1. Security Issues and Challenges in
Wireless Networks
Kishore Kothapalli
Bruhadeshwar Bezawada
Center for Security, Theory, and Algorithmic Research
(CSTAR)
International Institute of Information Technology
Hyderabad, INDIA
2. Introduction
Wireless stations, or nodes, communicate over a wireless medium
Networks operating under infrastructure mode e.g., 802.11, 802.16,
Cellular networks
Networks operating with limited or no infrastructural support e.g., ad
hoc networks in AODV mode
Security threats are imminent due to the open nature of
communication
Two main issues: authentication and privacy
Other serious issues: denial-of-service
A categorization is required to understand the issues in each
situation.
3. Introduction – Wireless Technologies
Different technologies have been developed for
different scenarios and requirements
WiFi is technology for Wireless LANs and short range
mobile access networks
WiMAX is technology for last mile broadband
connectivity
Wireless USB is technology for Internet connectivity
on the go
Other technologies like Infrared (TV remotes etc),
Bluetooth (soon to be obsolete) etc are short range
Extreme bandwidth but short range technologies are
Gigabit wireless etc
4. Introduction
Fixed Infrastructure
Base stations that are typically not resource constrained.
Examples: sensor networks, and cellular networks.
Mobility of nodes but not of base stations.
5. Introduction
Ad hoc wireless networks
No infrastructural support.
Nodes also double up as routers.
Mobility of nodes.
Examples laptops/cellphones operating in ad hoc mode.
Image from
www.microsoft.com
7. Introduction
To formalize study and solutions, need good models
for these networks.
Formal model to characterize the properties and
solutions
Models that are close to reality
Still allow for solution design and analysis.
8. Introduction
Solution properties
Light-weight
Have to use battery power wisely.
Other resources, such as storage, are also limited.
Local control
Many cases, only neighbours are known.
Any additional information gathering is expensive.
9. Introduction
Difficulty of modeling wireless networks as opposed to
wired networks:
Transmission
Interference
Resource constraints
Mobility
Physical carrier sensing
10. Outline
Introduction
Models of Wireless Networks
Various Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
Security Issues and Threats at each Layer
Security Solutions
Open Problems
11. Models of Wireless Networks
Unit disk graph model
Given a transmission radius R, nodes u,v are connected
if d(u,v) ≤ R
u
R
v
u'
12. Models of Wireless Networks
Unit disk graph model
Given a transmission radius R, nodes u,v are connected
if d(u,v) ≤ R.
Too simple model – transmission range could be of
arbitrary shape.
R
R
u
u
R
v
u'
13. Packet Radio Network (PRN)
Can handle arbitrary shapes
Widely used
Nodes u, v can communicate directly if they are
within each other's transmission range, rt.
u
v
w
v'
Models of Wireless Networks
14. What is the problem?
Model for interference too simplistic
u
v
w
v'
15. w can still interfere at u
PRN model fails to address certain interference
problems in practice
v
n – 2
s
t
≤ rt
≤ rt
≥ ri
≥ rt
What is the problem?
u
v
w
v'
16. Transmission Range, Interference
Range
Separate values for transmission
range, interference range.
Interference range constant times
bigger than transmission range.
Used in e.g., [Adler and
Scheideler '98], [Kuhn et. al., '04]
Models of Wireless Networks
u
rt
v
w
u'
ri
17. Transmission Range, Interference
Range
Separate values for transmission
range, interference range.
Interference range constant times
bigger than transmission range.
Used in e.g., [Adler and
Scheideler '98], [Kuhn et. al., '04]
What is the problem?
Extension of unit disk model to
handle interference
Models of Wireless Networks
u
rt
v
w
u'
ri
18. Model Based on Cost Function
Gr = (V, Er), set of nodes V, Euclidean distance d(u, v)
c is a cost function on nodes
symmetric: c(u,v) = c(v,u)
[0,1), depends on the environment
c(u,v) [(1 – )•d(u, v), (1 + ) •d(u, v)]
w
u
v
a
b
Edge (u,v) Er
if and only if
c(u,v) ≤ r
19. Transmission and Interference Range
Transmission range rt(P), Interference range, ri(P)
If c(v,w) ri(P), node v can cause interference at node w.
If c(v,w) rt(P) then v is guaranteed to receive the message from w
provided no other node v' with c(v, v') ≤ ri(P) also transmits at the
same time.
w
rt(P)
v'
ri(P)
u
v c(v,w) rt(P)
c(v, v') ri(P)
20. Carrier Sensing
Virtual carrier sensing using RTS/CTS.
Physical Carrier Sensing
Provided by Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) circuit.
Monitor the medium as a function of Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI)
Energy Detection (ED) bit set to 1 if RSSI exceeds a
certain threshold
Has a register to set the threshold in dB
21. Physical Carrier Sensing
Carrier sense transmission (CST) range, rst(T, P)
Carrier sense interference (CSI) range, rsi(T, P)
Beyond the CSI range, sensing is not possible.
Both the ranges grow monotonically in T and P.
w
v
rst(T,P)
v'
v''
rsi(T,P)
c(w,v) rst(T, P)
c(w, v') rsi(T, P)
c(w, v'') rsi(T, P)
22. Outline
Introduction
Models of Wireless Networks
Various Layers and Current Solutions at each layer
Security Issues and Threats at each Layer
Security Solutions
Open Problems
23. Various Layers of Interest – Physical Layer
Physical Layer
802.11 standard supports several data rates between
11 Mbps and 54 Mbps
802.16 support multiple data rates from 2Mbps to 300
Mbps
Several modulation schemes in use and support
different conditions and data rates
AM, FM, PSK, BPSK, QPSK, FDM, OFDM, OFDMA, ...
24. Physical Layer – WiFi
Stands for Wireless Fidelity Range of Technologies
Technology that uses IEEE 802.11 protocol standards
802.11b operates at 2.4 Ghz using DSSS
Has three non-overlapping channels with 11mbps max
802.11g operates at 2.4 Ghz resp, with 20 Mhz, OFDM
Achieves 54 Mbps and inter-operable to 802.11b
802.11a operates at 5GHz using OFDM
About 4-8 (depending on country) non-overlapping
channels
Bandwidth achieved is 54 Mbps
25. Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer
MAC Layer
Medium access control is an important requirement.
Collision detection (CSMA/CD) not possible unlike wired
networks.
Hence using Collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
Functions of MAC
Scanning, Authentication, Association, WEP, RTS/CTS,
Power Save options, Fragmentation
26. Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer
802.11 MAC
Use Physical Carrier Sensing to sense for a free
medium.
Explicit ACKs to indicate reception of packet.
Results in the problem of hidden node.
Use Virtual Carrier Sensing using RTS/CTS.
DATA
DATA
27. Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer
Virtual Carrier Sensing cannot solve the exposed node
problem.
A and D cannot succeed simultaneously.
DATA
DATA
A
B
C
D
28. Other MAC Techniques
Cell phone networks
Node to base station and vice-versa.
Fixed frequency for communication pair (FDD).
Separate frequencies for each pair.
Different technologies Analog/CDMA/GSM support
different number of simultaneous communications per
band.
802.16 has a Receive/Grant model which is basically
TDD (Time-Division Duplexing)
More efficient than FDD.
29. MAC Layer
More recent solutions address issues such as,
especially with respect to ad hoc networks
self-stabilization
Dynamism
Efficiency
Fairness
30. Various Layers – Network Layer
Route packets in the network.
Routing in infrastructure based networks is similar to
IP routing
All the base stations have a wired IP interface which is
used by the routers/switches to forward data
Issues like handoffs are handled through techniques
like Mobile IP or Cellular Handoffs or Soft-handoffs as
done in Mobile WiMAX
Now, for network without infrastructure the problem is
difficult as the routes are transient
31. Various Layers – Network Layer
Ad hoc networks
No easy solutions but different proposals exist.
Two kinds: proactive and reactive
Proactive: Maintain lot of state, proactive updates.
Example: DSDV, DSR
Reactive: Minimal state, react to changes.
Example: AODV
32. Other Important Layers
Transport layer
This is important layer especially since the wireless
medium suffers from high bit-error rate and collisions.
To offset this wireless technologies rely less on TCP’s
reliability mechanism
This is mostly handled at physical layer through
techniques like FEC and other error correcting codes
Application Layer
Notion of an application layer protocol
Email/Web/Games/SMS/MMS
33. Outline
Introduction
Models of Wireless Networks
Various Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
Security Issues and Threats at each Layer
Security Solutions
Open Problems
34. Threats in Present Solutions – MAC Layer
Denial of Service
Can hog the medium by sending noise continuously.
Can be done without draining the power of the
adversary.
Depends on physical carrier sensing threshold.
z
A
35. Threats in Present Solutions – MAC Layer
802.11 standard uses Access Control Lists for
admission control.
If MAC address not in the list, then the node is denied
access.
But easy to spoof MAC addresses.
00:1A:A0:FD:FF:2E
00:0C:76:7F:DF:49
00:13:D3:07:2F:A8
00:2F:B8:77:EA:B5
36. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Ad hoc networks
Network layer
Denial-of-service attacks
Broadcast nature of communication
Packet dropping
Route discovery failure in ad hoc network
Packet rerouting
37. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Denial-of-service
Easy to mount in wireless network protocols.
One strategically adversary can generally disable a
dense part of the network.
z
A
Nodes Disrupting Routes
Source
Source
Destination
38. Can simply engage in conversation and drain battery
power of other nodes – power exhaustion attack
Send lot of RREQ messages but never use the routes.
z
A
RREQ(a)
RREQ(b)
RREQ(c)
….
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
39. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Broadcast nature of communication
Each message can be received by all nodes in the
transmission range
Packet sniffing is a lot easier than in wired networks.
Poses a data privacy issue
s
t
A
40. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Route discovery in ad hoc networks
AODV discovers route by RREQ/RREP.
Few adversarial nodes can fail route discovery.
Difficult to detect route discovery failures.
Also vulnerable to RREP replays.
RREQ
RREQ
41. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Packet dropping
Wired networks can monitor packet drops reasonably
Such mechanisms are resource intensive for wireless
networks
AODV has timeouts but no theoretical solutions
Difficult to distinguish packet drops, say RREQs, from
non-existence of route itself
Nodes some times behave selfishly to preserve
resources
42. Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
Packet rerouting – also known as data plane attacks.
Attacker reveals paths but does not forward data along
these paths.
Control plane measures do not suffice.
Difficult to trace in wired networks also [Gouda, 2007].
s
t
43. Application Layer
Easy to infect mobile devices.
Rerouting content through the base station poses
privacy issues.
Bluetooth networks and ad hoc networks do not have a
base station facility.
Contrast with wired networks with firewalls, filters,
sandboxes.
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
44. Outline
Introduction
Models of Wireless Networks
Various Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
Security Issues and Threats at each Layer
Security Solutions
Open Problems
45. Security Solutions
Requirements
Need solutions that do not add any perceivable burden
Cryptography can help
Public key solutions
Public key operations about 1000 times slow compared to symmetric key
operations.
Cost of SHA-1 = 2 microseconds
Cost of RSA signature verification = order of millisec
Symmetric key solutions for privacy and authentication
Issue: How to distribute and manage keys?
46. Security Solutions for 802.11 Networks
Previous WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) based on
RC4 is prone to attacks
Privacy is not guaranteed as the key streams could be
easily recovered
Weaknesses in RC4 are well documented
Authentication is weak as well due to weak encryption
technique
Challenge-response using pre-shared keys is prone to
attacks if encryption is weak
47. Previous WEP Solution using RC4
RC4 is a Vernam Cipher meaning primary operations are XOR with pseudo-random bytes
Per-packet encryption key is 24-bit IV concatenated to a pre-shared key
Integrity Check Vector (ICV) is CRC-32 over plain-text (used as Message Authentication Code)
Data and ICV are encrypted using per-packet encryption key
Problem
RC4 is weak (as the IV is reused) and can allow an attacker to get the key stream used
The ICV can enable one to check the validity of the key stream recovered
802.11 Hdr Data
802.11 Hdr Data
IV ICV
Encapsulate Decapsulate
48. WEP Authentication Model
WEP Authentication Based on RC4
Authentication key is distributed out-of-band
Access Point generates a randomly generated challenge
Station encrypts challenge using pre-shared secret
Problem: Challenge-responses of valid users can be recorded and key stream can
be recovered due to RC4 working
Attacker can use the keys to encrypt any future challenges
Challenge (Nonce)
Response (Nonce RC4 encrypted under shared key)
Wireless
Node
AP
Shared secret distributed out of band
Decrypted nonce OK?
49. Security Solution for 802.11 Networks:
802.11i Model
Solution Requirements
Mutual authentication
Scalable key management for large networks
Central authorization and accounting
Support for extended authentication like smart cards
Key Management Issues
Need to dynamically manage keys to avoid manual
reconfiguration difficulties especially for large networks
50. Current Standard: 802.11i or WPA2
802.1X for Authentication Based on EAP (Extensible
Authentication Protocol)
Port based authentication
Access denied if port authentication fails
CCMP (Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol) using AES
for confidentiality, integrity and origin authentication
Dynamic Key Management
53. 802.1X Key Management
LEAP use dynamically generated WEP keys to secure authentication data
EAP-TLS –Station and Access Point use public-key certificates through a
TLS tunnel
Session key can be exchanged
Mutual-authentication as both parties have digital certificates
EAP-TTLS and PEAP –Only server-side certificate is needed
Simplifies implementation where certificate management is difficult
EAP-GSS where the authenticator is required to be in contact with a KDC
55. Key Derivation in 802.11i
At the end of EAPOL: Station and Server share a Master Key: MK (E.g., Using EAP-
TLS)
Both the Station and the AP derive a new key, called the Pairwise Master Key (PMK),
from the Master Key.
Radius Server moves PMK to AP
A 4−way handshake between the station and the AP to derive, bind, and verify a
Pairwise Transient Key (PTK).
Key Confirmation Key (KCK), as the name implies, is used to prove the posession of
the PMK
Key Encryption Key (KEK) is used to distributed the Group Transient Key (GTK)
Temporal Key 1 & 2 (TK1/TK2) are used for encryption.
The KEK is used to send the Group Transient Key (GTK) from AP to the station
The GTK is a shared key among all stations connected to the same authenticator
(AP), to secure multicast/broadcast traffic
57. Security Solutions for 802.16 Networks
802.16 or popularly WiMAX use X.509 certificates for authentication
Subscriber Station authentication using X.509 certificate
Establish security association (SAID)
Authentication Key (AK) exchange
AK is encrypted using public key of SS
Authentication is completed when both SS and BS verify possession AK
AK is used to exchange the TEK (Traffic encryption key)
Base station generates TEK randomly and encrypts using KEK
generated from AK
802.16 uses AES in CCM mode for privacy
Mutual authentication is possible through EAP-TLS etc (802.16e)
58. Security in Ad Hoc Mode
Ad hoc networks cannot use RADIUS type authentication
Problem: if RADIUS type authentication is used, every station will need to
store every other station’s credentials
Moreover, authentication will have to be using EAP-TLS which is
computationally intensive
Problem: mutual authentication is trouble some
Other Security Requirements
Cryptographic mechanisms for confidentiality
Key establishment for confidentiality
Public-key management to prevent replacement of keys
Symmetric key management to protect from compromise
Denial-of-service resistance in contention mechanisms at MAC layer
59. Security in Ad Hoc Networks
Security Mechanisms
Pro-active : Prevents an attacker from launching an attack say by
using cryptographic mechanisms
Requirement is establishment of necessary cryptographic material
E.g., Routing Attacks
Reactive : Relies on detection and mitigation of attacks
Benign behaviour is defined and behaviour analysis is done to detect
malicious behaviour
E.g., Packet Forwarding attacks
60. Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks- An
Overview
Key management – Manage a set of secure communication
channels so that
Use as few keys as possible
Avoid centralized infrastructure during sessions
Minimal cryptographic/message overhead
Ensure “reasonable” security
Two scenarios
Broadcast security
Peer-to-peer security
61. Security Solutions – Broadcast Security
Base station and a set of nodes.
Base station sends updates to all the nodes using broadcast.
N = number of satellite nodes
Authentication and privacy is required
62. Trivial Solution
Each node shares a key with the base station.
Storage is O(N) for sender and does not scale well
Authentication is expensive especially if messages need to be
broadcast
K6
K8
K1
K7
K4
K2
K5
K3
K1, K2, K3, K4,
K5, K6, K7, K8
63. Broadcast Security
Maintain a set O(log N)
Each satellite node gets a subset of log n keys of S.
Privacy: use XOR of keys to communicate with the user
Authentication: sender adds MAC using all its keys
Each node verifies signatures that can be generated using its subset of
keys
K1, K2, K3,
K4, K5
MACK1(M) MACK2(M) MACK5(M)
MACK4(M)
MACK3(M)
Message
K1, K3, K5
K1, K2, K4
K1, K3, K4
K2, K5, K4
K1, K2, K5
K1, K2, K3
K1, K5, K4
K2, K5, K3
64. Broadcast Security
Collusion is an issue
A larger pool of keys can be selected
For N users O(log N) keys can give good results
Scales well as the sender only needs to give a new subset of keys to a new user
K1, K3, K5
K1, K2, K4
K1, K3, K4
K2, K5, K4
K1, K2, K5
K1, K2, K3
K1, K5, K4
K2, K5, K3
K1, K2, K3
K4, K5, K6,
K7, K8
65. Security Solutions
Privacy in a Peer-to-peer situation
Public-key cryptography can be of use but expensive
Key distribution is a major hurdle given that communicating parties are
not known in advance
Anyone can communicate with any one
Trivial Solution: one unique key per pair of users work
Expensive
Not scalable if new user gets added
Revocation is little more tricky
Scalable approach : key pre-distribution
66. Point-to-Point Security
Point-to-Point security
Need a key for every pair of nodes in an n node network.
Trivial solution requires storing n – 1 keys at every node.
Not scalable on the space usage.
A B
C
D
KAB
KAD
KAC
KBC
KCD
KBD
KCD
C-D
KBD
B-D
KBC
B-C
KAD
A-D
KAC
A-C
KAB
A-B
67. Point-to-Point Security
Random Key Pre-distribution
A B
C
D
Pool of Keys
K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6,
K7, K8, K9, K10, K11,
K12, K13, K14, K15
K1, K2, K5, K6 K3, K9, K5, K11
K12, K11, K13, K15
K1, K15, K9, K13
K5
K11
K1+K15+K13
K1
E
F
G
K1, K5, K9, K13
G
K3, K5, K7, K9, K15
F
K10, K4, K5, K8, K7
E
K1, K15, K9, K13
D
K12, K11, K13, K15
C
K3, K9, K5, K11
B
K1, K2, K5, K6
A
68. Point-to-Point Security
Issues in Random Key Pre-Distribution
May need Intermediaries for key establishment
Storage is High
Experimental: 250 keys out of 10,000 keys may be necessary
An active adversary is dangerous
Collusion effect is unknown due to the randomness of key
distribution
Might require privacy mechanisms to hide key sharing patterns
Revocation issues exist
Probabilistic arguments for size of key storage and connectivity
possible
Practice proves otherwise, especially for sparse graphs
69. Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Multi-path Key Establishment
A B
C
D
Pool of Keys
K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6,
K7, K8, K9, K10, K11,
K12, K13, K14, K15
K1, K2, K5, K6 K3, K9, K5, K11
K12, K11, K13, K15
K1, K15, K9, K13
K5
K11
K1+K15+K13
K1
E
F
G
K1, K5, K9, K13
G
K3, K5, K7, K9, K15
F
K10, K4, K5, K8, K7
E
K1, K15, K9, K13
D
K12, K11, K13, K15
C
K3, K9, K5, K11
B
K1, K2, K5, K6
A
72. Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Deterministic Solution –Square Grid
[0,0
]
[0,1] [0,2] [0,3]
[1,0]
[2,0]
[3,0]
Direct Secrets
Some Solutions –Key Establishment
73. Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Deterministic Solution –Square Grid
[0,0] [0,1] [0,2] [0,3]
[1,0] [1,2]
[2,0]
[3,0]
[2,2]
[3,2]
[2,3]
[2,1]
Communication
Along Same
Row/Column
Some Solutions –Key Establishment
74. Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Deterministic Solution –Square Grid
[0,0] [0,1] [0,2] [0,3]
[1,0] [1,2]
[2,0]
[3,0]
[2,2]
[3,2]
Kg(0,2)
Kg(2,0)
[2,3]
[2,1]
Communication
Among Users of
Different
Rows/Columns
Some Solutions –Key Establishment
75. Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Square Grid Features and Issues
Mobility has no effect on key establishment –always guaranteed by
design
Failure tolerant –failure of links hardly matters
Storage is high, but comparable to random KPS
Collusion resistance is slightly weak
Two users are sufficient to compromise session key
Scalability is weak as the grid size is fixed before hand
Optimizations possible, by choosing higher grid size and allowing for
some additional users
Some Solutions –Key Establishment
76. Security Solutions
Can reduce storage further by considering a k – dimensional grid
User belongs to multiple grids with lower dimension: n1/k
number of keys stored per node decreases to kn1/k.
At k = log n, this reduces to log n.
But collusion resistance decreases with increasing k
Best case storage is around: 12log2n
Lower values are possible but multiplication constant is higher
77. Security Solutions-Hierarchical Solution
B D
A C
•Stands for any P2P key
distribution
•E.g. (A,C) could be
given a unique shared
key
•Better key distributions
are possible
78. Security Solutions-Hierarchical Solution for
Reducing Storage
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Nodes Treated
as Single Entity
• E.g. (A,B) and (C,D) could share a common key
• If B, needs to communicate with C, this key can be used
• Collusion resistance is an issue
79. Outline
Introduction
Models of Wireless Networks
Various Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
Security Issues and Threats at each Layer
Security Solutions
Open Problems
80. Open Problems
Problem 1: Secure Admission Control
For fixed infrastructure networks, how to decide admitting a new node
into the network?
EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS are expensive in terms of computation and do not
work well in ad hoc mode
Access points should be able to handle more decisions to enable easy
roaming
Need for a scalable but practical solution for admission control especially for
roaming accessibility
If key management is used dynamics and storage become issues
81. Open Problems
Problem 2 : Application Layer Security for fixed infrastructure networks
Equivalent notions of wired networks.
Require Light-weight sand boxing mechanisms
Privacy-preserving light-weight content filtering techniques
Existing solutions: J2ME KVM, DownloadFun, QualComm
BREW
82. Open Problems
Problem 3: Real-time Cell Communication Security
Key management solutions may not work due to real-
time voice data
Hacking/tapping cell phones is possible depending on
the encoding scheme used
83. Open Problems 4
Certificate mechanisms for nodes
Certificates in wired networks are
well understood.
Users typically have better user
interfaces e.g., PC Monitor, allowing
them to examine things like
certificates
Certificate verification/validation is
tolerable on desktops and even
laptops.
84. Open Problem 4
Problem: Not the same for mobile users say, cell phones
Integrating such features into a cell-phone is difficult
Expensive to verify certificates due long certification path.
Solution more difficult for devices with no display or limited display or
regular monitoring of the device, such as sensors.
Need a different way of handling certificates.
85. Conclusions
Situations are more complex in wireless networks, even with
infrastructural support.
Threats exist at various layers of operation.
Present solutions to address these threats are not scalable or
not strong enough.
Simple key management solutions can help.
But not always.
Still, lots of interesting and open issues to be solved.
87. References
Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Levente, Buttyan and Srdan Capkun “The Quest for
Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, ACM MobiHOC 2001
Laurent Eschenauer and Virgil D. Gligor “A Key Management Scheme for
Distributed Sensor Networks” ACM CCS 2002
Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song “Random Key Predistribution
Schemes for Sensor Networks” IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2003
S.S.Kulkarni, M.G.Gouda and A.Arora “Secret Instantiation in Ad Hoc Networks”
Special Issue of Elsevier Journal of Computer Communication on Dependable
Wireless Sensor Networks, 2006
Amitanand S. Aiyer, Lorenzo Alvisi, Mohamed G. Gouda “Key Grids: A Protocol
Family for Assigning Symmetric Keys” IEEE International Conference on
Network Protocols, 2006
B.Bruhadeshwar and Sandeep Kulkarni “An Optimal Symmetric Secret Distribution
for Secure Communication” Michigan State University Technical Report 2008 MSU-
TR-08-196
88. References
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Kishore Kothapalli, Christian Scheideler, Melih Onus, Andréa W. Richa: Constant density
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Edmund L. Wong, Praveen Balasubramanian, Lorenzo Alvisi, Mohamed G. Gouda, Vitaly
Shmatikov: Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity. PODC 2007:
147-156
Ran Canetti, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song and Doug Tygar “The TESLA Broadcast
Authenitcation Protocol” RSA Cryptobytes 2002
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