SESSION ID:SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Matthew Olney
Weaponizing Intelligence:
Interdiction in Today’s Threat Landscape
SP01-W11
Manager, Threat Intelligence and Interdiction
Cisco Systems
@kpyke
Matthew Olney
Talos Threat Intelligence & Interdiction Group
WEAPONIZING INTELLIGENCE
INTERDICTION IN TODAY’S THREAT LANDSCAPE
Matthew Olney
Manager of Threat Intelligence and Interdiction
11 Years with Sourcefire VRT and Cisco Talos
Prior to that 10 years in network engineering and security
I’m on Twitter
@kpyke
WHO AM I?
250+
Full Time Threat
Intel Researchers
MILLIONS
Of Telemetry
Agents
4
Global Data
Centers
1100+
Threat Traps
100+
Threat Intelligence
Partners
THREAT INTEL
1.5 MILLION
Daily Malware
Samples
600 BILLION
Daily Email
Messages
16 BILLION
Daily Web
Requests
Honeypots
Open Source
Communities
Vulnerability
Discovery (Internal)
Product
Telemetry
Internet-Wide
Scanning
20 BILLION
Threats Blocked
INTEL SHARING
TALOS INTEL BREAKDOWN
Customer Data
Sharing
Programs
Provider
Coordination
Program
Open
Source
Intel
Sharing
3rd Party Programs
(MAPP)
Industry
Sharing
Partnerships
(ISACs)
500+
Participants
“Interdiction is a military term for the act of delaying, disrupting,
or destroying enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area.”
Threat Intelligence and Interdiction takes action:
• Outside the border of our customer’s networks
• To disrupt and degrade actor capability
• Using linguists, reverse engineers, incident responders,
mathematicians, researchers and developers
• Working with law enforcement organizations (LEO), government
and industry organizations, hosting providers and other
intelligence partners
WHAT IS INTERDICTION?
Easy
• ISAC (Information Sharing
and Analysis Center)
• Industry, National and
Multinational CERTs
• Internet Service Providers
• Individual Researchers and
Research Groups
• Industry Partners
• Competitors (Seriously)
Tricky
• Web Hosting Providers
Strategic
• Law Enforcement
• Military
• Government
“I apologize for being a black hole.”
– Undisclosed Government Agency
WE ARE SUCCESSFUL WITH FRIENDS — NOT TECHNOLOGY
“It seems like they
gave up after about 4
days of 2-3 orders a
day. We have not
seen any order
attempts since 5/15.
Thanks for the quick
heads up, getting
those C&C IPs into
our netflow system
stopped them cold.”
– Intelligence Partner,
Angler Investigation
• Legal and economic barriers to cooperation
• Narrow profit margins
• Limited investment in abuse and security
services
• But there are costs incurred by hosting
malicious actors
• LEO interactions
• Abuse handling
• Bandwidth, engineering, charge-backs
Let’s help each other
TRICKY: WEB HOSTING PROVIDERS
INTERDICTION CASE STUDY #1:
SAMSAM & JBOSS
CVE-2007-1036
• “…JBoss does not restrict access to the console
and web management interfaces…”
CVE-2010-0738
• “The JMX-Console web application … performs access control
only for the GET and POST methods...”
TWO CRITICAL JBOSS CVES
“João Filho Matos Figueiredo, what did you do?”
– João’s mother, probably
JEXBOSS
• Telemetry indicates
December, 2015 start date
• Network-wide ransomware
attack
• Ransom paid via Bitcoin
SAMSAM
• Seen in many verticals,
but best known for activity
in healthcare
• Uses ‘Jexboss’
• Multiple Cisco IR
engagements
• Strong LEO interest
0.7-
1.5BTC
BTC/workstation
22BT
C
Total for all
keys
Preliminary blog post:
• Samsam: The Doctor Will See You, After He Pays The Ransom
Research: How bad is this JBoss problem?
• Full IPv4 scan Found roughly 3.2M IP addresses that behaved
in a way suggesting they were vulnerable JBoss servers
Express mild concern on social media:
TALOS RESPONSE (MARCH)
Day X
• JexBoss Invocation &
JBossAss backdoor installation
X+47 Days
• File Upload Installed on web
server
X+49 Days
• Full Webshell installed and
CVSDE Executed – Active
Directory dump
Forensic Timeline Developed By Cisco IR
X+73 Days
• tunnel.jsp installed allowing IP
Tunnel
• Elevated privileged user
connect via RDP
• Recon with Hyena
• Likely first use of admin
credential
X+74 Days
• Samsam encryption operation
begins
EMAIL OF THE YEAR: CISCO IR SHARES CRITICAL INTEL
• There is a window between shell installation and file encryption
• I dramatically fail at math and also manage to underestimate the
capabilities and determination of my team.
They finished it over the weekend and had the
results waiting for me Monday morning.
“ACTIONABLE”
2104
Shells
1575
Unique IPs
88
Countries
http://<Jboss IP address>/status
http://<Jboss IP address>/status&full=true
2,176
Uniquely-named shells
Almost 2000 notifications
• Intel partners
• Sales staff
• 20 Talos researchers
• 2 Weeks
Samples gathered
• IR specialists on site
• Sample exchange with Follett
and intel partners
New actors tracked
• JBoss status pages
• JBoss honeypots
Tracking compromised servers
STATUS CHECK
• IR received a SAMSAM engagement from an unmarked IP address
• Could be SSL on 443
• Or, fairly often, on port 8080
• Run the same play
• 2^32 scan for all 443 and 8080 ports displaying vulnerable JBOSS behavior
• Scan potentially vulnerable hosts for known backdoors
NEW DATA FROM CISCO IR
2,104
New targets
625
New backdoor IPs
• Notified servers not 100% remediated
• Actors continue to attack JBOSS servers
• Working with LEO
JBOSS – THE SAGA CONTINUES
Floki Bot Strikes
Talos, Flashpoint and FIRST
WHAT IS FLOKI BOT?
IDA Pro
FIRST – FIRST-PLUGIN.US
Function Identification
and Recovery Signature Tool
Streamline code research
• Prevent duplication of effort
• Reduce analysis time
• Detect code reuse between malware family
Open Beta
133
Users
187,988
Functions annotated
IDA Pro
FIRST SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Check for Metadata
56 6A 0C 6A 01 E8 64 AB 00 00
Add Function Metadata
Name / Prototype / Comment
Update Function Metadata
With the most recent version
sub_401000
--------------------------------------------------
56 6a 0c 6a 01 e8 64 ab 00 00 8b f0 8b 44 24 10 89
46 04 8b 44 24 14 89 46 08 a1 08 b4 47 00 85 c0 59
59 74 12 83 3d 00 b4 47 00 00 75 09 ff 35 0c b4 47
00 ff d0 59 a1 04 b4 47 00 85 c0 74 04 89 30 eb 06
89 35 00 b4 47 00 89 35 04 b4 47 00 83 26 00 5e c3
HOW THE PLUGIN WORKS
Check for a function
or many at once
Plug-in sends the server the opcodes,
architecture, and APIs called by function
BEFORE AND AFTER FIRST
USING FIRST TO ANALYZE FLOKI BOT
TOR SUPPORT
COLLABORATION WITH FLASHPOINT
CUSTOMER SERVICE IS IMPORTANT
TAKEAWAYS
WHAT SHOULD YOU DO?
• There is more to defense than just what happens on your network
• Demand that your information security operation spend time building relationships
with peers
• Demand that your security software supports customized detection
• Snort Rules
• ClamAV Signatures
• IP and domain blacklisting
• Arbitrary IOC tracking and blacklisting
• Ensure you have the visibility and policies necessary to share critical information
with your partners before you reach out for help
• Maneuver yourself in advance into a position that allows for flexibility and speed
when a crisis occurs
Q&A
talosintelligence.com
@talossecurity
@kpyke
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES
Project Aspis – collaboration between Talos and host providers
• Talos provides expertise and resources to identify major threat actors
• Providers potentially save significant costs in fraudulent charges
• Talos gains real world insight into threats on a global scale, helping us
improve detection and prevention, making the internet safer for everyone
CRETE – collaboration between Talos and participating customers
• Talos provides a FirePower NGIPS sensor to deploy inside the customer network
• Talos gathers data about real world network threats and security issues
• Customers receive leading-edge intel to protect their network
AEGIS – information exchange between Talos and participating members
of the security industry
• Open to partners, customers, and members of the security industry
• Collaborative nexus of intelligence sharing in order to provide better
detection and insight into worldwide threats
#RSAC

Weaponizing Intelligence: Interdiction in Today’s Threat Landscape

  • 1.
    SESSION ID:SESSION ID: #RSAC MatthewOlney Weaponizing Intelligence: Interdiction in Today’s Threat Landscape SP01-W11 Manager, Threat Intelligence and Interdiction Cisco Systems @kpyke
  • 2.
    Matthew Olney Talos ThreatIntelligence & Interdiction Group WEAPONIZING INTELLIGENCE INTERDICTION IN TODAY’S THREAT LANDSCAPE
  • 3.
    Matthew Olney Manager ofThreat Intelligence and Interdiction 11 Years with Sourcefire VRT and Cisco Talos Prior to that 10 years in network engineering and security I’m on Twitter @kpyke WHO AM I?
  • 4.
    250+ Full Time Threat IntelResearchers MILLIONS Of Telemetry Agents 4 Global Data Centers 1100+ Threat Traps 100+ Threat Intelligence Partners THREAT INTEL 1.5 MILLION Daily Malware Samples 600 BILLION Daily Email Messages 16 BILLION Daily Web Requests Honeypots Open Source Communities Vulnerability Discovery (Internal) Product Telemetry Internet-Wide Scanning 20 BILLION Threats Blocked INTEL SHARING TALOS INTEL BREAKDOWN Customer Data Sharing Programs Provider Coordination Program Open Source Intel Sharing 3rd Party Programs (MAPP) Industry Sharing Partnerships (ISACs) 500+ Participants
  • 5.
    “Interdiction is amilitary term for the act of delaying, disrupting, or destroying enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area.” Threat Intelligence and Interdiction takes action: • Outside the border of our customer’s networks • To disrupt and degrade actor capability • Using linguists, reverse engineers, incident responders, mathematicians, researchers and developers • Working with law enforcement organizations (LEO), government and industry organizations, hosting providers and other intelligence partners WHAT IS INTERDICTION?
  • 6.
    Easy • ISAC (InformationSharing and Analysis Center) • Industry, National and Multinational CERTs • Internet Service Providers • Individual Researchers and Research Groups • Industry Partners • Competitors (Seriously) Tricky • Web Hosting Providers Strategic • Law Enforcement • Military • Government “I apologize for being a black hole.” – Undisclosed Government Agency WE ARE SUCCESSFUL WITH FRIENDS — NOT TECHNOLOGY
  • 7.
    “It seems likethey gave up after about 4 days of 2-3 orders a day. We have not seen any order attempts since 5/15. Thanks for the quick heads up, getting those C&C IPs into our netflow system stopped them cold.” – Intelligence Partner, Angler Investigation • Legal and economic barriers to cooperation • Narrow profit margins • Limited investment in abuse and security services • But there are costs incurred by hosting malicious actors • LEO interactions • Abuse handling • Bandwidth, engineering, charge-backs Let’s help each other TRICKY: WEB HOSTING PROVIDERS
  • 8.
    INTERDICTION CASE STUDY#1: SAMSAM & JBOSS
  • 9.
    CVE-2007-1036 • “…JBoss doesnot restrict access to the console and web management interfaces…” CVE-2010-0738 • “The JMX-Console web application … performs access control only for the GET and POST methods...” TWO CRITICAL JBOSS CVES
  • 10.
    “João Filho MatosFigueiredo, what did you do?” – João’s mother, probably JEXBOSS
  • 11.
    • Telemetry indicates December,2015 start date • Network-wide ransomware attack • Ransom paid via Bitcoin SAMSAM • Seen in many verticals, but best known for activity in healthcare • Uses ‘Jexboss’ • Multiple Cisco IR engagements • Strong LEO interest 0.7- 1.5BTC BTC/workstation 22BT C Total for all keys
  • 12.
    Preliminary blog post: •Samsam: The Doctor Will See You, After He Pays The Ransom Research: How bad is this JBoss problem? • Full IPv4 scan Found roughly 3.2M IP addresses that behaved in a way suggesting they were vulnerable JBoss servers Express mild concern on social media: TALOS RESPONSE (MARCH)
  • 13.
    Day X • JexBossInvocation & JBossAss backdoor installation X+47 Days • File Upload Installed on web server X+49 Days • Full Webshell installed and CVSDE Executed – Active Directory dump Forensic Timeline Developed By Cisco IR X+73 Days • tunnel.jsp installed allowing IP Tunnel • Elevated privileged user connect via RDP • Recon with Hyena • Likely first use of admin credential X+74 Days • Samsam encryption operation begins EMAIL OF THE YEAR: CISCO IR SHARES CRITICAL INTEL
  • 14.
    • There isa window between shell installation and file encryption • I dramatically fail at math and also manage to underestimate the capabilities and determination of my team. They finished it over the weekend and had the results waiting for me Monday morning. “ACTIONABLE”
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
    Almost 2000 notifications •Intel partners • Sales staff • 20 Talos researchers • 2 Weeks Samples gathered • IR specialists on site • Sample exchange with Follett and intel partners New actors tracked • JBoss status pages • JBoss honeypots Tracking compromised servers STATUS CHECK
  • 20.
    • IR receiveda SAMSAM engagement from an unmarked IP address • Could be SSL on 443 • Or, fairly often, on port 8080 • Run the same play • 2^32 scan for all 443 and 8080 ports displaying vulnerable JBOSS behavior • Scan potentially vulnerable hosts for known backdoors NEW DATA FROM CISCO IR
  • 21.
  • 22.
    • Notified serversnot 100% remediated • Actors continue to attack JBOSS servers • Working with LEO JBOSS – THE SAGA CONTINUES
  • 23.
    Floki Bot Strikes Talos,Flashpoint and FIRST
  • 24.
  • 25.
    IDA Pro FIRST –FIRST-PLUGIN.US Function Identification and Recovery Signature Tool Streamline code research • Prevent duplication of effort • Reduce analysis time • Detect code reuse between malware family Open Beta 133 Users 187,988 Functions annotated
  • 26.
    IDA Pro FIRST SYSTEMOVERVIEW Check for Metadata 56 6A 0C 6A 01 E8 64 AB 00 00 Add Function Metadata Name / Prototype / Comment Update Function Metadata With the most recent version
  • 27.
    sub_401000 -------------------------------------------------- 56 6a 0c6a 01 e8 64 ab 00 00 8b f0 8b 44 24 10 89 46 04 8b 44 24 14 89 46 08 a1 08 b4 47 00 85 c0 59 59 74 12 83 3d 00 b4 47 00 00 75 09 ff 35 0c b4 47 00 ff d0 59 a1 04 b4 47 00 85 c0 74 04 89 30 eb 06 89 35 00 b4 47 00 89 35 04 b4 47 00 83 26 00 5e c3 HOW THE PLUGIN WORKS Check for a function or many at once Plug-in sends the server the opcodes, architecture, and APIs called by function
  • 28.
  • 29.
    USING FIRST TOANALYZE FLOKI BOT
  • 30.
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 33.
  • 34.
    WHAT SHOULD YOUDO? • There is more to defense than just what happens on your network • Demand that your information security operation spend time building relationships with peers • Demand that your security software supports customized detection • Snort Rules • ClamAV Signatures • IP and domain blacklisting • Arbitrary IOC tracking and blacklisting • Ensure you have the visibility and policies necessary to share critical information with your partners before you reach out for help • Maneuver yourself in advance into a position that allows for flexibility and speed when a crisis occurs
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37.
    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES Project Aspis– collaboration between Talos and host providers • Talos provides expertise and resources to identify major threat actors • Providers potentially save significant costs in fraudulent charges • Talos gains real world insight into threats on a global scale, helping us improve detection and prevention, making the internet safer for everyone CRETE – collaboration between Talos and participating customers • Talos provides a FirePower NGIPS sensor to deploy inside the customer network • Talos gathers data about real world network threats and security issues • Customers receive leading-edge intel to protect their network AEGIS – information exchange between Talos and participating members of the security industry • Open to partners, customers, and members of the security industry • Collaborative nexus of intelligence sharing in order to provide better detection and insight into worldwide threats
  • 38.