sex—the
level of generality is even greater. Social roles and demographic
variables differ from trait variables because they are more
general, permanent, and basically characteristic. Social roles, of
course, often relate to personality traits and psychological
states. Women and children, for example, are expected to react
differently from men and adults.
The final level, which deals with social norms, is the most
general of the four. Norms such as the norm of social
responsibility and the norm of reciprocity, if not universal
(Gouldner, 1960), affect most people in most cultures. In fact, it
could be argued that internalized social norms are so general
that they supply no information about the variance in incidences
of altruism. Their effect may only be of interest as it relates to
temporary states, personality traits, and general social roles.
Several researchers, however, have attributed variations in
altruism to the effect of social norms. The problems presented
by the normative approach will be examined more closely when
related research is reviewed.
A classificatory framework that involves the interaction
between two sets of criteria has been outlined. Table 1 presents
the resulting eight categories and an outline of the variables
within the categories that have been examined.
ALTRUISM AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPORARYSTATES OF
THE BENEFACTOR
The preponderance of research on altruism has manipulated
situational variables which induce states in benefactors that

mediate altruistic responses. The state may be a simple affective
state, or a cognitive state which relates to particular response
dispositions.
Research which has manipulated situational variables and their
corresponding psychological states can be divided into three
categories. The first two relate to affective states, and the third
relates to cognitive states induced by the observation of models.
Positive states have been created by supplying experiences
which involve success and the perception of competence.
Negative states have been created by supplying experiences
which involve failure, unintentional harm to another, and acts of
transgression. Finally, states have been induced by the
presentation of altruistic models. Table 2 contains an outline of
research which has manipulated positive and negative affective
states.
Positive States of the Benefactor
Four studies have tested the effect of experiences of success and
competence on altruism. Berkowitz and Conner (1966) tested
the hypothesis that success increases the salience of the social
responsibility norm, which leads to altruism toward dependent
others. They found that success on a simple task resulted in
greater effort on behalf of a highly dependent peer than did
failure or no experience at all. Success did not result in more
helping for others of low dependency.
The Berkowitz and Conner (1966) study used undergraduates. A
later study by Staub ( 1968) suggested that there may be
developmental differences in reactions to success and failure.
Although fifth-grade children tended to leave more candy for a
hypothetical other after they succeeded (versus failed or did
average) on a bowling game task, fourth-grade children left
more after they failed. The author suggested that a "norm of
deserving" motivated the fourth graders, but that the fifth
graders were motivated by "norms or standards or values
directly related to sharing." No reason was given, though, why
the two norms should differentially affect the two particular age
groups in question. The additional finding that children who

saw themselves as having internal control over their
environment shared more after success than those who felt
externally controlled suggests that perceived competence is
related to sharing.
A relationship between competence and altruism was found by
Midlarsky (1968a) . Subjects who were told that they adapted
well to electric shock (high competence) took more shocks for
another than those who were told they adapted poorly.
Unfortunately, the shocks were not of equal intensity across
conditions. A later study by Kazdin and
Bryan,[footnoteRef:1]though, which controlled for the cost of
helping, found essentially the same thing. Subjects who were
told they were highly competent on tasks which were both
relevant and irrelevant to the dependent variable offered to
donate more blood than those who were told they were
incompetent. The notion that a temporary state mediated the
altruism was supported by the fact that very few volunteers
followed through with their commitment to give blood. Once
they had a chance to recover from the positive experience, it
would appear, their altruistic inclinations decreased. (It is, of
course, possible that some subjects generalized their perceived
competence to getting rid of the solicitor, with no intention of
ever giving blood.) [1: Kazdin, A. E., & Bryan, J. H.
Competence and volunteering. Unpublished manuscript,
Northwestern University, 1968.]
Some naturalistic reports relating to reactions to disasters (e.g.,
Form & Nosow, 1958; Torrance & Ziller, 1957) suggest that
observers who perceive themselves as competent in emergency
situations help more than
TABLE 2
STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED THE EFFECT or AFFECTIVE
STATES OE THE BENEFACTOR ON ALTRUISM
Author and date

Subjects
Sex Age
N
Main independent variables
Main dependent variables
Positive states of the benefactor
Berkowitz & Conner (1966)
Staub (1968)
Midlarsky (1968a)
Kazdin & Bryan
M
M
cs
9, 10
cs
cs
108
196
80
96
Success, failure, or no experience on jigsaw task ; high,
intermediate, low dependency of recipient.
Success, failure, moderate performance on bowling game task,
locus of control.
Ability to adapt well (high competence) or poorly (low
competence) to
shocks; high vs. low dependency of recipient ; visibility.
Success vs. average performance on task; task relevant or
irrelevant to dependent variable.
Number of envelopes made for recipient
Weight of candy left for recipient.
Number of shock contingent problems completed for recipient.
Frequency of volunteering to give blood.

Negative states of the benefactor
Darlington & Macker (1966)
Rawlings (1968)
Krebs & Baer
Lerner & Matthews (1967)
Lerner
Freedman et al. (1967)
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Berscheid & Walter (1967)
Epstein & Hornstein (1969)
Wallace & Sadalla (1966)
Silverman (1967)
F
F
M
M
cs
cs
cs
CS
cs
HS
cs
cs
adult cs
cs
11
39
40
40
66
61

16
67
74
240
60
55
199
Failure which harms (vs.
does not harm) another.
Failure which harms another vs. observation of harm to another
Success or failure on intelligence test ; harm or help to another.
Fate of recipient dependent vs. independent of draw of
benefactor.
Fate of recipient dependent on draw of benefactor vs. draw of
experimenter.
Telling a lie vs. not telling a lie.
Responsibility for upsetting index cards.
Responsibility for upsetting index cards.
Opportunity to compensate harm done adequately.
Punishment (vs. no punishment) for selfish choice ; liked,
disliked, neutral recipien t.
Public, private, or no transgression.
Private high cheating, private low cheating, no cheating.
Frequency of volunteering to give blood (after three requests).
Duration of reciprocal shocks.
Amount of help volunteered for charitable cause.
Frequency of choices to comfort partner.
Frequency of choices to take partner's place; frequency of
choices to comfort partner
Frequency of volunteering for pleasant or unpleasant
experiment.
Frequency of volunteering
for victim's vs. nonvictim's experiment.
Frequency of volunteering to help victim in person vs, not in
person.
Frequency of compensating victim and nonvictim.

Frequency of selfish choices (choices which earned 104 but
shocked another) .
Frequency of volunteering for stress experiment.
Amount of free-play time volunteered for experiment.
Note.—Abbreviations are : HS = high school student; CS —
college student. 8 Age of first-grade children estimated at 6,
etc. b Sex constituted a variable.
those who do not. Competence in disasters, though, is different
from most experimentally manipulated competence. In
experiments, the experience of success seems to increase
selfesteem, which leads to increased positive affect and
altruism. In disaster situations, however, it would seem that it is
the implicit role requirements associated with competence,
especially when the competence is the result of special training,
that mediate helping behavior.
In summary, although none of the relevant experiments supplied
unequivocal evidence, they all found indications that altruistic
responses on behalf of dependent others are more probable after
success than after failure, or after a neutral experience.
Negative States of the Benefactor
Of the studies that compared the effects of success and failure
on altruism, only one (Staub, 1968) found a positive
relationship between failure and altruism, for fourth-grade
children, and that relationship reversed itself in the fifth grade.
Other studies, though, have found that failure which has a
particular consequence—harm to another—leads to altruistic
responses. Darlington and Macker (1966), for example, found
that failure to complete a pencil-and-paper task correctly
resulted in more agreement to give blood when the failure hurt a
helpful other than when it did not. The findings were interpreted
as evidence for displacement of guilt-produced altruism.
Because it was only after the third of three appeals for blood
that any difference was found, and because 13 subjects were
discarded, the results of the study must be viewed with caution.
Moreover, a later study (Rawlings, 1968) found that the

observation of a person receiving harm is enough in itself to
induce altruism. Although subjects whose errors on a task
caused their partners to receive shocks delivered reciprocal
shocks of short duration to a third person (and, therefore longer
duration to themselves), reciprocal shocks of short duration
were also given when they only observed their partners getting
shocked.
A study by Krebs and Baer [footnoteRef:2] compared [2:
Krebs, D. L., & Baer, R. The effect of perceived competence
and unintentional help and harm to]
the effect that experiences of success, failure, and helping and
harming another had on charitable behavior. Altruism was
greatest after failure which harmed another, and least after
success which benefited another. There was no difference
between the straight success and failure conditions. The
findings were interpreted as support for a self-concept
equilibrium model which suggests that people whose self-
images are unrepresentatively low are likely to seize an
opportunity to behaviorally reassert a more favorable
selfdefinition. Unrepresentatively high self-images, on the other
hand, are not maximized.
In the Krebs and Baer (see Footnote 3) study, the success and
failure of the potential benefactor had a corresponding effect on
his partner, and the altruism was directed to a charitable cause.
Studies by Lerner and his associates demonstrated that partner-
oriented altruism occurs in situations where success for self
results in failure for another. Subjects who drew a slip of paper
that assigned them to a control condition and their partner to a
shock condition (fates interdependent) were more prone to
comfort the other and volunteer to take his place than subjects
who determined only their own fate (fates independent; Lerner
and Matthews, 1967) or subjects whose fates were determined
by the experimenter (Lerner 4 ).
Other studies that did not involve success and failure have
supplied further support for the notion of reparative altruism.

Two studies investigated the effect of compliant and
unintentional harm-doing on altruism. Carlsmith and Gross
(1969) found that subjects in a Milgram (1963) type of situation
who delivered shocks to another were more likely to volunteer
to support a humanitarian project than those who did not shock
another. Freedman, Wallington, and Bless (1967, Experiment 2)
found that subjects who knocked over a pile of index cards were
more willing to volunteer for an experiment to help another than
those who did not, providing that the solicitor was not the
owner
another on altruism. Paper submitted for publication.
4 Lerner, M. S. The effect of a negative outcome on cognitions
of responsibility and attraction. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Kentucky, 1968,.
of the index cards. In a similar situation (Experiment 3),
subjects who harmed another were more likely to volunteer to
help him if they did not expect to meet him than if they did.
Although harm-doing elicited altruism, it was not oriented
directly toward its victim.
The Darlington and Macker (1966), Krebs and Baer (see
Footnote 3), Carlsmith and Gross (1969), and Freedman et al.
(1967) studies suggest that reparative altruistic behavior
relieves an unpleasant negative state associated with lowered
self-esteem by supplying a situation in which a wrong can be
righted and self-esteem elevated. The Rawlings (1968) and
Lerner and Matthews (1967) studies, though, lend themselves to
a slightly different interpretation. It may be that harming
another creates a feeling of guilt, which results in expiative
self-punitive responses. In cases where altruism was directed
toward the expiation of guilt it would be expected that (a)
private transgressions would lead to expiative responses, and
(b) self-punitive expiation would be preferred to nonpunitive
reparation. These predictions do not follow from a reparative
self-esteem model because the function of altruism is to reassert
a new self-definition, with no necessity for pain.

Although it is possible that transgression elicits reparative
responses in some situations by some people, and expiative
responses in other situations by other people, it seems that the
altruistic responses in most of the relevant studies were of the
reparative nature. Freedman et al. (1967, Experiment 1), for
example, failed to find, as expected, that subjects who lied
about their knowledge of an experiment chose the more
unpleasant of two other experiments. And Berscheid and
Walster (1967) found that harm-doers were most likely to
compensate their victims when they could make exact
reparation. Female members of church auxiliaries who caused
their partners to lose needed books of green stamps
subsequently awarded bonuses to them if the bonuses were
neither insufficient nor excessive relative to the original loss.
The behavior of the church ladies, in the experiment at least,
hardly seemed self-punitively expiative.
There is one study, though, that lends itself to an expiation
interpretation. If guilt is relieved by punishment, then it can be
predicted that punished responses are less likely to extinguish
than responses that are not punished. This prediction was
partially supported by Epstein and Hornstein (1969). They
found that selfish behavior toward a disliked other (pressing a
lever which maximized chances of gaining ten cents, while
delivering an electric shock to another) increased, and altruistic
behavior decreased, when selfish behavior was punished by a
third person. Due to the fact that selfish behavior toward a liked
other decreased after punishment, the generality of the findings
is limited.
Two final studies suggest that private transgressions are not as
likely to lead to altruistic reparation as public transgressions.
Wallace and Sadalla (1966) found that subjects who broke an
expensive machine were more likely to volunteer for a painful
experiment than those who did not, but only if their
transgression was discovered. Silverman (1967) failed to find a
higher incidence of volunteering from children who cheated on
a task but did not consider themselves caught than from those

who did not cheat.
In summary, many studies have supported the notion that public
transgression, whether intentional or unintentional, whether
immoral or only situationally unfortunate, leads to reparative
altruism. Reparative altruism would seem to alleviate a negative
state associated with lowered self-esteem. When amends cannot
be made to the victim, reparative responses are generalized to
others; in fact, in some situations reparative responses are made
only if they can be directed toward a third party.
States Induced by the Observation of Altruistic Models
The observation of models, according to Bandura and Walters
(1963), affects behavior in two distinct ways: by inducing the
acquisition of long-term behavioral dispositions, and by
inducing the performance of imitative behavior. The acquisition
of response dispositions, which, in relation to moral behavior, is
referred to as internalization, forms the basis of behavioral
analogues in which models correspond to parents, and modeling
effects are thought to lead to long-range changes in personality.
Performance, on the other hand, refers to situation-specific
behavior that occurs as the result of the induction of temporary
states. Although most of the research on modeling relates to the
performance of altruistic behavior, much of it is interpreted as
evidence for the internalization of altruistic dispositions. It is,
of course, difficult to sort out acquisition and performance
effects in one-shot laboratory experiments, but to draw
conclusions about the development of personality traits on the
basis of situational conformity is clearly unwarranted. Before
conclusions can be drawn about the acquisition of behavioral
dispositions, two criteria should be met: (a) The behavior in
question should be general to situations other than that in which
it was elicited, and (b) it should be relatively enduring. Because
the preponderance of studies on modeling have failed to meet
the two criteria of internalization, they seem best interpreted in
relation to parameters of performance, as a function of
temporary states. This is not to say that they should be
considered irrelevant to socialization, but only to suggest that

they have not established that modeling produces longterm
personality changes; or even that it would, on a prolonged basis.
Although the modeling approach has encouraged research
efforts, it has generally failed to supply explanations for
modeling effects. The label modeling has been used to explain
modeling effects, but modeling, like imitation, merely describes
a sequence of congruent actions—it does not explain it. Before
any real explanatory power is achieved, the reasons why models
induce imitative behavior must be elucidated; and these reasons
may well vary across situations.
A survey of the studies on modeling suggests that the
performance of altruistic behavior may be based on one of
several conceptually distinct aspects of modeling. An attempt
will be made to sort out the aspects of modeling situations that
elicit modeling effects by organizing the relevant studies in
terms of what seems to be their most appropriate explanatory
base.
At the most elementary level, models make behavioral
alternatives salient: They draw attention to particular courses of
action, and increase the salience of social norms. Second, they
supply information about what is appropriate in various
situations by setting an example, by helping to create a
normative standard, and by helping to supply a definition of the
situation. Third, models supply information about the
consequences of courses of action. Although the three aspects
of the modeling situation are conceptually distinct, they are not,
in most cases, unrelated. A rough hierarchical relationship, in
fact, seems to exist between them, with the third subsuming the
second, and the second subsuming the first. Although models
who make behavioral alternatives salient need not supply
information about what is appropriate, nor need they supply
information about behavioral consequences, models who supply
information about behavioral consequences usually supply
information about what is appropriate, and they usually make a
course of action salient. Studies which do not unequivocally
supply information about appropriateness seem most properly

reviewed in the first category, and studies in which the
perception of consequences is in doubt are reviewed in the
second. Table 3 contains an outline of studies on modeling
which fall in the three categories.
Modeling as a Function of the Increased Salience of Behavioral
Alternatives and Social
Norms
A series of three naturalistic experiments by Bryan and Test
(1967) demonstrated that observation of helpful and charitable
models elicits congruent altruistic behavior. In the first
experiment, motorists were more likely to stop to help a lady fix
a flat tire if they drove past a model helping a confederate fix a
flat than if they did not. Two other experiments found that
shoppers contributed more to a Salvation Army kettle in the 20
seconds or half minute after a model gave than in the 20
seconds or half minute before he gave. Although the most
parsimonious interpretation for these findings would seem to
relate to the increased salinence of the altruistic behavioral
alternative, Bryan and Test (1967) offered two other
interpretations. The first suggested that the effects were due to
the information that was supplied about the pleasant
consequences of helping, and the second suggested that they
were due to a comparison between observer and model, which
resulted in shame. The first interpretation does not seem tenable
in the flat-tire situation, where the consequence of helping was
hard work (unless of course those who stopped had a pick-up in
mind). The second interpretation runs into some difficulty in all
three experiments due to the fact that most of the shoppers and
motorists did not act altruistically. Moreover, the sight of the
Salvation Army solicitor in itself would seem to be enough to
elicit shame in those who were prone to react with shame. The
more conservative interpretation, therefore, seems justified.
In another study, Test and Bryan (in press) compared the effect
of three modeling situations on helping behavior. They found
that potential benefactors helped a stooge more after they
observed a generous model, and after they were helped

themselves than after they were exposed to an indifferent model
or to no model at all. There were no differences between the
observation of help and receipt of help conditions, nor between
the indifferent-model and no-model conditions. Although Test
and Bryan (in press) stated that their failure to find a difference
between the indifferent-model and no-model conditions was not
in accord with the results of studies by Rosenbaum and Blake
(1955) and Rosenbaum (1956), this may not be the case. The
studies are not strictly comparable because the Test and Bryan
study employed a model who failed to help, whereas the latter
studies employed models who actively refused to help.
Although the Test and Bryan indifferent-model condition did
involve constraints against helping, they were not as strong as
those in the Rosenbaum studies.
In an effort to obtain an effect for both altruistic and selfish
models, Wheeler and Wagner (1968) exposed enlisted men and
navy recruits to a situation in which they overheard a solicitor
request a twenty-fivedollar donation for one of two causes: to
help fly the family of a dying serviceman to his bedside, or to
build up the monetary reserve of a local serviceman's fund. As
expected, most money was given in the altruistic model
condition, least was given in the selfish model condition, and
the amount given in the control condition fell in between.
Although the responses of the models may have supplied some
hints about the appropriateness of various responses, there was
nothing about the models that legitimized their responses. Their
main function seems to have been to increase the salience of
behavioral alternatives.
The three studies reviewed above used adult subjects. When
children are exposed to adult models, however, the behavior of
adults is likely to serve as a standard of appropriateness. The
performances of authoritative or prestigious adults not only
indicate what can be done, but also what should be done.
Modeling as a Function of Information about the
Appropriateness of Behavioral Alternatives
Appropriateness as a function of prestige. Several studies have

exposed children to altruistic adult models. Rosenhan and White
(1967) found that 63% of a sample of elementary school
children donated gift certificates to charity during a game that
they played with a charitable model. Forty-eight percent also
gave when they subsequently played alone. Although the
authors interpreted the second finding as evidence for
internalization, the temporal contiguity between tasks and the
similarity of situations suggests that the children simply
behaved in what seemed to be an appropriate way.
A study by White (1967), which satisfied the endurance (but not
generality) criterion, suggested possible limitations on the
modeling of altruistic responses. Fourth- and fifth-grade
children were exposed to one of four conditions: enforced
rehearsal (ER), in which they practiced charitable behavior;
observation plus voluntary rehearsal (OVR), in which they
practiced charity with a generous model; observation of a
generous model alone (O); and a no-model control condition
(C). After performing the experimental task, half the children
were left alone to win some gift certificates and to donate, and
half were sent back to class without playing the game. All
subjects returned for a second testing after several days. Both
groups of children reacted
TABLE 3
STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED THE EFFECT OF MODELS ON
ALTRUISM
Author and date
Sex
Subjects
Age
N
Sex

Models
Age
ent
vs.
senta
Main Independent variables
Increased salience of behavioral alternatives and social norms
Bryan & Test (1967)
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
'Test & Bryan
(in press)
Wheeler & Wagner
(1968)
M
adult
adult
cs
adult
4,000
720
80
144
M
M
F
M
adult
adult
CS
adult
Ab
Ab
Ab

Model helping lady fix a flat tire vs. not.
Model donating to Salvation Army vs. not.
Helping model, nonhelping model, or no model; dependency ;
reciprocity.
Generous model, selfish model, or no model; cost of helping;
strength of appeal for help.
Frequency with which motorists stopped to help lady fix a tire.
Number of observation periods in which donation occurred.
Number of problems done for recipient.
Amount donated.
Information about appropriateness : prestige of models
Rosenhan & White
(1967)
White (1967)
M. Harris (1968)
Bryan & Walbek (1969)
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Grusec & Skubiski
(in press)
M/Fb
M/Fb
M/Fb
M/Fb
M/Fb
9-10
10, 11
9-10
8-10
8-9
8, 10
130
210
91
168

132
80
M
M
same sex
same sex
same sex same sex
adult
cs
cs adult
peer
peer adult
P/Ab
Ab
Ab
Prior nurturance of model; generous model vs. no model.
Generosity of models ; rehearsal of altruistic behavior ;
durability of altruism.
Object of generous model's donations ; model reinforced vs.
not; selfish model, and no model.
Model who preached charity, greed, or neutral, and practiced
charity or greed.
Prior nurturance of model; model who preached charity or
practiced charity.
Frequency of donation in presence and absence of model.
Number of gift certificates donated to charity.
Number of chips shared with model and charity; frequency of
sharing.
Frequency of donations, amount donated.
Number of marbles shared.
Note.—Models for Blake et al. (1955) were symbolic.
Abbreviations are: CS — college student.
• during measure of altruism. b sex constituted a variable.
Table 3—(Continued)
Author and date

Sex
Subjects
Age
N
Sex
Models
Age
Present
vs. absent'
Main independent variables
Information about appropriateness : group standards
Blake et al. (1955)
Schachter & Hall
(1952)
Blake et al. (1956)
Rosenbaum & Blake (1955)
Rosenbaum (1956)
M/F
M/F
M/F
M
cs
cs
cs
cs
50
444
362
45
135

M/Fa
peers
peers
P/Ab
P/A b
P
P
Mean amount of prior donations; variation among prior
donations.
Conditions of volunteering: high restraint vs. low restraint.
Public vs. private commitment; attractive. ness of alternative.
Agreement vs. refusal of models to volunteer.
Agreement vs. refusal of models; intensity of request.
Amount donated toward gift for retiring secretary.
Frequency of volunteering for an experiment; frequency of
showing up.
Frequency of volunteering for an experiment.
Information about appropriateness: groups standard and
diffusion of responsibility and blame
Darley & Latané (1968)
Latané & Darley (1968)
Latané & Rodin
(1969)
Korte (1969)
Kaufmann (1968)
Staub & Feagans
(1969)
M/Fb
M
M
M
M
cs cs
cs

cs
cs
5-12b
72
58
120
60
186
153
M/F
M
M/F
cs
peer
Ab
P
P
Ab
P
P
Size of group, status of other ; personality
measures.
Size of group; response of others,
Waiting alone vs. with another; status of other (friend, stranger,
stooge).
Focused vs. diffuse responsibility; other's definition of situation
; personality
measures.
Status of subject ; expectation of future role; culpability of
learner; legitimacy of authority.
Presence vs. absence of another.
Frequency and speed of reporting epileptic fit.
Frequency and speed of reporting smoke.
Frequency and speed of helping an injured woman.
Frequency of helping an asthmatic experimenter.
Frequency of stopping a Milgram-type experiment.

Frequency of trying to help an injured other.
Information about consequences
Hornstein et al.
(1968)
Midlarsky & Bryan
(1967)
M
adult
6—10b
105
M
F
adult
cs
Ab
P/Ab
Foreign vs. compatriot model; positive, negative, neutral effect
on model of acting generously.
Reaction of model to self-sacrifice; affectionate responses or
not; expressive cues during test, or not.
Number of returned wallets.
Num ber of self-sacrificial responses; amount donated.
similarly in the delayed session. The effect of time, however,
served to reduce the number of altruistic responses, especially
in the ER condition. A noteworthy finding was that there was
little reduction in giving for the girls in the OVR condition. It
suggests that for girls observation of models may have only
temporary effects on performance, whereas observation plus
rehearsal may result in the acquisition of behavioral
dispositions. Although other research has not supported this
suggestion (e.g., Rosenhan & White, 1967), it serves to
emphasize the importance of differentiating situational
performance effects from internalized behavioral dispositions.
A study by M. Harris (1968) demonstrated that modeling effects
sometimes have little generality. She found that children who

were exposed to a model who gave tokens to them returned the
favor, but children who were exposed to a model who donated
to charity also donated to charity. The children imitated the
specific behavior of the models, probably because it seemed
appropriate, but failed to internalize a general altruistic
disposition.
A study by Bryan and Walbek (1969) tested the relative
strengths of behavioral and verbal indications of appropriate
behavior. Groups of elementary school children were exposed to
one of six situations. They observed models who practiced
charity and preached either charity, greed, or gave a neutral
statement; or they observed models who practiced greed and
preached either charity, greed, or gave a neutral statement. A
series of three experiments indicated that although
verbalizations affected the attractiveness of models, it was what
models did that affected the responses of the children. No effect
was found for hypocrisy (discrepancy between word and deed).
Grusec and Skubiski (in press) supported the findings of Bryan
and Walbek (1969). They found that third- and fifth-grade
children were more prone to donate marbles after observing a
model donate than after hearing him verbalize the appropriate
behavior. Only girls who had had a prior interaction with a
nurturant model donated as much in the preach charity as the
practice charity condition. It seems likely that more was
supplied by the model than information about appropriateness.
As suggested earlier, actions which indicate appropriateness
also increase the salience of behavioral alternatives. Showing
children what to do, however subtly, clearly supplies more
information than telling them what to do.
It has been argued that although children see most adults as
authorities, adults generally do not. In some situations, though,
adults do supply standards of appropriateness, especially when
they are in groups. Studies which explored the effect of groups
of models on altruism have used two types of models: those who
are actively altruistic, and those who are passively selfish. A
series of early studies of the first type demonstrates the effect

of group standards on gift-giving and volunteering.
Appropriateness as a function of group standards—the modeling
of action. Blake et al. (1955) found that the amount which
graduate students donated toward a gift for a retiring secretary
depended on the amount they thought others had donated.
Although no model was physically present, a list containing
prior donations" supplied information about the behavior of the
reference group.
Schachter and Hall (1952) examined the effect of group
influence on volunteering behavior. Students who observed half
of a class appear to volunteer (low restraint) were more likely to
sign up for an experiment than those in high restraint
conditions. Subjects in low restraint conditions, though, were
not more likely than subjects in high restraint conditions to
fulfill their commitment. Another study (Blake, Berkowitz,
Bellamy, & Mouton, 1956) found that students who were asked
to raise their hands in class (without half the class appearing to
volunteer) were less likely to volunteer than students who were
asked to sign their names in private. The failure of other class
members to volunteer seemed to establish a group standard of
noncompliance.
Field studies have supported the findings of the classroom
studies. Rosenbaum and Blake (1955) found that students were
more liable to volunteer for an experiment if they observed
another student volunteer than if they did not. Interpretation of
the finding, though, is difficult due to the fact that it was only
the subjects who observed another person volunteer (and return
to his studies) who gained information concerning the (short)
duration of the experiment. A later study by Rosenbaum (1956)
controlled for perceived duration of commitment and attained
comparable results. Unfortunately the latter study contained a
further confound: Subjects, who were exposed to a model who
volunteered, anticipated participating in the experiment with the
model, whereas subjects in the other condition expected to take
part in the experiment alone. The added information may well
have influenced the volunteering behavior.

It should be apparent that the behavior reviewed above is
interpretable in a Sherif (1947) and Asch (1956) type of
conformity paradigm. People behave altruistically in order to
conform to group standards.
In the same way that students model the noncompliance of their
fellow students, bystanders may model the failure of other
bystanders to respond to pleas for help. In both cases the
reaction (or lack of reaction) of the group serves as a standard
of behavior. A series of studies by Darley and Latané
demonstrated that the presence of others inhibits altruistic
responses in emergency situations.
Appropriateness as a function of group standards—the modeling
of inaction. Puzzled by the shockingly irresponsible behavior of
the 38 witnesses who remained behind their apartment doors
while Kitty Genovese was being murdered (A. Rosenthal, 1964),
Darley and Latané ran a number of experiments on bystander
intervention in emergencies. In the first study, Darley and
Latané (1968) plaed college undergraduates alone in a room
with an intercom and told them that it was posSible for only one
person in their group (of either two, three, or six) to be on the
air at a time. After a short conversation, the subjects heard a
confederate appear to have an epileptic fit. It was the subjects
who thought that they were the only other ones present who
responded most consistently and rapidly; and subjects who
thought they were in threeperson groups responded more
consistently and rapidly than those who thought they were in
six-person groups. The investigators interpreted these results as
support for the hypothesis that people in groups fail to respond
because responsibility and blame are diffused among group
members. The diffusion of responsibility and blame
explanation, though, was cast in doubt by the further finding
that females in three-person groups did not respond any slower
when the other bystander was a male or a premed student—
people who would be expected to take responsibility in
emergencies.
Even though there seems to be more in effect than diffusion of

responsibility and blame, studies by Allen (1968) and Korte
(1969) suggest that diffusion does influence helping behavior in
some situations. In a situation similar to that of Darley and
Latané (1968), Korte (1969) found a greater incidence of
helping for subjects who believed that the other members of
their three-person group were strapped down to a table than for
subjects who did not. In the Allen (1968) study, commuters in
New York subways were given a chance to correct a stooge who
gave incorrect directions. The communters were least likely to
correct a stooge when the request for directions was directed to
the stooge. They were most likely to correct the stooge when
they were asked for directions; and moderately likely to correct
him when the request for directions was directed at a group of
bystanders.
In a second series of experiments (Latané & Darley, 1968),
bystanders were placed in emergency situations that contained a
personal threat to their safety. Male col]ege students who found
themselves in a room that began to fill with smoke were more
likely to report the emergency when they were alone in the
room than when they were in the presence of two other subjects
or two passive stooges. These findings do not fit well with the
diffusion of responsibility and blame interpretation, due to the
fact that it was the safety of the subjects themselves that was in
question. It would seem that part of the inhibiting effect of
passive bystanders occurs because they supply, by their lack of
concern, an innocuous definition of the situation. Their
passivity may, as a study by Latané (1967) suggests, even help
to validate defensively distorted perceptions of the situation.
Subjects whose tasks were interrupted by the tape-recorded
sounds of a "bully" assaulting a young child accounted for their
failure to help by saying that they did not believe that the fight
was real. The obvious inference— that the tape-recorded sounds
of the fight were unconvincing—was cast in doubt by the
further finding that subjects who were freed from responsibility
believed the fight was real. Detracting responsibility, though,
may have changed the situation in other ways. The group which

was freed from responsibility had no reason to doubt the reality
of the fight— what purpose could it serve? A faked emergency
would make more sense to subjects who were on the spot.
A further study (Latané & Rodin, 1969) extended the generality
of prior findings. Male undergraduates who heard a female
"market research representative" appear to fall from a chair and
hurt her ankle were more likely to help her when they were
alone than when they were in the presence of a stranger or an
unconcerned stooge. Subjects who were paired with a stranger
were more likely to help the "representative" than subjects who
were paired with a passive stooge.
Both Latané and Rodin (1969) and Darley (1967) found that
subjects who were paired with friends were more likely to help
than those who were paired with strangers. However, subjects
who were paired with friends were not as likely to help as
subjects who were exposed to the emergency alone. In view of
the fact that the passivity of subjects to emergency situations is
probably more apparent than real (they are upset but they do not
show it), the greater incidence of helping with friends might be
due to the fact that they are able to anticipate each other's true
reactions. Acting together, they also have consensual support
for their definition of the situation.
Surveying all the studies in the bystander intervention series, it
would appear that both a diffusion of responsibility and blame,
and a group influence explanation are needed (cf. Latané &
Rodin, 1969). In the seizure situation, where subjects were
isolated from one another, no information about group reaction
was supplied. Yet in the smoke-filled room situation, little good
could come from diffusing responsibility and blame when the
welfare of the subject himself was in question.
Although most of the bystander-intervention studies found that
bystanders were prone to help when they were alone, one study
(Latané, 1967) found that virtually all undergraduates failed to
intervene in behalf of an assaulted child, even when they were
alone. Similar results were obtained in a study by Kaufmann
(1968). Only 11%0 of subjects who were asked to observe a

"teacher" deliver what seemed to be increasingly severe and
dangerous shocks to a "learner' (cf. Milgram, 1963) responded
to the learner's pleas for help. No differences were found among
conditions in which the bystander was given a position of high
status, was led to believe he would later be the "teacher," or had
reason to doubt the legitimacy of the teacher's authority. People
fail to help in some situations, it would appear, on the slightest
excuse.
A developmental study by Staub and Feagans (1969) found that
children also failed to help in emergency situations. Unlike
their adult counterparts, though, they were less prone to help
when they were alone than when they were with another child.
Nursery school, first- and second-grade children tended to help
another child who appeared to fall and hurt himself more when
they were in pairs than when they were alone. At the fourth and
sixth grade the trend tended to reverse itself and the children
behaved more like their adult counterparts. It is possible that
the presence of a partner reduced the fear associated with doing
something wrong in the younger children, but served as a source
of potential negative evaluation for the older children.
Whatever the precise reasons, it seems likely that the behavior
of bystanders is predicted on their ignorance concerning the
consequences of helping. If they were assured that no harm
would come to them, their apparently heartless inaction would
seem less likely. And if they were assured that they would be
rewarded, helping behavior would seem virtually certain. It is
surprising, therefore, that none of the studies which
manipulated perception of consequences has achieved a clear
effect.
Modeling as a Function of Perception of Consequences
Models who supply information about the consequences of
altruistic behavior almost always supply other information.
Information about the consequences of particular choices of
action usually supplies an indication of its appropriateness. The
observation of the act also, of course, increases the salience of
related behavioral alternatives.

Of the experiments which tested for the influence of perception
of consequences, one used adult subjects and two used children.
In the study on adults, Hornstein et al., ( 1968) presented
passersby with a wallet that had apparently been found by a
model and then relost. Passersby who were led to believe they
were similar to the model were more likely to return the wallet
when an attached note indicated that the model felt good or
neutral about returning the wallet than when the note indicated
he felt bad.
In the first of the studies on children, Midlarsky and Bryan
(1967) failed to find any difference between the number of self-
sacrificial and charitable responses of elementary school girls
who observed a model who emitted expressive signs of joy after
making self-sacrificial choices, and models who did not. M.
Harris (1968), using an age group similar to that of Midlarsky
and Bryan (1967), failed to find a difference between the
altruistic behavior of children who were exposed to models who
were praised for their altruism, and those who were not.
Because the praising agent was absent when the children
performed, however, they had reason not to expect similar
consequences.
None of the studies that examined the effect of perception of
consequences found a significant difference between positive
and neutral consequence conditions. The Hornstein et al. (1968)
study, though, found that the perception of negative
consequences had an inhibiting effect on altruism. It is possible
that the lack of similarity between observer and model in the
studies which used children made the consequences of the
model's actions irrelevant.
Although situations in which consequences can be observed
were analyzed according to their effect on the performance of
altruistic behavior, some investigators (e.g., M. Harris, 1968;
Midlarsky & Bryan, 1967) analyzed them in relation to the
internalization of relatively permanent behavioral dispositions.
None of the studies, however, met the two criteria of
internalization—situational generality and longitudinal

stability.
Several studies, though, have set out to examine the antecedents
of modeling effects. Instead of explaining imitative behavior
with what is essentially a descriptive rubric, they have
attempted to find out what it is about observing a model that
results in the acquisition of congruent behavioral dispositionse
Three general approaches have been taken. The first examined
modeling effects in terms of identification, the second examined
them in terms of secondary reinforcement, and the third
examined them in terms of empathy.
Modeling and the Internalization of
Altruistic Dispositions
Although several investigators have viewed modeling in terms
of identification (see Bandura & Walters, 1963), there has been
only one study which examined the relationship between
identification and altruism. Rutherford and Mussen (1968)
found that generous nursery school boys saw their fathers as
more warm and nurturant than less generous boys. These
findings were interpreted as support for the hypothesis that
generosity results from identification with warm and nurturant
samesexed parents. Although the findings indicated that the
generous boys saw their fathers as warm and nurturant, no
information was supplied about the generosity of the fathers,
nor was the assumption that the boys were identified with their
fathers substantiated. Moreover, the hypothesis that
identification caused the boy's generosity was supported by only
correlational data.
Mowrer (1960) suggested that rewarding models are imitated
because stimuli that are associated with the performance of
imitative responses, especially proprioceptive feedback, are
secondarily reinforcing. Hartup and Coates (1967) tested
Mowrer's suggestion by exposing nursery children who had
histories of frequent and infrequent peer reinforcement to
rewarding and nonrewarding peer models. Both history of
reinforcement and rewardingness of model were determined by
time-sampled observations of a nursery school class. The

altruism of rewarding peer models was imitated more by
children with histories of frequent peer reinforcement, and the
altruism of nonrewarding peer models was imitated more by
children with histories of infrequent peer reinforcement. No
differences in attractiveness of model or social acceptance of
subjects were found among groups. The results suggested that
Mowrer's (1960) theory applies only to subjects with histories
of frequent reinforcement. However, on the basis of the positive
correlation between giving and receiving reinforcement from
peers (Charlesworth & Hartup, 1967) the results can also be
interpreted as support for the notion that subjects modeled the
responses of those who were similar to them. The latter
interpretation is consistent with the Hornstein et al. (1968)
findings. However, several other studies, which did not control
for history of reinforcement (e.g., Grusec & Skubiski, in press;
Rosenhan & White, 1967), failed to support the notion that
rewarding models are imitated more than nonrewarding models.
The results of a study by Aronfreed and Paskel (1968) on first-
to third-grade girls can be interpreted in accord with a
secondary reinforcement position. Aronfreed and Paskel ( 1968)
found that children who were exposed to a female model, who
emitted both expressive signs of joy and hugs (EH) after she
made self-sacrificial responses, evidenced more imitation than
children who were exposed to expressive cues (E) or hugs (H)
alone. If the model who emitted expressive cues and affection
responses is seen as the most rewarding of the three models
(and the fact that she was the only one who displayed pretask
nurturance makes this likely) , then the modeling effect can be
interpreted as a function of the secondary reinforcement effects
of imitation.
Aronfreed and Paskel (1968) interpreted their results
differently—as support for the notion that the self-sacrificial
responses of the girls were reinforced by empathically
experienced positive affect. Because the girls who were exposed
to both affective responses and expressive cues were exposed to
the most warmth, and because they were given the most

indication of what was desired of them, interpretation of the
results is difficult.
A later study by Midlarsky and Bryan ( 1967) controlled for
pretask warmth and added a condition in which the model failed
to emit expressive cues in the test situation. It also took a
second measure of altruism in a different situation. Although
the investigators did not interpret the results as support for the
position of Aronfreed and Paskel, their results were very
similar. Both studies found that exposure to the EH condition
resulted in more self-sacrificial responses than exposure to E or
H alone. Moreover, as Aronfreed and Paskel would have
predicted, more self-sacrificial responses were made when the
model emitted expressive cues during testing than when she did
not. The findings, though, that self-sacrificial responses
occurred in conditions other than the HE and EH conditions,
and that most of the girls who sacrificed candy also donated to
charity in the absence of the model, suggest that more was
involved than the empathic transmission of positive affect.
There has been no concrete support for positions that view
modeling as a function of identification, secondary
reinforcement, or empathy. Studies which appear to support
each position have alternative interpretations. Moreover,
although all of the studies were concerned with the
internalization of altruistic dispositions, none established the
situational generality and longitudinal stability of the effects.
Some researchers would argue that the two criteria are beyond
the range of laboratory studies. What is needed, perhaps, is
supplementary evidence from naturalistic studies. If, for
example, correlates of altruism could be found in the behavior
of parents or friends, relevant experimental analogues would
receive support. Such correlates have been reported in three
studies. Rosenhan (1967) found that a group of active civil
rights workers had a close relationship with at least one
altruistic parent; Tomkins (1965) reported that prominent
abolitionists were influenced by altruistic friends; and Rettig
(1956) found that altruism in parents was positively correlated

with scores made by college students on an altruism scale. Some
evidence was found in the Rettig (1956) study for the notion
that the effects of direct reinforcement of altruistic behavior by
parents dissipates over time, whereas modeling effects are more
enduring.
Although more precise studies are needed, the results of studies
which have found a relationship between attributes of parents
and altruism in children are encouraging, especially in view of
the failure of most studies to find a relationship between moral
behavior in parents and personality correlates in children (cf.
Kohlberg, in press).
Experimenter Effects
An appropriate way of ending the review of modeling and
altruism is to draw attention to the relationship between
modeling and experimenter effects. R. Rosenthal (1966) and
others have demonstrated that experimenters unintentionally
effect the responses of their subjects, even when they do not
perform the tasks in question. Modeling can be considered a
type of experimenter effect—it causes subjects to act in ways
congruent with the behavior (and, usually, expectations) of
models. The similarity between modeling and experimenter
effects has three implications. The first emphasizes the
suggestion that modeling effects are temporary and
situationspecific. The second emphasizes the subtlety of
modeling effects—a decade of research has been unable to
isolate the means by which expectations are communicated in
experiments. And finally, the necessity for methodological
caution in modeling studies becomes obvious. Most studies
attribute modeling effects to more than experimenter bias. In
spite of this, few studies have controlled for expectations of the
model.
ALTRUISM AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPORARY
STATES OF THE RECIPIENT
When it is the temporary states of recipients of altruistic
responses that are studied, the question that becomes relevant is
what kinds of states, and what situations associated with these

states, elicit altruistic responses. The range of recipient state
variables that has been studied is small. Only two variables —
dependency and interpersonal attractiveness—have been studied
in any detail.
A close consideration of the effect of interpersonal
attractiveness on altruism suggests that many altruistic
responses result not from characteristics of benefactors or
recipients alone, but rather from an interaction between the
characteristics of benefactors and recipients. Recipients, for
example, may be attractive to different benefactors for different
reasons, and benefactors may differ in attractability. In the
modeling studies, almost all recipients were dependent, and
their dependency probably interacted with the modeling effects
to elicit altruism. Even though characteristics of both recipients
and benefactors influence altruism, they can be separated for
classification due to the fact that most experiments vary one set
of characteristics and hold the other constant.
Dependency of the Recipient
The essential attribute of a recipient of altruism is his perceived
need for aid. In almost all of the reported studies on altruism,
altruistic behavior was elicited by a dependent other. Most
studies held dependency constant, or allowed it to vary
randomly. Some studies, however, gave specific attention to the
effect of dependency.
A set of ten studies (see Table 4) by Berkowitz and his
colleagues found a consistent effect for dependency. All studies
used the same basic experimental design. In the standard
situation, subjects were recruited for an experiment on
supervisory ability. A "worker" was required to construct paper
boxes or envelopes for a "supervisor." In the high dependency
condition, the worker was told that the supervisor's chance of
winning a prize depended on the worker's productivity. In the
low dependency condition, the worker was told that it was the
quality of the supervisor's instructions that would determine his
reward. The measure of altruism was either the number of boxes
constructed in the experimental session, or the difference

between the number constructed in the experimental session and
the number in a practice session. Berkowitz and his colleagues
(see Table 4) consistently found that more boxes were
4
STUDIES WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE EFFECT OF
DEPENDENCY OF THE RECIPIENT ON ALTRUISM
Author and date
Subjects
Age
Relationship between dependency of the recipient and altruism
Berkowitz & Daniels (1963)
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Daniels & Berkowitz (1963)
Berkowitz et al. (1964)
Berkowitz & Conner (1966)
Berkowitz (1966)
Goranson & Berkowitz (1966)
Berkowitz & Friedman
(1967)
Berkowitz (1967)
Berkowitz (1968)
Schopler & Bateson (1965)
Wheeler & Wagner (1968)
Midlarsky (1968a)
M
M
M
M
F
M
M

M
M
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
13-16 cs
13-16
cs
adult
cs
80
32
80
80
160
108
89
345
192
196
144
80
More produced for high vs. low dependent supervisor; no main
effect for awareness; no main effect for amount of reward.
More produced for high vs. low dependent supervisor; less
produced in Low Awareness X Low Dependency condition.
More produced for high vs. low dependent supervisor; less in
Low Awareness X Low Dependency; more in High Liking X
High Dependency.
More produced for high vs. low dependent supervisor; no
main effect for awareness.
More produced for high vs. low dependent supervisor; no main

effect for awareness; no effect for sex of subject or sex of
experimenter.
More produced for high vs. low (but not medium) dependent
supervisor ; more produced in High Dependency X Success than
High Dependency X Failure.
Study later elaborated by Berkowitz & Friedman (1967) and
Berkowitz (1968) ; see below.
(High dependency condition only) More produced after
voluntary vs. compulsory help for same (vs. different) person;
least produced after refused help.
(All in high dependency condition) ; sons of bureaucrats
produced more than working-class boys; sons of entrepreneurs
produced less after receiving low (vs. high) help from another.
(1) : More produced for externally-caused high dependency. (2)
: More produced for highly dependent others. (4) :
Sexdifferences in high and low dependency condition.
(All in high dependency condition) ; working-class boys (vs.
bureaucratic boys) who received high (vs. low) prior help
produced more for the same person.
Males gave more to lowly dependent (vs. highly dependent)
recipients, and females gave more to highly dependent
recipients, when cost of helping was low.
More tended to be given in order to help fly relatives to a dying
sailor than to help build up a serviceman's fund.a More shock-
contingent problems were solved for high (vs. low) dependent
recipients.
278 DENNIS L. KREBS
TABLE
284 DENNIS L. KREBS
TABLE
ALTRUISM 279
Note.—Abbreviations are: CS — college student.
built by workers in the high dependency condition than workers
in the low dependency condition. One study (Berkowitz &
Conner, 1966) created three levels of dependency— the

supervisor was dependent on the worker for 20%, 50%, or 80%
of the points that could earn him a cash prize. Workers whose
supervisors were 80% dependent made more paper envelopes
than those whose supervisors were 20% dependent.
It might be argued that the altruism shown by the workers was a
function of expectations of approval or fear of disapproval. To
test these possibilities, Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) and
Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) added an "awareness" condition.
Workers in the high awareness condition were told that their
supervisors would be informed of their productivity during the
experiment, and those in the low awareness condition were told
that their work would not be examined until after a month. In no
case was a main effect found for awareness. However, a
combination of (low) dependency and (low) awareness was
associated with low production. Moreover, production also
failed to increase when the experimenter's awareness was
manipulated (Berkowitz, Klanderman, & Harris, 1964).
Berkowitz interpreted the lack of difference between the
productivity of the high and low awareness groups in the high
dependency condition as support for the assumption that his
workers were not motivated toward the attainment of approval
or avoidance of punishment. It is also possible that the low
awareness manipulation was ineffective. Subjects may have
found it difficult to believe that their output would remain
unexamined for a month.
The notion that dependency elicits helping behavior in the
Berkowitz type of situation has not received full support from
other studies (outlined in Table 4). Schopler and Bateson (1965,
Experiment 2 and 3) and Schopler (1967) found that females
yielded more money to a partner when he was in a state of high
(versus low) dependency, but only if the cost of yielding was
low. Males in the low cost of yielding condition, on the other
hand, yielded more money when their partner was in a state of
low dependency. In a different situation, Schopler and Bateson
(1965, Experiment 1) found that although females were more
inclined to volunteer to help a student finish his thesis when he

was "desperate," males were more inclined to help when he had
a year to work on it (p < .10). The measure of altruism in the
Schopler studies seems more powerful than that in the
Berkowitz studies because of the material sacrifice involved.
The more the benefactor yielded, the less he kept for himself.
Other studies which involved a variety of situations, though,
have supplied support for the notion that dependency in the
recipient elicits altruism. Wheeler and Wagner (1968), for
example, found that Navy men were more likely to donate
money when they were exposed to a personal appeal which
involved a highly dependent family than one which involved a
condition of low dependency (p < .10). A study by Test and
Bryan (in press) failed to find an effect for dependency. A
posttest questionnaire, however, revealed that the dependency
manipulation had failed. In a situation similar to that of Test
and Bryan, Midlarsky (1968a) found that more help was given
to a partner with broken eyeglasses than to a less dependent
recipient, even though helping involved the receipt of electric
shocks.
It should be pointed out that the dependency manipulations in
the Schopler and Bateson (1965), Wheeler and Wagner (1968),
Test and Bryan (in press), and Midlarsky (1968a) studies
differed from those in the Berkowitz studies. In the Berkowitz
studies the supervisor was specifically dependent on the
worker—if the worker did not work hard, the supervisor did not
get rewarded. In the Schopler and Bateson (1965, Experiment 1)
and Wheeler and Wagner (1968) studies, on the other hand, the
dependency of the other was general—each subject could have
told himself that if he did not help, someone else would. The
Midlarsky (1968a) and Test and Bryan (in press) studies fall in
between. Subjects were not asked to help the dependent other,
but they were the only ones who could help him.
Before turning to studies which manipulated interpersonal
attractiveness of the recipient, it should be mentioned that
dependency need not be viewed as a unitary variable. Studies by
Schopler and Matthews (1965) and Horowitz (1968)

demonstrated that internally caused dependency (dependency
caused by the subject) tended to elicit less altruism than
externally caused dependency. Locus of dependency, though,
seems best examined as a trait variable.
Interpersonal Attractiveness of the Recipient Common sense
would predict that more is given to liked others than disliked
others. Because the prediction seems so obvious, perhaps, only
three studies on altruism (Daniels & Berkowitz, 1963; Epstein
& Hornstein, 1969; Staub & Sherk, in press) have manipulated
interpersonal attractiveness as a main independent variable. The
apparent paucity of research, however, may be misleading. It is
possible that interpersonal attractiveness has exerted an
unrecognized in-
5
STUDIES WHICH MEASURED THE EFFECT OF
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE
RECIPIENT ON ALTRUISM
Author and date
Subj ects
Sex Age N
Relationship between attractiveness and altruism
Daniels & Berkowitz (1963)
Staub & Sherk (in press)
Epstein & Hornstein (1969)
Berkowitz & Friedman (1967)
Schopler & Matthews (1965)
Brehm & cole (1966)
Kiesler (1966)
Schopler & Thompson (1968)
Walster & Prestholdt (1966)
Lerner & Lichtman (1968)
Lerner & Matthews (1967)
Lerner
M

M M
M
M
M
M
cs
9 cs
13-16
cs
cs
HS
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
cs
80
94
60
345
48
60
120
38
88
140
66
61
32
Greatest production for highly dependent well-liked
supervisors.
Crayon shared longer with preferred partners.
Liked recipients helped most when selfishness punished (vs.
not).
Partners who gave high (vs. low) prior help rated as more

likable and received more help, from entrepreneurial but not
bureaucratic boys.
Externally dependent subjects rated in more attractive terms and
helped more.
Subjects who did appropriate favor (vs. no favor) rated as more
friendly (but not as generally more attractive) and received
more help.
Partners who did not share after a cooperative (vs. competitive)
game rated as unattractive.
"Salesman" who gave flower in appropriate (vs. inappropriate)
circumstances rated as more generous (but not as more
attractive).
Person who was rated too harshly in low commitment (vs. high
commitment) condition was subsequently rated as more
attractive; he also tended to elicit more help.
Partners who performed illicitly (vs. legitimately) gracious act
were rated as less attractive and helped less. Attractiveness and
helping did not go together in other conditions.
When subjects draw placed him in a control and his partner in a
shock condition (vs. fates independent) partner was rated as less
attractive, but was comforted more.
When subjects (vs. experimenter) caused their partners to serve
in shock condition, partners were rated as less attractive, yet
subjects were more prone to take their place.
High dependent (vs. low dependent) supervisors were helped
more, but liked less.
fluence in other studies. Studies that manipulate characteristics
of the recipient usually affect the attractiveness of the recipient.
Table 5 contains an outline of studies which investigated the
effect of interpersonal attractiveness on altruism.
Interpersonal attractiveness as an independent variable. Only
three studies have focused on the altruism-eliciting effect of
attractiveness of the recipient. Daniels and Berkowitz (1963)
told "workers" that a questionnaire revealed they would either
like or dislike their "supervisors." As expected, the workers

made more boxes for highly dependent supervisors when they
thought they would like them than when they thought they
would not. Staub and Sherk (in press) found that fourthgrade
children shared a crayon longer with liked than with disliked
partners.
In the third study, Epstein and Hornstein (1969) found a more
complex relationship between liking and altruism. Subjects who
liked their partners made fewer selfish responses than subjects
who disliked their partners when they were punished for their
selfishness by a third person. When they were not punished,
however, they made fewer selfish responses for a disliked
partner. Although the results are difficult to interpret, it is
possible that punishment from a liked other served to remind
the subjects of the harm their acts did. Punishment from a
disliked other, on the other hand, may have antagonized them
into more selfish behavior.
Interpersonal attractiveness as a mediating variable. It seems
likely that most studies which manipulated characteristics of the
recipient incidentally varied his interpersonal attractiveness.
Recipients are usually more or less attractive depending on their
association with moral transgression or need for psychological
help (Bryan & Davenport 6 ; Nunnally, 1961), their race and
nationality (Bryan & Test, 1967; Feldman, 1968), the legitimacy
of their need (Frisch & Greenberg, 1968; Horowitz, 1968;
Schopler & Matthews, 1965), and the amount of prior help
attributed to them (Pruitt, 1968). Several of the Berkowitz
studies (e.g., Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967) found incidental
relationships between the amount of help given to supervisors
and their rated attractiveness. Other studies, though (e.g.,
Berkowitz & Daniels , 1963), found a negative relationship
between helping and attractiveness.
Research on the effect of inappropriate favors on altruism
demonstrates that although recipients who are helped tend to be
seen as more attractive than those who are not, the reverse is
sometimes true. Kiesler (1966) found that partners who did
appropriate favors were rated as more attractive than those who

did inappropriate favors, but no measure of altruism was taken.
Brehm and Cole (1966), Lerner and Lichtman (1968), and
Schopler and Thompson (1968) found that inappropriate favors
elicited less altruism than appropriate favors. They also found
that recipients who had done appropriate favors tended to be
rated more positively. But in every case, the recipients failed to
be rated as better liked. Lerner and Lichtman ( 1968), however,
found a positive relationship between selfishness and
unattractiveness—recipients who seemed "illicitly gracious"
were rated as unattractive and were helped little.
A final study, which set out to examine a dissonance effect,
supplied some information
5 Bryan, J. H., & Davenport, M. Donations to the needy:
correlates of financial contributions to the destitute. (Research
Bulletin No. 68-1) Princeton, N. J.: Educational Testing
Service, 1968.
about attractiveness. Walster and Prestholdt (1966) found that
subjects who increased their attractiveness ratings of targets in
order to compensate for an unfair rating or justify a high rating
tended to be more likely to volunteer to help the target person.
Unfortunately, though, the imminence of summer vacation and
final exams truncated their sample to the point that statistical
analysis of the relationship between attractiveness and
volunteering was not feasible.
Although there are suggestive indications that attractiveness
mediates altruism, the relationship is surprisingly weak. Several
studies, in fact, have found a negative relationship between
helping and attractiveness. Lerner and Matthews (1967) and
Lerner (see Footnote 4), for example, found that subjects who
perceived themselves (versus their partner or an experimenter)
as responsible for the suffering of another tended to devalue the
other in order to preserve their belief in a just world. In spite of
the devaluation, though, they were more willing than those who
did not devalue their partners to take his place in a shock
condition. It is possible that in cases where altruism is
reparative or part of a role requirement, it is not given as much

in behalf of the recipient as in spite of him.
PERSONALITY TRAITS OF THE BENEFACTOR
—CORRELATIONAL STUDIES
Research which has dealt with personality traits of benefactors
differs from most of the research reviewed thus far because it is
concerned with natural correlations rather than experimentally
induced relationships. Traitoriented correlational studies (see
Table 6) have used three different criteria of altruism. Some
have defined altruism according to the ratings of others. Some
have used scores on pencil-and-paper tests; and some have used
behavioral measures. Personality variables in each of the three
categories have been drawn from several different sources.
Trait-oriented correlational studies attempt to find out what
personality traits and syndromes are typical of altruists, and, in
general, what kind of people altruists are.
6
STUDIES WHICH EXAMINED 'I'llE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PERSONALITY TRAITS OF 'I'llE
BENEFACTOR AND ALTRUISM
Author and date
Subjects
Sex Age
N
Source of personality traits
Positive correlations with altruism
Negative correlations with altruism
Studies which used rating-scale measures of altruism
Turner (1948)
Cattell & Horowitz
(1952)
Friedrichs (1960)
MacDonald

M
F
M
F
9—16
cs
cs
cs
116
60
280
19
Ratings of paren ts and social workers.
Dormmates' ratings, 16 PFQ, "objective tests."
Dormmates' ratings, self-ratings, questionnaires.
Self-ratings; questionnaires.
Self-adjustment, grasp of social standards, social skills, good
community relations, adjustment, emotional stability, ethical
goodness. Cyclothymia
Attractiveness as a friend, political conservatism,
authoritarianism, theism, sociability, ingroup involvement.
Need for nurturance, need for autonomy, social values, religious
values.
Antisocial tendencies.
Paranoic-schizoid.
Economic involve. ment.
Economic values, political values.
Studies which used pencil-and-paper test measures of altruism
Friedrichs (1960)
Ribal (1963)
Saywer (1966)
M
M
CS
CS
CS

280
194
122
Self-ratings, questionnaires.
Edwards Personal
Preference Scale
Questionnaire, occupational aspiration.
Church attendance, theism.
Need for endurance
(males) ; needs for affliation and interception (females).
YMCA orientation
Ethnocentrism, neuroticism.
Need for achievement and dominance.
Studies which used behavioral measures of altruism
Rutherford & Mussen
(1968)
Staub & Sherk
(in press)
Gore & Rotter (1963)
Midlarsky (1968a)
Staub (1968)
M
9
cs
cs
9-10
31
94
116
80
196
Doll-play ratings ; racing game; teacher's ratings.
Need for approval questionnaire.
Locus of control questionnaire.

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